

AN APPRAISAL OF VEDĀNTA IN THE LIGHT OF
MODERN INDIAN THOUGHT

by

VINITA WANCHOO

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF ALLAHABAD
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PREFACE

Arthur Koestler in *The Lotus and the Robot* makes a provocative statement: each of the great eastern religions represent a way of life rather than a self-contained metaphysical doctrine; and when that way of life is altered by changing circumstances, as in India, the spiritual values crumble away. The industrial revolution in England caused a more violent uprooting of traditions than India is experiencing at present; yet the Church of England weathered the storm, while Hinduism is foundering. The only living religious tradition in India in the last thousand years was carried on by exceptional individuals—by its great swamis, from Śaṅkara to Vinoba. But their contributions lay more in their personality than in their teaching, and they rarely left written works of value on which their successors could build.

The theme of this dissertation was suggested by this remark on the present-day Indian scene. This is a much repeated criticism. In the nineteenth century there seemed to be stronger reasons for such prophecies of doom because many evil social and religious practices and institutions adhering to Hinduism were in need of reform and were just beginning to be questioned; and the philosophical bases of Hinduism had yet to be restudied and reinterpreted for the modern age. There seems less reason in the latter half of the twentieth century, when both the external form and the internal spirit have been well understood, to continue to prophesy the death of a religion which has amply demonstrated not merely its ability to survive but also its ability to incorporate new practices and ideas with ease, and thus to take on new forms. It was the Orientalists who first pointed out that Hinduism contains the highest essence of spirituality and ethics, were it but to throw off the evil accretions of centuries veiling its essential nature. The researches of Indian scholars have amply proved the truth of this conviction.

In the revolutionary transformation through which India is passing today, the

critical question relates to the foundation on which to build the super-structure of her new society. There are some who would like to make the future India only in the mould of science, economics or politics, but many thoughtful students of the transition in India feel that this is a very incomplete foundation. No nation can make a complete break with its past and India's history shows the all-shadowing influence of religion. Therefore, however modified, religion must remain the foundation of the future society and may be ignored only at the risk of distortion.

Even when this is granted a further difference of opinion arises. Some like K. M. Pannikar would have it that the strength of Hinduism lies in its practical and institutional aspect and they castigate idealistic philosophy for having supposedly vitiated Hinduism and made the Indian people weak. This evaluation is far from the truth. While avoiding the tendency of some apologists of religion to deny the influence of external forms and social appendages of religion, the balanced view must be that it is the philosophy which forms the heart of a religion and the quality of that philosophy is what ultimately sustains religion. And it is a very superficial view which dismisses the "idealistic view" as not fit for the modern age. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the possibilities of Vedānta darśana from this point of view, since of all the āstika darśanas Vedānta is the only living philosophy of India. But, there being many variations of the Vedānta darśana, it became necessary to confine attention to the systems of Advaita and four Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas.

The study was begun with the examination of the four puruṣārthas which are part and parcel of Vedānta. The meaning of artha, dharma, kāma has been changing according to the theory of yuga-dharma and dharma was subordinated to paramārtha or mokṣa. Attempts to modify and reform these values were made in every age, and such protests against contemporary values emanated as much from within Vedāntic schools as from the nāstika schools. The modern age is, therefore, repeating the process of history in questioning the traditional values, with a view to either purifying or replacing them.

The second chapter makes a statement of the Vedānta ideal of man, world and God as gleaned by a study of the texts of the three Prasthānas and the works of the

Vedantacaryas. The doctrinal differences of the latter do not make a general statement of this type impossible. The crowning point of the ideal of life is liberation—the attainment of sarvatmabhava, amṛta, abhaya and anand is the end of idealistic perfectionism.

A statement of this kind must be followed by consideration of the long-standing charge against Indian philosophy in general and Vedānta in particular, of world and life negation. It is said that both in theory and practice Vedānta has encouraged escapism—a flight from a life of usefulness in the world. A detailed examination of the grounds of this charge—intellectualism, pantheism, mysticism, doctrines of mokṣa, māya, karma and punarjanma—has been made on admittedly pragmatic and psychological lines. Since the ramifications and implications of philosophical doctrines cannot be disentangled from many other historical causes, the conclusion must be that it is not the doctrines but the weakening of social, economic and political organizations of society which gave rise to the so called "escapism" constituted by passivity, asceticism, impractical character of present day Indian culture. Economic determinism of history has a modicum of truth in it—the apparently depressing philosophy of Vedānta is not the cause but the effect of non-philosophic factors operating in history. A further implication of this is that an improvement of the latter would change the psychological climate and the pragmatic role of this philosophy in the direction of whatever amount of world and life affirmation is necessary in a properly balanced view of life.

Reliance on rationalism in its scientific form is the characteristic feature of contemporary life. In its very short history of the last four hundred years in the west scientific society has passed through many phases. It started with utmost confidence in its power to explain the world theoretically and to solve all human problems practically. There is the phenomenon of the gradual retreat of religion in the face of aggressive science, first in regard to knowledge of the world, then in regard to man's place in the world and lastly in regard to soul or spirit in man and the meaning of God in human life. The religious world-view was replaced by faith in scientific secular humanism as the panacea of all ills. The second phase saw the rise of doubts in regard to powers of science, moderation of its claim of single-handed human and social reconstruction and

the claim to serve as the sole basis of progress. But this doubt did not by any means lead to abandonment of the scientific view of life. The third phase reveals that remedies for failure of science are sought to be applied in the form of more science and not less science.

The second section of chapter four deals with the coming of science to India. The impact of science, rationalism, secularism and humanism has produced as vast upheavals in Indian life and religion as it did in the west, though the stages pointed out above are not so clearly discernible and are rather compressed. Furthermore, the Vedānta theory of world and society is not as rigid as the Christian world-view and the long-drawn out battle of science and religion was not repeated in India. The conflict of the spiritual and scientific attitudes is not at doctrinal level, but in the application of science and rationalism to social and economic institutions. These facts bring out the shortcoming of the criticism given at the beginning of this preface. Historical indications point to the conclusion that as Christianity in the west, so Hinduism in India will emerge out of its encounter with science widely transformed but not vitally wounded. And this new religion will lay claim to be a better foundation of life than exclusive science.

The historical statement has been followed up by an examination of the scientific meaning of progress, in the fifth chapter. It has been argued that science treats progress as a purely historical phenomenon and thus fails to comprehend its trans-historical or eternal meaning. Connected with this is the mistake in regard to the subject of progress—science emphasises society as a real entity over and above its parts, and, inspite of the importance given to individual personality, ends in subordinating that personality to the ends of the whole. It must be corrected by making the individual the pivot of social progress. But this will not be of much use unless the conception of man is taken beyond the physical, mental or social limits to include the religious meaning of the individual. The self-transcending character in man is the proof of his nature as spirit. Therefore, the criterion of progress cannot be merely specifically economic or even generally material, but spiritual—not in the limited meaning of ethico-cultural perfection, but in the religious meaning of realization of spirit

within.

The battle is carried into the camp of science, and its limitation in theory and practice revealed. The outstanding feature of the scientific age is unfreedom. Theoretically and practically, materialistic mechanism leads to human determinism, in spite of efforts to prove the contrary. And the quantitative explanation of life and world is a "one-eyed and colour-blind" view which distorts their meaning. The most serious deficiency of science consists in its inability to validate or to achieve all values of human life. Thus it fails in its claim to serve as a complete philosophy of life and is in urgent need of a darsana to give a final understanding of ultimate issues, without which human life is lacking in the depth and width which constitutes its every humanity.

In the sixth chapter the possibilities of Vedānta as a philosophy of life in the age of science, rationalism and humanism have been considered. This procedure might be objected to on the ground that Vedānta is Mokṣa-Śāstra and may not be reduced to a social philosophy. But the point of view adopted in this dissertation is that a philosophy which deals only in the transcendental and fails to account for or to operate in the empirical is no true philosophy. Nor need it be granted that Vedānta has traditionally left world and society to take care of themselves. Whatever the siddhanta-bheda among different Vedāntas might have been on the relation of dharma and mokṣa, the former was accepted as the principle of life in the world. There is, therefore, nothing illegitimate in the attempt to discover the outlines of a new yuga-dharma in Vedānta, and the principles of this dharma must serve as guides for man's life in the world. The Neo-Vedāntins take the stand that there is no distortion of the nature of Vedānta in considering its social philosophy and pronouncements on empirical man and his humanistic values.

All Neo-Vedāntins have argued that Vedānta rather than secular humanism is true humanism, since it makes spirituality the basis of individual and social life. It corrects science on a vital point by emphasising the dual nature of man as body and spirit. The human problem is the continuing obscuration of man's nature of spirit and its revelation is the discovery of true individuality. Science makes man wholly

determined, but Vedānta brings out the fact of both bondage and freedom—bondage in so far as man is governed by nature and freedom in so far as man listens to the call of spirit. Realization of this spirit is true freedom, in which both good and evil end in the condition of perfection. Such a condition is to be attained by an all-sided discipline—balance of contemplative and active life and integration of jnana, karma and bhakti, ending in the total integration of man. This occurs not by mere knowledge of scientific or religious truths but by a direct encounter with reality. Intellect is a necessary means to the end of intuition of reality. The nature of this Sacchidanand reality is a sufficient ground and guarantee for attainment of highest human values. Nor need one jib at the idea of transcendence of all values and of specifically moral values in that reality. Vedānta proclaims transcendence by way of completion or perfection and not by way of cancellation of relative values.

The essence of the social philosophy of Vedānta lies in the principles of vyavahāra discovered in it. The analysis of the Neo-Vedāntins has made explicit the implicit principles of a truly humanistic social ethics—equality, freedom and unity are the results of application of Vedānta to individual and social life, as fully as they may be discovered in any scientific philosophy. This is also the answer to the original criticism—"Universal Religion" or new Hinduism can admirably supply the needs of modern India, when this practical Vedānta is no longer confined to a few leading thinkers but permeates the mind of the masses, as it is bound to do sooner or later.

The feasibility of Vedānta was argued from the pragmatic and psychological point of view, in the third chapter, but the question of logical validity cannot be set aside. A Vedānta darśana which might serve as a satisfactory philosophy of life must be free from logical contradictions but not narrowly coherent. It must cover the nature of reality, world, man, conduct and the end of life in a consistent manner. In the seventh chapter it has been argued that the classical debate on the Saguna and Nirguna suggests the method of synthesis of the two. The theistic Neo-Vedāntins have retained both conceptions but instead of providing a logical synthesis their's is merely a practical or emotional synthesis. And Aurobindo's synthesis is only achieved in the infinite logic of the multiposed reality. Radhakrishnan's synthesis is the most

satisfactory: he avoids the meaning of unreality attached to the Advaita conception of Isvara, making the Saguna a real manifestation of one of the infinite possibilities of the Nirguna.

Advaita darsana establishes Brahmavada on the foundation of Mayavada. All Neo-Vedantins have emphasised the positive meaning of Maya that "All this is nothing but Brahma." The classical doctrine of Maya as anirvacaniya and mithya means relative reality and not unreality. And relativity is supported by the human experience of levels of being and knowledge. This relative creation is called a vivarta, but the traditional opposition with parināma has not been accepted—Mayavada allows scope for both. It is neither idealism nor realism but a higher position in which the truths of both have been reconciled.

To maintain the vyāvaharika sattā of the world a comprehensive philosophy of conduct must be worked out. Traditional sammucayavāda is true in spirit, only it is not wide enough. The idea of jñāna-sādhanā as peculiarly monistic and karma and bhakti sādhanās as dualistic cannot be sustained. The transcendental reality is monistic but the empirical approach to it through whatever sādhanā is dualistic, nor does this contradict the non-dual experience. Integral yoga of Neo-Vedānta is a well-balanced philosophy of conduct, and points to the reality of self which is undergoing the discipline of life. The argument of classical and modern theists has not been accepted that only the ontological and separate existence of individual self preserves its reality. Any form of unity-in-difference jeopardises the oneness of the Absolute. A thing may be temporary yet real. The metaphysic of Īsvara as one actualisation of the Absolute's possibilities, creating a world of selves and objects and interpenetrating with it until the spiritualised individual and world merge in God and God lapses back into the Absolute, preserves the truth of the individual self without insisting on its independent reality in the ontological sense. The end cannot be depicted merely in terms of jīvana or videha muktis. All Neo-Vedāntins have gone beyond this classical debate since both doctrines are individualistic or forms of jīva-muktis. The conclusion of sarva-mukti which was sought to be avoided by Advaita philosophers in the past, is the true doctrine of the end. A newer and more comprehensive interpretation of the

jivan mukti siddhanta in the metaphysic of God and world supported above enables one to validly reach the conclusion that not individual salvation but world-redemption or cosmic yoga must be the logical consequence of the realization of Advitiya Brahma. And this end of individual and universal perfection meets all theoretical and practical needs of a scientific-humanistic age and is also worthy to serve as its highest ideal.

To Dr. S. Datta, Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Allahabad, I express my deep gratitude, for without his constant encouragement and helpful suggestions this dissertation would not have been completed.

V. Wanchoo

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Upa.	. . .	Aitreya Upaniṣad.
A. V.	. . .	Atharva-Veda.
B. G.	. . .	Bhagavadgita.
B. P.	. . .	Bhagavat Purana.
Bṛ. Upa.	. . .	Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.
Chān. Upa.	. . .	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
C. I. P.	. . .	Contemporary Indian Philosophy, eds. Radhakrishnan & Muirhead.
D. N.	. . .	Dīggha Nikāya.
D. S.	. . .	Dharma-Śāstra.
E. R. E.	. . .	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. James Hastings.
Kauśī. Upa.	. . .	Kauśītaki Upaniṣad.
Maṇḍū. Upa.	. . .	Maṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.
M. B.	. . .	Mahābhārata.
M. N.	. . .	Majjhima Nikāya.
M. S.	. . .	Manu-Smṛti.
Maṇḍ. Upa.	. . .	Maṇḍaka Upaniṣad.
R. B.	. . .	Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya.
R. V.	. . .	Ṛg-Veda.
S. B.	. . .	Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya.
S. B. E.	. . .	Sacred Books of the East.
Taitti. Upa.	. . .	Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

CHAPTER I

TRADITIONAL VALUES AND THE PROTESTANT ATTITUDE

The Nature of Tradition

The primary factor in the formation of a unified society is tradition, a more or less rich store of memories of beliefs and practices, expanding under the will of the members of that society to make use of their social inheritance. It is defined as "that which is transmitted" in one way or another. It includes besides ways of thinking and acting, those of the social institutions which are inspired and governed by the central traditional doctrine. It may be equated to the very civilization of a people if the products of that civilization are creations and representations of a commonly held world outlook of that people. The action and reaction of tradition and society means that the former moulds the individual and social behaviour patterns and is, in turn, moulded under the dual pressure of internal evolution and the socio-physical environment. Since tradition is the sum of ideas, habits and institutions handed down from one generation to another it constitutes the principle of continuity by which the achievements of the by-gone generations are transmitted to the coming ones.

The "spirituality" of the Indian tradition is a notion which has become almost axiomatic both in the world of scholarship and the thinking of the common man. Thus "religion is the master passion of the Hindu mind"¹ and India is "the motherland of religion."² And religion is important not only in its external practices and beliefs, which are changeable factors, but as a trait of Indian disposition amounting, as some would insist, almost to an instinct. It has offered an explanation of life's meaning, hope and solace in the face of its sorrows, satisfying to the people. Also, throughout its history, the spirituality of religion has neither been suppressed nor over-laid nor

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 20.

2. F. Younghusband, *Dawn in India*, p. 223.

made subsidiary to any other principle of life; it has always appeared as the guiding motive and determining element of internal and external life. India has no monopoly of "spirituality" but so marked is this characteristic of its tradition that a contrast has been made between India and the rest of the world.

As in the case of all oft-repeated axioms, the full meaning and implication of this axiomatic spirituality also tends to disappear from our sight. This bent of the national world-view raised no doubts before, but in present times "Is the Indian tradition spiritual or not?" is an important topic of debate. Apart from those who, concentrating on the outer forms of religion, find Hinduism to be irrational, materialistic, polytheistic and idolatrous paganism, dismissing its metaphysics as mere "obfuscating reason,"¹ others of a more thoughtful turn of mind, finding the spiritual quality of the religious tradition over-stressed at the cost of other characteristics, tend to question or to deny it altogether.

This raises the necessity of defining the meaning of spirituality. Rationally understood, it is some high passion of effort of emotion, will and reason directed towards the end of perfection of the mental and vital ego or, at most, its subservience to the communal ego, which is still a finite and non-permanent end.² Indian spirituality with its "unique genius for grasping and expounding the realities behind the phenomenal world and the inner most meaning of life"³ points out that spirit is greater than body, life or mind. Every nation and individual has a certain philosophy of life and the central idea of the Hindu tradition is "mokṣa." All men seek happiness, but, rightly or wrongly, Hinduism holds that every happiness of this or the other world is bondage, being subject to the natural law of ending. Such sensuous experience of happiness has underlying it a never-ending spiritual bliss, the experience of which is recorded in the Vedas and attained in different degrees by the spiritually wise, through the ages. Man, living at many different levels as an individual personality, is not the centre of the universe, however perfected. The undoing of his limited selfhood or "un-selfishness" is the main feature of this ideal. So the important thing is the

1. William Archer quoted by J. Woodroffe in *Is India Civilized?*, p. 124.

2. Aurebindo, *The Foundations of Indian Culture*, p. 74.

3. William Archer, *loc. cit.*

subjective development of the soul according to its nature (swadharma), to the point where it becomes independent of its material, vital and mental environment. This is the goal of self-conquest (jitendriya), self-rule (swaraja-siddhi), a total change of the plane of consciousness, a real government over the limited self by the universal self, theologically termed God, in all planes, a freedom ending in liberation.

That this was not merely a fanciful or academic ideal is proved by the fact that in India it was made an object of wide-scale experimentation, meditation and discipline. There is difference of opinion as to the attainability of the goal "here and now" (jivana mukti), but what matters is the deliberate choice of it as a worthy ideal and the persistent striving to attain it. Fullest recognition was accorded to the man who having lived fully in the world, forsook the chains of worldly interests and led a life of detachment, i. e., passed on from the secular to the spiritual life. Not only was he not obstructed, but was actively helped and supported by society in living up to his ideal. Though no longer regarded as a materially productive unit of society, his spiritual productivity and utility was never a matter of doubt.

Nor was this ideal chosen infrequently in the Indian tradition. History abounds in examples of great rulers and administrators, great warriors and men of wealth, great artists and men of letters, but no less does it abound in men who gave up their all and spent their whole lives in the spiritual search. That this is the incomparable ideal¹ is testified to by the much stressed saying that he who having attained the hard to get (durlabha) human birth does not strive for the final goal, is a self-killer.² And, more than men of action, power or wealth "India has adored . . . those rarer chastened spirits, whose spirit's greatness lies in what they are . . . they declare the reality of the unseen world and the call of spiritual life."³ Never, in any period, was India lacking in such great spiritual souls, who were setters of examples and standards, guides not only in religion and morality but in practical life as well.

A further characteristic of Indian spirituality is its all-pervasiveness.

1. vide Buddha's teaching that nothing is more desirable than mokṣa, who ever you are, come to take it.

2. दुर्लभं जन्ममेतत् । देवान्पुत्रैश्चैतुःकम् । मनुष्याणां सुमुमुक्षुणां महापुरुषाणां शेषतः ॥

3. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 35.

Religion and life were never separated or conflicting, but religion was diffused through every aspect of individual and social life. Though the prominent ideal was mokṣa and not dharma yet the Śastras command the completion of dharma first. There are different, yet closely coordinated philosophies of life and action for those who follow the one¹ or the other.² Indian spirituality putting God at the beginning and end of life organized men in society through their material and mental equipments with a view to the manifestation of spirit.³ Belief in the doctrine of rebirth did not allow the forgetting of the truth that spirit works only through mind and body though, in the end, transcending both. A truly logical balance was established between claims of worldly life and the life of spirit, resolving all conflicts between the two.

But it is important to note that the spiritual or religio-philosophical standpoint while sufficiently emphasising the high tone, purity and sanctity of life never values it for its own sake only. Allowing full scope to all human activities it was yet an intermediate reality, the effort being to expand individual life in society through natural life-stages keeping, all the time, the spiritual goal as the highest. Every individual and social act was connected with this end and was sanctified. All products of cultural life, its creative self-expressions in art, poetry, literature and its external formulations in social organization and politics were regarded as forms of spirit and were accorded dignity and value for the sake of the spirit (Ātmārtham).

The last point is relevant in connection with the objection that spirituality has been pursued in India at the cost of worldly life.⁴ There is substance in this objection, but in its best form spirituality was not merely contemplation of the unknowable; allowed room for the material and the physical; nor did it prevent the highest development of arts and sciences. In fact, the sciences and philosophies were direct outcomes of the practical and intellectual aspects of Vedic spiritualism.⁵ "Solid achievements in positive knowledge as in materia medica, therapeutics, anatomy,

1. vide B. G., XII, 13.

2. vide ibid., II, 3; XI, 33.

3. cf., Aurobindo, op. cit., p. 141.

4. vide R. N. Tagore, Sadhana, pp. 13-14.

5. Ṣaḍāṅga, viz., Śikṣā (phonetics), Gāṇḍa (metre), Vyākaraṇa (grammar), Nirukta (etymology), Kalpa (ceremonial), Jyotiṣa (astronomy); Upāṅga, viz., Ṣaḍ-darśana (six philosophical systems).

embryology, metallurgy, chemistry, physics, descriptive zoology¹ and all branches of mathematics prove that spirituality proved no bar to the recognition of the "dignity of objective facts"¹ and to the appreciation of scientific methods of observation and experimentation. A high development of logical analysis and reliance on perception and inference were marks of Indian intellectualism. In the sphere of social action also there is proof of political capacity in the form of communal autonomy, in the establishment of the duties of the people and rulers (Prajadharmā and Rajdharmā) towards each other, in the high order of public administration and military organization. Nor was interest in economic life and material prosperity far behind. Ancient India was one of the leading countries in industry and commerce and renowned for her artisanship and industries even till the eighteenth century. Spirituality has not necessarily meant negation of "worldly success" in the past, but it is important to note that all these developments in the worlds of thought and of action were related, harmonised and hallowed by the infusion of the principle of spirituality in them. Tradition sought for the progress of man and society not so much through scientific knowledge and scientific social organization as through spiritual self-knowledge and perfection.

To the objection made from the point of view of the "practical reality of spirituality," it might be answered that the exalted nature of the ideal is an illustration of the adage that man's reach should always exceed his grasp. It was the distant star drawing men onward by its brilliance, but few did or were expected to attain the goal. The important thing, as stated before, was the prevalence of the religious attitude, the belief of the most simple and unlettered in society that spiritual life is the true life and his judgment of his aspirations and efforts by that standard. Attention of ordinary humanity might be occupied with worldly and material cares as much in India as in any other part of the world, but the religious mind of India did not fail to grasp the higher spiritual truths, which were vitalised and refreshed for it by a continuous succession of spiritual leaders, thus minimising the deadening effects of formalism, ritualism and ceremonialism. Such leaders never wanted for followers, and their spiritual message

1. B. K. Sirkar quoted by J. Woodroffe in *Is India Civilized?*, p. 232. Also Brajendra-nath Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. iii-iv.

commanded the ready acceptance of the masses. Thus, however dimly grasped and imperfectly realized, the spiritual aim was shared by the whole people.

Finally, a proof of the spiritual nature of the Indian tradition may be sought in history. In every age, religious revival, with its accent on spirituality, has preceded or accompanied other social and political transformations; religion has been the inspirer of such transformations. Any disturbance in the religious sphere surely produced far reaching parallel changes in the other spheres, and, on the other hand, every exaggeration of pleasure or wealth or power in society was corrected and balanced by corresponding stress on renunciation and asceticism of the spiritual ideal. Following the periods of decadence India's awakening always came first in its spiritual plane,¹ thus proving that it is the normal habitation of the national mind.

Traditional Values

The difficulty, if not the impossibility of bringing such terms as "Hindu" and "Hinduism" under some satisfactory definition has been remarked upon many times. Western scholars who approach this subject with a certain conception of religion derived from their experience of Christianity, complain that Hinduism seems to lack almost every feature which they think to be an essential element of religion. Such preconceptions of critics have been summed up by Sri Aurobindo:

How can there be a religion without rigid dogmas demanding belief on pain of eternal damnation, no theological postulates, even no fixed theology, no credo, distinguishing from antagonistic and rival religions? How can there be a religion which has no papal head, no governing ecclesiastic body, no church, chapel, no congregational system, no binding religious form of any kind obligatory on all its adherents, no administration and discipline? . . . How again can Hinduism be called a religion when it admits all beliefs allowing even a kind of high reaching atheism and agnosticism and permits all possible spiritual experiences, all kinds of religious adventures?²

All these difficulties being admitted, yet it cannot be denied that this system deserves the name of religion. As a form of life and thought Hinduism has a definite and unmistakable flavour of its own but its vast, complex and multiform nature has led one

1. e. g., the nineteenth century renaissance had its beginning in the religious sphere, and so did the awakening in the medieval period.
2. The Foundations of Indian Culture, p. 139.

scholar to call it "a parliament of religions."¹ Unlike other religions which may be said to be "founded" it is a thing of natural growth and not a development according to an original given plan. Hence the remarks that "it is a jungle not a building,"² a "mosaic of all types of religious aspiration and endeavour."³

The problem remains of understanding the nature of this "jungle" or "mosaic." If any one word can be said to sum up the essence of Hinduism as nearly as possible that one word is "dharma." This is one of the most important words in the whole range of Sanskrit literature. What in modern terminology is described as "Hindu"⁴ is really nothing more or less than "dharma" or more specifically "sanātana dharma" (ancient law) or "vaidikī dharma" (law of knowledge) or "mānava-dharma" (duty of man)⁵ or "varnāśrama-dharma" (duties of classes and stages of life). Hindu society and tradition is, thus, epitomised by the term "dharma."

The word is derived from the root "dhr" which means to hold together. In the Rg-Veda ṛta and anṛta sustain the cosmic order, commanding and forbidding acts whereby they assume the form of truth. Ṛta governs even the gods⁶ and dharma stands for custom, moral law and duty.⁷ By its association with ṛta the latter came to be declared the upholder of the world process and the gods.⁸ That the ancients understood dharma to have this power of sustenance is brought out in the śloka to the effect that dharma being violated destroys; dharma being preserved preserves; therefore dharma must not be

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1. Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I, Intro. p. xxxiv.
 2. *ibid.*, p. 41.
 3. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 313.
 4. In S. V. Ketkar's *An Essay on Hinduism, Its Formation and Future*, pp. 21-22, it is pointed out that the ancient Āryans had no particular name for themselves. Man being a member of a social group, and there being many such groups, foreigners were no different from people of other provinces and castes. The word "Hindu" then, is of foreign origin, first used by Muslims to denote people of this land who did not become a part of their fraternity by subscribing to their creed and adhering to certain ceremonies and sacraments connected with it. Originally, "Hindu" was a territorial rather than a credal term and derived from the word "Sapta Sindhu" which was the name of the rivers of the Punjab region. The Persians changed this to "Hindu" and derived many other words from it to indicate the land of India, its people and religion.
 5. It might be noted that G. Bühler, following Max Müller, translates the "Mānava" in the "Mānava Dharma-Sūtra" as the charana of the Mānavas, a subdivision of the Maitrāyaṇīya school of the Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda, to which this Dharma-Sūtra belonged. See Bühler's translation of the *Manu-Smṛiti*, Intro. p. xix.
 6. R. V., III, 17, 1, 10.
 7. *ibid.*, VII, 89, 5, 11; also X, 56, 3, 12.
 8. M. B., *Shāntiparva*, chap. 167.

violated lest it destroy us.¹ It was axiomatic with them that for the welfare of the world protection of dharma is necessary. They ask very often (in the Itihāsa, Purāṇas, Dharma-Śāstras), "What is dharma?" or more pointedly, "What is true dharma?" but never is it asked any where seriously, "What is the necessity of dharma?" The omission to ask this primary question in preference to the former secondary questions cannot be ascribed to lack of intellectual capacity or curiosity, for Śruti and Smṛti testify sufficiently to their intellectual powers. The reason must be found, then, in the conviction expressed in the verse of the ancient Law-giver mentioned above.

It is also said that the essence of dharma is very secret.² Which is a very true saying, as it is difficult to understand the full meaning of dharma in all its comprehensiveness. It has been translated into English as duty, as law, as righteousness, as virtue and also as religion. It has all these connotations and much else besides. Turning to Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtra³ we find the definition of dharma as property, and the thing with which it is related is the property or "dharma" i.e., that which has the dharma. Thus everything has its principle by virtue of which it is what it is. As dharma is that on which the thing depends for its existence it is synonymous with natural law. In terms of man dharma is the essential nature of humanity. Among the six orthodox systems the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā expressly claims to teach dharma.⁴ Kumārila Bhatta declares⁵ that the authority of the Veda regarding dharma being established, dharma and adharma cannot be pointed out by any other words but the injunctives. It is not merit obtained by doing a good deed but what should be done i.e., duty, the only reliable means of knowing which are Vedic injunctives. This is one of the most essential meanings of dharma which is brought out in other scriptures.⁶ Arjuna overcome by faint heartedness and puzzled regarding duty asked Śrī Kṛṣṇa on the battlefield the question about dharma.⁷ The Manu-Smṛti and the other Dharma-Śāstras have also been composed for the express purpose of declaring dharma. "Deign, divine one, to declare to us precisely

1. M. S., VII, 15.

2. अस्मिन् लक्ष्णे विहितं युष्मदात्मैः ।

3. III, 14: अज्ञानाद्विदितं धर्मज्ञैः शक्तिस्तु धर्मैः ।

4. धर्मं प्रवक्ष्यामि तु त्वं तेन कर्तव्यतया इति वचनव्युत्पत्त्या मानसा वृत्तिव्यवसा ।

5. Tantra-Vārttika, I, II, 1, 1-2.

6. B. G., IX, 21: सर्वं ज्ञानमस्मिन् प्रवक्ष्यामि ज्ञानार्थं तव भक्त्या ।

7. ibid., II, 7: प्रवक्ष्यामि त्वं धर्म-संसृष्ट-चित्तः ।

and in due order the sacred laws of each of the (four chief) castes (varna) and of the intermediate ones. For thou knowest the purport i.e., rites, and the knowledge of the soul (taught) in this whole ordinance of the Self-Existent (Svayambhū)."¹ Throughout the Śāstras dharma is also understood to mean law in the sense of customary law, which is codified, interpreted and modified in these Law-books. Duty, whether understood in terms of Vaidiki karma i.e., ritual, or in more general terms of duties of one's station in life, may be taken to be the objective meaning of dharma. And this dharma is the source of prosperity in this world and bliss in the other.² Dharma has also a more internal and subjective meaning of "virtue" or "religious merit." This ethical meaning is very clearly brought out in Manu's "tenfold dharma,"³ which has reference to the attainment of the individual's perfection. When it is said that the only friend who follows men even after death is dharma⁴ clearly the reference is to punya or "the credit side of spiritual assets," which has for its correlate pāpa or demerit. Thus the "protean" significance of the term dharma cannot be doubted. And we begin to understand the sense in which the Itihāskara (Vyāsa) declares that dharma is that which sustains all creatures.⁵ In its fulness dharma may be described scientifically as the characteristic property of a thing; morally and legally as duty; psychologically and spiritually as religion; and generally as righteousness and law; but duty above all.⁶ To this might be added that dharma carries a mystic power capable of rewarding and punishing human beings through its mysterious workings.

In the language of common usage dharma is now accepted as a synonym of "religion" Indian as well as western writers freely talk of the Hindu dharma as corresponding to the phrase "Christian religion" or "Mohammedan religion." Exception is taken by some scholars to such an equation of dharma and religion on the ground that the term religion is too narrow in its meaning and implications to contain the richness of the

1. M. S., I, 2-3.

2. Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra, I, 1, 2: मत्वाग्-भुङ्क्तेऽपि नोपसर्गोऽस्ति: स धर्मः । Also M. S., II, 9.

3. M. S., VI, 91, 92: धर्मः क्षमा दमो अस्तेयः शौचमिन्द्रियनिग्रहः । धर्मोऽसौ सत्यसंक्रान्तिः दशकः धर्मो लक्षणात् ॥

4. *ibid.*, VIII, 17.

5. आश्रमसंन्यासात् धर्मो धर्मकरो प्रजाः । यत् स्वार्थं धारणे समुक्तं स धर्म इति निवेदितः ॥

6. Bhagwandas, *The Laws of Manu*, p. 49, foot-note.

term dharma.¹ Be that as it may, we will follow other equally eminent scholars who have accepted the common usage, being careful to point out that even when we use the phrase "Hindu dharma" we leave out nothing of the rich meaning with which tradition has endowed dharma.

It is constantly asserted that the Indian mind is obsessed with religion. No field of life, be it social, legal, political or educational, is free from the operation of dharma. From the preliminary attempts at the definition of dharma it is clear that dharma is no other-worldly religion to be operated in certain areas and periods of human life only, but it is every duty, every law, every function of every being, both in this world and the next. To understand its full scope we must first know that mānava-dharma has got both a universal and an individual aspect, and the latter aspect comprises man's civic position. Being a member of several social groups the individual is subject to many types of dharma. This classification of dharma is with reference to the subject; beginning with swadharma which is the individual's personal dharma determined by past life and karma or his inner nature which dictates thoughts, words and deeds, the hampering or unfolding of his life, which ought not and must not be given up for any reason whatsoever.² Originally and ideally swadharma was the determiner of kula dharma

1. S. V. Ketkar contends in An Essay on Hinduism, Its Formation and Future, pp. 5-17, that in the Sanskrit language mata (doctrine regarding God) and mārga or sādhana (path to the desired good or end i.e., swarga or nirvāna or advaita) are distinct from dharma. The former are freely elected while the latter is eternal or unconditionally valid. There are brotherhoods or theophratrics based on worship and allegiance to theological doctrines, panthas or sampradayas, which correspond exactly to "religion." But whatever man's belief or unbelief of God may be he must still follow dharma i.e., human qualities and conduct proper to man determined by them. Hence Hindu or Ārya dharma does not refer to gods or tenets but to (right) conduct, which is contrasted to impure conduct of non-Hindus (mleccha dharma).

Réne Guénon in his Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines, Pt. II, chaps. V and X and Pt. III, chaps. I and V, contends that the religious point of view is not applicable to dharma. Of the three elements of religion; a dogma, not purely intellectual but sentimental; a moral law, also sentimental and social; a cult or form of worship; none is essential to dharma, which denotes the "manner of being" (single or collective) which will determine the "manner of conduct," not necessarily moral. Thus adharma is not moral or theological sin but "non-conformity with nature," "disequilibrium," rupture of harmony. He insists that the Hindu point of view, far from being religious, is metaphysical (not to be confused with the philosophical or theological), which is non-moral, purely intellectual, dealing with the principles of the universal order, too infinite to be defined, known immediately and completely by an intellectual intuition, which obliterates the difference of knowing and being.

2. B. G., III, 35: ज्ञेयान् स्वधर्मो विधुयः परधर्मो ध्वङ्गतिहातः । स्वधर्मो नियमः ज्ञेयः परधर्मो भयावहः ॥

(traditions of the family) and varṇa or jāti dharma (traditions of the caste),¹ āśrama dharma (duties of the stages or orders of life) and Ārya or Anārya dharma (duties of the nation).² In this aspect dharma laid down no absolute ethical standard. There were varying standards for individuals and groups, the general rule being that on the occasion of a conflict of duties the smaller duty must be sacrificed to the larger one.³ This relativity was no defect, but the very characteristic which gave binding force to the rules of the different dharmas, because the individual could see the relation of these rules to his own social status, temperament, power and capacities. A peculiar form of relativity appears in the idea that duties have reference to the degree of spiritual development, and the enlightened individual transcends dharma. But relativity was not all; the universality of dharma appears in two ways. Ideally, mānava dharma is meant to be the organization of the whole human race, a scheme of broad vocational classes and varṇas⁴ into which all races, tribes and groups can be fitted.⁵ All reaching a certain stage of development must take their place in the system of dharma, whether they would or no. Ethically, all the Dharma-Sāstra writers lay down certain virtues to be cultivated by all men, irrespective of the social group, age or place of the individual. The sāmānya dharma shows a judicious mixture of self and other-regarding, negative and positive virtues. Manu⁶ declares that all must show the virtues of fortitude, forgiveness, equanimity, probity, purity, self-restraint, reasonableness, truth and freedom from anger. The Bhāgavat⁷ follows the Law-givers generally, but putting harmlessness at the top of the list it goes on to detail, truthfulness, absence of

1. G. H. Mees in his *Dharma and Society* propounds the thesis that varṇa should be carefully distinguished from jāti, one being the ideal and the other the degenerate form of social and moral hierarchy. While admitting the distinction suggested by him, here we do not find it necessary to make special mention of it.
2. Again we have noted G. H. Mees' contention that "Ārya" is not primarily an anthropological but a cultural term.
3. व्यज्रदेकं कुलस्यार्थे श्रामार्थे कुलं व्यजत । श्रामं जनपदस्यार्थे कात्यायने पुरो व्यजत ॥
4. vide M. S., X, 4: The brāhmaṇa, the kṣātriya and the vaiśya castes (varṇa) are the twice-born ones, but the fourth, the śūdra has one birth only; there is no fifth (caste).
5. ibid., X, 44: The Paundrakas, the Coḍas, Draviḍas, Kāmbhogas, Yavanas, Śakas, Pāradas, Pahlavas, the Cīnas, Kirāts and Daradas.
6. vide supra, p. 9, foot-note 3; also X, 63; Yājñavalkya-Smṛti, I, 122: Non-killing, truth, non-stealing, purity, restraint of the senses, giving (alms), restraining the (passions or the) mind, mercy, forgiveness of injuries, these are the means of attaining virtue.
7. XI, 17, 21.

tendency to steal, freedom from passions of desire, anger, covetousness, activity in the direction of the agreeable and good for all as the desirable virtues for men of all classes. From the spiritual point of view the universality is seen in the generally accepted idea that the religious life is for all and no class has a monopoly over it.

Even this does not exhaust the scope of dharma. Indian thought regards life as a cycle made up of two halves. In one half there is an engagement in and with life, putting on of the body by the spirit, as it were, and in the other half disengagement from life, the putting off of the body by the spirit. All the Indian philosophical systems have pairs of words to indicate this process which is described by the terms *pravṛtti* or pursuit of worldly ends and *nivṛtti* or renunciation of worldly ends and pursuit of the spiritual ends. Each half of life has its own peculiar dharma, which constitutes the most integral part of the Hindu tradition. This, then, is another classification of dharma with reference to the end of life.

Though dharma is a mystical force yet it manifests itself in human life through very clear sources. All the Law-givers are in general agreement as to the source and authority of dharma. Manu's famous dictum¹ gives a four-fold foundation to dharma. First and foremost, the authority of dharma rests on the eternal and impersonal Vedas. True and complete knowledge should be our guide in conduct and the Vedas constitute such revealed knowledge. All other sources are subordinated to the vision of the ancient ṛṣis. Smṛti (tradition) must not contradict Śruti (knowledge), and if it cannot be explained by the latter it must be discarded. According to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, these two must not be questioned, since dharma arises from these and they teach what cannot be otherwise known viz., the connection between acts and their omissions and the resulting mysterious fruit (*adrṣṭa*). The propriety of conduct must be judged according to whether it is Vedokta, Śāstrokta or Purāṇokta. Dharma may, thirdly, be determined by the conduct of the śiṣṭa or the wise and the virtuous; a single man or men who are selfless and so imbued with sacred knowledge as, always, to take the right decision, will legislate in an assembly, and that will be the law for the less cultured people. Thus the example of

1. M. S., II, 12: ऋतिः स्मृतिः सप्तमः सर्वज्ञः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः सत्त्वः
Also II, 6; Āpṣṭambha, I, 1, 1-3; Gautama, I, 1-4; Vasiṣṭha, I, 4-6; Yājñavalkya, I, 7; Baudhāyana, I, 1, 1, 1-6; M. B., Shāntiparva, chap. 269.

good people and custom, called *acara* (*desacara*, *lokacara*, *kulacara*), shall be the guide because it represents collective wisdom. When no guidance is received from any of these sources then the individual may turn inward and take that path which self-satisfaction dictates. But his conscience must be a sound and enlightened one. The Indian tradition shares its belief in the four sources of the moral law or *dharma* with other religious traditions e. g., Islamic theology derives the moral law from the *Quran* (revelation), the *Hadis* (sayings of the prophets and apostles), *Ijma* (decisions of the learned) and *qayas* (individual opinion based on reason), in the same order.¹ That realism is not lacking in the concept of *dharma* is proved by this combination of revelation and reason, though reason is subordinated, always, to revelation. Yet, the Law-givers declare unequivocally that *dharma* must be rational,² because from loss of reason there results complete ruin.³ *Dharma* and *adharma* do not go about declaring themselves but have to be discovered by sound reasoning, which alone can interpret tradition.⁴ Moral situations in life being very complex, in cases of uncertainty the doing of ordained duty is said to free man from sin; and such duty must be performed even if it frustrates desires, leads to poverty or death.⁵ Then again, the end of *Rajadharma* is stated as *loka-yatra* or advancement of society and maintenance of the social order; this and the principles of self-preservation allowed for guidance in abnormal times,⁶ gave scope for the operation of human reason.

A study of *dharma*, in both its theoretical and practical aspects, amply proves its evolutionary and flexible character in ancient times when tradition was still a living and growing reality and not a fixed and rigid dogma. It was tacitly accepted by the ancient thinkers that though permanent in its essence, the form of *dharma* is changeable, as it operates in a changing world. No single infallible authority existed to declare these new forms or rules yet there were competent authorities (*Sastras*) which

1. Bhagvandas, *Laws of Manu*, p. 170.

2. M. S., XII, 105-106: Perception, inference and *Dharma-Sastra* (testimony) must be used to give correctness with regard to *dharma*. Reasoning, not repugnant to Vedic lore, is necessary. Also M. B., XII, 101, 2-5: Truth, custom and applicability (*upaya*) are sources of *dharma*.

3. B. G., II, 63.

4. *Apastambha*, I, 20, 6.

5. B. G., III, 35: स्वधर्मं विना न क्षीयति:

6. vide M. B., *Rajadharma* and *Apadadharma* parvas.

"discovered," from time to time, the valid consequences of dharma arising from tradition. In their efforts to codify dharma the Law-givers were circumscribed by custom and scriptural tradition, but not completely bound by these. There is sufficient evidence to prove that Dharma-Śāstra writers felt free to reject rules of dharma which, in their judgment, were unsuitable, though these might be permitted by the scriptures.¹ Another method by which dharma was expanded was the emergence of new social groups which necessitated development of new rules of conduct for them. The theoretical explanation for this phenomenon of change was given in the doctrine of yuga-dharma. The Bhagavadgita declares that the Lord himself comes to earth from age to age to restore the declining dharma.² A theory of the golden age in the past and progressive deterioration of mankind was prevalent in ancient India as in many other parts of the ancient world. Āpastambha talks of avara (inferior) men of the modern age (Kaliyuga) in which no more ṛṣis (seers) are born.³ The Bhāgavat-Purāna contains a striking allegory in which a dialogue between earth (in the form of a cow) and dharma (in the form of a bull) is narrated. Dharma relates how through the four ages successively one fourth of its substance (feet) has been withdrawn until in the last age of Kali it walks on one foot, as it were.⁴ One by one the three elements of austerity (tapas), purity (pavitratā), compassion (dayā) were withdrawn, so that now only the element of satya remains.⁵ Dharma is determined by desh and kāla. Āpastambha declared that the holy ṛṣis of old could do even forbidden acts without diminishing their lustre.⁶ Thus the dharma of each age is different from every other according to the level of culture e. g., in Satyayuga men attained to the highest state by dhyāna (meditation) alone, in Tretā by yajña (sacrifice), in Dvāpara by pūjana (worship), but in Kaliyuga by bhakti.⁷ Paralleling this change in social life there is also the evolution of dharma in individual life, in

1. e. g., Āpastambha forbade niyoga, II, 10, 27, 2-7, and substitutes for legitimate sons, II, 5, 13, 1-2 and 11.

2. B. G., IV, 7-8.

3. Āpastambha, I, 2, 5, 4-5.

4. B. P., Skandha I, chaps. 16-17; also M. S., I, 81-82.

5. vide Rāmacarita Mānasa, उत्तर | दे. २० | श्लोक : धर्मवर्तिना वा वासुदेवो जगत्कुरुप्रियात | दे. २० | श्लोक : १०१-१०२
 ५. Here the essence of Kaliyuga-dharma is said to be charity, not truth; M. B., Shāntiparva, chap. 262 gives first place to abhayadāna and chap. 269 calls dayā paramadharmā.

6. Āpastambha, II, 6, 13, 1-10.

7. M. S., I, 85-86; also Rāmacarita Mānasa, उत्तर | दे. २० | श्लोक : २-३ |

a very special sense. Man learns dharma not so much from scriptures and law-books as by his inner urge; however he can understand it only according to the level of his development. In the lower levels of development (brahmacarya and gṛhastha) when he has no clear subjective realization of it he must follow dharma as laid down by wiser people (Śruti, Smṛti, sadācāra), but at higher stages he could over-rule these and determine the course of his own life and could even transcend dharma altogether (vanaprastha and sannyāsa). On the same principle, but now over a number of lives instead of in one, the individual may rise to higher dharma (kṣātrīya or brāhmaṇa) or even fall to lower dharma (vaiśya or sūdra) by the mode of his conduct.¹ The developmental aspect of dharma for the individual might be stated thus: dharma is the inner nature which has reached in each man a certain stage of unfoldment, containing within it the law of the next stage of unfoldment.

Tradition maintained a very healthy balance between the two parts of the life-cycle viz., pravṛtti and nivṛtti, rightly insisting on the inseparability of the two. Perfection of life cannot be achieved by pursuing the dharma of either half exclusively. The ideal of the complete life is expressed in the concept of chaturvarga (artha, dharma, kāma, mokṣa), in which the last or the spiritual end is the crown of the rest. But it is also possible to take the two halves separately, as a majority of men are far from perfect, in which case the ideal is expressed in the concept of trivarga (artha, dharma, kāma). The difference may be summed up in terms of niḥśreyas (spiritual perfection) and abhyudaya (prosperity here and hereafter), which are, respectively, the goals of the "group of four" and the "group of three." These ends of life are called puruṣārthas or human values. Since these values formed the motive power in society the bent of Hindu tradition was practical. And they were to be pursued consciously by man in his rational and spiritual capacity. The Smṛtis had the special aim of propounding the nature and relation of these values for man's good.²

The values of human life have reference to natural human appetites. The

1. M. B., Anushāsanaparva, 143, 6.

2. In Apte's Sanskrit dictionary Itihāsa is defined as

इतिहास प्रकाशने । Also Rāmacarita Mānasa,
उत्तम विभाग वि-वाङ्मै ।

trivarga can be understood in the light of the three primal appetites, desire for wealth (vitta-aiṣana), desire for honour and fame (loka-aiṣana) and desire for son or sense-pleasures (putra-aiṣana), or in another sense we may consider the three to represent the economic, the intellectual and ethical, and the instinctive and psychological aspects of human nature, respectively. If the term economic be taken in a wide sense to include the material objects of human pursuit, the means of this pursuit and the needs and desires suggesting this pursuit,¹ then artha may be equated to it. Hindu tradition pays sufficient attention to the business aspect of life though it is always regarded as instrumental to certain more essential values. As life has, necessarily, a physical foundation,² wealth and its pursuit was never decried. The Mahābhārata declares that no one should rob another of his wealth since poverty is a state of sinfulness.³ Artha-Śāstra defines the duty of the ruler as the acquisition, preservation, augmentation and distribution of wealth. Yet much emphasis was put on the methods of attaining wealth and its uses. Both must be legitimate, and the law-books lay down in legal minutae rules regulating the economic function in society e. g., the division of labour, the occupations of various castes in normal and abnormal times, the distribution or disposal of wealth etc. Thus, artha as the first end of life stands for perfection of wealth by the restraint and discipline of dharma. "Orientation of Indian mind is towards dharma and that of Indian culture towards the realization of dharma. It was ultimately dharma-pradhāna and only in an inferior, accessory or instrumental sense artha-pradhāna."⁴

Kāma is the perfection of feeling and sense-experience. The Kāma-Śāstra investigated every aspect of this value, and tradition accepted the naturalness of physical satisfaction and well-being. There was a high development of the fine arts through which the emotional nature was sought to be satisfied in its nine aspects. But, as in the case of artha, here also the need of channelling the natural impulses was recognised. The Dharma-Śāstras lay down the laws of marriage and physical purity in the interest of a good life. Thus kāma is never understood as a good-in-itself, but is a

1. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p. 36.

2. e. g., Upaniṣadic worship of food as a great devatā, annam is Brahman.

3. M. B., XII, chap. 8.

4. Aiyanger, *Ancient Indian Economic Thought*, p. 19.

worthy ideal only as a part of a spiritual process. Behind both artha and kāma lies the idea that man does not live for himself alone nor at only one level of mundane existence, but his activity has necessary reference to society, of which he is a part, and to a higher level of super-mundane existence. Each human being, whether he will or no finds himself subject to three debts. The deva-r̥na (debt to the gods), the ṛṣi-r̥na (debt to the ancient sages) and the pitṛ-r̥na (debt to the ancestors). By the lawful pursuit of artha and kāma he is able to discharge these three spiritual, cultural and biological debts to society and thus attains his development in conjunction with that of society. There occurs no clash of interests, no disharmony between the individual and society. The method of discharging the debts is described as pañca-mahāyajña, which forms an integral part of the kula-dharma of the individual. The deva-yajña, the ṛṣi-yajña, the pitṛ-yajña, the nṛ-yajña and the bhūta-yajña are the reenactments by the individual of the primal sacrifice of the Creator by which world-multiplicity was created out of His original unity. By performance of the pañca-mahāyajña, by dāna (liberality), by swādhyāya the individual is able to establish harmony between himself and human, super-human and sub-human forces.

The primacy of dharma was neither accidental nor unconscious. The question of the relative merits of the three ends occupied the minds of ancient thinkers. The Law-givers¹ hold that the essential duty of the king is to know the respective values of artha, dharma and kāma and to exercise his powers of punishment in the light of that knowledge. Mam admits that kāma is the motive force of actions of every kind, be they the study of the Vedas or performance of sacrifices or keeping of vows or practice of restraints.² The principle is recognised that nothing prompts a man to action except what is a means to some desired end. Since there is no creature without desire, dharma and artha abide in kāma, which is the source of the former two and constitutes their very nature. The psychological realism of the ancient thinkers leads to this pronouncement of kāma as the primary force in the operation of the trivarga. But they also realised that since pursuit of pleasure is innate and instinctive to man, it needs to be

1. M. S., VII, 26; Gautama, XI, 2.

2. M. S., II, 2-4.

curbed and directed rather than to be emphasised. So, this conclusion is not considered to be final by any ancient thinker except the Carvaka hedonist. From the point of view of Artha-Śāstra, artha is declared to be the primary end, as, without it, there can be neither accomplishment of dharma (duty) nor attainment of kama. The latter are but parts or organs of artha. Economic activity or varta, under which the Dharma-Śāstras¹ include agriculture, cattle-breeding, industrial arts, trade and commerce and usury, is the basis of wealth and varta is the root of the world.² But this also is not a final conclusion as the statement follows that in the order of activities first must come the pursuit of dharma, then the acquiring of wealth and from this will follow satisfaction of desire.³ A scale of values is set up in which dharma is declared to be the best, kama to be the worst and artha to be the medium value. The more or less unanimous conclusion is that all these ends must be pursued together. The man who follows only one end is the inferior man, the one who follows two is the mediocre man and the one who follows all three is the superior man.

In its many-sided complexity dharma has been described as equivalent to the whole of Hindu tradition. In the preceding paragraph it appears as one third of the triple values and in this capacity its regulative character has been indicated. No sphere of life, be it social, political, economic or educational, is outside its regulative power. It represents the rule of morality in human life determining which pleasures (kama) are to be pursued (good) and which are to be rejected (bad), which means of livelihood are to be employed and which are not to be employed. It occupies the same place in the Hindu scheme of values as does justice in the Republic of Plato. Both justice and dharma are "architectonic," upholding all the virtues and functions of life, by working in and through them.

The wise man knows that artha, kama and dharma make life happy, in fact they are nothing but three levels of happiness viz., health and wealth, pleasure and joy. But such relative or limited happiness is really an obstacle to the attainment of

1. M. S., I, 80, 80-98; Āpastambha, I, 20, 10-21; Baudhāyana, II, 4, 16-21; Gautama, VII, 1-26.

2. M. B., Vanaparva, 67, 35.

3. *ibid.*, Shāntiparva, 167; also B. P., I, 2.

absolute bliss.¹ When the idea of that end arises in the mind of man then the conception of dharma undergoes a transformation. It is no longer the beginning and end of human striving but the link between the first three and the last value of life. Under its power bhukti (enjoyment) and mukti (salvation) are combined.² Whereas in the trivarga it was the producer of abhyudaya in the chaturvarga it produces cittasuddhi (purification of mind), which is the prerequisite for the pursuit of the higher end. Dharma is highly praised, for even a little practice of it protects from great fear,³ it never fails to achieve its goal.⁴ But the good of him who desires dharma⁵ is different from the good of him who desires mokṣa.⁶

Having exhausted the three objects of the pravṛtti-mārga, which is the path of repeated births in this world, man is ready to set out on a new path viz., nivṛtti-mārga, which leads him out of the cycle of births and deaths (saṃsāra). It is declared that the wise man chooses śreya (good) in preference to preya (pleasant).⁷ Mokṣa is derived from the root "muc," which means to loose, set free, let go, release, liberate. The need for liberation arises because the soul has fallen into the bondage of empirical existence (saṃsāra) due to the ignorance of the nature of reality. Mokṣa transcends merit and demerit and the trivarga, it is freedom from likes and dislikes and from karma, which binds and directs all creatures according to the will of providence.⁸ All that was of value in the earlier path pales before mokṣa. This is called paramārtha (summum bonum) while the others are only lesser goods (bonums) which, now, find their completion in mokṣa. All the scriptures and philosophies of the Hindus investigate mokṣa-dharma or that orientation of life which will lead to absolute bliss, from which there can be no lapse into the lesser level represented by the trivarga. Spirit is higher than body, life or mind⁹ and to live in the knowledge of spirit is

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1. B. P., I, 2.
 2. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion and Society, p. 106.
 3. B. G., XI, 40.
 4. M. B., Mokṣadharmaparva, 174.
 5. B. G., II, 3; XI, 33.
 6. B. G., XII, 13.
 7. Kātha Upa., I, 2.
 8. M. B., Shāntiparva, 167.
 9. Taittī. Upa., II, 1-5.

mokṣa.¹ Self-conquest (dharma) and knowledge (jñāna) are the means to mokṣa. Thus both morality and truth subserve mokṣa and are, in turn, perfected by it. Śaṅkara says² that to attain mokṣa is to perfect the means to it. Hence perfection of goodness and perfection of knowledge is the meaning of spiritual perfection. Such a perfected man is characterised by super-physical powers (yoga-siddhis)³ and freedom from unrighteousness, for he recognises in the Self all things, both the real and the unreal, and he recognises the universe in the Self.⁴

Organization of Individual and Social Life—Varnasrama-Dharma

Varna-dharma is the objective or social form of dharma. The chaturvarṇa ideal is the attempt to give a practical or workable expression to the spiritual ideal towards which the individual may develop within the bounds of law. All societies are characterised by divisions and groupings of various kinds but the Hindu social constitution is unusual in regard to its long history and its religious, moral, social, economic ramifications.

The genesis of the caste system lies in the difference which the ancient Āryans tribes, new-comers to India, felt between themselves and the indigenous population. The hymns of the R̥g-Veda⁵ implore the favour of the gods for the Āryans as against the Dasyus. The distinction was based on racial, religious and linguistic differences. The Āryans were of fair complexion (varṇa), worshipped the shining ones (devas) and spoke the Sanskrit language and they looked down upon the conquered Dasyus who lacked all these virtues. Soon after the invaders settled in India the original racial connotation of the term Ārya or varṇa was forgotten and it became a title, having the meaning of "noble" or "cultured."⁶ The Vedic commentators explain varṇa as elite (varṇīya). Race did contribute towards the development of caste but not so much in an anthropological sense as in the sense of degree of culture or sociality. Among the primitive Āryans certain

1. M. S., XII, 85.

2. Bhāṣya on B. G., II, 55.

3. Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtra, II, 37-38.

4. M. S., XII, 118.

5. I, 103, 3; I, 117, 21; III, 38, 9.

6. G. H. Mees in Dharma and Society and S. V. Ketkar in An Essay on Hinduism, Its Formation and future are opposed to Max Muller who argues that Ārya is a purely racial term.

functional divisions occurred. First was distinguished the priestly class to take charge of the sacrificial ritual which became increasingly complex. The military class also distinguished itself from the rest of the population engaged in productive occupations. The fourth class was formed by the Dasyus¹ to whom were given the most unclean jobs involving manual labour. The first three classes called themselves dvija (twice-born) because they had the right to the upanayana samskara (sacrament of the sacred thread) which was the condition for the study of the scriptures, from which the lowest class was debarred. The gulf between the upper three and the fourth was, thus, ritualistic as well as functional. Originally the class division was broad and flexible, permitting growth of the classes by entry from outside. The meeting of tribes led to borrowings and fusion of ideas, manners and customs. As the tribal people were assimilated into Hindu society and adopted its religious practices and manners they acquired the status of castes. Migration of groups to different regions of India and changes in their customs gave rise to new castes. Later with the rise of sectarian religions still other castes arose, having their bond in a common allegiance to a religious leader, theological doctrines and cult of worship. Manu's theory that originally all castes were kṣatriyas, but they sank to the status of śūdras due to non-observance of rites and non-consultation of brāhmanas,² does not accord with the historical fact, which shows that the caste system, far from having a single cause, is a product of the combination of racial, migrational, regional, economic, functional and religious factors. Yet another factor very influential in the development of castes was the fact of inter-marriage. Such inter-mixture between Āryans and Dasyus probably occurred first among the vaiśyas and śūdras as they were closer to each other in status and function and then spread upward.

No rigid division prevailed among the Āryan dvijas in the period of the Ṛg-Veda. They pursued different functions, but the occupational division combined with the racial to give rise to new groups in which the principle of heredity became predominant. The occupational principle was never absolute, and, even in the later rigidity of the caste system, could not be strictly applied. By the time the sacrificial system of the

1. R. V., I, 83, 1.

2. M. S., X, 43-45.

Brāhmanas¹ arose in its fully developed form the four castes (jātis) were rigidly separated and the principle of birth (janmana) was the decisive factor rather than the principle of function (karmana). The Dharma-Śāstra writers² laid down the functions of the four castes in great detail. For the brahmanas the six-fold dharma consists in teaching and study of the Vedas, sacrifice for their own benefit and for others, giving and accepting of alms.³ The kṣātriya-dharma is to protect and command the people, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifice, to study the Vedas and to abstain from sense-pleasures.⁴ The vaiśya's dharma is to tend cattle, to bestow gifts, to offer sacrifices, to study the Vedas, to trade, to lend money and to cultivate the land.⁵ Only one dharma is assigned to the sūdras viz., to serve the other three castes.⁶ The Artha-Śāstra adds some other functions for the latter viz., agriculture, cattle-breeding, trade, profession of artisans and court-bards. The Epics and the Purānas follow the Law-givers on the subject of varna-dharma and in a more popular and less legal form depict the functions of the castes in many places. Among the several occupations the most commendable are teaching the Vedas for a brāhmaṇa, protecting the people for a kṣātriya and trade for a vaiśya,⁷ but a realistic attitude towards varna-dharma is adopted in times of difficulty. Those who are unable to live by their own lawful occupations may adopt that of the next inferior caste, but never that of a higher caste.⁸ The insistence is on the discharge of one's own appointed duty in preference to that of any other varna as the best method of attaining perfection.⁹

Traditional belief in the immemorial antiquity of caste can be explained by reference to the allegory of the Puruṣa-Sūkta.¹⁰ The later thinkers seized upon this mystical and mythical image and based their speculations about the origin, nature and

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1. Max Müller assigns the period 600 B. C.-800 B. C. for this development, which is considered to be a conservative estimate according to Indian scholars.
 2. Max Müller puts these works, which are metrical forms of earlier Dharma-Sūtras, between 600 B. C. and 200 B. C.
 3. M. S., I, 85; X, 74-75.
 4. M. S., I, 90.
 5. *ibid.*
 6. Vasiṣṭha-Smṛti, II, 20.
 7. M. S., X, 80.
 8. Vasiṣṭha-Smṛti, II, 22-23.
 9. M. S., X, 97; B. G., XVIII, 45, 47.
 10. R. V., X, 90.

functions of the caste upon it. Manu declares that the Self-Existent created the four-fold division for the sake of the prosperity of the worlds (*lokasamrakṣaṇa samvardhanartham*), of the gods, the plants, the minerals and men.¹ The division being divinely ordained it was argued that the duties laid down for the castes are created by God. Thus the conception of *varṇa-dharma* or social ethics had the authority of religion as its sanction.

From the symbolical representation of the Cosmic Man also arises the conclusion of the organic nature of society. Social hierarchy ought to reproduce analogically the constitution of the Universal Man.² The organ of origin of each *varṇa* determines its superiority or inferiority relative to the rest, e. g., the mouth is the higher organ as compared to the feet. There is division of labour as each has a different function to perform in the originally divided social body, yet interdependence is implied as all are united as emanations from one creator. Theoretically speaking, if the social order be regarded as an ordinance of God the implication is that the wisdom of the *brāhmaṇa* must combine with executive power of the *kṣatriya*, the skilled production of the *vaiśya* and the devoted service of the *śūdra* to make world progress (*lokasaṅgraha*) possible.³ Practically speaking, a certain balance of power was achieved because the *brāhmaṇas* enjoyed religious powers but had no control over economic or political and military powers, the *kṣatriyas* had the administrative-military power but no economic or religious powers, and the *vaiśyas* had economic power but no religious or military powers, therefore some cooperation was essential for the functioning of society.⁴ A natural functional hierarchy arose out of the different orders among which there could be no single moral standard for all. The *dharma* of a higher *varṇa* would be too ideal for the lower; there must be difference in the kinds of responsibility and the kinds of conduct according to the degree of culture and sociality. The *dvija*-class participated directly and consciously in the tradition while the *śūdras* could do so only indirectly through association with the upper classes and in an instinctive manner.⁵

1. M. S., I, 31.

2. René Guénon, *Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrines*, p. 220.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 356.

4. B. G. Gokhale, *Indian Thought Through the Ages*, p. 35.

5. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

The Bhagavadgita gives an ethical and psychological theory of varna. The duties of the four orders are said to be divided according to the qualities (guna) born of their respective natures (swabhava).¹ The Mahabharata describes the four colours of men, white, red, yellow and black, as symbolising the inherent qualities of their nature.² Originally there were no castes but later divisions arose due to actions of men and needs of society.³ In these speculations varna is given an inner meaning. Thus the Bhagavadgita while describing the duties of the upper two classes stresses the mental virtues, while for the lower two it is thought sufficient to mention their occupations.⁴ But work is the basis of varna, not in the sense of a profession or work for personal profit as in the sense of social service and service of God. The similarity between this theory of varna based on temperamental differences of men and the social division of Plato's ideal state strikes us forcefully. The philosophers, soldiers and workers of that state represent the rational, the spirited and the concupiscent elements of the human mind, respectively, and correspond to the upper three varnas of the Hindu social system. The sudras may be said to correspond to the class of slaves in Plato's Republic, about which he has kept silent. This parallel shows that in ancient theories of social organization there was sufficient recognition of the need to relate social stratification and duties to human nature.

The theological basis of the social system was provided by the doctrines of karma and transmigration. In the Rg-Vedic speculations about the fate of the soul after death no mention of the karma doctrine occurs. But beginning with the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,⁵ where the first germs of the doctrine are found, it gradually developed until in the Upaniṣads⁶ it appears in its fully developed form and is taught there as a most secret doctrine. There it is connected with the older ideas of transmigration and heaven and hell. The idea of rebirth in this world gained ascendancy over the idea of rebirth in another world. The ritualistic meaning of karma which was emphasised by the

1. B. G., XVIII, 41.

2. M. B., Shāntiparva, 188, 6; 280, 33-37.

3. M. B., Vanaparva, 180, 21, 23, 25-26, 31-35; B.P., XI, 17.

4. B. G., XVIII, 42-44.

5. VI, 2, 2, 27.

6. Kāṭha Upa., V, 7; Chān. Upa., III, 14, 1; V, 10, 2; Br. Upa., III, 2, 13.

Brāhmanas was supplemented by the ethical and spiritual meaning. The essence of the doctrine is that karma or action is a sequence of events i. e., cause and effect. Action as cause is not to be separated from the effect, which is but the transformed form of the action belonging to the future. The doctrine is an attempt to explain in rational terms that all that happens to man is a consequence (phala) of his past actions, rather than the decree of some Divine arbiter of human destiny. His physical and mental constitution is shaped by his own karmas; his nature and form in transmigration is regulated by tendencies (saṃskaras, vāsanas, āśaya) accumulated through those karmas. The karma doctrine, insisting as it does, that every act must bear its appropriate fruit in the life of its agent, sooner or later, and that no action is ever lost, carries the implication of the principle of retributive justice operating in a moral and cosmic order. It is the fully developed form of the conception of ṛta or the moral law and has been described as the counterpart, in the moral world, of the law of causation operating in the natural world. Man's good or evil actions determine his fate of rebirth, high or low, from the tāmasic yoni or the darkest forms of life as in plants and trees to the rājasic or sāttvic yonis or the most enlightened forms of life as in human, semi-divine or divine spheres. These individualistic implications of the karma doctrine were supplemented by the sociological implications. As the Bhagavadgītā asserts that varṇa and dharma are determined according to karma, the effect of karma in determining the social destiny or the station and duties of the individual was emphasised. Jāti is a resultant of the particular qualities of the individual combined with hereditary qualities, but both elements are ultimately to be traced to the individual's karma. There is no "accident of birth," as the individual is born in the caste merited by his conduct, nor may a man change his caste in this life, because that would be to negate his own nature and karma. However, the possibility of improvement of caste in a future life was kept open and made dependent upon the condition of faithful fulfilment of the dharma of the social position in which the individual may find himself in this life. Lasting devotion to one's calling (dharma) was thus instilled in the Hindu promise of rebirth, for Hinduism joined occupational stability not only to moral nature of the person's vocational stability and humble modesty but to his very interest

in salvation.¹

The theory of varna-dharma described above represents it as an ideal in a number of ways viz., in the form of laws to be applied to social phenomena, in the form of ideal to be striven for in the social constitution and in the form of facts, conceived by ancient thinkers, as they ought to be.² But the actual caste system as it developed in India diverged widely from the theory. Manu's "fanciful" explanation of the origin of many castes had little reference to historical facts. By the fifth century B. C. the hereditary principle had definitely displaced the functional and qualitative principles and later history does not support the theory of character as the determinant of caste. The Dharma-Sastra writers in their utmost fear and abhorrence of "mixture of castes" helped in the accentuation of caste exclusiveness by prescribing particular professions for each and more specially by prohibiting inter-marriage and inter-change of hospitality on a basis of equality. Most rules and customs are for the purpose of preserving the distinctiveness and purity of castes, but instead of proving beneficial they caused crystallisation and rigidity of caste.³ As a device for solving the conflicts of a multiple society consisting of racial, economic, social and religious groups, by a process of gradual and peaceful assimilation and harmonisation of groups, its usefulness in ancient times was great. But this assimilative process and development of mānava-dharma and social reform connected with it stopped many centuries ago.⁴ The functional cooperation of different orders for satisfactory functioning of the social system was vitiated by the low status assigned to the productive groups and the primitive social and economic techniques employed. It is remarked⁵ that it is difficult to imagine a more traditionalistic idea of professional virtue; revolutionary ideas and progressivism was inconceivable and rationalisation of economy impossible. Instead of a common social feeling and harmony arising from the natural hierarchy based on cultural differences there were the inequalities of the caste system with special privileges claimed by the

1. Max Weber et al., Religions of India, p. 121.

2. G. H. Mees, Dharma and Society, p. 60.

3. *ibid.*, p. 67.

4. S. Radhakrishnan, Hindu View of Life, p. 104.

5. Weber, *loc. cit.*

upper castes¹ and the rising of the out-caste,² for which the varna-theory has no scope whatsoever.³ Caste, in fact, is a negation of the idea of society. The tyranny and oppression of the caste system is opposed to the unity taught by the Gita which stands for an organic as against an atomistic conception of society.⁴ In short, the caste system is really opposed to the varna-doctrine.

The conception of āsrama-dharma is inseparably connected with the conception of varna. It is the objective but individual manifestation of dharma, serving to unfold the individual soul in a single life-time as the varna-dharma serves to unfold it during one part of its whole period of transmigration. However, only three out of the four stages fell within the purview of the varna-dharma and the fourth was outside it. The root "śrama" means to toil, and āsrama indicates the place as well as the manner of work. Herein the individual's life is so ordered that his activities harmonise with the ritualistic, socio-moral and spiritual needs of society while he is progressing towards his own life-goal. The earliest references to āsrama-dharma are found in the Brāhmaṇas,⁵ though some of the earlier texts mention only three stages instead of four. The reason being that the last two stages of definitely spiritual exertion are somewhat similar and differ only in the degree of renunciation, and were separated as distinct stages only by later thinkers. The Dharma-Śāstras and Artha-Śāstra lay down detailed rules of dharma to be followed in the four stages of life. They obviously refer to the ideal operation of the system, yet it is clear that the system had a working reality and was generally accepted in society. The Bhāgavat-Purāṇa⁶ gives a symbolical account of the origin of the four orders of life from the body of the Creator, obviously to bring it in line with the allegory of the Puruṣa-Sūkta.

The first stage of brahmacharya was one of preparation and learning. Brahmacharya literally means "attendance on the Veda."⁷ Beginning with the sacrament of the sacred

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1. M. S., I, 93, 96, 100: Very exaggerated claims are made for the superiority of the brāhmaṇas.
 2. B. P., XI, 17, 20: The fifth caste has all the anti-social qualities e. g., impurity, falsehood, theft, atheism, quarrelsomeness, anger, greed, infatuation.
 3. M. S., X, 4: There is no fifth (caste).
 4. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 161.
 5. Taitti. Brāhmaṇa, III, 12, 3.
 6. XI, 17.
 7. G. N. Jha, Philosophical Discipline, p. 12.

thread for which different ages were fixed for different castes the student was to devote himself to the study of the Veda and Vedangas.¹ Proper initiation, amounting to a second birth, began with the learning of the Gayatri-mantra.² The Dharma-Sastras lay down many specific duties and strictly enjoin respect towards parents, teachers and elders.³ The student-life was one of poverty, purity and self-control.⁴ The vow of study had to be kept for thirty-six years or half or quarter of that period or until the student had learnt the Vedas and closed with the samavartana ceremony or "graduation." Having dwelt with his teacher for the first quarter of his life the individual might enter the order of the gṛhastha⁵ by marrying a girl of equal caste. This life provides a discipline harder than that of the student life as duties of the householder were many and difficult.⁶ The man had to be diligent in studying the Vedas, in training pure sons and pupils, in controlling the sense-organs and in non-violence towards all creatures. By sacrificing to the gods and manes, by showing hospitality⁷ and by sharing his wealth the individual discharged his three debts to society. Having arrived at the age of maturity, the individual's thoughts turn to things beyond the world. Surrendering his worldly possessions and duties to his heirs he becomes a vānaprastha. He must now practice sense-control, liberality, compassion, meekness and chastity.⁸ By offering sacrifices and studying the Vedas most industriously, by fasting and penance he was to prepare himself for union with the supreme soul.⁹ Having arrived at the last quarter of his life the individual might enter sannyāsa and abandon all worldly objects, applying his mind to salvation.¹⁰ He observes the vow of non-violence and to him there is no danger from any creature. Pure of heart and speech, he must cultivate friendship towards all and return good for evil.¹¹ Having in this manner renounced all attachments he becomes freed from all pairs of opposites and gains

1. M. S., II, 191.

2. M. S., II, 147-148.

3. M. S., II, 145.

4. M. S., II, 160-161, 177; Baudhāyana-Smṛti, I, 2, 3, 20.

5. M. S., III, 2.

6. Chān. Upa., 8, 15; M. S., III, 70; Baudhāyana-Smṛti, II, 6, 11, 1.

7. M. S., III, 101, 117-118.

8. M. S., VI, 8; Vasiṣṭha-Smṛti, IX, 5.

9. M. S., VI, 29.

10. M. S., VI, 33 and 35.

11. M. S., VI, 46-48.

immortality even in this world.¹ Having risen above possessions, caste, religious practices, he is called varnatita.

Through the four stages of āsrama-dharma the individual grows from the narrowest idea of his individuality to the most universal. In the first stage he begins to realize his separateness as an individual; in the second stage of responsibility towards family and community his self expands to include many others. In the third stage he acquires a still larger outlook in which the whole world is considered as his family.² In the final stage the individual realizes his oneness with the universal self and reposes in Brahman. Through the āsrama-scheme the individual and society are brought together in the solution of their common needs. In the first three stages the problems of education, of economics and of order and security (yoga-kṣema) could be dealt with, while the solution of the problem of peace (śānti) belongs to the period of sannyāsa.³ This scheme of life is also integrated with the four puruṣārthas. In the first two stages the individual prepares himself and then fulfills, by social activity, the ends of artha, dharma, kāma, and in the last two stages he first prepares himself by contemplation and finally realizes the goal of mokṣa.

The Dharma-Śāstras generally enjoin the individual to pass through the āśramas step-by-step,⁴ as these are the normal stages of human growth. All men must acquire some general education, must raise a family and must think of higher things, i. e., the āśrama-dharma is the ideal meant for all, while in the varṇa-dharma the individual can belong to only one varṇa in a particular life. In exceptional cases the individual was allowed to pass from the stage of brahmacarya to that of vānaprastha or sannyāsa.⁵ Those who have many desires (sakāma) may enter gṛhastha, one who desires citta-śuddhi may enter vānaprastha, but if his heart is already pure he may enter sannyāsa.⁶ In this flexible form the āśrama-scheme was helpful, but not indispensable, for the individual.⁷

The ancient thinkers speculated about the relative merit of the āśramas.

1. M. S., VI, 75.

2. अथ निजः परोक्षेति जगत्तु जप्युच्यते । तदाप्युच्यते । तदाप्युच्यते । तदाप्युच्यते । तदाप्युच्यते ।

3. B. P., XI, 18.

4. M. S., III, 2.

5. Vagīṣṭha-Sūtri, VII, 3.

6. B. P., XI, 7.

7. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 382.

Although it is declared in the Mahabharata¹ that in the order of the asramas each succeeding one is better than the preceding one, the Dharma-Sastra writers unanimously praise the gr̥hastha-āsrāma as the most superior one.² Their belief in its excellence stems from their realistic realization that the householder supports the other three orders by his socially useful labour and hospitality. "As all rivers . . . find a resting-place in the ocean, even so men of all orders find protection with the householder."³

Though all Hindus had to belong to one of the asramas the āsrāma-dharma in its entirety was applied only to the twice-born. The sūdras being deprived of the privilege of the upanayana saṁskāra were debarred from the study of the scriptures. In practice even among the twice-born the majority might find the dharma of vānaprastha and sannyāsa too much beyond their powers, therefore the majority of men in society were destined to remain at the stage of gr̥hastha, hoping to rise to higher levels in some future life. For the kṣatriya and vaiśya, however, all āśramas were open except sannyāsa and for the śūdra only gr̥hastha was open. It is doubtful whether in practice the strict observance of āśrama-dharma on any significant scale ever extended to castes other than the brāhmaṇa, of which only a small section could have entered the third and fourth stages, after the Upaniṣadic age.⁴ But the value of the ideal was not lessened by the fact that it could only operate for the highly cultured.

We are now in a position to define dharma as the whole duty of man in relation to the fourfold purpose of life, by members of the four groups and the four stages⁵ or the right law of the functioning of each part of man and society. And this conception of dharma relating to social grouping and schematic division of individual life was a major influence in the social and spiritual evolution of India.

Paths to the Goal of Salvation—Mokṣa-Sādhana

Of the two aspects of religion, the internal and the external, greater

1. Shāntiparva, 243.

2. M. S., VI, 87.

3. M. S., III, 78; VI, 89; Vasiṣṭha-Smṛti, VIII, 15.

4. B. G. Gokhale, Indian Thought Through the Ages, p. 38.

5. S. Radhakrishnan, Religion and Society, p. 107.

significance attaches to the former. The inner-most essence of all religions is constituted by their spirituality rather than by dogmas or rites and ceremonies. Indian religious tradition lays a special emphasis on this aspect and judges the religious man by the quality and depth of his spiritual experience. Only the man who has removed all doubts about reality and by long and persistent concentration on the truth intuited it directly is competent to be the teacher and guide for others. This is the point of meeting of religion and philosophy, aiming as they both do at the realization of the highest truth (sākṣātkāra) and not merely at the knowledge of it. The demand is for a conscious and complete coincidence of theory and practice or spiritual dynamics. Metaphysical doctrines are not irrelevant in this process but constitute the indispensable prerequisites of salvation, the other aids to which are religious rites and moral discipline. The immediate experience of the Divine is the only factor that counts—this is the fact which explains why many religious sects or philosophical systems, inspite of their difference of beliefs, practices and codes of conduct, are yet able to coexist in the orthodox Hindu tradition.

This being the case, all sects and philosophical systems in India give their closest attention and most serious thought to the method of realization, which is termed mokṣa-sādhana. Literally, it is the means by which something, viz., the desired end is attained, and in this case it includes a well-planned systematic course of self-discipline—physical, mental, moral and spiritual—by which the gulf between the idea and the fact, the knowledge and the being of reality is bridged. Every type of theory (siddhānta) and every kind of practice (anuṣṭhāna) which might be helpful in the attainment of the goal, is examined theoretically by critical reasoning and tested practically by actual experimentation; only those are accepted as valid which are thus demonstrated and verified by both reason and experience. The Indian approach to the problem of method is truly scientific in this respect¹ as well as in the exactness with which the nature, stages, details of supporting and obstructing factors of the means and the qualifications of the spiritual aspirant (sādhaka) are worked out.

The nature of this realization is understood in the widest possible sense:

1. N. K. Brahma, *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhana*, p. 52.

since the human soul is striving to rise from imperfection to perfection, from ignorance to knowledge, from the unreal to the real, from death to immortality¹ no one particular type of experience can take in the wholeness and perfection of reality. On the one hand is the infinitude of reality and on the other hand the fact of many-faceted human nature—these two factors lead the Indian thinkers to the acknowledgement of innumerable ways of realization of the Divine.

Historically, three movements can be discerned in the Hindu tradition which has its source in the Vedas. The first and the earliest phase was that of the active faith of the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmanas in which men approached the higher anthropomorphised powers through methods of sacrifice. This self-assertive and activist phase was followed by the more rationalistic phase of the Upaniṣads and their later developments in the Vedānta schools wherein men turned inward in self-contemplation in their search for reality. The Epics and the Purānas represent the third and last phase which appeared in its full grown form in the sectarian religions wherein the human spirit had its uttermost development of the feeling of faith, reverence and love. Corresponding to these three movements tradition accepts broadly three paths (mārga) to mokṣa. Karma-mārga (the path of action), jñāna-mārga (the path of knowledge) and bhakti-mārga (the path of devotion) can be explained from one stand-point as the three approaches of man through the conative, cognitive and affective aspects (karma, vicāra and bhāvanā) of his nature to God or reality, conceived in its three aspects—God as power or sat, God as truth or cit and God as supreme personality characterised by bliss or ānand.² From another stand-point the three sādhanās represent the three types of upāsana or meditations, from the most superficial to the most abstract and impersonal contemplation, to remove the distance between the worshipper and the object of worship. Karma-mārga allows for the upāsana of the āgāvābaddha type in which the aspirant develops himself through many religious activities. In bhakti-mārga there is pratīka-upāsana or worship of one particular form of the personalised deity and in jñāna-mārga there is ahaṁgraha or ātmopāsana or contemplation of reality in the form of the impersonal self. The

1. Br. Upa., I, 3, 27.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I, 533.

important thing to be noted is that each individual chooses his own path and even his own ideal according to the needs of his own nature and aptitudes. Adhikaravāda (doctrine of fitness) with its emphasis on the qualifications and the state of preparedness of the disciple determining the undertaking of a particular type of discipline and stages of growth in it, is an essential corollary of the spiritual practice.

The followers of the three paths, in a partisan spirit, try to prove the superior efficacy of either karma or jñāna or bhakti in attaining the goal. However, the antagonism of the three paths is only apparent and not real. All the sādhanas lead to the goal of salvation, which, though explained differently by different schools, is to be understood as the attainment of perfect equanimity, peace and bliss, perfect independence and self-control.¹ It is a state of fearlessness (abhaya), as union with reality is achieved. Secondly, it is to be noted that none of the courses can stand by itself, but a harmonious synthesis of ideals and methods becomes necessary. Thus, apart from Sāṅkhya which follows the path of mere jñāna other systems, viz., Pātañjala-yoga and Advaita, admit the possibility of karma as an optional or compulsory preliminary for the attainment of highest knowledge, though it may cease afterwards. The Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, admit knowledge of self as subsidiary to karma in achieving liberation. Finally, there is the samuccayavāda of Nyāya and Rāmānuja which combines karma and jñāna as perfectly coordinate sādhanas. Both systems are theistic and, in fact, Rāmānuja declares bhakti to be the crown of all spiritual effort. The most perfect synthesis of the three is achieved in the Bhagavadgītā. It teaches karma,² but this work culminates in jñāna³ and is motivated by supreme bhakti towards God.⁴ Thirdly, followers of all paths unanimously agree about the necessity of self-purification or citta-suddhi and detachment or vairāgya as the essential prerequisite of mokṣa which is to be attained by karma. The difference is thus not so much in regard to karma as such but in regard to karma as a means to liberation. In the karma-mārga renunciation is of the fruit of work, in jñāna-mārga it is renunciation of the illusory universe, in bhakti-mārga it is

1. B. G., V, 19; VI, 15, 28 and 24.

2. B. G., II, 18, 37; III, 19; VIII, 7; XI, 33; XVI, 24; XVIII, 72.

3. B. G., IV, 33.

4. B. G., XVIII, 57.

of all attractions and objects of the world except God. The rāja-yoga of Patañjali is the universal discipline used by all types of spiritual aspirants either implicitly or explicitly, either in part or in its entirety of eight steps. Yoga has many meanings and in its most general connotation it is the union of man and God. But in the Aṣṭāṅgayoga-Sāstra it is the science and art of mental discipline (citta-vṛtti nirodha) which is the condition of citta-suddhi. Yama¹ and niyama² are the negative and positive ethical controls which together with the next three steps of asana (posture), prāṇāyāma (breath control) and pratyāhara (drawing in of sense-organs from their objects) constitute the more external discipline which precedes and prepares the way for the internal discipline of samyama³ culminating in samādhi. In all systems physical, moral and mental discipline forms the bahiraṅga sādhana and dhyāna and samādhi is antarāṅga sādhana corresponding to the two aspects of rāja-yoga. It might be noted in passing that Yoga finds a place for all three methods in the course of its discipline as Īśvara-praṇidhāna, tapa and swādhyāya form the kriyā-yoga while the triad constituting samyama is the jñāna-yoga and devotion to God as the supreme teacher to whom all fruits are surrendered⁴ is the bhakti-yoga, which is the easiest method of achieving the goal as God by His grace removes all obstructions to it.

Doctrines of salvation by works is historically the oldest and followed by the larger proportion of the people in all ages, though having different implications in different periods. The concrete and active deities of the Rg-Veda demanded a concrete and active worship from man. Sacrificial ritual was the only way to propitiate their anger, to gain their favour and a share in life after death. The philosophic basis of such religious activity was the sacrifice of the Supreme Being (Ekam Puruṣa) by which the world was created.⁵ The principle of personality is linked with creative activity since the world originated from the will and effort of the supreme. Man as a creature of the eternal must share in that will and, in imitation of the gods, take part in the eternal sacrifice, in a spirit of faith, charity and truth. Systematisation of Vedic

1. viz., ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya, aparigraha.

2. viz., śauca, santosa, swādhyāya, Īśvara-praṇidhāna.

3. viz., dhāraṇā, dhyāna, samādhi.

4. Patañjala-Sātra, II, 1; I, 23, 26; II, 1.

5. R. V., I, 90.

karma-mārga occurred in the literature of the Brahmanas and Kalpa-Sutras, where karma was definitely equated with sacrifice and the tendency was to limit it to bodily actions only. It overshadowed everything in as much as men and even gods were sustained by it.¹ Men won salvation by paying their debts in the form of ritual.² The Sruta-Sutras prescribed great public sacrifices and the Gṛhya-Sūtras the domestic sacraments requiring oblations of animals, grains, fruits etc. This Karma-Kāṇḍa was popularised by the Śruti literature. The Dharma-Śāstras took the legal view of karma in laying down the precepts of varṇāśrama-dharma. In the Pauranic period karma-mārga prevailed among all sects taking the form of worship and prayer to gods in homes and temples, performances of prescribed rites and sacrifices, specially of the non-bloody types, fasts, charity, pilgrimages, penances and ascetic practices. Karma-Mīmāṃsā represents the philosophical aspect of this approach. Earlier philosophers viz., Jaimini and Śābara were only concerned to lay down rules for the interpretation of Vedas so as to ascertain the commands in respect of karma (codanā) as a means to life in heaven. But with the acceptance of mokṣa as the goal later philosophers proclaimed the efficacy of karma in attaining parama puruṣārtha. By performance of nitya karma (obligatory duties) such as sandhyā or agnihotra sacrifice and of naimittika karma (occasional rites), without desire for fruit in the form of attainment of heaven, and avoidance of niṣiddha karma (prohibited actions) and kāmya karma (fruitful activity), man attains liberation, which consists in cessation of karma and its potentiality and of the body which is its result. In the karma-mārga emphasis is on karma as the principal factor in achieving the goal, whereas in the other paths it plays a secondary part.

As mentioned earlier the Bhagavadgītā attempted to arrive at a working synthesis of all the sādhanas and, what is more important, it gave a new direction and depth to the method of works. It takes the word karma in its widest sense, of not only sacrificial actions but all actions, not merely physical actions but also mental actions. Karma-yoga differs from the earlier karma-niṣṭhā in as much as, in the view of the Gītā, the latter leads to impermanent ends since the merit collected by sacrifice is bound to

1. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, III, I, 43; IV, III, 2, 5.

2. *ibid.*, I, VII, 2.

be exhausted, while the former leads to the highest end from which there is no return to *samsara*¹ and yet there is continued activity in the world² by total surrender of mind and heart, of all actions and even of the sense of doership in the hands of the Absolute. By this process karma is transformed—from being a source of bondage it becomes the vehicle of liberation. Yoga is defined as equanimity (*samatvam*)³ or sameness of mind under all circumstances, towards all beings and pairs of opposites. Such unique behaviour so different from the ordinary behaviour flows from a vision of the real self and the realization that all created beings are in the one self and vice-versa. In the light of this vision elimination of egoistic and separative consciousness occurs and equality of reason (*sthitaprajñatā*) is attained. The *Gītā* admits, very frankly, the impossibility of total cessation of work. *Karma-sannyāsa* taught by *Sāṅkhya* is contradicted by the very necessities of *śarīrayātrā* which are controlled by *Prakṛti* (nature). This being the case, the first rule of *karma-yoga* is *niṣkāmatā*. Not work, but desires in the form of primary instincts of attachment and repulsion (*rāga-dveṣa*) towards objects, passions and self-seeking, disturb the mental poise, and have to be given up. This negative principle is supplemented by the positive rule, wherein in place of the ordinary selfish motives and incentives the *Gītā* enjoins action as a sacrifice to the Divine. This is to be no formal ceremonialism, as hitherto, but the sacrifice of the egoistic self to the universal self, by which alone self-fulfilment can result. Such action will be in complete accord with the sacrificial cycle⁴ by which the universe is created and sustained. Both the physical and moral necessity of action is established by the *Gītā*. Identifying himself with divine cosmic consciousness (*Brāhmī-sthiti*) man performs his share of the world's work (*swadharma*) in a god-like spirit for maintaining the world (*lokasaṅgraha*). In whatever spirit man approaches reality his sacrifice is accepted in the same spirit and each act however lowly is sublimated. Since knowledge of *Ātman* has taught man that actions are but modifications of *Prakṛti* he escapes the natural law of karma or cause and effects. His work is done most perfectly

1. B. G., IV, 6; VIII, 15, 16.

2. B. G., XVIII, 3-4; M. B., *Shāntiparva*, 348, 53; 347, 80-81.

3. B. G., II, 48.

4. B. G., III, 10-16.

yet it is purely physical work, since he has no personal desires left. This is the meaning of the sayings that the wise see action in inaction and vice-versa and that the wise man is the worker who works not.¹ Such a discipline requires and creates devotion, for this constant withdrawal of self from one's desire-nature is too difficult for most, hence the aspirant may regard himself as the instrument of the Divine and seek Him in friendly and compassionate service of all life. If even selfless love-inspired action is difficult then work may be done for oneself, yet fruit may be renounced under the conception of God as the Divine Governor who has entrusted his property to man. From renunciation will result peace, which will make the practice (abhyāsa) possible, and, from this, knowledge of truth will result. Thus the Gītā declares the jñānī-bhakta to be the dearly beloved of God² and also the true yogī. In the last chapter the Gītā gives a clear verdict on the question of the method of attaining the summum bonum—sannyāsa or nivṛtti is the renunciation of desire-prompted action for the attainment of Brahma-nirvāna but it is not the highest stage. The ultimate stage is karma-yoga or tyāga or dedication to the one self in all life of the fruits of action performed desirelessly. It brings the same result as sannyāsa,³ and, in fact, true sannyāsa is impossible without this niṣkāma-bhāva. Karma-yoga is the easiest path of all, which can be followed by all, even the householder, who may, by this method of nivṛtti, attain the highest good (śreya).

Jñāna-mārga as a distinct spiritual discipline had its origin in the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. With the arising of the doctrine of karma and saṁsāra it appeared to the critical minds of the philosophers that karma with its selfish and unenduring fruits was altogether inadequate for achieving liberation.⁴ Both brāhmana and non-brāhmana thinkers inquired into the nature of karma and the laws of its fulfilment and working out. The philosophical systems applied the Vedic conception of law more vigorously to life and universe and combining it with the moral conception of cause and effect, bondage and suffering came to conceive the goal of life as the end of suffering. This was to be

1. B. G., IV, 18 and 20.

2. B. G., VII, 17.

3. B. G., IV, 2.

4. Kaṭha Upa., I, 2; Chān. Upa., VII, 10; VIII, 1, 6; Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22.

attained by a culture of true knowledge, through the discipline of yoga culminating in self-illumination (Ātma-jñāna) rather than by Vedic and allied knowledge. The six systems form a series in which Purva-Mīmāṃsā gave explanation of Vedic ritual and duties, Nyāya investigated the method of reasoning, Vaiśeṣika analysed metaphysical doctrines and reduced the universe to nine ultimates, Sāṅkhya reduced these to two, Yoga developed the practical discipline for direct experience of truth and Vedānta rose to the idea of absolute unity. The heterodox systems of Buddhism and Jainism also understood liberation to consist of true knowledge, as well as the sectarian religions like Pāñcarātra and Śaivism. The starting point of all religions and philosophies in India was the acceptance that ignorance is the cause of bondage, hence the end for all is perfect knowledge. However, the goal of spiritual endeavour (jñāna) is to be distinguished from the path of knowledge (jñāna-mārga) which is just one way among three. Here (Ātmopāsanā) is worship of the highest as the real self,¹ than which there is nothing nearer or dearer to man. It is the most direct and immediate form of worship.

The three processes of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana constitute the essence of the intellectual method. The Upaniṣads² give their attention wholly to this internal aspect (antarāṅga) of the discipline while later thinkers prescribe other mental and moral trainings as the preparatory external means (bahiraṅga) constituting an auxiliary part (sahākārī) of the main discipline. Śravaṇa consists in receiving lessons from the scriptures or the spiritual preceptor who is well-versed in the scriptures and experienced in the truth. The teaching must be regulated, direct or otherwise, according to the nature of the subject and the fitness of the aspirant. After hearing that there is no real bondage he ponders upon the significance of this and trying to drive out contrary beliefs about the reality of phenomenal experience fixes this truth in his mind. So far the aspirant has proceeded on faith (śraddha) in the scriptures and the guru, because without such faith not even the hearing of truth can take place, let alone the attainment of it. But faith cannot contradict reason for long, so the truth must be established by manana. All legitimate doubts and questions must be removed by

1. Br. Upa., I, 4, 8.

2. Chān. Upa., VII, 6, 1; Mānd. Upa., II, 2, 3; Maitrī Upa., III, 4, 4; Br. Upa., IV, 4, 21.

ratiocination, argumentation and discussion and only when conviction has been logically established does a certain loosening of the bonds of attachment take place. However, this knowledge being merely intellectual is still indirect and not powerful enough to counteract ignorance. Wrong knowledge of self and the world is fixed in the mind by direct experience of countless lives, hence the difficulty of destroying "worldwardness" of the mind. The content of the final experience will differ according to the sādḥaka's belief in the nature of reality but all are unanimous regarding the necessity of transforming mere intellectual conviction or reason into intuition. Such an experience (anubhava) is termed Brahmavidyā (Rāmaṇuja, Nimbārka) or Tattvajñāna (Advaita) or Vivekajñāna (Sāṅkhya), its essential character being immediacy (aparokṣatva) and infallibility. Jñāna is a term used for both intellectual and intuitive knowledge but the distinction is clear to all. The Gītā distinguishes between jñāna, which is mediate knowledge, and vijñāna, which is the same transformed into living experience. Nididhyāsana or dhyāna is the final step to convert the idea of reality into the being of reality. It requires complete self-concentration, withdrawal of the mind from all gross objects, overcoming of all mental and physical obstacles¹ and even the forgetting of one's separative selfhood. By repeated concentration on the one reality (ekatattva abhyāsa) illumination occurs in the form of samādhi. Śāṅkara sums up the relation of the three successive steps of the intellectual discipline:

Bhakti-mārga is the latest of the three cults to arise in the history of Hinduism, but it has fully justified itself by the extent and power of its hold on the mass-mind. Though ritualism was predominant in the Vedic period reflection showed that the Vedic mantras were used in the sacrifices to gain the good-will of the divine beings; the true essence of religion was upāsana or bhajana in the shape of namaskāra, vandanā, sevā and archanā. The spirit of sacrifice was not so much represented by the mechanical

1. Patañjali talks of nine diseases, viz., unfitness, doubt, indifference, idleness, attachment, error, failure of concentration, persistence in that state. Sadānand in Vedāntasāra talks of four obstacles, viz., mental inertia, distraction, passion and tasting of flavours.
2. Vivekachūdāmaṇi, 365.

and material offerings but by the sraddha with which they were offered.¹ Vedic hymns to Varuna, Ushā etc. exhibit fully the sentiments of devotion, piety, reverence. The Upanisads advocate the jñāna-mārga but the spirit of devotion is not lacking in them. Upāsana was taught in order to turn the mind towards reality; introspection and contemplation by which communion was sought to be established with the Supreme Lord (Paramātmā) had sraddhā at its root. Evidence of bhakti towards a personal deity and the doctrine of grace which is an integral part of the bhakti-cult is clear in many passages of the Upanisads.² The Bhagavadgītā is the earliest scripture which expressly tries to establish bhakti as an independent niṣṭha equal to the others. Its efforts on this point might be an indication that upto that time bhakti was not considered an independent sādhanā. The Nāradiya or Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata teaches the ekāntin-dharma which is an echo of the Gītā-teaching. In the same place is mentioned the Pāncarātra-dharma which proclaims bhakti towards Nārāyaṇa as the supreme ruler and creator of the world. Śuddha bhakti appears in this religion of the Bhāgavatas. The full blossoming of the bhakti-cult is seen in the Purāṇas. The Bhāgavat-Purāṇa makes Kṛṣṇa the all-pervading supreme personality and teaches selfless, unceasing devotion towards Him. The later devotional literature of the medieval period and the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva scriptures propound the religion of bhakti. All Indian systems trace their source to sūtras bearing the names of their real or fictitious expounders, and it was not long after the rise of the bhakti-cult that Nārada and Śāṅdīlya Sūtras came to be regarded as the authorised texts of bhakti-mārga.

All the works on bhakti point out its superiority in as much as it is the easiest and the most effective method. The Bhāgavat declares that the finite self separated from God by the veil of illusion incurs sorrow and suffering due to its identification with objects, but this tendency can be counteracted by bhakti which is the natural function of man, hence the highest dharma, whose consummation lies in the supreme pleasure of Bhagavān.³ Bhakti does not need anything to support it but carries its own validity.⁴

1. R. V., I, 15, 60; II, 12; Sāma-Veda, I, I, 9.

2. Kāṭha Upa., II, 23; Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 3; Śve. Upa., VI, 23.

3. B. P., I, 2, 6 and 13.

4. Nārada-Sūtra, 58-60.

Here is the realization of God by love and not by abstract thinking or mechanical actions of the body; love is a universal and powerful factor in life of which bhakti is the best possible use. Besides, karma and jñana always contain some tinge of pride and egoism, therefore, they cannot arouse God's mercy as humble and meek bhakti can.¹ Bhakti has the additional advantage of being open to all classes and conditions of men. All castes are capable (adhikāri) of devotion as all are sharers in the sāmānya-dharma, and no disabilities of family, knowledge etc. are admitted.² The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins throw open this sādhanā to men of all castes subject only to the requirement of the desire for mokṣa and absence of all interest but God, while the other sādhanās are reserved for the twice-born castes only. Psychologically, the simplicity of the bhakti-mārga can be explained by the fact that man's senses are naturally turned outwards and here the sādhanā's attention is centred on a concrete object, and that object the most infinite and perfect of all. He has but to develop his natural attraction towards all good, true and beautiful objects and trace them to their source, viz., God. There comes a point where he forgets himself as a separate entity and the whole of his consciousness is pervaded by the object of worship. In the jñāna-mārga there is the much more difficult process of turning the mind inward and by concentration on the qualityless, hence, abstract Ātman the attempt to rise above the subject-object relation (tripuṭivilaya). The Gītā admits that the knowledge of the unmanifest is difficult and possible only for the few, while loving devotion for the Lord in the incarnate form is possible for the weakest, most ignorant, lowly and sinful.³ Since the concentration in bhakti is on the blissful aspect of God and the bhakta meditates on the auspicious attributes of God, he is led easily and step-by-step towards higher and higher experiences. Rāmānuja says that in point of early fulfilment and felicity of performance the superiority of bhakti consists in the object of love or God Himself.⁴

Bhakti is defined as supreme attachment towards God.⁵ It is absolute perfection of the emotional element and Nimbārka states its essential character to be special love

1. *ibid.*, 81.

2. Śaṅḍīlya-Sūtra, 78; Nārada-Sūtra, 72; B. P., IX, 14, 21.

3. B. G., XII, 5; IX, 32.

4. Bhāṣya on the Gītā, Intro. to chap. XII.

5. Śaṅḍīlya-Sūtra, 2.

of God. The bhaktas declare their inability to describe its nature fully, as is the state of the dumb who tastes the sweet fruit. But the experience is the most real of all and one who has it attains immortality, perfection, and satisfaction (atmarama) in the self; a state free from sorrows or attachment of objects; a state of peace.¹

Rāmānuja defines it as continuous, vivid, loving recollection and meditation on the Lord (dhruvasmṛti),² which when perfected gives rise to direct perception or sākṣātkāra.

There is a difference among the Bhaktivādins as to the possibility of combining bhakti with other sādhanas, specially jñāna. Śaṅḍīlya declares that bhakti is antagonistic to the others as with its dawning jñāna is destroyed; nor does it need the effort of the agent as does kriyā.³ Nārada says that it requires nothing else being its own means and its own end.⁴ The Bhāgavat-Purāna though expressing similar views in certain places tends to the general position that karma and jñāna and all other means are subordinated to bhakti; in fact, they operate only when undergirded by bhakti and it is bhakti which gives rise to jñāna.⁵ In the synthetic approach of the Gītā the marks of the jñānī and the bhakta are found to be substantially identical and both come together in the realization of the goal. Hence, of the four types of bhaktas the jñānī bhakta is declared to be the best.⁶ Among the Vaiṣṇava philosophers the difference on this point is one of degree rather than of kind. Rāmānuja thinks that Brahma-sākṣātkāra is jñāna which assumes the form of loving devotion. Vallabha and Nimbārka hold bhakti to be the goal but Brahmavidyā or jñāna as instrumental in generating devotion. Madhvācārya believes that karma performed with jñāna is useful in deepening bhakti. Unlike these teachers the followers of Caitanya think that the highest bhakti is self-proven and needs neither jñāna nor karma. Though all of them stress bhakti and subordinate or minimise jñāna it is to be remembered that the goal to be reached by either path is the same; but while in the jñāna-mārga the approach to that one reality is from the view-point of consciousness and cit and the end is direct perception of the supreme self, in the bhakti-

1. Nārada-Sūtra, 3-6.

2. Śrī Bhāṣya, IV, 1, 1.

3. Śaṅḍīlya-Sūtra, 4, 5.

4. Nārada-Sūtra, 30.

5. B. P., I, 14, 4; IV, 29, 37.

6. B. G., VII, 17.

mārga the approach is from the view-point of anand and the end is the experience of supreme love (premaśvada).

The essence of bhakti is ananyatva or eka saranatva i. e., exclusive devotion and complete dedication (arpaṇa) of all possessions, all acts of body, speech, senses, mind, intellect and ego, and, in fact, of self to God.¹ The Gīta ends its teaching by enjoining the devotee to seek refuge in God alone for absolution of sins.² Such a merging of mind and will in that of God, so that God's pleasure is the pleasure of the devotee, is called sevā of God;³ and such a self-forgetfulness is prapatti in which the devotee in all humility throws himself completely upon the mercy of God. The bhaktas are agreed that salvation is not due to the merit of the weak and imperfect individual, but to the grace of God (prasāda) alone, but some hold that the devotee's effort must combine with God's grace (markaṭa-siddhānta) while others regard grace alone as sufficient in leading to mokṣa without any effort on the part of the devotee (mārjāra-siddhānta).

Since bhakti requires the establishment of a special and personal relationship of love with God the devotee regards God as his Lord alone, as belonging to him exclusively. Such iṣṭa-niṣṭhā, as it is called, is an important element of bhakti, beautifully brought out in the statement of Hanumana, "I know that the Lord of Lakṣmī and the Lord of Jānakī are one as the Supreme Spirit (Paramātman) yet my all is in the lotus-eyed Rāmachandra." Bhakti-mārga allows for that conception of the object of worship which will be in perfect accord with the nature and need of the sādḥaka, to facilitate his spiritual growth. Thus, those with an intellectual bias hold God to be formless, qualityless, impersonal being pervading the universe, the Self of all selves and their worship is of the nirguṇa type. Others regard God as a Supreme Person endowed with many attributes, with whom various relations are possible. Pratīka-upāsanā occurs because it is easier for the large majority to conceive of God as having a form. Again, among such saguṇopāsakas, as they are called, some need a very concrete ideal such as that of God appearing in history as an avatāra.

1. B. P., XI, 2, 33.

2. B. G., XVIII, 66; VIII, 14; IX, 54.

3. Nārada-Sūtra, 64.

In the bhakti-mārga the personality of God is insisted upon as well as the duality of bhakta and Bhagavan, the finite devotee and the absolute object, for the maintenance of the love-relationship. All the Vaisnava theists attack the Advaita theory of the impersonal and attributeless reality and try to prove the concrete and personal nature of the highest as creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world. In this connection they reject the theory of world-illusion, and, in place of it, establish the reality of world-multiplicity and its relation with God. They are also concerned to refute the Advaita theory of absolute identity in favour of the theory of distinction between jīva and Paramātmā; while Madhvācārya adopts the position of absolute duality the other teachers postulate varying types of difference and identity between self and God. Since the infinite is realized by the devotee as an object of consciousness the duality of sevaka and sevya remains at every stage and even in the state of liberation. Mokṣa never takes the form of sāyujya or absolute identity with Brahma, but may appear as residence of a perfected soul in the eternal abode of God (sālokya) or enjoyment of the glory of God (sārṣṭi) or nearness of God (sāmīpya) or acquisition of the qualities of God (sārūpya). Or the end may be the highest bhakti, called nirguṇa bhakti by the Bhāgavat, in which even desire for liberation is absent and in which the devotee goes beyond all guṇas to the love-nature of God.¹ In any case, the distance of the worshipper and worshipped is never wholly overcome.

A distinction must be made between bhakti as means or aparā, gaunī bhakti and bhakti as end or parā, premā bhakti. The former represents the discipline of the bhakti-mārga the essence of which is vairāgya, which is implied in the teaching of unmotivated bhakti in the Bhāgavat.² Nārada declares that the nature of bhakti is nirodha or renunciation of worldly and scriptural actions, indifference to all things opposed to the object of worship.³ The vairāgya of the bhakti-mārga is characterised by naturalness and spontaneity. Here is no negative effort at forcible detachment of the mind from the world but an almost effortless and unconscious detachment occurs when the mind is attracted towards God. It is to be noted that bhakti does not require

1. B. P., III, 29, 8-10.

2. B. P., Māhātmya; IV, 29, 37; I, 2, 6.

3. Nārada-Sūtra, 7-9.

renunciation of all desires, but only desire for objects.¹ Love of God makes the bhakta restless whenever there is consciousness of separation from God or forgetfulness of God.² Thus the higher interest drives out the lower; the expulsive power of a new affection, is a great psychological truth.

As a means of attaining supreme one-pointed bhakti the scriptures enjoin the practice of injunctory (vaidhī) bhakti. This external discipline inclines the mind towards God and generates the spontaneous love or internal discipline called rāga-mārga or path of love alone. The Bhāgavat brings out both aspects in its teaching of navadhā bhakti.³ Śravaṇa is listening to scriptural instruction imparted by the guru and study of the scriptures, whose meaning gradually dawns upon the sādḥaka. Kīrtana is singing of God's name, His glory, His qualities, the story of His embodied forms and exposition of His impersonal nature. This is the best means of controlling the restlessness of the mind and of purifying speech. There must be constant remembrance or smarana of God's name at all times, under all conditions. Pādasevana literally means bowing before God's image and before the guru in complete humility and reverence. It is complete subservience in speech, mind and body to the commands of God and the guru without whose mediation and grace liberation is not possible. Arcanā is actual or mental worship of God's images with scriptural rites and objects. Offering of the best of our possessions and actions to God creates a spirit of dedication and non-attachment. Namaśkāra is expression of devotion by bowing or prostration before God and all good and saintly men by whose grace forgiveness of sins is obtained. It epitomizes all spiritual virtues. The last three steps constitute rites of worship and are followed by dāsya or service of God and God's devotees in all places and in all ways, great and small. Sakhya is the cultivation of friendship towards God. God tests his devotee in every way, but through all suffering the devotee must calmly hold to his faith and love. Regarding God as his all-in-all he must, patiently, learn to make God's will his own. This is the real test of bhakti-mārga and in this stage occurs the coming together of the devotion of the

1. Śāṅḍilya-Sūtra, 21.

2. Nārada-Sūtra, 19.

3. B. P., VII, 5, 23: श्रवणम् कर्तव्यम् [विष्णोः स्मरणम्] पादसेवनाम्, अर्चनम्, कर्तव्यम् [कर्मणः] शक्याम् ।
Also Śāṅḍilya-Sūtra, 47-48; Nārada-Sūtra, 36-38.

helpless devotee and the grace of God. Atma-nivedana is the culmination of the bhakti-marga, in which all separateness is lost. The falseness of the ego is realized and only God remains.

The followers of Caitanya advocate the raga-marga or the life of love in which there are no laws to be followed as in the vidhi-marga, and it is the higher stage which follows from the latter. The distinctive feature of ragatmika or prema bhakti is the adoption of various human relationships with God. The sadhaka may cultivate any of the many emotional attitudes which hold between human beings and direct them towards God. This process being in line with the natural psychological process also accounts for the simplicity and popularity of the bhakti-marga. There is no suppression of emotions, but a full expression of the purified and God-directed emotion. Indian Bhakti-literature depicts experimentations in emotional relationships with God on a larger scale and with a greater wealth of detail than any other devotional literature of the world. Rasa or infinite bliss of God is reflected in lesser degree in human life and takes the form of dāsya-bhāva (master and servant relationship) or sakhya-bhāva (relationship of friendship) or vātsalya-bhāva (mother and child relationship) or madhura or kānta-bhāva (relation of lover and beloved or husband and wife) or śānta-bhāva (calm and peace from which the idea of personal relationship is excluded). This latter type is called jñāna-mīra bhakti. The bhakta may pass through various types of love-relationships with God or having adopted any one of them may, by sublimation and intensification of it, reach God. The theists regard dāsya-bhakti as the most inferior, containing, as it does, an element of fear and compulsion and madhura-bhakti as the best, since it is love inspired by the loving and charming attributes of God. This is the truly unmotivated (ahaitukī) bhakti, which even desire for mokṣa does not contaminate. But it must be remembered that all such love (prema) must be completely free from sensual passion (kāma), since it is love transformed from the secular into the spiritual and the divine.

The Protestant Attitude

The tradition described above has a long history, going back to a remote date when it was brought to north India by the Indo-Āryans, and gradually adopted by a

majority of the indigenous people in the course of centuries. There has been a remarkable continuity of it in as much as new doctrines, philosophies and institutions were but developments of the seeds contained in the Vedas. The scholarly division of it into Vedism, Brahmanism and Hinduism does not obscure the fact that these are actually stages of one and the same developing tradition. This tradition was powerful and comprehensive enough to keep all major deviations within bounds without the need of a central regulating authority and the help of any political authority or, if the dissidence or heresy became too marked, it was expelled from the main body of tradition.

From this it should not be concluded that the Hindu tradition was so overpowering as to elicit blind or unquestioned assent from the totality of the population. Every society allows an area of freedom and an area of control and the Hindu society allowed this freedom in the sphere of thought. Man could believe any doctrine—he could believe in all gods or one God or no God—and could even propagate his belief by preaching. The danger of chaos inherent in such unrestricted freedom of thought was counteracted by utmost control in action. Dharma was the supreme regulative authority in society, preventing disruption of it. Under this combination of utmost liberty of thought with conformity in action we should not be surprised to find scepticism of every form and degree expressed by religious thinkers. Nor was such scepticism a feature of only periods of prosperity and wealth,¹ but the sequel will show that every age of Hinduism, however degraded, had its protestants who raised their voice against traditional beliefs in the midst of prevailing piety.

Though tradition has its source in the scriptures yet there is no fixity or closed character about it. From the beginning it is a vital growth developing in many directions by the assimilation of beliefs and practices. The theoretical aspect of this growth occurred in the new interpretations of revelation in every age, so that the link was maintained between the new form of tradition and its ancient source. This constantly changing nature of Hindu tradition is to be explained in terms of expression of new doctrines which took place in the atmosphere of intellectual freedom. Orthodoxy

1. vide Will Durant, *Story of Civilization*, I, 522: Humanity doubts its gods most when it prospers, and worships them most when it is miserable.

adopted the weapons of conciliation, concession, compromise against such daring innovations. Though we may not go to the extent of saying that it was orthodoxy and not heresy or reformation which was mostly on the defensive in such conflicts,¹ yet it must be admitted that it could only win by making large concessions and by adopting from the new positions all that was of popular appeal in them, thus, being itself modified in the process.

Though the freest discussions were tolerated in intellectual circles yet a distinction did exist between orthodox and heterodox beliefs, relating not so much to thought as to action, the area of social control. Thus orthodoxy did not mean conservatism of conduct nor did heterodoxy imply revolutionary attitudes. The latter was any type of action of a group which did not accord with the tradition of Brahmanical sacraments or deliberately neglected it on principle, thereby creating a new tradition. Formation of new groups separating from the main body of society might be accompanied by assertion of new theological doctrines, but this was a secondary consideration. Such attacks on tradition occurred from time to time, both internally and externally, resulting in such modifications of it as to bring it in line with existing needs.

Doubts may be of three kinds—those arising from an attitude of general scepticism or from theological differences or taking the extreme form of a positive assertion of the non-existence of God.² Tradition shows many examples of the last two kinds throughout the course of its history, though the form and nature of these may be different according to the conditions under which they were voiced. The long drawn out contest of Brahmanical Hinduism and the Buddhist and Jain heresies, the opposition of Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava sectarians, the quarrels of Vedāntic schools are examples of theological and philosophical scepticism. It is claimed that atheism in all its forms was never so wide-spread or aggressive as in modern times.³ Ignoring the fact that atheism is not necessarily irreligion, since the name of religion cannot be denied to Buddhism and Jainism inspite of atheistic metaphysics, and that there are types of politico-economic systems which have developed all the marks and motives of religion though they

1. vide Cultural Heritage of India, IV, 12.

2. A. Lee, Philosophy of Religion, p. 186.

3. *ibid.*, p. 187.

are manifestly atheistic, we find that ancient India was not lacking in atheism of various kinds. There were thinkers, if not schools,¹ who totally rejected the traditional values of dharma and mokṣa together with belief in divine powers and some eternal essence in man, on which such values rested. Examples of agnosticism or active anti-theism may be found both within and without tradition, since the criterion for distinguishing orthodoxy from heterodoxy was never atheism but the acceptance or non-acceptance of Śruti. This was some times no more than a formality since the widest latitude was allowed in the interpretation of it.

In order to compare the nature and forms of the protests we may divide the history of Hinduism into three periods, and briefly noting the intellectual atmosphere and social conditions of each together with the main movements of protest draw our conclusions regarding their similarities and dissimilarities. The ancient period may be said to extend from the establishment of the Indo-Āryan Vedic tradition till the eighth century A.D., which saw the victory of traditional religion over the two heretical systems. The medieval period extends from the eighth century A.D., marked by the rise of Brāhmanical systems in defence of the Karma- and Jñāna-Kāṇḍas of the Vedas, till the end of the seventeenth century A.D., which saw the complete exhaustion of the great Bhakti-movement. The modern period began in the eighteenth century A.D. with the gradual extension of British power in India and may be said to be still continuing, since the new forces which appeared in the early part of this period are still working themselves out.

Doubts began with the very establishment of tradition, as it were. Disbelief in the gods, and the world and men's modes of approaching the gods is expressed even by some Rg-Vedic poets.² The Upaniṣadic thinkers seem to revolt against the priestly system and the soulless ritual. The Vedic knowledge is declared to be the lower truth as compared to the superiority of Ātmavidyā.³ Meditation and inner system of self-control is substituted in place of the mechanical and cumbersome method of animal

1. References to the Lōkāyata doctrines which came to include all anti-brāhmanical and anti-traditional beliefs are to be found in the Buddhist canons, Rāmāyana, Shāntiparva, Svasaṃvedyopaniṣad, Sarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha.

2. R. V., X, 129; VIII, 89, 3; VII, 163.

3. Muṇḍ. Upa., I, 1, 45; III, 2, 3; Kaṭha Upa., I, 2, 2, 3.

sacrifice.¹ Such teaching may not be regarded as a revolt against tradition, but as a development of it from the elementary stage of externalism and formal course of instruction to the advanced philosophical and internal stage of religion. Thus the Upaniṣads form the very heart of the primordial tradition and orthodoxy does not impute to them scepticism or agnosticism. The Upaniṣadic method of generally ignoring the empty ritualism with its goal of happiness in this world and the next in favour of jñāna with its goal of mokṣa together with emphasis on the reality of Atman, and failure to work out a practical religion for the average man, was neither calculated to end this system nor to reduce the power of the priestly class over the masses resting on its claim to be the mediator between the gods and men through correct performance of yajña and possession of magical formulae. Brāhmanic claim of superiority on grounds of birth, knowledge of Vedas and divine ordination was still a debated matter in the sixth century B.C. For the kṣatriyas these pretensions must have been particularly galling, since the exclusion from the right of direct sacrifice which they had once enjoyed as householders in a simpler age and the exclusion from the life of sannyāsa, hence salvation, were serious disabilities. Protests were voiced, however, by brāhmaṇa and non-brāhmaṇa thinkers, who led wandering lives of asceticism and propounded every type of heretical doctrine. Of the three heretical systems, Buddhism, Jainism and Ājivakas, only the first two survived but we find references made to the last in contemporary literature.² Since the Brāhmanical system was founded on particular theories of soul and karma the protestant thinkers questioned these very theories,³ and denied the possibility of salvation.

Buddha's intuition of the four Ārya satyas was supported by a truly rationalistic approach to life. He denied the truth of the Brāhmanical tradition since no one could claim personal insight or knowledge of those truths.⁴ He too proclaimed dharma, but instead of taking a sacramental view of it he established it on the foundation of

1. Kauś. Upa., II, 5; Ait. Upa., III, 2, 6, 8.

2. Brahmajāla-Sūtra mentions sixty-two schools.

3. vide D. N., Samaññaphala-Sūtra.

4. M. N., Cāñcī-Sūtra.

morality.¹ Later the term came to stand for the doctrines of the order but always the emphasis was more on the element of righteousness rather than ritual. As against the brahmanical emphasis on tapas he asserted that insight, self-mastery, emancipation of heart and mind and noble conduct are higher than austerity.² He urged the sacrifice of the heart instead of the physical sacrifice of Karma-Kānda. The goal of life being nirvāna and not the attainment of benefits through coercion of divine powers, jñāna-mārga could be the only path to it.³ Many regard Buddha as a political and social reformer fighting against class-privileges, others hold that he failed to use his influence to abolish the caste system. But this was the period when caste was still in the process of formation and the exclusiveness and privileges associated with it were not as yet too oppressive. He always strove to inculcate the most reasonable view in the public-mind by constantly stressing the claims of wisdom and virtue as against mere birth. Within his own order he disregarded all considerations of birth, occupation, social status or sex. All had equal rights and freedom to attain to his dharma and to the right. Nor did he insist on the gradualness of approach to the goal as did the orthodox but opened the way to all to "go forth" to the life of the bhikku.⁴ Preaching his religion in the common language he excluded none from the highest knowledge. Perhaps his indifference to the gods and his insistence on man's independent striving for the goal, his rejection of Vedic revelation, even his novel doctrines of soul and impermanence which were opposed to traditional doctrines might have been over-looked—the resemblance between these doctrines and doctrines of orthodox Sāṅkhya have been noted—but the establishment of a separate way of life and worship, an independent saṅgha was a more serious matter, disrupting the unity of the parent society. He himself did not think that his system was an innovation or philosophically opposed to traditional doctrines, but regarded it as a return to the original and pure Ārya tradition. Modern scholarship⁵ tends to regard the Buddhist movement not so much as a

1. "What is Dharma? To eschew evil and to follow after good; to be loving, true, pure in life and patient. This is dharma."
2. D. N., Kassapa-Sihanāda-Sūta; M. N., Ghotamukha-Sūta. 209052
3. D. N., Kūṭadaṅṭa-Sūta. 209051
4. M. N., Esukarī-Sūta. 209050
5. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, I, 388; R. de Reincourt, Soul of India, p. 60; L. Renou, Religions of Ancient India, p. 99.

revolt against tradition as a reformation of it in the direction of greater democracy and moral purity.

Mahāvīr also attacked the creed as well as the claims of the brahmanas by denying the Vedas and God on whom the former were based. Disregarding the rule of gradualism he threw open the door of renunciation (sannyāsa) to all. Though the practical value of this rule even in orthodox circles might be limited since few even of the brāhmaṇas advanced to this stage (the Upanisads speak only of three āśramas), yet its abolition had the effect of liberalising religion on the one hand, but of disrupting social life on the other, as all restrictions and qualifications save declaration of faith in the new doctrine were dispensed with. Like other thinkers of his age he too declared that it is conduct which determines one's caste and only he who is above karma is to be called a brāhmaṇa.¹ Belief in the soul combined with belief in karma and transmigration led to a protest against animal sacrifice more emphatic and long continued than that of the Buddhists. Salvation must be sought not through the sinful cult of murder but through the method of austerity consisting of right faith, knowledge and conduct (Triratna). *Samyag-darsana-jñāna-caritrāni mokṣa-mārgah.*

Such protestant systems by virtue of their ethical and spiritual fervour and also with the help of royal patronage were able to gain ascendancy in many parts of the country at different times, but traditional religion was never in danger of disappearing.² In the eighth and ninth centuries decadent Buddhism received its death-blow through destruction of its monasteries by Muslim invaders, through new philosophical attacks of brāhmaṇa thinkers, through the onslaught of popular bhakti in the South. But

Jainism . . . was not extinguished in a storm which swept Buddhism out of India. . . . It had never, like Buddhism, cut itself off from the faith that surrounded it, for it had employed Brāhmaṇas as its domestic chaplains. . . . Then, too, amongst its chief heroes it had found niches for some of the favourites of the Hindu pantheon, . . . Mahāvīr's genius for organization also stood Jainism in good stead now, for he had made the laity an integral part of the community. . . . So, when storms of persecution swept over the land Jainism simply took refuge in Hinduism which opened its capacious bosom to receive it.³

1. S. B. E., XIV, 40: Uttarādhyāyana.

2. cf., Smith, Oxford History of India, p. 55.

3. Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, Heart of Jainism, p. 18.

But such developments did not occur before traditional religion had assimilated from the movements all that made for their universal appeal and permanent value.¹ Buddhism and in a lesser degree Jainism are accountable for growth of image-worship, the temple-cult with new rites and ceremonies, development of monasticism and ecclesiastical discipline in traditional religion. Their irrefutable logic of ahimsa combined with visible proof of the uselessness and costliness of the sacrificial cult and destroyed, largely, public faith in it; and the development of the theory of incarnation and Advaita owes much to Buddhistic influence. However, caste distinctions and brahmanical privileges were too strongly entrenched in the traditional pattern to be demolished by merely a new interpretation on ethical lines, and the protestant movements failed to make any lasting effect on them.

The medieval period is marked by the entry of a new factor. Islamic religion and culture disrupted the unity of the Indian cultural tradition. These new beliefs and practices could not be absorbed as the indigenous ones had been, but the process of interaction modified both and brought out certain principles inherent in the traditional religion. Though the first wave of Muslim invaders entered India between the eighth and the tenth centuries A.D. writings of this period give evidence that the chief rivals were still the heretical systems. From the eighth century onwards leadership of Hinduism was shifted to the South since political upheavals were not conducive to peaceful pursuit of religious life. Attempts were made by brahmanical thinkers to reestablish the theoretical and practical aspects of the traditional system. Śaṅkarācārya aimed to remove the fissiparous tendencies of religious sects and used his dialectical skill to overthrow rival systems of thought and to evolve out of the conflicting Vedāntic texts a logical and harmonious philosophy, while Kumārila Bhaṭṭa attempted the defence of Karma-Kāṇḍa. In this revival tradition was enriched by its admixture with heretical doctrines and popular beliefs. Śaṅkara was no blind supporter of ancient tradition and his attempts to bring about reforms in practical religion by abolishing immoral practices and superstitions met with opposition from orthodoxy. In instituting the orders of saṁnyāsa he rose above conceptions of caste, nor did he accept the rule

1. cf., Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, 103.

that moksa could be pursued only in the last stage of life.

The great Acaryas, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Madhva, and Vallabha were founders of philosophical systems as well as religious reformers. They helped to create the intellectual foundations of revived and expanding Hinduism. Their religious activities in connection with the Vaiṣṇava bhakti-cult went a long way in purifying practical religion and broadening its base. Ramanuja went further than any Vaidiki teacher in recognising religious merit regardless of its connection with inferiority of caste. All the teachers whole-heartedly accepted the varṇāśrama-dharma but this did not prevent Rāmanuja and others from allowing lower and out-caste people limited rights of temple-entry and of receiving religious instructions. The path of prapatti was open to all though the privilege of Vedic study could not be extended to śūdras and women. The Vaiṣṇava reformers totally rejected animal sacrifice and, instead, emphasised the all-sufficiency of the bhakti-mārga. Though they were anxious to preserve their link with the Śāstric tradition and made no claim to philosophic or religious innovation they did help to change it from within by purifying its ritual and worship and social life generally.

The mystics and hymn-singers of the South were the precursors of the Vaiṣṇava reformers. They let loose a flood of religious devotion which went a long way in revolutionising society and bridged the gap between the philosophy of the few and the polytheism of the many. The Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava bhaktas were representatives of the people being drawn from all caste and out-caste groups and singing in the language of the people. They attacked the externalia of religion, viz., fasts, pilgrimages, sacrifices, purificatory ceremonies, image-worship and claimed the right of all castes and sects to reach the goal of religion. Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava philosophies and theologies differ but they exhibit the common features of the bhakti-cult viz., worship of one God or of the incarnation of God and rejection of the many gods and goddesses, reverence for the guru, equality and brotherhood of the faithful in the sampradāya. The progressive simplification of faith and deepening of emotion is so marked that some see in it not only the natural and logical development of the seeds of bhakti contained in the original tradition but the intervention of some external influence. The contention is that medieval

bhakti received its inspiration from Christianity or from the "levelling and leavening" influence of Islam. But monotheism and devotion are not unknown even in the oldest reaches of the Vedic tradition; the Buddhistic conception of equality and fraternity did not disappear totally but reappeared in the bhakti systems. Islam with its strongly monotheistic and egalitarian social system certainly gave a new stimulus and orientation to traditional religion so that the particular synthesis and emphasis of earlier elements appeared in the form of the bhakti-cult.

The second phase of the medieval period shows a marked and conscious attempt at reconciliation of traditional religion and Islamic culture. The latter was no longer a wholly foreign force as, by this time, it had imbibed certain features of its new environment and assumed a new form different from its original form. Hinduism was able to hold its own against the new faith and never lost its distinctive identity in the process of give and take. Beginning with Rāmanand who brought bhakti to the North there occurred a new phase of liberalisation of religion. Rāmanand has been called the maker of Hindi language. He rejected caste distinctions in the godward path, giving religious instructions to all alike, and going as far as to admit Muslims in his order. He was outdistanced in religious radicalism by his disciple Kabir. Kabir's revolutionary ideas were attacked by the orthodox people of both religions yet he was not regarded as a heretic, but as a saint. The primary aim of his life was to break down the barriers between sects by removing all superstitions and leading society to the worship of the pure, impersonal, formless Being. He rejected tradition where ever it conflicted with this truth and daringly attacked priestcraft, empty formalism of religion, vain and pretentious austerity, ceremonial purity and worship of idols. Nor did he hesitate to reject the varṇāśrama system, the six darśanas and the infallibility of Vedic knowledge in favour of higher knowledge (parāvidyā). Kabir is the boldest and best representative of a large group of mystic devotees of this period of political subjugation and religious persecution, who by voicing a new self-conscious protest against the exaggerations and evils of traditional religion helped in the establishment of new religious and social values. His ideas are echoed by religious teachers in all parts of north India. Nanak preached the unity of God, rejected idolatry, caste distinctions and religious

sacrifices and became the founder of a new and purified ethical and religious tradition closely allied to the old, yet independent of it. Eclecticism is evident in his doctrine and practice, and the desire to bridge the gulf between the two communities, as well as the firm belief in the equality of men. Caitanya of Bengal and the bhakta saints of Mharastra focussed the ferment which the new political and religious influences had created. Dadu, Malukdas, Charandas and numberless saints throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries echoed these messages of purified religion, equality of men in the love of God and identity of "Ram and Rahim." Every part of India had its own contribution to make in the expansion of the bhakti-movement and the enrichment of devotional literature composed in the languages of the people. All the teachers deprecated empty karma and mere jñāna as against the power of loving devotion. Thus bhakti was a great leveller of mankind, reducing the difference between castes and sects, between householder and ascetic in so far as the attainment of salvation was concerned. M. G. Ranade remarks:

The religious movement gave a literature of considerable value . . . modified the strictness of the old spirit of caste exclusiveness . . . raised Sūdra classes to a position of spiritual power almost equal to that of the Brahmana. It raised the status of women. It made the nation more human at the same time more prone to hold together by mutual toleration. It suggested and partly carried out a plan of reconciliation with the Mohammadians. It subordinated the importance of rites and ceremonies, and of pilgrimages and fasts, and of learning . . . to the higher excellence of worship by means of love and faith. It checked the excesses of polytheism.¹

However, by the end of the seventeenth century the mystical impetus of the bhakti-movement lost its momentum; its protest against priesthood, ceremonialism and caste was exhausted and it was assimilated into the social system by the formation of a large number of religious sects and castes; the excesses of its emotionalism gave rise to degenerate practices in the religious sects.

India entered the modern period in the nineteenth century at the lowest ebb of her political, social and religious life. There was the phenomenon of social evils or evil customs connected with the system of caste, with the institutions of marriage and family, with the status of women and lower classes in society, with the strong hold of the priestly class on society. Religion was largely reduced to materialistic and

1. Rise of Maratha Power, p. 76.

mechanical ceremonialism and empty formulae. The urgently needed correction of social and evil practices was blocked by popular superstitions, blind adherence to customs and the ancient Sastras.

The impact of western civilization, with its recently acquired rationalism and individualism, its scientific and industrial bent, on such an unprogressive and static society with its fixed religious ideas and social conventions and prejudices was bound to have the effect of shaking it to the core. To understand the developments which occurred due to this impact of an alien culture on the traditional culture three factors need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, the fact of British rule; secondly, the introduction of western system of education; thirdly, the fact of Christian missionary criticism and propaganda. In regard to the first, we need only to note the fact of the gradual establishment, in the course of the nineteenth century, of a unified political and administrative system for the whole of India such as she had never enjoyed in the course of her whole history. From the point of view of religious tradition the declared policy of the government, of non-interference with the religious life and practices of the people had the effect of preserving the religious and social status quo. On this point the conservatism of the British rulers coincided with that of the Hindu orthodoxy. In conformity with this laissez faire policy the government long resisted the idea of introducing western education in India, since such a step would have meant refusal to allow Indian culture to develop along its own lines. In the early part of the century it was consistently in favour of "Oriental" education through the media of Persian and Sanskrit languages. But the demand of the leaders of Bengali society¹ aided by that of Christian missionaries and independent non-official Englishmen led the government to accept the idea of introducing western education through the medium of English. The motives were varied. The missionaries, convinced that the future progress of India depended on her conversion to Christianity, regarded a liberal education as the best means of such conversion. Among the ruling powers some thought it to be the best means of making Indians understand the English ideals and principles of

1. e. g., Ram Mohan Roy wanted "to instruct the natives of India in Mathematics, in Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Anatomy and the other useful sciences."

democracy and thus inducing them to a ready submission to the continuance of the beneficent British rule. Far-sighted Indians and Englishmen anticipated from this the growth of desire in the Indian mind for freedom from foreign rule, though at some distant future. Psychologically, the Indian demand may be explained as due to the desire to understand the secret of European power, and by acquisition of its scientific knowledge to appropriate that power for India.

The new system was introduced at a time when the indigenous system was in the last stage of decadence in its narrowly scriptural and conservative bent. Knowledge of the ancient philosophies and sciences of India was almost at the disappearing point. The immediate result of the new education was to produce a generation of rationalistic minded sceptics nourished on the latest utilitarian and evolutionary ideologies of the west and, in consequence, repudiating with contempt the ideas, customs and values of ancient tradition. Though the masses remained fixed in their traditional ideas, practices and superstitions, untouched by the new intellectual and religious ideas, the intelligensia was more or less swept off by the flood of such ideas and values. India's confidence in its past reached its lowest ebb, such as it had never reached even in the worst days of Muslim ascendancy. The reaction of the orthodox was to close their minds to such new ideas and to adhere blindly to old ideas and ways with all their accretions. Others went to the opposite extreme of pure scepticism and materialism, or, at best, took the stand of accepting moral ideas without belief in the deity. Only a very few of the strongest and best minds accepted the challenge of the new age viz., the need for a systematic and critical analysis of traditional values and a complete overhauling of the customary patterns of individual and social conduct, with a view to discover their relevance for a modern Indian society. From such minds emanated the great protestant movements of the modern period in the form of the "Samajs."

The third factor responsible for creating the attitude of doubt was the impact of the Christian religion. Though Christianity claims a long history in south-western India and is known to have been presented in the court of Akbar it was not till the eighteenth century that it became a strong religious force, able to challenge and to modify the tradition. This modern Christianity was introduced in India under the most

favourable conditions. It was associated with the ruling power, at least in the public mind, though the first generation of missionaries had their own battles to fight with the East India Company and later with the representatives of Imperial authority in India in order to be able to propagate their religion. Not the least of the advantages of Christianity was its alliance with the latest democratic, utilitarian and progressive ideologies of western civilization,¹ which enabled it to claim that "the moral idealism and passion for a juster social order which are characteristic of West are not the product of humanism but are due to the leaven of Christ's teaching."² An added advantage was that it was not propagated by intolerant persecution and brute force but expounded by sincere, if zealot, private missionaries, who were, moreover, the best educationists of the day. The many and glaring weaknesses of Hindu society gave enough support for their criticism that the Hindu religion is puerile and false mythology, its practices are immoral and degrading, its doctrines are amoral, pessimistic and anti-social. Such criticism combined with the disbelief created by the new learning led many to despair of reforming Hindu society and to their conversion to Christianity, while others though not openly throwing off their allegiance had nothing but scepticism about its beliefs and practices. This mood of conscious inferiority so alien to the whole history of Hinduism, this "off-balance" of the Indian mind, did not last long. The instinct of self-preservation caused Hinduism to fight back with its own weapon of assimilation from the opposing culture of all that was necessary to meet the demands of a new age and a new world, and to make a determined protest against whatever was weakening it internally.

The purpose is not to follow the detailed history of the protestant movements but only to note the significant directions they took with a view to assessing the nature and value of their protest against tradition. The first of these movements departed farthest from tradition and was the most influenced by Christian beliefs,

1. cf., The English Works of Raja Rammohan Roy, p. 174: From the skill which Europeans generally display in conducting political affairs and effecting mechanical inventions, foreigners very often conclude that their religious doctrines would be equally reasonable, but religious truth has no connection with political success or economic superiority.
2. A. C. Underwood, Contemporary Thought of India, p. 149.

in its latest reaches, at least. Perhaps the logic of history dictated a veneer of western ideas and ideals over the traditional foundation, as the only method of stemming the tide of early scepticism and conversions. Negatively, throughout its history the Brahma Samaj reflected, more or less faithfully, its founder's opposition to idolatry, the social restrictions and disabilities of certain sections, and the claims of spiritual superiority and mediatorship of the brahmana caste. Positively, the revolutionary attempt of Raja Ram Mohan Roy to establish a purely ethical and monotheistic religion was intensified with time. This same attempt led Maharshi Devendranath Tagore to abandon the infallibility of both the Karma- and Jñāna-Kāṇḍas of the Vedas and to fall back on the judgment of rationalistic intuition, thus taking the first step away from tradition. Even so, his exposition of Brahma-dharma was meant to be but an extract of the true essence of the scriptures. The third stage of development was the frank avowal of the eclectic principle by the Brahma Samaj of India under the leadership of Keshav Chandra Sen, ending in the attempt to combine religious and moral ideas drawn from different religious traditions in the Church of the New Dispensation. The legal break from tradition and Hindu society which had occurred with the passing of the Native Marriage Act of 1872 was confirmed, in the public mind, by these religious developments. The final development of the movement appeared in the form of the socially progressive and democratic Sadharana Brahma Samaj. Thus "the Brahma Samaj which started its life as a religious movement . . . ended in being a secularised community, almost a caste . . ."¹ It passed from the attempt of the Raja which was not strictly a revolt to Devendranath's religious revolt ending as a movement of social revolt with certain political implications involved in it.² In the parallel movement of western India the leaders of the Prarthana Samaj proceeded with greater caution and moderation, but their spirit of deference to tradition and convention went with a strong determination to purify religion and society of their dross. The alliance of the "Bhagavat-Dharma" with the "Social Conference" under the leadership of Mahadev Govind Ranade went a long way in conditioning the minds of the people to new social and

1. M. Parekh, Brahma Samaj, p. 28.

2. B. C. Pal, The Brahma Samaj and the Battle of Swaraj in India, pp. 25-26.

moral values, though the reforms suggested were not accepted immediately.

Unlike the Brahma Samaj movement, the inspiration of the Arya Samaj was indigenous. Dayanand Saraswati sought the very fountainhead of tradition in order to rejuvenate society and religion. Traversing backward over the whole sweep of past tradition, leaving behind its Pauranic and philosophical outgrowths he found intellectual and moral comfort only in the theism of pure Vedicism. He too was influenced by new forces and ideas but his protest against bigotry, superstitions and social evils was made, not from the western view-point but from the Vedic stand-point, though his interpretation of this was largely his own. He fought his battle on two fronts; his khandana or counter-attack on traditional religion was accompanied by an attack on foreign religions, for he regarded both as false in contrast to the "universal" truth and ethical perfection of the Vedas, containing as they did the seeds of all knowledge, according to him. He was a genuine social reformer in as much as he attacked idolatry, ritual, mythology and unethical teachings of the Purānas and Tantras, but, as in the case of all other modern reformers, he too found it necessary to protest against the evils of the social order, viz., false developments of the caste system, extravagant claims of the greedy, unscrupulous priesthood, impure rituals and the low status and ignorance of women. His movement is characterized by emphasis on scientific and technical education no less than by emphasis on national Sanskrit learning and spread of Hindi language and literature. In spite of the slogan of "Back to the Vedas" the spirit of innovation was apparent as much in the Suddhi-movement which was meant to throw open the doors of Hindu society to outsiders and more specially to reclaim the out-castes, as in the emphasis on social reform and social service. Convinced as Dayanand was that the weakness of Hinduism lay in its lack of definite creed and organization, he attempted to work out a theistic creed suitable for the present age and organized the "church militant." He opposed his purified Arya-dharma which, according to him, alone agreed with the Vedas to other foreign and indigenous dharmas. Though denouncing caste and its perversions he gave up no essential part of dharma. Declaration of belief in the caturvarga and mokṣa as the highest end of life, interpretation of the social order in terms of pure varṇāśrama-dharma based on the principles of guṇa and karma and allowing

for change of caste even in a single life, the establishment of a refined ritual of *pañca-mahayajna* and sixteen *samskaras*, testify to his adherence to tradition and largely account for the popular appeal of the *Arya Samaj*.

Among the religious personalities of the nineteenth century that of Ramakrishna Paramhansa stands out as the most spiritual. Others might preach the unity of religions but he brought a new freshness and vitality to modern Hinduism by proving the unity of all religions by the practice of Hindu, Christian and Islamic *sadhanas*. Though western ideas and ideals were apparently unknown to him he too imbibed the influences of his age and his teaching became the inspiration for national service. Vivekanand had to debate the claims of individual salvation and collective welfare with the result that the Ramakrishna Movement exhibits a striking combination of monasticism and activism or *karma*, not divorced from *jñāna* or *bhakti*. Like his predecessors he too rebelled against many phases of contemporary religious and social life. Reforming zeal is very evident though the protestant attitude is constructive, not destructive. Since he was engaged in the defence of the essential truths of Hinduism he found it necessary to point out to society, in very emphatic terms, the urgent necessity for establishing social equality, social sympathy, social and material well-being. He aimed at social regeneration by bringing about a spiritual change of heart in men. To purify religion from the state of "don't touchism" and priest-ridden superstition and ritual to which it was reduced¹ he asserted more strongly than other protestant leaders that religion should not try to formulate social laws or institutions or insist on making differences between beings, for its function is to end such differences and inequalities in the unity of *Ātman*.² His attempt to interpret *Vedānta* for a new age had the effect of giving Hinduism a more definite form, though not to the extent of laying down a creed, as had been the aim of Dayanand.

The twentieth century did not give rise to any new religious developments but the forces and ideas emanating from the movements of the last century are still being worked out in all their implications. In spite of the initial and even violent

1. Vivekanand, Complete Works, V, 152, 292-293.

2. *ibid.*, IV, 304.

opposition of orthodoxy to the social reforms pressed by these protestant movements almost all of them have been incorporated in the normal pattern of social thought and behaviour. As for the purification of religious forms and rituals, the very impure types have disappeared under the moral and humanitarian forces aroused by the reformers. All of them were convinced that regeneration of religion must depend upon a system of education which must be an amalgam of the most advanced scientific learning with the ancient knowledge in which nothing of good and value in India's religion and culture should be left out. Since such an education is not yet a reality the further modification and purification of forms of religion lies in the future.

General Characteristics of the Modern Protest

Some general features of the modern protestant movements may now be noted. Though all of them clashed with the orthodox sections of society, yet their protest against and departure from tradition was not always in the same direction. This is evident from the characterisation of Brahma Samaj as anti-traditionalist and anti-nationalist while the other two are described as revivalist movements, either partial or complete; or if the former is described as reformation then the latter two are described as anti-reformation. But though they differ in their theology and metaphysics they all agree in their desire to change society, to purify the forms of religion and to infuse in it the active principles of social morality. Thus all may be described as nationalistic and traditionalistic or anti-nationalistic and anti-traditionalistic according as the description is that of a friend or a critic. Apart from this, the first movement is as much inspired by ancient ideals as the later two, the difference between them being partly due to the difference of time. The Brahma Samaj being the first to meet the challenge of a new culture and religion and being forced to adopt a defensive attitude is seemingly the most critical of tradition. The Arya Samaj movement, being later in time enough to be conversant with the destructive effects of western education and the defects of western culture reacted by taking the offensive and asserted the superiority of sanātana dharma. The Ramakrishna movement, being the latest entrant in the field of religious protest, felt even less the need of

repudiating any part of tradition except the most glaring perversions of it. Of the three, it is the most fully representative of all the phases of tradition; unlike the others which rejected certain developments of it and accepted certain others. In a sense, it might be argued that the first was the most radical in its religious protest and the last one the least so. At the same time the latter exhibits a certain balanced maturity lacking in the experimental eclecticism of the Brahma Samaj and the aggressively militant approach of the Arya Samaj.

Another characteristic of the modern movements was that all leaders thought in terms of continuity and evolution of tradition rather than in terms of revolt and sudden change. They remained within their society believing that religion and society could only be changed from within; that basic beliefs of mind and conduct have to be changed to ensure growth which must be organic and slow. Each one of them rejected the charge of being an innovator or discoverer of new truths. The continuity was maintained by taking the stand that the practices and beliefs attacked were perversions of the true principles of religion and what was being advocated was but the perfected and modern expression of the true spirit of religion. The sanction of change was sought and obtained from the ancient tradition though the stimulus came from outside. "The respect for tradition, the past, the national lines and ideals is no less conspicuous in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than the yearning after the 'now' and the 'new'."¹

A third feature of the modern protest was its rationalism. It derived its strength not from emotional appeals to the masses but from the intellectual conviction and support of the educated, though the reformers did not neglect the masses and their activities expanded in ever-widening circles to affect the masses. This rationalism is in no wise inconsistent with the fact that almost all the leaders accepted scriptural authority, either partially or wholly, for their understanding of it was individual and independent rather than traditional. Their conclusions in regard to new forms of dharma were arrived at on grounds of reason and humanitarianism, under the influence of new ideas of social democracy, but they sought to connect these with the values of

1. B. K. Sirkar, *Creative India*, p. 460.

sanātana dharma. The attempt of Dayanand to cull even modern scientific beliefs from the Vedas was one such attempt to prove the rationality of sanātana dharma. Reliance on reason again took the Brahma Samaj step-by-step through repudiation of Vedic infallibility to the attempt at eclectic synthesis of religious traditions, which was based on its assertion of the equality of all religions. A conscious and judicious combination of independent thinking and reliance on conscience with religious authority characterises the stand of all the foremost leaders.¹ The twentieth century saw a shift from Śāstric foundations of reform to pure rationalism and humanism, as the conviction gained ground among the more recent reformers that it is not Śāstra which determines conduct but fear of caste and custom. Even the search for the enduring, spiritual essence of religion was conducted on definitely rationalistic lines and the philosophy of religion and action of men like Tagore, Gandhi and others is a product of free thinking e. g., the latter is a "sanātānist," but with a difference.

Another marked feature of the modern protestant movements was their stress on social reform. Since they arose in reply to criticisms of social institutions and practices supported by religious beliefs and customs, the reformers directed their attention towards rectification of these. Closely related to this activity, yet secondary to it, was their attempt at reinterpretation and reconstruction of religious and cultural tradition with a view to making it fit for the new society envisaged by them. The professed motive of the Samajs was religious not social. Even the Brahma Samaj, following as it did the method of reform by open rebellion, claimed that such reforms were religious reforms applied to social needs of the community.² In spite of this, the tendency was towards the progressive diminution of the religious spirit behind social

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1. e. g., Roy, op. cit., p. 93: The best method perhaps is neither to give ourselves up exclusively to the guidance of the tradition of ancient nation nor of reason, but to endeavour to improve on intellectual and moral faculties relying on the goodness of Almighty power. Also Vivekanand, op. cit., IV, 43: Some times I think I am right when I agree with ancient teachers, other times they are right when they agree with me. I believe in thinking independently, being free from holy teachers; pay reverence to all, but religion is independent research. I have to find my light as they found theirs. I have to become the Bible and not to follow it.
 2. cf., Majumdar, P. C., Faith and Progress of the Brahma Samaj, pp. 131-132, 146: The Brahma Samaj never desired and commenced any social innovations not necessitated by spiritual emergency. We do not understand social as apart from religious advancements, and the social reforms in which the Brahma Samaj engaged have been carried out in a strictly religious spirit.

life, specially after the second schism. Though Ranade had a very clear conception of the necessity of all-sided development of national life, religious reform was to be the basis of his programme of social and political reform. He was able to balance the two motives but with his successors the emphasis shifted to social reform. For Vivekanand also, spiritual reform alone could be the basis of social reform. Though he claimed to be a greater reformer than any,¹ a reformed society, as such, was not his goal, but salvation. All the nineteenth century religious leaders were convinced that religion must be the basis of the new social order. For them service was never merely social service but service of God, the moral governor of the world or the immanent principle in society. However, from the very fact of their starting point, from their attempted separation of religion from mythological, ritualistic and sociological forms to vindicate its spiritual purity, it followed that religion tended to lose its leadership of society to political and economic motives. The logic of the choice was that either religion must accept responsibility for the social structure of the past or it must give up the claim to be the foundation-stone of the society of the future.

A new factor entered Indian life in the twentieth century, for which the reformers of the last century were responsible in no small degree, viz., the rapidly spreading and intensifying national and political consciousness. More and more of the attention and energies of the nation were diverted towards the struggle for freedom. Gandhi made a supreme effort to spiritualise politics, to establish social, economic and political freedom, equality and justice, by removal of the disabilities of all oppressed classes, on the principles of religion i. e., truth and non-violence. He inspired many, but it is doubtful whether the contention of the nineteenth century reformers and of Gandhi that religion should be the determiner of the new social order gained general acceptance. The problems entailed in the democratisation of a rigidly caste-bound society and the introduction of an industrial economic system in a largely agricultural society were vast. The inadequacy of any purely religious approach to effectuate political, economic and social changes became apparent. In the context of these needs and the expanding struggle for freedom the question of religious and even

1. Vivekanand, op. cit., III, 220-221.

social reform fell into the background; leadership of events passed from the hands of religious men into those of politicians, economists and scientists, who questioned why rationalistic, humanistic and utilitarian considerations, rather than religion, should not be the basis of the good society. The culmination of this attitude, which gained ground steadily in the twentieth century is the secularisation of the Indian state by the first constitution of free India.

The protestant reformers of the last century had sought to change social and religious attitudes and practices by means of education, persuasion, propaganda and the setting of personal example by individuals. Very reluctantly and very seldom were they willing to evoke the authority and sanction of the state to effect these changes. This was not only due to the fact that the state was represented by foreign rulers, but also because they were unwilling to arouse the extreme hostility of the orthodox and were desirous of following the traditional method of change by growth of new customs under the influence of an enlightened public opinion. Even so, laws relating to social customs e. g., age of marriage, inter-caste marriage, disabilities of lower castes, had to be passed even in the nineteenth century. In the present century, with "the increasing participation of Indians in the administration" of the country, with the realization that glaring injustices and inequalities could not be rectified nor urgent needs for provision of social and economic institutions and organizations be fulfilled by the slow method of development of custom, state-legislation became the most potent instrument for effecting these changes. We have seen that traditional dharma was evolved by interpretations of ancient religious Law-givers (Smṛtikāras) supplemented by the laws of the state but such "changes were sporadic, local and depended on individual commentators."¹ In present day society legislation by the state, operating on a national scale and covering every aspect of life, takes the place of dharma. Responsibility for social and even moral and religious reform tends to be taken by the state, and, after independence, reform by legislation has become axiomatic. If politics supplanted social and religious reform before, now economics becomes supreme as the idea of planned development along socialistic and democratic lines gains ground.

1. K. M. Pannikar, *Hindu Society at Cross-roads*, p. 55.

Pride in ancient culture is strongly evident in the teaching of every one of the modern religious reformers. As mentioned before, they were largely instrumental in bringing about the growth of nationalism, and, in turn, the national movement dictated the course of many social changes; in this background of developing nationhood religion imbibed new social values and was revitalised and reenergized. Even while making the protest against traditional religion, the leaders were conscious, as never before, that India has a certain mission, a contribution to make to the world culture.¹ Though hard-pressed by new political and economic forces and social and ethical values they were, yet, insistent on the innate spiritual strength of the old values, this being, for them, the most precious heritage of Hinduism. Ram Mohan Roy though willing to concede the superiority of the west in mechanical arts and political and economic affairs was not inclined to admit its superiority in religion or philosophy.² Patriotism was, at least, one motive for religious reform. The motive of national pride is even more evident in the Arya Samaj movement, which protested against orthodoxy but even more strongly against foreign religions and ideals. The loss of faith in national religion and culture resulting from western influences aroused the instinct of national self-preservation and led to the insistence on the nationalisation of education. Religious nationalism, with its slogan of "Ārya for the Āryans," was closely allied with social and political nationalism with its slogan of "Swadeshi and Swaraj"³ i. e., an organized uplift of Hindu tradition, social, religious, intellectual and moral as against imported and alien ideals. Vivekanand became a nation-builder aiming, as he did, at the uplift of the masses through the vehicle of national education and self-help,⁴ at giving back the sense of lost individuality without loss of innate spiritual nature; but the arousal of dormant spirituality meant, necessarily, the arousal of the

1. e. g., M. G. Ranade says, "We would be unworthy of ourselves if we are not hopeful with our tradition which transcends the traditions of every other nation of the world India is favoured . . . the people of this country have been preserved from dangers . . . as . . . a people with a special mission We are under the severe discipline of a high power." R. M. Roy aimed at the unity of the human race by preservation of all that is distinctive in the racial genius of each in a spirit of reverence and toleration for others.

2. vide English Works of Raja Rammohan Roy, pp. 906, 146.

3. Dayanand, Satyārtha Prakasha, chap. VIII.

4. Complete Works, III, 302; IV, 362.

national spirit as well. All the protestant movements were movements of Hindu "swadharmāgraha"—developing later into swarājāgraha—and the leading thinkers of the present century, likewise, believe that regeneration and purification of Hinduism must come from inner motives and be carried out by Hindus themselves, because the close growth of Hinduism and Indian civilization has made the former the life-blood of the people and the shaper of India's distinctive personality. In passing, we may note that this "nationalism" is connected with the quest for "world-force" for Hinduism. It was Ram Mohan Roy who struck the note of universalism in the new age and M. G. Ranade and many others were convinced that sanātana dharma or Hinduism at its best was a religion of universal brotherhood and piety, and could be the nucleus of a world religion. Unity and equality of all religions with the corollary of perfect tolerance and respect for all religions, are conceptions, which, arising with Ram Mohan Roy, continue through the synthesising attempts of the Brahma Samaj whose ideal was "not collection of truth, but unification of truth . . . the oneness of all truth . . . not a philosophical attempt but a spiritual fact,"¹ and receiving a new verification through the spiritual experience of Ramakrishna, continue to be the convictions of the best minds of modern India and part of the creed of its leaders.

Comparison of the Protestant Attitudes of Different Periods

A comparative study of the protestant attitudes and movements of the three periods of Hindu tradition reveals certain similarities and differences. The ancient protest was due to purely internal stresses and strains; certain practical and theoretical weaknesses of contemporary religion provoked a protest by way of reaction, in which the attempt was to purify ancient or Aryan dharma and to formulate it along more humanistic and ethical lines. Though the protestant faiths broke away from tradition they exhibit many points of agreement with it and are explicable in terms of indigenous forces, being independent developments of certain elements inherent in tradition itself. In the medieval period the protestant movements occurred under the dual pressure of internal development and external force in the form of confrontation with an alien

1. P. C. Majumdar, Faith and Progress of the Brahma Samaj, p. 77.

culture and religion. The seeds of bhakti inherent in earlier religion and scriptures appeared in a new totality due to changes of political and social conditions occurring at the advent of Islam. Though the protests were voiced in very revolutionary forms as in the negation of scriptures, traditional dharma and practices of religion yet they were all absorbed by religion and resulted in its purification and popularisation without leading to a break in tradition, such as had occurred in the case of the heretical systems. The philosophers of this period were careful to relate their philosophies and theologies to the scriptural tradition. In the modern period India came into contact not only with another culture and religion but with political, economic and scientific world-forces as well. The internal forces of dormant and depressed Hindu tradition were roused to a new activity of incorporation and assimilation of new ideas and ideals. As the medieval reformers avoided revolutionary methods so did the modern reformers, putting their reliance on education and enlightenment. Once again the continuity of tradition and its indefinite modifiability was demonstrated.

The ancient and medieval reform movements were primarily religious though having repercussions in social and literary spheres, while the modern reformation is a part of a much wider upheaval, social, economic and political, and derives its direction and tempo from these factors. Nor did the earlier movements proceed from the motive of national self-respect as does the modern one in both its negations and affirmations, never losing sight of the idea of India's spiritual contribution to the world and its influence in the "comity of nations." This motive, which might be termed extra-religious, is totally absent in the ancient period and only a tinge of it is found in the teachings of medieval saints and philosophers. The yoke of an alien rule might rouse in them the desire for the revival of past glories and unification of a purified Hindu tradition and society, but for the most part their eyes were fixed on man's relationship with and his realization of the Divine.

It is noteworthy that in all three periods the protest occurred when the formalism of religion had almost overcome its soul. Dharma has a tendency to become conventionalised and soulless. The exaggerations of ancient religion in the form of mechanistic ritualism with attendant ecclesiastical supremacy on the one side and

subtle and intellectualistic dogmatisations on the other; of medieval religion in the form of caste exclusiveness, ceremonial ideas of purification and pollution, reliance on authority and priesthood and superstitions of polytheistic worship; of modern religion, again, in the form of oppressive separatism and restrictions of caste-customs together with the gross forms of popular beliefs and methods of worship, provoked a protest in the best minds. In every age there was a movement to alter the social expression of varṇa-dharma by evoking the ideal principle of varṇāśrama as against the actual social classification and relationship. But ancient and medieval protests against caste were primarily based upon the religious point of view. The philosophers and saints ignored or denied distinctions with reference to the goal of religion but accepted, more or less fully, the ideal of varṇa-dharma with reference to social life, making no attempt to alter it there i. e., they were primarily religious reformers and not social reformers, except in so far as their teachings might have social repercussions. The modern protest against caste is made on a much wider national scale and from many different angles. Gradually the religious bases of the institution, such as the idea of brāhmanical superiority, determination by karma and impossibility of change of status, exclusion of lower castes from access to scriptures or regulation of caste life and functions by Śāstric laws or divine origination and relation of classes, tend to be forgotten, but this is not so much due to religious protests as to the arising of new political and economic conditions in which the system and even the principle of varṇa-dharma, as understood by scriptural tradition, is found to be anachronistic. As noted before, even the religious reformers were primarily inspired by social, economic or national motives, and less by religious, in their protest against the caste system.

Thus, the trend of the protestant movements in all three periods was towards a democratisation in religion and in society. The new liberal ideas were preached in the language of the common man and gave rise to mass movements. But the aim of the earlier reformers was neither to establish social nor political democracy but to establish the idea of religious democracy. Social inequality does not militate against the equal rights of all to attain the summum bonum. In the same spirit, the ancient and medieval reformers relaxed or rejected the āśrama-dharma and allowed the pursuit of mokṣa at any

period of life. In modern life the asrama-dharma can hardly be followed in any literal sense. Though it is claimed that the essential spirit of that dharma is not absent, yet the organization of the institutions of education and family can hardly be said to follow either the letter or the spirit of that dharma. Be that as it may, we have noted the trend towards liberalisation and equalisation in society resulting from the modern protestant movements also. Though many religious leaders either tacitly or expressly disavowed interest in purely social or political activity, yet the end result of their efforts—combined with forces, economic and political—was to produce a conception of democracy more definitely political, social and economic in nature.

In connection with this it might be remembered that earlier protests against traditional religion were made by men of religion—mystics, saints and philosophers who had renounced the world and whose primary interest was in leading men towards the higher life rather than in promoting happiness in this world. Modern protestant reformers were not all necessarily men of religion, though all of them were highly religious in their approach to life, nor did they remain uninfluenced by the idea of physical and material well-being of man in this world. Their teaching gives evidence of insistence on the balance of spiritual and material ideals in society in the very spirit of the caturvarga.¹

The four great traditional values and their relation to each other were not seriously questioned by reformers of the past. Dharma might be defined by them less ritualistically or sacramentally, but it is still subordinated to the goal of mokṣa. The relative relation of the puruṣārthas tended to be changed in modern times. The reformers though accepting mokṣa as the highest and concentrated their attention on dharma, their aim being to give it a new content to enable it to guide man in a modern society. They attempted to moralise dharma according to new ideas and gave a psychological, ethical and functional interpretation of varṇāśrama-dharma without reference to the Śāstras.² A double result followed—the ideal of mokṣa tended to recede in the

1. e. g., Vivekanand declares that he does not believe in a God who cannot give him bread here, giving him eternal bliss in heaven; Ranade and Ram Mohan Roy appreciate material progress and prosperity in this world.
2. Brahma-dharma and interpretations of varṇāśrama by Dayanand, Vivekanand, Gandhi and others.

background and on the other hand dharma was conceived more individualistically, internally and ethically as the duty of the individual in any existing society. Even traditionally, dharma in its wider connotation of law and justice is not free from political and economic implications (as in the conceptions of Rajadharma or Arthashastra), yet the modern trend was to subordinate or, at least, to link it to politico-economic values and activities. Among the trivarga, artha and kama are now no longer subordinated to dharma as in the traditional scale. Rather, kama in the sense of individual and social well-being and artha as the material means to it, assume greater importance. As mentioned earlier, the earlier movements neither aimed at nor resulted in a separation of religion and social life i. e., dharma in subordination to moksha remained the regulator of life. The modern protest, arising as it did under criticism of social institutions and practices sanctioned by traditional religion, perforce, had to separate religion from the deficiencies of the social system in order to rebut that criticism. This divorce led to the relegation of dharma to the category of a "private affair." Earlier, reference has been made to the secular approach with its reliance on state-legislation. This reduces the initiative and scope of traditional dharma in public affairs, or we might say, that it prevents dharma from being the supreme cohesive force in society, which it once was.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter may be concluded with certain remarks about the present position of traditional religion. The strenuous efforts of modern religious and social reformers have brought about a change in the outer structure of religion by way of ridding it of the most pernicious practices, and such changes have not failed to affect its inner aspects also. Insistence on the separation of changing social institutions, forms, customs and personal laws from religion has made it possible to affirm the indestructibility of its spiritual truths. There is no unanimity about these truths but modern thinkers are engaged in the task of examining and reinterpreting such truths. One view is that the very heart of the Hindu tradition is constituted by its philosophy and more specially the Vedānta philosophy; that the different forms of Vedānta typify

different stages of spiritual growth and therefore teachers and schools of whatever sect—Saiva, Vaisnava, Śākta or Smarta—have as the basis of their system the three Prasthanas of Vedānta. Vedānta derives its scriptural authority from the Jnana-Kaṇḍa of the Śrutis, its commentary is constituted by the Gīta and its organized philosophical system is presented by the Sāriraka Bhāṣya.¹ And Hinduism, ancient or modern, is but the application of Vedānta to the ethics, customs and creeds of the Indian people.² Vedānta, then, is the enduring essence of Hindu tradition which is destined to survive all transformations of customs and creeds as well as to mould and to inspire new forms of life and institutions.

This view is assailed from different angles. The more general objection is that Hinduism is not to be equated to the philosophies which have become linked with it from time to time e. g., the impersonalistic monism of the Upaniṣads or Advaita, atheistic metaphysics of certain darśanas or the personalistic theism of Vedāntic schools. Such philosophies are lacking in creative force, which alone can produce a living religion i. e., an organization of society or a cult or a moral system. As a religion the Hindu system has proved far more serviceable than the philosophy, since it has served as guide and comforter for the people as well as the basis of their philosophies. This linking has had a double effect. The Hindu system has proved a prison for the philosophies, since no spiritual worship was possible for them in the context of popular polytheistic idolatry. So-much-so that inspite of their high metaphysical and ethical principles they could not transcend the limitations of caste, the superstition and the "folly and filth" of the Hindu worship. Thus the "Hindu system proved stronger than philosophy and stunted its natural growth in every direction."³ A somewhat similar objection with a different and more specific emphasis is to the effect that the essential aspect of religion is its outer form of worship, festivals, rituals etc., and the Hindu system is not to be equated to the Vedānta philosophy, which is not a living faith but a mere metaphysics and a doctrine of liberation. However, both the inner and outer forms of religion are bound to go on moulding the new society, the evolution of its social

1. Vivekanand, Complete Works, IV, 281.

2. *ibid.*, V, 64.

3. J. N. Farquhar, Crown of Hinduism, p. 454.

institutions, customs and laws.¹

It might be admitted that the outer form of traditional religion or what may be called practical religion is a very important factor to be considered in the context of the transitional phase through which India is passing and in view of the future Indian society envisaged by its thinkers and leaders; it might also be admitted that there is further scope for the simplification, purification and beautification of the outer structure of religion. But the purpose of this thesis is to examine the claims made on behalf of Vedānta as the philosophy that is likely to satisfy the needs of man in a new type of society.

1. K. M. Pannikar, *Hindu Society at Cross-roads*, pp. 97, 100.

CHAPTER II

THE VEDANTA IDEAL

Mokṣa-Śāstra

In Vedic circles the search for the highest was gradually directed from the outer world to inner spirituality. While the early Vedic people aimed at "happy residence in heaven," all shades of Vedāntic thought, in line with the general trend of Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Lōkāyatas, could be satisfied with nothing less than liberation from the sorrows of life. Mokṣa is freedom from all kinds of misery, dukhanivṛtti.¹ As the science and art of life, Vedānta provides the knowledge and the method to reach that goal which a seeker may attain with the guidance of a teacher. It may be classed under the heads of the tattva i. e., the essential truth, the hita i. e., what is good for the soul and the puruṣārtha i. e., the goal.² While recognising that from different aspects of his nature man seeks different ends the Vedānta has consciously limited its scope to the fourth and final aim, salvation, therefore, it is rightly designated as Mokṣa-Śāstra.³ The aim of philosophy is to evaluate phenomena to enable man to get out of bondage, otherwise it is vain, like the counting of sand.⁴

The Vedānta is in perfect agreement with the four Ārya satyas of Gautama Buddha. Its thinking and discussion revolves around them. That there is suffering due to the operation of karma and transmigration, was enunciated clearly by the Śruti Prāsthana of Vedānta. That ignorance is the cause of suffering is the very axiom from which the

1. Kapila-Sūtra, I: अयं त्रिकालदुःखसंसारसिद्धात्सर्वत्र-मुक्तिर्वासाः
2. Rāmānuja, Vedānta-Deep, Intro. to Adhyaya III.
3. cf., Vallabha, Saudāsha Grantho Bāla-Bodha, 4, 7: I shall describe here the goal as conceived by men; the first three kinds of this set of men-conceived goals have been expounded at length in the Dharmasāstra, Arthasāstra and Kāmasāstra, for which reason I shall not say anything about them here—(except) for the fourth kind i. e., that concerning salvation.
4. Jayatīrtha, Tattva-Sankhyāna: परतन्त्रप्रमेयं स्वतन्त्रप्रमेयमनन्तरं विदितं हि तिरस्कृतव्यक्तं सत्यं / अन्तर्गतं संसारसंज्ञं । अज्ञानं हि इदं तन्त्रसंज्ञं तन्त्रसंज्ञं तन्त्रसंज्ञं ।

Vedantic search for knowledge starts, that suffering can be terminated is the Vedantic conclusion, described as fearlessness, immortality and bliss. That there is a way to end suffering is an indubitable certainty of Vedanta, which is fully occupied with the ways and means. Its ethico-religious philosophy stands on its analysis of the sources of human desires, which cause sorrow if frustrated. It concludes only with the attainment of the highest human good i. e., the removal of suffering in mokṣa.

As the orientation of Vedanta is towards a transcendent goal, therefore the ideal depicted by it is a super-mundane one. Whereas Ramānuja and Nimbarka treat that ideal in a definitely eschatological sense, others, who admit the possibility of its attainment by man living in the body and world, still regard that ideal to be more than worldly. As a Mokṣa-Śāstra Vedānta does not display keen interest in the social and physical sciences. It is neither concerned with political organizations nor with economic well-being nor is it a mere enquiry into natural and human phenomena for the satisfaction of curiosity. Its ideal man is neither social, political nor economic, but spiritual. It is in this capacity that its ideal exercised a strong fascination for and gained the acceptance of all sections of people.

Since the Vedānta is, confessedly, not a Dharma-Śāstra it leaves the investigation and interpretation of the rules of dharma, its nature and results, to the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The latter proceeds on the assumption of the reality and value of the mundane world as the arena for the performance of dharma, whereas the Vedānta or Uttara-Mīmāṃsā is concerned with the investigation of ultimate reality or Brahma. All schools accept dharma as a legitimate, though not the ultimate, ideal of man. They take for granted the world and its values as depicted in dharma, but differ on the question of the role of dharma as a contributory factor towards the highest end. The greater or lesser scope they allow to dharma in their discipline may be regarded as an index of their greater or lesser interest in the mundane world.

In the Upaniṣads no one attitude on dharma is to be found. In as much as householders, discharging the duties of their social stations, are depicted as also enquiring after Ātman and Brahman,¹ the Upaniṣads hold no inconsistency between dharma or worldly

1. cf., Chān. Upa., V, 11, 1; Br. Upa., IV, 1-4.

life and values and the search for the highest goal. It is specifically declared that both knowledge and one's own dharma is the antidote for the elemental soul's miserable condition.¹ On the other hand, attainment of reality is also found incompatible with the world, its desires and activities.² Or the modes of religious life (asrama-dharma) lead not to Brahman and immortality, but to the lesser reward of dharma-loka.³ Hence, the way of dharma is not the way of mokṣa.

The Smṛti Prasthāna of the Vedānta, however, takes the stand throughout that dharma and jñāna are essentially correlated; life in the world, due discharge of one's own duty is perfectly compatible with the highest end.⁴ The command is never to give up dharma in the world.⁵

Similarly, the Brahma-Sūtras take a positive view of dharma and discuss the scope of āsrama-dharma in the disciplinary process.⁶ Dharma has a dual function: serving as subsidiary to the ideal of mokṣa as well as a guide of duties in the varṇa and āsrama systems. Duties of social life are obligatory on all men regardless of whether their desire or purpose is mokṣa or not.

Only in the Vedāntic schools does the difference of attitude towards dharma become marked. On the theoretical plane doctrines range from the Advaitic position of absolute rejection of dharma with reference to mokṣa to the theistic position of acceptance of dharma with reference to mokṣa. The discussion centres round the question of what constitutes the preliminary to the enquiry into Brahman. In interpreting the term "atha" or "then" in the opening sūtra Śaṅkara declares that Brahma-jijñāsā does not presuppose understanding of acts of religious duty and can be engaged in without engaging in dharma-jijñāsā, for the latter has transitory fruit of felicity depending upon performance of religious duties, and the former has for fruit eternal bliss not depending on performance.⁷ The followers of dharma suffer loss.⁸ The difference between

1. Maitrī Upa., IV, 3.

2. Br. Upa., III, 5.

3. Chān. Upa., II, 23, 1.

4. B. G., III, 19; XVIII, 45.

5. B. G., XVIII, 48.

6. B. S., III, 4, 25ff.

7. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 10ff.

8. *ibid.*, III, 4, 20, p. 301.

dharma and Brahma or mokṣa is that the former is an ideal something to be accomplished in the future while the latter is real and already accomplished fact. Complete dichotomy between nature and results is the conclusion:

Since the fruit (mokṣa) results even from intuition of Brahma there is not to be suspected even a trace of injunction in the Vedāntas. If there were, then there would result only one enquiry into dharma in sixteen chapters. And the separate commencement, "athāto Brahma-jijñāsa," would not be intelligible. Therefore, only because of the difference between dharma and Brahma there is difference between the enquiry into the two.¹

Both artha and dharma are to be condemned, and for all classes of men desirous of mokṣa turning away from these is enjoined by scripture.² The wise remembering his nature gives up his varṇa, which is the cause of dharma, because of their incompatibility.³ Ati-varṇāśramin is the one who has realized by self-experience what he is taught by the Vedas and for a jñānī the use of dharma and Veda is like a small tank in a country flooded with water.⁴

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins insist on renunciation of dharma only for one bound by laws of chastity (brahmacārya) but not for others i. e., they adopt a much less extreme position in regard to dharma. Rāmānuja holds⁵ that knowledge is realized only through performance of dharma-prescribed works on the part of persons fulfilling all the enumerated conditions. Mere works produce non-permanent results, but true knowledge arises from insight into nature of works without which true attitude of renunciation of works (sannyāsa) cannot be reached.⁶ Hence Brahma-jijñāsā comes only after limited nature of works is known through a systematic study of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā or dharma-jijñāsā. Dharma is the inseparable means to attain spiritual consummation, niḥśreyas; in itself, by its very nature dharma is happiness, but when it reveals God to the devotee it is the way leading to the blissful goal.⁷

Other Vaiṣṇavācāryas follow the lead given by Rāmānuja in proving the necessity of dharma or duties in the world before the mind turns to mokṣa. Nimbārka insists on

1. Vivaraṇa Prameya Saṅgraha, IX, XXXV.

2. S. B. on Br. Upa., II, 4, 1.

3. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XV, 8; Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 41-42.

4. S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 66.

5. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 18.

6. ibid., I, 1, 1, p. 147; I, 1, 2, p. 255.

7. R. B. on B. G., IX, 2; cf., Vedānta Deep, II, 1, 1.

the study of the Veda, removal of doubts about results of karma by the study of Purva-Mimāṃsā before Brahma-jijñāsa begins.¹ Vallabhacārya regards Purva- and Uttara-Mimāṃsās as one whole topic or manifestation of God in his two qualities of kriya and jñāna. Works prescribed by dharma are both causes and effects of jñāna. Of the three modes of spiritual life the puṣṭi-marga is the most superior; and it is dedication to God of mind, body, property, allowing man to be free from worldly ties while living in the world.² Dharma is not to be neglected, but it must not be at the cost of worship or seva.³ The latter alone is the true or Ātma-dharma, while all other dharmas are related to the body. Unlike all other Ācāryas who agree that sannyāsa or renunciation of dharma is prescribed by Śruti, he did not consider it necessary in his puṣṭi-marga.⁴

The difference between the absolutists and theists can be understood by comparing their interpretations of the analogy, aśvavat.⁵ Śaṅkara remarks that just as a horse is yoked to a chariot only and not to a plough so āśrama-dharma though useful in the earlier stages of knowledge is of no use in its later stages i. e., dharma is absent in mokṣa. Rāmānuja says that just as a horse carries the rider to the goal on condition that he girds up his loins and takes the mount so knowledge leads to mokṣa provided it is supplemented by āśrama-dharma i. e., it is a necessary accessory to the goal. The other three Vaiṣṇavācāryas, Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha take the stand that the horse is useful on the road but not on entering the house, similarly dharma is useful as means, but not when the goal is reached.

We may conclude that, theoretically, the Advaitin separates dharma from mokṣa i. e., denies that life in the mundane world is a means to the attainment of the goal on doctrinal grounds and his ideal man is vidhi-niṣedhātita. The theists see no antagonism between the two and stand for a natural relation and transition from one to the other. Practically, however, the difference is much less since both absolutists and theists fully subscribed to the ancient tradition and its values. In fact, the Advaitin

1. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, I, 1, 1; Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 4, 27.

2. Bhakti Vardhini Grantha, 2.

3. ibid., 3, 6-7.

4. Sannyāsa-Nirṇaya Grantha, 1-6: Renunciation is not desirable for karmayogī, only for bhakti- and jñāna-yogīs. But even for Navadhā bhakti it is not desirable since dharma is not a hindrance to it.

5. B. S., III, 4, 26.

is the champion of the Śmārta tradition and as staunch an upholder of dharma as the Non-Advaitin. In the spiritual discipline of each there is the fullest scope given to the operation of dharma i. e., worldly and religious activities and values are not neglected but regarded as stages in the development of spirituality.

Samsāra

The attitude of Vedānta towards the world is set in the Upaniṣads. The chief feature of samsāra is change and suffering. The individual is compared to a rotating wheel of many parts and conditions, eternally in motion, or a river of many streams and sources in the flood of fivefold misery; in this Brahma-wheel the soul flutters about thinking itself different from its mover.¹

Like the wave in the great river, there is no turning back of that which has previously been done. Like the ocean tide, hard to keep back is the approach of one's death. Like a lame man--bound with fetters made of the fruit of good and evil; like the condition of one in prison--lacking independence; like the condition of one in the realm of death--in a condition of great fear--intoxicated with moha (delusion); like one seized by an evil being rushing hither and thither; like one bitten by a great snake--bitten by objects of sense; like gross darkness--the darkness of passion; like jugglery (indrajāla)--consisting of illusion (māya-maya); like a dream falsely apparent; like the pith of a banana tree--unsubstantial; like an actor--in temporary dress; like a painted scene--falsely delighting the mind.²

And we see this whole decaying, as gnats, mosquitoes and the like, the grass, and the trees that arise and perish.³ The individual's body is a conglomeration of many loathsome materials, it is afflicted by many evil passions, and miseries of hunger, thirst, senility, death, disease and sorrow.⁴ Man the elemental soul (bhūtātman), is filled and overcome by the dark (tamas) and passionate (rajas) qualities of nature.⁵ Despondency arises from this--"In this cycle of existence what is the good of enjoyment of desires, when after a man has fed on them there is seen repeatedly his return here on earth?"⁶

In later Vedāntic speculation the doctrine of the three sources of misery and fivefold misery (kleśa) was held as an axiom.

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1. Śve. Upa., I, 4-6.
 2. Maitrī Upa., IV, 2.
 3. *ibid.*, I, 4.
 4. *ibid.*, I, 3; III, 4.
 5. *cf.*, *ibid.*, III, 5.
 6. *ibid.*, I, 4.

¹ i. e., the world is the cause of infinite pain, originating from self, from elemental beings and superhuman powers. We know that creation is full of grief from womb to death² and the Lord is enquired into by those afflicted by the triad of pain.³ The suffering is broadly classified into five general types—nescience, egoism, attachment and hatred, fear of death and subjection to the three gunas of Prakṛti.⁴ Samsāra is the tree whose seed is the dark quality of tamas, whose sprout is Ātma's identification with individual self, whose leaf is attachment, whose sap is karma, whose trunk is the body, whose vital airs are the branches, whose flowers are objects of sense and whose fruit is the variety of suffering which binds jīva.⁵

The unsubstantiality and transiency, no less than the misery of the world struck the philosophical mind of Vedānta. The difference in the degrees of pleasure and pain having for its antecedents embodied existence and for its cause difference of degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known to be non-eternal, fleeting, changing nature of samsāra.⁶ The finite is subject to destruction, being governed by the law of change, which nature is absent in the infinite real.⁷ The conclusion is that attachment to the world epitomised by the body opens the flood-gate of suffering.⁸

Vedānta explains the experience of individual existence, change, activity, pain and suffering as due to the body which represents the spirit's connection with non-intelligent matter. The embodied soul (bhūtātma) is afflicted by karma and the pairs of opposites, it is overcome by nature's qualities, failing to see its oneness with the Lord, full of desires and distractions it is in a state of self-conceit (abhimānatva). In thinking, "this is I" and "that is mine" he binds himself with his self, as does a bird with a snare; being overcome by the fruits of his action, he enters a good or evil womb, so that his course is downward or upward and he wanders around.⁹ Similarly

1. Rāmānuja, Vedānta-Tattva-Sāra, pp. 52, 72.
2. Vedānta Deep, II, 1, 32.
3. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1.
4. Vallabha Sampradāya, Vedānta Ratna Manjūṣa, p. 43.
5. Viveka Chūdāmani, 147; cf., S. B. on B. G., II, 10.
6. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4, p. 27.
7. S. B. on Chān. Upa., VII, 23, 24; cf., Ātmabodha, 1.
8. cf., Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, II, 70.
9. Maitrī Upa., III, 1-2.

the Gītā declares¹ that matter and spirit are without beginning, all modification and qualities are of nature which produces body and senses causing the spirit to enjoy all objects of nature of the three gunas. Attachment to these qualities is the cause of birth in good and evil wombs.

Avidyā

The Vedāntācāryas are in general agreement in regard to their analysis of what constitutes bondage or the state in which the truth about the nature of God and the self is hidden for the time being, either in reality or in appearance. Though this spiritual ignorance, Avidyā and Ajñāna, is the direct cause of bondage, according to all, they differ in their understanding of it.

Śaṅkara declares that as pervasive ākāśa is regarded as soiled by dust and smoke due to superimposition, so unborn (ajāta) Ātman, without parts or forms or change appears to be associated with misery and happiness. As the many forms, functions and names of akāśa in common experience (vyavahāra) are caused by upādhis, so is the case with Ātman which is not affected.² As clouds produced by the rays of sun manifest themselves by hiding the sun so egotism arising in connection with Ātman manifests itself by hiding the real character of Ātman.³ The jīva affected by Avidyā is conjoined to the body, senses, mind, intellect, objects and sensations.⁴ But this second nature of the individual soul, the aspect depending on the upādhis, is not its real nature. So long as it is not free from nescience in the form of duality it remains an individual soul.⁵ Advaita understands bondage to be due to Avidyā only,⁶ and later thinkers developed a number of theories to explain the exact relation of Avidyā or Māyā to jīva. Bondage is the function of the mind characterised by pleasure and pain arising from action and enjoyment.⁷ But this bondage of self is an appearance only and not real.⁸ The reason is that the scripture and the whole process of sādhanā serves a purpose in bondage.

1. B. G., XIII, 19-21.

2. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 1 and 8.

3. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 144.

4. S. B. on B. S., I, 4, 1.

5. ibid., I, 3, 19.

6. ibid., III, 2, 29.

7. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, 13; cf., Upadeśa Sāhasrī, III, 4.

8. Gauḍapāda-Kārikā, II, 32: ८

Though dualists regard bondage and liberation to be real conditions of the self, it cannot exist in different states because that would make it non-eternal.¹ The exact process of bondage is as follows:

The effort to remove pain is quite natural; all creatures . . . seek to avoid pain of every kind. But pain is there because the body is there. The body is the result of our past merit and demerit, which is due to our right (vidhi) and wrong (niṣedha) actions. Our actions proceed from our attachment and antipathy But our attachment and antipathy are due to our considering (quite falsely) certain things as good or evil If there were no duality nothing would appear as either good or evil. But this duality is due only to ignorance of self Happiness is the abiding natural state of self but it is covered, as it were, by ignorance Ignorance of the self is thus not only the ultimate cause of pain, but it is the only thing that prevents us from realizing our true nature.²

The theists emphasise karma as the chief explanation of the world-cycle, while the Advaitins hold that Avidyā obscures reality and thus produces the endless process of saṃsāra with plurality or bheda-jñāna. According to Rāmaṇuja, souls exist in essential nature, connected with matter as embodied souls, due to nescience of good and evil works failing to recognise their own nature.³ Bondage springs from Ajnana in the form of eternal stream of karma.⁴ Soul's experiences of pleasure and pain are not due to its being conjoined to body but due to its good and evil deeds.⁵ Nimbārka agrees with Rāmaṇuja that though one's natural form is ever present in bandhana and mokṣa, in bondage it is subject to the nescience of karma and surrounded by matter in its causal and affected forms, tormented by various afflictions and deluded by many false arguments, it is eternally fettered.⁶ The Lord is the source of creation, to whom all creatures are connected. He is the cause of bondage and liberation causing all to revolve in saṃsāra by His Māyā.⁷ Ajñāna is not a world-principle but a quality of the jīva, who being associated with beginningless chain of karma is naturally blinded in his view of knowledge.⁸ Sorrow is due to attachment to things outside one's own self.⁹ This is the theory of karmātmaka Ajñāna like that of Rāmaṇuja, since Nimbārka traces Avidyā to

1. B. G., XIII, 2.

2. Naiṣkarma-Siddhi, chap. I, Intro.

3. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 88.

4. ibid., p. 147.

5. ibid., II, 1, 14, p. 428.

6. Vedānta Kaustubha, IV, 4, 27.

7. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, I, 1, 10.

8. Anantārāma, Vedānta-Tattva-Bodha, p. 12.

9. Vanamāli Mīśra, Vedānta Siddhānta Saṃgraha, I, 9, 10.

karma rather than karma to Avidya, as according to him the soul's real attributes are concealed by the states of waking and the rest, rooted in karma, meritorious or non-meritorious, and existent from all eternity.¹

Vallabha declares that separation of jivas from God creates forgetfulness of their original nature and they are involved in samsara, the product of selfish imagination and action. Thus ahantā (I-ness) and mānta (mine-ness) are the false relations binding jīva in the web of life.² Vidya and Avidyā ordained by God affect the jivas, because of which they suffer misery and littleness. Ignorance of oneself and the four-fold delusion resulting from the senses, body, vital energy and mind are the five forms of Avidyā. Bound by these the souls go through the cycle of janma-marana. Ajñāna is wrong attribution of quality to an entity to which it does not belong.³ Maya is clouding of jīva's intelligence, making him forget his identity with Brahma and regarding the world as independent of Him. Madhva regards the Prakṛti of three guṇas to be the mysterious will of God.⁴ Avidyā is a negative substance which by God's will veils the natural intelligence of all. It is the false assumption of independence of jīva⁵ which by its two veils hides the nature of jīva's qualities as well as the nature of God.⁶ Wrongly this Ajñāna makes the jīva think that buddhi, senses, bodies and their functions are self-derived.⁷ From this follows the consciousness of happiness and misery, rāgadveṣa towards opposites and the cycle of saṃsāra. Ajñāna accrues to jīva by its nature.⁸ In general, the theists believe in the reality and validity of embodied existence and effort for deliverance, and both states of the soul as dependent on the will of the Supreme Lord.

Karma and Punarjanma

Though there are doctrinal differences in regard to the cause of bondage, all

1. Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 3, 19.
2. Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha, I, 31-32.
3. Subodhini, III, 7, 11: अज्ञानं विदुः कर्मणा जन्ममृत्योर्दुःखमिति । तदु-
परिहृत्य जिवन्मुक्तिरिति ।
4. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 4, 25; also Jayatīrtha, Nyāyasudhā, 19: अज्ञानं तदु-
परिहृत्य जिवन्मुक्तिरिति ।
5. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 1, 1.
6. Anu Vyākhyāna, p. 2.
7. Nyāyasudhā, 26: बुद्धेर्निवृत्तिः शरीरनिवृत्तिः स्वस्वपरित्यागः स्वस्वनिवृत्तिः स्वस्वनिवृत्तिः स्वस्वनिवृत्तिः
अज्ञानं तदुपरिहृत्य जिवन्मुक्तिरिति ।
8. ibid., 64: स्वस्वभावो जन्मः पापवृत्त्यादि । तदुपरिहृत्य जिवन्मुक्तिरिति ।

agree that the operation of samsāra takes place according to the laws of karma and punar-janma. The Upanisads lay down a clear enunciation of these laws. Karma determines the nature of man, for according as one acts or conducts himself so does he become. If an evil-doer he becomes evil, if a good-doer he becomes good.¹ Karma is carried back into the inner aspect of will. "A person is made of desires only, as is his desire (kama), such is his resolve (kratu), as is his resolve, such the action (kārya) he performs, and what action he performs into that he becomes changed (karman)."² "Now, verily, a person consists of purpose (kratumaya). According to the purpose which a person has in this world, thus does he become on departing hence. So let him form for himself a correct purpose."³ Though in samsāra man is bound by work and his freedom is limited by fruits of work being temporary, yet is he free to form desires and purposes.⁴ The river of desires runs between the banks of good and bad, but by effort of will we can compel it to move in the direction of the good.⁵ The Gītā sees most clearly that desire is more fundamental than action and that action in itself is not binding.⁶ All actions being impelled by material parts of man, he is impelled to evil actions by the force of false desires, which are his great enemies, causing spiritual and moral degradation, suffering and death.⁷

Not only is the nature of the individual self determined by his karma but his fate of future rebirth. For where one's mind is attached—the inner self goes thereto with action, being attached to it alone.⁸ Entertainers of desire are born here and there according to their desire.⁹ The self chooses its forms of embodiment according to its own qualities and the quality of his acts.¹⁰ Whatever is one's thinking (citta) therewith he enters into life. His life joined with Ātman leads to whatever world has been fashioned in thought.¹¹ The Gītākāra is convinced that future destiny is determined

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1. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 5.
 2. ibid., IV, 4, 2.
 3. Chān. Upa., III, 14, 1; cf., Plato, Laws, 904c.
 4. Chān. Upa., VIII, 1, 6.
 5. Muktikōpaniṣad, II, 15, 6.
 6. B. G., IV, 21-22; III, 9.
 7. B. G., III, 27-29, 36-37; II, 62-63.
 8. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 6.
 9. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 2.
 10. Śve. Upa., V, 12.
 11. Praśna Upa., III, 10.

by the desires for objects at death.¹ The question is asked, "A man when cut down by death—from what root does he grow up?"² The reply is that vidya and karma withdraw into the subtle body at death, lay hold of jīva—as the caterpillar coming to the end of a blade of grass in taking the next step draws itself together towards it; the body and senses merge with the elements and only good and bad karmas are left to operate.³

The departure of the soul from hence and the return to earth is aided throughout by karma. The details of the process may differ but broadly there are three kinds of fates. The knowers go by the path of light (arcimarga, devayāna) to the world of Brahma never to return.⁴ The doers of karma or sacrifice, living in the grāma, go by the path of smoke (dhūramārga, pitryāna) to the moon where their works being exhausted they return, by the residue of their karmas, by the path of the five fires⁵ to the world via space, air, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, rice, barley or vegetation and creatures; thus they cycle around.⁶ Yet a third type of soul passes into the being of lower animals or plants.⁷ According to its deeds carried in the vestment of the subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra) the soul fares in the other world and the new life of pleasant or unpleasant birth.⁸

The broad fact of karma and transmigration underlies the speculations of the Gītā⁹ and the Brahma-Sūtra.¹⁰ The implication of connecting the two is that karma is the unmanifested future birth and rebirth is the manifestation of past karma. Migration of the soul assisted by the two principles is eternal, for Vedānta postulates the beginninglessness (anāditvam) of saṁsāra as a necessary corollary of these two. If the perpetuity of karma and jīva be not granted, or the question of the beginning of saṁsāra were raised, there would follow the absurdity that souls are requited for what they have not done i. e., for no reason, or it may be that jīva is deprived of the

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1. B. G., VIII, 6.
 2. Br. Upa., III, 9, 28.
 3. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 2-4; III, 2, 13.
 4. *ibid.*, VI, 2.
 5. Chān. Upa., V, 3, 10; IV, 15, 5.
 6. *cf.*, Muṇḍ. Upa., I, 2, 10; Prasna Upa., I, 9.
 7. Kaṭha Upa., V, 7.
 8. Chān. Upa., V, 10, 7.
 9. VIII, 23 and 28.
 10. III, 1.

result of his good or bad karma.¹ The beginninglessness of karma might also be traced to the beginninglessness of the nature of jiva.² Vedānta denies that jiva is ever without a moral character by showing the logical inadmissibility of the question of the beginning of karma and saṁsāra.

As to the question of free or controlled operation of the law, Vedānta tends to take the position that the law is an impersonal one, operating by its own inner impetus. But it is also declared that the Lord causes jiva to perform good or evil actions according to the fate He wishes to inflict upon it.³ The Gitā⁴ denies that the Lord determines the doership or the doings of beings or even their contact with the fruits of actions, because it is nature which functions, though it is guided by God. And the Brahma-Sūtra likewise denies the personal character of karma.⁵ The Lord is not subject to the charge of partiality and mercilessness because in creating the world and its differences He is guided by karma.

The Vedānta schools follow the general spirit of the three Prasthānas. Śaṅkara declares⁶ that the accepted view of the Śruti, Smṛti, reasoning and tradition is that happiness and misery are outcomes of past works, the gods or God or time by no means upset the results of action which depends on requisite factors, and even if they did, would not have power to produce results i. e., these factors are auxiliaries to work, hence our faith in the attainment of results is not shaken. As there is no fixity about the relative preeminence of past work, time, destiny and nature of things, karma is inscrutable, hence people are thrown into confusion about its most important factor. As to the statement of the Kauśītaki Upaniṣad,⁷ certainly the agentship of jīva in the state of Avidyā, founded on upādhis, depends upon the Lord who makes him act according to efforts made by it, meritorious or otherwise, arranging favourable or opposite circumstances. Though the activity is not independent the soul does act, the Lord causes it to act according to previous effort, but it acts itself. That the Lord has such

1. Vedānta Deep, II, 1, 35; S. B. and Nimbārka Bhāṣyas on B. S., II, 1, 35.

2. Madhva, Bhārata-Tātparya-Nirṇaya, XXII, 184-185.

3. Kauśī. Upa., III, 8.

4. V, 14.

5. II, 1, 34.

6. S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 4, 10, pp. 163-164.

7. vide S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 42-43.

regard for effort is known from the purposefulness of vidhi-nisedha in Sruti. Also if the Lord had no regard for previous effort then also men's ordinary efforts will be purposeless. Even as rain¹ helps seeds² according to their respective qualities so God is the in-varying condition whereby each person's karma determines his growth. The inequalities are due to papa and punya; the Parjanya, giver of rain, is common cause of rice, barley and other plants and differences are due to the potentialities of seeds, even so God is the common cause of creation and difference is due to the deeds of jīva. This absolves God of partiality and cruelty but does not militate against His omnipotence, as when a master dispenses rewards in accordance with the services of servants he does not indeed cease to be master.³

Rāmānuja argues that the self is provided with inner instruments of action and acts or does not act in accordance with its own wishes.⁴ The inner ruler prompts it only in so far as the volitional effort of the individual soul is made, by granting permission and favour (anumati). The statement of the Kausītaki applies to the devotees who are well-disposed and determined to be on God's side or to please Him; them he blesses by giving the resolves which are virtuous and taste for actions which can win Him; others bent on displeasing Him He gives opposite fruit of vicious resolves and actions. Such is the dependence-independence of the soul i. e., the soul desires and acts according to its free-will and God as inner controller gives the fruit accordingly. Nimbārka agrees that from God alone arise the fruits accruing to different individuals in accordance with particular duties to which they are entitled,⁵ and as in the case of mundane karma, tilling etc., Vedic works done by men in samsāra are dependent on another and do not bring about fruits independently.⁶ Rāmānuja continues the argument that the Lord is the operative cause in creation and the material cause is the potentialities (karma and saṃskāra) of beings.⁷ Though He has full capacity to create

1. *ibid.*, II, 1, 34.

2. S. B. on Chān. Upa., VI, 3, 1 equates bīja to three types of natures, viz., *निमित्तकर्मणि* मूलानां त्रीणाम्निमित्तकर्मणि भवति न अण्डजं, सैवजसृष्टिकर्मणि; and "seed" means that which has individual selves behind it and grows. cf., B. G., VII, 10: *कोऽयं मां सर्वेषु कार्माणां*; X, 32: *सकृत्कर्मणां चोत्पत्तिर्न हि*

3. *Bhāmātī*, II, 1, 34.

4. R. B. on B. S., II, 3, 39-41.

5. *Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha*, III, 2, 38.

6. *Vedānta Kaustubha*, III, 2, 41.

7. Rāmānuja quotes *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa*, I, 4, 51-52.

His creation is in accordance with some rule i. e., paying due regard to the previous karmas accumulated by jīva. Hence there can be no charge of partiality and cruelty.¹ Madhva also regards jīva to be a real agent otherwise vidhi-nīśedha would be groundless and also the sādhanā, such as śravaṇa etc.² Jīva is a doer whose activity is derived from God, who enables him to pursue action according to former life and deserts.³ Thus not only is God absolved from partiality and cruelty but karma is traced to the distinctive nature of souls.⁴ This nature or swarūpa योग्यता is perfected by karma.⁵

Purpose of Samsāra

The Vedāntācāryas are agreed that repeated experience of the mundane world prepares man (adhikārī) for the attainment of highest goal by producing in him vairāgya or detachment. Nimbārka declares⁶ that the idea of the Sādhanā-adhyāya is to generate dispassion by exhibiting the soul's going to and returning from heaven and the rest. The first quarter tries to generate strong feeling of disgust towards the mundane existence by demonstrating the imperfections of this world and the second quarter tries to generate yearning for Brahma by demonstrating His attributes. And⁷ just as the first quarter of the third adhyāya dealt with the relation of the soul in the waking state to elements and elementals for generating right discrimination, between soul and the non-soul and its relation to heaven and hell to create the feeling of dispassion for worldly objects, similarly to make the viveka and vairāgya still stronger dream and the rest is discussed to promote the rise of devotion to Brahma. Rāmānuja⁸ agrees that this negative and positive purpose is present behind the depiction of samsāra in as much as the first two adhyāyas set forth the nature of Brahma and the last two the means of attainment. The third adhyāya is concerned with the enquiry into meditation, the motive of which is absence of desire for other things and desire for That Thing only; it points to

1. Vedānta Deep, II, 1, 34.

2. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 3, 33.

3. ibid., II, 3, 41.

4. Madhva on M. B., XVIII, 15: नदन्तवर्तमानतः परशक्तं स्वतन्त्रमधिकार्यं तं प्रवर्तयति तं जीवः स्वतन्त्रतः। प्रवृत्तिः तः।

5. Nyāyasudhā, 316: स्वतन्त्रतः वास्तवतया: शक्तिमान्। कामोत्कर्षितः।

6. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, III, 1, 1, Intro.

7. ibid., III, 2, 1.

8. R. B. on B. S., III, 1, Intro.

the imperfections of the individual soul moving about in different worlds and the blessed character of Brahma by which He is raised above all imperfections. Vallabha expresses this idea in a somewhat different way: the purpose of the Vairagyapada is to show the necessity of attaining another body to receive jñāna. Madhva says¹ that the description of exits and entrances or various phases of transmigration is to instil non-attachment. And only the process of samsara provides for līṅga-sarira etc. for jīva to unfold himself.² Thus God's only purpose is to help jīva to exhaust its karma and vāsanā by bhoga or experience of it.³ Sankara declares⁴ that though the individual souls come from the real they are not aware of this fact. But God never wearies in effecting mokṣa through migrations because His love for the self is that of a self to self and not of a self to non-self.

The Vedānta view of the empirical world has, thus, a definite purpose. On the empirical plane of effort and discipline i. e., on the ethical side, Vedānta requires the help of karma and punarjanma as logical corollaries of the idea of salvation, immortality, bliss, fearlessness and unity. As a process of becoming and suffering saṃsāra is meant to lead man to detachment from individuality. Individuation creates evil and evil is the cure of individuation. Vedānta, through these doctrines of karma and punarjanma, provides retribution of evil, not by death, since that is incidental to plants, animals and good as well as evil men, but through a series of lives, during the course of which the reformation of the soul is also worked out. The conclusion might be that the motive of Vedāntic eschatology as well as cosmology is more religious than scientific or speculative. Evolution is mainly the unfoldment of souls, or preparation of mumukṣus.

World Reality-Unreality

Though Vedāntins generally agree about the cause and the content of the mundane world, its character as a process of becoming and suffering, they are deeply divided on

1. Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 1, 1.
2. Viṣṇu Rahasya, chap. V: शक्तिं ते सृष्ट्यादेवैव शुभात् स सृष्ट्यादेवैव भावः । तत्रैव च सत्त्वं । तत्रैव च विद्या-
मर्मा-न पराशरणाः । अथर्वणं सत्त्वव्यक्तं तत्रैव कर्मात् सत्त्वव्यक्तम् ।
3. Aṅu Vyākhyāna, II, 1, 33: आत्मप्रज्ञानात् सत्त्वं सृष्ट्यादेवैव भावः । तत्रैव च सत्त्वं । तत्रैव च विद्या-
मर्मा-न पराशरणाः । अथर्वणं सत्त्वव्यक्तं तत्रैव कर्मात् सत्त्वव्यक्तम् ।
4. S. B. on B. S., III, 2, 8.

the question of the metaphysical status of the world. The absolutists find it to be a pattern factual but not real, while the theists hold it to be both factual and real.

Advaita does not find any reason for believing in the reality of the evolutionary process. Though some believe in creation as the manifestation of the super-human power of God and others regard it as illusion manifested by God (svapnamaya), the seeker after liberation has no interest in creation.¹ The Upanisadic texts about creation etc. purport to establish identity and only reiterate duality as a matter of common experience, so they are to be understood metaphorically.² If creation were real then scripture would not talk about unreality, hence imaginary creation has been given in order to understand non-duality.³ Nor do statements about the order of creation affect the omniscient, non-dual Lord, the cause, Brahman, therefore, conflicts of cosmological statements do not matter greatly as scripture does not wish to teach creation.⁴ Nowhere is man's welfare (phala) said to depend on this, so such passages are subordinated to those teaching Brahma.⁵

Creation is described for the purpose of teaching that effects are not really different from the cause⁶ e. g., "being" ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by name and form and "non-being" denotes the same previous to differentiation i. e., Brahma in a secondary sense is called non-being previous to origination of the world. Were manifold names and forms of the Lord not manifested the transcendent nature of self would not be known; when manifested as body and organs it is possible to know its nature.⁷ For the wise do not regard the changes as vyatirikta from Brahman but as means⁸ or indicative marks⁹ or as expressions of Brahman.¹⁰

Śaṅkara takes pains to prove, as against the Yogācāra subjectivism, that the world is not dependent on the perceiving mind, or that the individual subject is not

1. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, I, 7-8.

2. *ibid.*, III, 14.

3. *ibid.*, III, 24.

4. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 33: *सुखं ननु तदवस्थायां विद्यमानं तदवस्थायां सुखं ननु*

5. *ibid.*, I, 4, 14; *ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनवच्छेदं तु यत्तं ब्रह्म*

6. S. B. on Taittī. Upa., II, 7.

7. S. B. on Br. Upa., II, 5, 19, p. 403.

8. Chān. Upa., VII, 17, 1: *ब्रह्मस्यैव तद्विद्यमानं*

9. S. B. on B. G., XIII, 13: *यदि चैतन्नैकं तद्विद्यमानं*

10. Chān. Upa., VI, 2, 2: *संशयान्मनात्*

its maker.¹ With regard to the manifold names and forms, mountains, rivers etc. no soul apart from the Lord possesses the power of evolution.² Nor is the world creation without support, for the self-luminous Ātman Himself, by His own Māya imagines the different objects.³ This is not nihilism because non-duality is established as the substratum. Brahman is not unreal because ever unimagined; as the rope is real even before the knowledge of the unreality of the snake.⁴ The Madhyamikas say that phenomena are only illusions founded on nothing, but illusion must abide in something real and in the absence of the site no illusion can arise; even nothing stands in need of the witness intelligence.⁵ Śāṅkara insists as strongly as the theists that the existence of the world is not independent of Brahma,⁶ and taken separately from it it is unreal.⁷

So long as the self is identified with the body so long the world reality is valid.⁸ Just as dreams appear to be true as long as one does not awake, so the identification of self with the body etc. and authenticity of sense-perceptions and the like, in the waking-state, continues as long as there is no self-knowledge.⁹ Nor does anyone think from the beginning that duality is false.¹⁰ Since the world-complex is considered true prior to the arising of jñāna, there is no reason why secular and religious activity (vyavahārārtham) should not continue undisturbed.¹¹ "We do not maintain the existence of things different from Brahma in highest knowledge. Nor do we deny validity, for the ignorant, of actions with factors and results while the relative nāmarūpa saṁsāra exists. Therefore, scriptural or conventional outlook depends entirely on knowledge or ignorance. Hence there is no contradiction between them"¹² Belief in reality of objects does not contradict the final perception of non-dual Ātman as the

1. S. B. on B. S., II, 2, 28; cf., Pañcadaśī, IV, 34: Mental function is necessary to establish existence of external world, because it assumes shape to discover the object so the object must be in existence.

2. S. B. on B. S., II, 4, 20.

3. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, II, 12.

4. ibid., II, 33.

5. Pañcadaśī, VI, 75-76.

6. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 9: ननु तद्व्यवहारार्थं हि लोके अस्ति प्रमाणमस्ति, अतएव साक्षात्कृतं

7. S. B. on Chān. Upa., VI, 3, 2: सर्वत्र तत्रैव प्रकृतं तद्व्यवहारं

8. S. B. on B. S., I, 4, 11; IV, 1, 3.

9. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, 11, 5; 17, 20.

10. S. B. on Br. Upa., V, 1, 1.

11. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 14.

12. S. B. on Br. Upa., III, 5, 1.

above causality and duality depends upon belief in existence.¹ Advaita does not conflict with Dvaita because the latter is its effect. Though appearing ultimate for the deluded it is not so for the Advaitin.² For people in Avidyā, multiplicity of change is the only reality.³ Not only is it possible for the namarupa samsara to exist, but its existence is essential for achievement of human purpose.

Mere absence of the external world will not produce a knowledge of Advitiya Brahman. Since in pralaya duality is gone and with it guru and Sastra, no knowledge is possible. Therefore, Īśvara's creation is not antagonistic but a means of Advaita-jñāna. Jīva's mental creation of duality may be independent of Sastra, and to be given up, or in accordance with it i. e., argument and analysis of Vedanta to be practiced until unreality of duality is established.⁴

Thus Advaita makes three levels of objective existence. There are imaginary objects called alīka or asat such as sky-lotus, hare's horns. These being without ground (adhiṣṭhāna) do not function in the practical sphere.⁵ There are other illusory objects, having prātibhāsika existence, such as snake imagined in the rope or silver in the shell, which are sometimes called asat. They differ from the first because they have a permanent locus to sustain them.⁶ There are, next, phenomenal objects, namarupa or vikāras having practical or vyāvahārika existence. These also have a ground or cause into which they will ultimately merge.⁷ The last two kinds being inseparable from their substrata are alike.⁸ There is no difference between illusory shell-silver and illusory things seen in a dream, only in the latter the internal organs function independently of contact with external objects; nor is there difference between these two in illusions and things perceived in waking-state. In all cases Māyā effects the illusory projection of unreal things on the substrate of universal consciousness.

The vikāras are called by Śāṅkara satya.⁹ It is only by knowing the truth of the five elements, prāna, the organs, body etc. that the Truth of Brahman can be ascertained by eliminating of these lesser truths.¹⁰ The world reality in the ordinary

1. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, IV, 42 and 75.

2. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 18.

3. S. B. on Br. Upa., III, 5, 1: तासां च त्रैलोक्येऽपि साक्षात्पश्यन्त्यात्मवदृश्यं तत्र तद्व्यभिचारोऽपि न स्यात् ।

4. Pañcadaśī, IV, 39-42.

5. S. B. on B. G., IX, 4: नदि निशकालं चिदिन्द्रियानुभूतं तद्व्यभिचारोऽपि न स्यात् ।

6. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 27: अतीतिध्वनान्तरात् तद्व्यभिचारोऽपि न स्यात् ।

7. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 16: कल्पं तदा विद्यात्तं कल्पं तदा विद्यात्तं कल्पं तदा विद्यात्तं कल्पं तदा विद्यात्तं कल्पं तदा विद्यात्तं ।

8. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, I, 7.

9. S. B. on Br. Upa., II, 3, 1: यत्र सूक्ष्मं तद्व्यभिचारोऽपि न स्यात् ।

10. ibid., II, 3, 6: अति मोक्षं ताकात्मा तद्व्यभिचारोऽपि न स्यात् ।

sense consists of the three aspects of sat, jnana, karma derived from its substrate.¹ The namarūpa world is described as anirvacaniya or mithya,² because it is different from the tattva, Brahma, as well as from the atattva.³ This quality is produced by Ajnana or Māyā. It is the Paramesa-sakti⁴ by which the world is born, neither noumenal nor phenomenal nor both, neither different nor non-different nor both, neither particled nor unparticled nor both, wonderful, undescribable.⁵ It is the nature of God, made by three guṇas.⁶ The power of rajas causes extension (vikṣepa), the essence of action and modification of mind, and tamas envelopes (avrtti). By pure sattva Ātman is perceived.⁷ Māyā is not non-existent, being experienced by all, nor existent, being capable of destruction, but something tuccha from the stand-point of jñāna.⁸ It is described in three ways: in the highest state as tuccha, in logic as anirvacaniya, in vyavahāra as satya. Thus the mithyātva of Māyā as well as the world is due to the impossibility of defining the nature of either. If all learned men were to join in investigating one entity out of the many in the world they are sure to declare their ignorance, hence the wise regard Māyā and the world as a magical performance.⁹

The anirvacaniya saṁsāra is to be regarded as asat only when compared with paramārthika sattā itself.¹⁰ What is meant is that just as dream phenomena are found unreal on waking, so waking phenomena would be found unreal on attaining turiya. Dream and waking are similar, but differ in the degree of reality because the former is contradicted (bādhita) every day, while the latter only when Mūla Avidyā is destroyed by jñāna.¹¹ Śaṅkara postulates three levels of existence differing in their degrees of uncontradictability (abādhyatva). Some later Advaitins postulated the extreme doctrine of two

1. Drg-Dr̥ṣya-Viveka, 20: अत्र ज्ञानं विद्यते तत्र ज्ञेयं तत्र ज्ञानोपपत्तकम् । अत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् ।
2. S. B. on Taitti. Upa., II, 6: तत्र ज्ञेयं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञानोपपत्तकम् ।
3. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 27: ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयं तत्र ज्ञानोपपत्तकम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् ।
4. ibid., I, 4, 3.
5. Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 110-115.
6. S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 41.
7. Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 121-125.
8. Pañcadaśī, VI, 129-130.
9. ibid., VI, 143 and 146.
10. S. B. on Chān. Upa., VII, 17: सत्यं तत्र ज्ञेयं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञानोपपत्तकम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् । तत्र ज्ञेयत्वं तत्र ज्ञानं तत्र ज्ञेयम् ।
11. cf., S. B. on B. S., II, 2, 29-31; III, 2, 1-6.

levels:

If maintainer of three kinds of existence is asked whether duality is real or unreal, not the former, nor the latter, for how can sattva be threefold. Yet the twofold view is not contradictory of the older threefold view of existence. Ancient teachers . . . taught that the dual order depends on perception, but taught the threefold existence to satisfy the deluded vulgar. For although the esse of the mind is percipi, (there is) no contradiction in maintaining the practical as a third kind, if attention is had to these intermediate differences (between waking and dreaming) which the unphilosophical are persuaded of.¹

The exact position is that however the world may appear in the realm of relativity in the absolute or metaphysical sense it is not real.

Advaitins advance evidence from scripture in support of their view of metaphysical falsity of the world. All modifications are known to be unreal according to the scripture which says they are words only.² Sruti mentions names, forms and actions, but they are interdependent like a painting and description of it, so the unreal world exists for the deluded intellect.³ If self alone were reality, then by knowing it all will be known;⁴ the assertion of one existence before creation, of Ātman as Brahman, unity in sleep, the assertion of tattvamasī etc. means that there is no enjoining of meditation on all things but that self alone is everything.⁵ Everything evolved out of Ātman is always Ātman. Where there is duality etc.⁶ means that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of nescience, while the subsequent text declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.⁷

Logic also impels us to the same conclusion. The waking objects being perceived (dṛṣṭatvāt) as dreams are known to be unreal, form the ground (hetu) for the inference that they are unreal.⁸ Since they do not exist either at the beginning or at the end (changeability or vyabhicāra darśanāt), hence also not in the middle.⁹ The real is ever existent and the unreal is never existent, so self and non-self, real and unreal, are also distinct to the mind of jñānī, for vikāras like mirages are non-existent, false

1. Prakāśānand, Siddhānta Muktvāli, X, XI; cf., Raju, P. T., Idealistic Thought of India, p. 79.

2. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVII, 31 on Chan. Upa., VI, 1, 4-6.

3. ibid., XVIII, 10-11 on Br. Upa., I, 6, 1.

4. Br. Upa., II, 4, 6.

5. B. S., III, 3, 18, p. 210; cf.:

6. Br. Upa., IV, 5, 15; II, 4, 14.

7. S. B. on B. S., I, 2, 21.

8. S. B. on Māndūkya Kārikā, II, 4.

9. ibid., II, 6.

appearances.¹ Satya is defined as trikalabadhya and that is Brahma only. "According to a general principle of Vedanta nothing that is real can ever be annihilated, so nothing that is liable to annihilation has the right to be called real."² Yet another argument is that experiences are elicited by external and internal stimuli because of the nature of the self supporting it, but only the Self is svartha and not parartha or dependent on Sabdadi.³ So, it alone is real, while the world being other-dependent is unreal.

The two alternatives of Advaita are: either reality is realized in an experience of identity or not realized, in which case there is sustained manifestation of the manifold appearances. The latter state must give way before the former arises; but until that happens our conviction that empirical entities, pleasures and achievements are true will remain unshaken i. e., the conclusion of unreality is not inconsistent or irreconcilable with ordinary experience. Nor does Advaita allow the ignoring of the practical world as long as empirical ego lasts.⁴ Mithyātva of the world is distinct from asat, but the world has no further reality apart from its factual nature; though it coexists with anādi appearance, when the necessity of explaining it is no more, it is also no more and its appearance is no more. The insistence of Advaita that all plurality is illusion is to be understood in a strictly transcendental sense. The purpose of postulating falsity of the world is a psychological one, viz., to produce a certain attitude.

The main argument of Advaita doctrine of falsity of the world is not to establish the difference between the self and the not-self, but the instilling of the feeling of disgust in the worldly affairs. The attachment to the world does not melt away so soon by determination of the transitoriness of the world, as by the knowledge of its falsity . . . hence the knowledge of difference . . . should be assumed to be the chief means of release. This difference is only nominal, in as much as the whole world of not-self is false and consequently has no independent existence apart from the self.⁵

Vaiṣṇava Vedānta strongly repudiates the doctrine of world-falsity and takes its stand on the metaphysical reality of the world. Rāmānuja argues that there is no proof

1. S. B. on B. G., II, 16.

2. Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 154; cf., Bhāmati, I, 1, 4: अप्रतीत्यगतासंदिग्धा कोऽपि जनकत्वं हि प्रमाणत्वम् प्रमाणात्तमम् ।

3. S. B. on Br. Upa., II, 1, 18-19: वस्तुतत्त्वात्तदवयवस्यैव प्रतीत्यगतासंदिग्धा

4. cf., Pañcadaśī, VI, 13-14.

5. Viṭṭhalesōpādhyāyī quoted in Advaitasiddhi, Intro., p. 77; cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 1, p. 5-6.

of undifferentiated substance found in Sabda, pratyaksa and anumana, nor is mere being ever revealed by perception, hence plurality is not unreal; its reality is not to be denied even in passages where differences are said to vanish, nor is everything different from knowledge false since the world is manifestation of Brahma.¹ God by his own power, knowledge and consciousness creates the world.² His Maya permeated by three gunas produces marvellous effects, but signifies no falsity.³ The Mayavin is one who produces real effects on another's imagination. Maya works to veil true nature of Bhagavan and lures men to find pleasure in itself. Hence all the world bewitched by Maya fails to recognise God.⁴ Advaita interprets Sruti-text⁵ on Māyā as meaning production of jiva and Īśvara in abhāsa or mere reflection of Brahma, but Ramanuja interprets it as false reasoning (hetvābhāsa, dharmābhāsa). Thus "Māyā produces the error that body is soul . . . soul is self-dependent . . . that He (Lord) is an effect, has another as basis and is conditioned by Māyā."⁶ Unreal Maya cannot give rise to Brahman with the nature of bliss, even in sport, "for none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal and in the consciousness, itself unreal, of such a play."⁷

No pramāna proves that the phenomenal world apprehended by perception is false. Perception apprehends padārtha and Śāstra is concerned with form of Brahma, methods of worship and fruits of His grace. Śāstra and perception are both real pramanas.⁸ If everything is unreal it cannot be reasonably held that all can be known when the One is known for the simple reason that there is no "all" to know; the assertion is tenable in case that "all" has reality of its own by having the One for its soul.⁹ Nor can it be said that the words, "sarvam khalu idam Brahma," are really intended to make known the non-existence or falsity of all but Brahma, for that is opposed to "janmādasya yatah"

1. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 39ff.

2. R. B. on B. G., IV, 6.

3. ibid., VII, 13.

4. ibid.

5. Śve. Upa., VI, 9-10.

6. Vedānta Tattva Sāra, pp. 54-55.

7. R. B. on B. S., II, 1, 15, p. 442.

8. Vedārtha Saṅgraha, II, 52-53.

9. ibid., I, 12; cf., R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 88.

and injunction to meditate on the Saguna.¹ Nor is there any soundness in the argument that the effect is false because owing to its being perceived and its being perishable it cannot be defined as either real or unreal. For a thing being perceived and its being perishable does not prove its falseness, only its non-permanence.² Advaita defines mithyā as having the same locus (adhikarana) as that of its negation and that its negation is for all three times, but to prove it false it must be shown to be sublated with reference to that very place and time in connection with which it is perceived and not with reference to others.³ Moreover, Advaita admits practical reality (vyavahāra) of water-pots and cloth and other mundane objects but the essentially false like the muktā-sukti is not susceptible to use in practical life.⁴ Nor can there be instruction etc. accompanied by perception of duality by one whose original ignorance and its effects have been destroyed by intuition of Advitiya Ātman; there can be no persistence of the negated after revelation of true knowledge.⁵

Rāmānuja admits that nature does not possess an existence like that of Brahma because she is not uniform, as shown by its changefulness, perpetual modification. For the purpose of generating dispassion from worldly objects "false" and other metaphorical terms are applied to nature and its effects like sleep-experience and water of the mirage, which are metaphorically described as "non-existent" since they appear and disappear; but "what the Advaita asserts as false because it is perceived and later destroyed (in its form), not described as sat or asat, does not prove that effects are false but rather that they are impermanent."⁶

Nimbārka takes the stand that there are three kinds of reality, distinguished as sentient, non-sentient and Brahma; the object to be enquired into (Brahma), the enquirer (sentient) and Māyā (non-sentient) consisting of three guṇas, the original cause of nescience and bondage.⁷ All cognitions of objects as well as the trinity

1. Vedānta Tattva Sāra, p. 79.

2. R. B. on B. S., II, 1, 15, p. 446.

3. ibid.

4. Vedānta Tattva Sāra, p. 34.

5. ibid., pp. 8-9.

6. ibid., p. 21; cf., B. G., II, 18; V, 22; II, 14; IX, 33.

7. Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 1, 1, p. 11; also I, 3, 5.

jiva, padartha, kala, kriya) are ordained by Isvara's will.¹ Fivefold differences exist between jivas and jadas and Brahman, on the one hand, and mutually among jivas and jadas themselves, on the other; "this scheme of pancabheda is not illusory as it is cognised by God, maintained and controlled by Him, for there can be no illusion for God."²

The solution of the problem of how to rise out of misery is not provided by the supposition of the unreality of that condition. If the world were unreal it would not affect anyone adversely or favourably, but man's imperfections and limitations are felt to be real by the inmost self and never proved false within his own experience.³ If the intuition of pleasures and pains by saksi is doubted as illusory then the decision on reality or experience of Ātman would be open to doubt, and there would be no finality in truth-determination in any sphere of life. If Advaita agrees with the self-validity of knowledge then this implies reality of the objective world in its spatio-temporal setting.⁴

Though, even for Madhva, world is a lesser reality than Brahma,⁵ still it is an object of knowledge or prameya, hence satya and abādhyā. This nature is not inconsistent with its dependence and non-absolute nature. If a thing exists of its own sattā, if it has a function as pravṛtti and knowledge or pramiti, it is real and such reality belongs to the world in a paratantra way. World experience is sometimes likened in scriptures to dreams etc. not on account of its factual unreality, but in virtue of its impermanent and changing character and its dependent nature.⁶ Brahman is known as ṛtam because it remains always in the same state, what is changing is anṛtam i. e., vibhakta or separative and vikārin or changing, but not unreal for reality is existence at some-time and not for all time.⁷

The Śruti statement that all is known through one means that one alone is the cause and not that others are false. How could knowledge of false things be derived

1. Anu Vyākhyāna, II, 2, 19.

2. Viṣṇu-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, 27.

3. Anu Vyākhyāna, I, 1, 1.

4. *ibid.*: अदि तदस्त्वैतन्मामुदा विद्वत्सत्ता लक्ष्णे वा वि.

5. Nyāyasudhā, 53b: अस्तु सिद्धेति वाच्यं

6. Viṣṇu-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, 25.

7. Nyāyasudhā, 217b: अदि सत्ता वाक्येन वा वाक्येन अविद्यमानेति तदस्त्वैतन्मामुदा

Advaita equation of the world with dreams and illusory phenomena, Ramanuja makes dreams and waking world equally real creations of the Lord. Nimbarka concurs that these are "wonderful creations" of the Lord. Vallabha makes the world a real creation of the supreme and the dream an unreal creation of the individual soul. And Madhva makes even the dream creation a real work of the supreme soul caused by His mere will (māyamatram). In spite of the divergence on the term "mithya," theists agree with the Advaitins that the world is not as real as Brahma. To mistake the temporal as independent of the eternal is to be caught in Māyā. Samsāra with its perpetual process of change, its character of transiency gives rise to the conception of Maya, the feeling of vanity of life.¹ But the transiency does not prevent a pattern, a rule of law in the world. Theistic position of factuality but dependent reality of the world comes close to the Advaita position of factuality (sarvānubhava-siddha, sarvaloka-pratyakṣa) but ultimate unreality.

Moral Life in the World

Vedānta takes for granted a social life of morality and piety as the essential condition for search of the real self. The gods are unwilling to allow man to withdraw from the sphere of social morality.² The foundation of the individual and social scheme of life was laid down in the Upaniṣadic period, and was given the religious sanction, as the natural discipline for attainment of the highest end. The divisions of man's natural life are analogous to religious sacrifices.³ His whole life, all its activities are to be lived in a consecrated spirit.⁴ Life was divided into three āśramas or periods of spiritual labour, each with its own discipline. The householder's life is to be governed by the rule of sacrifice, charity, study of the Vedas, the vānaprastha's life by the rule of austerity and the student's life by the study of Brahmavidyā and chaste living in the household of a teacher.⁵ One who had concluded his study was to enter life, discharge social duties by founding a family, by bringing up virtuous sons,

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, p. 135ff.

2. cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., I, IV, 10: Man ought not to break from society until he has discharged his duties and gained its goodwill, so to speak.

3. vide Chan. Upa., III, 16.

4. vide *ibid.*, III, 17, 1-3.

5. *ibid.*, II, 31, 1.

by continuing the practice of study and concentration on the real self and by practicing non-injury to creatures. Social life could be lived at its best by not neglecting truth and virtue or welfare and prosperity.¹ All this is to be combined with proper establishment of social relationship between superiors and inferiors, for reverence for elders is a virtue equivalent to respect for gods,² and worship of God is not possible while neglecting social duties.³

The fourth stage of life was actually above natural social divisions,⁴ and the very fulfilment of life's goal,⁵ but was accepted in later Vedānta as the "penultimate" preparatory stage for mokṣa. References to it are found even in the earliest Upaniṣads.⁶

This symmetrically complete system of dharma was accepted by Vedantic traditionalists unquestioningly. The Gītā requires man to live in the world fully, to subscribe to general and specific rules of morality laid down by Law-givers and tradition. The faithful, sincere, selfless discharge of social duties is to be regarded as true worship.⁷ Even death in the discharge of duty brings blessedness, and it is preferable to another's duty.⁸ It is for the reestablishment on a firm footing of declining dharma that God comes to the world again and again, for He is the creator and pervader of the world and society and their functioning.⁹ There is a strong plea for the preservation of dharma or social and moral life, without which the human race suffers grievously.¹⁰ The Brahma-Sūtra also insists on the performance of dharma as a part of sādhanā for mokṣa, though only men of the dvija class qualify for instruction in Brahmavidyā.¹¹ Though pure men not belonging to any āśrama can, by religious works alone, qualify for the highest knowledge, yet life in the discharge of social duties is much superior to life without dharma.¹² Vedānta does not allow for coercion in this matter, but there is

1. Taitti. Upa., I, 11, 1.

2. cf., ibid., I, 11, 2.

3. Rāmāyana, II, 30, 33: How shall we seek to please the Divine who is not within reach when we neglect father, mother, teacher, who are with us.

4. Śve. Upa., VI, 21: Atyāśramī.

5. Chān. Upa., II, 31, 1: Brahmastha.

6. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22 and 23; III, 5, 1; Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 26.

7. B. G., XVIII, 46.

8. B. G., III, 35.

9. B. G., IV, 7-8 and 13.

10. B. G., I, 40-44.

11. B. S., I, 3, 25-39.

12. B. S., III, 4, 36-38, 39.

perfect freedom to pursue worldly ends or to renounce them at the call of spirit, so man is required to enter the specifically spiritual path after much deliberation and to pursue it with serious and single-minded devotion. He must not fail to live up to the duties of his social position in life, nor can there be any retrogression, but only progression, in the individual's social life and morality, on pain of being excluded from the goal of beatitude.¹

Vedānta adopts the position that though transcendently man is one with God, empirically he is separated from his divine essence, as well as from other beings. Due to the admixture of material (Prākṛtic) elements his nature is overcome by abundance of inferior qualities of rajas and tamās, the dynamic element causing pain and the static tending towards ignorance and obstruction of the manifestation of jñāna and ānand. His personality must be purified by morality. Vedānta praises dharma as a law which by its power enables the weaker to control the stronger because it is truth itself.² But it is not regarded as a mere code of conduct to ensure and preserve social stability and well-being, nor is it the code of morality or law of a human or divine law-giver, who regards social prosperity to be his end, nor even is it valued because its ritualistic duties are producers of religious merit leading to heaven (Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā). Vedānta, in fact, regards such natural and supernatural pleasures and powers resulting from dharma to be obstacles, hence to be strictly eschewed by the mumukṣu. The essential value of social and moral life in the world lies in the development of the sattva guṇa in man's nature, by which alone he can be united with his true nature.

Advaita Vedānta though excluding dharma from mokṣa gives it its due value in the mundane sphere, operating on the basis of the idea of duality.³ It does not try to force anyone into higher knowledge or to dissuade anyone from social life unless he is ready for the knowledge of non-duality.⁴ Śaṅkara denies that man living in the phenomenal world can, for any reason, give up his social and religious duties.⁵ He goes further and allows that, indirectly, social and moral life may help in the attainment of

1. cf., B. S., III, 4, 40 and 42-43.

2. Br. Upa., I, 4, 14.

3. cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., V, 1, p. 807ff.

4. cf., S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 14.

5. ibid., III, 4, 19.

the highest good, because only by enjoyment of dharma and its results can man be convinced of the inferior nature of that good compared to mokṣa.¹ So long as man finds no superior cause dharma practiced in a non-attached spirit leads to the gods, practiced in a mixed way it leads to the position of men, and practiced in an inferior way i. e., mixed with irregular practices, it leads to lower creatures, in the process of saṁsāra.² The very nature of worldly life is transformed when man's attention is turned from worldliness to spirituality, or when dharma is no longer combined with egoism (ahaṁkāra) and attachment (kāma).³ Thus moral and social life far from being a cause of bondage is converted into means of mokṣa.⁴

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins hold that moral life is not only necessary from the mundane stand-point but that dharma and highest knowledge must continue to co-exist until the very end.⁵ All duties connected with different conditions of life are to be discharged, because they directly help towards the achievement of vidyā, as their performer is not overcome by passions, but enjoys inner content and peace.⁶ Neglect of socio-moral life is a great obstacle to spiritual discipline and salvation. And one must have performed these duties in a previous life or the present one in order to attain the goal.⁷

Ethical Virtues

The socio-moral-religious life of Vedānta is characterised by certain moral virtues. From the point of view of rigorism virtue is apt to be regarded solely in the light of an acquired faculty of resistance to inclinations. Vedāntic ethics requires man to regulate and to rise above his natural inclinations, but this struggle is not an end in itself, nor is the quality valuable merely because it is an outcome of such a struggle. From a more utilitarian point of view virtue may be regarded as an intelligent weighing and regulation of natural inclination with a view to attainment of

1. S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 41.

2. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, IV, 76.

3. S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 44-45.

4. Madhusūdana's Tīkā on S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 56.

5. R. B. on B. G., XVIII, 5, 45-46; Vallabha, Bhakti-Viveka-Dhīrya-Āśraya Grantha, 16.

6. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 16; III, 4, 32-33.

7. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 4, 38.

greatest pleasure. But Vedānta believes that there is a qualitative difference between the mind set on the life of self-pleasing and the fixed identification of will with a goal of permanent and impersonal value. Certainly, Vedāntic virtue is transformation or "conversion" of the natural inclinations, but it is that quality of character which secures that the life and actions of man should be controlled by the idea of the whole—the complete (pūrṇa) or the infinite (bhūman).

It is also necessary to keep in mind the Vedāntic ethos or the moral habitudes of thought and action, the atmosphere in which its best representatives live and the functions they seek to fulfil in the world i. e., attainment of self or release, in order to understand the full significance of the virtues admired by it.

The virtues of Vedāntic discipline have a civic and social character, as well as an individual and spiritual one. Conflict between individual and social welfare is avoided by the graduated scheme of life and virtues and duties incidental to each stage. Vedānta also does not accept the classification of self- and other-regarding or egoistic and altruistic virtues, for, in fact, there is no virtue which relates exclusively either to the self or to the other. Any list of Vedāntic virtues, therefore, contains virtues which have a special bearing on the individual's inner development as well as others which have a greater bearing on social and external life. The two types of virtues are distinguishable but not separable in Vedānta. Nor can it be said that the former type have precedence over the latter, for the perfection of subjective virtues is dependent on the perfection of objective and social virtues and vice-versa, as a study of any list of virtues will prove. However, Vedānta does not enquire into either social life or its virtues for their own sake, but as subservient to the spiritual goal. Therefore, it regards them as religious rather than individual or social virtues, though their individual and social reference is perfectly apparent.

The Upaniṣads teach the foundational virtues of self-control, charity and compassion,¹ into which Prajāpati instructed gods, men and demons. Since men may be classified according to their vices as well as virtues, this may be regarded as a lesson to men who are naturally unruly, avaricious or cruel. Men's greatest enemies are lust,

1. Br. Upa., V, 2, 1-3.

greed and anger,¹ and without development of counteracting virtues neither individual nor social life can be enhanced. Both the content and the spirit of charity are regulated.² The best gifts are not material and tangible but intangible inner virtues, since austerity, alms-giving, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness are the real gifts for good and religious men. As to the manner of giving—one is required to give with faith, plenty, modesty, fear and sympathy.³

The vices which are destructive of social order are to be avoided.⁴ Misappropriation of property, interference with the right of life of good men, or self-indulgence of other kinds is punished by spiritual degradation. And a realm free from thieves, misers, licentious, impious and unchaste men is an ideal society.⁵

With the sacrificial fires linking man to the whole universe and virtues relating to humanity⁶ are combined other virtues of the inner self. Among them highest place is given to law and truth, for truth alone conquers in the world and outside. Only the true path leads to ultimate truth.⁷ The very initiation of man into innermost doctrines⁸ has to be supported by the truthfulness of heart.⁹ Truth is the characteristic quality of the superior man.¹⁰

All later Vedānta schools accepted the ethical virtues of the Yoga philosophy¹¹ and Gītā-Śāstra, called dharmapūga, as necessary parts of the discipline. Sympathy and identity of feelings with others, compassion for miseries, complacency at the sight of virtue and the sacrifice incidental to its practice and indifference to the vices in society—these are to be read together with the wisdom declared in the Gītā.¹² Absence of pride, modesty which does not proclaim its own virtues and innocence, non-injury, patience and forgiveness which is unaffected by the injuries received, service of the

1. B. G., XV, 21: The three gates to hell.

2. Chān. Upa., III, 17, 4.

3. Taitti. Upa., I, 11, 3.

4. vide Chān. Upa., V, 10, 9.

5. ibid., V, 11, 5.

6. Taitti. Upa., I, 9: Mānusa.

7. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 6.

8. Sve. Upa., V, 6: Guhyam. Also Chān. Upa., III, 52: Guhyam ādesam.

9. Br. Upa., III, 9, 23.

10. vide Chān. Upa., IV, 4, 4-5.

11. मेरी कृपा बुद्धिप्रेमणा सुखादुःखयुक्तानुपपत्तिषु वा सततमस्मिन् प्रसादात् ।

12. S. B. and R. B. on B. G., XIII, 7-11.

teacher, purity of body and inner self combined with concentration of effort on the spiritual goal, self-control of body and senses, non-attachment to objects and evils of saṁsāra, non-attachment to social relation, constant equanimity, undisturbed by over-delight or despondency. Devotion to God and solitary life away from the unenlightened results in constancy of self-knowledge and perception of truth. Even for the least spiritual path non-enmity for friend and foe, good-will to all, clemency or tenderness for suffering, non-selfishness of body and senses, patience and contentment with life's lot is essential.¹

The Gītā is never tired of reiterating the necessity for cultivating behaviour and disposition of the ethically highest type, called the divine nature.² Fearlessness, purity of inner organ devoid of deception, knowledge of what is taught by the teacher and scripture by one-pointed concentration of yoga. The sāttvika nature is to be constantly cultivated by charity, control, worship, study, austerity, uprightness, harmlessness, truth not unpleasant, non-anger, renunciation, serenity, compassion to creatures, absence of covetousness and fickleness, energy, forgiveness, fortitude, and absence of hatred and pride. The giving of harmlessness to all creatures is the prime condition of the apprehension of self.³

All these virtues, negative and positive, are to be practiced together, for they constitute the conduct and disposition habitual to the perfect man of Vedānta. Hence they are means for the aspirant, to be constantly practiced.⁴ *सर्वं कर्म यत्करोति साधुः श्रेयसायै* *सर्वदा* .⁵

In the virtuous disposition of character certain main traits are to be discerned. The whole self without reference or reservation must go into the proposed object and find its satisfaction therein. Virtue is integrity—the interest must be energetic and persistent. Endurance through discouragement, good and ill tests the vigour of

1. R. B. on B. G., XII, 13-19.

2. B. G., XVI, 1-3.

3. Maitrī Upa., VI, 8.

4. cf., S. B. on B. G., II, 55: For everywhere in spiritual science the very characteristic attributes of successful yogī are being advocated as means for attaining that stage. The means which by effort lead to the end later become the attributes of the yogī. Also XIV, 26.

5. Nīlakāntha Bhāṣya on B. G., XII, 20.

interest in the good, and the interest must be pure, sincere and single-minded. Each one of these traits is to be discovered in the virtuous character which Vedāntic discipline must cultivate.

The Vedāntic ethos enables us to understand the significance of the cardinal virtues supported by it. Like the Platonic treatment of types of virtues representing the different yet related aspects of human nature, viz., feeling, will and intelligence, the Vedānta also requires the virtues of self-control, fearlessness, truth and compassion. But whereas Plato sets forth the cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, wisdom and justice as primarily qualities of society, Vedānta treats them as primarily qualities of the individual. Yet another difference is that while Plato makes justice or harmony or proportion the regulating principle of all others phenomenally, the Vedāntic virtues of individual and social life are to be sublimated into a super-empirical state of jñāna.

Self-control and fearlessness are the negative and positive sides of the virtuous disposition. Self-control in the widest sense being resistance to all temptations of pleasures and evil passions, positively involves cultivation of purity and innocence (yama-niyama, śama-dama). Fearlessness in its widest sense being resistance to all fear of suffering and pain on loss of pleasure, positively involves cultivation of equanimity (dvandvātīta, sama dukha-sukha). Both together constitute all types of opposition to temptations of human life. A wise choice of the conduct to be followed depends upon the ability to discriminate the truth (viveka). Truth is the entrance and the path which leads to the goal. And these three together constitute the three cardinal virtues of the individual in Vedānta.

Compassion relates to the individual's relations with his fellows in a deeper sense than the other three. It appears in all its negative and positive aspects and shadings in Vedānta, for with the injunction to practice harmlessness, non-anger, non-malice, there is the command to cultivate forgiveness, goodwill, charity, sympathy. Compassion epitomises the spirit of justice in its highest sense in Vedānta.

If virtue be understood as the ideal relation of part and whole, then in Vedāntic phraseology it is the disposition and conduct of man by which his discernment

of highest good (parama purusārtha) is expressed. Vedānta, no less than Plato, holds wisdom or jñāna to be the source of all virtue.

The Religious Spirit in Vedānta

If religion be regarded as the revelation of ultimate reality to man as his most precious experience then Vedānta cannot be separated from religion, because its central problem is the vision of God and man's ascent to Him. Man feels his utter dependence on that reality and this is the essence of piety in religion.

The Upaniṣads exhibit a strong religious piety and faith. Without insistence on a particular belief about the nature of the Deity, the seers revealed to the qualified seekers their religious experiences. Of worship and ritual, of religious organization and priests directing religious ceremonies there is a minimum of mention. Of images of gods and temples, of holy places of pilgrimage there is no mention at all. Religion is constituted by spiritual experience alone.

According to the difference of temperaments and methods adopted the sages have different experiences of reality. But they do not quarrel about their different objects of meditation or intuition because man goes to the world of the god he worships and meditates upon, and they are manifestations of one reality.¹ The Divine is experienced in two ways according to the approach employed. The via negativa makes out Brahma to be beyond all rational knowledge, but realized in a state of spirituality. This is the niṣprapañca reality above all things in the world, physical or mental.² However, reality is not left hidden behind negative terms only. The positive phase is the apprehension of the Absolute as a creative urge. He is the object of worship, "thou" or Personal Being, approached by worship and prayer. He is the highest embodiment of all human virtues and the very condition of the existence of all things or the saprapañca reality immanent in the world.³ Nothing can exist apart from this being who is the origin, existence, end and inner controller of all things.⁴ These two approaches are inseparable in the Upaniṣads and are present in different degrees in all Vedānta.

1. vide Maitrī Upa., IV, 5-6.

2. vide Māṇḍū. Upa., V, 7; Br. Upa., III, 14, 26; IV, 2, 4.

3. Chān. Upa., III, 14; Śve. Upa., IV, 11-14.

4. Māṇḍū. Upa., V, 6; Kauśī. Upa., III, 8.

The abstract nature of the Absolute is modified and supplemented by the personalistic touch, and the anthropomorphic bent of the personalistic conception is modified and supplemented by mystic intuition of the identity of reality and man in the impersonalistic idea. The first approach emphasises jnana and the second worship and devotion, but in both the religious quest must end in experience of the Divine.

The synthesising and harmonising approach of the Gītā results in a closer union of the two.¹ The question of the relative merits of the formless and formed Brahma is raised and the answer is that though the unmanifested is the goal of aspiration yet worship of the manifest is efficacious and the easier method of achieving that goal.² While propounding the truth of the identity of Ātman and Brahman the Gītā transforms the impersonal attributeless reality into the Supreme God, Puruṣottama. The Brahma-Sūtra discusses the many aspects and methods of meditation (upāsana) in its Sadhana-adhyāya but nowhere specifically raises the question of the nature of God as personal or impersonal, formless or formed.

The question of the nature of God assumed a controversial form among the Vedāntacāryas and their followers. The difference was hinted at even in the Śruti Prasthāna,³ which declares that Brahma is that which is not expressed, but by which speech is expressed and not what people here adore. The Advaitins make this the basis of distinction between two aspects of reality—Brahma which is beyond logic and apprehended in jñāna and Īśvara the highest object of devotion of the religious spirit. Brahma is apprehended as limited by conditions owing to evolution of multiplicity of nāmarūpa and also as free from these.⁴ The two ways of worship are viewing of Brahma as something different in upāsana, dependent on the view of the worshipper and realization of Brahma as one's self, which is dependent on Brahma itself i. e., vastutantra.⁵ But seers of difference between the two aspects are in danger of losing their goal.⁶

1. cf., S. K. Belvalkar, Vedānta Philosophy, I, 21-22: The outstanding achievement of the Gītā was the alliance of Advaita and bhakti, knowledge and faith.

2. B. G., XII, 1; VII, 1-7; XII, 2-8.

3. Kena Upa., I, 5.

4. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 11.

5. S. B. on Kena Upa., III, 1: तस्मै च ब्रह्मणः ... सद्युक्तं च यथात्मनः. Also Mund. Upa., II, 1, 3: अक्षरं नामकं च युक्तं सत्त्वं ... तुल्यस्तद्वत् सत्त्वं च यथात्मनः प्रकृतं च।

6. S. B. on Taitti. Upa., II, 7: सदेव हि त्वासीन्नकारसो तदेव प्रतीत्युत्पत्तयः तं कृतं च सत्त्वं यथात्मनः।

Neither in metaphysics nor in the philosophy of sadhana does Sankara allow any other reality than Brahma.

The distinction of the two aspects corresponds to the Advaita distinction of vyavahāra and paramārtha. In the former the distinction of worshipper and worshipped remains; as wave, foam, bubbles and other modifications of sea-water are sometimes in separation or in combination, so the enjoying personality and the enjoyed object do not pass into each other.¹ Upāsana does not require the removal of the character of self as actor as does the Advaita experience. Upāsana is an action or ritual and such personalistic meditation allows the free conception of many cognitions and attributes of reality.² He makes a special effort to prove the Highest Lord to be the cause of creation.³ He contends against the materialists and atheists that Śruti nowhere declares the non-existence of God as it declares the non-existence of earth, in reality. To the objection that prohibition is only with regard to what is naturally done or known, and Īśvara is not so naturally an object of knowledge or action, hence there cannot be any prohibitory passages, he replies that the idea of God is natural to man, so it is necessary for scripture to declare this natural tendency as true or false, and nowhere is the idea of God denied. Similarly, no text declares that God does not award fruit of karma.

But in the practical and religious sphere Īśvara is viewed as the immanent cause of world modifications⁴ and this is a one-sided, hence false view of reality;⁵ the transcendent reality remains unaffected through these modifications.⁶ Finite things do lead to direct discernment of the supreme as their absolute source; Brahma is the substance of all things and so beyond them by three-quarters.⁷

While insisting that there are not two realities but only one viewed as an object of meditation or as jñāna, Śaṅkara admits that the results of the two views are

1. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 13: कर्तव्यं चैतन्मतेन कश्चिद्वन्द्वं चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति।
2. *ibid.*, III, 3, Intro.; I, 3, 33.
3. *ibid.*, I, 1, 2.
4. *ibid.*, I, 1, 20: विकारधर्मैः।
5. *ibid.*, II, 1, 14: अतद्भाष्यं चैतन्मतेन कश्चिद्वन्द्वं चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति।
6. *ibid.*, II, 1, 18: न त्रैलोक्यादिमात्रेण चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति न चैतन्मतेन चरति।
7. *ibid.*, III, 3, 22.

different. As long as Brahma is viewed through the categories of devotion, object of devotion and devotee (upasya-upasaka-bhava) jiva reaps different rewards, viz., abhyudaya, karmaphala, krama mukti, according to devotion being directed to different qualities of the Lord.¹ The highest meditation of the Lord is that in which He is understood as the very self and not as a separate object or identical with symbols of worship.² One desirous of release should not engage in fruitless dispute about Isvara, but the disciples are necessarily at different levels. Instead of following the course of practice in vogue among the ignorant it is preferable to have the scriptural action, better than that is the form of personal worship and impersonal worship is the best of all.³ Worship is essential for cleaning the internal organs, but from personalistic worship only Brahma-loka results.⁴

The Advaitin also apprehends God as personal.⁵ Even the mukta may perform worship.⁶ Several stages of imperfect realization have to be passed before the soul awakens to truth. Some devotees not of sharp intellect shrink from the unmanifest Brahma; for them the wise allow meditations.⁷ Or for some who are not spiritually advanced or belong to no āsrama⁸ the development is only possible through path of meditation, religious works, propitiation of the Saguna.⁹ However, at the highest stage man must forsake the incomplete and defective conceptions and disciplines.¹⁰ The Saguna ideal is inadequate in paramārtha but only by following it the disciple rises above his natural imperfections, hence it is not valueless. By the theoretical doctrine of abhinnaimittopādānakāraṇavāda of Īsvara and by the practical lead of the leaders of Advaita siddhānta the personalistic conception of God was given a place in the spiritual discipline, as a necessary step towards the highest impersonalistic experience.

But the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins were dissatisfied with what seemed to them half-

1. Pañcadaśī, VI, 206-209.

2. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 3.

3. Pañcadaśī, IX, 121.

4. S. B. on B. S., IV, 3, 7; I, 3, 13; also Madhusūdana, Siddhānta Bindu, IV, 4, 22.

5. S. B. on B. G., Intro.; XVIII, 67.

6. मृता अपि तत्रैव विद्यते इति श्रुतिः.

7. S. B. on Muṇḍ. Upa., IV, 42-43; cf., S. B. on Chān. Upa., VIII, 1, 1; I, 6, 6.

8. B. S., III, 4, 35.

9. Pañcadaśī, IX, 54.

10. e. g., Śaṅkara's prayer to Śiva to be forgiven his three sins: forgetting God's omni presence, thinking of what is beyond thought, praying to what is beyond words.

hearted acceptance of the supreme being. They regarded the Advaita acceptance of pancayatana in the smarta tradition as no more than a contradictory, illogical accommodation, since Īsvara is an illusory phenomenon in Advaita, Lord only of the vyavaharika sphere, which is ultimately transcended. The conception of the Nirguṇa is irreconcilable with the religious spirit, which requires an ultimate distinction of a real devotee and object of devotion. Claiming an equal right to interpret the three Prasthanas in their own way¹ they expressed their humanising tendency in importing into them the conception of a compassionate, loving God, the ruler of cit and acit, as ultimately real.² Not only are God and souls similar (sadharmyata) as both are persons, but they must be distinct also. The theists charge Advaita with nihilism and atheism,³ though it replies that it does not deny God, but only denies anything other than God.⁴

The conception of the Nirguṇa as a reality higher than the God of worship and meditation was the theist target of attack. Rāmaṇuja declares categorically that reality as unqualified cannot be proved, since all proofs (of consciousness, speech, perception or inference) are based on the assumption of some qualified character.⁵ God's nature is known through the scripture, so He is not indefinable. According to Madhva indefinability only means that complete knowledge of God is difficult to acquire, as the supreme transcends our perception.⁶ The theists reject the Advaita procedure of giving precedence to the Nirguṇa-texts, and cancelling the Saguna-texts by the alleged strength of the former. They insist on reading both together: the Saguna as the positive and the Nirguṇa as the negative descriptions of the nature of God.⁷ The

1. S. B. on B. S., I, 3, 19, concedes that other Vedāntins, *śāstra-śāstra*, differ on the most important question of separateness of the soul.
2. cf., Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 189: Rāmaṇuja could give back not only one's own soul but a personal God to his followers.
3. Anu Vyākhyāna, II, 2, 29: *śāstra-śāstra*: *śāstra-śāstra* |
4. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 3: *śāstra-śāstra*: *śāstra-śāstra* |
5. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, pp. 39-45.
6. Bhārata-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, I, 1, 5; III, 2, 23.
7. cf., Nyāyāmṛta, II, 4-5: Summary of arguments for greater weight of Saguna-texts: Saguna-texts being prescriptive are stronger than proscriptive Nirguṇa-texts; they are to be taken literally (niravakāṣa) while Nirguṇa-texts are meant only to deny material and empirical attributes (traiguṇya-niṣedha); expressly mentioned attributes cannot be negated by negative texts having only general scope; positive texts are logically more self-consistent than self-contradictory Nirguṇa-texts: the former are the sustainers (upajīvyā) of the latter being more specific enumerations (viśeṣa vidhāyaka), hence more powerful.

Vedānta sūtras¹ may be interpreted without making the distinction of lower Isvara of vyavahara and higher Brahma of paramārtha. There is no distinction between God in his transcendent essence apprehended in direct intuition (darsana, sakṣātkara, aparoksa) and God as grasped by the mind in His cosmic aspect as object of adoration. A moral meaning can be given to the negative judgment as denying all evil qualities, imperfections to God (Ramanuja) or Brahma is described both in His static aspect of transcendence and dynamic aspect of immanence (Nimbarka) or God inspite of being the creator is not Saguna because elements constituting His qualities cannot go against Him, or deprive Him of independence; freedom of God allows both Saguna and Nirguna conceptions (Vallabha) or the formlessness of Brahma is due to transcendence of and control of Prakṛti, and this is the very essence of sat, cit, ānand (Madhva). As for the declaration² that Brahma is the inexpressible and not the object of adoration, that is susceptible to another explanation, viz., that it points out the difference of the knowledge of the supreme by those who understand God to be of limited nature and the real nature of Brahma as unlimited (Rāmānuja).

The Nirguna conception allows no possibility of upāsana, for how can the formless be thought of, or be imaginarily endowed with qualities.³ Only the believers of the Saguna can regard Brahma as object of meditation, possessing numberless auspicious attributes, assuming many forms by His marvellous powers.⁴ The meditation must be on the goodness, mercifulness and all virtuous qualities of the Lord.⁵ The highest type of meditation being on the Supreme Lord as the very self of the devotee.⁶

The theistic process of spiritual development begins with devotion to the Personal God and ends with realization of the Supreme Lord. For them⁷ it remains a settled conclusion that the Brahma to be known is the highest personality, free from all imperfections, endowed with all auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence, ruler

1. B. S., III, 2, 11-31: सपञ्चस्य ।

2. Kena Upa., I, 5.

3. Anu Vyākhyāna, 33b.

4. Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Nimbarka Bhāṣyas on B. S., III, 3.

5. R. B. on B. S., III, 3, 13.

6. R. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 3-6; Rāmānuja, Vedānta-Sāra, III, 3, 5; Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 3, 19.

7. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 12; I, 3, 19.

of all, antagonistic to evil, with true purposes, omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful, from whom creation emanates.¹ This supreme being with infinite powers enters various stages of evolution of matter and brings about manifestation of things.² The one God is not intuited as mere ground (adhīsthāna) of superimposition of world-illusion, but the real creator in theistic Vedānta.

Or if it is said that cit, acit and Īśvara existed in their subtle forms, there is no authority for holding that, beyond these three, there is a substance called Brahman. Even if we accepted this, we have to investigate as to what is the relationship between them and Brahma; the only answer can be that Brahman created these things . . . Hence Īśvara is the one Brahman.³

Search for Truth

The direction in which Vedānta was to develop was indicated in the question asked by many Upaniṣadic enquirers of their teachers: "Through understanding of what, pray, does all this world become understood, Sir."⁴ That is the highest instruction by which the unheard, the unperceived, the unknown becomes heard, perceived and known, as by knowing one clod of clay or one nugget of gold or one iron-scissor, all things made of these are known.⁵ Verily, with the seeing, with the hearkening, with the thinking, with the understanding of the soul this world-all is known.⁶ These questions and answers show clearly the desire to have the "master key to unlock the closed door of reality," or the very "arch-type" of knowledge. No "prototype" of truth in the form of empirical knowledge of physical and organic world, or even non-empirical knowledge about gods and goddesses or eschatological knowledge of the soul's journey from and to the world could satisfy. The Vedāntic seers go beyond these truths to very reality itself, and the real is the true. The "ativādī"⁷ is the man who speaks excellently of that truth alone.

Man's fundamental need is to discover this truth, because without seeing truth or his own world nothing else can protect him from great sorrow.⁸ It is not so much the

1. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1-2, p. 156; Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, I, 1, 1.

2. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 3, 11.

3. Rāmānuja, Vedārtha Saṅgraha, Intro., p. 13.

4. Mīmāṃsā Upa., I, 1, 3.

5. Chān. Upa., VI, 1, 3-6.

6. Bṛ. Upa., II, 4, 5.

7. Chān. Upa., VII, 16.

8. Bṛ. Upa., I, 4, 15; III, 8, 10.

search for truth-in-itself, for its own sake or even for the mere satisfaction of intellectual curiosity, but search after truth inspired by desire for eternal happiness, which constitutes the nature of Vedānta as a Mokṣa-Śāstra. But truth must not fail to satisfy either the intellect or the spiritual need of man. It certainly gives the highest joy and peace, but that is the result of discovery of a truth which is free from all contradiction (abādhyā). It must be complete (pūrṇa), free from defects (nirdoṣa), the real object of knowledge (jñeya), the goal of effort (gamyā) as well as the source of all other knowledge (guru). The dual aspect of Vedāntic truth is summed up:

All Hindu philosophy has a practical aim . . . to the Hindu mind, "the Truth shall make you free," otherwise there is no virtue in it. They all seek the truth not because of its abstract interest but because in some sense or the other they think that a realization of Truth about man's place in the universe and his destiny will solve all man's problems, free him from the troubles of life . . . in short, bring him to the Supreme Brahman.¹

But the liberating power of truth depends entirely upon the extent of its appropriation by man through the pursuit of a pattern of conduct of mind and body. First there is an enquiry into the cause of being and becoming resulting in epistemological, ontological and cosmological knowledge. Then follows a life of moral purification to prepare a fit medium for revelation of truth, through renunciation, purity, meditation and devotion. The end is in the form of mystic yearning for union (anumukṣutva) with truth and bliss and the actualisation of that experience intuitively. Vedānta darśana is philosophical knowledge of truth strengthened by viveka and vairāgya. It does not rest on the mere light of dialectical argumentation (tarka-drṣṭi) but on spiritual vision (tattva-drṣṭi). The philosophical method is that of discussion among men who are free from passion,² and the outcome of it is decision of truth (tattva-nirṇaya).

Two Knowledges

The Vedānta distinguishes between higher and lower truths. Brahmavidyā and the lower knowledge were both taught by Brahmā, the world-maker and protector to the first-born, Atharvan.³ Nārada expressed his dissatisfaction with the latter to Sanatkumar:

1. Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavad-Gītā*, pp. 6-7.
2. e. g., Varadarāja defines vāda as vītarāgakathā.
3. *Mund. Upa.*, I, 1, 1-2.

I know the R̥g-Veda, the Yajurveda, the Sama and the Atharva, the Epics, the ancient lore, grammar, science of number, of portents, of time, logic, ethics and politics, of the gods, of sacred knowledge, of elemental spirits, of weapons, astronomy, serpents and fine arts. I am like one knowing the words and not a knower of self Verily, whatever you have learned is only a name.¹

All these sciences arise from the supreme cause,² hence they are manifestations of reality, but they are still lower as compared with the knowledge of the imperishable. Without the higher knowledge to crown it the lower knowledge of arts and sciences becomes a source of self-conceit, pride of learning, opiatedness.³ These sciences are "intellectual gymnastics," mere products of the mind (manomaya), for the Vedas form the various parts of the person consisting of mind;⁴ being dualistic and finite they are less than the complete and foundational truth. There is a distinction between learning and "enlightenment;" having learned all the books (Vedas) extant with all the available knowledge yet a man does not "know."

Later Vedāntins though differing about what constitutes higher and lower truth agree that there is such a distinction. Śaṅkara distinguishes the para and apara as knowledge of unity and knowledge arising from the acceptance of difference, respectively.⁵ Brahmavidyā is the King of Sciences,⁶ or higher knowledge is of Paramātman, known only through the Upaniṣads, but not so much by assemblage of words as by mastering that knowledge after spurning all desires and approaching a guru.⁷ The lower knowledge is of Veda and Vedāṅga dealing with the means and results of dharma and adharma.⁸ Or the two might be distinguished as Brahma-knowledge and dharma-knowledge, the former aiming at mokṣa and the latter at a variety of actions, prosperity in both worlds; this being less than the truth is called Avidyā.⁹ Parāvidyā leads to samyagdarsāna or jñāna but others have only relative value, for good pronunciation, command of language, exegetical skill and learning generally is for delectation of the learned but mokṣa is

1. Chān. Upa., VII, 1.

2. Bṛ. Upa., II, 4, 10; IV, 5, 11.

3. Chān. Upa., VI, 1.

4. Taitti. Upa., II, 3.

5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 40.

6. S. B. on B. G., IX, 2.

7. S. B. on Muṇḍ. Upa., I, 1, 5.

8. ibid., I, 1, 4.

9. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1; I, 2, 21; I, 4, 5.

not obtained by such pundits.¹ The higher knowledge is of identity with Nirguna Brahman, but the lower is knowledge of Saguna.

The theists also talk of the transition from lower to higher knowledge. Ramanuja declares that the lower knowledge from Vedas to the Dharma-Sastra is to be treated as means to the highest intuition, which is upasana or devout meditation of bhakti resulting in direct perception of Highest Brahman.² The distinction is of indirect and direct perception of the same truth, which is the nature and qualities of Brahma. Madhva agrees that the whole of the scripture, without any division, is para or apara according as it is or is not correlated to the Supreme Being.³ "Vidyās like Rg-Veda etc. are considered apara when they do not designate Viṣṇu but are only employed in a ritualistic sense, but these very sciences become paravidyā when they express the Lord Viṣṇu."⁴ But if the individual soul were to perform work desiring to please the Lord, even such work becomes paravidya.⁵

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins while rejecting the Advaita distinction of para and apara jñāna as pointing to two different aspects of reality, the indeterminate Absolute of intuition and the determinate being of meditation as well as the negation of the latter in the former knowledge i. e., Karma-Kāṇḍa in Brahma-jñāna, are agreed with Advaita that the higher truth is more than empirical, for unrelated to Brahman all secular and religious learning is apara and a vain and useless burden. They also agree that the lower knowledge is a preliminary for the attainment of the higher. Only those who are learned in the scriptures qualify for instruction in Brahmavidyā, in the Upaniṣads. The knowers of Brahman who declare that there are two knowledges⁶ also declare that the higher knowledge of non-sound Brahma is revealed only by knowledge of the lower or sound Brahma.⁷ Even Śaṅkara admits that apara is not useless as Śruti provides meditations and particular results for sādhakas of different capacity. In lesser knowledge there are many phases, and this knowledge aims only to teach that

1. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 60 and 56.
2. R. B. on B. S., III, 2, 23.
3. Bhāṣya on Muṇḍ. Upa., I, 1, 5.
4. cf., ibid.
5. ibid., I, 2, 1.
6. Muṇḍ. Upa., I, 1, 4.
7. Maitrī Upa.. VI. 22.

Brahman alone is the true self.

All Vedāntins accept that aparā vidya comprises all Vedas, Vedāngas and the extant sciences, but Advaita looks down on them because they reveal an incomplete facet of reality, as against Vedānta-jñāna which reveals complete reality. The theists do not distinguish between Veda and Vedānta, Karma- and Jñāna-Kāṇḍas. Taking both as complementary to each other they distinguish the higher and lower on the basis of the use made of the unified knowledge i. e., Advaita emphasis is on the content of the two knowledges while the theists emphasise the use of the synthesised whole of knowledge.

Empirical Knowledge and Transcendental Experience

Since truth-determination (tattva-nirṇaya) is for the sake of paramārtha, Vedānta stresses limitation of discursive thought and the power of intuition to attain that truth. The rational element consisting of logical deductions, analysis, consistency of thought and experience is inextricably mingled with the element of revelation and dogma, in which the speculations and intuitions of truth of ancient seers are elaborated in new directions by interpretation, criticism, emphasis and alteration. All Vedāntins apply the three criteria of scriptural support, logical consistency and intuitive certainty (Śruti, yukti, anubhava) to their respective doctrines. The experience which Vedānta appeals to is both sensuous and supersensuous.

The Upaniṣads open with the statement that the knowledge of ultimate reality is not possible in any empirical sense. Unknowability is propounded in many places. Language and mind turn back from it.¹ The senses, speech and mind go not to it because it is other than the known or the unknown.² It is not obtained by instruction, intellect or much learning,³ but it is known by him to whom self chooses to reveal itself. Unknowability is asserted because where knowledge is of a dual nature one hears, sees, smells, tastes, touches and knows everything, but where knowledge is not of the dual nature, not action, cause or effect, it is indescribable.⁴ In the absence of duality there is no other to have sense perception, conception and understanding of

1. Taitti. Upa., II, 4.

2. Kena Upa., I, 3.

3. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 3; Kaṭha Upa., II, 23.

4. Maitrī Upa., VI, 7.

this.¹ It is a unity in which speech grows weary.² Epistemologically, technical knowledge is impossible: how can the knower, the subject of all knowledge be made the object?³ The self perceives all, but it cannot be known.⁴ The paradox of knowledge is stated in the Socratic spirit: it is conceived of by him by whom it is not conceived of. He by whom it is conceived of knows it not. It is not understood by those who (say they) understand it; it is understood by those who (say they) understand it not.⁵ Vedānta expressly admits the limitation of perception and reason in regard to knowledge of God and self, and falls back not on the Kantian postulation of faith but on the non-empirical source of direct experience.

The Vedāntacāryas admit a similar failure of epistemological sources of knowledge in regard to the ultimate, while granting their validity within the field of experience. Śaṅkara declares that no doctrine should be adopted without full enquiry (avicārya) by all powers within the reach of man, otherwise there is danger of missing the goal of bliss and incurring great injury.⁶ Truth must be investigated,⁷ but reasoning not founded on true authority of scripture rests on individual opinion i. e., not having a proper foundation, and for this reason men of most eminent intellect contradict each other. Nor can logicians of past, present and future be called together to settle, by agreement, opinions on a particular matter. So reason must be subordinated to Śruti, in as much as it helps to ascertain the meaning of contradictory passages in Śruti.⁸ Like a sword's keen edge when applied to rock, inference is dented when used to criticize scripture and to say that inference is stronger than Śruti is improper bravado.⁹ While discussing reasoning which proves the scriptural doctrine of Advaita Śaṅkara admits that Ātma-jñāna is not a proposition to be proved or disproved by scientific tests.¹⁰ Thus, in supersensuous matters mere reliance on reason results in want of

1. Br. Upa., II, 4, 14.

2. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 20; cf., III, 6, 1.

3. ibid., II, 4, 14; cf., III, 4, 2.

4. Śve. Upa., III, 19.

5. Kena Upa., II, 3; cf., B. G., II, 69.

6. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1: निरञ्जनमात् प्रविकृतं . . . ज्ञानवेत्तम्।

7. ibid., I, 3, 8.

8. ibid., II, 1, 11 and 6; cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 3, 22.

9. Bhāmati, II, 2, 37-38: ज्ञानानामिच्छुम्भितम्।

10. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 1.

release.

The Vaiṣṇavacāryas agree that with regard to God the Sūtrakara rejects unsupported reasoning. Srutyānugrahitā tarka is proof in establishing Isvara, otherwise why should jijnāsa or application of reason be started at all.¹ Reason would not be able to prove the existence of God since it can always be countered by other reasons e. g., the theistic proofs are inconclusive while the aim of jijnāsa is to have definite knowledge about the object of enquiry.² By reasoning not even dharma is known, neither can existence of Brahman be known.³ Rāmājuna takes the stand that not by inference or perception, either internal, external or yogic, nor by inductive or deductive reasoning can Brahman be revealed,⁴ but all means of knowledge do stand in need of tarka; scriptural authority does require the assistance of tarka to make understanding of dharma and Brahma possible.⁵ Similarly, Nimbārka and Vallabha affirm the inefficacy of unaided reasoning in respect of the revelation of God's nature.

All the Bhāṣyakāras are unanimous that Śruti alone reveals the nature of Brahman, however they may differ in understanding that nature. The Brahma-Sūtra states the position thus: only from the Vedas can Brahman be known, Śāstra alone is authority for Brahman and has for its purpose only Brahman.⁶ Since all other pramāṇas fail to prove reality the evidence of Śruti is evoked as final. Śaṅkara follows the Sūtrakāra and declares the Vedas alone as source of knowledge about truth beyond sense perception and mind.⁷ Scripture teaches the eternal, pure, free, intelligent nature of Brahman which is known dimly as the self of everyone, hence an enquiry into its nature is to be carried out.⁸ The true nature of the world-cause is too abstract to be known without help of scripture.⁹ Perfect knowledge depends upon the siddha vastu, has the mark of uniformity; the Veda which is eternal may be allowed to have for its object such a

1. Nyāyasūdhā, II, 1, 4.

2. Aṅg Vyākhyāna, 32.

3. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 1, 3-4.

4. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 3-4.

5. ibid., II, 1, 4.

6. B. S., I, 1, 3-4.

7. S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 1; S. B. on Taitti. Upa., I, 11.

8. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 14ff.

9. ibid., II, 1, 11.

firmly established thing.¹ Knowledge of the Absolute as supreme bliss will not arise unless the relevant sayings of the Sruti come to our help.² Nor do these mahāvakyas need to be corroborated by other pramanas in order to give rise to proper knowledge.³ Śāstra as final authority for the self-proved (svayamsiddha) self serves to eliminate the superimposition (adhyāropana) of attributes alien to the self, but not as revealing what has been altogether unknown.⁴

The Vaiṣṇavācāryas agree that Śabda or authority alone can give truth. Thus, Rāmānuja declares that scripture is the only evidence of the Absolute being the cause of the knowing self, which is the cause of knowing the Absolute since it is super-sensible; nor can inference for the illation, the ocean etc. must have a maker because it is an effect like a water-pot, be worth more than a rotten pumpkin.⁵ Scripture does not give any injunction to act but is connected with the highest end. Both Vallabha and Nimbārka argue that scripture alone can be authority or proof of creatorship of God, as God's nature cannot be known by perception or inference. According to the former, synthesis means that He is both the material and efficient cause, while the latter says that there is a synthesis of the entire Veda to establish Brahman alone and not action.⁶ Madhva declares that synthesis of the scripture by the seven rules of exegesis (upakrama, upasamhāra, abhyāsa, apūrvatā, phala, arthavāda and upapatti) points to Brahman alone,⁷ and in supersensuous matters Āgama is more decisive than other means of knowledge.⁸

Vedānta accepts the distinction of sensuous and supersensuous activities of the mind, which apprehend different aspects of reality. Proceeding on the fact of experience that we some times learn about the world by relying on the authority of others without using our own perception and reasoning, it accepts authority as a source of knowledge valuable to philosophy. But there are gradations in men's capacities e. g.,

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1. *ibid.*, I, 1, 2.
 2. *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi*, II, 4.
 3. *ibid.*, II, 5.
 4. *S. B. on B. G.*, II, 18.
 5. *Sarva-Darsana-Samgraha*, p. 85.
 6. *Bhāṣyas on B. S.*, I, 1, 3-4.
 7. *Bhāṣya on B. S.*, I, 1, 4.
 8. *Viṣṇu-Tattva-Nirṇaya*, 3-4.

perception and inference of normal type is open to all men and even to animals, other types of realities are grasped only by sharpened philosophical powers or reason. The highest capacity of direct perception is not possessed by ordinary men, but only by the disciplined yogī. The Vedānta theory of Śāstra pramāna is described as a "faith that enquires." Śāstra is a body of eternal self-valid truth, in which the synthesis of reason and revelation has been verified by past seers, and is verifiable by any present seeker who makes the requisite preparation. It is the intuition of the "vītarāgas," the men who having disciplined their minds and removed all passions are least liable to error. Another implication of finality of Śruti pramāna is that truth has to be intuited. The Upaniṣadic seers found it in mystic union. "The person is to know the soul with the thought, 'I am he.'"¹ Ātman knew itself, "I am Brahma," and who ever knows this becomes this All—even the gods have no power to prevent his becoming thus, for he becomes their Ātman.² The soul as the subtle essence of the world is satya and that is to be understood as thou, Śvetaketu.³ Truth is undeniable, unalterable because it is one's own self and experienced without interval or mediacy in a union of knower and known.

All Vedāntins, Advaitins and Vaiṣṇavas, transcend the logical level and ultimately fall back on intuition, for reasoning and even scriptural evidence must give place to the process of life-experience. Śāṅkara declares that the end of all enquiry is not understanding but experience.⁴ This is a perception in which subject and object coalesce.⁵ The truth is known by becoming it,⁶ not by mere intellectual apprehension of the mahāvākyas.⁷ The mind brought under discipline by jñāna and vairāgya, neither in the oblivion of sleep nor distracted by objects, when quiescent like flame of light in a windless place becomes Brahman, and there is no return to the seed stage of Avidyā.⁸ Upon realization neither Śāstra nor guru's teaching has authority, but only

1. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 12.

2. ibid., I, 4, 10.

3. Chān. Upa., VI, 8, 7.

4. S. B. on B. S., I, 4, 14: *सत्यं वा श्रुतं वा* : . Also I, 1, 2:

5. ibid., I, 1, 5.

6. Māṇḍu. Upa., I, 1, 5; Br. Upa., I, 4, 7.

7. cf., S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 2.

8. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 46 and 35.

self-experience, since freedom and contentment like anxiety, health, hunger are matters to be experienced.¹ In truth, there is even the absence of Śruti,² for it is only meaningful in the stage of bondage or avidyā or dualistic knowledge.³ If the question be asked how we are brought from Avidyā to Vidyā, this is logically inadmissible, for when error is destroyed self-sufficient truth reveals itself—no better answer can be given than the grace of God.⁴ But after jñāna Śruti is no Śruti;⁵ at best it performs the negating service of eradicating all false notions about reality, so it has value indirectly. Advaita finds the ultimate sanction of truth not in Śruti, but in sāksāt-kāra or aparokṣa-anubhava.⁶ Truth is self-certifying since nothing else can illumine the all-illuminating Ātman.⁷ Nor can anyone contest the truth of another possessing knowledge of Brahma, vouched for as it is by his heart's conviction.⁸

Rāmānuja declares that jñāna is of the same nature as seeing (intuition) and immediate presentation (pratyakṣatā).⁹ Indirect knowledge springs from the Vedas but direct only from meditation or yoga which is bhakti.¹⁰ He agrees with Śaṅkara that jñāna is knowledge of self and other things acquired from scripture and the guru, but personal experience of the same is vijñāna.¹¹ Truth or essential nature of Brahma cannot be manifested by any other proof, there must be anudhyāna (uninterrupted meditation) by which Brahma is pleased and there occurs apprehension of His essential nature or attributes.¹² According to Madhva, Brahma is always unmanifest in upāsana or dhyāna, but by grace and His inscrutable power He reveals Himself to the upāsaka. Aparokṣa is a flash-like revelation resulting from long śravaṇa etc. in fulness of self-surrendering devotion to the Lord as our biḥa.¹³ Generally, the theists hold that direct realization of Truth or God is only through His grace and removal of obstruction by the

1. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 475-476.

2. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 3: *स्मृत्यभावात् प्रतीतिः*

3. S. B. on B. G., XIII, 2; cf., S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 14.

4. S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 41.

5. ibid., IV, 1, 12.

6. ibid., I, 1, 1: *जोषितं च प्रमाणानामनुभवं ब्रह्म*. Also I, 2, 8: *स्वस्वभावः*. I, 3, 13: *स्वस्वभावः*

7. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 533 and 534; cf., Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XV, 41.

8. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 15: *स्वस्वभावप्रमाणं ब्रह्मविद्यया*

9. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 11.

10. ibid., I, 2, 23.

11. S. B. and R. B. on B. G., III, 41.

12. Vedānta-Sāra, III, 2, 23-24.

13. Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 2, 27.

meditation of a purified mind.¹ Vedāntic "authority" is thus founded on direct experience and reasoning, not a mere imposition on the mind of the thinker from outside. Finally, "authority" was what the thinker himself established i. e., his own experience.

Broadly speaking Vedānta accepts all possible sources from which empirical knowledge might be derived. Perception and reasoning may have limitations, but even in the matter of philosophical enquiry (Brahma-jijñāsa) their use is as indispensable as the use of Śabda or Āgama pramāṇa. The pramāṇas, pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda, present things generally seen. In the first stage of investigation authority has to be supplemented by perception and inference, as in the sciences. Next comes upadesa or instruction presenting Śruti and Smṛti to the aspirant. Lastly, the direct enquiry into truth, which ends in converting the Śāstra pramāṇa or nirṇāyaka Śāstra into nirṇaya or Brahma, in direct experience.

As far as commonsense and scientific knowledge is concerned the Vedāntacāryas admit the capacity of perception and reason to produce knowledge, and may not be classed exclusively as empiricists or rationalists. The number of pramāṇas or valid sources of knowledge depends upon the different definitions and explanation of the process of operation of each. Thus Advaita holds pramāṇas to be divided into six, pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi. The schools of Rāmānuja, Madhva and Nimbārka accept only perception, inference and testimony. Vallabha's followers admit perception, inference, śabda and postulation. Theists do not reject the validity of the other pramāṇas of Advaita, but by defining them in their own way find them to be variations or types of the pramāṇas accepted by themselves.

All admit that pramāṇas operate in the absence of defect or obstruction and have the power to produce true knowledge. A mode of knowing deserves that name because it makes known something not otherwise known, thus śabda is accepted because it is the source of knowledge of that aspect of reality which is not apprehended by any other method. According to Śaṅkara, all pramāṇas produce certain and fruitful knowledge e. g., pratyakṣa produces the knowledge that fire is hot and anubhava that self is pure

1. Mādhava Mukunda, Parapakṣa-Giri-Vajra, 203-206.

consciousness and bliss.¹ As the scope of one pramana is different from that of another i. e., there is no overlapping, one pramana may not contradict another.² Facts of perception cannot be challenged on ground of improbability because they have been perceived.³ If the validity of such empirical knowledge is challenged all activity including eating and drinking will become impossible.⁴ However, such validity is only provisional or in the practical sphere. Since both "I" and the object are superimposed on pure consciousness, cit, therefore there is no untruth in perception and so on, though they are superimposed, and so superimposition is the material cause of practical life. Such vṛtti-jñāna, not sublated in life, is called pramā or true knowledge,⁵ otherwise it is bhrama. Reality as cognition by pratyakṣa etc. is not inconsistent with ultimate illusiveness. Perception relates to the present alone, not apprehending non-sublatedness in all three times.⁶ Advaita upholds the validity (pramātva) of truth yielded by the valid sources (pramāṇas) in the world of commonsense and science, but classes it as bhrama only in respect of the ultimate truth.

Theists reject the distinction of pāramārthika and vyāvahārika satyas. Madhva argues that all pramāṇas are true in a final sense. Philosophical enquiry is testing of truth in the light of proofs and they apprehend the object as it is; validity of Āgama and anumāna is as intrinsic (yathārtham) as that of pratyakṣa.⁷ Perception is the basis of mental activity, and independent of the other two, while Āgama is also independent of the other two; neither can sublimate the other in its own sphere and anumāna must follow both. Right conditions being fulfilled true knowledge arises, which is valid once and for all. It is contradictory to impose time-limits on the validity of perception and to restrict it to the present only (vyāvahārika); if it is sublated later on how can it be valid even in the present.⁸ Knowledge is naturally relative to

1. S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 4, 7.

2. ibid., IV, 3, 6; II, 1, 20.

3. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 2; S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 3, 6; cf., Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, p. 50.

4. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4; S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 3, 7; cf., S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1: Reasoning is perfectly valid in empirical life as men act on the assumption of past and present etc. being uniform.

5. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, p. 88.

6. Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha, II, 1.4.

7. Anu Vyākhyāna, 3.

8. ibid., 33b.

the object and its truth is self-valid. Since knowledge, object and relation are real and natural, there is no relativity about truth. In the very contradiction (badha) or denial of it we imply that, at least, the knowledge of denial is true.¹ Ramanuja takes the stand that since reality is sarvajna etc. all knowledge is an expression of it. Both in vyavahara and paramārtha subject and object are brought together in the knowledge situation. He insists on the truth of knowledge at all levels (satkhyāti) of experience, through pratyakṣa, anumana and Śāstra on the ground that jñāna is self-valid and true (svaprakāśa). Nimbārka while defining perception as that which destroys darkness of heart, i. e., Sruti as Deity and inference as Smṛti,² otherwise concurs with Ramanuja on the truth of all cognitions. Satkhyāti means that all knowledge is produced by the existent object, which is the cause of it. True knowledge is the very characteristic quality of self, and validity or "svatastva" means that in the absence of any defect the data of cognition produces knowledge that represents its nature as it is.³

The position of Vedānta in regard to sources of valid knowledge is summed up; "Scriptures are therefore subordinated to reason where we are concerned with matters of actual and sensuous experience . . . on the other hand, reason has to yield the palm to scripture where scripture appeals to a distinct supersensuous experience."⁴ Eventually both reason and scripture must get their sanction from experience. Vedānta concentrates its attention on the supreme truth and not on scientific or commonsense truth, hence empirical means of knowledge are transcended by spiritual intuition. Though not striving for knowledge for its own sake in the empirical sphere, Vedānta admits the ability of the pramāṇas to give true knowledge, provisionally or finally. It rejects scepticism or even agnosticism in regard to both sensuous and supersensuous truths.⁵

Search for the Self—Who Am I?

Vedānta does not concentrate its attention so much on the question of the first

1. vide Nyāyasudhā, 209-220.
2. Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 3, 40; IV, 4, 20.
3. Parapakṣa-Giri-Vajra, 253.
4. S. K. Belvalkar, The Vedānta Philosophy, I, 17.
5. cf., P. T. Raju, Some Fundamental Problems of Indian Philosophy, p. 75.

cause or even the origin of suffering as on the problem of the nature of the self and its position in the world. "Who am I, how came this world, birth and death, what is the world; by enquiring within one's self great will be the benefit."¹ The question about the nature of humanity is first raised in the Rg-Veda,² and following the casual answer, "I know not what I am,"³ there is later more serious reflection in the Vedānta. Though the direction of thought was turned from external Puruṣa and Brahma to the internal self, but for long it was still regarded as a physical entity. The first systematic reflection⁴ noted that the Ātman is gradually developed in plants and trees as sap; in animated beings as citta, and in man as prajñā. He alone can communicate his knowledge of what he has perceived and understood by his Ātman; he alone ponders on the events of the future, the visible and the invisible entities and, finally, desires immortality.

In the Upaniṣads there is ascription of reality to the tangible man, but it is soon discovered that these are parts falsely identified with the self. The instruction on the real self proceeds by different steps according to the capacity of the pupil. In the Brahnavalli,⁵ self is discovered in five stages of analysis. At first the person is thought to consist of the essence of food. This is the coarse, physical body⁶ which sustains life and all its operations in all creatures.⁷ Within this inorganic sheath is the self consisting of prāṇa or breath, which fills the whole physical frame and sustains the life of all (sarvāyūṣya). All biological functions are possible due to the constant operation of life in the bodily city and it has cosmic relations as well.⁸ But this organic self is called śarīra ātman,⁹ for it is the mortal, the stationary, the actual, while the real is the self within.¹⁰ Within this sheath of the biological self is the self consisting of mind, filling the former completely. Through

1. Annapūrṇa Upa., I, 40: केतुं जगन्मृतं, सान्निध्यं चोपैश्वर्यं, सत्त्वान्मृतं चोपैश्वर्यं, इत्येवमिदं शरीरं ।
2. R. V., I, 164, 4: केतुं जगन्मृतं ।
3. R. V., I, 164, 37: न का जानन्ति मरुतं, इह नमो भवेत् ।
4. Ait. Āraṇyaka, II, 3, 2.
5. Taitti. Upa., II.
6. Chān. Upa., VIII, 7, 4.
7. Maitrī Upa., VI, 11.
8. Br. Upa., VI, 1, 7 and 13; Chān. Upa., V, 1, 6 and 12; Prasna Upa., III, 4-8; IV, 3-4.
9. Taitti. Upa., II, 3.
10. Br. Upa., II, 3, 5-6.

it occurs the conscious activities, the operation of the ten organs of sensation and action, both in sleep and in waking. Through it the Vedas are known. It is the consciousness or prajñātma which, related to the prānamaya self, is supreme in all functions and facts of existence.¹ But manas is not what we should desire to understand,² for it also is the sarira ātman as are the former two.³ Within the sheath of this psychological self is the self consisting of understanding or vijñānamaya atman. It fills the consciousness of the person and on it are based faith, right, truth, contemplation, might; it is the vehicle of aparokṣa jñana, the seer, the inner controller.⁴ Within the sheath of this logical self, which also is the śarira ātman as are the former three,⁵ is the self consisting of bliss or ānandmaya ātman. It pervades the intellectual self, makes possible the experience of pleasure, delight, great delight and bliss. This is the highest world of the seer, which sustains all other creatures,⁶ being life itself.⁷ This self of bliss is also the bodily self like the others,⁸ the vehicle of the potentiality or seeds of karma.

Later Vedāntins were divided on the question whether this experiential self is the highest self only in terms of thought pointing to another intuitive self beyond it, or the real self itself beyond which there is nothing else to discover. While Śaṅkara holds that the search for the Ātman must continue beyond all five koṣas and must not stop at the fifth koṣa, which is also a mere modification of ultimate self of bliss,⁹ Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabha consider the self to be vijñānamaya or conscious self, while ānandmaya, for them, is the supreme being, Parabrahma or Paramātman, who is the very self of the individual Ātman. Madhva regards all sheaths to belong to Brahma as He is immanent in all. The self same Parabrahma issues from anna to ānand; there are no false sheaths, but the whole world consisting of jīva and jaḍa is of the essence of ānand.

1. Kauśī. Upa., III, 2-7.

2. ibid., III, 8.

3. Taitti. Upa., II, 4.

4. Kauśī. Upa., III, 8; Br. Upa., III, 4, 1ff.; III, 7, 1ff.

5. Taitti. Upa., II, 5.

6. Br. Upa., IV, 3, 32-33.

7. Chān. Upa., IV, 10, 5.

8. Taitti. Upa., II, 6.

9. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 12.

The Chandogya¹ describes the progressive enlightenment of Indra regarding the real self. He found the preliminary teaching about the bodily self (the person seen in the eye) to be unsatisfactory, for this self is subject to changes of happy and miserable conditions and perishable. Such must be the doctrine of demons, non-believers and body-servers. Nor did Indra find the teaching of the mental self (he who moves about in a dream) to be any more enjoyable because that self is also subject to changes of pleasant and unpleasant conditions, as it were. Indra also questions the reality of self in sound sleep, composed, serene, knowing no dream, for it knows not itself to be the self; it seems to be destroyed. But Prajapati teaches him that this is the real self, being pure consciousness, bodiless (aśarīra), untouched by pleasure and pain and real Experiencer or Subject of all experience.

The above teaching hinted at the different conditions of the self, described as the four fourths of the Ātman.² The first fourth common-to-all-men (vaiśvānara) is the waking state (jāgarita sthāna) of the enjoyment of gross objects. This is the naturalistic self accepting the universe as it appears to it. The second fourth is the brilliant (taijasa) which is the dreaming state (svapna sthāna) of the internal cognitive activity and enjoyment of subtle objects (pravivikta bhuj). The third fourth is the cognitional (prajñā) which is the deep sleep state (susupta sthāna), a unified (ekībhūta) cognition-mass (prajñāna-ghana) consisting of bliss and enjoying bliss, the Lord, the All-Knower and the origin and end of all. The fourth is without an element of duality, with it is no dealing, the cessation of development, benign, without a second, without mark, unthinkable, unnameable. This is the Turiya.³

The slightly varying teaching of the Upaniṣads was the basis of the controversy between Advaitins and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins in regard to the nature of the self as Saguna or Nirguna. But all agree that there is a false self (jīva), constituted by the inorganic, organic, volitional and intellectual elements, who experiences saṁsāra, and beyond this is the true self or Ātman which is sat, jñāna, ananta and ānand.⁴ In the

1. VIII, 7-12.

2. Māṇḍū. Upa., III, 12.

3. Br. Upa., V, 14, 3; cf., Maitrī Upa., III, 11, 7-8.

4. Taittī. Upa., II, 1.

parable of the rider and the chariot,¹ the rider or self riding the chariot of the body, with intellect as the driver, with mind as the reins, with the senses as the horses ranging over the objects of senses, is the enjoyer or the bhokta. Higher than all these is the Ātman hidden in all things, seen only by subtle seers with superior intellect.

Vedānta very early distinguished the real self from the empirical individuality or jīvahood.² The spatio-temporal man, with a history, who is perceived, is not the whole or real man. Mundane human nature is a composite of physical and psychical traits (nāmarūpa) but beyond it is the essential, changeless principle, which alone constitutes his peace and happiness.³

Soul in . . . popular religion means that which remains when a body is arbitrarily subtracted from a human personality If we talk of the soul passing from death to another birth, this, according to the Upaniṣads, is a soul accompanied by a subtle baggage of mind and senses . . . still physical or super-physical, but not spiritual . . . (there is) another condition known as the fourth stage . . . when discursive thought ceases, when the mind and the senses are no longer active, the result is not unconsciousness equivalent to non-existence, but the highest and purest state of the soul, . . . in which . . . it enjoys the untrammelled bliss of its own nature.⁴

The real self is uncreated. Creation refers not to the soul of the individual self, but to its body, birth and death, the entering into and passing out (prādurbhāva, tirobhāva) of the body. The Upaniṣads suggested the doctrine of the three bodies in which the self is caught and bound. The physical body (deha, sthūla śarīra, annamaya koṣa) destroyed at death, the subtle body (liṅga, sūkṣma śarīra)⁵ of five subtle elements, made up of buddhi, manas, prāna and ten indriyas accompanies the departing soul. Lastly, there is the body (kāraṇa śarīra) supporting the seeds of karma (karmāśraya).⁶

The Gītā declares the soul to be neither created nor destroyed, unborn, eternal, everlasting.⁷ The body, which is changeable and transitory, is not real.⁸ Senses and their contact with objects giving rise to feelings are equally transitory, hence to be ignored.⁹ The mind is greater than the senses, and greater than the mind is intellect,

1. Kaṭha Upa., III, 3-12.

2. R. V., X, 16, 4.

3. Kaṭha Upa., III, 1; Śve. Upa., IV, 6, 7; Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1.

4. Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, Vol. I, pp. lxii-lxiii.

5. Maitrī Upa., VI, 19.

6. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 2.

7. B. G., II, 20.

8. B. G., II, 13.

9. B. G., II, 14.

but they too are not ultimate, because there is a self higher than them.¹ The ego, the intellect, the ten sense organs and the mind together with their operations, the subtle elements, the primordial matter and the gross objects are all prakṛtic, non-sentient.² The knower (kṣetrajña) knows all these—body and its accessories—as objects.³ Action, growth and decay belong to prakṛti, which furnishes the psychical and physical frame of empirical selfhood, while the self is none of these.⁴ Self, ever-dwelling in the body, is really transcendent, the witness, the guide, the sustainer, the experiencer, the Supreme Lord and the Over Soul.⁵ As the one sun illumines this whole world so the one Ātma illumines the whole kṣetra (field).⁶

In the spirit of the Vedāntic Prasthānas the absolutist and theist Vedānta-ācāryas rejected the materialistic doctrine in all its forms. The doctrine of the non-sentient soul makes it non-liable to vice and virtue, bondage and salvation, which are respectively the present condition and the future destiny of the soul. The self is not to be regarded as the epiphenomenon of matter (Cārvāka-siddhānta) for it is the knower and controller of matter or body (kṣetra). Self is not to be confused even with the biological and mental elements. The Ācāryas unanimously reject dehātma-vāda, indriyātma-vāda, prāṇātma-vāda, aṅtākaraṇavāda, sūkṣmadehavāda.

Śaṅkara declares that according to Śruti and tarka the greatest attainment in the worlds of men and gods is to know the real self to be one's own; to know wrongly the non-self is no attainment.⁷ When the pupil, pessimistic about the body, senses, objects and the pain caused by them, asks, is this my own nature, the teacher replies, no, it is causal-caused by ignorance and removable.⁸ It cannot be argued that since body and the rest are conceivable nothing beyond them is to be determined as self, for nothing prevents us from identifying self with the eternal intelligence through which body etc. is conceived.⁹ Nor can it be argued that all know the self in "I am," hence

1. B. G., III, 42-43.

2. B. G., XIII, 4-6.

3. B. G., XIII, 2.

4. B. G., XIII, 29.

5. B. G., XIII, 22.

6. B. G., XIII, 33.

7. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVI, 44 and 74; XVII, 4.

8. ibid., I, 45-46, 48 and 50.

9. Pañcadaśī, III, 12.

there is no need to teach knowledge of self, because the non-Atman, body etc. which are jñeya, are, through error, known as jñata or Atma and are not distinguished from it.¹

The subject and object, the sphere of the "ego" and the "thou" are opposed as darkness and light. It is wrong to superimpose upon the subject the object and vice versa. The apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something previously observed in some other thing is adhyāsa The internal organ is superimposed on the interior self (saksi) and vice versa as body and self are in a natural beginningless process and endless appearing in the wrong conception of the individual souls as agents and enjoyers.²

Adhyāsa in the case of the self means nothing else than the self's being connected with the attributes of being an agent, having experiences of pleasure and pain . . . the fact that ordinary people although verbally acknowledging the difference of self and non-self—in using forms of expression such as "this body is mine"—do not really conceive a self different from the body unless their minds be illumined by scriptural teaching.³

Self is the peculiar subject matter of the Upaniṣads in that it cannot be known through any other source; but they only start to destroy the Avidyā which conceives the self.⁴

The method of disentangling the self is that of presence and absence (anvaya and vyatireka), what is constantly present is the self, what is sometimes absent is the non-self.⁵ "I am neither the earth, nor the water, nor the light, nor the air, nor the space, nor any organ of sense, nor their aggregate because they are variable by nature."⁶ Neither the gross nor the subtle non-ego qualifies the self.⁷ Determined by one's own past karma and made of five elements (pañcakṛta) is born the gross body or medium of pleasure and pain.⁸ This physical body formed of semen and blood is derived from food and is non-eternal and destructible.⁹ The subtle body consisting of pañca prāṇa, ten indriyas, manas and buddhi is born out of tanmātras.¹⁰ The kāraṇa or causal body is formed by indescribable, anādi Avidyā. "Know for certain that Ātman is other than these three conditioning bodies or upādhis."¹¹ The sum total of states, actions, passions, impulses etc. constitute the finite individual or "me"—

1. Madhusūdana, Siddhānta Bindu, 2.

2. S. B. on B. S., Intro. to I, 1, pp. 3-4, 9.

3. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, VI.

4. Siddhānta Muktaṅgalī, XXV.

5. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, II, 5 and 8.

6. Siddhānta Bindu, I.

7. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, VI, 2; cf., Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, II, 11-12 and 16-17.

8. Ātmabodha, 12.

9. Pañcadaśī, III, 3.

10. Ātmabodha, 14; cf., Pañcadaśī, III, 5-7.

11. Ātmabodha, 14; also 18.

--which if taken as separate from the witness is unreal.¹

None except materialists believe that the gross body is the self. Similarly, the self to which the property of egoity, activity, desire belong comes and goes, hence these are objects and not the self.² If egoity were the property of the body it would continue in sleep and in liberation, but it is not so present.³ Like ornaments these qualifications, objective parts of ego are imposed on the self and can be cut away like a part of the body, while the self remains.⁴ Of the learned the "I" is related to the body as to the jīva, of the mahātma "I" is Brahma.⁵

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins reject the doctrines of adhyāsa and the individual self as a composite of subjective and objective elements. They find no evidence of false superimposition. According to Madhva, the presumption that we identify our body with the soul is not true, for everyone of us has valid experience of "this is my body," difference between self and body, organs is felt even by animals, birds, aquatic creatures; the self pervades the body and there is difference in expressing this or difference in language, but there is no proof of adhyāsa.⁶ It is jīva which is eligible for both bondage and release, enjoys happiness and suffers the ills of life; the difference between jīvas is intrinsic and eternal, and not adventitious or aupādhika.⁷ Rāmānuja does not agree with Advaita that egohood is transitory or changeable, for the self as conscious subject does not lose its "ahampratyaya" i. e., is not sublated, even in deep sleep.⁸ The sakṣī is the ahankāra, who knows about something by personal observation. So, in deep sleep due to lack of external objects the ego-consciousness grows dim but does not disappear i. e., the statement is, "I was conscious of nothing." If "aham" were an adhyāsa of Avidyā like the body etc. then our consciousness would be, "I am consciousness" and not, "I am conscious."⁹ Both Vallabha and Nimbārka agree with Rāmānuja that the self is a self-conscious ego or "ahamārtha" not consisting of real

1. S. B. on Kāṭha Upa., II, 20: अहं इति शब्दोऽपि नित्योऽस्ति न चान्यथा

2. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, II, 21 and 22.

3. ibid., II, 32.

4. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, VI, 3-4.

5. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 162.

6. Anu Vyākhyāna, 33.

7. Madhva Bhāṣya on Chān. Upa., p. 11.

8. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 35: अहं इति शब्दोऽपि नित्योऽस्ति न चान्यथा

9. ibid., p. 36ff.

and unreal factors, but only of what is essential to self. The proof of its reality is its constant presence; in sleep the ego-intuition does not cease, the citta perceives the self, though intuition of body and mental psychosis are absent. Thus theists deny that there is any evidence of mutual superimposition of ego on the self or of object upon the subject in the composition of empirical self.

However, the negative view of the self of the Advaitins is acceptable to the theists. The individual's real self is not to be confused with the body, either gross or subtle, because that is the impure nature of self in saṁsāra. Body being a lifeless thing, and self being life and consciousness itself, neither can be the cause of regard to those who understand their nature.¹ Self is to be distinguished from material elements, the sense organs, the vital breaths, the mind and its modes, these being all the implements of the soul.² But theists do not negate the vijñānamaya from the real self as does the Advaita because of its theory of adhyāsa.

Positively, the Vedāntins agree that self is pure consciousness in some form, but their difference appears in the interpretation of the sūtra *ātmanasvabhāva*.³ Śaṅkara holds this to mean self's nature as knowledge itself. If consciousness be different from self, then there could be no relation of substance and attribute between them; but if they are identical there is no point in saying that one is the attribute of the other, hence self and intelligence are identical. The theists, on the other hand, regard the self to be a knower in its essential nature. Jñaptimātra is the swarūpa or essence of self according to Advaita, and an inseparable quality or dharma according to the theists. Rāmānuja makes both the essence and the quality of Ātman eternal.⁴ Nimbārka regards self as a substance having the quality of jñāna, because identity does not mean absolute resemblance between dharma and dharmī.⁵ Vallabha and Madhva also agree that self is a knowing subject in its pure nature.

Another point at which divergence appears is on the question of agency of self.⁶

1. R. B. on B. G., II, 11.

2. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, II, 4, 10-12.

3. B. S., II, 3, 18.

4. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 30: स्वभावात्मा चिदस्वरूपं ज्ञानं चैतन्यः गुणानः।

5. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, III, 2, 17: ज्ञानं स्वभावतः स्वतः ज्ञानात्मकः।

6. B. S., II, 3, 33-40.

Śaṅkara attributes kartṛtva and bhokṛtva, as body etc., to adhyasa.¹ If self were a real agent mokṣa, which means ending of karma, would be impossible, since the self cannot get rid of its nature.² He emphatically denies eternality and naturalness of agency: those who think themselves to be one with Brahma and at the same time doers and enjoyers should be regarded as fallen from both jñāna and karma.³ As against this the theists are unanimous that agency is natural and eternal attribute of jīva. Nimbārka argues that being jñātā the self is also kartā, for Śāstra-injunctions imply agency and so also does control of body by the self; it is agent both in bondage and salvation, in one state enjoying the pleasant and unpleasant fruits of karma and in the other state the bliss of liberation.⁴ Rāmānuja comes to the same conclusion by arguing negatively that if self were a non-agent then there would be no determination of enjoyment for it. Vallabha and Madhva adopt a similar position that the doctrine of non-agency leaves the doing of acts such as Śāstra-injunction, adoption of various sādhanas, the free activity of the mukta, undetermined.

The analogy of the wood-cutter⁵ is differently interpreted. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka make "ubhayatva" stand for "kadācikatva" or occasionalism of action on the part of the carpenter. Vallabha understands it to mean both kartṛtva and bhokṛtva. Madhva talks of swārtha or parārtha kartṛtva as when the carpenter works independently or controlled by the master. In spite of these differences the theists generally agree about the real nature of self as agent, while Śaṅkara declares that its activity (pravṛtti) occurs only till the goal is reached, after which there is non-activity (nivṛtti).

This difference of doctrine in regard to the nature of self as jñātā and kartā hinges on the Advaita stand on Nirguṇa Ātmā as ultimate and the theistic stand on Saguṇa Ātmā as ultimate. Sage Auḍolomi⁶ took the stand that self is pure intelligence and Jaimini that it has many attributes (satyasamkīpatva etc.), and Bādarāyana

1. Atmabodha, 22.

2. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 89.

3. ibid., XI, 8.

4. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, II, 3, 32-40.

5. B. S., II, 3, 40: तथा च तस्मिन्मया ।

6. B. S., IV, 4, 5-7.

reconciles the two. Śaṅkara explains that the latter's reconciliation only refers to practical life (vyavahārapekṣya) while in liberation self is pure intelligence, free from all determinations and attributes. The theists understand Bādarāyaṇa literally: the real self is determined by possession of many high and excellent attributes.

Whatever be the difference between the Vedāntacāryas in regard to the "what" of the self, the "that" of the self is not in question e. g., Śaṅkara declares that everyone is conscious of the existence of self and no one thinks, "I am not,"¹ the very existence of all pramāṇas presupposes a self-established intelligence.² Nor is there any doubt that pure consciousness is the swarūpa and not an āgantuka dharma of the Ātman. Ātman should not only be regarded as eternal but as possessed of an eternality of consciousness, otherwise it would be reduced to a mere unconscious principle of nature.³ The theists also accept permanence of consciousness to be as necessary as permanence of soul. Vedānta strongly advocates the method of self-analysis for achieving self-knowledge. It would whole-heartedly accept the command, "Know thyself." But the self-knowledge is no mere psychological introspection. It is the religious method of discipline to restore man's mental, moral, spiritual wholeness. The dynamic power of spirit is made to function by meditation. The task laid on man is to exert his spirit to negate finiteness, to overcome suffering resulting from separation from his real nature. Man has many aspects, natural and social, but his real resting place and freedom is in his spiritual self.

Vedānta Way to the End—Discipline

The saving knowledge is the result of strong effort, for constancy and steadfastness is required to obtain what is eternally constant and steadfast. "All authorities teach that no one can possibly enter into its spirit who has not previously subdued his passions and abominations of the human heart."⁴ One makes one's own world by one's thought and it can be purified only by effort to rid the mind of sloth,

1. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1: सर्वो हि आत्मस्त्वित्यस्य प्रत्यक्षं न तावत्प्रतिपत्तिरिति.

2. ibid., II, 3, 7; I, 3, 22.

3. cf., Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, II, 5-6.

4. Max Müller, Three Lectures on the Vedānta, p. 163.

distracted and changeable.¹ There are no short-cuts, no results obtained by proxy. Sons and others are capable of discharging a father's debts but no one except himself can remove (his own) bondage of *aviçya*, *kama*, *karma*.² The path is difficult because obstacles are great and internal. The *sādhaka* is stifled by unspiritual desires in the physical and astral bodies and the six enemies are desire, anger, greed, delusion, egoism and jealousy.³ The essential nature of self is overcome by egoism, so "one's mind engrossed in bad impressions must be forced back into the good course by strong personal effort."⁴ "One should lift oneself by one's own effort . . . for one's own self is one's friend and one's own self is one's enemy."⁵ The spiritual aspirant must not be inert or restless, but by heroic endeavour must conquer his lesser nature. Not by the weak or the heedless is the *Ātman* obtained, but by the strong.⁶ And the exhortation is to arise, awake and to understand the boon of human life, the way to which is as difficult to tread as the sharp edge of a sword.⁷

Vedāntic discipline throughout accents self-effort, for everything in this world is accomplished by free action accompanied by well directed effort. When a person realizes this the desire to be active arises and therefore there is activity.⁸ The foolish man who believes that all is in the hands of destiny is ruined,⁹ for past *karma* beginning to produce its fruits may obstruct knowledge, but even for the *prārabdha* to become fruitful in experience free action is needed as in husbandry, commerce and all human intercourse.¹⁰ Or if one argues that he has neither inclination for good deeds, nor can he abstain from evil deeds because he is only moved by the *Antaryāmī* to act, from this dependence on the inclination of *Īśvara* there will be uselessness of incentives or endeavours to action, good or bad, but this is wrong, for *Īśvara* is changed in the shape of what a person is capable of doing, and therefore everywhere the

1. *Maitrī Upa.*, VI, 34.

2. cf., *Viveka Chūdāmaṇi*, 53-57; *Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka*, I, 15.

3. *Viveka Chūdāmaṇi*, 270 and 396.

4. *Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka*, loc. cit.

5. B. G., VI, 5.

6. *Mund. Upa.*, III, 2, 4: अयमन्वित्यन्तरेण जलान्तरिक्षे च वायुः ।

7. *Kāṭha Upa.*, III, 14-15: सुखं दुःखं चित्तं विविक्तं सुखदुःखम् ।

8. *Rāmānuja, Vedārtha-Saṅgraha*, III, 119.

9. *Yoga Vasīṣṭha*, II, 5, 29.

10. *Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka*, I, 14.

individual's endeavour is the chief cause of all work.

Self's freedom is due to its having the essence of supreme power. Meta-physically self is its own master (samrata), though empirically it is controlled by Paramatma or Antaryami, according to all Vedānta schools. Nor can it be argued that since Vedānta holds Atman and Brahman to be essentially one there is no need for discipline, for discipline is necessary because of self's beginningless bondage to empirical existence which cannot be ended by mere death, but by sādhanā alone, which frees soul from elements of nature.¹ Unless such free will and activity (purusakāra) in accordance with scripture be accepted, all Vedāntic discipline beginning with the diagnosis of ignorance and ending in liberation would be vain.² The Kantian argument that the moral imperative implies freedom of will is quite acceptable to Vedānta. For unless man can be free to progress in the spiritual path Vedānta cannot say that he ought to enter it. And that there exists such a path and process, there can be no doubt.³

Discipline and Auxiliaries

Vedāntic discipline consists of yoga or mental control, vicāra or enquiry and sādhanā or use of auxiliary means. Even before coming to the investigation of scripture on the nature of reality, man must pass through all stages of religion, theology, morality and mysticism. The ignorant man of the world looks outward to unstable pleasures but the spiritual man must introspectively turn all his faculties inward.⁴ The conviction that no superficial approach of the unpurified, uncomposed mind based on mere intellectuality or learning can lead to the end, is the starting point of discipline.⁵ Only the pure minded can see the Atman, so there must be control of mind by the yoga of control, of speech by mind, of mind by understanding, of understanding by the self of knowledge (jñānātmā) and of that by the tranquil self (sāntātmā).⁶ With

1. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 1, 4.

2. cf., S. B. on B. G., III, 34 and 36.

3. cf., Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 45-46: Fear not, wise man--there exists a means for crossing the ocean of births and deaths, an effectual means by which thou will attain to supreme bliss.

4. Kāṭha Upa., IV, 1-2.

5. cf., ibid., II, 23-24.

6. ibid., III, 13; VI, 10-11.

understanding, faith and steadfastness truth is desired by the ativadi.¹ The discipline is many-sided as seen in the difference of emphasis of different seers.² By rta, satya, tapas, dama, sama, by sacrifice combined with study and instruction is moksa obtained. All are agreed that knowledge and right activity must combine with austerity,³ though austerity at the cost of neglect of duty is not proper.⁴ So study of Veda, sacrifice and charity must precede austerity in order to obtain jñāna.⁵ The pupil must dwell in austerity, chastity and faith as a preparation for true instruction.⁶ But austerity must be well directed,⁷ and must not be mere torture of the body.⁸ The Gītā⁹ makes a clear distinction of sattvic tapas which is regulation of body by worship, purity, straightforwardness, continence and non-violence; regulation of speech by unoffensive, truthful, agreeable, wholesome speech; and regulation of mind by cheerfulness, serenity, habitual meditation on God and self-control. That is false austerity which is motivated by desire for name and honour and for mere show, or done under delusion of understanding with torture to the mind, senses and body or to cause injury to another.¹⁰ Satya, tapas, jñāna, brahmacarya and śraddhā are the key words in Upaniṣadic discipline which begins with vairāgya. Discipline requires solitude,¹¹ renunciation of worldly ties,¹² and external objects;¹³ and this is the essence of vairāgya. Later the rule for renunciation or samyāsa, as soon as spirit of detachment arose in the mind, was laid down,¹⁴ but renunciation without detachment is punished by hell. The world is not to be relinquished because of a sick heart, or mere aimless wandering without guidance. The true tapas leads to jñāna and ānand, the other is mere torture and pain.

1. Chān. Upa., VII, 16; Śve. Upa., I, 15; Satya, tapa. Also Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 5: Satya, tapa, jñāna.
2. Taittī. Upa., I, 9.
3. Kena Upa., III, 3; Śve. Upa., I, 15; IV, 21; Taittī. Upa., III, 2, 5.
4. Maitrī Upa., IV, 3-4.
5. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22; Chān. Upa., VIII, 5.
6. Prasna Upa., I, 27.
7. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 4; Br. Upa., III, 8, 10.
8. cf., Maitrī Upa., I, 2.
9. XVII, 14-19.
10. cf., B. G., XVII, 5-6.
11. Maitrī Upa., VI, 8.
12. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22.
13. Maitrī Upa., VI, 10.
14. Jābāla Upa.: अथ विरजितं तपो प्रव्रजितम् !

The Sadhana-adhyaya of the Brahma-Sutra¹ tries to give insight into the imperfections of karma-bound samsāra to enable the jiva to develop vairāgya, preparatory to a Vedāntic life. The negative desire for freedom from attachment or virakti is fulfilled, love of world and objects is replaced by love of Atman or Paramatman. Brahma-jñāna, Brahma-prayatna and Brahma-anand coalesce for the sadhaka. Part of the discipline of upasana is the internal and external discipline provided by varṇaśrama-dharma.² The karma-vicāra of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, dealing with Vedic imperatives of dharma, is modified and given its proper value in the light of the Vedāntic Brahma-vicāra.³

The Bhagavadgītā gives a new interpretation of niṣkāma karma, which became the controlling factor in the Vedānta morality and spirituality. Because of the impossibility of renunciation of karma by embodied beings, true renunciation is defined as renunciation of fruit of karma.⁴ Life is a sphere of duty in which man must do the right and refrain from wrong at any cost, without an eye to the result of conduct.⁵ Duty is a penalty incurred due to desire, its discharge cancels the desire, while its violation through selfishness leads to further entanglement in material nature and correction by it. Hence right action is the condition of knowledge.⁶ To this conception of karma-yoga is allied the discipline of ananya, avyabhicārin bhakti to God. Out of such an exclusive, unchangeable love springs knowledge, which brings about surrender of all works and consequences to God.⁷ The negative discipline of detachment, renunciation, cessation of activity is deeply informed by positive attachment to God, and both combined lead to liberation.

The Vedānta schools worked out a more systematic form of discipline based on the method of the three Prasthānas. The difference of emphasis on various elements of the discipline was accentuated by sectarian controversies, but the broad outline of Vedānta discipline emerges clearly.

1. B. S., IV, 1: Vairāgyapāda.

2. B. S., III, 3; IV, 4.

3. B. S., III, 4, 2ff.

4. B. G., XVIII, 11.

5. B. G., II, 47.

6. S. B. on Kena Upa., I: सत्त्वानुसृत्य तु श्रद्धाशून्यं प्रवृत्तव्यं प्रमादमैव कार्त्तव्यं

7. B. G., XVIII, 55-57, 66.

The Vedānta principle of *adhikāra-bheda*, i. e., the graduated imparting of spiritual truth according to the learner's capacity, is an essential part of the discipline clearly laid down in the Śruti Prasthāna.¹ The later Vedāntins are careful to define the qualifications necessary for receiving instruction. In the Advaita philosophy it is a principle based upon the conception of epistemological duality of reality and world as long as man is still in *Avidyā*. At the level of *vyavahāra* there is the distinction of the wise teacher, the enquiring pupil and the teaching imparted as something from outside.

Both absolutists and theists agree that the only beings lower than the gods who qualify for *Brahma-jñāna* are men.² There is appreciation of human life and good birth, and desire for spiritual knowledge which is a reward for infinite lives of good deeds.³ Of all creatures men alone have the power of discrimination,⁴ but even among men a classification has to be made of those who are or are not fit for *Brahma*.

The external standard of birth leads the Vedāntins to debar *sūdras* from *Brahma-jijñāsā* on the ground that they have not knowledge of nature of *Brahma* or worship, nor the rite of initiation which entitles them to study the Vedas or to sacrifice. Śravaṇa of the truth through other sources (*Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa*) merely destroys their sins and secures prosperity.⁵ *Brahma-vicāra* is only open to the *dvija-class*⁶ because they alone have the preliminary knowledge of *Veda* and *Vedāṅga*.⁷ The Advaitins following the pure *jñāna-mārga* insist on pure *brāhmaṇa* birth as condition of fitness for *sannyāsa*, which is the condition of *jñāna*;⁸ the other castes may qualify for *brāhmaṇa* birth by good deeds of *upāsana*, *dāna* etc.⁹

The theists make other classifications according to the natures of men. According to *Nimbārka*, there are some *jīvas* in bondage who are desirous of enjoyment in the world (*vibhukṣu*) and others who are aspirants (*mumukṣu*) for the real nature of self

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1. *Prāśna Upa.*, I, 2; *Chāṇ. Upa.*, VIII, 7.
 2. *B. S.*, I, 3, 26-33.
 3. *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 2.
 4. *S. B.* on *Kaṭha Upa.*, II, 2, 35.
 5. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka *Bhāṣyas* on *B. S.*, I, 3, 34.
 6. Vallabha *Bhāṣya* on *B. S.*, I, 1, 1.
 7. *Vedānta Kārijāta Saurabha*, I, 1, 1; I, 3, 38.
 8. *Upadeśa Sāhasrī*, I, 2.
 9. *Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha*, III, 1.42ff.

(nija swarūpāpatti) or the nature of God (Bhagavan-bhāvapatti). Among the former some are found to revolve eternally in saṁsāra (nitya saṁsarin) and others are future mumukṣus (bhāvi nihsreyaka).¹ Vallabha makes a distinction of three kinds of jivas² according to the degree of spirituality in their natures. The puṣṭi jivas, born from the blissful element of God, the maryāda jivas from the speech (vāka) element of God and the prāvāhikas from the manas of God, each qualifying for a different path. The former two qualify for receiving grace and can follow the path of devotion or karma till they come to the goal. The third type of men drift in the Māyā-world because of their self will. According to Rāmānuja,³ jīvātmās consist of baddha souls or bound by karma, the mukta or the liberated and the nitya or those who are eternally free.⁴ Madhva distinguishes the nitya or eternally free souls from the muktas, who have become freed from saṁsāra, like the devas, ṛṣis or the "fathers." Yet a third type are the baddha souls among whom some qualify for release (muktīyogya) and others not, because they are either consigned to the darkness of tamas (tamoyogya) or fated to revolve in saṁsāra for all time (nitya saṁsārins) according to the preponderance of the three guṇas of nature.

The Gītā adopts a more liberal view in regard to competency for the highest goal. Not concentrating exclusively on jñāna-mārga or the ritualistic karma-mārga, but combining both with bhakti-yoga, it rejects the external qualification of birth, difference of caste and condition;⁵ and in its practical aspect of bhakti Vedānta does not debar anyone provided he has the essential inner or subjective qualification called mumukṣutva, whether it be generated by karma, jñāna or bhakti, or any combination of these sādhanās. It is that strong and absorbing desire for freedom from the bonds of saṁsāra, without which Brahma-jijñāsa may not even begin. It arises in man due to growth of discrimination in the individual or his experience of good and evil effects of karma, due to the grace of God.⁶

1. Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 4, 10.

2. Siddhānta Muktaṅgalī, 9.

3. Vedānta Deep, Intro., p. 1.

4. Vedānta Deśika in Tattva Mukta Kalāpa, II, 27-28, argues that some souls are nitya baddhas.

5. B. G., IX, 32.

6. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, I, 1, 1.

All Vedantins insist on detachment from world and its objects and renunciation of social life at some stage of discipline. Vairagya is indifference to the transitory desires of the world and its objects.¹ "He who being devoid of fitness by chance or curiosity or by the thought that he knows much makes enquiries after Brahma, cannot surely know the self as Brahma because his thought is not inwardly directed and he is attached to externality."² Vairāgya arises from the viveka that Ātman alone is permanent and everything else is non-permanent; both act and react, deepening each other. According to Rāmānuja, vairāgya arises from reflection on the evil of things,³ detachment from joys and sorrows, control of the senses and lusts⁴ and the cessation of all worldly relations.⁵ Craving for objects only ends when there is knowledge of Ātman and this is only possible by centering the mind on God. True renunciation of jñāna-niṣṭhā consists in withdrawing the senses from objects like the tortoise, but one who practices extreme austerity will still have cravings.⁶

According to Nimbārka,⁷ spiritual enquiry is only entered upon by one who has studied Veda and Vedāṅga, is assailed by doubts about the results of works, has enquired into the science of dharma and has, consequently, developed disregard or indifference for worldly objects i. e., his vairāgya springs from viveka of the finite karma-phala and eternal Brahma-jñāna. Madhva declares⁸ that destruction of desires is the very condition of adhikāra for Brahma-jñāna, and vairāgya is conviction of world's perishability acquired by karma, study and reflection. Vallabha⁹ defines viveka as conviction that God does everything according to His will. This supported by dhīrya or patient bearing of fivefold misery with equanimity and āśraya or consciousness of one's helplessness in mind, body and act prepares mind to be withdrawn from the world into God by remembering all things. And by grace of God such non-attachment becomes fixed.¹⁰

1. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 3; Aparokṣa Anubhūti, 4; Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, IV, 71.

2. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṁgraha, p. 170.

3. R. B. on B. G., XIII, 8.

4. ibid., V, 20-21.

5. ibid., VI, 9.

6. S. B. and R. B. on B. G., II, 58-59.

7. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, I, 1, 1.

8. Bhāṣya on Īśa Upa., I.

9. Viveka-Dhīrya-Āśraya-Grantha, 1, 6 and 8.

10. Nirodha-Lakṣaṇa-Grantha, 9-10 and 15; cf., Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha, I, 45.

All Vedantins support the institution of *sannyāsa* as an expression of the spirit of detachment. But they differ about the degree of obligatoriness and the stage at which formal renunciation should occur in the disciplinary process. Advaita considers it a necessary final step on logical grounds.¹ Non-action in the form of *sannyāsa* makes *mokṣa* a negative product, therefore eternal. But *sannyāsa* must only occur due to *vairāgya* and for no other reason.² Even a man who but seeks illumination must also renounce (*vividiṣā*), and this *sannyāsa* is a part of *Ātma-jñāna* because through it (renunciation of desire) ignorance is contradicted.³ Real *sannyāsa* is not mere entering of the particular stage of life or even renunciation of all fruits of action (*tyāga*), but *karma-sannyāsa* of the *jñāna-yogī* who is no longer a body-wearer.⁴

Theists reject the Advaita conception of *karma-sannyāsa*. While Advaita allows possibility of knowledge in the stage of the *parivrājaka* only,⁵ Rāmānuja allows that people of all *āśramas* can attain Brahma.⁶ Generally the theists consider that though the entering of the *sannyāsa-āśrama* is not absolutely necessary, yet it is helpful in the path of *jñāna*.⁷ In the *gṛhastha*-life duties of the world and scripture are both present hence they make development of knowledge impossible, therefore, abandonment of *gṛhastha-dharma* is enjoined by scripture.⁸ Vallabha considers true *sannyāsa* to be only a product of devotion to God. When one is led to renounce because love to God has become *āsakti* and *vyasana*, that *sannyāsa* alone leads to the proper result of removal of sin by repentance. Any other kind of *sannyāsa* is mere hypocrisy, in *Kaliyuga*.⁹

1. vide *Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha*, IX, XVIII, a, b, c; It is denied that *mokṣa* is accomplished, because there is no *vidhi* in regard to *jñāna*, nor can any act precede *mokṣa* or Brahma without the difficulty of non-eternality.
2. vide *Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka*, 2 and 3: Desire for knowledge may arise merely from the heat of the moment as one desires to acquire an art or learn a science, and skin-deep learning is also found in scholars, yet neither renounce the world. So desire for knowledge is like hunger gnawing in which no action except eating recommends itself to the mind, even a moment's delay is intolerable. So when deep disgust towards actions and their results, *jarā-marāṇa* and desire for study arises that is real *jijñāsā* leading to *vividiṣa sannyāsa*.
3. S. B. on *Bṛ. Upa.*, IV, 5, 15; III, 5, 1.
4. cf., S. B. on B. G., Intro. to V; XVII, 2ff.; XVIII, 49.
5. S. B. on B. S., III, 4, 20.
6. R. B. on B. S., III, 4, 19.
7. cf., *Madhva Bhāṣya* on B. G., III, 4.
8. *Vedānta Kaustubha*, III, 4, 25.
9. *Sannyāsa-Nirṇaya-Grantha*, 10, 13 and 16.

Jñāna, Jñāna-Karma, Jñāna-Bhakti

Advaita takes its stand on pure jñāna. According to Saṅkara, God has distinguished jñāna-niṣṭhā for the sāṅkiya or knower from karma-niṣṭhā for the yogi.¹ Mokṣa being result of jñāna alone the jñāna-niṣṭhā cannot desire results of karma.² Nor is any combination of the two possible,³ because jñāna only arises after action ceases; they cannot exist simultaneously.⁴ As means of mokṣa they are as impossible to combine as the sun with darkness.⁵ Nor is knowledge a mental activity; the injunction with regard to it has the purport of diverting men from objects of natural activity and turning the stream of thought on the inward self.⁶ So, no action of mind, body and speech can lead to jñāna.⁷ One who thinks self a doer has the idea of something to be done and is qualified for scriptural works but not the mumukṣu or jñānī.⁸ The reason for the total absence of karma is the immutability of self. If Brahma were supplementary to certain actions and mokṣa were an effect of them it would be non-eternal.⁹ Since the idea of agency is too wide in its application and is common to both religious and worldly works, since Vedānta teaches knowledge which cuts karma short, since in mokṣa no otherness is seen, knowledge does not require any help to accomplish mokṣa.¹⁰ Mokṣa cannot result from karma since it is not a thing to be produced (utpādya), attained (āpta), modified (vikārya) or purified (saṅskārya), but only the revelation of the hidden reality.¹¹ Where things to be obtained are already with us and things to be discarded are not at all with us action can do nothing.¹²

Utility of karma, in Advaita, is not inconsistent with the need for renunciation, for the two are not different stages. Activities are not proximate (sannipatyā) but remote (āradupakāraṅka) auxiliaries.¹³ Knowledge may not require help

1. S. B. on B. G., II, 10; cf., S. B. on Īśa Upa., Intro.

2. S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 66.

3. *ibid.*, II, 11; *अज्ञानं कर्मणोऽप्यनुष्ठानं तदज्ञानं कर्मणोऽप्यनुष्ठानं*

4. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, I, 54.

5. *ibid.*, I, 79.

6. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4, p. 35ff.

7. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, I, 99-100.

8. S. B. on B. G., II, 21.

9. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1.

10. *ibid.*, III, 4, 2ff.

11. S. B. on Br. Upa., III, 3, 1, p. 447; also S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.

12. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, I, 34-35.

13. Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha, III, 1-21.

to accomplish its fruit but does need something else with a view to its origination. Sacrifice and works wash away impurities, produce calmness of mind and subdue the senses.¹ Self has duties to perform as long as there is ignorance.² Such performance is natural and proper, for one with desires (sakama) naturally proceeds to action.³ Also, the meditator of the Saguna is still subject to injunction of the scripture.⁴ Kṛti in the form of śraddhā, bhakti, dhyāna and yoga is a necessary discipline for him. Wherefore, one qualified for karma must perform it before he is fit for jñāna-niṣṭha, and he ought not to abandon works, for such abstention leads neither to freedom from karma (naiṣkarmya) nor to jñāna-yoga.⁵ Scriptural works should be performed as means to dhyāna-yoga.⁶ Such karma-yoga consists of worship of Īśvara, practice of samādhi, niṣkāma karma resulting from destruction of dvandvabhāva. This, through the grace of God, will result in Ātma-jñāna and karma-sannyāsa which is the condition of Brahma-jijñāsā.⁷

The theists consider karma as a more positive and direct cause of mokṣa than Advaita. Though release is ultimately attained by jñāna alone and karma is not an independent means to it,⁸ yet Rāmānuja takes his stand on sammucayavāda:⁹

Since, then, the knowledge of sacred rites . . . is mediately through engendering of dispassion and through putting away the defilement of understanding, an instrument of the knowledge of the Absolute, . . . revelation by censuring each when unaccompanied by the other shows that it is knowledge together with works that is efficacious for emancipation.¹⁰

Not all men are born with mumukṣā but all can engage in karma, which, done in a desireless spirit, as worship of God, removes evils from the heart and enables man to enter the jñāna-mārga. Only by continued performance of scriptural duties can competence for knowledge be attained.¹¹ This path is free from danger, for to act is an easy, natural

1. S. B. on B. S., III, 4, 27.

2. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XIII, 16.

3. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 5, 15; S. B. on Taitti. Upa., I, 11.

4. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 16.

5. S. B. on B. G., II, 46; XVIII, 5; III, 4.

6. ibid., Intro. to VI.

7. ibid., II, 39; cf., V, 12-26: The stages of Ātma-jñāna in order are : karmayoga, purity of mind, attainment of jñāna, renunciation of actions and lasting jñāna-niṣṭhā or meditation ending in peace of self-realization.

8. B. S., III, 4, 3-26.

9. Bhāṣya on Īśa Upa., 9-11, 12-14.

10. Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 80.

11. R. B. on B. G., III, 3-4.

accomplishment superior to the mental course. Since bodily existence necessitates karma it cannot be escaped.¹ Attachment comes only from work undertaken for self, but work as a sacrifice and worship, dedicated to God is consecrated work.² When it is said that actions of devotees should have no motive this does not include actions which are performed with the motive of pleasing God; for sakāma karmas are only such as are done from motive of pleasing one's self, and these have harmful effects always.³ The aim of both knowledge and works is non-different.⁴ The process is that by karma-yoga sins are melted, mastery over guṇas obtained and internal organ being purified jñāna-yoga is made possible.⁵

Nimbārka holds that Brahma is to be attained by jñāna and jñāna is superior to karma.⁶ Scripture teaches that Paramātmā alone is to be known, and this is not possible if Vidyā or Paramātmā were subordinated to karma.⁷ But other texts establish the equality of both jñāna and karma, thus karma without desire for result, but for the sake of knowledge, is justified; it is an aṅga of vidyā to which it leads.⁸

Madhva also argues that karma alone cannot be sufficient means to mokṣa because Śruti says there is no final way except jñāna.⁹ But karma performed with faith, jñāna of the supreme and vairāgya is efficacious. For the followers of jñāna-mārga karma is excluded but for all others it is enjoined, for the purification of the inner organ.¹⁰ Hence, though there is no sammucaya yet karma is a necessary subsidiary to jñāna; karma-yoga is the right kind of wisdom and action in which the goal of direct knowledge is brought about by bhakti helped by niṣkāma karma.¹¹ If it be asked why karma is needed if jñāna leads to mokṣa, Madhva replies¹² that jñāna may lead to immortality but it may be immortality of misery, and karmas are necessary in order to have bliss. Mere karma

1. *ibid.*, III, 9 and 16.

2. *ibid.*, IX, 27.

3. Venkaṭanātha, Sarvārtha-Siddhi, p. 202.

4. R. B. on B. G., V, 14.

5. *ibid.*, III, 57.

6. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, III, 4, 1 and 2-7.

7. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 4, 8.

8. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, III, 4, 9 and 26.

9. Nyāya Vivaraṇa, III, 1, 7.

10. Bhāṣya on B. G., III, 4: अतोऽप्येवमवगतानामेव कर्माणां ज्ञानात्प्राप्तौ प्रवृत्तिः।

11. *ibid.*, III, 32; II, 21: विदुषः कर्मोपनिबन्धनानां ज्ञानिः कर्मात्। अन्वयः। विदुषो ज्ञानात्। ज्ञानिः कर्मोपनिबन्धनानां।

12. Bhāṣya on Kena Upa. summarised in Brahmasāra.

makes man happy, but not lastingly; mere jñana makes man immortal, but painfully immortal; hence, both yajña and Brahma-jñana lead to the supreme end of immortality and happiness.

Whatever be the stages of discipline, no Vedāntin denies that knowledge alone is the immediate and direct sādhana. And not even Advaita denies that karma, either in the present or previous life is a necessary precursor of the end,¹ having instrumental and direct value. In any case, the path to release is in and through jñana, and no other way exists,

However, the conception of jñana differs among the Vedāntins. While Advaita regards it as a direct intuitive experience (aparokṣa anubhūti) of the real the theists take it to mean meditation connoted by bhakti. Rāmānuja² admits that release is by jñana, but the view of plurality continues because it is beginningless and infinitely strong. Hence scripture enjoins meditation or dhruva smṛti i. e., a continuity of steady remembrance uninterrupted like a flow of oil. Knowledge is bhakti, having the same meaning as upāsana,³ and devotion is a kind of cognitive knowledge admitting no motive save illimitable beatitude and freedom from all desire. Nimbārka defines knowledge as a form of worship, highest devotion, steady remembrance which destroys evil and is the special cause of attainment of the Supreme Person.⁴ Madhva declares jñana to be a constituent of bhakti.⁵ It is a firm, unshakable love of God which rising above all other ties, is based upon an adequate knowledge and conviction of God's majesty.⁶ All other means must be united with a clinging attachment to the Lord resembling the viscosity of water.⁷ Vallabha considers navadhā bhakti alone to be the proper means to mukti, far superior to the pure jñana-mārga.⁸ Vidyā alone does not bring release as Vidyā and Avidyā are mutually dependent.⁹ Bhakti may be a part of

1. S. B. on Kena Upa., Intro.; S. B. on Chān. Upa., VIII, 5, 1.

2. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, pp. 11, 14, 16.

3. Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 83.

4. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 4, 26.

5. Anu Vyākhyāna, III, 4: ज्ञानं च भक्तिर्भोगतः परीक्षा ज्ञानीकर्मणोः । ज्ञानं च विदितं च भक्तिर्भक्तिः ।

6. Mahābhārata-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, I, 86; cf., Nyāyasudhā, 18: अन्तःकृतमिदं कर्मिणः किञ्चिदप्य-
अन-कामनया कृतं तदुत्थलं तदुत्थलं । स्वात्मलोकाय समाह्वयमाप्तुं योऽन्तःकृतमिदं कर्म तदुत्थलं ।
अन्तः कर्मिणोः प्रथमं प्रवर्तते ।

7. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 2, 19: अग्रभुवनं अधि-
कृतं ।

8. Siddhānta Muktaṭvālī, I.

9. Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha, I, 63.

jñāna or independently leading to mokṣa.

For the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins bhakti is both the means and end of the process. Rāmaṇuja's jñāna-viśiṣṭa bhakti sādhanā¹ with its emphasis on reverence towards the majesty (aiśvarya) of God culminates in saraṇagati or kīṅkarya, complete surrender of self and activity to God in loving service.² Nimbārka's prema-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa³ or mādhyama pradhāna bhakti with its emphasis on grace of God and utter humility is supplemented by prapatti, resignation to the mercy of God,⁴ who is moved to save the soul from Avidyā-karma. According to Vallabha, the path of navadhā bhakti is transformed into puṣṭi-mārga and its last stage is perfection of seva. Bhakti as fruit of discipline is distinct from bhakti as a sādhanā. Madhva, though not accepting the end of prapatti, also finds the culmination of karma and jñāna in supreme devotion (parābhakti) to be the quintessence of Bhāgavat-dharma.⁵ It is the state of mokṣa in which worship of the Lord is unalloyed bliss in itself.⁶ Such bhakti moves God to grace, by which alone the direct vision of God is achieved.⁷

The discipline of bhakti has a place in the jñāna-mārga of Advaita, but not in the primary sense. It is an indirect auxiliary, as is karma. Those who have no faith in Ātma-dharma do not even attain to bhakti, which is the path to the Saṅgata Brahma.⁸ The devotee must fix his mind on God as the self of all beings and the goal; such desireless worshippers receiving God's grace achieve the buddhi-yoga of God's essential nature.⁹ A karma-yogī who serves God with the bhakti-yoga of discriminatory knowledge resulting from grace of God crosses the three guṇas and is adhikārī of Brahma.¹⁰ However, Śāṅkara understands supreme devotion (parābhakti) in which God is realized as self, with all distinctions annulled, to be not different from samyagjñāna.¹¹ His

1. Vedārtha-Saṅgraha, p. 146.

2. cf., R. B. on B. G., Intro. to VII; Vedānta Deśika, Nyāsa Vināśati, 18, 22: Nyāsa or Ātma-nikṣepa consists of six aspects—प्रदुःख संकल्प, इतिक्रम लक्षणम्, शिवाय २ विचारः, शिवाय २ विचारः, शिवाय २ विचारः, शिवाय २ विचारः, शिवाय २ विचारः, शिवाय २ विचारः

3. Daśa Śloki, 9.

4. ibid., 6 and 8.

5. Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 3, 27-31.

6. ibid., IV, 4, 21; Anu Vyākhyāna, 41: सुखरूपिणी मुक्तिः ।

7. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 2, 23-27: परमात्मापरोक्षं तत्प्रासादादेव न जीवन्मुक्तताम् ।

8. S. B. on B. G., IX, 3.

9. ibid., IX, 34; X, 10.

10. ibid., XIV.

11. ibid., XIII, 18.

jñana does not exclude devotion and parājñana nisthā is para bhakti or jñana-niṣṭhā-lakṣana bhakti.¹

The characteristic features of Vedānta sādhanā are self control and moral purity. All agree that good birth, which is the precondition of adhikāra for jijñāsā, depends not only on ritualistic works and their fruit, but that such performance of karma (anuṣṭhāna) must, in turn, be supported by good conduct (caritra, śila, ācara, vṛtta),² and that good conduct is subservient to puruṣārtha.³ As a preparation for Brahmanvidyā even more important than niṣkāma karma which leads to sattva śuddhi, is the cultivation of satya, ahimsā, asteya, brahmacarya. But these means depend upon the operation of sādhanā catuṣṭaya, the proximate auxiliary described by Śaṅkara in the introduction of the Śāriraka Bhāṣya. The very first step in spiritual life is nitya-anitya vastu viveka, because without a first glimpse of the eternal ground of all things man will remain satisfied with the finite and the destructible. From this vision follows ihāmutra arthabhoga virāga, indifference to the enjoyments of objects of this world or the world to come. When the attractiveness of the infinite is felt then there is the incentive to cultivate the six virtues, ṣaṭ sampatti, the positive virtues resulting from viveka and vairāgya.⁴ Śama is the abandonment of all previous impressions or concentration on objects; dama is confinement of senses to proper objects, uparati is independence from objects and actions of the world; titikṣā is suffering pleasure and pain with patience i. e., without retaliation, dejection or lamentation; śraddhā is meditation on the Śāstra taught by the guru and belief in its efficacy; samādhāna is absorption in the highest aim combined with the disposition of constant contentment, kindness, forgiveness, sincerity, tranquillity and control.⁵ Having cultivated these virtues there arises in the individual the urgent and deep desire for liberation, mumukṣā, which causes him to adopt the path of knowledge.

Rāmānuja insists on seven auxiliary sādhanas for originating vidyā. These⁶ are

1. *ibid.*, XVIII, 55.

2. *Vasiṣṭa-Sūtri*, VI, 3: अन्ना-होने च पुनश्च वेदाः

3. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka Bhāṣyas on B. S., III, 1, 9-11.

4. *Aparokṣa Anubhūti*, 6-9; *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 17-28.

5. *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 84; S. B. on *Māṇḍūkya Karikā*, II, 35.

6. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 17.

viveka of food and abode, vimoka or freedom from attachments, abhyasa or repetition of these virtues, kriyā or performance of the five sacrifices, kalyana or virtuous conduct of truthfulness, honesty, kindness, liberality, gentleness, non-coveteousness, anavasada or absence of dejection resulting from unfavourable conditions, anuddharsa or absence of over exaltation. All aspirants whether they be householders or renunciates must practice the virtues of śama-dama etc.¹ The sāttvic nature is not troubled by evil acts and its fruits, but this means only acts which he has unwittingly happened to perform and does not mean that he may deliberately perform bad acts, for one who has not ceased from wickedness cannot attain jñāna.² Nimbārka considers the internal (antaraṅga) sādhanas consisting of ṣaṭ sampatti to be both causes and effects of vidyā,³ for they directly conduce to one-pointed concentration, while karma only helps in that indirectly. All sādhanas require the supporting help (sahakārin) of śraddhā or reverence to guru and Śruti, ārjava, straightforwardness or harmony of mind, body and speech, viśvāsa or belief in gods, satsaṅga or company of good men and devotees, virāga or absence of rāga-dveṣa and bhakti or devotion. Vallabha insists on freedom from all sins of body and soul⁴ as the first step in sādhanā. Madhva's discipline with its emphasis on aṣṭāṅga yoga is based on the condition of moral purity (pañca śīla) and austerity, contentment, study and worship, self-control of mind and body. This alone leads to aparokṣa darśana of God. The Gīta⁵ epitomises the disposition of self-control and purity in its ideal of sthitaprajñā and sthitadhī. Whether this be regarded as the nature of the siddha (Śaṅkara) or of the sādḥaka (Rāmānuja), the stability of mind is a resultant of abandonment of desires and passions and occupation with the self.

Another auxiliary of discipline is the triple condition of paṇḍitya, bālya, mauna.⁶ Learning is the knowledge preceding reflection and mauna is the command to practice the object of meditation (Rāmānuja) or the command to eradicate the false notion of multiplicity which prevents pre-eminence of jñāna (Śaṅkara) or asceticism and

1. Vedānta Deep, III, 4, 27.

2. R. B. on B. G., XVIII, 10.

3. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, III, 4, 24.

4. Siddhānta Rahasya, II, 4.

5. II, 55 and 58.

6. Br. Upa., III, 5; B. S., III, 4, 47.

profound reflection not yet culminating in jñāna (Nimbarika). All agree¹ that bālyā does not indicate the heedlessness, wickedness, non-tranquillity, non-attention, non-peace of childhood, but that it means absence of guile, pride, arrogance, passion, self-consciousness, self display of learning and virtuousness.

The most proximate auxiliaries of jñāna are the mental processes of manana and nididhyāsana, following śravaṇa of Vedānta truth. But the exact relation of these steps is disputed. Manana generates knowledge by argument and defence of the truth of texts. Vedānta insists not only on the discarding of material goods, but of feelings, thoughts, opinions and perceptions to which men are attached, but which are found to be false by reason. Mind is purged of all preconceived ideas by this method. Without thinking there is no jñāna.²

According to Śaṅkara,³ repeated śravaṇa of truth terminates in direct intuition just as the husking of paddy is seen to end in the separation of grain. Nididhyāsana is the repetition of the truth carried within for one who has not cognised the mahāvākyas, or for one who has no obstacles they may be intuited at first enunciation.⁴ To ascertain the drift of the mahāvākyas after the method of Vedānta is śravaṇa, carefully to reflect on it by argument is manana,⁵ when the mind is free from doubts then comes the identity with Ātman in contemplation, which when ripened is the nirvikalpa samādhi called the dharmamegha. By a process of manana of negation of conditions through the Śruti statement, "neti, neti," oneness is realized.⁶

According to Ramanuja, the meditator equipped with the sādhana saptaka enters the state of śravaṇa etc., leading naturally to dhyāna or practice of the presence of Ātman, having the three stages of steady remembrance (dhruva smṛti), repetition (āvṛtti) and union or darśana samānākāratā.⁷ When the jñāni meditates on Brahma as on his own self and cultivates eka bhakti controlled by the idea of mukti then the Brahmopāsana is

1. Bhāṣyas on B. S., III, 4, 49-50.

2. Aparokṣa Anubhūti, 10-11: विना ज्ञानं निश्चिन्तनं सुखं न

3. S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 1-2.

4. Pañcadaśī, I, 53-60.

5. cf., Aparokṣa Anubhūti, 12: विचारः, शक्यः, इति श्रुतवत्, किं च कर्तव्यं विचारं, उपदानं किमस्तीति विचारः संयमीत्यर्थः

6. Ātmanobodha, II, 30; Aparokṣa Anubhūti, 13-23.

7. R. B. on B. G., VII, 1: उपासने च स्मृतिवन्नाप्यप्ये कश्चिन्नानाकारं व्याप्यं यत्सर्वव्यापकं

transformed into Brahmabhava. Vallabha distinguishes between his pusti-marga of divine grace by which man is directly led to God and the path of maryāda or vaidhi bhakti which requires the auxiliaries of karma, sravana, manana, and nididhyasana. Nimbarka subordinates sravana and manana as means to nididhyasana of Vedānta truth, and all three as indirect auxiliaries for the attainment of mokṣa.¹ According to Madhva, upāsana is twofold; one is deep study and reflection on Śāstra and the other is deep meditation (dhyāna). Manana removes doubts about the Dvaita knowledge of prameya and gives definiteness to it, and this is followed by uninterrupted meditation or nididhyāsana.² By this process the image of God created by impressions is, finally, directly intuited (Bimbāparokṣa).³

The general stages and processes of Vedāntic discipline are, firstly, mumukṣutva, engendered by viveka and vairāgya, which at some stage leads to sannyāsa of the āśrama-dharma (Vaiṣṇava Vedānta) or karma-sannyāsa (Advaita). Secondly, jñāna-sādhana, either in its pure form or synthesised with devotional and karmic elements; karma-yoga performed in the niṣkāma spirit until the requisite spirit of renunciation and purification of mind is attained (Advaita) or till the very end of life, as a supplementary or subsidiary factor of jñāna-sādhana (Vaiṣṇava Vedānta). This is accompanied by cultivation of purity of mind, body and speech by means of pañca śīla, ṣaṭ sampatti, sādhana saptaka, aṣṭāṅga yoga. A necessary supporting factor in sādhana is learning, asceticism and childlike innocence of heart. The most proximate auxiliary of jñāna-sādhana is śravaṇa of the Vedānta truth from a wise and competent teacher, approached with utmost reverence. This being followed by independent reflection prepares the sādḥaka for one-pointed concentration culminating in aparokṣa darśana.

The Goal

Ending of Saṁsāra

The actual experience and the theoretical explanation of the mundane world gives

1. Vedānta Kaustubha, I, 1, 1; I, 2, 17.

2. Tattva Prakāśikā, III, 3, 43: सक्ते च श्रेयसं निमित्तं कुर्वन्तः, ये तस्मिन्निर्वाणं निवारयन्ति... निरन्तरा निचिन्ता निदिध्यासनमुच्यते।

3. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 2, 37.

rise to the conception of the end, in which all deficiencies, limitations and imperfections of world conditions have been removed. In this sense, the ideal is the opposite of the actual and is expressed as "ending of samsara" or "cutting of the fetters."¹ The world of Brahma is free from change, day or night, old age, death, sorrow, all evils, afflictions, injuries and defects of the body.² Suffering and becoming, the marks of samsara, are absent; objective knowledge and relationships, all limiting conditions are removed in mokṣa.³

The condition of repeated birth and death (punarjanma) ends because its cause, karma, is rendered inoperative. That condition of negated karma is described as the state of desirelessness. Verily, freedom from desire (niṣkāmatva) is like the choicest extract from the choicest treasure; for a person who is made up of all desire, having the marks of determination, conception and self-conceit, is bound. Hence, in the opposite of that he is liberated.⁴ If thought were as firmly fixed on Brahma as on world objects who would not be released from bonds. It is the impure mind filled with desire which binds, so the mind purified by being made motionless, free from distraction or the state of mindlessness which is the supreme estate.⁵

Now the man who does not desire He who is without desire, who is freed from desire. Whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is the soul . . . he goes to Brahma . . . when are liberated all the desires that lodge in one's heart then a mortal becomes immortal.⁶

The satyakāma are those who have found the real desire of the soul. The desires are real, but there is a covering that is false and though all creatures attain to them day-by-day in union with Ātman in deep sleep, yet they do not find them as one who not knowing the spot might go over hid treasures of gold again and again.⁷ Knowing the impossibility of ending desire by their satisfaction i. e., the paradox of desire, Vedānta envisages the state of desirelessness (akāma) or resting of desire or fulfillment of desire (āptakāmatva) of the perfected man whose desire is the soul.⁸

1. Maitrī Upa., IV, 34; Kaṭha Upa., VI, 15.
2. Chān. Upa., VIII, 7, 1.
3. Bṛ. Upa., IV, 3, 21-31.
4. Maitrī Upa., VI, 30.
5. ibid., VI, 34.
6. Bṛ. Upa., IV, 4, 7; Kaṭha Upa., VI, 14.
7. Chān. Upa., VIII, 4, 1-2.
8. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, X, 5, 4 and 15.

But of him whose desire is satisfied, who is a perfected soul (krtātman), all desires even here on earth vanish away.¹

The state is also one of freedom from all evil and sin. "As to mountains enflamed deer and birds do not resort, so with Brahman-knowers fault never any shelter find."² As water adheres not to the leaf of lotus-flower, so evil action adheres not to him who knows.³ He is not troubled by the thoughts of not having done good (sadhu) or having done evil (pāpa), for shaking off all such evil the perfected soul passes into the uncreated Brahmaloaka.⁴ By knowing that Brahman is beyond karma one rises above evil actions; he overcomes and destroys evil and is freed from impurity and doubt.⁵ Thus the Upaniṣads envisage the state of perfection to be one in which good and evil karma, the cause of good and evil rebirth, has become ineffective, and this is freedom from bondage of rebirth.⁶ Nor is the state of enlightenment one of inactivity since actions continue but no longer bind. A wise man going on the path of Brahman is the doer of right (puṇyākṛta), finding bliss only in the self he performs the rites (kriyāvaṇ) and is the best of Brahma-knowers.⁷

The Brahma-Sūtra and the Gītā also accept the end to be transcendence of karma and rebirth i. e., the ending of saṃsāra. Non-return of the mukta soul to the world is the fruit of jñāna.⁸ The Lord says that after reaching me the released souls never get in this sorrowful and perishing world; all worlds including the world of four-faced Brahma are places of returning; men who obtain my likeness by means of this knowledge will never have creation or destruction.⁹ Having become gunatīta they are freed from the body, birth, death, old age and sorrow, they enjoy immortality.¹⁰ By jñāna all sins will be overcome as the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes.¹¹

Even the wise are unable to distinguish between action and inaction, without

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1. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 2.
 2. Maitrī Upa., VI, 18.
 3. Chān. Upa., IV, 15, 3.
 4. Taittī. Upa., II, 9; Chān. Upa., VIII, 13, 7.
 5. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 23.
 6. Kaṭha Upa., II, 3, 18: ब्रह्मप्राप्तो विरजोऽयं द्विगुणः।
 7. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 4.
 8. B. S., IV, 4, 22: अनादृशः।
 9. B. G., XIV, 2.
 10. B. G., XIV, 20.
 11. B. G., IV, 9 and 36-37.

knowing this mysterious distinction the end is not attained. Freedom from desires of the world, the fruits and complete subduing of the mind is the precondition of true action, which is inaction as it does not bind.¹ Though one who delights in the soul has no more duties in regard to things to be done or not done, yet action is superior to inaction, hence the wise act even as action is performed by God to maintain the world order.² Their one motive is promotion of welfare of all beings.³ Such work done as sacrifice is the true freedom from karma; being done in the spirit of desirelessness of fruit and dedication to God it has no more power to bind the soul to saṁsāra.⁴ There is destruction of all previous works (sañcita), both good and bad, and also the non-clinging of all future works (kriyamān), only the works which have begun to bear fruit, of which jñāna is the product, have to be exhausted by experiencing their fruit.⁵

As it is the fundamental tenet of Vedānta that the empirical self consists of desire, therefore the goal of true condition of desirelessness can be reached by regulation of these.⁶ The Gītā makes it the great desideratum, because it is equivalent to inaction in effort or freedom from the effect of karma. Such a state of niṣkāmatva is also a state of sinlessness. Scripture forbids the doing of what one likes to the jñānī,⁷ and Smṛti declares that only men of virtuous deeds whose sins are ended know God.⁸ Since the unattached, non-desiring man offers all acts to God sin does not touch him, as water does not touch the lotus-leaf. Later Vedāntins developed the conception of the end found in the three Prasthānas. According to Śaṅkara, realization of oneness is liberation from conditioned existence and no return is possible.⁹ Saṁsāra is a sure result of acceptance of difference, it ends because the knower sees only unity.¹⁰ He has uninterrupted bliss, his desire for illusory objects must vanish, for he can see no advantage in the world.¹¹ Spatial and temporal existence, world-evolution ends because

1. B. G., IV, 16-19 and 22-23.
2. B. G., III, 17-18 and 24: *साक्षात्पश्यन् ।*
3. B. G., V, 26: *सर्वभूतहितेन च ।*
4. B. G., IV, 32, 14 and 41.
5. B. S., IV, 1, 13-14 and 19.
6. B. G., III, 36-43.
7. B. S., III, 4, 31.
8. B. G., VII, 28-29.
9. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 225.
10. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 27.
11. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 429, 457.

vāsanā, its cause, is no more, from which follows want of enquiry into the past, speculation about the future and indifference to the present.¹ Mokṣa is freedom from embodied existence, since Ātman is without change (kuṭastha), omnipresent as ether, free from modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, without parts, beyond the three orders of time.² It is impossible that the jñānī should belong to saṃsāra as he did before attaining the end, for one who imposes body on self is subject to pain and fear, but we have no right to assume that the jñānī should still be subject to the same evils.

When there arises in man's mind the knowledge, "I am that that is," "Brahman is myself," when owing to sublation of the conception of the body and relations and the like the figurative and false comes to an end how should the effect i. e., apparent saṃsāra and distinctions exist any longer, such a person no longer belongs to transmigratory existence.³

The manner of ending of saṃsāra is that knowledge of unity simultaneously removes illusion of name and form and establishes the nature of Brahma as other than both.⁴ One who perceiving (apparently) the world of duality in the waking state does not (perceive it as real), as a man in deep sleep does not perceive it owing to duality being negated, and who is (actually) actionless even when (apparently) acting, is the man of self-knowledge.⁵ That is, once established in truth man can see the world-multiplicity yet knows it to be rooted in the non-dual, pure, free reality. For, "if the perceived manifold were real then certainly it would disappear, but duality is mere appearance."⁶ Knowledge in turīya is possible after disappearance of the perceived manifold, yet non-duality exists while manifold remains because it did not really exist; hence its appearance and disappearance is not a real fact (as the snake or the magic vision).⁷ Jñāna permits everything and rejects nothing; permission means the appearance of objects for ordinary understanding and its negation means the negation of real being to all.⁸ World dissolution is essential because it occupies our mind and distracts us from Brahma-jñāna. The rival being abolished, bodha is no longer obstruc-

1. *ibid.*, 431, 433, 444.

2. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.

3. *ibid.*, pp. 41, 45; cf., S. B. on B. G., XVIII, 66.

4. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, I, 2.

5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, I, 13.

6. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, I, 17.

7. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, I, 17.

8. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, IV, 51.

ted.¹ Vilaya does not take place like clarification of solid particles of butter by heat, but by the dissolution of superimposition of world on Brahma and consequent identification. If actual dissolution took place then the first case of release would have destroyed the world for all time, so that the world would be empty and all substances annihilated.²

The jñāni shakes off all deeds because there remains nothing to be reached through karma.³ Śaṅkara agrees with the Sūtrakāra that the past karma becomes inoperative because its fruit-producing power is counteracted by other causes i. e., jñāna, and the non-clinging of future works occurs because of non-entering into the state of agency.⁴ But the prārabdha karma remains only through effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the body, as a discharged arrow or the moving potter's wheel stops at the end due to gradual cessation of impetus.⁵ There are two ways of getting rid of karma already performed: the prārabdha karmas are counteracted by enjoyment and suffering of effects and the sañcita by penance; the third way is jñāna which terminates all actions with their fruits.⁶ We are free in regard to action not yet performed; we may or may not do it, but with regard to an act which is already performed we have to suffer all consequences whether we like it or not. There is dependence on object and perception of pleasure and pain even by the jñāni due to prārabdha, but he is not affected by it.⁷

The objection is raised that if knowledge of Ātman could destroy all objects it could cause destruction of prārabdha also. Advaita replies that jñāna only establishes impermanence and unreality and does not cause destruction.⁸ Jñāna does not remove prārabdha being itself a product of that karma. From this there does not result the contradiction of coexistence of experience of oneness and perception of duality, since Advaita declares them to be not simultaneous but sequential in origin and

1. S. B. on B. S., III, 2, 21: ब्रह्म स्वभावो हि प्रकृतो न प्रपञ्चो जन्ममृत्योः प्रसङ्गः क्वचित् कृतं क्वचित् कृतं समानं च, प्रत्यर्थात्कृतः प्रपञ्चो प्रविलापविद्यः। अत्र नामरूपप्रविलापिनः ब्रह्मणो जन्ममृत्योर्भावो नास्ति।

2. *ibid.*

3. S. B. on B. S., III, 3, 27.

4. *ibid.*, IV, 1, 13-14.

5. *ibid.*, III, 3, 32.

6. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, I, 81.

7. Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 446, 454.

8. Pañcadaśi, VII, 179.

suppression.¹ Therefore, jñāna and prarabdha are not antagonistic. If this be not admitted Yajñavalkya will cease to be a teacher, because when he sees the external world his knowledge of non-duality is virtually at an end, and when he sees it not no words can flow.²

On doctrinal grounds Advaita arrives at the position of the actionlessness or non-agentship of the knower. Both action and inaction are mutually involved as pravṛtti and nivṛtti presuppose agency, which is a state of Avidyā pertaining to deha. The wise see that neither action nor inaction belong to self.³ From knowledge results desirelessness; the sage does not desire self for the sake of other things projected from it, but desires only the world of self, which means attainment of all ends.⁴ All inauspicious desires or the causes of misery being entirely unrooted, man needs not even the power of the gods, who are objects of pity.⁵ How can he desire another who knows himself without a second and for whose sake would he desire.⁶ Since all ends and means cease there is eternal contentment.⁷ His consciousness is awake yet devoid of all characteristics of waking, since free from all traces of desire.⁸

All codes of conduct are transcended by knowledge of identity though the knower does not let others know what he has become.⁹ Neither should obligatory duties continue till the end of life as knowledge does not depend on it to produce liberation.¹⁰ The argument that since there may be sometimes perception of duality hence there may be perception of rites (jyotiṣṭoma), is not admitted, since the anuṣṭhāna depends upon cognition of specific time, place, eligibility and agency which is absent from Brahma-jñāna.¹¹ Nor can there be a motive for action, for one does not try to attain anything in which one has lost interest; so why will a man seeking liberation, who has lost interest in the three worlds, make any effort at all, and much more free is the

1. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, IX, XXXII, a.

2. Pañcadaśī, VII, 184.

3. S. B. on B. G., IV, 18.

4. S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 4, 15.

5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XIV, 28-32.

6. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 11.

7. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVII, 49.

8. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 430.

9. Mandūkya Karikā, II, 36. अउतवलाकम् श्वाचरेत्; cf., S. B. on B. G., XIII, 2.

10. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 8 and 11.

11. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, IX, XXXII, b.

liberated.¹ "No one likes to eat poison even if pressed by hunger. So no one who is not a fool will knowingly eat it when his hunger has been appeased by sweet-meats."²

The jnani is not an agent,³ because the internal condition of action i. e., desire is absent. Also, because agency leads to assumption of instruments, which depend on others, but self being not conjoined to anything is no agent.⁴ Nor can he act because he finds no difference in self in any state of body or mind.⁵ If it be objected that mind's relation with doership cannot be ended as fluidity or heat cannot be removed from water or fire, the reply is that it is possible to neutralise the nature of a thing, as poison can be neutralised by an antidote.⁶ Thus it is indeed an ornament that after Brahma-jñāna there is destruction of all obligations⁷ and accomplishment of everything to be accomplished.⁸

Paradoxically, Advaita postulates the activity of the jñānī who has become a non-agent, in the above sense. A distinction may be made between the state of jīvana mukta in samādhi, where object-subject, desires, saṃskaras, sensations have ceased, and the state of vyūthāna in which prārabdha causes sensations due to operation of guṇas, but these are not attended by desires of overpowering strength.⁹ Śaṅkara declares that such a jñānī quietly devoted to his duty passes through life unknown.¹⁰ The knower of Brahma, treading that path, is a doer of good deeds, a yogī, sense-controlled.¹¹ Even the psychological operations remain intact, for he acts under feelings of love (eating), hate (turning away from the Nāstikas) and fear (escaping from the snake), but he remains unaffected as akāśa is by smoke, dust or cloud filling it.¹² He is full of the sixty-four arts, though not exhibiting them.¹³

Even after the elements of body and mind have been ascertained to be unreal

1. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVIII, 231.
2. *ibid.*, XVIII, 232; Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, IV, 66.
3. *cf.*, S. B. on B. S., IV, 1, 2.
4. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 105; *cf.*, Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 432, 437, 439.
5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XIV, 30.
6. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 13.
7. S. B. on drift of Īśa Upa.
8. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.
9. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 26ff.
10. S. B. on B. S., III, 4, 50.
11. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 11.
12. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 21.
13. *ibid.*, I, 24.

they are capable of being used, the jivana mukta by his viveka-caksu disregards duality and confirms Advaita-jñāna.¹ Advaita admits that the principle of individuality can be well seen and no one asks us to do otherwise e. g., Bharata and others did not live without eating like wood or stone, but by giving up the idea of agency were freed from suffering.² After the ending of vāsanā it should not be thought that intercourse with the world, the prime cause of keeping body and soul together, will be put out. The wise do enjoy such intercourse through the senses, mind and intellect but, through jñāna, retain supreme contentment, feeling no dejection in calamity, unruffled, peaceful, ever remaining within limits like the sea, never swerving from the path of prārabdha.³ The world is illusory, self is intelligence—in this knowledge there is no antagonism to popular practices; the jñānī may use the world and ordinary means of knowledge since he cannot do away with the mind, body and external objects, so he is able to carry on the popular duties and practices without detrimental effect.⁴ Works or no works, meditation or no meditation, sacred formula or not, cannot produce benefit or injury, since the jñānī is free from desire. As Janaka coming out of samādhi bethought of life and the ways of men, considered what was worth taking up, what needed effort, desiring nothing not his own, without attachment to results, attended to his duty.⁵ Janaka could maintain his sovereignty and duties since his knowledge was so firm, and if anyone else is as firm in his knowledge there is no restriction for study or occupation.⁶

The mukta does not give up strenuous life necessarily.⁷ The motive from which the jñānī works is sacrifice and service. All the activities of the jñāna-yogī or the jivana mukta, and not only religious duties, constitute his tapas; his whole life is a sacrifice attended by the giving of various gifts, all the time.⁸ He works for the welfare of all being; though having nothing to attain for himself he must work

1. Pañcadaśī, II, 93ff.

2. *ibid.*, VI, 249 and 273.

3. Jivana-Mukti-Viveka, II, 94.

4. Pañcadaśī, X, 88, 103 and 114; cf., Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 542-545.

5. Jivana-Mukti-Viveka, II, 96.

6. Pañcadaśī, VIII, 130; cf., Jivana-Mukti-Viveka, IV, 4-5.

7. e. g., Śaṅkara's comments on B. S., IV, 1, 15, are traditionally regarded as referring to his own direct experience of ultimate reality.

8. Jivana-Mukti-Viveka, IV, 157.

diligently to make others act similarly.¹ He is neither attached to karma nor phala but continues to work to set an example; this "semblance of active life" does not constitute karma.² Even were he to practice the vidhi-nisedha it would not harm him. The object of such practice by the jñāni among the ignorant men is that that which helps the cognition of self in the ignorant the jñāni should do; he has nothing else proper for him.³ The highest tapas of the jīvana mukta is good for the world of pupils, devotees and neutrals. The first, full of faith and truthfulness, grasp what is taught by the teacher quickly and attain peace; the second share in the tapas by helping the jñāna-yogī in food, habitat etc.; believing neutrals imitate him and unbelieving get rid of sins by the sight of the yogī.⁴ The self-controlled, compassionate guru versed in scriptures, unattached to the world, renouncing means to actions, established in Brahma, has only one aim to help others and desires to impart knowledge only.⁵ Though not interested in the worldly concerns of his pupils and concentrated on Ātman, teaching about Brahma is not a dissimilar use of words, he utters words expressive of his own experience, enlightening pupils to lead them to desirelessness. The giving of blessings for innumerable worldly goods leads to distraction, counter to jñāna, but "Nārāyaṇa" is a fit greeting as it cures inclination to attachment and possible disappointment to the salutes.⁶ Thus the great and peaceful ones live regenerating the world like the coming of the spring; having themselves crossed the ocean of embodied existence they help others who try for the same, without personal motive. This natural tendency to remove other's suffering is a spontaneous desire. The guru ever plunged in the ānand-sāgara roams about purifying.⁷ Even the gods feel puzzled while trying to follow the foot-steps of such men who leave no tracks behind, who realizing themselves in all are devoted to the welfare of all.⁸

The mark of the perfected man is his freedom from sin and his purity. Since

1. S. B. on B. G., V, 24-25; III, 24.
2. *ibid.*, III, 20.
3. Pañcadaśī, VII, 289 and 267.
4. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, IV, 153ff.
5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 6.
6. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 28, 34-35.
7. Viveka Chūdāmaṇi, 39-40 and 578.
8. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, IV, 95.

he has refrained from desire, repentance for evil acts does not overtake him, nor does the happiness from good acts leading to another body come to him. The Brahma-state neither increases nor decreases by karma, because man is self-controlled, patient, calm and collected.¹ It does not result from absence of obligation to do or to avoid in moksa (since vidhi-niṣedha relate to differences of bodies and adjuncts and are absent from Ātman) that he who has arrived at perfect knowledge can act as he likes, for it is wrong imagination which impels to action and that is absent in him.² And mere affections of mind leading to pāpa and punya are absent. "Where is the use of saying too much on the nature of good and evil; evil lies in the eye that distinguishes between good and evil. The Good is beyond the one as well as the other."³ Prārabdha karma brings inclination for present karma in jñānī but it does not mean that he has any inclination for bad or sinful acts. He works but does not sin.⁴ The knower of Brahma, established in It, is never a transgressor of rules of conduct.⁵ It is argued⁶ that if the Ātma-jñānī were to allow himself unbridled license in his acts what would be the distinction between the dog and the sage. From unrighteousness arises ignorance and licentious acts, but from righteousness arises jñāna, so how could there be license in any form in the state of jñāna when one even rises above righteousness. Only a person without egoism, vanity or hatred towards beings and having other virtues can have true jñāna, though these virtues are no longer means but follow from his nature as a sage. There is no Ātma-jñāna for one who has got vicious tendencies.

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins also envisage the perfected state as freedom from mundane existence. According to Rāmaṇuja, the freed soul desires only the Supreme Lord

1. S. B. on Bṛ. Upan., IV, 4, 22-23.

2. S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 48.

3. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 34, quotes from Bhāgavat-Purāna; cf., Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, IX, XXXII, c: If it be said that Brahmajñānī is not regulated by Śāstra, he can act as he wills, this is denied, for action is caused by desire for attainment or avoidance of good or bad. But for the jīvana mukta who experiences parama-ānand in his own self, for whom all evil is removed by residue, no desire for human goal to be accomplished remains, hence no action at all; whence the contingency of action as he wills? As for begging, that is due to prārabdha dosa, but pāpa-punya are not caused by prārabdha, but by avidyā which is ended by Brahmajñāna.

4. Pañcadaśī, VIII, 131-132, foot-note: Nṛsiṅgh Sarasvatī admits that in Śruti and Smṛti immunity of jñānī from all restraint is admitted, but adds that it was not intended that he should act this way. It is merely arthavāda.

5. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 6.

6. Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi, IV, 62-63, 68-70; cf., Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 28 and 30.

who saves the devotee from karma and saṁsāra. He enters no other form of activity and the idea of return to saṁsara is excluded.¹ Similarly, Nimbārka declares the non-return of the soul which has attained the highest light and has become freed from transmigratory existence.² Madhva also asserts categorically:

The mukta . . . is never born again in the sense that there is no compulsory incarnations and disincarnations for him. Why? This Lord came from nowhere, was never born . . . therefore the knower . . . also never takes birth nor dies. Secondly in its essential nature the Jīva is unborn and incapable of dying.³

According to Vādirāja, the reason for this is that when the mind is inwardly directed as in mokṣa there is no possibility of paying attention to the external objects of the world. When the attention is concentrated on one particular subject, it is not possible to think of another. All of us, in life, are dvitas in the sense of having two gate-ways of knowledge, the material and the spiritual, but there is no physical body in release, so there is no possibility of having knowledge of external reality and reacting to the stimuli by the released soul. All the theists reject the Advaita view of falsity of the world. Vallabha is careful to point out that the disappearance of saṁsāra, product of ajñāna or selfish imagination, in mokṣa does not affect the physical cosmos, because various layas or dissolutions are to be experienced in the mind only, and in reality there is no prapañca-vilaya.⁴ The selfish and imaginary view of ignorance ends, but not the world.

The theists also agree with Advaita that karma is neutralised by jñāna.⁵ The vidvat is no longer affected by the past or future evil karma and even the good deeds, according to Nimbārka; he awaits only the end of the body to be released. Rāmānuja does not hold the cessation of good deeds to be immediate on the arising of jñāna, but only at the death of the vidvat. Madhva explains that the evil deeds of the devotees and the good deeds of the enemies of the Supreme Lord perish. Vallabha declares that when the knower emerges from the state of oneness then there is cessation of evil deeds, but not of good deeds. All are unanimous, however, that the non-operation of

1. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 22.

2. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, IV, 4, 22.

3. Bhāṣya on Katha Upa., II, 18.

4. Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha, I, 24 and 99.

5. B. S., IV, 1, 13-14.

karma on the arising of jnana is only of the sancita and not of prārabdha karma, which ends only by retributive experience in one or more lives.¹ Ramanuja strongly objects to the Advaita view of prārabdha as the impetus of the wheel continuing after jnana; for him its continuation depends entirely on the will of God, who is guided by good and evil deeds. Generally the theists agree with him. Vedānta postulates the ending of even good karma as well as evil, as they have the undesirable result, for the mumukṣu, of producing rebirth. Were good deeds to follow after enjoyment of their fruit rebirth would occur, and there would be the contradiction of the Śruti, "non-return."²

The theists reject the Advaita doctrine of the non-agency of the enlightened soul. Instead, they argue that the soul's perfected activity and experience continue under the control of the Lord. Rāmānuja declares³ that the śreṣṭha men set the example of varnāśrama-dharma to others even as God takes birth in the world like karma-bound creatures, for the profit of the world. They dictate the principles of righteousness and unrighteousness for men attached to karma and saṁskāras and do not preach other methods (jñāna) more arduous and dangerous. The jñāni will abide within the scope of karma-yoga though knowing that Ātman is not essentially an actor, to persuade the men of lesser knowledge that by this path unaided the vision of the self is possible. According to Madhva, even after aparokṣa jñāna the knower who has become jīvana mukta continues to work until the prārabdha has been completed.⁴ Both the sādḥaka and siddha work, the former for purification and the latter for loka-saṁgraha. Social duties of varnāśrama-dharma are aided by religious duties of worship. Though there is no prescribed duty in mokṣa, according to the theists, work and worship become ends.⁵

The true jñānin . . . is kriyāvān, performing all duties and works of his prārabdha, . . . the jñānin therefore, realizing that all his activities are primarily of the Lord . . . does not become an ativādi, . . . does not say, "I am the agent." . . . When such a jñānin is not in the state of asaṁprajñāta samādhi he is always active, . . . always performing puja of the Lord Not only this, he explains to others the sacred books . . . , he becomes a teacher among seekers of Brahma.⁶

1. B. S., IV, 1, 15 and 19.

2. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 3, 29.

3. R. B. on B. G., VI, 20-29.

4. Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 4, 33; IV, 1, 16: न ह्यवगतोऽपि शक्यते।

5. e. g., Madhva, Gītā-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, 663: साधनानन्तस्त्वप्येव सात्त्विकानां साधनानां . . . Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., IV, 4, 21: ह्येव धारणा-चात्रं सदैव सुख-प्रदं न तुल्यं नान्यथा . . . Also Rāmānuja's ideal of Ātma-dāśya and kainkaryā; Vallabha's ideal of sevā.

6. Madhva Bhāṣya on Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 4.

Vallabha agrees that with the perfection of love in the puṣṭi-marga there results among other ends sevā-upayogī deha. The prakṛta deha, even here on earth, is transformed into the body of God or Ānand, in order to perform sevā or participation in divine life as lived in heaven. Nimbārka also declares that it is not to be apprehended that through knowledge there will result cessation of duties encumbent on one's stage of life, such as sacrifice, charity, austerity etc. They are to be performed to foster jñāna.¹ The Vedānta idea of adhikārī souls who,² though liberated, continue to serve divine will and cosmic sacrifice by remaining in the illusory body of matter in relation to other souls, is the representation of the true action of the perfected soul. Jñānīs like Vaśiṣṭha etc. abide in the body as long as their duty or office lasts owing to the influence of karma on which their office depends. All Ācāryas agree that such enlightened souls continue to function on earth until their mission or adhikāra is fulfilled.

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins are fully agreed with the Advaitins that the highest stage is one untouched by evil of any kind and morally perfect, for the self has acquired its own attributes of perfect purity, knowledge and bliss.³ Evil and sin arise from the hidden seed of avyakta or matter. It is not in the nature of reality but in the changing individuality of the striving jīva, lasting only so long as the imperfect human condition lasts. Since evil is, technically, caused and effected by karma, the highest state must be one in which pāpa-punya are necessarily discarded, since no more material fruits remain to be attained; only one fruit, vidyā or attainment of Brahmabhāva remains.⁴ The mukta soul is perfectly disciplined by spiritual and social rules; for it is not moved to actions by likes and dislikes.⁵ Śruti commands the reverse of acting as one likes, is the conclusion of all the Ācāryas. The pleasures of the mukta are not petty and evanescent, mixed with contemptuous matters.⁶ Only when the desires of the inner organ (āntahkaraṇa) are renounced and there takes place

1. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, IV, 1, 16-17.

2. B. S., III, 3, 31-32.

3. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 3-7.

4. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 3, 27.

5. B. S., III, 4, 31.

6. Vedānta Deep, IV, 4, 18.

the manifestation of desires belonging to the body of intelligence (sadatma), is the soul released.¹ It cannot entertain low desires, but only desires for the changeless reality.²

Mukti

Different experiences of the freed souls are indicated in the Upaniṣads. Instantaneous release by sāksātkāra (direct experience) with the ultimate is the experience of certain sages. The desireless one whose desire is the soul, his breath departs not, he goes to Brahma being very Brahma.³ When are cut all the knots of the heart, here on earth, the mortal becomes immortal.⁴ Such texts point to the attainment of freedom while man retains the body. On the other hand are texts which point to the attainment of release only after life on earth is completed. The ascetics purified by application of renunciation (sannyāsa-yoga), in the Brahmaloḥa, at the end of time, are liberated beyond earth.⁵ Here on earth one who has a teacher knows: "I shall remain here only so long as I shall be released (from the bonds of ignorance). Then I shall arrive home."⁶

The nature of unity with the divine is expressed in different ways. Sometimes it is described as reaching the region of the divine (sālokya).⁷ He who knows thus goes to the world of the divinities, to equality, to complete union. Here the goal is sāyujya mukti or complete union. What is the rule (vidhi) for this elemental soul, whereby, on quitting this body, it may come to complete union with the Ātman?⁸ Or the attainment of divine nature or likeness is the end striven for.⁹ Verily, the great unborn, undecaying, undying, immortal soul is fearless Brahma. He who knows this becomes fearless.¹⁰ All the parts of individual soul become unified in the Supreme Imperishable, or when the seer sees Brahma then shaking off good and evil, stainless,

1. Madhva Bhāṣya on Kaṭha Upa., IV, 14.

2. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., IV, 4, 18-19: न कश्चिन्मं विमुक्तयति प्राप्नुयान् । कश्चिन्मं ।

3. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 6.

4. Kaṭha Upa., VI, 15.

5. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 6.

6. Chān. Upa., VI, 14, 2.

7. ibid., II, 20, 2.

8. Maitrī Upa., IV, 1; VI, 22.

9. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 25.

10. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 9.

he attains supreme identity.¹ This is the conception of unity of nature or sārūpya.

In its Phala-adhyāya the Brahma-Sūtra describes the manner and time of departure from the body of the meditator or vidvān.² The conception of "gati" and "gantavya" is the path of light by which he passes through various stations³ and reaches the Brahma-loka and the glorious existence of the released soul. The fate of the vidvān after death, the attainment of his own nature is release, and in this state enjoying the state of Brahma the soul is yet different from the Lord.⁴ The Gītā speaks of mokṣa as the entering of God's being;⁵ the knower lives in eternal identity with Brahma, attains the peace of Brahma, reaches the supreme state, the Supreme Being or abides in God.⁶ None of these terms indicate whether release is a state to be attained on earth or only after death. The idea of attainment, reaching and the description of the bright path of non-return⁷ indicate the latter conception. But the declaration that the seeing of diversity is rooted in and projected from the Supreme Being and leads to the attainment of Brahma instantaneously,⁸ points to the former position. The nature of the union is also not clearly indicated. The souls acquiring wisdom having attained the likeness of God are not tormented.⁹ And the Lord promises release after men have reached His supreme region of residence.¹⁰

The later Vedāntins engaged in a controversy on the question of the embodiedness or disembodiedness of the state of release. The Brahma-Sūtra¹¹ discusses the question of the freed soul possessing body and sense organs at will. Sage Badari is of the opinion that the released soul is devoid of these, while sage Jaimini urges that the soul must have many forms in order to express its manifoldness and indestructibility, though these are not karmic bodies subject to pleasure and pain. The

1. *ibid.*, III, 2, 7: सर्वे लोकान् भवन्ति. Also III, 1, 3: परमम् आत्मन् सुखम्

2. B. S., IV, 2.

3. B. S., IV, 3 and 4.

4. B. S., IV, 4, 1, 17 and 20.

5. B. G., IV, 10; VIII, 5; XIV, 9: मद्गतम्

6. V, 20: ब्रह्मणि स्थितः. V, 24-26: ब्रह्मनिर्वाणं ब्रह्मरूपता. VI, 45; VIII, 13 and 15; XIII, 28: परं जितम्. VIII, 10: परमम् पुण्यम् उपैति. XII, 8: निवर्तितव्यं तं भवेत्

7. VIII, 26.

8. XIII, 30.

9. XIV, 2: साधुर्मर्त्या आगतान्।

10. XV, 6: तद्वदाम् परमम्।

11. B. S., IV, 4, 17-22.

Sutrakara concludes that the freed soul is embodied according to its own free will to enjoy the pleasures of the perfected state. Both theists and absolutists are agreed that the mukta has the pleasure of Brahma with or without a body. Ramanuja and Vallabha hold that a body to the soul is provided by the will of God,¹ but this is a non-prakṛta body of intelligence or cit only (Vallabha). The released souls have no body or sense organs, they are bodies in a very special sense (alaukika śarīra), according to Madhva. The theists conceive the mukta to be residing in a spiritual body in the world of Brahma.

Śaṅkara does not make the bodiless or embodied state of the soul to depend upon the Lord but only on free will.² Nor does he insist absolutely on the nature of that body as non-material. Possession of a prakṛta deha does not take away from the perfection of the released soul, which remains a siddhātmā, no longer a sādḥaka. Disembodiedness does not follow from death alone, since the cause of the going on of the body and self is wrong knowledge, hence eternal disembodiedness is realized by knowledge. Since imagination of merit and demerit due to actions of self is known to be false, the knower is free from the body.³ The fruit of jñāna is liberation from asat Prakṛti due to detachment from it.⁴ The mukta is no longer subject to evolution, his mind is not on his body, which is strung on prārabdha, whether it appears or disappears. Having the self of bliss why should he nourish the body?⁵ Śruti speaks of the prārabdha of the unreal (body) from an external point of view (bāhya dṛṣṭi), but not to teach its reality to the wise.⁶ Since he remains a spectator of its enjoyment his body does not constitute bondage.⁷ Just as a body going from place to place for alms seen in a dream is not oneself, so witnessing the body in the waking state the seer must be different from it as it is seen.⁸ He has changing body for his support when activities of eating etc. occur but never shelters in external objects as his enjoyment is derived only from

1. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 10-13.

2. S. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 12.

3. *ibid.*, I, 1, 4.

4. *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 423.

5. *ibid.*, 413-418.

6. *ibid.*, 462-464; cf., *Jivana-Mukti-Viveka*, IV, 148.

7. *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 548.

8. *Upadeśa Sāhasrī*, XIV, 2.

truth of Ātman.¹ The mukta lives in the body identified with all but does not revert to former embodied existence (object, organs) or become subject to punarjanma, as the snake casts off its slough.² The mukta may possess a gross body whose purification is termed virajasa.³ Understanding the body's effects, disinterestedly free from restraint and working from free will or out of the motive of benevolence,⁴ the mukta's absorption is not permanent, for he may return to the body from time to time until his service is completed in the world, though he is never subject to Avidyā but remembers all past lives and enjoys the bliss of Brahma.

The significance of the debate on the relation of body to the released soul is to lead to the conclusion of either "freedom from embodiment" or "freedom in embodiment," technically termed videha mukti and jīvana mukti, respectively. By neither disputing the embodiment nor disembodiment of the released soul Śaṅkara admits the possibility of both conditions of release. He takes the stand that the fruit of jñāna, viz., mokṣa, is not subject to the same rule as the origin of jñāna. Knowledge may originate here or hereafter, in present or next life, only when the obstacles in the form of karma have been removed. But the phala is not subject to any such variation and is immediately manifested on the arising of jñāna.⁵ However, since prārabdha karmas have to be endured there results jīvana mukti.⁶ Advaita regards the only difference between jīvana and videha muktis to be one of absence or presence of the body; both have in common absence of duality, so that while the former moves about in the world the whole of it exists not for him, but only the all-pervading Ātman.⁷ And after leaving the body the jñānī enters videha mukti like the wind coming to a standstill.⁸ The rationale of jīvana mukti is that if jñāna arising in life does not destroy Avidyā how can that destruction occur outside life. Only in life can jñāna arise, because after life instruments of the origin of knowledge (sense organs etc.) are absent. So,

1. S. B. on Maṇḍūkya Kārikā, II, 37-38.

2. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 7.

3. S. B. on B. S., IV, 2, 12.

4. ibid., III, 3, 32: *जीवनमुत्तरसा देहव्यारणम् ताकर्मजापकारार्थम्*

5. ibid., III, 4, 51-52.

6. ibid., II, 4, 15.

7. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, I, 21.

8. ibid., I, 24.

if there be mukti it must be jīvana mukti, otherwise no mukti is possible. How the body survives is explained in terms of anirvacaniyata.¹ Later Advaitins gave a number of explanations:² according to Maṇḍana, the Avidyāleśa in jīvana mukti is due to vikṣepa śakti which causes the persistence of the prārabdha, and the saṁskāras of Avidyā remain like the smell of garlic in a vessel after it has been cleansed; others hold that Mūla Avidyā persists as burnt cloth retaining its configuration; Sarvajñātma denies Avidyāleśa on Brahma-sākṣātkāra and Appaya Dīkṣit concludes that the teaching of jīvana mukti is arthavāda for the injunction to hear etc.

Śaṅkara makes a distinction between krama or saguṇa mukti and sadyo mukti of the jīvana mukta state called nirguṇa mukti, corresponding to his distinction between the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa aspects of reality. The going of the souls on the two paths of light and darkness applies only to the man who has the lesser knowledge, while for the knower of the Highest Brahma departing and going is not possible.³ He neither moves nor departs as Highest Brahman is present everywhere, the self of everything. On the path of the gods the videha mukta or the knower of the Saguṇa or effected Brahma is led gradually to the effected Brahmaloḥa, living somehow absorbed with the highest deity or separately in a subtle body; and when that is withdrawn into the causal Brahma at pralaya, he is re-absorbed.⁴ In krama mukti the going of the soul has for its goal only effected Brahma.⁵ In consequence of not ascertaining the distinction between knowledge of the higher and lower type, the final and instantaneous liberation (sadyo) which is the fruit of the former is wrongly confused with texts about going to the lower Brahma by stages.

The theists reject Śaṅkara's distinction between relative and absolute, krama and sadyo mukti, and hold that only the fate of one type of vidvān or Brahmavit is described by the Sūtrakāra in the last adhyāya. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka take their stand on videha mukti exclusively. Nimbārka argues⁶ that there is no fixed rule that jñāna

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1. Bhāmati, IV, 1, 15.
 2. Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha, IV, 1.1-1.4.
 3. S. B. on B. S., IV, 2, 12-14.
 4. ibid., IV, 3, 7-10.
 5. ibid., IV, 3, 11 and 14.
 6. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 4, 50-57.

must arise in the very life in which the means are performed; it arises only when the obstructive karmas are removed, in this life or the next, similarly there is non-restriction about the fruit of jñāna, viz., mokṣa. If the kriyaman be absent mokṣa arises after freedom from the present body, or if they are present then mokṣa arises after yet another body.¹ It is established that the knower too has to depart from his body for attainment of Brahma; immortality belongs to him who has no connection with the body and the rest.² Rāmānuja's stand is essentially similar: as there is no fixed rule (aniyama) with regard to the phala of meditation aiming at abhyudaya (i. e., phala may be manifested in this world or the next), so there is no fixed rule about the time of origin of phala of upāsana aiming at mokṣa i. e., mokṣa does not result immediately (sadyo) on the arising of jñāna. The time interval between them is determined by the prārabdha karma. Of those who have a cosmic office to perform the liberation or departure on the devayāna is delayed as long as the adhikāra is not exhausted.³ According to Rāmānuja the Advaita siddhānta of jīvana mukti stands refuted, because nescience is not terminated by mere comprehension of meaning (jñāna) of texts. If consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness how can jīvana mukti mean release while the soul is still joined to the body. Hence Advaita mukti must be non-different; videha mukti and release consisting in cessation of plurality cannot come while man still lives. "Śaṅkara's krama mukti and Rāmānuja's mukti represent the cosmic destiny of the soul and Śaṅkara indicates mukti when that cosmic destiny is fulfilled."⁴

Among the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins Vallabha and Madhva have accepted the conception of jīvana mukti, but they do not give it the same significance as the Advaita. Madhva postulates aparokṣa jñāna of Ātman as a proximate result of sādhanā.⁵ This corresponds to the Advaita jīvana mukti as far as removing the nescience in regard to Ātman is concerned. But, unlike Advaita which holds it to be the highest and ultimate state of freedom, Madhva regards it as relative or incomplete release, since the līnga śarīra of sixteen kalas of Prakṛti remains to be disintegrated by working out the prārabdha. If

1. *ibid.*, I, 2, 4.

2. *ibid.*, IV, 2, 13 and 8.

3. R. B. on B. S., III, 3, 32-33; Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 3, 32-33.

4. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, p. 221.

5. Bhāṣya on B. S., III, 2, 27.

prārabdha karma is worked out there is no delay, otherwise many lives have to be passed; by grace of God there is freezing (upamarda) of some undesirable good karmas and all demerits, thus there occurs Brahmāparokṣa.¹ Unlike Śaṅkara who allows highest release to co-exist with prārabdha and deha-dhāraṇa, Madhva insists that highest release only arises after either the exhaustion or cancellation of all karma. Absolute liberation is not compatible with embodied life.

Vallabha argues that when jñāna destroys Avidyā souls become free even in the body; the body, senses and vital energy become free from delusion but do not disappear.² Even by jñāna one attains only sātत्वika mukti, but the worship of Kṛṣṇa, the primal form of God, is called nirguṇa bhakti and leads to jīvana mukti.³ By the perfection of devotional love in puṣṭi-mārga the prakṛta body of soul is transformed into the body of Brahma or Ānand, while still on earth, and is used for the worship of God. Two points of contrast may be noted between the Advaitic and Vallabhite conceptions of jīvana mukti. In the former the adhyāsa of the body (all three bodies) is altogether transcended and only non-dual Ātman is seen, while in the latter the mukta replaces the gross material body by a pure spiritual body of bliss. Secondly, the jīvana mukti of Vallabha is the perfection of the worship of the Supreme Personal Being; though he calls it nirguṇa bhakti, yet it corresponds to Advaita saguṇa bhakti which results in the relative and gradual type of mukti.

In this discussion on jīvana and videha muktis the supporters of the latter adopt a wholly eschatological point of view of the supermundane or spiritual goal of human life, while the supporters of the former, agreeing that the goal is transcendental and spiritual, allow its attainment by man while he still retains the human frame, though not the mundane point of view.

As to the nature of unity with the divine, there are different conceptions and emphases among the Vedāntācāryas. All except Madhva understand that state to be one of non-difference between Ātman and Brahman in some sense or another, each according to his particular doctrine. Śaṅkara holds that the souls are only imagined parts, as it

1. *ibid.*, III, 4, 4-5.

2. *Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha*, I, 32 and 34.

3. *ibid.*, I, 14.

were, of the Supreme Brahma. In reality there is absolute identity between the two, as there is non-difference between fire and sparks.¹ As one self cannot become another without being destroyed, if the individual self were really different it could not be Brahma as long as it existed, and if it were destroyed who would be Brahman, therefore one should have knowledge of non-difference between Brahman and oneself.² It is self-contradictory that two personalities, Ātmā and Paramātma, can merge into a single personality, so "avibhāga"³ means complete identity. By abstracting the notion of jīva from the entity "I" we establish the meaning of Ātman. Tat has the meaning of the interior self and tvam has the meaning of tat. Both words drop part of their meaning—tvam that of empirical ego and tat that of not-self.⁴ The state of mokṣa is none other than one's own inherent nature as Brahman. Brahma being of one nature liberation is of one sort only and sālokya and other kinds of specific liberations are acquired results admitting of degrees, but not mukti.⁵

While Advaita understands the meaning of "sampatti"⁶ in the primary sense of identity with the Nirguṇa, the theists understand this as joining together or union, in a partial sense, of the soul with the Supreme Soul. Rāmānuja holds the relation of soul and Brahma to be that of real parts to the whole and terms it apr̥thak-siddhi relation.⁷ Because Brahma pervades all souls there is representation of identity, and the soul is to be acknowledged as a portion of Brahma. The difference between soul and Brahma is known only from the Vedas. All equality or parama sāmya with Brahma—equality of region⁸ or equality of nature and communication and realization of apr̥thak-siddhi or sāyujya⁹ is mokṣa. The released soul attains the nature of God, though not swarūpaikya.¹⁰ Tvam means that operators of body are in reality modifications of

1. S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 43.

2. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XV, 1.

3. B. S., IV, 4, 21.

4. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 18, 177-183 and 197. Later Vedāntins explain this in detail by the help of jahadajahallakṣaṇā (exclusive-non-exclusive implication). cf., Vedānta Paribhāṣā, IV, 26-28.

5. S. B. on B. S., III, 4, 52.

6. B. S., IV, 2, 14-15.

7. R. B. on B. S., II, 3, 43.

8. R. B. on B. G., VIII, 21.

9. Vedānta Deśika, Nyāya Siddhāntjana, 221 and 222-224.

10. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1: ब्रह्मणो भावः न तु स्वस्वैक्यस्य।

Supreme Spirit, because constituting His body. The word tat refers to Brahma as the one cause of the world. Tat tvam refers to the same Brahma under aspect of inner ruler of the individual soul modified by the embodied soul.¹ Tat tvam asi means that Brahma is distinguished by difference, one thing subsisting in two forms.²

Nimbārka declares that souls are neither different nor non-different as parts of the highest self.³ This relation holds due to the specific peculiarity of Brahman's nature, hence described as swābhāvikabheda-vāda. The part is different as subject to bandha and mokṣa, non-different as existence and activity are controlled by the whole.⁴ When the individual soul through direct vision of Brahman becomes similar to the infinite that is freedom.⁵ He denies absorption or laya of the soul in Brahman and swarūpaikya, and considers Brahmabhāva or sāyujya to be growth in likeness to God and bliss, but separation due to atomic nature and non-creatorship of the soul.⁶ One element in mokṣa is Ātma-swarūpalābha, possible when there is realization of essential nature or participation in the nature and qualities of God; the second element is Brahma-swarūpalābha or Bhagavatbhāvāpatti.⁷

Vallabha declares that by the manifestation of ānand of Brahma in himself jīva attains Brahmabhāva but even higher than this is fellowship with God, attained by worship of Hari, in puṣṭi-mārga.⁸ The words tat tvam asi which are given so much importance are not able to produce vidyā by mere logical understanding (as in Advaita). They are meant to establish the reality of souls and matter with the ultimate purpose of describing the fact of Brahman being all.⁹ The phala of perfected bhakti is alaukika sāmānyā or great power of experiencing the nature of God and sāyujya or continual contact with God in order to perform sevā.¹⁰ He takes tat tvam asi to be literally and not figuratively true, for when soul attains bliss the difference between

1. Vedārtha Saṅgraha, II, 20; III, 65.
2. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 130ff.
3. Vedānta Kaustubha, IV, 4, 4.
4. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, II, 3, 42.
5. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 2, 36.
6. ibid., IV, 4, 21.
7. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, IV, 4, 1-2.
8. Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha, I, 36.
9. ibid., I, 61-62.
10. Sevāphala Vivṛti.

it and Brahman will lapse.

Of all the Vaisnavacāryas Madhva alone denies the unity of Atman and Brahman in mokṣa. The difference is real;¹ it is wrong to think that jīva and Brahman are non-different in release and different in samsāra, since two things cannot at any time become non-different or vice versa. "Never let him imagine that even the released soul can ever become equal to Hari—let one know that even among the released souls from men to Brahma there is difference between them, and that Viṣṇu is the highest of all beings."² Since without His grace there is no release, nor does desire for it or effort to attain it arise in the hearts of men without the command of the Lord, the jīva should never think that he can ever become Brahma.³ Jīva is like God, but different.⁴ "Even the Ātman of the liberated sage becomes like unto Him, but not identically the same."⁵ Nor can the mukta become as perfect as God (parama sāmya), since mokṣa depends upon capacity and effort of each soul (yogyatā, sādhanā). Thus, "If the difference between jīva and Brahma be admitted as established by valid means of proof, it could never be disproved by identity texts."⁶ The identity texts admit of another reasonable interpretation than that of Advaita, in terms of metaphysical independence and primacy of the supreme and identity of place, interest, similarity of attributes.⁷ Mokṣa is conceived by him as the perfected soul living in the eternal presence of God (sālokya) or having fellowship with God (sāmipyā) or having qualities similar to God (sārūpyā), though always much inferior, or enjoying the power of God (sāyujya or sārṣṭi).⁸ These are the various meanings where ever jīva is said to be a portion of the Lord.

Sarva-Mukti

The Vedānta conception of mokṣa carries in it a hint of the universalisation of

1. Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 2, 12; Nyāyasūdhā, 435: जीवात्मनः परमात्मनः प्रात्मनिकत्वेनैव असम्यक्तेः ।
2. Madhva Bhāṣya on Īśa Upa., 14, quotes from Kūrma Purāna.
3. Madhva Bhāṣya on Kena Upa., II, 5.
4. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., IV, 2, 16: मुक्तो नो मत्वा कामत्वं स्वामश्नी च परमात्मा तु । स्वामश्नी च कामत्वं नान्वत्तेषां ।
5. Madhva Bhāṣya on Katha Upa., IV, 15.
6. Viṣṇu-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, 20.
7. Madhva Bhāṣya on Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 7: Ekī bhavanti has three meanings, unanimity of opinion, similarity, being in the same locality and it does not mean identity.
8. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 3, 29.

the highest state. Since release is the manifestation of the self's own nature, not an adventitious thing, it cannot be denied or withheld from anyone. Among the theists Madhva seems to deny this, since he gives a classification of souls in which some are expressly excluded from the attainment of moksa. Moksa depends on the grace of the Supreme Being. The bhakti of the few sātvic Ātmās only, who are classed as mukti yogya, leads to their ultimate release. The nitya samsārins oscillate between heaven and earth. The third class described as tamoyogya are eternally debarred since their essential nature (svarūpa) cannot be changed by education or effort (sādhanā). Some are worthy and others are unworthy of liberation.¹ Vallabha describes the prāvāhika jīvas as drifting in the Māyā world of self will and false imagination and not qualified for higher bhakti. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka distinguish between baddha and mukta jīvas; but they do not disqualify any soul from mukti expressly. The Vedāntins alone hint² at the logical possibility of sarva-mukti or natural right of all, on the ground of the doctrine of moksa as a non-dual eternal unity. Śāṅkara agrees with the theists in rejecting the extreme doctrine of ekajīvavāda.³ Transcendental unity but empirical plurality is the position adopted by him, because, in ekajīvavāda, sadyo mukti means dissolution of the unitary Ajñāna and thus the unacceptable conclusion of termination of bondage of all at the release of the one soul. Nānājīvavada has its own dilemma since it points to the unacceptable conclusion of many jīvana muktis, to avoid which the later Advaitins posit the equation of jīvana mukti with Īśvaratva or union with the Saguna.⁴ Such a saved soul must engage in spiritualisation of the world which is the creation of the Highest Lord, because as long as there is a single soul in bondage Māyā is not completely or eternally annihilated. Only when the bahu-jīvas have all transcended Avidyā and been merged in pure consciousness is there absolute release of any from the bondage of Māyā. Sarva-mukti need not be confused with an earthly paradise, but the logical possibility of spiritual life of all is indicated by the unity of the

1. Nyāya Vivarāṇa, 16a: अद्वैततत्त्वात् सर्वेषु जीवेषु मोक्षोऽप्येव स्यात् । तत्र तत्र भक्तिरिति चेत् तत्र तत्र मोक्षोऽप्येव स्यात् ।
2. Bhāmati, II, 3, 14.
3. S. B. on B. S., III, 2, 21.
4. cf., Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha, IV, 4, 4-223: There, on the view that the Lord is the proto type (hīmba) there is no flaw in the released having the status of the Supreme Lord till the release of all.

indwelling God."¹

Freedom From "Ahaṁta" and "Mamā" — The Universal Outlook

Vedānta looks forward to the goal of perfect absence of egoism and attainment of the universal outlook. The ideal of "indifference" or recognition of the worthlessness of worldly objects and ties is only the negative description of the condition, the positive aspect of which is the assertion of the larger self including all—"vasudhaiva kutumbakam."² Self is the highest object of love, as the greatest value,³ but self-love is prevented from degenerating into selfishness by expanding its sphere. The self loved is the Infinite Self, not the empirical ego.

The question of attaining non-egoism is to be distinguished from the question of survival or non-survival of the individual self in release. Vedāntins are divided on the latter question. The very classification of Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas rests on the doctrines of the non-survival or survival of personality, respectively. The Upaniṣadic sages give support to both the personalistic and impersonalistic types of release. When there is emphasis on oneness mokṣa is said to be without desire or even consciousness.⁴ He who worships another thinking He is one and I am another, he knows not.⁵ Mokṣa is one Supreme Self of the universe and no other self separate from it. It is complete penetration of the Brahma or the mark⁶ by the arrow or Ātman. There is absolute forgetfulness of the finite in the infinite and a condition of non-duality where no self exists to know another different from it.⁷ The analogies of the rivers flowing into the ocean and disappearance of their names and forms in it or the One Person without parts,⁸ or salt dissolving into water⁹ so that none of it can be seized forth again, suggest that in mokṣa there is no survival of separate consciousness. On the other hand, the description of the knower's journey to Brahma on the devayāna and

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, p. 221.

2. अथातो निजः परमं सत्त्वं वासुदेवमनुब्रवीत् । तस्यैव तस्यैव तस्यैव तस्यैव तस्यैव तस्यैव ॥

3. Br. Upa., IV, 5, 6.

4. *ibid.*, II, 4, 12: न प्रियं अन्ता एतत् ।

5. *ibid.*, I, 4, 10.

6. Mund. Upa., II, 2, 2-4.

7. Br. Upa., IV, 2, 21; IV, 5, 15.

8. Mund. Upa., III, 2, 8; Praśna Upa., VI, 5.

9. Br. Upa., II, 4, 12.

reception into Brahmaloaka suggests that the individual self survives in moksa, free from all oppositions and conditions.¹ Attainment of swarājya, sāmrajya,² the description of the pure self moving about at will (kāmacarin), gaining all worlds it desires,³ the attainment of all desires by mere will⁴ and the enjoyment of Brahman's bliss⁵ also suggest the survival of separate selfhood.

But whether the self survives or not the insistence is on the negation of lesser, impure, empirical self. When through self, by the suppression of mind, one sees the brilliant self which is more subtle than the subtle, then having seen the self through one's self one becomes nirātman. Selflessness is the mark of liberation. This is the secret doctrine, rahasya.⁶ Rising above the temporal individuality by passing beyond the elements, the senses and their objects through a life of renunciation, one should by freedom from self-conceit (abhimāna) strike down egoism (ahaṅkāra) which causes confusion (saṁmoha) and all other passions and evils, such as covetousness, envy, lassitude, drunkenness, impurity, anger, lust; one should disperse the sheaths covering Brahma.⁷ The exhortation is: one should stand free from determination, free from conception and free from self-conceit. This is the mark of liberation and the pathway to Brahma in this world.⁸

The vision of the Supreme Ātman gives a sense of unity with the whole universe because everything in it is seen to be nought else than the self. All relations, possessions, conditions of life, worlds, gods, knowledge and beings are of value because the self is in them.⁹ He who has the vision of all beings as in the Ātman and the self as in all beings, does not shrink away from these i. e., since all beings are just the self of the discernor he has no revulsion against the existents and is free from delusion and sorrow.¹⁰ Without having perceived self, here, there is destruction

1. Kauśī. Upa., I, 3-4.

2. ibid., IV, 20.

3. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 10.

4. B. S., IV, 4, 7.

5. B. S., IV, 4, 19-20.

6. Maitrī Upa., IV, 20.

7. ibid.

8. ibid., VI, 30.

9. Bṛ. Upa., IV, 5, 6-7.

10. Īśa Upa., 7-8; Bṛ. Upa., IV, 4, 15; Kāṭha Upa., IV, 5.

(vinasti) for man and for this world and the only truth is discernment of it in every single being, which leads to immortality.¹ The Purusa himself is everything here, he who knows rends asunder the knot of ignorance here on earth.² Higher than all gods and world is Brahman, hidden in all things, body by body, by knowing Him as the Lord man becomes immortal.³ The Upaniṣads understand liberation to be a true perspective of the interrelation of all, a complete abnegation of the lesser self, and complete self identification and self effacement in the higher self.

The Bhagavat Gītā does not give a clear answer in regard to the condition of the freed soul. States of siddhi, parā siddhi,⁴ parama gati,⁵ pada anāmaya, śāśvata-pada avayava,⁶ śānti,⁷ seem to point to the continuance of consciousness in eternal bliss or the presence of God. When it is said that while worshippers of other gods and beings attain their objects of devotion but my worshipper enters me and is no more tormented by birth and death,⁸ there is an indication of the personalistic conception of mukti.

But the Gītā, too, demands expressly the ending of egoism in man.⁹ Only he who gives up all desires and moves free from attachment, egoism and thirst for enjoyment (nirman, nirahaṅkāra) attains peace. Such a God-realized soul having overcome delusion even at the last moment of life attains Brāhmic bliss.¹⁰ The necessity of rising above desire for objects, acts and fruits, on which the Gītā expatiates at every turn, is the very essence of negation of all selfishness in man. He who before casting off the body is able to withstand the urges of lust and anger is the true yogī, the yukta (harmonised soul) and the happy man (sukhī nara).¹¹

Such a negation of self leads to the attainment of sarvātmabhāva. In the very last birth of all, the man of realization worships Me, realizing that all this is God.

1. Kena Upa., II, 5.

2. Muṇḍ. Upa., II, 1, 10.

3. Śve. Upa., III, 7.

4. XII, 10; XVI, 23; XIV, 1.

5. VI, 45; VIII, 13; IX, 32; XVI, 22 and 23.

6. II, 5; XVIII, 56.

7. IV, 39; V, 12; XVIII, 62.

8. VII, 23; IX, 25; XIV, 2.

9. V, 11: Shaking off feeling of meum in respect of action.

10. II, 71-72.

11. V, 22.

Such a great soul is very rare.¹ The knowledge by which man sees one imperishable entity in all beings is the true or sattvic knowledge.² The expression of this state of mind is equal-sightedness; the yogi united with all-pervading consciousness looks on all with equal eyes, (samadarśana), sees the self present in all beings and all beings existing in the self.³ This is expressed in very striking language: the jñāna-yogī with completely subdued senses makes no difference between a clod, a stone or piece of gold.⁴ He is alike equal to friend and foe, likewise to honour and ignominy, alike to heat and cold and pleasure and pain.⁵ He looks with equal eyes on the learned brāhmana, a cow, an elephant, a dog and a pariah.⁶ As a result of this new vision the standard of action and judgment becomes one and the same for oneself and for others. What benefits or injures the self also benefits or injures others. He looks on all as one, on the analogy of his own self.⁷ Such a man of universal outlook is necessarily a well-wisher of all. The devotee who is free from malice towards all, friendly, compassionate, without feeling of meum and free from egoism is dear to God. Never can he be a source of annoyance to the world, nor can he ever be offended by it.⁸

According to Advaita, ahaṁkāra is a special modification of the internal organ, a product of universal Avidyā; its experiences are mistakenly ascribed to universal consciousness.⁹ "Aham Brahma" means that "I" is absolute, and the denial is of self as an ego, just as a particular object which is mistaken for a stump is later decided to be a man.¹⁰ The elements transformed into body, organs, senses, from which the self comes as an individual, are merged like rivers in a sea. Individualised existence is like foam and bubbles of water and is destroyed in the water or self. After attaining

1. VII, 19.

2. XVIII, 20.

3. V, 7; VI, 29-30.

4. VI, 8.

5. XII, 18 and 6; XIV, 25.

6. V, 18: Śaṅkara comments that these are examples of sāt̥tvic, rājasika and tāmasika beings, which are seen to have the same reality by the sage who has humility and tranquillity.

7. VI, 32: ज्वात्सवन्नेव रात्रौ जसं पशवोः ।

8. XII, 13-15.

9. Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, XXIX, p. 375.

10. Naiṣkarma-Siddhi, II, 29 and 30.

oneness self has no more particularised consciousness.¹ Getting rid of the ego-sense means dissociation from all objects of the dual world.² "Mine," "thine," "this," "I am so," "another not so," are ideas due to delusion, meaningless, unreal.³ Such super-imposed ideas of "mine," "thine," do not exist when the self is known to be one.⁴ Just as the idea of "mine" is not thought to exist in other bodies so also it does not any longer exist in one's own self, the common witness of all intellects.⁵ Non-egoism is not to be thought as absorption of the ego in Brahma, since the jīvana mukta while giving up the idea of Ātman in the "I" yet remains in those elements, regarding them as broken earthen-pots i. e., worthless, inauspicious, through want of interest in them.⁶ It is really the cessation of the idea of separateness (anyatvabodha) and independence,⁷ for if a person is one with the Absolute and still identifies himself with a particular class (brāhmaṇa etc.) this is nothing short of a blunder. It is bound to go with the rise of true knowledge. If it does not go then his Brahma-jñāna is to be considered fruitless and he is still ignorant.⁸

Another way of saying that Ātman is Advaita is to say that there is no anātma-vastu in it. It is "whole," "complete" (pūrṇa), without any deficiency of reality and value, and this is explained in terms of Brahmātmabhāva, sarvātmabhāva, sarvabhāva, advaitabhāva.⁹ The result of knowledge is identity with all, while the result of ignorance is identity with the limited personality of one's own body.¹⁰ This all is self because universe is of the same nature as the self while arising and merging in it.¹¹ The goal is the replacement of narrow, jaivika view by the cosmic self, whose interest coincides with all of the universe.¹² Sarvātmabhāva is not the actual

1. S. B. on Br. Upa., II, 4, 12.

2. Naiṣkarma-Siddhi, II, 31.

3. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, X, 11.

4. ibid., XIV, 9.

5. ibid., XV, 12.

6. Viveka Chūḍamāni, 383.

7. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 11: *सर्वव्यापकं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं*

8. Naiṣkarma-Siddhi, I, 75-76; cf., S. B. on B. S., I, 4, 19: *सर्वव्यापकं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं*

9. cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 3, 30: *सर्वव्यापकं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं*
परमैश्वर्यं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं. Also IV, 3, 2: *सर्वव्यापकं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं तन्मैत्रेयं*

10. ibid., IV, 3, 20.

11. ibid., II, 4, 11.

12. S. B. on Chān. Upa., III, 14, 1; S. B. on B. S., I, 2, 1-8.

abolition of the objects of the world as unreal but seeing of all as expressions of Brahma-nature.¹

Since to the jñānī all objects are regarded as equal in respect of his self,² he who sees self in all beings and at the same time feels he has enemies, desires surely to make fire cold.³ Jñāna-yoga gives happiness and well-being and is free from strife because the Advaitin, finding himself in all, finds no cause for quarrelling, which is inevitable in disputes consisting of opposite stands (points of view), while in the Self there is no contradiction as the disputant is part of him.⁴ He does not fear the world's slander, "If they slander the Self they slander themselves of themselves, if they slander my body, they are more my friends than my foes; slander becomes mere ornament to the ascetic (vidvat)."⁵ The world has nothing to fear from him as he has contempt for none, nor deals in chastisement, nor is so dealt with, nor is he afraid of the world, as his mind conceives no irritation or fear of the woes of the world.⁶ The supreme self is content and has no desire for welfare of itself;⁷ having attained it the mukta causes pain to none, since he is convinced that what is pleasant to himself is pleasant to all creatures.⁸ In such an ascetic (tapasvī), wise (paṇḍita) and righteous (dhārmika) soul all beings become calm and confide.⁹ "Universal friendship and all other qualities come of their own accord, without any effort, in one who has awakened himself to the light of Self."¹⁰

Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins, unlike Advaitins, hold that pure egoity, śuddha pratyagātmā, remains even in mokṣa, for who will desire mokṣa if the ego becomes extinct. Śāṅkara regards the ego to be a compound of self and not-self, hence ahaṅkāra or jīva or not-self is to be destroyed, while the pure self (Ātman) devoid of ahaṅkāra remains as Brahman. It is the Nirguṇa Ātmā which is free from the empirical self and non-egoism

1. cf., S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.
2. Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 434; cf., S. B. on B. G., IV, 35.
3. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XIV, 32.
4. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, IV, 2; cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 15.
5. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, II, 85.
6. ibid., I, 23.
7. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XIX, 3.
8. S. B. on B. G., VI, 32.
9. Jīvana-Mukti-Viveka, IV, 57 and 160.
10. ibid., I, 32; cf., II, 78.

is the state of freedom from all determinations. For the theists it is the Saguna Ātma which is distinct from empirical ego and the negation of the latter leaves intact the knowing "I". They explain the last five sūtras of Bādarāyana in terms of retainment of difference between the released soul and the supreme creator and ruler. Śankara agrees with this interpretation, but distinguishes the saguna mukti from nirvāna or advaita of jīvana mukti. Though the theists tend to stress the absoluteness or separateness of God or "that" as against the "thou" even in mokṣa, and reject the Advaita distinction of Nirguṇa reality and determinate jīva i. e., the transcendental Ātman and the temporal ego, yet they too insist on the abolition of egoity. In salvation man is divested of world-consciousness or consciousness of himself and his interest, and is restored to his own original purity, untouched by sensations, perceptions, feelings and volitions.

Nimbārka declares that ahamārtha continues in release. There is no laya or absorption of the individual soul, neither is there conjunction (samyoga) or unity of nature (swarūpaikya) between the soul and God. The mukta Ātman grows in likeness to God but remains separate and limited in its being, to enjoy the bliss of Brahma.¹ It is not right to suppose that any person desires a state of bliss, but the desire must be for enjoyment of the unobstructed bliss. It is the "aham-pratyaya" which enjoys all experiences, but when by absolute abnegation springing from love the individual feels himself to be controlled and regulated by God, and himself a constituent of Him, that is the state of emancipation.

According to Vallabha, "I-ness" and "mine-ness," the products of Avidyā, must disappear in mokṣa. The climax of puṣṭi-mārga is the attainment by the devotee of the heart and mind of God. One result of bhakti is oneness of all with the self; by love the object of love or God is perceived in all things, which are manifestations of Him.² When one is merged in Brahma in this way that condition is called allness (sarvabhāva), with no sense of separation in it. It is possible to say, "I am that" due to the inrush of wisdom which causes the unfoldment of all-consciousness in which identification

1. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, IV, 4, 21: Avibhāga.

2. Bhāṣya Prakāśa on B. S., quoted in Bhakti Mērtanda, p. 85: विनायकं च तस्यै सर्वत्र तत्त्वानुभवात्, यत् कामेन तादृशीप्रयत्नानुभवः इति सर्वत्रभावो लक्षितः।

with everything occurs.¹

Ramanuja argues that the mukta Ātmā stands in relationship of fellowship, equality of attributes with Paramātma, and this means consciousness of separate existence.² The self-gift of the individual self and the sovereignty of the highest self in the experience of viśiṣṭaikyā is mokṣa.³ To maintain that the "I" does not persist in mokṣa is inappropriate, amounting to the doctrine that release is annihilation of the self.⁴

If the "I" were not the self, the inwardness of the self would not exist. "May I freeing myself from pain enter on free possession of endless delight," this is the thought which prompts the mumukṣu to apply himself to the study of the Veda. Were it a settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of "I" the same man would move away as soon as release were hinted at. "When I myself have perished there still persists some consciousness different from me," to bring this about nobody will exert himself. The very existence of the self-luminous consciousness depends upon its connection with a self. When it is broken, consciousness itself cannot be established.⁵

If there is loss of personal existence in mokṣa there would be absence of willing and qualified pupils and loss of authoritativeness of the scriptures.⁶ On the Advaita position ānand (or sukha as a quality of the soul) is not intelligible; Brahman is no quality, nor can it denote being agreeable (anukūlatva)--the question is to whom? Since no jīva exists in Brahman while the latter is denied enjoyment; nor can ānand be the object of its own enjoyment.⁷ The enjoyment of "I" in mokṣa is very different from the consciousness of "I" in the saṃsāra-state, but it is separate consciousness all the same.⁸

According to Rāmanuja, the ahaṃkāra which is comprised within objectivity (not-self) is really egoity such as pride or arrogance, causing men to slight superior men; this is the consciousness to be sublated.⁹ Resignation of desires and freedom from "my-ness" and "I-ness" and non-confusion of unatomic body with Ātman is the state leading to niṣkāma karma based on Ātma-jñāna and, finally, to Brahmī-

1. Vallabha Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 1, 30.

2. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 4.

3. ibid., IV, 4, 21: Avibhāga.

4. ibid., I, 1, 1, p. 69.

5. ibid., p. 72.

6. ibid., p. 70.

7. Nārāyaṇārya, Nītimālā, Vāda III.

8. Vedānta Deep, IV, 4, 2.

9. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 72.

stṛiti.¹ From such non-egoism there follows the universal outlook. Having attained the nature of Brahma and freed itself from false imagination there is non-difference between self and self.² The mukta realizes that Ātmās are the same where ever they abide,³ and regards them as equal by reason of their essential character of intelligence.⁴ By jñāna the universe of creatures and devas is seen in himself, between them and him there is equality as the Ātmās of all divested of their temporary material nature are conscious entities. As a result of this vision he becomes well disposed towards all beings, removed from ill-wishing which is produced from egoity. Seeing God in all Ātmā-principle and Ātmā in God he looks on misery and happiness as one whether it befalls himself or another, with indifference.⁵

Madhva also argues against the Advaita idea of nirguṇa mukti that release is not worth having unless Ātmā survives as self-luminous entity, since it is the target of desires.⁶ All extraneous associations have to be shaken off to regain one's own selfhood.⁷ Since Ātman is of the essence of consciousness, any cessation of self-consciousness in mokṣa would be equivalent to loss of selfhood. There is no difficulty in accepting the existence of self-consciousness in mokṣa; experience is indeed the test of what is compatible or not.⁸ It is capacity to feel bliss and the continued presence of the enjoyer in mokṣa which makes happiness a puruṣārtha.⁹ Loss of such personal consciousness in Advaita-mokṣa makes it a state no different from the nihilism of the Buddhists.

Brahman is the goal to be reached by the mukta, and the object to be reached must be different from the object reaching. Bādarāyaṇa clearly indicates the difference between the muktas and the Lord.¹⁰ Nor is it acceptable to Vyāsa that the distinction between the independent Brahma and dependent souls is only phenomenal.¹¹ The

1. R. B. on B. G., XIII, 7; II, 71-72.

2. R. B. on B. S., I, 1, 1, p. 101.

3. R. B. on B. G., VI, 29-32.

4. *ibid.*, V, 18.

5. *ibid.*, XII, 4.

6. *Aṅu Vyākhyāna*, 57b.

7. *Bhāṣya* on B. S., I, 1, 17.

8. *Aṅu Vyākhyāna*, 58b: संज्ञाभाषायां चाद्वैतं गतं किं सुखं वा नः प्रसिद्धम् ।

9. *Nyāyamṛta*, 635-636: तत्र गतवत् सुखं वा नः प्रसिद्धम् । तत्र गतवत् सुखं वा नः प्रसिद्धम् ।

10. *Madhva Bhāṣya* on B. S., I, 3, 2.

11. *Dvādaśa Srotra*, III, 7.

ignorant do not perceive the names and forms of the rivers when they rest in the ocean, yet the names and forms persist, so the released souls resting in Visnu retain their names and forms intact. There is splitting up of the two but never total annihilation (niranvaya dhvaṁsa).¹ In mixing of the waters with water the two cannot be separated, still they have not become one, since there is an excess in quantity, at least; jīva is not inseparably lost in Brahma, but some difference must remain.² Even after liberation sages perform different functions,³ so the final state is not one of loss of individual identity. God has made jīvas differently⁴ and mukti is the realization by each of his own different nature.⁵

The difficulty of infinite regress resulting from postulating the right of one jīva to control another is overcome by postulating Īśvara as the regulator of all interrelations.⁶

Let one have this firm faith that this town (body) is under the control of the Lord . . . the person who has got intuitive vision (aparokṣa jñāna) becomes vimukta or free through humility and absence of egoism even while still in the body. He next becomes mukta (vimucyate) in the higher sense of that word when all sorts of sorrows . . . are destroyed.⁷

He perceives and experiences the world only in and through Brahma.⁸

The controversy round nirguṇa and saguṇa muktis hinges on the devotionism of bhakti. It is thought by the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins that love demands a separation, both empirical and transcendental, of the devotee and the object of devotion. Hence it is not only the Vedāntic dualists but even Rāmānuja and other Ācāryas, who swayed by the devotional fervour of bhakti (and not wishing to be deprived of religious rapture), insist on the individual consciousness being retained in the state of at-one-ment. The Advaitins do not accept that nirguṇa mukti means any real loss to the self and regard the fears of the theists to be childish. "Yogīs shrinking from jñāna-yoga,

1. Madhva Bhāṣya on Praśna Upa., VI, 5: He reads नामस्य विना as-प्रविशत्य because वि as the prefix gives the word its negative form e. g., विमुक्त is not free, विना is not united.
2. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 1, 13.
3. Madhva Bhāṣya on R. V., X, 71, 11.
4. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 3, 51: प्रतिगित्तमज्ञं विना वैश्विकेनात्मना, अत्रात्मिकत्वमिति । अतः विना हात्मनो दि वै-सम्भत् वैश्विकम् ।
5. Bhāgavat-Tātparyā-Nirṇaya, II, 10, 6: मुक्तिर्हित्वात्मप्राप्तौ रसवतोऽप्य ज्ञानविपतिः ।
6. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 2, 7.
7. Madhva Bhāṣya on Kaṭha Upa., IV, 1.
8. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., IV, 4, 5: स ब्रह्मणा पश्यति, ब्रह्मणा शृणोति, ब्रह्मणेऽपि सत्त्वयुक्तमिति ।

thinking that it brings annihilation of self, are aviveki, full of fear, apprehending destruction of self in a reality which is fearlessness itself."¹ Worshippers of the Saguna dread the nirvikalpa samādhi, but asaṅga-yoga gives no cause for fear; like little children left alone they dread the non-dual condition.² If the dualist objects: does one become conscious of happiness in mokṣa? How can that be if there is no one to manifest it due to the absence of body, senses etc.? The Advaitin answers:³ the self being capable of making itself manifest, swataḥ siddha, does not need another substance to become manifest as the highest joy, after the removal of Avidyā. Those who equate the "aham" and self give the inference that "aham" exists in mokṣa because it wills and works for it. The vyāpti of this inference is that the substrate of action for mokṣa must also be the substrate for mokṣa. But this rule is not true in all cases e. g., the servant works for his master, but does not enjoy the fruit of acts.

Leaving aside the controversy of saguna and nirguna muktis we find the highest common point of agreement in regard to the ideal of self-noughting, among the Vedāntins. Of all sacrifices the sacrifice of self for all is the best sacrifice.⁴ This destruction of "ahamvṛtti" is not for its own sake, but for the sake of the emergence of equal sightedness (sama-dṛṣṭi) based on the perception of the reality behind the whole world. "That is the truly liberal, human and universal outlook in which the inner eye being converted into one of pure knowledge the whole universe is viewed as Brahma, and not the mere fixing of the eye on the tip of one's nose."⁵ The Vedānta ideal is the removal of all barriers separating man and man by striving for the attainment of the condition of universal selfhood.⁶

Establishment in One's Own Nature--Autonomy

Vedānta regards the freedom of self to be no acquired character but an inalienable essence. Ātman is dearer than all other possessions, for all other things

1. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Karikā, III, 39.

2. Pañcadaśī, II, 23-24.

3. Madhusūdana's Tikā on Siddhānta Bindu, IX.

4. Yakṣa, Nirukta, VIII, 21: "Swāhā" in every sacrifice means the renunciation of the ego i. e., Swatva havana.

5. Aparokṣa Anubhūti, 116: दृष्टिं ज्ञानमसौ कृत्वा पश्येत् स्वामी जगत् । इति च परमात्मनो नान्यत् ।

6. cf., S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 4, 6: सर्वद्वेषमसौ भासो जगत् ।

might be lost but not the imperishable dear self.¹ Neither the sovereignty of the earth, nor the pleasures of the heavenly world are eternal.² Hence the wise sport in the self, delight in the self, have intercourse with the self, have bliss in the self alone.³ For Ātman indeed is this whole world.⁴ In liberation the self assumes no adventitious or celestial (aprākṛta) form, but returns to its own essential nature.⁵

Assumption of its own nature by the self gives it self-mastery. He is described as self-ruler (swarājan) and no longer subject to another (anyarājan).⁶ "Verily, so long as Indra understood not his self, so long the Asuras overcame him, when he understood. . . then striking down and conquering the Asuras he compassed the supremacy (sreṣṭhya), independent sovereignty (swarājya) and overlordship (ādhipatya) of all gods and of all beings."⁷ Similarly the meditator reaching the highest Brahma obtains independence (swātantrya). The Phala-adhyāya of the Brahma-Sūtra also declares that after the attainment of Brahma the soul becomes manifest in his own form (swena rupeṇa).⁸ The realization of desires by the mukta by his own free will without need of other instruments gives him mastery over himself, and freedom in all the worlds.⁹ Such a man, conquerer of himself, alone rules others.

Following the true spirit of the Upaniṣads the Vedāntācāryas declare the goal of endeavour to be establishment in one's true nature. One who knows that all external objects and circumstances affect only the body and not the self, he alone is absolutely free. The search must be for what is our own and not of something other than ours. According to Advaita, acquisitions of wealth and fame, considered to be the source of happiness, produce opposite results due to loss; eternal acquisition is only of the eternal self.¹⁰ No one, incomplete or particular aspect of the self is sought, but the complete and the whole nature of self, viz., jñāna.¹¹ The accidental characters of

1. *ibid.*, I, 4, 8.

2. Chān. Upa., VIII, 1, 6.

3. Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 1, 4.

4. Chān. Upa., VII, 25, 2.

5. *ibid.*, VIII, 3, 4.

6. *ibid.*, VII, 25, 2; Kauśī. Upa., IV, 20.

7. Maitrī Upa., VI, 22.

8. B. S., IV, 4, 1.

9. B. S., IV, 4, 8-9.

10. Upadeśa Sāhaśrī, XVII, 5.

11. B. S., IV, 4, 1.

pleasure and pain are absent in the essential nature. Mokṣa is not accidental or transitory because it is not going from one state to another. It is neither union nor separation, neither Brahma coming to self nor self going to Brahma, but the undestroyable nature of self, neither caused, accepted nor rejected by one self or another.¹ Since self's nature is ever-accomplished, according to Advaita, it is asked how mokṣa can be said to be attained? Some² hold "attainment" in a "figurative sense" (as the forgotten ornament discovered round one's neck); others describe it as caused by cessation of ignorance, or that anand not manifest in bondage which is attained in mokṣa or that not immediately manifest ānand in saṁsāra which becomes so manifested in mokṣa, hence, attained. Thus, Advaita considers "attainment of one's own nature" in the figurative sense, but the theists consider it to be a real attainment.

All Ācāryas are unanimous that in sleep the soul attains its own nature temporarily,³ while in liberation it returns permanently to its own nature of jñāna. Thus Rāmānuja declares that the superior existence (aiśvarya) of the freed soul passing on the path of the gods to the highest light is manifestation of its own nature, which is, no doubt, eternally accomplished but temporarily obscured in saṁsāra.⁴ Nimbārka urges that the soul is not to be conceived only in bondage as knower and doer etc., its real nature in release consists of attributes which are to be conceived in meditation, for in release the soul becomes of the nature of its real form.⁵

The contention of the Mīmāṁsā that the goal of life is universal performance of works (karmānuṣṭhāna) and search for self-nature is only weakness (daurbalya), is strongly rejected by Vedānta as a reversal of values. For, if only an independent thing (swārtha) can be puruṣārtha then such an independence resides only in the self, and pleasure and pain are only for the sake of self.⁶ All spiritual beings have one wish, to be completely independent, and compared with this state "all dependence means suffering, सर्वम् परवशम् दुःखम्; service is called a dog's way, so try to avoid it."⁷

1. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVI, 39-41 and 43.

2. Siddhāntaleśa-Saṁgraha, 3-1, 3-2, 3-31-3-32.

3. B. S., I, 1, 9.

4. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 1.

5. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 3, 52; I, 3, 19: प्राणित्तुल्यवशम् परवशम् ।

6. Prakāśānand, Advaita Siddhānta Muktaṅgī, XXXVII; Br. Upa., IV, 5, 6.

7. M. S., VI, 160.

"From the Srutis we know that the soul's form is to be subservient to the Supreme Spirit."¹

All Vedāntins, thus, equate the real self with self-government, but theists preach limitation of the mukta's will by God's power e. g., Rāmānuja declares that though the mukta soul is under no ruler yet it is subject only to the Lord's controlling power.² Though capable of realizing all his wishes the mukta has his sovereignty limited by the Lord's power of creation, declares Madhva, and other Ācāryas agree with him. Madhva goes on to remark that in the state of phenomenal existence the individual soul arrogates false independence to itself,³ but in mokṣa he realizes his dependence on the self as natural reflection of the soul.⁴ Therefore, even in mokṣa the dependence of the jīva on the Lord does not end. With regard to saguṇa mukti, even the Advaitins agree that the highest power is the supreme being, on whom the released soul, stopping at the stage of saguṇa mukti, depends for achieving its purposes.⁵

The theists find no contradiction between the conception of Ātmā's free self-determination in its perfected state and God's ruling and controlling power, for the self surrenders to the Lord as its highest self. The soul is under God's control and thus swarāṭa, shining with the help of its own self, none other than the Lord.⁶ The surrender of the finite to the infinite is really its own perfection. Vedāntic theism takes a negative attitude towards finite personality only with reference to the infinite and perfect personality of God. Search for the real self is thus a well directed "egoism," involving rejection of the lower self and adherence to Ātman. Vedāntic self-negation leads to discovery of the Self. Absolutism achieves a state of being in which the conception of dependence and independence, ruler and ruled is non-applicable, hence it finds nothing to contradict its ideal of government of the self by its own true self, which is identical with reality itself. The Vedānta ideal is that spiritually perfected condition in which rising out of all false selves or

1. Vedārtha Saṅgraha, III, 143.

2. R. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 9, 14-15 and 19.

3. Bhāgavat-Tātparya-Nirnaya, II, 8; स्वातन्त्र्यमिति शक्तिं तु कथं नित्यं बुद्धिर्मात्रेण | प्रतिफलमात्रं तु तद्व्यवस्थितं कर्मणः

4. Madhva Bhāṣya on B. S., II, 3, 50; सौवादिभिरुपाधिभिश्च प्रतिफलमात्रं तद्व्यवस्थितं जीवो ज्ञानरस-पुरुषादिभिः । इत्युच्यते ।

5. S. B. on B. S., IV, 4, 20.

6. Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha, IV, 4, 9.

lower physical planes man is controlled or determined by no other factor than his true will. Self-determination is true autonomy.

Amṛta, Abhaya, Anand

The cultivation of the Vedānta goal is a source of strength against evil forces. The keynote of its ethics and philosophy is blessedness, fearlessness and deathlessness. "From the unreal lead me to the real! From darkness lead me to light! From death lead me to immortality!"¹ And Śaṅkara comments: when he says from the unreal lead me to the real, the unreal, verily, is death, the real is immortality; from darkness lead me to light—the darkness, verily, is death, the light is immortality. From death lead me to immortality. Make me immortal—that is what he says.

The prayer and promise of immortality, unceasing striving after it is expressed in every line of the Upaniṣads. The body dies but the soul survives, returning again and again.² It is not the mere endlessness of the soul in the time-process, interminable acquirement of new bodies or enjoyments of pleasures under new conditions of life, in this world or the other. Immortality must be a lasting and elevated state of the soul. Continuation in saṁsāra is not our true immortality, but a reformatory process, by which the self is led to its immortal nature as Brahma, never lost during all the states of life and death but merely hidden.³ Having attained it, there is no possibility of resiling because desire has ended, hence desire for body is ended and with that comes true immortality.⁴

Negatively, the conception of Ātman carries in it the notion of freedom from fear and, positively, complete satisfaction and bliss. Even in the Rg-Veda the destiny of man is to be immortal in the region of ānand and nand, muda and pramuda (happiness and enjoyment, pleasure and joy). Perceiving the controller of the many, one has eternal happiness.⁵ It is the state of peace and tranquillity.⁶ The prom-

1. Br. Upa., I, 3, 28.

2. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 6.

3. *cf.*, Br. Upa., IV, 4, 7.

4. *ibid.*, IV, 4, 11.

5. Śve. Upa., VI, 14.

6. Muṇḍ. Upa., II, 2, 10; Kaṭha Upa., V, 12-15.

issory statement is that by this knowledge all sorrow is ended.¹ This goal is set for man because Vedānta identifies man's nature with ānand,² having obtained which object of desire all desire is satisfied and no unfulfilled desires remain to produce sorrow.³ Desire for happiness is natural and human, but it is only after man has discovered the imperfect, transitory nature of lesser happiness that he comes to the perfect and complete happiness. The measure of ānand is incalculable. Vedānta seeks to give a mīmāṃsā (consideration) of that bliss as infinitely greater than human happiness,⁴ measured in terms of knowledge, quickness, firmness, strength and wealth. Words and mind fail, are defeated in their attempt to describe the indescribable ānand of Brahman. In the measure there is bliss, in that measure there is life and being in this world, for this bliss is reality itself.⁵ "The origination of existence, what is called sukṛta, well done, that, verily, is the essence of existence. For truly on getting the essence one becomes blissful. For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in space!"⁶ All life and activity is due to pleasure and to understand pleasure one must know:

Verily, a plenum (bhūman) is the same as pleasure. There is no pleasure in the small Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else—that is a plenum. But where one sees something else—that is the small. Verily, the plenum is the same as immortal (amṛtvam), but the small is the same as mortal (martyam).⁷

Nor is the greatness of the soul of the relative type, as all objects and possessions are based on one another, but this is the infinitude based on itself as absolute. Also the ānand naturally manifests itself because it is internal to man, his own nature, and not something obtained from outside.

Having attained this immortality and ānand man is freed from all fears. Fear comes from attachment to things which are lost to man through being destroyed or seized by another, or by becoming limited or injured. But Ātman is not subject to any of these fatalities. "That great, unborn soul, undecaying, undying, immortal,

Chān. Upa., VI, 1, 3: तस्यैव शोकम-आत्मनि ।

2. Taitti. Upa., II, 5.
3. Br. Upa., IV, 3, 21.
4. ibid., IV, 3, 33; Taitti. Upa., II, 8.
5. Br. Upa., IV, 3, 32.
6. Taitti. Upa., II, 7.
7. Chān. Upa., VII, 23-25.

fearless is Brahman—who knows this becomes the fearless Brahma."¹ He becomes devoid of expectations, freed from fear as fully in regard to others as in regard to himself.² Having attained the bliss of Brahma he is not tormented by the thought of not having done the good or having done the evil, and has no longer the fear of such torment i. e., all desires being satisfied there remains no karma to be performed, which would bind to saṃsāra. Also the state of Atman is without fear because it is advitiya and śiva (benign).³ Atman thought to itself: since there is nothing else than myself, of whom am I afraid? Thereupon, verily, his fear departed, for of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly, it is from a second that fear arises.⁴ "When one finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is indivisible, bodiless, undefined, non-based, then he has reached fearlessness. When, however, one makes a cavity, an interval therein, then he comes to have fear."⁵ The impregnability of the knower of Ātman is as the rock against all evils and injuries in the world.⁶ Finally, mokṣa being equivalent to the ending of saṃsāra-state it is *śaśvataḥ sukhaḥ*.⁷

The Brahma-Sūtra⁸ debates the question of the "Ānandmaya" as the highest self or not. All Bhāṣyakāras are agreed that this ānand, the cause of the world cannot be the individual self. All understand the suffix "maya" to indicate the abundance or perfection of bliss, and not modification of bliss as found in the world. The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins argue that since the ānandmaya is the giver of its own joy to the soul it is the Paramātmā, Parama Brahma or Parama Phala and the jīva enjoys the supreme ānand of Brahma in that state.⁹ According to Nimbārka, Śruti teaches union of that (bliss) with this (individual soul) in this (ānandmaya or the Lord), and Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva generally agree with this interpretation. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, does not regard the ānandmaya or Īśvara as the highest state. It is as much a modification as all other states, and all are supported by bliss itself. They are saviśeṣa and it is

1. Br. Upa., IV, 4, 25; IV, 2, 2.

2. Maitrī Upa., VI, 30.

3. Māṇḍū. Upa., 7.

4. S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 4, 2; IV, 3, 21.

5. Taittī. Upa., II, 7.

6. Chān. Upa., I, 2, 8.

7. S. B. on Br. Upa., IV, 2, 4; Rāmānuja, Vedānta Deep, I, 1, 13.

8. Brahma-Sūtra, I, 1, 12-20.

9. B. S., I, 1, 20.

nirviśesa. The latter does not consist of but is itself ānand.¹ If the objection is raised, is not joy impossible in a state of advaita since there is none to know joy, he rejoins that mokṣa is not knowledge of bliss by either the self or Brahman, but pure anand itself.²

However the Advaitins and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins may differ due to the doctrinal difference of saviśeṣa and nirviśeṣa there is no difference in their understanding of the highest state as one of absolute joy. Rāmānuja says,³ pleasant cognitions are relative and impermanent in any object different from Brahma, but in Brahma absolute and permanent. Brahman being pleasure, one is happy when one has attained Brahman. The Supreme being boundless bliss, becomes bliss to another too, because there is no difference in that He is beatitudinous. And Śaṅkara declares⁴ that grief is only due to identification with limited things, but the realized nature of the soul is śāntam, śivam, sundaram.⁵ To attain Brahman is to attain that which leaves nothing more to be attained, the blessedness of which leaves nothing more blessed to be desired, and the knowledge of which leaves nothing more to be known.⁶ The word "thou" comes to mean one free from pain on account of being used with the word "that," which means eternally devoid of pain.⁷ Because when non-duality is realized as identical with Ātman then multiplicity ceases, nothing exists as of the same or another nature from reality, to cause misery or fear.⁸ Pleasure and pain are from desire, aversion, fear, having their seat in the intellect, the knower is above intellect and so devoid of fear.⁹ Because, only when he has identified himself with something (citta) which has assumed the form of unhappiness is there sorrow, and not by merely seeing it does the witness Ātman feel fear and pain.¹⁰ The essence of mokṣa is boundless joy, utter removal of pain. As it is perfectly clear that men always desire both, there is always a desire

1. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 12, p. 65ff.; cf., Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi, 209 and 211.

2. S. B. on Br. Upa., III, 9, 28.

3. Vedārtha Saṅgraha, III, 142.

4. S. B. on Br. Upa., I, 5, 20, pp. 238-239.

5. Ātmabodha, 50; Siddhānta Bindu, I: १०० : १००० : १००० : १०००

6. Ātmabodha, 54.

7. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, XVII, 171.

8. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Karikā, II, 34.

9. Upadeśa Sāhasrī, II, 35.

10. ibid., XVI, 7-9.

for release.¹

Thus all Vedantins assert the eternal value of Brahma-jñāna as a positive condition of ineffable bliss. They join issue with Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas which regard mukti as a condition of mere cessation of sorrow; it is certainly a state devoid of misery, but equally of happiness. In view of the Śruti and Smṛti declaration of great joy in that state as well as on the basis of direct experience Vedānta rejects this as an improper view. Because cessation of misery can only be subsidiary to ānand the human goal must be positive, but gradation in non-existence of misery is not possible.²

If mokṣa were devoid of bliss there would be no motive for seeking it with so much trouble . . . the very fact that people submit to great privation and trouble for a little joy shows that if mokṣa were a state of absolute absence of bliss none would turn to it. The fact that people face great dangers to prevent loss of their happiness confirms this, therefore, the above theories are not sound ones.³

The Śruti statement that neither pain nor pleasure affects that state is to be understood as meaning that all that is material and disagreeable is ruled out from mokṣa and material pleasures as well as pains are disagreeable.⁴

In Vedānta, the terms Ātman, Brahman, truth, consciousness and bliss are always to be understood as inseparable.

Standard—Pleasure vs. Good

The Vedānta ideal must be examined in the light of the standard on which it rests. It is not with reference to any external law or criterion that the value of its discipline and goal is to be judged. Though theories of the moral standard are not developed or discussed as independent problems, yet there are certain texts hinting at the heteronomous standard. Those things which are regarded as good should be revered and in case of doubt brāhmaṇas, competent, apt, devoted, not harsh, but lovers of virtue should be the models.⁵ Dharma is both positive and negative, having its origin in custom, law-givers and rulers. This combined with the authority of the

1. Sāṅkṣepa Śārīraka, I, 67.

2. Citsukhī, IV, 2, 42.

3. Anu Vyākhyāna, 58.

4. ibid., 57-58.

5. Taittī. Upa., I, 11.

"moral connoisseur" will provide the individual with external guidance, though this will be limited to the achievement of lesser ends. Nor does Vedānta emphasise the theonomous nature of the standard. No rules are handed down for man by command of the divine ruler, to be obeyed on fear of punishment. But the cosmos having originated from God and existing and dissolving in Him, it must operate according to His will.¹ From fear of Him fire burns, sun gives heat and Indra and wind and death speed along. Rising above these standards Vedānta arrives at the highest law of autonomy. The knower of the self is independent of all else, enjoys absolute freedom. Vedānta goes beyond the conception of inherited codes as the standard to the stage of reflection, in which the contrast of inward freedom of spirit and subjection to any law, human, social or divine, is clearly seen.

The question of what ends man should live by only arises when the instinctive or customary levels of moral life are transcended by reflective consciousness. Vedāntic reflection discovers the idea of ends of life as well as the supreme end, the difference of lesser goods and highest good, and imposes on man the task of acting wisely (*vivaka*) with reference to these ends or end.

Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the end of life. That men do seek pleasure in life and that there can be only one motive viz., desire for pleasure, is psychological hedonism. The Upaniṣads do not overlook this motive, "for, verily, when one gets pleasure for himself, then he is active, without getting pleasure one is not active. Only by getting pleasure is one active. But one must desire to understand pleasure (*sukha*)."² Vedānta concedes the naturalness of this desire and shows that men attain the satisfaction of hedonistic motive by attaining external and internal goods,³ and also the methods for such satisfaction.⁴ Nor are reasons or persuasives for "good" conduct or "duty" at the mundane level totally absent. Of the four sanctions of Hedonism, the political and social sanctions in the form of *dharma* operate for people living by the standard of hedonism (*abhyudaya*). The natural sanction

1. *ibid.*, II, 2; *Kaṭha Upa.*, VI, 3.

2. *Chān. Upa.*, VII, 22.

3. *Sve. Upa.*, IV, 22: Children, cattle. And *Taitti. Upa.*, I, 11: Truth, virtue, welfare.

4. *Chān. Upa.*, V, 2, 4-8; *Kauśī. Upa.*, II, 3-4; II, 7-11; *Bṛ. Upa.*, VI, 3; VI, 4.

operates because nature controls all by its three gunas.¹ Men impelled by pleasures and pains arising from obedience and disobedience of nature are made to follow nature,² so long as they are bound to egoism.³ Nor is the religious sanction absent. The law of karma under the control of God (Karmādhyakṣa) is the reason for pursuit of rules of worldly morality, because man hopes for the pleasure resulting from reward for meritorious work and fears pain resulting from punishment of unmeritorious act, which the moral law promises, in this world or the next.

The hedonistic doctrine proceeds on the fallacy that pleasure as a feeling-state is always identical. But pleasure is only the measure of value, and value attaches to objects at which men aim; the quality of pleasure will differ according to the value of the object aimed at i. e., there is a difference of kinds of pleasure: some are of a "higher or more excellent kind" as compared to others depending upon the superior value of the object whose attainment is under consideration, or upon the comprehensiveness of the will or "universe of desires" whose satisfaction is resulting in that mental state of pleasure. The critic points out that the feeling of satisfaction attending the fulfilment of natural appetites is different from the state of satisfaction resulting from satisfaction of religious desire for perfection; the former is to be termed pleasure or happiness (sukha) and the latter blessedness or joy (ānand).

Vedānta makes a distinction between quality of pleasures and assigns a lower place to all other pleasures in comparison with ānand, and it understands the difference to result from the value-quality of the object of desire e. g., as between the two objects, wealth and knowledge, Vedānta unhesitatingly concedes the superiority of the latter. Indeed, the objects of desire other than knowledge are not altogether valueless, as even Śaṅkara admits that the purpose of the dialogue between the Sage Yājñavalkya and King Janaka⁴ is to prove that the presence of goods (cows, gold) is a way to the acquisition of jñāna, and yet another way of acquisition is through

1. B. G., III, 27-28.

2. B. G., III, 33.

3. B. G., XVIII, 59-60.

4. S. B. on Br. Upa., III, 1, 1, p. 408.

association with adepts and discussions with them. Nor does Jnani Raikva hesitate to accept material goods and wife as inducement to impart knowledge to King Janasruti.¹ The Vedantic acceptance of the traditional values generally, and that gradation of them which subordinates the trivarga to paramārtha, suggests that, at best, wealth and all material objects of desire may be allowed to have instrumental value, but only knowledge has an absolute value. And the satisfaction resulting from the latter is of a different kind and infinitely more excellent than the satisfaction resulting from the former. The calculus of happiness in the Upaniṣads² is no mere mathematical measurement of amounts or units of pleasures in terms of the utilitarian principles of calculation,³ though the calculation is made in quantitative terms. It is to be understood as arthavāda for the state of Jñāna or Brahman comparable to Plato's judgment of the happiness of the philosopher as seven hundred and twenty nine times higher than the pleasure of the man of appetite.⁴ In both cases the infinity of quantity is indicative of the supreme excellence in quality of the pleasure to be preferred. Also, this blessedness or joy is incidental to the attainment of the real self, which is the direct object of desire. The paradox of hedonism is that the best way to get pleasure is to forget it, as too direct a concentration on and striving for it is apt to lead to diminution or even loss of pleasure. Vedānta envisages the supreme bliss to result only when the desire itself, and consequently, desire for pleasure (worldly or super-worldly) has been completely eliminated from man's mind, and the concentration is only on the one entity.

Vedānta does not deny the relative validity of the hedonistic motive with reference to individual and social life in the world. There are as many objects of desire and, consequently, pleasures as there are types of beings. According to Rāmānuja:

Whatever misconception one has of one's own soul one holds the end of life to agree with that. Pleasure is differently determined according to the body for which the soul is mistaken—lion, . . . man, god, dānava etc.—everything is judged by whatever aim of life corresponds to mistaken identity of the soul.⁵

1. Chān. Upa., IV, 2.

2. Br. Upa., IV, 3, 33; Taitti. Upa., II, 8.

3. Bentham gives seven criteria for comparative weighing of two lots of pleasures, viz., intensity, duration, nearness, certainty, purity, fruitfulness and extent.

4. Republic, IX, 587.

5. Vedārtha Saṅgraha, III, 143.

But with reference to the highest end or summum bonum Vedānta does not concede the validity of hedonism at all. In the dialogue between Sage Yajñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī,¹ the latter asks if the whole earth's wealth would give immortality and receives the reply that that would give her only a life of pleasure like that of the rich, but not hope of immortality. Yajñavalkya praises her choice of knowledge which leads to immortality as the right choice. When the god of death offers all desires of pleasure to Naciketas, the latter rejects those ephemeral objects in favour of knowledge of what is beyond the passing on.² As Śāṅkara puts it, "enjoyment of objects of senses indeed constitutes pleasure (sukha), but not welfare (hita). The attainment of the summum bonum is not only accomplished by pleasure but also by welfare."³ The standard is welfare in the highest sense, the health (swasthatā) of the Ātmā, and pleasure in any other form is merely an imperfect, diseased condition of man's soul. "One cannot indeed pursue pleasure and at the same time mokṣa. Each gets his reward: the desirous gets the fruit of his karma, the desireless gets jñāna and the jñānī gets mokṣa."⁴ The absolute divergence of hedonism and mokṣa is brought out in the following famous words:

The good (śreya) is one thing and the pleasant (preya) is quite another . . . of these two, well it is for him who takes the better; he fails of his aim who chooses the pleasanter Going all round the two, the wise man discriminates . . . chooses the better, indeed, rather than the pleasanter. The stupid man from getting and keeping (yoga-kṣema) chooses the pleasanter Widely opposite and sunder are these two. Ignorance (avidyā) and what is known as knowledge (vidyā), . . . those abiding in the midst of ignorance . . . thinking themselves learned . . . go round deluded. Like blind men led by one who is himself blind.⁵

The Vedānta ideal of life may be said to be based on the standard of the Good. Since this end is constantly described as being above both good and evil, it is clear that there is here, implicitly, a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic good. The good the Vedānta aims to transcend is always described as being the correlate of evil, the cause of prosperity in this world and the next and desired for the same. Hence it is the relative and instrumental good Vedānta rejects in favour of the

1. Br. Upa., II, 4, 2-4; IV, 5, 3-5.
2. Kaṭha Upa., II, 22-29.
3. S. B. on Māṇḍū. Upa., Intro. to IV, 2.
4. S. B. on B. G., IV, 11.
5. Kaṭha Upa., II, 1-5; cf., Maitrī Upa., VII, 9.

intrinsic good, which is not relative to anything whatsoever. It is not to be described with reference to particular modes of existence and action.

It is said that supreme value is that which gives satisfaction to a rational being.¹ A completely satisfactory, perfectly ordered universe giving satisfaction to a rational being, apprehended and chosen as such and progressively realized, is the supreme good. To think of such a universe includes choice and presence of effort. Prof. Mackenzie distinguishes the good, the choice of the good and the effort to bring it about. The complete good is such a perfectly beautiful world with all ugliness removed. Moral good is the choice and effort to achieve it and such moral good is included in the complete good. Were we to substitute the term spiritual for rational in this statement we would find in it an exact statement of the Vedānta standard of the end as the Good. The Ātman- or Brahman-world is a perfectly whole and harmonious universe, with all sin, evil, suffering removed, in which the spirit of man finds rest. The apprehension of such a complete good involves the choice (*mumukṣutva*) and the constant effort for it (*sādhana*).² Śaṅkara's comment on the Upaniṣadic distinction of the good and the pleasant is illuminating:

Two ends . . . one mundane and the other transcendent—come to man indiscriminately for his choice. All men are propelled by these two goods according as one wishes for mundane prosperity or the supreme happiness. These two are opposed and conflicting in their nature to each other . . . not easily distinguishable by persons of poor intelligence and irresolute mind. The truly wise man examines both . . . as a flamingo separates milk and water . . . and selects only the supreme end as preferable . . . but the man of poor intelligence, incapable of such discrimination, pursues . . . cattle, sons, position, wealth, for the purpose of gratifying his pleasures of the senses.³

As the highest end of man, Vedānta offers a categorical and absolute good for all men, for all ages and all times. In the above passage there is a clear discrimination of higher and lower goods, comparative evaluation of the relative worth of the two courses, rejection of the one and selection of the other, followed by the pursuit of the higher till the end is realized. The fact of deliberation and choice, resolution of will and appropriate action following upon it, points to the independence and moral responsibility of the human self.

1. J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 224.

2. cf., B. G., VI, 37-46.

3. S. B. on *Kaṭha Upa.*, II, 1-5.

The Vedānta conception of absolute good is expressed as Self-realization, *Ātmalabha*. Spiritual life is a process of growth to which the idea of evolution applies. However, if the evolutionary explanation be advanced in a strictly naturalistic sense i. e., if the whole process of growth is to be explained in terms of the beginning or of the historical stages, then it is irrelevant for Vedānta. According to the Spencarian formula, life is a process of adjustment of external and internal relations and good and evil is that which helps or hinders such adjustment. Pleasure is the sign of successful adjustment and evolution is to be judged in terms of length of life of the individual or race, or the amount of pleasure it gives rise to. Such a conception has no meaning for Vedānta which does not judge in quantitative terms of length¹ but depth of life or soul. Only the explanation of the process of human evolution in terms of the end (*Ātma-darśana*) has any relevancy. The value of human life is judged in terms of nearness or remoteness to that goal.

Aristotle defined eudaemonism as the exercise of man's soul (capacity) in accordance with excellence or virtue, and if there be more than one virtue, then, in accordance with the most complete excellence. Vedānta accepts this definition of spiritualistic or idealistic perfectionism. It agrees that there are many capacities in man, concedes the due place of physical, biological, sensational, and intellectual urges of human life and decides that *Ātman*, *ānandmaya* or *ānand* is the highest, most complete excellence which must be activated in man. Unlike western idealism which tends to understand the spiritual principle in terms of reason,² Vedānta insists that man must grow out of the rational level as much as out of the others (from *anna* to *vijñāna*). Reason is not the highest excellence, but *Ātman*.

This answers the question which is asked in connection with the end as self-realization, viz., the question as to which self is to be realized and which to be sacrificed. The rule of ethical thought which demands that the narrow self or universe of desire be rejected in favour of a more comprehensive or complete one is wholly acceptable to Vedānta. However, the more comprehensive in merely the ethical

1. In fact, the reverse is true as Vedānta aims to end rebirth.

2. e. g., Aristotle, Hegel, Green etc.

sense is not its goal, as much as the metaphysical or spiritual self which is the one universal reality itself.

In the Vedānta conception of self-realization there is no room for equal or all round development of all capacities, nor is there scope for specialisation i. e., different capacities to be developed in different men. These principles operate at the level of dharma or morality in Vedānta, but at the level of mokṣa or spiritual perfection the standard must be absolute and categorical, not admitting of any conditions or exceptions whatsoever.

Another difficulty generally arises in connection with the standard of self-realization. It seems too individualistic in its statement, but Vedānta does not find the ideal of Ātmalābha, in any way, to be individualistic, since the Ātman that is being realized is the most comprehensive and perfect one. Nor did Indian society ever consider the search after Ātman as a selfish striving. The very absence of the problem of selfishness versus unselfishness or egoism versus altruism is evidence for the non-individualistic nature of the end of self-realization, as it operated in Vedānta, though there could be no effort for it in any social sense and it had to be chosen, striven for and realized by each individual for himself.

Summing up, we might say that the Vedāntic standard lies not in law, but in the conception of an end. The end is an ideal form of existence in which there is complete subordination of man's lower nature to the most complete self or Ātman. Man lives at many levels: to live completely and eternally in the universe which he occupies in the deepest moment of wisdom or spiritual insight is blessedness--self-realization is realization of sat, cit, ānand.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ESCAPE

The Psychology of Escapism

It is more or less axiomatic that all men seek happiness. "How to gain, keep and recover happiness is the secret motive of all men do and endure."¹ Embued with many desires man seeks those internal and external objects which will fulfil those desires. But his attempts are not always successful, as many factors exist to thwart the satisfaction he seeks, giving rise to the fear in his mind that either he will be totally denied the happiness resulting from such satisfaction, or, at least, will have to submit to a substantial reduction of that happiness. The first, most obviously thwarting factor, which might be termed internal, is his certain knowledge of the destined dissolution of the body, which is the instrument through which he enjoys his happiness. There are not wanting many external factors in the shape of the whole order of the outer world and his relations with other beings, specially his fellowmen, which threaten his happiness.² Life conditions in every society or culture-pattern give rise to the fear of loss of happiness, caused by natural or social obstacles in the form of enemies and social relations such as hostility arising from suppression, injustice, enforced dependence, and frustrations arising from cultural traditions such as fear of demons and violations of taboos.³

There are various ways of reacting to this situation. The proper method is to turn the natural desires whose satisfaction is being obstructed into channels and directions which are less conflicting, hence less liable to frustration, with the outer world, which method is termed sublimation in modern psychology. Man may try to overcome his sense of weakness, aloneness and fear by spontaneous relation of love

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1. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 77.
 2. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 28.
 3. Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Times*, p. 25.

and activity with the outer world of men, so as to give scope for a true expression of his desires and capacities.¹ As for the obstruction caused by the unpredictable or destructive forces of nature, the individual may harness these natural forces into more useful directions, to obey human will, by the use of scientific knowledge.

Failing these methods, there are other methods by which man tries to eliminate the distance between his self and desires on the one hand, and, the world, natural and social, on the other, in a bid for happiness, peace and freedom. One such way of happiness is the negative one of reducing suffering and pain by reducing the natural desires or demands for happiness i. e., the pleasure-principle becomes so modified by the reality-principle that the motive of avoidance of pain puts desire for pleasure in the background. Since outer forces prevent satisfaction and since unrestricted gratification of desires brings its own punishment according to the principle of excess leading to its own destruction there occurs a voluntary limitation of desires, a withdrawal from others and turning away from the dreaded outer world. Modern psychology terms this process "escapism."

According to one classification there are four main ways of escaping the fear arising from frustration of desires by external and internal dangers.² One way is to narcotise the fear i. e., a method of control of the individual organism rather than the external situation by intoxicants, which help men to slip away from reality, but it is manifestly a very crude, unsatisfactory and self-destroying method. A second way is to rationalise the fear i. e., a method of evasion of responsibility for meeting the concrete life-situation in a poised manner and grappling with it till some solution is reached; a method of defence of irrational postures and mental attitudes by advancing of seemingly reasonable explanations and theories.

A third way is to deny the situation and resulting fear altogether i. e., a method of exclusion of it from the very awareness of the individual in the form of inhibition or delusion. When the individual ego is unable to cope with the outer world and its activities or to defend itself from it or to modify it according to its

1. Erich Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, p. 120.

2. Horney, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

will due to physical incapacity, or when it is unable to judge or to accept the inevitable reality in the light of reason i. e., rationally, due to intellectual incapacity, it seeks to defend itself against the dangers, pains and fears by denial of that reality.¹ In place of the unbearable reality or forces there are substituted agreeable delusions developed by imagination. Satisfaction is sought through illusion or life of phantasy having little connection with reality or the individual may break all connection with the world around him to create a world, in fancy, more suitable to himself.² Such a method of escapism is of limited value due to the equally pressing need of the ego to critically test and to cope with reality.³

A fourth way is to avoid thoughts, feelings, impulses and situations which obstruct desire and arouse a sense of weakness and fear i. e., the method of withdrawal, internal and external, taking many forms. As remarked before, all such attempts are psychologically prompted, not by desire for pleasure but by need for reassurance against fear of pain. While the third method of escape consists in banishing reality itself out of the consciousness of the individual, in this method the full knowledge of reality remains in consciousness, but instead of perceiving or confronting the painful situation and impression it is open to the individual ego to refuse to encounter the dangerous situation at all. It takes to flight and so, in the truest sense of the word, "avoids" the occasion of pain.⁴ This is a primitive or natural mechanism by which the role of spectator is adopted in the face of difficulty, so that the activity may not need to be compared with that of others or with any outside standard; a method of withdrawal from a painful situation by adopting inactivity, detrimental to individual development.

Broadly, this method of escape may be classified as social or psychological. In the social aspect protection from fears and pains due to external and internal dangers may be sought, not only by going into a desert or into complete seclusion, but also by achieving independence from others as they affect one's internal or

1. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*, p. 74.

2. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 32.

3. cf., Anna Freud, *op. cit.*, pp. 87, 97.

4. *ibid.*, p. 100.

external needs.¹ Independence from internal needs is achieved by attempting to become emotionally detached from people, so that nothing will hurt or disappoint. "If I withdraw nothing can hurt me."² Independence from external needs is achieved either by piling up of possessions in an irrational quest for possessions for their own sake or by restricting one's needs to a minimum.

The psychological aspect of this method operates on the principle that, since satisfied instincts and desires lead to happiness, the individual may hope that by influencing these impulses he may escape some degree of suffering. This method of defence seeks to control the internal sources of our needs, and, in extreme forms, it appears as the annihilation of instincts e. g., as practised by the yogi. "When it succeeds, it is true, it involves giving up all other activities as well (sacrificing the whole of life), and again, by another path, the only happiness it brings is that of peace."³ In such a method of actual or figurative destruction of the world and its relations, the individual escapes the feeling of fear and powerlessness and remains in "splendid isolation," not crushed by the power of the object outside, because there is no need for comparison.⁴

Yet another method of escape is that of authoritarianism.⁵ The individual ego might fuse itself with somebody outside to acquire strength i. e., the feeling of weakness and consequent fear is overcome by reducing the self to zero, by submission to a power either external or internalised. This saves the individual from the pain of doubt, indecision and responsibility for one's own fate, and the troublesome task of finding out the meaning of life or what "he" is. The finding of satisfaction by submitting to or losing oneself into something greater, dissolving the self, getting rid of its doubts, conflicts, pains, limitations and isolation is called by Nietzsche liberation from principium individuationis.⁶ The aim is to achieve a union of individual self with another, greater self, in such a manner as to make each lose its

1. Horney, op. cit., p. 98.

2. *ibid.*

3. Sigmund Freud, *loc. cit.*

4. Erich Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, pp. 154-159.

5. *ibid.*, pp. 121ff.

6. Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Times*, p. 270.

separate integrity and to become dependent on the other. The individual's activity, after such a union, becomes rooted in the sense of his own powerlessness. He acts in the name of God, the past, nature or duty, but his whole life is rooted in desperation, lack of faith, and leads to nihilism or denial of life.¹

A statement of some psychological theories of the phenomenon of escapism in human life is a proper introduction to a modern assessment of Indian thought, more specially that which is comprised within Vedānta. Oriental scholars, the most sympathetic as well as the most critical, are more or less unanimous in judging Indian thought, almost from its inception (i. e., after the period of the R̥g-Veda), to be permeated with the spirit of escapism. The attitude of mind denoted by such a characterisation is not a normal or healthy one. Modern psychology has devoted special attention to this attitude, specially in its abnormal phases. How far any or all these psychological theories may be explanatory of the alleged "escapism" of Indian thought is a matter of individual judgment. The critics, though not psychologists, agree that such a state of mind is a product of a combination of psychological and non-psychological factors and conditions. An examination of the causes adduced by them to explain this phenomenon might, profitably, be preceded by the statement of the exact characteristics which go together to produce this character of Indian thought. In the terminology of medical science we might call these elements the "symptoms" by which the diagnosis of the disease of "escapism" is made possible.

Symptoms of Escapism

Pessimism

According to the critics, pessimism is one such striking symptom pervading the whole of Indian thought. Optimism may be understood as the state of mind in which a man refuses to find any evil in life inspite of obvious hardships and difficulties i. e., the attitude of "the best of all possible worlds." Those men may be called "natural optimists" who are born with a sense of immediate happiness in life, while philosophical optimists are those who arrive at the reasoned conclusion that the state of things in

1. Fromm, loc. cit.

the world is, in the final analysis, good, and evil is either excluded from the world or ignored by them.¹ As opposed to this, pessimism is the overwhelming consciousness of life's evil. It, too, may be natural, as when a man has a congenitally gloomy and morbid reaction to life, or philosophical, in which case it is the speculative procedure of regarding evil as the very essential nature of things, in spite of the manifest presence of good things in life. Each mental state has a valuation of the world peculiar to it. The optimistic outlook attributes to the world and human life decided worth and represents it as good, beautiful, pleasant, while the pessimistic outlook denies the value of life and represents it as unworthy, unsatisfactory and deplorable.²

Western scholars hold that Indian philosophy and religion originated in a pessimism based on the belief of the evanescence and sorrowfulness of the world.³ The original Aryan faith was joyous and active, the mood of the Rg-Veda being marked by a natural, sunny optimism. But that joy of life was changed into its logical opposite and in the Upaniṣads the mood of sombre despair and weariness of life prevailed. Nothing but sorrow is found in this life, and no good can relieve its gloom. This, according to critics, is not the "divine discontent" which rejects some false or seeming good in order to bring into the focus of attention some higher, genuine good, but the purely pessimistic view which sees nothing but the evil of life, and, hence, rejects it. The excessive gravity of their problem, viz., the everlasting sorrow and bondage of human life, influenced the profound spiritual questionings of the Upaniṣadic thinkers, demoralising them and affecting the solution of the problem.⁴ Unlike Greece, philosophy in India originated not in "curiosity" but under pressure of this actual and pressing need of relief from suffering, so it is not "love of truth" but the remedy of a disease i. e., merely a means to an end. Fear of repeated birth and the consequent suffering ending in death (*jarāmaraṇa*) runs through the whole of Indian philosophy and thus "philosophy is meant to be a preparation for a happy death or euthanasia."⁵ It is admitted that the earlier Upaniṣads show only a moderate pessimism, a mild expression

1. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 77-78.

2. James Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 5.

3. cf., Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, 45.

4. W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 26.

5. Max Müller, *Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 12.

of the unsatisfactoriness of the finite as compared to the infinite and not absolute empirical despair of the world,¹ yet the tendency is sufficiently marked even there and later deepened to influence the Vedānta in the whole course of its development towards extreme pessimism.²

Denial of Life

Inevitably, connected with this gloomy view of life is the element of life and world negation, because pessimism is an implicit condemnation implying that the world is operating abnormally, almost an atheistic conviction that the world is irrational or unreal. World and life affirmation consists in man's view of life experienced within himself and developed outside himself as of value per se and, accordingly, striving to let it reach perfection in himself, whilst, within his own sphere of influence he tries to preserve and further it.³ World and life negation means that he regards that existence as something meaningless and sorrowful, accordingly, he resolves to bring life to a standstill by mortifying his will to live and renouncing all activity which aims at improvement of the conditions of life in this world. The most profound affirmation is hard won from estimates of things unbiased by illusion and even wrested from misfortune, while negation is developed in theory despite a naturally serene disposition and happy circumstances.⁴ As the Āryan mind turned from the outer world, in the Rg-Veda, to the inner mystery of the self, in the Upaniṣads, the anthropomorphic nature of gods dwindled in importance; there occurred a disvaluation of ritualistic theology and also of the visible world of nature connected with it.⁵ This tendency was to appear in later Vedānta either as the denial of the reality of the subjective and objective world (monism) or, if the world-reality was affirmed (theism), then, as the denial of the worth of the world, because it was not viewed teleologically as moving towards the goal of perfection. The Upaniṣads and later Vedānta, Advaita and Vaiṣṇava, have a definite aim to escape sorrow and not to overcome it; mokṣa is a deliverance from the bondage of the painful,

1. A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of Veda and Upanishads*, I, 521 and 581.

2. cf., Archibald Edward Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 29.

3. Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, pp. 1, 3.

4. *ibid.*

5. Heinrich Zimmer, *The Philosophies of India*, p. 356.

fleeting, finite experience, a refuge from life's problems, not a bettering of things. Though it is admitted by the critic that the spirit of world denial was mitigated by various factors, such as the very necessity of living, the practice of the priestly calling, propagation of the race, discharge of social debts, demands made by the cult of the manes,¹ yet he insists that attention shifted from the world, which had nothing to attract man, to another world; yearning after eternity made India a stranger to this world,² for eternity is attained only by renouncing and quitting the world. This is the basis of the characterisation of the Indian mind, by unsympathetic critics, as dreamy, hopeless, unpractical,³ completely untouched by the world and, by sympathetic critics, as spiritually other worldly.⁴

Asceticism

Denial of life is exemplified chiefly by exaltation of asceticism in Indian thought. All possible ascetic methods were practised with great thoroughness and were developed into a theoretical and practical technique of yoga. The asceticism of the Rg-Veda, practised even by the gods (Puruṣa-sūkta), was productive of magical potency (tapas) or it was a form of productive labour akin to the intellectual which was considered the necessary preliminary to knowledge. The hymns mention yogīs who exalted themselves into ecstasy through Soma juice, mortification of the flesh and self-hypnosis. Later the spiritual element came to the forefront and all the four āśramas were ascetically regulated. As asceticism was primarily the method of producing extraordinary holy states in which alone salvation could be achieved⁵ it comprised conduct transcending varṇa-dharma and meant flight from the world into contemplation and ecstatic states.

Western critics adjudge the results of yoga conscientiously practiced to be nothing but folly and idiocy.⁶ The aspiration to attain that state very much akin to

1. Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 40.

2. Max Müller, A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 9.

3. G. W. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 16.

4. Müller, loc. cit.

5. Taitti. Upa., I, 9, 3; Kena Upa., 33; Chān. Upa., II, 23.

6. cf., Henri Bergson, Religion and Morality, p. 212; also T. H. and Julian Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 71.

annihilation was a sign of a people unhappy and tired of life because of its unremitting cruelty. The speculative daring of the Indian mind, its belief in the power of the mind to subdue matter, further stressed the sense of suffering and weariness.¹ In turn, asceticism was bound to have a further depressing effect because no middle point was found between mental excitement of ecstasy and torpid indifference when outside it, and all products of Indian mind show this stamp of monotony, compounded of satiety and ungratified zeal.

Spiritual and ethical development has two aspects of negative and positive effort. The value of exercise and discipline was well understood in India, and it constituted the negative element in spirituality. But Indian spirituality demanded excessive mortification of the flesh, exercises in self-submergence, annihilation of the senses through mental effort, silence, fasting, self-torture, even to the point of cutting off of all desires. All this was meant to overcome all distractions and temptations of life but no commensurate effort was made to develop positive qualities or to find expression for individual and social activities. But asceticism is meaningless except as a step towards moral affirmation.² Vedantic asceticism was purely individualistic, consisting of personal discipline only, without reference to the social motive or the social order, opposed to all mundane ends since these lead only to advantage in the present and future life but not to the highest goal.

Critics declare that among the many religious motives of ascetic practices, such as desire to propitiate the unseen in times of trouble, the wish to work out salvation by conquering the flesh, the desire to prepare for union with the divine by purification or despair arising from disillusionment and defeat in the battle of life,³ the last is

1. cf., Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 65.

2. cf., W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 44.

3. cf., James, *op. cit.*, p. 291: Asceticism has many motives:

- a) expression of organic hardihood, disgusted with too much ease;
- b) temperance in food, clothing, chastity, non-pampering of the body, is fruit of love of purity shocked by what savours of the sensual;
- c) fruit of love i. e., sacrifice to the Deity;
- d) ascetic mortification due to pessimistic feelings about self and theological beliefs concerning exaltation, escape from suffering by penance;
- e) psychopathic mortification carried to irrational lengths to get interior consciousness feeling right again;
- f) perversity of bodily sensibility i. e., pain-giving stimuli are actually felt as pleasure.

the motive force of Vedāntic asceticism. The element of asceticism and world surrender involved in the idea of sannyāsa, imposed as it was on the whole of Indian society, involving labour, fatigue, pain, is interpreted by critics as implicit judgment of pessimistic outlook on life. The conclusion is that Vedānta texts virtually became the burden of world weariness and listlessness and this is the unheroic side of asceticism.

Quietism

The emphasis on gnosis and ascetic ecstasy was not conducive to the development of an adequate, rational methodology for conduct in the world. Since both deny the ephemeral and meaningless appetites and activities of everyday life they are bound to give rise to an attitude of mind both passive and other-worldly. The truly religious man leads a "workless" life of mendicancy or in highest meditation his consciousness must be emptied of all consciousness of relations and cares of life. For the common man also there was no way of deriving a philosophy of conduct of everyday life from the goal set before him, rather was his conduct regulated by traditional and ritualistic rules of caste.

Quietism is the outcome of highest religion and philosophy,¹ since the desire is to attain the goal of rest from the round of rebirth in a state of profound and deathlike trance in which all powers of mind, emotion and will cease to operate. Asceticism and knowledge are here not the means to the end of subduing lower powers for a higher good but the very cessation of life, the withering of all powers, talents and actions, and finally, of character itself.²

Psychologically, the quantity of active impulse affects the attitude towards life. The full flow of vigorous activity gives rise to a hopeful view, whereas inactivity, disinclination to movement if combined with a naturally depressed temperament, gives rise to the view that life is unalterably bad and beyond redemption. So men drift into pessimism due to weariness and distaste for exertion. Hence, this philosophy is a rationalisation of the lack of energy and exertion which results from intense heat,

1. cf., Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, 44.

2. cf., Arthur Schopenhauer, *World as Idea and Will*, pp. 490, 494, 500.

which makes peace seem the greatest bliss and meditation the highest duty. Death, disease, famine and pestilence bring tragedy so that man's effort to better his lot consists in providing the fewest possible hostages to life i. e., he must divest himself of all possessions, all activities. An opposite explanation of "quietism" is that kindness of nature, simplicity of life in which needs were fulfilled in small social organizations, were bound to develop the inactive and non-combative, the reflective and non-social side of human nature.¹

It will be noted that the charge of quietism is brought from two angles. The practical discipline or the means employed by Vedāntawere such as to prevent the operation of active manly virtues.² Secondly, after the attainment of the goal no work was left for man to do. Since he had conquered karma, his soul became perfectly quiescent, every action would derogate from the state of rest and involve him further in the world of suffering. At best, forms of conduct are prescribed for helping the soul to attain deliverance, but stilling of karma i. e., quietism of renunciation and surrender of will is the goal of both monistic and theistic forms of Vedānta. The purgative or ascetic value of work is admitted but not the meritorious i. e., there are no "fruits of work." The striving is for inactive action, passionless life, so that all work as such is regarded as useless and futile. In the absence of a gospel of works, of love and mercy, compassion and charity, there was bound to be a further deepening of the depressing effect.

Non-Ethical Character

The most striking of all the symptoms of escapism in Vedānta, according to the critics, is its non-ethical or amoral character.³ The more extreme critics not only levy the charge of indifference to morality, but active encouragement of immorality.⁴

They refuse to admit the presence of any moral virtues whatsoever. However, since the Śrutis, Smṛtis, Purāṇas and Itihāsa are so full of mention of virtues,

1. cf., F. M. Müller, *India What can It Teach Us?*, p. 1.

2. cf., F. M. Müller, *Collected Works*, p. 192.

3. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, pp. 361-362.

4. cf., N. N. S. Gore, *A Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems*, p. 278; also G. A. Jacob, *Manual of Hindu Pantheism*, p. 122.

cardinal and non-cardinal, these are interpreted in the light of asceticism, ritualism, superstition or mythology, and, thus, dismissed. The altruism of the highly prized virtues of hospitality, liberality, forgiveness, truth, purity, compassion, is sought to be neutralised by discovering illogical, anti-social, defective character of the conduct enjoined and practiced.¹

Critics find it particularly hard to reconcile themselves to the supposed absence of social and cultural ethics in Vedānta. Paradoxically, Hinduism which is characterised as a social system (represented by dharma) is said to allow little place for society in its thought and practice of philosophy. The highest goal is salvation pure and simple, and to this goal the world and its duties are incidental, not essential. Dharma has reference only to the individual's own perfection (Ātmasiddhi), there is no recognition of social duties i. e., humanitarian moral ideals are not present in any positive sense, but only the virtues of passive and negative tolerance.² Non-social self-sufficiency is the keynote of the law of karma which prevents development of the idea of suffering for the sake of others, and positive moral aid to others is self-contradictory. Swarāja or self-rule alone supplies the principle of moral conduct, neither society nor state nor, even, God can supply the rule. The zeal is for self-improvement without reference to society. Each is to be a lamp unto himself.

In the moral discipline for moksa the bias is towards service of God and not towards service of man. Vedānta in its monistic phase leaves out altogether the relation of man to man and makes the religious relation consist only between the individual soul and God; identity with the divine is achieved in a solitary state and not in society. And even theistic Vedānta while admitting the soul's membership of a fellowship of devotees and sharing of mutual joys and sorrows, does not insist upon the world of human relations as a necessary corollary of the service of God. Theistic service is merely submission to the will of God, independence from a world of human relations, in which one might perform works of charity and love. It provides for only religious

1. cf., E. W. Hopkins, *Ethics of India*, pp. x-xi, summary of J. Mackenzie's criticisms.
 2. cf., Rudolf Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and Contrasted*, p. 84: Negative form of the golden rule is found in Yajñavalkya Samhita, II, 65: न तत् परस्मिन् अस्मिन् च तावत् प्रतिवृत्त्यम् अद् व्यतिमानः; but not the active (positive) form of command to love one's neighbour.

virtues and activities. Hence Vedānta fails to provide for a philosophy of society on moral lines and leaves tradition to be the only guide in these matters. Such lack of socio-moral activities is a sure symptom of denial of life and world.¹

The critics discover that the goal and scope of ascetic discipline allows no scope for individuality. In Advaita the very recognition of individual soul is a logical inconsistency, a concession made to the empirical and temporary state of being and Śāṅkara formally denies even the existence of individual soul² or depreciates it.³ This approach results in a complete devaluation of personality.⁴ The chief problem of Vedānta being the very disjunction of the phenomenal self from the transcendental, it aims to remove this separation by rejection of phenomenality altogether. Search for reality does not take place through self-development, expression or through one's contribution to the world, but through the obliteration of the obstacles and allurements of self.⁵ There is not only the attempt to rise above selfishness but even to rise above self; the two are confused and equally condemned.

The destruction of individuality is effected by suppression of all desires and volitions. While most people struggle for satisfaction of desires to a certain point, the Indian mind finds little zest in the struggle and looks only to the ending of all desires. No possible worth is recognised in desires and the blame is put on the faculty in itself, as well as on its working.⁶ Any desire, however good, is tied up with the separative ego, therefore, the ideal man is the akāmyamān.⁷ Through yoga and sannyāsa the twin evils of desire and plurality-consciousness are suppressed after which all action ceases to affect the man.⁸ This is objected to by the critic on the ground of psychological impossibility, since all natural motive, meaning and material content has been removed, as well as on the ground of its being a worthless and sterile ideal likely to produce nothing but hardness of heart. The attempt of the Gita to reinstate the

1. cf., Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 243.

2. vide S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 19; I, 4, 22.

3. vide ibid., II, 3, 50: Upādhis of self are neutral.

4. cf., Alfred Lyall, Asiatic Studies, II, 86, quotes Vamadeva Sastri.

5. cf., Archibald Edward Gough, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 11.

6. vide Br. Upa., IV, 4, 33; Chān. Upa., VIII, 1, 1-6.

7. vide Br. Upa., III, 5; IV, 4, 22; Taitti, Upa., II, 4; Katha Upa., IV, 5.

8. Chān. Upa., IV, 14.

ideal of perfect action through self-devotion to God and discharge of one's social duties is a mere rationalisation to hide the non-ethical and world negating principle.

Critics take most serious exception to the Vedāntic tendency to transcend empirical moral distinctions and standards i. e., supermoralism. Vedānta not only holds the way to salvation to be open but also posits the attainment of the goal as an actual experience. Critics find that the only use of the ideal of perfected freedom in life (jivana mukti) is that it gives a sort of "moral holiday," because such a being is consciously released from the call of duty in this world. The liberated man is a law unto himself, he has no more religious duties, or even moral and social duties; he has crossed sin by achieving identity with the Ātman; his limitations are ended.¹ At the final stage of attainment the ethical progress achieved by karmic ascent is simply left behind. Perfection being a higher concept than good, the highest state is opposed to the ethical state, according to the critics. It is dangerous to hold such a principle that one who has realized reality cannot sin. Vedānta does not guard against the morally disastrous effects of this, for if past and future good and evil are of no effect to the saint they can be practised without effect and danger of antinomian conduct is not averted by the ideal of dvandvātīta.² If there is no excitement to evil, at least there is also no protection to the good, nor is it possible for the enlightened man to do good, since he has risen above all desires and motives. The highest stage does not give support to morality, it does not bear any fruit in the conduct of life. If such a transcendental ethics is the determinant of the morality of every man, then, this is no better than immorality.

Causes of Escapism

The above symptoms taken together constitute the escapist nature of Vedānta philosophy. The critics are not slow in discovering the causes of these "undesirable" traits. We will consider only the more theoretical or philosophical causes adduced by them.

1. vide Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22-23; Taitti. Upa., II, 5-9; Chān. Upa., I, 2, 8; IV, 14, 3; Kena Upa., 34; Muṇḍ. Upa., III, 2, 9; Praśna Upa., V, 5; Maitrī Upa., VI, 18.

2. vide Kauśī. Upa., III, 1; Chān. Upa., VII, 12, 3; Br. Upa., IV, 4, 23.

Intellectualism

Many critics object to what they call the "intellectualist" character of Vedānta. All Indian philosophies have a common presupposition, almost amounting to a dogma, that knowledge is the single absolute path to highest perfection. This is not knowledge of the things of the world or even of nature or social life, but a philosophical gnosis by which the essence of the world is realized. From this intellectualism certain consequences follow in the outlook and conduct of the people.

Vedāntic intellectualism operates in a peculiar form, divorced from conation, though allowing for play of affective elements.¹ The error of intellectualism lies in its belief that the reality of subjective and objective world is to be sought in conscious thought alone.² The extreme form of such a belief is seen in Vedānta, which finds its only indubitable certainty in affirming the sole reality of the consciousness of the philosophical subject, after the elimination of all internal and external, adventitious and changeable elements during the philosophising process.

Monistic Vedānta advances the postulate of two kinds of knowledge. The lower contains all ordinary experiences, but its highest point is not the Absolute, while in the higher knowledge the unity of reality is so firmly established that it is not knowledge in any ordinary sense. It may be allowed that the standpoint of philosophy is different from the purely commonsense or even scientific one, but Vedānta provides for no meeting point of the two, which are found to be absolutely separate in their aims, beliefs and functions.³ The weakness of Vedāntic intellectualism is that it cannot relate the two and dictates a total annihilation of the lower sphere instead of its sublimation in the higher.⁴ This method is wasteful and negative, since, by it, conclusions of intellect at the lower level are not preserved or fulfilled in the higher intuition, but merely cancelled. Were the negation of the lower to imply that inadequate teaching may lead to more adequate, there is scope for further intellectual effort, but if the total falsity of the lower is averred, it cannot lead to anything,

1. cf., E. R. E., Vol. IX, p. 812.

2. cf., Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, pp. 132, 134.

3. vide *Mund. Upa.*, III, 1, 10; III, 2.

4. W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 116.

and the impossibility of certainty in that sphere means that intellect must lose heart. Intellectualism ends in pessimism as it becomes conscious of its own limits. The mind is completely shut up to itself and the goal is to know the self undisturbed by knowledge of the outside world.¹ The abstract method results in utter neglect and lack of interest in outside facts.

Intellectualism of Vedānta leads, perforce, to an abstract, agnostic view of reality. Finding all categories insufficient, monistic Vedānta denies all these to reality, and at the same time the idea of bare unity and simplicity so fascinates the mind that any breach of that unity in the Absolute is regarded as a degradation of it. On the principle that "all determination is negation" the conclusion of the unknowability of reality follows, since it is not knowable in terms of any empirical category. Due to its abstracting procedure Vedānta reaches the conclusion of agnosticism, and from this abnormal treatment of human nature intellectual hopelessness is bound to result.

Such intellectualism may satisfy the intellect but is too detached from the practical realm of facts. The doctrine of unreality of the lower level of existence and knowledge obstructs all attempts to grapple with and to surmount its difficulties. Vedāntic intellectualism suggests the method of escaping reality and its evils by thinking them out of existence, and not by trying to solve them by the higher knowledge.²

Critics find the Vedāntic concentration on truth and the consequent neglect of the values of goodness and beauty to be defective and unsound.³ The conclusion that reality cannot be known since the world does not depict its nature means that man must attain some sort of mystical condition, which has no reference to social life and ordinary human concerns. In fact, all contact with the world is felt as a disturbance of ecstasy and the desire to operate in or to explain it vanishes. "Highest knowledge of self is achieved by two techniques, a systematic disparagement of the world as illusion or as an equally thorough going realization of the sheer materiality of it all."⁴

1. cf., Dorothea Jane Stephen, *Studies in Early Indian Thought*, p. 104.

2. cf., Urquhart, *op. cit.*, p. 248; also W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 153.

3. cf., R. E. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 30; also M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, p. 262.

4. Heinrich Zimmer, *The Philosophies of India*, p. 12.

The negation of life and world is the inevitable consequence and knowledge is prized as a means of escape.

Intellectualism or gnosis taking the mystical form had a further consequence in the form of asceticism, which was its essential prerequisite. It was not so much a balanced asceticism of moderation amidst the sensual pleasures and temptations of life in the light of its higher elements, but mere "moral suicide" due to speculative dogma and thoroughly pessimistic in relation to present life.¹ Since the world did not represent the pure truth for which the knower was striving it had to be overcome altogether. Intellect asserted its sole reality by annihilating all other factors of human nature by the mental power of meditation. The path of knowledge and the dawning of knowledge acted as a suppressor and quietener of all desires, volitions and relations.

The intellectualist method of Vedānta is further aggravated by its individualistic and aristocratic bent. It treats of the individual instead of the community and preaches a salvation only from the individual standpoint, society being treated only as a means to an end. Formation of a "redemptive aristocracy" is bound to result because gnosis is not accessible to everyone.² The highest reality of Advaita has no regard for the religious needs of common man but is preserved for a few true philosophers; for the majority a lower level is assigned. Theistic Vedānta has a less patronising and exclusive attitude, as it offers a concrete reality which may combine both metaphysical validity and religious satisfaction at the highest level. But the critics find Vedānta to be essentially exclusive in that its highest truth is a jealously guarded privilege of the few high-born individuals, possessing the very pure, elevated and spiritual qualifications for the pursuit of the Vedāntic path, which is much beyond the reach of the common man.³ Since the larger part of humanity is excluded from the highest religious goal and must consent to remain in ignorance this creates a sense of hopelessness and despondency in them; while in the best of the privileged few there is a chilling of mind and heart for they cannot share their blessed state with others, in

1. J. Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 46.

2. Max Weber et al., *The Religions of India*, p. 331.

3. Urquhart, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

the worst of them there is arrogance resulting from conviction of their superiority.

As Vedānta puts its whole faith in the power of thought it follows that the basis of religion and philosophy in India is metaphysical, not moral.¹ The absolute disregard of conation and minimal scope of emotion in Vedāntic intellectualism was bound to have an adverse effect in the field of conduct. The corrective effect of will and practical action being absent there was nothing to check the exaggeration of abstract thought in monistic Vedānta or to prevent the extreme emotionalism of later theistic Vedānta.² Since Vedānta aims at the destruction of empirical and psychical mechanism and appeals to non-dual consciousness in its aspect of pure knower this explains the absence of proper morality in it. Bondage is described as false thinking and the suffering consequent upon it, but not wrong willing. Hence liberation is sought in the form of new knowledge only, but this is an unsatisfactory idea unless the effect of that knowledge on the will of the knower is made clear.³

The conception of mokṣa by knowledge is found everywhere in Vedānta, and religious ritual, worship and even good conduct is no longer required. At best, the effort is to be delivered from one's own sins and not to aim at overcoming evil and sin in society generally. Knowledge does overcome evil,⁴ but critical thought was turned upon life and morality to prove its non-validity for those who have reached the highest knowledge. The conclusion is not that the knower becomes virtuous but that "knowledge cancels past sins and permits the knower unblushingly to continue in what seems to be much evil with impunity."⁵ Notwithstanding the insistence on good conduct in many places knowledge of a doctrine is more powerful to save than commission of moral fault is powerful to destroy.⁶ The search for the Divine in intellectualist Vedānta is apart from conduct and ethics, since the doctrine of Ātman is continually coming in conflict with our consciousness of moral distinction and necessity of choice between good and evil, which are seen as mere verbal distinctions in the level of partial knowledge.

1. cf., Alfred Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, II, 46 and 86, quoting Vamadeva Sastri.

2. cf., E. R. E., Vol. IX, p. 812.

3. cf., Paul Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 177.

4. vide Chān. Upa., V, 10, 9-10; V, 24, 3; Kauśī. Upa., III, 1.

5. R. E. Hume, *Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 60.

6. Dorothea Jane Stephen, *Studies in Early Indian Thought*, p. 106.

Critics hold that the doctrine of jñāna may not produce evil living, but its neglect of morality produces bad results on untrained minds.¹

Pantheism

According to critics, Vedānta has been drawn towards forms of pantheistic doctrines² which have had pernicious results in the field of religion and morals.³ The popular mind finds it easier to accept the immanent forms of mysticism,⁴ while the intellectualists find pantheism satisfactory because of its protean nature and its vagueness of character.

"Pantheism means God created the world by transforming Himself into the universe . . . the terms God and universe become synonymous and the idea of God is retained not to break the tradition."⁵ The pantheistic formula stands: All is God and God is All. The first phase makes God all-pervasive i. e., all that exists is divine, which is no better than naturalism. The second phase denies the existence of anything which is not the Deity i. e., the search for the principle of unity ends in idealistic monism. While the Upaniṣads show forth both phases, the acosmic phase being the subjective emphasis on unity alone and the cosmic phase being the objective deification of totality, the critics find the prevailing tendency of Vedānta to be an idealism in which the intellectualistic position of negating the finite is adopted.

Pantheism as an intellectual doctrine existed from the very beginning of religion and morals in India, coextensive with social and national life. India is the home of pantheism, radically pantheistic and that from its cradle onwards. The critic adjudges Vedic polytheism and pantheism to be the lower and higher forms of one world-view. Henotheism is sometimes verging on monotheism and other times on pantheism.⁶ The Rg-Veda declares, "He is himself the very universe. He is whatever is, has been and

1. cf., N. N. S. Gore, Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems, pp. 276-277.
2. cf., G. W. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 147.
3. cf., G. A. Jacob, Manual of Pantheism, p. 5, quotes Cowell.
4. vide Rāmācarita-Mānasa, बाल काण्ड। श्लो० ७ गः ७६ ईश्वरं जगं जीवन्तं वाचं च शमाम्नां जायते अविनाशकम्
परं कर्मणः सदां ज्योतिः जुगं पानि।
5. Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 160.
6. cf., A. Barth, The Religions of India, p. 28; also Samuel Johnson, Oriental Religions and Their Relation to Universal Religion, p. 107.

shall be."¹ By empiric distinction between the First Being as cause and the world as its effect the Vedas come to the pantheistic standpoint.² In the Upanisads the idealistic conception unites the self with all or universe and gives control of all things from that source.³ No other doctrine ever seriously challenged this pantheism which was able to maintain its primacy against other doctrines and to colour them as well as popular beliefs. Theistic sects giving devotion to a personal deity as the creator and saviour, hence, transcendental God, cannot accept the identity doctrine theoretically, but, inconsistently, pantheistic ideas colour their ideas from the very base.⁴

Such pantheism merely serves to enhance pessimism and world negation in Vedānta. Emotionally, the pantheistic devotion of the saints produced a dreamy, unpractical mood in which there was negation of all particulars because God was all. It became a refuge from the glaring inequalities of political and social life when moral effort of the people was weak, a metaphysical justification of withdrawal from social responsibility, a flight rather than a victory.⁵ Unlike normal philosophy which explains the whole of life, pantheism declares life's difficulties to be dreams, but since these nightmares cannot be escaped the gloom deepens.⁶ With loss of interest in the world life becomes worthless and miserable and human ideals valueless. Pantheism may be universally attractive but its fascination is unhealthy, the symptom of a disease, because it offers freedom from the ills of life by running away from them and declaring them to be unreal.⁷ But the conviction that evils and pains are inherent in the world process prevents confidence in realization of higher values or overcoming of evil by good effort. Thus the pessimism is deepened, there is increase of vacuity and excessive naturalism.

Absolutistic pantheism leads to God as the last product of abstraction,

1. R. V., X, 90.

2. L. D. Barnett, *Brahma Knowledge*, p. 20.

3. vide *Chān. Upa.*, III, 14, 1; *Br. Upa.*, II, 1, 20: *सर्वं ब्रह्म*

4. cf., M. A. Macauliffe, *Sikh Religion*, Vol. I, p. lxii; Nicol Macnicol, *Indian Theism from Vedic to Muhammadan Period*, p. 1.

5. W. S. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, p. 21.

6. *ibid.*, p. 587.

7. cf., G. A. Jacob, *Manual of Hindu Pantheism*, p. 4.

psychological and cosmical. God is without parts, passions or positive attributes. Such an empty characterless real makes the world process meaningless and interest in the actual impossible.¹ Knowledge of Ātman does not make the meaning of the world clear to man, but frees him from phenomenal attachments. It deprives religion, faith, love, hope of all concrete objects and gives rise to worship of a cold, passionless and resigned type. Promise of absorption in some unknowable reality creates intellectual discouragement. "What a prospect dark and void, this supreme spirit before which all human endeavour, all noble ambitions, all hope, all love is blighted."² Pantheistic reality is cause of depression to the common man.

The pantheistic goal of obliterating the distinction of subject and object in gnosis, ending the intellectual and moral separation of the soul, can only lead to a philosophy of renunciation in actual practice. In the path of pantheistic mysticism there is little mention of positive duties, even a positive under-rating, if not scorn, of all religious cults and rituals. All categories, even that of personality, being inapplicable to reality, because all are too limiting, there is a serious disvaluation of these categories. The unity and impersonality of the whole calls for the surrender and belittling of everything that is human. The rejection of all human motivations, good and bad, is productive of indifference, neglect of all active powers.³ The pantheistic emphasis on the perfection and majesty of the divine whole prevents particularistic activity of will. Pantheistic seeking after freedom from action means denial of human responsibility, and the call for moral reformation is mere "moral and religious gymnasium."⁴ The Vedānta call for action in the pantheistic setting of the Gītā loses much of its ethical force.

Pantheism makes the "All" a mode of the Infinite and Eternal, and progress does not mean that there is any change for the better by individual effort, here and now; there can only be recognition of that which is already real. Progress requires the background of space, time, multiplicity, causality and moral principles, but all categories

1. cf., E. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, 108-109.

2. Lanman, *Beginnings of Hindu Pantheism*, p. 24.

3. Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

4. W. S. Urquhart, *Pantheism and the Value of Life*, p. 395.

being denied to pantheistic reality there is impossibility of progress. Pantheism is equal to determinism and the fatalism consequent upon it.¹ Vedānta stands for the transcendental freedom of Ātman but in the physico-moral world, whether real or unreal, all is predestined by the nature of God. Even transcendental freedom is minimised since the individual who is to attain it must put away all his individuality. A creed of determinism and deification of the actual also involves pessimism, since the actual has a mingling of good and evil and the absence of conviction that good must increase also adds to the hopelessness in man.

The critic expresses great indignation at the pernicious effects of pantheistic Vedānta on moral life and activity. The abstract reality obliterates all distinctions, hence all moral distinctions. When a man believes his final rest to be in such a reality all moral obligations are bound to be relaxed.² In theistic Vedānta God is the highest repository of moral perfections, but so untouched by the world that the conception has no inspiration for moral activity. In monism the personal-conception is a mere myth, while reality is devoid of all qualities and activities. From this follows the consequence that "Vedāntic authorities have asserted that they are not subject to law, rule, virtue or vice, injunction or prohibition."³ If reality is all-inclusive it is an empty category. If God is in all things He is equally absent in all things, and pantheism does not differ from atheism.⁴ The blurring of distinctions easily passes into pessimism, for if all is equally divine it makes no difference whether we call everything nothing, good or bad. Pantheism strikes at the root of morality by taking away the sense of free agency and making sin and self both unreal. This is a comfortless and paralysing view, destroying the personality of God and the moral personality of man.

Mysticism

Mysticism as an earnest search for God and great longing for Him through direct and immediate experience appeared in Indian thought at the very beginning and culminated in the Upaniṣads. Mysticism and pantheism tend to strengthen each other in Vedānta.

1. cf., Robert Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 336.

2. cf., Alfred Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*, II, 33, quotes Vamadeva Sastri.

3. Bannerjee, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 381.

4. W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 156.

The vision of the cosmic being¹ inspired the pantheistic conception of immanence and led to the nature-mysticism of theism, while spiritual mysticism culminated in the identity of Ātman and Brahman. The divine has different connotations, so that the relationship to God and even to nature is different among mystics. Advaita does not deny first-hand, direct experience of a personal God and unity of fellowship through devotion, but this is subordinated to a direct realization which is "pure, unspotted . . . in a cool stillness beyond the emotional stimulus of theistic or believing piety, in an ice-cold clarity of pure being and knowing."² The doctrine that mystical consciousness is present in all is the central teaching of the Upaniṣads. Self and God have always been identical and in the state of mystical enlightenment this hidden fact will be manifested. Reason may fail to discover the nature of ultimate reality, but the Vedāntic mystic is driven by the need of the soul to the conviction and actuality of unity with the highest.

Mystics as a class and Indian mystics, specially, are accused of turning away from the active duties of life into an ecstasy of bliss, selfishly enjoyed for its own sake. In fact, the structure of Indian society was so arranged as to allow this flight from life and its duties, for the cultivation of mystical ecstasy. Vedāntic mysticism is concerned with the idea of being exalted above the world.³ The search for the sublimation of individual entity into immortal timelessness (*amṛtva*) destroys the mystic's feeling for past and present; the recovery of transcendent being involves effort to overcome all obstacles in the shape of pairs of opposites (*dvandvātīta*), the value of contradiction in life and thought is denied. The search being carried on in the innermost hidden self, the mystic path involves negation of all activity in the outer world. The sole reality of the soul makes the world inexplicable appearance, an unhappy anomaly, a cosmic mistake of *Avidyā*.⁴ Neither the pure path of gnosis nor of gnosis and devotion, in Vedānta, explains the world in scientific terms. Both are charged with the tendency to "explain it away," but the world remains painful and miserable, unreconciled with mystical reality.

1. Chan. Upa., III, 18.

2. Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism, East and West*, p. 151.

3. cf., Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 3.

4. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

The mystic reality of Vedānta is spiritual and contrasted to the natural, but not active or loving, not infinitely rich in life and experience for the individual self. It is a unity discovered by the device of reflective self-consciousness, ending in the state whose nearest analogy is dreamless sleep. Empirical consciousness and its dualism being overcome in that ineffable experience the mystic Absolute of Vedānta gets its perfection from its contrast-effect from the finite; whatever content is found in it is felt to be due to finite consciousness and man must approach unconsciousness in order to possess it.¹ It is an aberration of mysticism which Vedānta does not escape that God is called the Infinite, but is nothing but the indefinite, dissolving all distinctions into the abyss of bare indeterminism.

The result of such an aspiration after such a reality is complete loss of self-hood. The mystic passion for oneness, deliverance from pangs of separation due to ignorance does not only destroy false parts of the self but its very nature, though theistic Vedānta seeks to retain separate individuality to make devotion to the will of the Supreme Person possible. Mysticism is, by definition, non-individualistic and abolishes the "I," "me" and "mine." It involves realization of the finiteness and imperfection of self, and purgation and purification of it by self-denial, ending in union, but Vedāntic mysticism insists on a further stage of absorption into the Infinite, which is the logical corollary of the pantheism of oriental mysticism.² Critics point out two undesirable results of this. Firstly, since there is substitution of divine for human nature, there is danger of spiritual arrogance. Identification of individual self with the universal self is conducive to pride in Vedāntic mystic, that in his own being he carries the Infinite. The Nietzschean superman is a miserable creature compared to Brāhmanic superman, in terms of arrogance.³ Secondly, mystic denial of the impulse of life and personality springing from world weariness, becomes passive, quietist, resigned and contemplative.⁴ In Advaita, the mukta leaves all activity and reposes in oneness. Śaṅkara uses all his dialectic to cloud and twist the

1. cf., Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, p. 193.

2. Underhill, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171.

3. Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, p. 33.

4. cf., Nicol Macnicol, *The Making of Modern India*, p. 99.

clear meaning of the Gītā which praises deeds dedicated to Īśvara.¹ Even theistic Vedāntins receive no inspiration for voluntary activity from mystic experience of the actionless God. In either case the goal is rest and content (sānti) and not perfected activity of the perfected and unified soul (āpta).²

The mystical experience derives its emotional content from two values. Subjectively or in relation to the mystic its value lies in giving joy to him, objectively its value lies in its beneficial effects in the outer world, regardless of its emotional value to the mystic, painful or pleasurable.³ Vedāntic mysticism is found to be too deeply impressed by the first aim and the second is scarcely noticed by it. It searches for a good which is outside the world, but the evils it seeks to escape are sickness, old age, pains etc., and not sin, unworthiness, unrighteousness. Experience of Impersonal Ātman-Brahman or even the Personal Brahman is not "a hunger and thirst after righteousness." Thus Indian mysticism has no ethic, as mystical identity is non-ethical and ethical nature is not attributed to reality.⁴ From this experience there is no message for man and society. The Vedāntic mystic knows the unity of being from which there is experience of bliss, but no mystical "love" for man results, nor any zeal for service of others.⁵

Mokṣa

There is nothing of which we hear more in Indian thought than immortality or final beatitude, the end of human aspiration. It is the burden of precept, philosophy and prayer,⁶ indicated by many terms, mokṣa, mukti, rakṣaṇa, śreya, niḥśreya, which the critic finds to be not identical with redemption, rescue, welfare or salvation. The Vedānta message of Ātman-Brahman gives rise to effort for freedom from the bondage of the present, visible and temporal existence. This pessimism owes much to the

1. Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism, East and West*, p. 207.

2. cf., *ibid.*

3. cf., *ibid.*, p. 188: The difference is expressed in the question that the mystic might ask himself. "How can I win perpetual happiness" or "How can I become righteous in the eyes of God."

4. cf., Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

5. cf., Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

6. Rudolf Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and Contrasted*, p. 16.

speculation about the theory of being.¹ The infinite is bliss, and knowledge of this alone leads to salvation. In mokṣa Ātman is revealed, but His revelation is silence.² Though positively realized as sat, cit, ānand, in any sense within the reach of human understanding, that being is non-being, that consciousness is not knowledge of the real, for it remains unknowable, nor is bliss that which is known to us, but that which holds sway in sleep.³ So vague and detachable from experience is the ultimate that it is falling below the level of consciousness and not rising above it to reach unity by way of unconsciousness.⁴ Vedānta offers rest in the eternal which is too much like the sleep of death, complete annihilation,⁵ and there is consequent increase in the misery and hopelessness of man.

The critic explains that the world being a meaningless "wheel" rolling on eternally, with finite souls caught in this web of suffering and imperfection, the prospect of an indefinite number of lives and deaths fills the mind with horror, man struggles to divest himself from time, change and evils supposed to be inherent in temporal life. The extreme radicalism of "world denial was due to the world-image of Vedānta which left no other choice possible."⁶ This pathetically sombre representation of a transitory death-consecrated nature needed to be counteracted by the concept of a bliss all the more positive. But the goal of Vedānta does not attract man so much by its winningness and beauty, as that man is driven to it by weariness and dislike of life's sorrow and bleak prospects.⁷ Indifference to the world and evasion of its problems is associated with mokṣa. The bondage to be escaped is more important and not the liberty that is gained.⁸

The idea of self-conscious individuality did not stand out in the mind of Vedāntins. "Amṛtvam" is a qualitative dimension not equated with hope of continued

1. Sydney Cave, *Redemption*, p. 65.

2. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

3. cf., Archibald Edward Gough, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 267; Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 156; Henry Haigh, *Some Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, pp. 74, 36; N. N. S. Gore, *A Rational Refutation of Hindu Philosophical Systems*, p. 274.

4. W. S. Urquhart, *Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 120.

5. cf., E. D. Soper, *The Inevitable Choice*, pp. 136-137.

6. Max Weber et al., *The Religions of India*, p. 167.

7. Nicol Macnicol, *The Making of Modern India*, p. 130.

8. cf. Deussen, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

existence beyond physical dissolution. Mokṣa is not "atonement" of sins, propitiation of God but passing beyond objectivity, duality, merit and demerit of fruit of karma, by release from the fetters (granthi, bandhana) of desires. The path to mokṣa is the technique of apathetic ecstasy, contemplation, in which the effort is to silence all human elements, anxiety, passions, drives, strivings, and consciousness is emptied of all else to make room for the Divine.¹ All power of thought and experience is blurred and confused by mokṣa. In the analogies of the rivers and ocean, salt and water the self that remains in mokṣa can hardly be called self, in any human sense. Selfhood in spatial and temporal order with its distinctions and histories and even its values is lost, as at the highest reach the migrating self is "refunded" into the impersonal self.

Mokṣa has no value in terms of morality. In later Vedānta the distinction of jīvana mukti and videha mukti is clear, but even the former liberation based on the attainment of intuitive knowledge has no reference to moral change. Since the good is connected with desire and the latter is imperfection, mokṣa is above goodness. In the transcendental state such a conclusion may not matter but in the empirical state this provides no counterpoise to the reality of evil. The total failure of will and reason in mokṣa is bound to have the baneful consequence of moral emptiness. No noble life of justice and righteousness follows from mokṣa, there is no rebirth or recreation of man at a higher level, so this characterless state does not help to keep spirituality at a high level of purity.²

Critics take strong exception to the individualistic character of mokṣa. There is no conception in Vedānta of the redemption of society. The relation of society to the individual, with reference to mokṣa, is one of means and end. The value of social virtues lies not in themselves but in their being conducive to the goal of mokṣa for the individual. In videha mukti there is a complete break from society and life. Even in jīvana mukti deliverance does not issue in any social results, for there is no scope in it for moral action of a perfected personality, uniting love and purposeful exertion.³

1. cf., Gough, op. cit., p. 235.

2. cf., Deussen, op. cit., pp. 361-362; Sydney Cave, Redemption, pp. 74-75; Gough, op. cit., p. 267.

3. cf., Henry Haigh, Some Leading Ideas of Hinduism, p. 135.

Moksa is only for the recluse, the monk, the devotee, but the majority, failing the final knowledge, are debarred from the goal and have to submit to ordinary practices of dharma. Since moksa is not the fulfilment but the negation of dharma, it is merely the negation of the social morality followed by common humanity.

Māyā

Of all the doctrines of Vedānta the one that is found to be the primary cause of its escapist attitude is the doctrine of illusion. The theists have objected strongly to the reduction of the world to unreality, while the monists have just as strenuously tried to maintain the positiveness of world appearance, while denying its eternalness. In the monistic world-view, the modern critic finds the central doctrine of Māyā the most objectionable in view of its effects on the philosophical and popular outlooks of the Indian mind. The effect is so pernicious that even where the doctrine of reality is advanced, it produces the idea of the undesirability of the world. The representative temper of Vedānta is that of Māyā, in which all schools admit the inadequacy of human means, thoughts and language to transcend the names and forms which constitute the world.

Classical Vedānta and its modern scholars are divided about the exact meaning of Māyā, the philosophical and psychological motives for its adoption, its vagueness of nature (inexplicability), its exact point of origin in the evolution of Vedānta. The critic, while willing to grant that Māyā may not be taken as an out and out principle of illusion, argues that that is the effect of the doctrine on many minds. Śaṅkara does not guard sufficiently against the illusory interpretation.¹ As for the realistic standpoint adopted by Śaṅkara in refuting the Buddhist opponents, that is either judged as an outright contradiction of his theoretical stand of mystic intuition of the world's non-finality or as a methodological device by which the provisional concession of reality of external world is made a step in the final refutation of it.² Hence Advaita realism is but a further support of Māyāvāda.

1. cf., W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 57.

2. *ibid.*, p. 98; cf., Haigh, *op. cit.*, p. 97: Realism is but a psychological position adopted by Śaṅkara and not a real position. Hence, mere "opportunism in argument."

Mayāvada completes the negation of the world. The first degree of independent and substantial existence is alone real, philosophically. The third degree of existence in dreams and illusions is called illusion both by philosophy and commonsense, but Vedānta degrades the second degree also to the level of the third. The latter two are "avastu" in comparison with the first which is "vastu." As Māyā implies the unseen to be more real than the seen the defect of materialism is avoided, but from the proclamation of unreality of the seen a disesteem of facts follows, a distrust of the natural world, which merely hides the real and is not a revelation of it. The vyāvahārika level of commonsense realism or even scientific investigation is so divorced from the highest spiritual level that the Vedāntist cannot escape the temptation to leave behind all difficulties of the lower level. Knowledge of the secular level is unreliable while that of the divine is impossible for the many, or reserved for the few. The mind of man becomes oppressed by the general distrust of facts, lack of faith in the possibility of mastering inconsistencies by reason. Hopelessness ensues and the only possible attitude seems to be one of stoic indifference. The doctrine of Māyā necessarily has a devitalising effect on life since no theoretical or practical conquest of the world is possible. The very admission of Māyā as a mystery becomes an excuse for not attempting to penetrate it.

Not only does this become the basis of transfer of all interest from normal ends and means of the world, but the Vedāntic spiritual quest becomes a journey through unreal objects and experiences; all varied and rich content of the world being dropped out, the journey itself is unreal. The world of becoming in time and space, without any purpose or direction, creation, history, progress, loses its meaning for man. Facts of life are real enough to the common man, but they cannot be related to any purpose of the world-creator, so "the doctrine of Māyā is just an attitude towards life of baffled mistrust, undependability, magic."¹ The world is a magic-show of the Great Magician (Māyin) and the implication of Māyāloka is of something blinding the eye of knowledge, and spiritual development means being uninfluenced by the powerful attraction of its magic charm i. e., the religious man negates life and world by mortifying the will to

1. Devanandan, The Concept of Māyā, p. 184.

live, renouncing all activity for world improvement, not taking any interest in it. Pessimism in regard to the world is the persistent trait of the Indian mind.

The implications of Māyavāda in the sphere of religion are found to be as destructive as in the sphere of the phenomenal. Īśvara, the theistic God, in contrast to the highest reality of Brahman, is empirical only, the first product of Māyā, though still above it; hence monism offers a false God to a false world to the bitter chagrin of theistic Vedānta, which opposes this conclusion with all its might. Nor can the common man find any hope or consolation in this theism which makes God hold only in the world of appearance, not in reality, for he is destined to remain in the sphere of religion, which, he is told, is false, while the philosopher, from his transcendental level of reality, looks down condescendingly on the state of unreality of the majority without making the effort to disturb them. The religious perspective is an error which mistakes God for Brahman and has to be transcended by yoga.

Such conclusions are accentuated by the negation of human personality, which follows upon Māyā. The standpoint of reality postulates that each soul is the whole, undivided Brahman, but the standpoint of Māyā postulates a multiplicity of limited, finite souls in saṃsāra. In reality there is no individual, separative self, for the illusive psychic jīva is no more in it. Such is the destructive zeal of Vedānta that it seeks to suppress altogether the finite and its experiences in favour of the infinite. All that is of value to the individual viz., personal freedom, personality, selfhood, is suppressed as fictitious and empty.¹

With the denial of the reality of the empirical self moral obligations also cease. Morality exists only in view of the soul as distinct from a real body, but Māyāvāda denies the soul's connection with body, mind, senses. Since it explains away all evils with the world there can be no incentive for moral improvement in the individual and society. As the evils and sufferings of an illusory world are also illusory, what need is there for effort on the part of the individual to overcome illusory evils.² There is no need for man to distinguish good from bad, higher from lower value and to

1. cf., Haigh, op. cit., p. 103.

2. cf., A. C. Bouquet, Comparative Religions, p. 103.

labour for the promotion of the good or higher value. Such a depreciation of moral sense makes expediency the highest virtue. All being equally unreal, either man is free to choose as prudence dictates or might becomes the standard of what is morally right.¹

Karma and Punarjanma

In the region of conduct karma and punarjanma are the two most powerful influences. The difference between the attitudes and tones of life between the R̥g-Veda and the Upaniṣads is explained as being due to the rise of belief in transmigration, with which was combined the idea of equating justice in the shape of karma. This is indicative of social crisis in the Upaniṣadic age, in which there was intellectual unrest and growing weariness with the sense-world. Only the assumption of a constantly changing continuum of life connected with the doctrine of the power of the deed could satisfy the moral consciousness of the Vedāntic seers. Later Vedāntins were all imbued with these traditional beliefs, but karma and punarjanma are relative truths, because they only explain samsara and have some connection with the idea of salvation, but all are agreed that with the grasping of highest truth both must vanish.²

According to the critics, these doctrines greatly accentuate the spirit of escapism. Transmigration carrying with it the idea of repeated death is viewed as a curse to be escaped only by destruction of the individuality which is undergoing this curse.³ In the endless succession of lives the importance of a single life is minimised, men are relieved of responsibility in regard to the justice of their fates and actions. Nor has the conception of rebirth any significance of spiritual awakening to truth, but only a straightforward empirical sense of continuity from life to life. Since future life is not consciously connected with the present there is no personal immortality for the ordinary man, it is weary work to plod through hundreds of reincarnations without attaining to any continuous thread of memory. Therefore the view of life as decay and replacement is unrelieved by any theory of instinctive faith in

1. cf., Haigh, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

2. cf., F. M. Müller, *Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 53; *vide supra*, pp. 157ff.

3. cf., Monier Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*, p. 41; Maurice Bloomfield, *Religion of the Vedas*, p. 258.

general advancement of the race or betterment of all, but the utmost that is possible for each is to see to his own uplift and freedom from this worthless world. The misery and vanity of life overcomes joy and hope, and profound pessimism is the ruling factor.

Karma determines all that happens to man and the world. Things are what they are because they cannot be otherwise; karma operates through latent impressions which preordain certain kinds of actions. Objectively, they determine social and external conditions of life and subjectively, mind's attitudes, temperament, pleasurable and painful experiences. The exact process by which they produce their effects is not worked out, but the pattern of desires, thoughts and actions of the ego which constitute bondage are consequences of karma. Thus fatalism sets in in the form of belief that karmic destiny uninfluenced by man controls his whole life and what happens to him, this is expressed in the form of *daiva* or fate, *vidhi* or arranged lot.¹ Concentration on the inexorable and heavy weight of past deed on present plight of man becomes fatalism.²

Since the working out of karma produces new karma, the actual effect is that no hope of immortality illumines the future.³ The conviction arises in the minds of men that good deeds no more than evil can set them free from the wheel of life. This is dualistic pessimism in which good and evil are both made to emphasise evil; evil, because it is evil and good, because its existence suggests the existence of evil.⁴ This is bound to have a depressing effect on individual and society. There is no incentive to moral effort. Man can but quiescently submit to fate and cannot hope to ascend gradually through moral reformation to freedom from sin and evil. History teaches that the effect of karma is to compel men, in revolt from the tyranny of the past, to seek to sever completely the effects of their deeds; as a reaction to an excessive emphasis on karma *mokṣa* takes the shape of entire separation from karma.⁵ The cheerlessness of the doctrine of *mokṣa* as annihilation in pure identity, and belief in karma and transmigra-

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1. cf., L. de La Vallee Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāṇa*, p. 94; Henry Haigh, *Some Leading Ideas of Hinduism*, p. 31.
 2. cf., Devanandan, *The Concept of Māyā*, p. 182.
 3. cf., L. D. Barnett, *Brahma Knowledge*, p. 7.
 4. Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 267.
 5. Sydney Cave, *Redemption*, p. 189.

tion, act and react on each other. Though the identity doctrine is older historically, yet the belief in these doctrines once arising the sense of human misery deepened and escape from saṁsāra became the great goal of Vedānta.

The relation of body and soul and the postulate of good and evil deeds following from these doctrines imply the reality of the world. But in the summum bonum both are transcended and the soul is untouched by bodily conditions, so there is no validity of ethics there and it is relegated to the lower unreal sphere. Thus karma has both ethical and non-ethical implications. As determining both physical environment and man's life it is ethical, but with reference to the liberated and God, who are unaffected by it, it is supra-ethical. Though even the gods are subject to the karmic law the Highest Brahman is exempt, since He refrains from all activity. The hope of even theistic Vedānta for a personal, righteous God is frustrated by the conviction that God, if free from the operation of karma, must be inactive in regard to the world, but if He is active and concerned with the world He will be bound by the law of karma. This increases the sense of misery and futility, because existence is not regulated by a supreme and righteous judge but by spontaneous operation of the soul's experience. Either God or karma must yield, one to the other. But since karma cannot be changed by one iota and law works automatically nothing but inertia, supine submission and acceptance can result from the feeling of being caught up in a soulless machine, moral but godless.

Nor is there any scope in the karma doctrine for consolation in suffering or any motive to relieve the suffering of others. Even if it is believed that human will is strong enough to overcome karmic difficulties, karma in this life remains unchanged. The legalistic idea of justice involves conception of suffering and evil as fruits of or punishment for sins, hence they are deserved. Kindness and mercy are interference with the just law of retribution, hence unjust.¹ Karma has been hostile to the idea of the good life for the individual and society, undermining personal responsibility as the individual begins to think of life as a penance laid on him by an irresistible fate for things done in another existence. Under such fatal individualism the sense of social

1. cf., J. N. Farquhar, *The Crown of Hinduism*, p. 142.

responsibility cannot grow, the individual can not submit passively under evil. Since karma operates individually the egoistic consequence follows that each seeks a solitary salvation and not the redemption of humanity, which alone can make the doctrine satisfactory. Each man working out his own karma can do little for his fellow sufferers, so that there is no scope for sympathy and helpfulness. It carries individualism to an extreme extent and obstructs all motives or incentives or responsibility for fighting of social wrongs or selfless service of God and man. This examination of Indian thought brings out the fact that exaggerated individualistic impulse is a reaction from the fatalism of karma.

Socio-Historical, Geo-Political Factors

Attention has, so far, been directed to those doctrines of Vedānta which, according to the critics, are the fundamental causes of its "escapist" outlook. They, however, do not stop at these, but go on to adduce what might be called socio-historical, geo-political factors, which, they say, have been contributory to Vedantic indifference towards and turning away from the "adventure of life," so much so that one word viz., "transcendence," sums up its distinctive character. They argue that India's flight into the realm of the transcendent must be due to the hopeless and hard conditions of her life, poverty of her natural resources, affording no outlet to the energy and aspirations of her people through normal secular activity. The curious "despair of life" was aggravated by the adverse influence of the tropical climate. Temperate climates are not apt to produce such an attitude of pessimism as does the heat and enervation of India's climes.¹ Geographical monotony, terribleness of nature's forces produce quietism and slight hold on the natural order of things.²

The misery of India's political conditions and history is also adduced as a cause. Political circumstances contributed in producing this curious reluctance to meet life realistically. It is adjudged that political life was less interesting in ancient India than in the west, and the political organizations developed were crude.³

1. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Indian Buddhism*, p. 21; Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

2. cf., R. K. Mukerjee, *A History of Indian Civilization*, I, 82.

3. Dorothea Jane Stephen, *Studies in Early Indian Thought*, pp. 82-83.

Absolute monarchy or tribal oligarchy, system of narrow and unexpanding trade-guilds did not provide scope for exercise of human freedom or development of new or higher forms. Civic life being without lasting or great forms, a constant succession of petty tyrants split up society into castes and prevented the development of a common national feeling.¹ Thus, one of the most important external realms, viz., public affairs, for expression of interest and activity provided no scope, material or comfort for the Indian people. They had to fall back on their inner resources of mind and spirit.

The racial principle is pressed into service by the critic to explain how the buoyant, exultant, world affirmation of early Aryans was toned down and overcome by a gradual admixture of the invaders with the aboriginal Dravidian stock, with the result that the beliefs, superstitions and practices of the latter weakened the mental power of the Aryan race.²

Among the sociological causes, the caste system comes in for the largest share of blame. Some critics have argued that caste with its intolerable yoke of the brāhmanic system, minimisation of the individual added to the depression of the people, but other authorities reject this argument. Even the prevalence of vegetarianism is brought forward as the explanation of religious despondency and quietism, since its cumulative effect over generations is thought to induce a patient, unaggressive and probably despondent habit of mind, and indolence and apathy as the physical result.³

The reason why this conglomeration of causes has been stated is not due to the desire to rationalise by confusing the issue of "escapism," but to point out that, firstly, not only are the critics not agreed about the explanation of escapism, and secondly, to draw attention to the genuine difficulty, admitted by the critics, of disentangling cause from effect in this matter. Neither has the science of psychology devised any theory or satisfactory method of measuring the effect of climate, geography, economy, politics, sociology, ethnology and habits of life of a people on their outlook on life, nor can any historical evidence be found to connect this outlook to the

1. L. de La Vallee Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāna*, p. 16.

2. cf., E. R. E., Vol. IX, p. 812; Heinrich Zimmer, *The Philosophies of India*, p. 459.

3. John Campbell Oman, *Mystics and Ascetics of India*, p. 14.

accumulated distresses oppressing the Indian mind.¹ The reasons advanced are then, singly and in combination, no more than mere unverified hypotheses.² Keeping in mind the difficulty of the above situation the purpose here is to examine the doctrines of Vedanta which are held responsible for the many symptoms constituting "escapism."

Evaluation of Symptoms and Causes of Escapism

Introductory Remarks

At the outset, it is necessary to clear one point in order to avoid confusion. The question of the theoretical doctrine behind the outlook of a time or people is to be distinguished from those psychological sanctions, which, originating in their beliefs and practices, influence them in a certain direction. The truth of a religious or philosophical doctrine is not equivalent to its psychological significance, but is determined by its logical structure. The psychological motivation is derived from the needs of the people and operates as a sanction. An understanding of these psychological factors cannot serve in place of rational judgment of validity and value of a doctrine, though it helps to clarify our understanding of it. Much is made of the necessity of objectivity, freedom from "ulterior motives" or needs, interests etc. or openness of the mind of the thinker, but subjective or psychological motivation cannot be avoided, since it determines the philosophical awareness of the problem and the direction of search for the solution. It is only when ideas are connected with the urgent needs of life and personality or the actual functions of human life that they have any general appeal and actual influence on the action and life of the people.

This points to another aspect of the psychological significance of a philosophy. Since theory and practice act and react upon each other, the question of the effect of the actual operation of philosophy on the minds and lives of a people arises. Modern pragmatism insists that this last factor of successful operation is the determinant of the truth-value of a doctrine; "workability" is the test of truth. This viewpoint

1. E. R. E., Vol. IX, p. 805.

2. cf., E. R. E., Vol. IX, p. 812: The provisional result is that Indian pessimism is at once environmental, temperamental and speculative. Of course, all this is all very tentative and hypothetical.

cannot be accepted, since both true and false ideas and doctrines are manifestly seen to "work" in people's lives, for a longer or shorter time. But, at the same time, this criterion may also not be rejected wholly, since the absolute non-operableness of an idea in life is a prima facie proof of its non-validity. A middle point is clearly indicated. A true doctrine must also justify itself on practical grounds, though not necessarily by being universally and continuously in "successful" operation.

These preliminary remarks will serve to clarify the standpoint from which it is intended to evaluate the symptoms and causes of Vedāntic "escapism." This standpoint has been dictated by the ground adopted by the critic himself. Since his objection to Vedānta is, here, largely on the ground of the undesirable practical, moral and psychological results of that philosophy, the evaluation must also be based on the same ground. Therefore, though the following interpretation of the possibilities and actualities of Vedānta philosophy may appear to be pragmatic in form, the question of logical validity being brought in only incidentally, it is not intended to be a final judgment of its value and truth. It is the continuing task of past, present and future Vedāntins to meet philosophical doubts on all the grounds of knowledge and truth admitted by philosophy i. e., to establish Vedānta firmly on the logical plane. But according to the element of truth allowed in the pragmatic criterion, if the critical assessment of Vedānta as largely productive of pessimism, discontent, dissatisfaction with and uncertainty about the world can be met by showing its practical effects to be largely elevating and conducive to the satisfaction of the human need for truth, the demand of the present situation will have been fulfilled.

Two reservations must be made: firstly, whether or not the critic is a pragmatist in his general philosophical outlook, in the above analysis of Vedānta he adopts the stand that conduct and practical considerations must wholly justify the Vedāntic belief, which, in his opinion, is not the case. On the other hand, it is being argued throughout that truth-value of Vedānta must be established on other grounds than "workability," but that an added justification of its theoretical position can be given by bringing to light its practice and practical effects. Nor will it be pretended that the professors of that philosophy have always lived upto it. Secondly, the same

advantage may be claimed for the following interpretation as claimed by the critic, who admits the hypothetical nature of his judgment of "escapism," based as it is on many and varied causes, difficult to disentangle from their effects.¹

It is necessary to note that some of the causes of "escapism" are mutually contradictory. On the one hand, intellectualism of Vedānta is objected to and, on the other, Vedānta is discovered to be a world denying mysticism. Many students have pointed out the anti-intellectualism of mysticism, its "tendency to discontinue intellectual information in religious experience."² What Otto calls the "numinous feeling" is a mystic illumination of the non-rational type. An additional evidence of Vedāntic anti-intellectualism is provided by its search for truth, not for its own sake but as subserving a religious aim.³ Critics cannot discover the faults of both pure intellectualism and anti-intellectual mysticism in Vedānta. Rather, the fact is that there is a useful combination of both in Vedānta.⁴ As for the religious aim of Vedānta, to be what one knows to be real is the goal of effort. Nothing is thought which is not mystically one with man's thought i. e., truth is by participation, and not second hand. This partly negates the charge of "intellectual bankruptcy" supposed to be inherent in pantheistic mysticism, which reduces unity into mere abstraction, diversity into determinism, materialism and fatalism. Vedānta does not suffer from any vagueness of faith of this type, but has been the source of emotional and intellectual satisfaction to its adherents.

The critic freely uses the terms theism, pantheism, nature-worship and polytheism, giving each a certain connotation in the context of western philosophy. But he will also admit that none of these terms apply exactly to Vedānta. Reality is in all things rather than Reality being All e. g., the Upaniṣadic Brahman is nowhere said to be transformed into the world and thereby exhausted, but remains infinitely great.⁵ In the Gītā there is a combination of ideas of immanence of God in the world and men's hearts and transcendence, in which He controls and protects and listens to

1. vide supra, pp. 241-242.

2. G. Dawes Hicks, *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*, p. 101.

3. M. H. Harrison, *Hindu Monism and Pluralism*, p. 173.

4. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 231.

5. vide Śve. Upa., III, 14-17; Chān. Upa., VI, 9, 1-2: पूर्णस्वा पूर्णमादात् पूर्णमावाविशित्वात् ।

prayers.¹ Similarly, all schools of Vedānta reject pure immanence, in which God is wholly transformed into the world, but all insist on transcendence, in the interest of moral and spiritual necessity of salvation. Even Advaita in its vyavahārika phase insists on the distinction of Brahma, cit and acit. Śāṅkara interprets Badarāyana to remove inconsistency between the ideas of God developing into the world while being transcendent, and the idea of His being a simple spirit without parts, while Vaiṣṇava schools admit the world of matter and spirit to be associated with God as His characteristic or body or power, undergoing change, while He yet remains pure.²

The second sense of "God is All" is no more applicable, since even Advaita does not hold ordinary things to be "mere" illusions.³ Vedāntic pantheism allows for distinction, which is explicable by the mysticism at its base. "Its unique synthesis of science, philosophy and theology in its correlation of pramānas in intuition, insistency on the eternity of self, clear exposition of Brahma and mukti takes it far outside the scope of pantheism."⁴ The pantheistic mysticism of Vedānta is the emphasis on underlying unity of which the seers are directly aware. Sense of supreme unity and wholeness is the special capacity of Vedānta and its worship of that unity leads to spirituality, as by its inspiration the mind is led from manifold observation of the senses to intuitive affirmation of spirit's unity.⁵

Yet another inconsistency lies in charging Vedānta with the holding of both the doctrines of Māyā and pantheism. One declares that the world is unreal, and the other that the world is nothing but divine, hence real.⁶ These criticisms cancel each other because the Māyā doctrine brings out the super-personal, non-active nature of reality by its negativistic approach, while pantheism brings out its ceaseless self-expression and creativity. One way of getting out of this difficulty is by emphasising the logical inconsistency inherent within Vedānta itself or by falling back on the distinction of esoteric and exoteric doctrines i. e., Māyā may be regarded as the "fundamental" and

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1. Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, p. 47; S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 527.
 2. *Tattvārtha Dīpa Nibandha*, I, 1 and 101; R. B. on B. G., X, 21-39 and 42.
 3. vide supra, pp. 93-95.
 4. Edgerton, loc. cit.
 5. cf., William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 379, 389.
 6. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 30.

pantheism as the "prevailing" doctrine, a concession necessitated by the clamour of empirical consciousness.¹

Pessimism and Its Causes

It is the tendency to consider optimism as a virtue and pessimism as a vice, with the result that the characterisation of Vedānta by the latter is, ipso facto, a condemnation of it. The problem of optimism or pessimism of any world-view cannot be decided by merely understanding either term in a simple or unitary sense. There are shades or types of both attitudes and it is necessary to distinguish what might be termed "lower" and "higher" varieties of both clearly. The optimism which has no basis in facts or is divorced from realism is no virtue. A superficial contentment with fortune's goods, a happy-go-lucky attitude looking complacently on the sunny side of life only is called by William James the outlook of the "once-born" type of nature, having no sense of morbidity, a quasi-pathological incapacity of sadness or momentary humility.² Such an emotional state of happiness based on blindness and insensibility to contrary facts is an instinctive weapon of self-defence.³ Nor can this type of lower optimism be sustained till the end.⁴

The counterpart of this is the lower pessimism which is mere cowardice, weakness or inability to face sad reality. As opposed to this there is higher pessimism which is indicative of a courageous and imaginative nature, consisting in the realistic facing of the sad facts of life, a correct appreciation of evil and its hold on human existence, acceptance of the burden and the use of it for spiritual progress, which may be considered a great virtue. William James calls this the outlook of the twice-born consciousness. It is the deliberate religious policy to regard much of what is evil as due to the way men take phenomena, the ideal being to think unhappiness not only painful but also mean and ugly.⁵

1. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 159ff.

2. James, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

3. *ibid.*, p. 86.

4. *vide ibid.*: The purely naturalistic outlook however enthusiastic in the beginning is sure to end in sadness i. e., and of every positivistic, agnostic or naturalistic philosophy is pessimism.

5. *ibid.*, p. 136.

James, while calling optimism healthy minded, since it is actuated by the pleasure-principle, admits that it is a "one-eyed" view of the world. On the other hand, pessimism, which he describes as an index of sickness of soul, is a completer view. It is a product of high culture, of an experienced and mature mind which has savoured all the joys and sorrows of life fully.

Indeed, the outlook of the twice-born, holding as it does more of the evil in solution, is a wider and completer outlook. The "heroic and solemn" way of theirs is a higher synthesis of morbidness and healthy mindedness. Evil is not evaded but sublated in the higher religious cheer of these persons.¹

Religious belief may conduce towards an augmentation of optimism, since it promises super-natural happiness, but it also deepens pessimism in regard to the world. The sign of a well-rounded religion or philosophy is, therefore, the presence in it of a strongly marked pessimistic element, for which reason it becomes a philosophy or religion of deliverance.

In this connection, another classification of pessimism must be kept in mind. There is an empirical pessimism and a philosophical pessimism. Men suffer many actual ills and evils in life and they seek remedies for each particular ill with the help of scientific knowledge, and religion also provides certain cures and consolations. Philosophy's approach to these is a different one. It concentrates not so much on the immediate and, it may be, temporary remedy for each specific ill, as do the other approaches, but on the problem of understanding of the very presence of evil and suffering in this world, and any solution it offers is not relative but absolute. The non-philosophical mind is concerned with the "why" and the "what" of suffering. Empirical pessimism must be faced by all men² and may be called "physical" suffering. But philosophical pessimism is for a few rare minds, and is a variety of mental unease due to the very existence of the problem of evil and suffering. These two are largely exclusive of each other, since the general problem does not strike the unphilosophical mind ordinarily, while the philosophic attention is largely given to that problem alone. This is the reason for the differences in the nature of the solution arising from the

1. *ibid.*, p. 478.

2. *vide supra*, pp. 81-82: Vedāntic classification under three heads: suffering due to man through carelessness; due to elemental world (floods, earth-quake etc.); due to super-natural agencies (providence, sudden death).

empirical and the philosophical standpoints.

There are a number of possible psychological motives of the pessimistic outlook. Men may drift into pessimism due to indifference to progress and weariness and distaste for exertion of effort; or it may be the outcome of a carping fault-finding disposition,¹ the expression of a temper of revolt, which instead of accepting facts grumbles about them and passes judgment against them.² A third type of pessimism is due to disappointment of personal desires or idiocyncrasy. None of these motives, singly or in combination, gives the true explanation of Vedāntic pessimism. That the first is not the motive is proved by the supreme exertion demanded by Vedānta in spiritual life. Instead of the second motive of revolt against the "given" we find Vedānta teaching "anādītvam" of the world and making the best use of it. Nor is it due to personal frustration that the Vedāntin turns towards Ātman and away from the world, but because of the rise of discriminatory knowledge (viveka).

Vedāntic pessimism is philosophical in its fullest sense and not empirical. It is the motivation for investigation of truth. Vedānta takes a realistic stand about suffering. If man had been completely happy there would be no philosophical thinking at all. At the same time, if there had been only suffering, then too, there would be no philosophy, because if suffering is inherent in human nature it cannot be changed. Vedānta, therefore, holds that there is suffering in life, but it uses the term "suffering" in a strictly technical meaning to subsume under it both happiness and misery as understood by the common man i. e., it goes behind the experience of both happiness and misery to raise the question about the ultimate truth sustaining it. For the unphilosophic people it does not deny a large measure of happiness in pursuit of the goals of artha, dharma, kāma,³ and amelioration of misery in many ways, but it itself is dealing with the universal aspect of suffering and does not consider that removable by finding of remedies for each ill, or by inaction in life⁴ or by mere ending of life.⁵ It searches for a philosophical explanation and an absolute remedy only

1. James Sully, *Pessimism*, p. 422.

2. Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I, p. lxxv.

3. cf., C. K. Raja, *Some Fundamental Problems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 376.

4. vide B. G.

5. due to karma and punarjanma.

achievable by moral elevation and true knowledge. Thus it is the philosophical "evil," not empirical, which is found to be the starting point of the world-process. Evil is of the nature of nescience and it can terminate in a good and positive reality.

The important thing is to note the manner of operation of pessimism in Vedānta. The greater the knowledge, the greater is the sensitiveness to and dissatisfaction with the world experience in Vedānta. In the absence of any tendency to shirk the duties of the world, Vedāntic pessimism or condemnation of pleasures and pains must be understood as having its basis in the perception of a higher conception of bliss obtained by self-conquest, in comparison with which the world's pleasures and heaven's joys are insignificant. "Discontent with the actual is the pre-condition of moral change and spiritual rebirth and Vedāntic pessimism is a condition of philosophy."¹ It is no ignoble pessimism which gives a man a sense of imperfection of his present moral life, disgust of futility, smallness and ignorance. William James remarks² that there are two things in the mind of the candidate for conversion (i. e., Vedāntic sādhanā), the present incompleteness and wrongness and the positive ideal he longs to compass. With the majority the former is more distinct than the positive ideal so that "conversion" (i. e., Vedāntic mokṣa) is a process of struggling away from wrongness rather than of striving towards the positive ideal, but in the Vedānta true sādhanā means illumination (viveka) of the consciousness which is striving by the conviction of the greatness of the Ātman. "It is important to note that mokṣa is not based on any general aversion to intercourse with the world or such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti as the supremely blessed one."³ The Vedāntic stress on sorrow and finitude may be understood as motivated by desire to call attention to some "genuine" good in place of a false or "spurious" good i. e., "pessimism" is, here, the figure of speech called vyājastuti. Its purpose is to praise the perfection of the infinite and eternal. It may be called a "true" pessimism, since it is not due to a morbid or melancholic affection of a sick mind but the result of philosophical

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 146; cf., Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, 310.

2. James, op. cit., p. 205ff.

3. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, I, 76.

reflection, as demonstrated by the positive and negative relation of the Vedāntic view of the mundane world to the highest end of life. The cause of the trouble being discovered by analysis, the mind is prepared for and provided with means of removing it by developing a certain attitude towards the world.

The continued existence and growth of the Vedānta philosophy is evidence for the correctness of the explanation of the theory and practical effect of Vedāntic pessimism given above. Radhakrishnan remarks:

We cannot . . . understand how the human mind can speculate and remodel life when it is filled with weariness and overcome with hopelessness. A priori, the scope and freedom of the Indian thought (and Vedānta, in particular), is inconsistent with ultimate pessimism, unless it be understood to bear a sense of dissatisfaction with what is or exists, and in this sense all philosophy is or has to be pessimistic.¹

"At all events, there is enough faith in life in the Upaniṣads and later Vedānta to support a genuine search for truth."²

Pessimism and Intellectualism

It has been explained in what sense Vedāntic pessimism is intellectual. But the critic raises an objection against the intellectualist method of Vedānta and its abstracting approach which, according to him, ends in intellectual hopelessness. Since the Absolute is beyond the reach of mind and language, pessimism arises due to the conviction of the limitations of intellect. Also, the mind is cut off from the outside world and confined to itself. It is to be noted that the stand of Vedānta and specially of Advaita, in which knowledge, love, possession of all things is averred only in so far as they subsist in Ātman, is really the standpoint of complete idealism which denies independent reality to the manifold world and makes all things spring from spirit consisting of knowledge. Only when reason fails does the Vedāntin become conscious of the other possibilities of his nature.³ His life is an unceasing search for truth in a religious spirit. Never does his confidence fail that there is an answer to life's problem, which is the end-in-itself and the absolute good.⁴ Pessimism regarding the

1. Indian Philosophy, I, 50.

2. A. Barth, The Religions of India, p. 84.

3. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Mysticism, p. 172.

4. e. g., Advaita insists on pure jñāna-mārga because it implies that reality is of intrinsic value; were it effected by human activity it would become relative.

failure of intellect is the beginning of "spiritual optimism."

The pessimism resulting from the intellectualistic exclusiveness of Vedānta has been the object of much adverse criticism. But it is a matter of historical record that not only has Vaiṣṇava Vedānta opened its truth to all classes and sections of people and become the source of spiritual inspiration to them, but even Advaita, far from adopting a patronising attitude and looking down upon the majority who are in ignorance, has received the assent of the majority of both the philosophic and non-philosophic alike. The non-dualistic unity, when it became a living reality for the advanced few who had made themselves eligible for it, had such an influence on them as to make them the spiritual leaders of the less developed mankind. Hence, the illuminati did not become either despondent due to their inability to share their privilege with the less advanced or arrogant in the consciousness of their own superiority.

More creditable to ancient believers was the fact that inspite of their exalted position based on superior knowledge and sanctity they never looked down with disdain on the less intellectual. It was recognised from early times that the religion of a man cannot and ought not to be the same as of a child, nor of an old man that of an active man.¹

It was this universal recognition and spirit of toleration and spiritual helpfulness resulting from it which was the greatest counteracting factor against any pessimism which could, theoretically, result from "intellectual exclusiveness." The common man did not feel the sense of exclusion from the highest state, since truth was open to all who aspired after it and no one was debarred from it. The pure and elevated qualifications required also did not, in fact, create despondency, since they operated uniformly for all men and did not give any unearned advantage, such as special opportunities for education etc., to any section. The caste-principle which excluded the lowest class from the highest truth of Vedānta must be admitted to be the cause of such pessimism, but not the so-called intellectualism of that system. "But in principle, this (caste) exclusion was wrong and clearly contradicted by the true spirit of Vedānta."²

Pessimism and the Doctrines of Karma and Punarjanma

The critic holds that the Vedāntic world-view governed by the two laws of karma

1. F. M. Müller, *The Vedānta Philosophy*, pp. 15-16.

2. *ibid.*, p. 43.

and punarjanma cannot but produce an idea of an endless, wearisome repetition of a futile process, since each life but gives rise to another, the working out of karma to more karma, leading nowhere. It must be conceded that he who holds the saṃsāra doctrine to be final, cannot avoid the gloomy and depressed mood resulting from it. But Vedānta always insists on the provisional nature of the fleeting, the unsubstantial and the suffering, which must, in the end, give way to a bright end.

The karma doctrine of Vedānta holds out the greatest truth in the realm of the self i. e., its success and happiness as within itself, to be worked for through purification of thoughts, emotions and actions. Infinite quest for perfection is allowed by the doctrine of punarjanma, which connects all moments of experience, and past, present and future existence into a meaningful teleological process. The supreme value of truth or mokṣa strengthens the optimistic outlook only by the help of these doctrines. "It is thus the poverty of man's present spiritual equipment taken along with the greatness of his final destiny which explains belief in a plurality of lives."¹

If we are to be optimists that there is some goal to be reached by all individuals in a temporal process then the notion of a series of successive existences in the course of which all are gradually purified and made fit for heaven would seem to be the one least open to objection.²

The critic holds that the cheerlessness of the goal of annihilation in pure identity as well as of the doctrine of saṃsāra mutually reinforce each other. It might be argued that the doctrine of saṃsāra, taken by itself, is certainly pessimistic, but in the main, historically and psychologically, it has been transformed into an inspiring conception through its connection with the highest value of man (paramārtha). The critic further objects that since the laws of karma and punarjanma are purely laws of determinism in the empirical field, while mokṣa is the idea of transcendental freedom,³ the affirmation of the latter is a logical denial or an implicit condemnation of the former. Certainly, Vedānta envisages mokṣa as the ending of karma and punarjanma, but this is not so much an admission of logical falseness of these laws, as the critic likes to believe, as the idea of "going beyond." As physical science harnesses natural laws

1. Mactaggert, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 113.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahma Sūtra*, p. 206, quotes G. L. Dickinson; cf., Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 314.

3. cf., Deussen, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

to its own purposes, the pursuer of Ātmavidyā controls these moral laws instead of being controlled by them i. e., turns them from their nature as "destructive" forces to more beneficial and useful purposes, when his attention is turned towards mokṣa. As the law of gravity holds good within the earth's field but not in the cosmic field, similarly Vedānta asserts that karma and punarjanma operate in the field of saṃsāra but not in mokṣa.

The psychological value of the connection of these moral laws with the conception of mokṣa, in the form of inspiration and consolation, has been greater than the value of more scientific doctrines. Instead of the "one life—one chance" theory of salvation it stresses the many chances each has to attain that good.¹ The despair that might result from the idea of inexhaustibility, inescapability of these laws is counterbalanced by the hope resulting from the idea of dispassionate operation of these laws by which the lowest soul may raise himself to the highest position by acting in the right way.² The idea of the working out of the laws of karma and punarjanma in the shape of the final conquest of matter by spirit is no pessimistic outlook, and inspite of the conception of "eighty four lakhs of lives" the Vedāntin derives true encouragement from the thought that to be born in human form is itself evidence of the long distance covered in the path to that goal. The immense vista enhances rather than depresses the value of his effort and action through tapasyā.

Another element of psychological value inherent in these doctrines is the support they give to the instinct for life and abhorrence of death in man. This is enhanced by the possibility of improving the future by self-effort, through the operation of the law of karma. The sense of continuity of self transcending death, in punarjanma, is thus supported by the evolutionary principle of karma ending in the attainment of true immortality or amṛtva of the self. And this is a source of optimism for the Vedāntin.

Critics are intolerant of the pessimistic resignation and acquiescence to fate which they find to be the necessary result of these doctrines. The ethical possibilities

1. Floyd Ross, *The Meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism*, p. 36.

2. cf., B. G., IV, 38.

and actualities of these doctrines will be dealt with later, but here it is appropriate to point out that the causal explanation of the inequalities of life afforded by these laws is psychologically satisfying, as evidenced by the absence of bitterness. Among other attitudes resulting from these laws are patience and persistent endeavour in using life's possibilities, toleration and sympathy towards the less fortunate. The sense of despair created by the vast, incomprehensible fate is balanced by the belief that life is self-chosen and possible to improve. The ideal attitude towards life's problems created by these is that of equanimity i. e., detachment, contentment, which is no ignoble or pessimistic attitude inspite of the condemnation of it as mere "stoic indifference." The important point about the karma doctrine is that, paradoxically, it inspires us both with hope for the future and resignation towards what may occur in the present. This is not pessimism but the very opposite of it.

In their actual operation the doctrines of karma and punarjanma have not always been interpreted in a synthetic way. The best Vedāntins have been able to balance the elements of past and present to determine the future i. e., prārabdha karma compounded with puruṣakāra has been productive of the highest type of kriyamān karma. But the unphilosophical mind was not able to attain such a true balance. In certain periods and individuals the over-emphasis on the prārabdha has produced that mood of fatalism about which the critic complains. Again, the tendency to understand karma as a mechanical law converted it into mere soulless fate and was productive of a sense of helplessness. Failure to keep in mind the tri-dimensional aspect of karma doctrine converts this law of moral and spiritual harmony into a "reign of terror."¹ It is difficult to decide, however, the true relation of cause and effect in this situation. Is the one-sided interpretation of the laws of karma and punarjanma the cause of the pessimistic outlook or does the pessimistic outlook generated by socio-historical factors lead to that one-sided interpretation?

It might be profitable to pay attention to certain historical factors at this point. In the Vedānta literature the Upaniṣadic anti-hedonism appears in the form of pessimism. This is counteracted and corrected by the Bhagavadgītā, the Purāṇas and

1. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 130.

Dharma-Sastras, in which the claims of the world are not neglected but reconciled with the claims of the spirit. Hence, optimism and pessimism are well balanced. In the Vedāntic Prasthānas, clearly, karma rules the world. Man's ultimate destiny is immortality (amṛtasya putrah), which testifies to his dignity. Emphasis is on man's power to attain the highest, and the way is that of moral effort, truth and yoga. Moral conduct, tranquillity and a concentrated mind is essential for mokṣa.

It was only at the end of the Gupta period, when the dynasty was breaking up under foreign invasions that signs of greater pessimism began to appear. Internal stresses and strains led to cultural decline, conservatism and exclusiveness in orthodox circles, loss of political and religious freedom gave rise to defeatism, decline of faith and weakness. In spite of religious and reformatory movements there was a serious decline in philosophical thinking. This situation prevailed from the tenth century till the modern times and gave rise to views on God, man and the world, different from that of the Vedāntic scriptures. Thus God appeared as the determiner of man's fate, having the power to do, undo or not to do.¹ The conception of man's evil nature² was connected with the idea of his weakness and utter dependence on God's grace. Humility, devotion and surrender was the way to God. Karma was no longer the moral law governing all,³ but appeared as fate or will of God or destiny.⁴

Some historians interpret the bhakti movement as the only possible reaction to a situation of defeat and moral and social weakness in which political subjection found its counterpart in subjection to an omnipotent divine ruler, the determiner of man's fate, to whom no other approach save that of adject devotion and resignation was possible.⁵ Sometimes "escapism" is dictated by the necessity of sociological survival or as an alternative to the destruction of a people or a culture. But the interpretation of medieval Vedāntic bhakti movement purely in terms of political and social escape from Muslim subjection may be questioned. For that is "to miss the social implication

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1. कर्तुं शक्यं भक्त्या वा कर्तुं समर्थः ।
 2. कर्तुं शक्यं न, पापकर्मिणो न, पापी ।
 3. vide Ramacarita-lānasa: अर्थात्का का०, दो २१८, ४; कर्म प्रयोग विना कर्मिणो न, जो जगत्कर्मिणो न, का०, १०-११।
 4. vide ibid.: बल का०, सो० ५१, ७: हाइहि सोई जो रामा सोन भक्त । का नहि तत कदा न भक्त ।
 5. cf., B. G. Tilak, Gītā Rahasya, p. 704: The prowess of the country began to decline during the Muslim period and onesided emphasis on the emotionalism of bhakti, which was inactivist and world negating, developed.

of a nation-wide mass upsurge, a movement of inner integration which true to the genius of Indian civilization abolished barriers of caste, creed, dogma, ritual, form and etiquette. It represented a characteristic way of combating the religious and social challenge of Islam."¹ The subjectivism, world negation, lack of originality and scepticism of post-Aristotelian philosophy in Greece is explained in terms of political, social, religious and artistic decline.² It is noteworthy that the period of decline in India produced a philosophy not confined to a few, but operating on a mass scale, neither sceptical nor unoriginal, since bhakti was a sublimation of philosophical energies in a new direction, made necessary due to the limitations of karma- and pure jñāna-mārgas. It is also noteworthy that though theistic Vedānta constituted the popular faith, throughout this period of political and social depression the conception of Advaita continued to influence the philosophical thinking as well as the devotional mysticism of the medieval saints. Historical and political crises have produced a dual reaction in the Indian mind e. g., the reaction to attacks on the spiritual and cultural values in the medieval period was not merely pessimistic world negation but also positivistic and realistic in the form of the rise of Sikh and Maratha nationalism and militancy. Similarly, an initial pessimism and depression under the advent of western power was succeeded by rise of national pride and reassertion of ancient philosophical values. "On the one hand, the Vedāntic absolute has not always been combined with the doctrine of illusion and misery (pessimism) and on the other hand, a period of depression (pessimistic situation) does not lead to loss of faith in the absolute: this is the evidence of history."³

Vedāntic Optimism

In this background, it is possible to understand the nature of Vedāntic optimism. Pessimism is the foil of its doctrine of salvation. Without a lessening of the feeling of evil there is a hope of overcoming it; this is no shallow optimism which ignores the power of evil with resulting frivolity and hardness of heart nor a despondent

1. R. K. Mukerjee, A History of Indian Civilization, I, 51.

2. W. T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, pp. 339-343.

3. B. C. Gokhale, Indian Thought Through the Ages, p. 145.

pessimism which despairs of victory of good and paralyses power to struggle and make effort, with consequent indifference of heart.¹ It overcomes pessimism with the idea of the Kingdom of God, not as a distant ideal but as a present reality in the hearts of men; without the denial of the opposition of the real and the ideal, this is understood only as one side of the truth which can be raised to unity. That pessimism which declares world and its life as the worst possible without any hope or chance of relief is out of place in Vedānta, because the world-scheme is thought of as one in which remedies of suffering and evil are also available, both at the empirical and the philosophical levels. The world is a place where perfect happiness is not only a theoretical probability but a practical possibility. From this point of view Vedānta is highly practical and hopeful. By pointing a way out of evil and illusion into union with truth it saves man from ultimate despair.² The charge of pessimism comes as a surprise to the Vedāntin who sees God everywhere and his own identity with God, derives supreme bliss and peace from the knowledge that no more wants remain to be satisfied, and all sense of deficiency, pain, regret and fear disappears.

Keeping the distinction of higher and lower pessimism in mind we find that, according to the definition of William James, Vedānta provides a religious and philosophical world-view which is complete and whole, not one-eyed and superficial. Its basic realism and robustness is seen in the steady facing of the facts of life and its determination to overcome suffering by self-effort.³ One might aptly quote Bosanquet: "I believe in optimism, but I add that no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it."⁴ Or it might be remarked that to Vedānta it is no more pessimistic to cognise that whatever is other than self

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1. These and the following remarks about Christian pessimism-optimism by Otto Pflieinderr in *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, pp. 312ff., 321, apply to Vedānta in toto.
 2. cf., Sydney Cave, *Redemption*, p. 64; Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, 310.
 3. cf., James Sully, *Pessimism*, pp. 398, 400: The scientific and speculative pessimism of Schopenhauer is incorrect. Though Schopenhauer preaches quiescence, his pessimism does not paralyse effort. Pessimists do not abstain from seeking all illusory goods of life, which proves men to be wiser than their creeds.

It need hardly be pointed out that no such inconsistency marks the philosophical pessimism of Vedānta. Its pessimism does not paralyse effort; however, that effort is not so much directed towards the "illusory goods of life" as towards the real good or the spirit.

4. *Social and International Ideals*, p. 43.

is sadness, than it is optimistic to recognise that when there is no other there is literally nothing to be feared. "Let those however, who wish to find sorrow in the Upaniṣads find sorrow, and those who wish to find bliss, find bliss."¹

At this point another objection is raised from the psychological and empirical point of view.² It is said that the value of life is not to be determined on the ground of its supplying or not supplying conditions of absolute truth; nor is it self-evident that the search for the Absolute will be a permanent factor of intellectual life. Man may be satisfied with exact knowledge of phenomena. On the other hand, the prospect of possessing the ultimate secret of the universe does not of itself lead one to accept existence as a happy condition. The question of pessimism i. e., world is bad, or optimism i. e., world is good, must be solved within the limits of experience and the attempt to override experience by some metaphysical conception of the nature of reality is to be rejected.

Firstly, it may be pointed out to the objector that it is dogmatic to insist that empirical experience alone must be taken into account in order to determine whether a world-view is, in the last analysis, optimistic or pessimistic. Since some men do experience that which is more than the physical and mental and all men have vague intimation of the infinite in their nature and experience, the ancient search for the Absolute may not be dismissed as mere primitive unenlightenment or superstition. It must be conceded that a majority of men in the present and future may be satisfied with phenomenal knowledge alone, but that was true also of the past. This, however, did not prevent the search for the noumenon by some rare natures, who became the spiritual guides of mankind. It is true that the formulation of some metaphysical notion of the Absolute and the ultimate nature of good and evil only on theoretical lines (as in western absolutism), divorced from attempts to realize it in practice, leaves the question of suffering and evil in the actual world unresolved. But the Vedāntic Brahman is no product of abstract ratiocination alone, rather is it the eternal reality living in the heart of the Vedāntin, inspiring him to ever higher moral and spiritual

1. R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 13.

2. Sully, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-156.

effort.¹ The influence of such a metaphysical reality on the empirical life of man cannot be denied and must be taken into account in resolving the question of optimism and pessimism. It has also been noted that it is not on empirical grounds (where a man may legitimately pursue pleasure and avoid suffering) but on transcendental grounds that Vedānta becomes pessimistic i. e., rejects the value of kāma or pleasure etc., and bases its life on the supreme value of moral discipline etc.²

It would not be irrelevant to point out that the conviction about the ultimacy or non-ultimacy of the empirical world and what constitutes its good or evil nature is a matter of temperament, after all. It is not inconceivable that there may be men, regardless of race or clime, who are not satisfied only with the empirical world and set up a different ideal, in the light of which they try to live even in this world.³ However difficult it may be for modern man to understand the Vedāntic sages, who were men of few wants and disinclined towards the world, it must be granted that their pessimism was no ordinary or shallow judgment and that their dissatisfaction with the world arose because of their urgent desire for the highest good, so great that no compromise with other desires was tolerable to them.⁴

Lastly, it must be noted that Vedānta does not treat the matter of optimism and pessimism by contrasting the happiness of mokṣa with the suffering of saṃsāra, but by opposing the perfection of mokṣa to the imperfection of saṃsāra. The Vedāntic term "sat" means both reality and perfection. The real is also the supremely valuable.⁵ The imperfection of the phenomenal is the present condition and knowledge of man while

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1. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Mysticism*, p. 66: The doctrine of transcendental self arose only after the actual practice of liberation of true self from bondage.
 2. cf., Sully, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
 3. cf., Eliot, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. lx-lxi: Indian thought does not really go much further in pessimism than Christianity, but its pessimism is intellectual rather than emotional; the fundamental contrast is rather between India and the New Testament on the one hand and on the other the rooted conviction of the European race that this world is all important. This conviction finds expression not only in the avowed pursuit of pleasure and ambition, but in such sayings as that the best religion is the one which does most good and such ideals as self-realization or full development of one's nature and powers. The great majority of Europeans instinctively disbelieve in asceticism and the contemplative life; they demand a religion which theoretically justifies the strenuous life. All this is a matter of temperament. The other temperament which rejects this world as unsatisfactory and sets up another ideal is understood and honoured there (India) more than elsewhere.
 4. S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Mysticism*, p. 66.
 5. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 50.

the perfection of the noumenal or Absolute is the ideal impelling the Vedāntin to effort. The objector must grant the propriety of the Vedāntic attempt to judge the world in the light of his standard of perfection, and if its conclusion is not favourable to the world, such "pessimism" is not only perfectly justified, but is the "basis of all optimism."

World and Life Denial and Its Causes

As a metaphysical doctrine Vedānta is based on the acceptance of traditional values and the ideals of individual and social life implied therein. It carries itself forward from the point upto which those ideals bring man, though not stopping to speculate separately and for long on the first three ends of life. The systematic character of life with the four interests succeeding each other at the proper time and place, is a negation of the charge of exclusive or other-worldly direction of life in Vedānta. The acceptance of four desires of human life as perfectly legitimate is an indication of affirmation of life, its instincts and motives of action. It is true that the distinction of the pleasant and the good, *preya* and *śreya*, leads Vedānta to subordinate the *trivarga* to *paramārtha* on the understanding that man's nature is ultimately spiritual and cannot find full satisfaction in merely worldly experiences, such as correct social behaviour, economic security, political success or artistic creation; all such experiences still leave man wanting to know how to acquire inner peace. But it is important to note that the Vedāntic conception of superiority of *mokṣa* over *artha*, *dharma* and *kāma* did not detract from the importance of ethics, law, society, politics, science, arts and crafts, in practical life.

Vedānta makes a distinction between *Ātma-vidyā* and all other knowledges. The latter or phenomenal sciences (*vikāra-jñāna*) such as mathematics, logic, ethics are to be distinguished from the science of the thing-in-itself (*tattva-jñāna*). They are not condemned but only held inadequate for the purpose of the goal of *sādhanā*. At the same time, Vedānta would admit *Ātma-* or *Brahma-vidyā* to be equally inadequate as a substitute for the other sciences.

Tranquillity of mind and body was indispensable for the attainment of the

Vedāntic goal, and this being achieved in samnyāsa is read as the rejection of life and world, by the critic. But this co-existed with the genius for system and order in Vedāntic intellect, therefore, the ignoring of the phenomenal in the higher reaches of both Advaita and Vaisnava Vedānta must be understood, not as due to its unimportance in itself but as due to its being beyond the speculative sphere of investigation. Vedānta declares itself to be a Mokṣa-Śāstra and not a Dharma- or Artha-Śāstra, therefore its attention is necessarily given to the ultimate goal.

Denial and Intellectualism

The objection against Advaita is that its procedure of cancelling the lower knowledge in the higher is wasteful and productive of intellectual despondency. Since the experience of vyavahāra is falsified in the experience of paramārtha there is no one standard of truth in Vedānta. But from the epistemological angle Advaita defines true knowledge or pramā as one in which there is identity of pure consciousness underlying both the knower and the known. Similarly, there is identity of "that" and "thou" in transcendental experience. Hence there is a single standard and only the false aspects of vyavahāra are sublated in paramārtha. "Śāṅkara declares that the former is a combination of true and false¹ . . . so the element of truth does survive from the lower in the higher knowledge."² The objection that Vedānta makes too abrupt a transition from one to the other sphere is due to the failure to take into account the whole process of sādhanā, which is long-drawn out and gradual, though the jñāna may be immediate.

Even the critic admits that "denial" in itself is not necessarily to be interpreted as pessimistic rejection of life and its gifts, for in the loftiest moral and spiritual planes it sometimes happens that man attains his freedom only by sacrificing some lesser values and even life itself for the sake of some higher value or end.³ This is not the negation which consists in lack of interest in any realizable purpose or improvement of world-condition, but the highest affirmation according to the spiritual

1. सत्यं च त्रिविधं कृतं . . . तेषां त्रिविधं ज्ञानं तत्रोच्यते :

2. S. K. Belvalkar, Vedānta Philosophy, I, 18.

3. Albert Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Development, p. 6.

paradox that one can only live by dying. All true spirituality does require a radical renunciation of certain aspects of life and world for the sake of others.¹ Vedānta was not misunderstood by the common people when it demanded the denial of lesser values or artha, dharma etc. for the sake of true affirmation of self. Vedāntic attitude of negation was fully correlated to the consciousness that life must pass through a phase of no life in order to reach a fuller life.²

The objection is that Vedānta denies the worth of the world by not providing any goal for the world as a whole in its doctrine of līlā. However, Vedāntic pantheism does not fail to accord value to life and world, theoretically, as the finite expression of the infinite. Theistic Vedānta understands abhinnaimittopādāna kāraṇavāda as literally true (except Madhvācārya) while even Advaita concurs with the doctrine as long as world remains "real" for man. Practically, the value of the world is not denied by any Vedāntin since it is the only field of opportunity for action by which to reach the goal. Scripture speaks of human birth as precious (durlabha) and Vedānta carries in it an urgent command that man should not waste his life but utilise all its goods in their proper sphere, to realize the highest purpose. It is true that Vedānta pictures no utopian goal of world evolution, but neither does it deny the value of life, since it sets for each man the highest goal of idealistic perfectionism, to be achieved only through human existence and effort. There is no lack of interest in this purpose of human life, nor any misgiving about the improvement of the human condition, though Vedānta does not have anything to say about the improvement of the world-condition.³

That Vedānta was able to maintain a proper balance of negative and positive attitudes towards life is testified to by many modern scholars as well as by facts of history. "Life and world negation is self originated in India, out of a cloudless sky, does not claim to be generally accepted, but remained on good terms with affirmation."⁴ It was systems like Sāṅkhya and the heterodox philosophies which were unable to maintain

1. cf., Rudolf Otto, *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and contrasted*, p. 72.

2. W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 18.

3. The conception of sarva mukti is not more than hinted at, hence, cannot serve as the end of world or social evolution.

4. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

the correct balance of negation and affirmation.¹ The struggle of orthodoxy and heterodoxy finally ended with the banishment of Buddhism and this has had significant implications.

On the practical side the triumph of Vedānta has meant the triumph of the positive ideal of life. This is not only shown by the social basis of ethical discipline which Vedānta as an orthodox doctrine commends, but also by its conception of the highest good which consists, not only in isolating the self from the environment as it does for the heterodox schools, but in overcoming the opposition between the two by identifying the interests of self with those of the world.²

The strong influence of Vedānta on the social life of the earlier and later medieval period has, in fact, not led to wholesale renunciation of the world by the populace, as occurred earlier under the Buddhist influence. Vedāntic sects were the great teachers of a pure and elevated social and ethical life to the masses.

Neither do the Vedāntic canons lack in zest of life and enthusiasm for active life. The Smṛti Prasthāna preached a positivistic attitude to the world.

The usual attitude of the Gītā is definitely opposed to world denial, it seeks to justify participation in normal worldly life, though with qualifications Teaching moderation in all things as the characteristic of a disciplined yogī it gives a complete religious justification for the continuation of normal human life.³

It might be said with confidence that among the three Prasthānas of Vedānta the Gītā alone has had any religious significance for the non-philosophical public, and they have learned from it the lesson of living and acting in the spirit of devout piety. As for the philosophers of Vedānta, they too have discovered in it the philosophy of activism in the worldly sphere.⁴ And if the critic now objects that this is merely an illogical compromise forced upon Vedānta by the force of the reality-principle, then it must be repeated that the foundation of Vedāntic philosophy and life is laid in the varṇāśrama-dharma, the entire scheme of saṁskāras culminating in the initiation ceremony, the life of the householder requiring the performance of the five great sacrifices. In accepting this programme of duties Vedānta shows recognition of the fact that naturalistic and social selves of man cannot be neglected; he can grow into a wider sphere only by fulfilling all human needs. There must be sublimation and not suppression of man's

1. cf., *ibid.*, p. 40; A. B. Keith, *Philosophy of the Vedas and Upaniṣads*, Vol. II, p. 521; M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, pp. 262, 264.

2. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 25-26.

3. Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, p. 29.

4. *vide supra*, pp. 148-151.

lower capacities, before he qualifies (adhikara) for the study of Vedānta. And on this point Vedānta did not leave its position ambiguous.

If a just arrangement of society is one aiming at the ideal life of its members, such an order is upheld by Vedānta. But it is an arrangement enforceable only to a limited extent by law and sanctions. The norm of institutions, duties and virtues being laid down, the appropriation of that social arrangement depends upon the rationality, goodwill and discipline of natural instincts in its members. By allowing the individual the freedom to undergo the discipline of each stage of social arrangement as and when he is ready for it Vedānta tried to safeguard the principle of free development of individual life.

Denial and Pantheistic Mysticism

The criticism is that the pantheistic mysticism of Vedānta ending in an abstract, empty, impersonal reality can neither explain the meaning nor the value of life. Pursuit of such an ideal merely negates diversity and change and is productive of depression.

Students of mysticism are divided about the nature of mystical unity. On the one hand is the opinion that mysticism always ends in an impersonal immortality;¹ and on the other, the opinion that though the unity of being is a grand idea it should not be the resting place for the mystic, who should rise to absolute reason, will and self-consciousness.² A distinction is made between a natural state of imageless emptiness in which there is feeling of peace and rest without the grace of God or emphasis on love, which is supposed to characterise Vedāntic mysticism,³ and a higher state of true supernatural union with God in which love is all important, as in Christian mysticism. Apart from the fact that the long controversy between the believers of the Saguna and the Nirguna testifies to the fact that the above characterisation of Vedāntic unity as purely impersonal and abstract is too sweeping, the difference of opinion between the

1. W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 162.

2. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 8.

3. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Mysticism*, p. 42.

critics proves that the mystic unity has as many manifestations and phases as there are mystics, and it is not a justifiable procedure to take a particular experience as the standard of normality, and to judge others by it.¹

The purpose is neither to prove nor to disprove the correctness of either experience but to assess the effect of the supposed abstract reality on life. The Upaniṣadic mystics describe the ineffable reality as being beyond the finest values of life. This "plenitude of experience" is wrongly called an "infinite blank" by critics. Failure of conceptual thought or language is not negation of that which is beyond the phenomenal. In mystic experience one passes from ordinary consciousness into vast reconciling consciousness in which the very denial of adjectives points to that nature of truth which is super everything, and negation is higher affirmation having a correlated counterpart in personal will: mystic consciousness is "on the whole pantheistic and optimistic, or at least the opposite of pessimistic."² Without committing oneself to any judgment about the logical consequence of pantheistic mysticism in terms of optimism or pessimism it must at least be noted that Vedānta does not display any superficial and easy optimism in regard to the bliss of absorption or "escape" from evil, as charged against it, nor does it display black pessimism due to the contrast between the ideal reality to which it aspires and the actual fulfilment of it in life, as a matter of historical fact. Pantheistic unity, far from having a depressing effect on the Indian mind has been a great source of consolation, a sustainer in times of difficulty and conflict. The popularity of the Bhagavadgītā is evidence of the solace drawn from the pantheistic unity of Ātman.

The negation of worldly life, its duties, laws and even religion resulting from mystic realization of Ātman has not been objected to in India, as by the critic, because the people understood the sannyāsi's rejection of organized social life and religion as an outcome of intensification of spirituality. It was perfectly intelligible to them that to the discerner of truth external conventionalities may become matters of indifference. And the actual lives of many mystics of deep learning, pure lives, strong and

1. cf., W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, p. 97: Both experiences are similar and different cultures and also individuals have different emotional reactions.
2. Betty Heimann, *Indian and Western Philosophy*, pp. 95-96.

purposeful characters and specially their engagement in the upholding of dharma, reconciled the Indian people to their philosophical denial of the world.

According to another interpretation,¹ Vedāntic mysticism far from being a negation of life and world is expressive of the philosopher's closeness to life. An original unity (Vidyā) is to be discerned under all Vedāntic ideas. The basis of that mysticism is not remoteness from actual facts but nearness to life and concrete empirical observation that all things in nature are associated. The urge to mysticism is the result of induction or pratyakṣa or contact with objects and the likeness of objects.

To conclude that naturalism or atheism is the outcome of Vedāntic pantheism is deliberately to misunderstand its letter and its spirit.² Pantheism which sees God alone is not to be equated to the atheism which denies God beyond what it perceives. The Vedāntin does not say that the world as it is in each particular thing is God.³ He looks to the underlying divine reality and his "All is God" is the opposite of atheism or naturalism, and the true spirit of religious piety.⁴

Denial and Mokṣa

An examination of the charge that Vedāntic mokṣa is a lapse into "nothingness," a negation of everything positive, is in order here. Speech fails when all that is denoted by Brahman has to be expressed, hence negative descriptions or unknowability is asserted.⁵ As stated before, it is negation of all limitations and determinations.

1. *ibid.*

2. Here the critic is falling into self-contradiction because atheism and naturalism far from being life and world negating are life and world affirming.

3. cf., J. Allinson Picton, *Pantheism*, pp. 8-10: No pantheist has ever held that everything is God any more than that teachers of physiology, enforcing on their students the unity of the human organism, would insist that every toe and finger is the man. Thus those who hold that the reasonable soul and flesh are one man—one altogether—but at the same time deny that the toe or the finger or the stomach or the heart is the man, are bound, in consistency, to recognise that if pantheism affirms God to be All in All, it does not follow that pantheism must hold a man or a tree or a tiger to be God.

4. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, 203: The Upaniṣads are not pantheistic in the bad sense of the term. Things are not thrown together into a heap called God, without unity, purpose or distinction of values. They are pantheistic, if it is pantheistic to say that God is the fundamental reality of our lives, and we cannot live without Him, the indwelling of the divine. Pantheism in this sense is an essential feature of all true religion.

5. vide S. B. on *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, I, 9

The terms sat, cit, anand are all known terms, nor does Vedānta, even in its theistic form, dare to assert that it knows Brahman in His perfect state. But this does not nullify the knowledge indicated in the above description. "Vedānta is not reduced to absurdity by: 'the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes,' for there still remains the One after abstraction of all human mental processes."¹ From the standpoint of logic the Advaita position is that very union of opposites, though the nearest possible descriptions are inadequate, and we do not improve the conception of reality by limiting ourselves to one side of the opposition (i. e., giving a positive predication). States of the indefinite are not specific negations or counterparts of specific positive states, hence not negations. Or, to put it in another way, Advaita argues that every negative judgment implies a positive, but all positive judgments do not imply a significant negative. Negation has significant validity only because it leads to a positive real.²

This statement of the Advaita position in regard to the negative description of mokṣa will help in evaluating the charge that an empty goal or "nothingness," in any empirical sense, cannot be of any attraction to man, and his motive becomes mere escape from life's misery. It is true that a certain disillusion about the world (vairāgya) is the starting point of sadhana, but the incentive to continue it is derived from the joy of new and newer stages of self-conquest or deepening of devotion to God.

The charge that pessimism and world denial is inherent in the ideal of mokṣa rests on the general disvaluation of the ideal of spiritual salvation. "The notion of immortality has vanished and is chiefly reserved for consolation in bereavement (with the idea of eternal punishment vanished the idea of eternal life). Hope is no longer religious but secular."³ That mokṣa was not regarded by Vedānta or the common man as negation of life, but the very fulfilment of life, can be understood only if we can set aside the modern view-point, with its essentially secular and material approach relying on planning, technology, education, opportunities, relentless activity, change etc. as

1. James R. Ballantyne, *Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy*, p. 45; cf., *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 214, 216, 218.

2. cf., *Upadeśa Sahaśrī*, XVIII, 125-126.

3. W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 68.

means of salvation or redemption, but in a purely empirical sense. In the context of Vedāntic philosophy "mokṣa is a force impressing itself on every feature and discipline of Vedāntic life, shaping the entire scale of values. Not a refutation but the final flowering of the success of the successful man."¹ It is true that mokṣa is not a mere extension of the possibilities of human order, consisting in indefinite prolongation of life under different conditions, but a state beyond all change. Optimism is not dampened by this ideal since it is conceived as attainment of complete and harmonious life and not merely getting rid of undesirable attachments to the self (i. e., hampering egoism, non-self). Mokṣa was known by the happiness it produced in the individual. Freedom, love, illumination, power, rather than depression and dejection, are its characteristics.

Denial and Māyā

Critics consider the Advaita doctrine of Maya to be the chief cause of world and life negation. At the outset, it may be remarked that the "illusion" doctrine coexists, in Advaita, with a practical and even theoretical realism. Nowhere does it try to establish the non-existence of the world or negate its conditioning cause or its practical utility. Though Śaṅkara calls the non-illusory mundane object (vyavahāra) neither real nor unreal, while the theists call it real, both are agreed that phenomena are distinct from noumenon. In any case, the phenomenal reality consists in the pragmatic standard of artha-kriyākāritva. Vyavahāra means conduct and action. The world is, therefore, a world of action and is to be known in its being and structure through action. Thus, the phenomenal is to be admitted in so far as its empirical and moral values are means to the spiritual end.² "For all practical purposes the Vedāntin holds the phenomenal to be real and leaves a wide sphere of real usefulness" for it.³

There are not wanting Advaitins⁴ who take the extreme stand of pure illusionism but, by and large, they hold that things are as they are perceived, because Brahman is not perceived empirically but underlies all that is perceived, known or remem-

1. Heinrich Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p. 43.

2. cf., F. M. Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 183.

3. F. M. Müller, *The Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 85.

4. e. g., Prakāśānand in *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*.

bered.¹ Vedānta accepts the reality of both physical and psychological objects, though it rejects the popular notion of their ultimate independence. An examination of its definition of *pratyakṣa* proves that physical objects and even mental states are objective and known through *vṛttis* reflecting the pure intelligence (*citta*).² Illusory objects exist as perceived, and all contradictions are real, so long as we take them at their own level.

The Vedānta carefully distinguishes between the real, phenomenal and false. The three orders do not make the world an "illusion" in the common acceptance of that term and the Vedānta has a standard for separating them viz., *bādha*. Advaita holds all things perceived, conceived and named as phenomenal. *Māyā* is just this distinction of the phenomenal and the real, and the former can only exist as the appearance of some real.

The critic objects that since, according to Advaita, to seek to know *Māyā* or *Avidyā* is a self-contradictory position (inexplicability), it is a non-philosophic doctrine in origin and nature.³ And only by giving up the attempt to understand the nature of *Māyā* does Advaita come to a position of realism. It is true that theoretically it is objectionable for philosophy to account for any difficulty by holding it to be an illusion to be destroyed when truth dawns, but Advaita finds some support in experience itself. There do exist illusions which disappear with the arising of knowledge and our standard of reality is formed by the last experience which remains uncontradicted.⁴ In the light of the Absolute or ideal the imperfect world is bound to be discovered as less than real (*mithyā*), or as disappearing (*bādhita*), at the level of the ideal.⁵ In effect the theistic Vedāntins, in spite of their criticism, and in the same position e. g., to try to refute *mithyātva* and to explain illusion as a real

1. cf., *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, II, 12 and 33.

2. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, II, 17-22.

3. cf., W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 140.

4. cf., P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 62: The very process of philosophising begins because world contains unreality, contradictions of actual and ideal, matter and spirit, practice and theory. Those aspects of experience which show comparative absence of contradiction become the criterion of reality, which, unlike the world objects, must be totally free from the possibility of contradiction. Hence Advaita sets the metaphysical standard as changelessness or non-contradiction in all three times.

5. cf., K. S. Murty, *Reason and Revelation in Advaita*, p. 156.

manifestation of the real, as does Rāmaṇuja (satkhyativāda), will bring the empirical world and the illusory object to the same level with reference to reality.¹ Advaitins admit that since the Absolute is perfection itself, it cannot explain the appearance of the defective or imperfect, yet it is none the less real, as its nature is shadowed forth in the world.²

The critic indicts the theory of levels as a weak rationalisation forced upon the Advaitin because of the unavoidable nature of the world reality pressing upon him and refusing to disappear simply because he has called it "unreal." But the objector, who considers the psychological and practical effects of "Māyā" to be depressing and quietening of all powers of human life, may not refuse to take account of the distinction of levels, because, apart from its theoretical support practically also, Advaita has been able to remain the leading champion of traditional social life only on the strength of that doctrine. Far from making it a lame excuse Vedānta made it the foundation of human responsibility in society.

The dialectical debate with the dualists and others led to the formulation of five principal definitions by older Vedāntins.³ Studying the different significations in which the term "Māyā" is used in Advaita philosophy⁴ it appears that, in general, Vedānta uses "Māyā" as a mysterious principle of creation and seldom as absolute unreality, even in Advaita.

There are not wanting critics (Farquhar, Winternitz) who declare that the main motive for the adoption of Māyāvāda in Advaita is the scholastic one i. e., systematisation of Upaniṣadic philosophy being Śaṅkara's aim, he found that Māyā and the doctrine of levels of thought and being, alone, could overcome the contradictions of Upaniṣadic thought.⁵ But in view of the actual influence of Maya on the thought and practice of Vedānta it seems that mere scholasticism hardly touches the essence of the matter. The philosophic or mystic consciousness of the contradiction between the reality to which

1. Raju, op. cit., p. 131ff.

2. cf., ibid., p. 90: Duty of man is to know the higher and to try to realize it. In vain does he long for explanation of "why" and "how" the lower has appeared.

3. vide infra, pp. 779-782.

4. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 573-574.

5. George Thibaut (trans.), The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarākārya, Intro., pp. cxii-cxiii.

man aspires and the actuality of imperfections from which he suffers, the problem of moral choice between the higher and lower ends of life leads to Māyāvāda, in which the position is adopted that things are not really as they seem but that their meaning will be known only in the unity of reality.¹ It is a commonplace idea that the world is not the best possible place and man conceives the idea of a perfect reality. However much our knowledge of the social and material world may increase, the contrast of the actual and the ideal always troubles us. The Vedāntin treats present knowledge or experience as partial and imperfect i. e., "illusion," in contrast with a future, permanent, superior truth, and this develops in him the motive power of spiritual progress.

Māyāvāda is specially disliked because of its supposed harmful effects on the spirit of religion.² Critics do not pay enough attention to Śaṅkara's claim of usefulness of world for religion and for spiritual enlightenment.³ The critic's contention that Māyāvāda contradicts religion is rebutted by Deussen,⁴ who, adopting Kant's three postulates of faith, argues that religion is possible only if world is Māyā (appearance), and assumption of its final reality will destroy religion i. e., metaphysical reality of space will destroy the idea of God, of time that of immortality, of causality that of freedom. An empirical theism which makes world real and different from God has harmful moral implications, as responsibility for evil falls on God. Vedāntic theists avoid this by referring the world-order and operation to the immanent principle of karma, by which God is guided. But Advaitins seek to avoid the difficulty of this solution by also adopting the other solution viz., world's good and evil is not ultimate, but produced by non-discrimination. Without necessarily subscribing to the Kantian position it can still be seen that the Advaitin's intuition of the impersonal reality is connected integrally with its theistic conception of the personal. He does not confuse the higher and lower, but neither is it logical inconsistency which makes Śaṅkara adopt the personalistic definition of God⁵ and give a strong defence of the Saguna against

1. cf., Suresh Chandra Chakravarty, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 206.

2. cf., F. M. Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 189.

3. e. g., the jīvana mukta does not lose the sense of individuality or world-order, though having a correct evaluation of it.

4. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 44.

5. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 2.

atheists. The knowledge of Īśvara (apara) may have to be transcended in Advaita experience (para) but still it is not a false doctrine (bhrama). This is only understandable if his Brahman is not indifferent to Isvara and can claim all the dignity and value of the theistic conception.¹

Vaisnava Vedāntins make their protest against Māyāvāda largely on the score of its making God only empirical and true bhakti impossible. But the belief that bhakti and Māyā are irreconcilable is refuted by Vedāntic history. Not only were Advaitins ardent worshippers of the personal deity, but the medieval mystic saints combined bhakti with Advaita and Māyā. Hence it is that Advaita holds great sway inspite of attacks by theists. The special merit of Vedāntic mysticism is its more or less rational reconciliation of the philosophical Absolute with passionate devotionism through the device of the two standpoints, which was not a linguistic rationalisation but a principle actually operating in their lives.

The Advaitins may not be charged with the fault of a double standard i. e., of applying the "vyavahāra" standard to others and the "paramārtha" standard to themselves. Such a criticism is the product of mere prejudice, ignoring the fact that Advaitins did not exempt themselves from the vyavahāra standard, either in theory or in practice. All teachers of Māyā lived on the basis of the reality of the world.² Unless we declare in a wholesale way that they were all hypocritical or weak or unable to live upto their beliefs, an impartial study of their lives proves that they considered world and karma to be real enough i. e., a metaphysical conviction of Māyā did not prevent an equally strong conviction that the world is governed by an eternally unchangeable law, nor were they encouraged by Māyāvāda to act as they pleased or to ignore an "unreal" world. On the contrary, they were impelled to discharge their duties to the world of men by bringing them the message of Ātman.

As for the unphilosophic public, the doctrine of Māyā never wholly or exclusively shaped the popular thinking. The religious and devotional ideal of a real world

1. cf., Rudolf Otto, *Mysticism, East and West*, pp. 112, 115.

2. In fact, the critic has admitted this in charging Advaitins with inconsistency of theory and practice.

as God's *līlā* was an equally powerful influence.¹ As pointed out before, the strain of positivism and realism originating in the Vedas, continuing at the level of the common man, expressed in the Purānas, Epics and Dharma-Sāstras, and philosophically supported by the Gītā, was always present to counteract extravagances in the development of *Māyāvāda*. Commonsense accepted the "bhāvarūpa" nature of *Māyā* and the mysteriousness of the relation between God and the world, which did not interfere with any empirical activity and value. The popular mind might be unable to grasp the full philosophical significance of the denial of world reality, but did not miss the implication of the distinction of the transcendental and the empirical, nor did it misconstrue it as an invitation to treat the world and life as non-existent. Above all, the common man did not miss the psychological implications of *Māyāvāda* i. e., *Māyā* means separation and limitation of individuality, and the consequent attachment and aversion (*rāga-dveṣa*) which result in karma. Though *Ātman* is one (*Advaita*) or the inner animating Soul of all souls (*Antaryāmi*), each lives as a separate self (*jīva*) due to non-discrimination (*aviveka*) on the individual's part---this is the meaning of *Māyā* to the ordinary man.

The conclusion of unreality is not irreconcilable with ordinary experience. Far from the idea of the super-temporal, super-spatial and super-causal as the ground of the opposite type of effect (*samsāra*) through *Avidyā* appearing contradictory to many people, the idea might afford a satisfactory explanation of world-contradictions.² The critic argues that the nearer *Māyā* approaches the meaning of illusion the more depressing and devitalising is its effect upon life and activity. He misses the truth that "realism" in the sense of the conviction of the ultimacy of world and its evil, its meaning to be exactly as it appears, can be an equally hopeless conclusion, because man cannot hope to make evils and wrongs anything other than they are, from a higher point of view. Illusion, which means that all below God is *Māyā*, is an idea which can help man to master suffering and loss and to turn hindrance into help.³ Śāṅkara's teaching of ultimate unreality of creation, having its substance in the divine, or that of

1. cf., Thibaut, op. cit., Intro., p. cxxvii.

2. cf., Samuel Johnson, *Oriental Religions*, p. 352; also F. M. Müller, *Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 85.

3. Johnson, loc. cit.

Ramānuja and Nimbārka that the world is a mode of the real, or even that of Madhva insisting on the separate existence of creation, but only in a paratantra way, does not separate world and God, in practical life. For the common man as well as for the philosopher such a conviction is motivated by faith and not by "escapism." And this becomes the basis of religious optimism.

Asceticism and Its Causes

Vedāntic philosophers early recognised the transitoriness of the world and came to the conclusion that possessions did not give permanent happiness. Happiness lay in inner life to which external possessions were hindrances.¹ The asceticism and the institution of sannyāsa which arose out of this state of mind, the result of a mature and deliberate thought, was often abused. Its exaggeration took the form of self-torture, crude repressions of nature, flight from the troubles of life and debasement of its values. It is pointed out:

Many lazy, good-for-nothing people, who saw honour and praise bestowed upon those deniers of worldly comfort turned it into a means of acquiring that (worldly good, honour, praise) of which the whole system of asceticism is a denial. The majority of the wandering faquirs and the possessors of so-called super-natural powers in India of today shows clearly to what degradation has this noble doctrine reached.²

Two points must be made before proceeding further in the examination of Vedāntic asceticism. Firstly, critics speak as if any form of religious self-restraint is unhealthy. Devotees of the cult of self-indulgence wrongly equate it with self-expression and freedom, failing to recognise that it too, indirectly, is a form of self-torture, in which there is even less freedom than in self-repression, and the ascetic's restraint has a higher end in view, while self-indulgence has no end except further indulgence.³ Even the exaggerations of asceticism have a nobler aim than the exaggerations of the opposite viewpoint. Secondly, it is to be kept in mind that intellectual and practical standards of philosophers are not subjective but derived from the contemporary world, specially in matters of theology and religion. To judge the ideal and practice of a philosophy we must be able to separate the essential from the historical

1. vide Br. Upa., IV, 4, 22.

2. H. D. Sharma, Brāhminical Asceticism, p. 11.

3. Floyd H. Ross, The Meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism, p. 56.

element. The modern ideal of worldly activity is contrasted with the medieval ideal of monasticism, and judgment given in favour of the former, without a proper understanding of the significance of the spirit of self-control and discipline which animated the latter.

Leaving aside the spurious and perverse forms of asceticism, we must examine the scope, nature and implications of asceticism in Vedānta. William James has most pertinently remarked:

Asceticism symbolizes . . . the belief that there is an element of real wrongness in the world, which is not to be ignored or evaded, but must be met by appeal to soul's heroic resources and neutralized and cleansed by suffering The ultra optimism of "once-born" nature treating evil by ignoring it can be no general solution and appears shallow to sombre minds Asceticism apart from vagaries must be acknowledged to go with the profounder way of handling the gifts of existence. Naturalistic optimism is mere syllabus and flattery and sponge-cake in comparison.¹

Vedāntic asceticism implies a noble effort towards absolute freedom of spirit and is indicative of high culture and high moral elevation of spirit.²

But asceticism is not offered as the final solution of human existence in Vedānta. Its detachment and mortifications are not ends, though the discipline seems severe, but are accepted in order to release the self from the pull of lower nature. The belief in the power of the ideal nature to overcome the world, and the power of thought and will to control the senses by sheer effort is the heroic aspect of asceticism. There was no doubt in the power of self-control to effect the union with the divine. Thus,

(There) developed a systematic method of rational conduct for the purpose of overcoming the status naturae, to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his dependence on the world and on nature. It attempted to subjugate man to the supremacy of a powerful will, to bring his actions under constant self control with a careful consideration of their ethical consequences.³

Since Vedāntic asceticism was a means to an end its disciplines were commensurate with the forces it had to overcome. The purgatory was not of another world but here, the foes of freedom and purity were anger etc., which had to be mastered by tapas.

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1. The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 354-356.
 2. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Mysticism, p. 71.
 3. Max Weber's remarks in The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 118, about Protestant monasticism apply to Vedāntic asceticism, having reference to dharma and sādhanā.

It considered knowledge and detachment (*viveka*, *vairāgya*) equally indispensable like the two wings of a bird, enabling the soul to rise to its goal of freedom and peace.¹ What the critic calls the ascetic regulation of the whole of social life is the Vedāntic way of converting social life into a necessary discipline, preparatory to the entering of *sannyāsa*. The ascetic ideal becomes "positive" in the command for self-renunciation through service in the form of *swadharma*, and to this was connected the command to put aside the idea of being an agent and enjoyer. It may be noted in passing that all Vedāntas do not require *sannyāsa*,² but do require detachment, nor does Vedānta treat the body with contempt, but as an instrument of righteousness, *dharma-sādhana*m.

As for the type of austerity practiced in Vedāntic discipline, it is necessary to remember that neither in *vidvat* nor in *vividhiṣā* *sannyāsa* is there merely mortification of the flesh for its own sake; on the contrary, yoga is avoidance of excess and abstinence.³ Vedāntic asceticism should not be equated to *hathayoga*. It is a fallacy to confuse the question of origin with the development and uses of any doctrine or practice. It has been remarked that primitive yoga is a magical cult practiced to yoke or harness the spirit of the gods for human purpose or to "yoke" psychic powers by self-mortification (*tapas*), its aim being, not Brahman, but *siddhi*.⁴ But primitive yoga is not to be confused with Vedāntic discipline, for Vedānta could utilise yoga for its own higher purpose of *mokṣa*.⁵ This is not merely a novel interpretation, because the distinction of the two types of yoga was clear to the Vedāntins themselves.⁶

In the three *Prasthānas* of Vedānta the distinction of false and true austerity

1. *Viveka Chūḍāmaṇi*, 376.

2. *vide supra*, p. 147.

3. B. G., VI, 16-17.

4. Rudolf Otto, *The Original Gītā*, pp. 117, 177.

5. *cf.*, *ibid.*, p. 129.

6. *vide Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*, III, 34-46: Yogīs shrink from Vedānta truth thinking that *jñāna-yoga* brings annihilation of self, but they are non-discriminating and full of fear. They look on mind as separate from but related to *Ātman* and try to attain destruction of misery or fearlessness by control of mind. But their effort (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*) is not the only way. The mind should be disciplined, brought back from object to *Ātman* but not to *śamādhi* yoga or *laya* which is as harmful as desire, since it is characterized by absence of *Ātma-jñāna*. *Sādhaka* should not taste the happiness experienced by the yogī seeking *śamādhi*, which is false, since the mind is not identified with *Ātman*. The mind brought under discipline, not in the oblivion of deep sleep, nor distracted by objects i. e., when quiescent like the flame of light in a windless place, then only it becomes Brahman.

is clearly made.¹ The Gītā teaches rāja-yoga and the ideal of niṣkāma karma. Whatever the technical doctrine of salvation may be it is, in fact, an inner freedom by which to meet the sensual temptations, the independence of a serene and self-sufficient superior spirit. Otto remarks:

In this way there arises . . . against the background of primitive yoga . . . "character-yoga" for which the true yogin is the self-controlled man who pulls himself together in intense concentration, . . . the "harnessing" now becomes the life long "yoking" of will against sense-impressions and emotional agitations, a never ceasing condition of control and alertness, inner "collectedness" therefore, but at the same time persistent exercise of will, together with discipline.²

Contrary to the critic's judgment that Vedāntic asceticism ends only in "folly and idiocy" or "annihilation," the aim of asceticism was to enable man to lead a completely alert and intelligent (illuminated) life, ascetic conduct meant a rational planning of life in accordance with the demands of the spirit or the will of God.³ Nor may exception be taken against the use of the term "rational" in this context, because it must be remembered that "rational" is not a term with a unitary meaning—and mystic rationalism is different from worldly rationalism. Asceticism was the ideal life of the Vedāntic sage, pure, chaste, discriminating, detached; a genuine emancipation of nature which enabled him to look on pleasure and pain, abundance and privation as alike irrelevant and indifferent (dvandvātīta); engaging in action and having experiences without the fear of corruption and enslavement.⁴

Absence of Ethics and Its Causes

The problem of moral content and standard must be studied on grounds of Vedānta's own theory and practice. Since it is avowedly and actually a philosophy of actual realization, not merely a speculative or "pure" philosophy, the moral development of man and mystical character are its essence, not accidents.⁵ This practical nature presupposes competency (adhikāra) in its adherent, who, if he wishes to follow any method of culture (sādhana), must first live a meritorious ethical life. Vedānta

1. vide supra, p. 142.

2. The Original Gītā, pp. 128-129.

3. cf., Max Weber, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 154: This rationalisation of conduct within the world but for the sake of the world beyond was a consequence of ascetic protestantism.

4. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 353.

5. vide supra, pp. 124-127.

is realistic enough to realize that man as he is is not living a divine life, hence an elaborate discipline with exact directions and training is worked out to develop a noble character.¹ Nor can it be objected that the discipline is over-balanced by sheer ritualism:

Despite the handicap of an over-stressed ritual, India emerged with the belief that religion is not a matter of form but of mind and will and that character is more essential than good ritual, (and the old rule) by deed, thought and word do good to all living beings . . . shows how ill deserved . . . the criticism is which declares Hindu morality to be only a matter of form.²

When it is said in jñāna-mārga that mokṣa is brought about by knowledge alone, it is presumed that the aspirant has the full moral equipment. Critics fail to grasp the significance of the well-known rule that a pure sāt̥tvic mind is the very first step and intellectual apprehension and moral worth are but two sides of the sadhaka's nature. "Knowledge without morality is as futile as morality without knowledge."³ Though salvation is the fruit of knowledge in Vedānta, knowledge is no pure and simple intellectualism, but a life and conduct resulting from that truth. "But apart from gnosis of the mystic even the knowledge of the ordinary worshippers is no ordinary knowledge but a combination of ethical, devotional and intellectual factors."⁴

It is necessary to understand the exact position of ethics in Vedānta. In one sense morality has a negative significance since immorality is clearly regarded as a serious or fatal hindrance in all scriptures of Vedānta.⁵ Also, Vedānta considers morality to lead to happy existence but to fall away in release as it considers it to be a sign of imperfection from the ultimate standpoint. This philosophical position does not prevent the teaching of a practical ethics for the worldly minded as well as for spiritual men, inculcating the loftiest moral principles. Criticism of negativistic ethics can be refuted by the many injunctions to exert oneself and to engage in active good works.⁶ It is true that in the period of decline there was neglect of many

1. Edmund Davison Soper, *The Inevitable Choice*, p. 98; cf., F. M. Müller, *Three Lectures on Vedānta*, p. 163.

2. E. W. Hopkins, *Ethics of India*, pp. 236, 255.

3. *ibid.*, p. 79.

4. *ibid.*, p. 185.

5. e. g., B. G. provides a practical moral code for distinguishing the divine and the demonic characters.

6. Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 179; cf., P. D. Mehta, *Early Indian Religious Thought*, p. 132.

virtues and values, but it is noteworthy that positivistic, humanistic values (charity, non-injury, toleration, love, hospitality) have not suffered as much as mundane values viz., political and social efficiency.

The charge of individualistic ethics is based on the ground that in Vedānta moral forms of conduct are prescribed with reference to either good future conditions for the soul or the soul's attainment of salvation.¹ If this criticism is exaggerated to mean that since it teaches morality for purifying the soul of earthly things we might reach the same result by not using moral capacity at all, such a misconception is to be rejected out of hand, since the moral struggle is an essential part of the discipline, and so is the distinction of right and wrong. From the individual's standpoint the moral standard is clear and simple.² It is a fact that Vedānta does not face the problem of individual versus society, therefore, social ethics does not become imperative for it as a separate field of thought and action. It largely insists on character-formation by a pious, abstemious asceticism, a well-balanced life of restraint. Vedānta does emphasise subjectivistic ethics; austerity, self-control, renunciation, non-attachment, concentration rate high as virtues, yet it is to be remembered that personal morality alone can be the true foundation of a high moral tone in society. Nor is the ethics of inner perfection, subject as it is to the primary demand of surrender of individual claims, inconsistent with social ethics, since the inner perfection finds corresponding expression in outer conduct.³ Nor may it be forgotten that moral worth of conduct has reference both to its subjective and objective aspects, and the former standard rated very high with Vedānta, but the latter was never totally rejected by it.⁴

Secondly, it may be noted that ethics has two aims. On the one hand it seeks to establish harmonious relations between men and, on the other, between God (Truth) and man. Henri Bergson distinguishes between "natural" morality, tribal, traditional and institutional, which treats the individual as a unit of society, and "absolute"

1. John Mckenzie, *Hindu Ethics*, p. 250.

2. vide supra, pp. 103-104.

3. vide supra, pp. 181-192.

4. cf., Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 361.

morality based on mystic intuition, dynamic in nature and having the effect of an appeal, in which the individual is open to humanity, but always as an individual.¹ Vedānta takes its stand on the latter and is bound to appear as individualistic.

Two other features of Vedāntic ethics should be noted, because the misunderstanding of them partly accounts for the charge against it. The emphasis is always on the inward rather than the outward aspect of conduct. The insistence is on control of conduct at its source of character, or motive and desire, rather than regulation of its outer expression and results. Secondly, the admission of relativity of standards in which right ethics for each is what is true to his own capacity and character, his aspirations and dharma. Vedānta resists an absolute standard at the human level because to attempt a higher ethics without sufficient knowledge and discipline is a sure way to destruction. Three levels of ethical development are to be noted. Firstly, there is the standard of the good life for the man in the world, strictly within the socio-moral sphere and judged in terms of obedience to law or dharma; secondly, a much stricter code for the ascetic, at a higher moral level, to be understood in terms of self-responsibility and thirdly, a different standard of transcendental morality for the perfected man based on the freedom of the Atman. Though both characteristics may suffer from misapplications and exaggerations yet the wisdom of either, from the moral standpoint, cannot be denied.

Here the critic raises the objection of logical inconsistency.² Morality is contradictory of Vedantic metaphysics and not deducible from it. The identity-conception of Advaita is not differentiating enough to provide the basis of a sound social ethics. Critically considered, it is compatible with utmost egoism as with thorough going altruism. If there is one ultimate spirit what does it matter which illusory self suffers or enjoys. Altruism requires sympathy based on separation of object from oneself and not sympathy of the unconscious type in the absorption of identity. This, when coupled with denial of others' individuality in the impersonalist-ic conception, is really fatal to social morality.³

1. Religion and Morality, p. 5.

2. cf., W. S. Urquhart, The Vedānta and Modern Thought, p. 175.

3. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Mysticism, pp. 98-99.

It may be pointed out to the critic that it is rather dogmatic to think that certain conclusions (morality) can result only from one premise and not others i. e., he has fallen into the fallacy of definition by initial predication, assuming that the subject of discourse (morality) cannot belong to any other complex except the one he has indicated in his own definition. It would be well to make the point clear that the presupposition of man's essentially sinful nature and of God as the dispenser of rewards and punishments for man's good and evil deeds, and the function of religion and philosophy as the means of "saving" man from this is not applicable in the case of Vedānta. The critic who applies the above standard of morality is bound to come to the "conclusion" that Vedānta is lacking in morality or has no high level of morality. Such a conclusion is unjustified; not only can the relation of individual and society be worked out from the principle of Ātman, but, in fact, ethical enquiries of Vedānta (dharma and sādhana) are based upon its metaphysical position that Ātman as distinct from transitory saṃsāra is the Good and most satisfying reality.¹

In support of morality Vedānta insists that only after jñāna, when the world is seen as Brahman, can the vision of man be truly liberal and fruitful.² The Vedāntic command to know the self is not to know the ego but what lies beyond the ego, the self which runs through all. Its conviction that every human being has his true meaning in Brahman is a metaphysical one, but it breaks out as a moral power also.³ Nor is the Vedāntic teaching that self is the supreme object of love equivalent to selfishness but the very opposite.⁴ The highest and purest morality is the immediate consequence of Vedānta. Tat tvam asi gives in three words metaphysics and morals together.⁵

Absence of Ethics and Pantheistic Mysticism

Vedāntic mysticism did not negate all elements of human nature but allowed intelligence, feeling and will to be permeated by the intuition of unity. Removal of

1. cf., Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 404: Hence there would remain to Christianity the merit of having more profoundly grasped morality, to Vedānta the merit of having set forth the highest attainable reason for it.

2. सा एते परमात्मनि ।

3. cf., F. M. Müller, *The Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 89; also Deussen, loc. cit.

4. cf., Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself*, p. 101; also Abraham Kaplan, *The New World of Philosophy*, p. 252.

5. Paul Deussen, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 336.

intellectual confusion, delusions, hallucinations, attainment of accurate intellectual conviction (sraavana, manana), purified emotion and a full-fledged morality was the prerequisite of mystical experience.¹ The latter was no miracle or accidental attainment, but a slow growth under severe discipline. The empirical test of that experience was not lacking. "When a man comes out of samadhi he remains enlightened, a sage, a prophet, a saint. His whole character changed, his life changed, illumined."² Historically and sociologically, the conception of unity and wholeness in pantheistic mysticism of Vedānta led men beyond moral platitudes to supreme effort. The separateness which is the basis of selfishness is annulled in the experience of unity, the counterpart of which is love. The mystical experience has its end in the unity which lies behind the world, therefore, the field of morality extends beyond the human sphere to cover the whole universe. There is nothing illogical in the idea that mysticism which bases its ideals on the unity underlying all things, may lend the inspiration and zeal behind those ideals. The Vedāntic view is that such mystical consciousness becomes explicit in enlightenment in the form of Brahmabhāva, sarvātmabhāva etc. "The part of the theory that love and compassion are parts of mystical consciousness must be accepted, since it is so stated by those who have the consciousness. Love can flow from it to the world, hence, mysticism can be a motive for ethical and social action."³

The criticism is that pantheistic pervasion by God and mystical identity led to relaxation of moral obligations. But the insistence of Vedānta on the realization of immanent Deity in his consciousness ministers to moral strength, gives the incentive to consecrate his life and activities to God, endurance for action and courage to rise above visible good and evil and egoism. The pantheistic vision of the Bhagavadgītā and Arjuna's decision is a proof of this. It gives that power, that freedom of high aspiration which the conviction of such a divinised universe must guarantee to all its proper forces.⁴ Advaita rejects as fallacious the argument that Brahman being All there is no

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1. R. D. Ranade and S. K. Belvalkar, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. VII, Indian Mysticism, preface 2.
 2. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 392.
 3. W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 330; cf., S. K. Belvalkar, Vedānta Philosophy, I, 65.
 4. cf., W. T. Urquhart, Pantheism and the Value of Life, pp. 19-20.

scope for moral distinctions and endeavour. This is a confusion between the real (eternal) and the existent (temporal); as fire is one only but we shun that which has consumed dead bodies and not any other,¹ so all is Brahman but certain things are to be avoided and others to be desired. Until the experience of identity each is a moral agent and has his own work which he cannot delegate to another. Responsibility for discrimination between good and evil, pursuit of the former and avoidance of the latter does rest on man.² It is man who makes the world good or evil by his proper or improper use of it.

The absence of a complete theory of ethics on modern lines, or the very compressed form of ethical ideas in Vedānta cannot justify the judgment of "unethical." It is true that inspite of interest in ethical conduct Vedānta did not succeed in working out a regular ethical code, since its concentration was more on the inner aspects of conduct i. e., on attitude of mind rather than on speculating on conduct or working out of complete theories. Neither was the relation between moral laws and their grounds worked out systematically because Vedānta concentrated on the practical forms and methods of self-realization. However, the mere presence of a complete ethical philosophy is no guarantee that it will actually influence ethical conduct (e. g., Greek or Western philosophy inspite of its systematised world-view in ethics, politics, psychology and metaphysics has not always been an exact representation of actual life and practice). Contrariwise, absence of such a theory is not evidence of non-ethical practices. As pointed out before, Vedānta does not suffer in comparison with any system of philosophy in having an intuitive feeling of necessity of the highest form of ethical culture, and the philosophical justification of such conduct is also inherent in Ātman philosophy.

All the ingredients of an advanced type of ethical philosophy or principles of

1. S. B. on B. S., II, 3, 48.

2. cf., Vivarāna Prameya Saṅgraha, IX, XXX, d: Now in the midst of the world there is no human goal devoid of evil, whether here or hereafter, therefore let even that be desired that is in conflict with an unseen result. If this be said, true it is that everything good is conjoined with evil, yet that which is less evil is a human goal, while what is more evil is not a human goal. Thus is there distinction.

ethics are present in Vedānta.¹ The idea of the end of endeavour is much thought about. There is an evaluation of different aims and goals, the limited ends are rejected in favour of the unlimited bliss of Ātman. The goal of ānand is a combination of the perfectionist theory, involving severe moral discipline, and the eudaemonistic theory.² "Self-realization" implies a fusion of ethical and mystical elements and "swarāja" ideal is the true freedom of determination by the ideal self. Vedāntic ethics points to an autonomous principle, since the moral imperative is derived from within and is not the command of any external authority. "Man" or Ātman is the standard in terms of fullest self-responsibility. This meets the objection that there is no principle in Vedānta by reference to which the value of conduct may be determined. On the level of the individual the standard is the realization of the true self and on the social level the central principle of ethics corresponding to the Vedānta metaphysics is abheda. As remarked before, the realization of the universal principle common to all leads to gradual inclusion of self into the self of others. The acquiring of the attitude of samadarśana³ leads to justice in dealing with all i. e., treating self in himself and others with equal impartiality. One of the most striking doctrines of Vedānta is substantially that of the golden rule.⁴ "This principle is regarded as perhaps the highest formulation of practical ethics that any religion has attained. It is interesting to see how naturally and simply it follows from one of the fundamental tenets of the Gītā philosophy."⁵ A profound sense of solidarity with the universe underlies morality, in which individual evolution and social well-being are connected together through the cultivation of perfect serenity (śama), identity of pleasure and pain (sāmya) and equality of all fellow-men with oneself (ātmaupamya).⁶

That the ethical standard is based on the fullest understanding of psychological

1. P. T. Raju in *The Concept of Man*, p. 329, controverts this statement: attempt to derive moral law from the nature of the absolutely transcendent God (by finite intellect) leaves doubt unresolved. Neither does the immanence-experience give details of conduct apart from empirical study of human nature.
2. vide supra, pp. 203-206.
3. B. G., V, 18.
4. vide B. G., VI, 32; V, 25.
5. Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavad Gītā*, p. 25; cf., S. K. Belvalkar, *Vedānta Philosophy*, I, 64.
6. R. K. Mukerjee, *Indian Scheme of Life*, pp. iv-v.

factors is shown by the analysis of desire or springs of action in Vedānta. Both physical and psychological energy is non-moral, and only when it enters consciousness in the shape of desire does it become moral. Vedāntic morality has a double aspect because it relates to desire as well as to desire transcended.

As to the Vedāntic conception of desirelessness, there is no psychological impossibility if it is understood in the Vedāntic sense. It is the extinction of evil passions, without which practice of supreme ethics or mokṣa is not possible. Vedānta holds that without destruction of craving, hatred etc. any desire however good is bound to be linked with the egoistic self-will and not with the divine will. So, freedom from desire should not be taken literally, since even Vedānta makes a distinction of true and false desires, and the spiritually alert desire nothing except what they ought to after the senses have been tranquillised.¹ A threefold distinction can be made of acts in terms of their value. The wholly good act (niṣkāma) which, when combined with knowledge, does not bind; the desireful though good act (sakāma) which leads to happiness here or hereafter (abhyudaya); the selfish bad act which leads to suffering. So, dismissal of fruit in niṣkāma karma is to be understood as giving up all diverse motives (desire for abhyudaya) in favour of the one motive of self-conquest (Ātmasiddhi). In the Upaniṣads the idea is advanced to the point that with the ceasing of desire karma will also cease. The Gītā carries forward this idea to enjoin life in the world and performance of duties with perfect detachment. So understood, the ideal of desirelessness is not to be confused with the attempt to destroy personality by suppression of all desires and volitions.

Absence of Ethics and Loss of Individuality in Vedānta

The critics hold pantheistic doctrines and mystical methods to be specially liable to the defect of loss of individuality in an abstract and impersonal reality. "If they (mystics) go far enough in their work of recollection and meditation they end by losing their intuition of a personal God and having a direct experience of a reality

1. Chān. Upa., VIII, 3, 1; VIII, 2, 56; cf., S. B. on B. G., III, 1.

that is impersonal."¹ Vedānta in its monistic phase is specially guilty of destruction of individuality. Mokṣa is the complete negation of all elements of human nature and even of consciousness, in the Nirguṇa Brahma.

Those who apply the test of personality as essential to make a philosophy "appeal to the heart" find the Vedāntic Absolute to be empty, void. But such tests are of very limited value in judging the worth of a philosophy. It may be pointed out that the conception of personality is a very modern one, and ancient philosophy, western or Vedāntic, does not have the same valuation of it as modern thought,² in which "each self is an unique existence which is perfectly impervious to other selves in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue."³ As against this emphasis on the separate and ultimate individual egos Vedānta allows only one perfect self or principle of being (Puruṣottama, Ātman-Brahman) as real and all imperfect individual egos as non-ultimate. Secondly, unlike modern western philosophy which equates personality to the human person chiefly in its corporeal mode, Vedānta understands it as only one state of real being among an indefinite multitude of other states.

Vedāntins dispute among themselves the ultimate or non-ultimate nature of ahamārtha, but all agree that "two words bind and release, mineness and freedom from mineness."⁴ If this be regarded as abolishing of personality Vedānta will ask, what does our real individuality consist of? As we do not regret the development of personality from childhood to adulthood, from viciousness to virtue, so pantheistic mysticism of Vedānta looks forward to a state in which self develops from imperfection into a full and rich perfection. Nor will it subscribe to the prizing of the separate ego, which exists only in the sphere of imperfection and change. In the mystical experience (Advaita, Brahmabhāva, sarvabhāva) all is one. Mystic loss of selfhood in Brahma is felt, in Vedānta, to be attainment of perfection. Entering the Ātman, its

1. W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 163, quotes Aldous Huxley; cf., Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 21.
2. cf., Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 162: Remember that ancient philosophy and Christian theology had no word for personality or need of it. Persons of the Trinity are quite different from personality. When modern theologians make personality the centre of their system they are at best translating Christian philosophy into an alien dialect, using a new category.
3. *ibid.*
4. *Pañjala Upa.*, IV, 20.

possibilities are realized and though it ceases to exist as individual, it is not destroyed but transformed. Absence of anxiety over personal consciousness leads the Advaitin to have little interest in continuation after death. But his desire for real being is strong and his faith that he is made for it appears continually in the idea of *amrtvam*, which is a qualitative dimension very different from the absorption of the physical type, with which the critics equate it. Were this not the case, the striving after *moksa*, the whole progress of the mystical path would be meaningless.¹ Advaita asks the theists what the individual stands to lose in pure identity? It is merely puerile fear which longs to perpetuate finiteness and fragmentariness, rather than accept divine selfhood. Advaita does not admit unconsciousness of Brahman or *moksa* simply because there is absence of imperfect human consciousness there, nor is it devoid of feeling because we do not find human feelings there.² It is searching for the ground of personality, as well as truth and good, free from all contingencies, and the final appeal to the *Nirguna* overcomes the intense worship of individualised will and purpose.³

The emphasis on the individual in modern thought is connected with development of democracy, while non-individualism is due to failure to develop democracy in the orient.⁴ The insistence on the value of personality in the empirical world is necessary to guard against political and social injustice and tyranny, but to extend this conception into the "Eternal Now" is a logical and practical fallacy unless we conceive God as a tyrant against whom individual's rights have to be asserted.⁵ Vedānta might plausibly argue that the western idea of persistence of individuality is merely a sign of greater aggressiveness and self-assertiveness of western man; the attempt to condemn Vedānta, specially Advaita, by carrying the western conception of the infinite worth of individual from politics to the religious sphere is without merit.⁶

There is, also, a logical contradiction in charging pantheistic mysticism with

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1. cf., Samuel Johnson, *Oriental Religions*, pp. 359-360.
 2. cf., Mahendranath Sircar, *Hindu Mysticism According to the Upaniṣads*, pp. 68ff.
 3. cf., Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 321.
 4. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *East and West in Religion*, p. 27.
 5. W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, p. 320.
 6. *ibid.*, p. 322.

the double defect of loss of individuality, on the one hand, and, on the other, with spiritual pride allegedly resulting from the unity of the human with the divine spirit, which latter defect is, psychologically speaking, the extremest form of individualism. But leaving the question of the critic's illogicality aside, the latter point needs further examination. In Vedānta knowing is by being, man is one with what he worships, either literally or in some figurative sense. The Vedāntic "that thou art" is not a mere matter of protestation, but the very solution of the world-riddle. On two counts the term "deification" is offensive to the critic. Firstly, he creates an absolutely transcendental, unapproachable God (as in western theism) and is afterwards afraid to approach Him, thus the Vedāntic mahāvākyas sound like sheer blasphemy to him,¹ because such self-assertion on the part of the individual is derogatory to the divine majesty. Secondly, the western critic emphasises the distinctness of individuality and is suspicious of anything, even the Infinite and Eternal Being, which looks like interfering with the rights of personality.² But there is another way of understanding "deification" in pantheism and mysticism which is purely and simply a consciousness by man of being transformed by contact with spirit or God.³ Vedānta is most clearly conscious of the self as "vessel of the spirit."⁴ Far from being self-glorification this is the very spirit which overcomes individualism, creates humility in man as he realizes himself to be the instrument of the divine. The extreme humility of the Vedāntic theists before the glory and majesty of God and the religious piety of Advaitins shows that to maintain the eternal identity of the human and the divine is different from arrogating divinity to humanity. Vedānta is not guilty of the enormity of claiming that man in his present condition is Brahman.⁵ What the critic calls the "pride of the brāhmanic superman" is just the inspired statement of the man who realizes himself as Ātman.⁶

1. F. M. Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 122.

2. William Ralph Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 356.

3. cf., Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 418.

4. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

5. cf., Abraham Kaplan, *The New World of Philosophy*, p. 243.

6. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 167, quotes Kaivalya Upaniṣad, 19: In me the universe had its origin. In me alone the whole subsists. In me it is lost--this Brahman, the timeless, it is I myself.

In the light of the above stand of Vedānta the critic's insistence on the retention of the individuality-principle as a necessary condition of moral conduct would appear to be the very opposite of truth. According to Vedānta, the uncultured mind or "the ordinary man makes distinction of his own and others ego but the noble (knower) to whom the principle of individuality is not significant sees others' suffering as his own."¹ Even after dissolution of personality the purely ethical part remains indestructible, and Vedānta inculcates love of neighbour with complete renunciation of self-love; love generally not confined to mankind, but including all living creatures; benevolence, the requital of all wickedness, however base, with goodness and love.² Vedāntic denial of individuality is practically coincident with non-egoism and non-selfishness, to which no exception can be taken by the most critical.³ It must be kept in mind that Vaiṣṇava Vedānta does not deny the reality of the individual either at the empirical or the transcendental level, therefore, there is full scope for individual responsibility in regard to moral conduct.

Absence of Ethics and Intellectualism

Another factor in ethics is the sense of moral responsibility in the individual. The criticism is that there can be no ethics in Advaita as its intellectualism means neglect of the will. It is necessary to understand that Vedāntic psychology differs from the modern in emphasising the subjective elements of mind instead of its motor-active phase.

According to Hindu psychological schools, the greatest expression of mind lies in its total illumination, which is achieved . . . by the subjective method of concentration and meditation and consequent total integration. Greatness of mind can be judged not by its ability in action but rather by its integration and unification.⁴

Vedānta does not hold "Avidyā" to be mere intellectual error, but an ignorance involving false desire or kāma, producing false action or karma; similarly, jñāna is a "self-finding" not purely intellectual, because it is achieved by renunciation of false

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, p. 481.

2. *ibid.*, p. 501.

3. *cf.*, Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 221; also S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man*, pp. 331, 336, 361.

4. Nikhilanand, *Hindu Psychology*, p. 11.

desire or by ethical effort. If, as Deussen holds, the essence of "morality is transformation of will" then moral regeneration is only possible through true knowledge, as in Vedānta. Truth however imperfectly grasped is the only source of good; and ethics and all other perceptions depend on knowledge.

Vedāntic intellectualism is not "much learning" devoid of practical value, this has been stressed before. But Vedānta does not make the mistake of modern pragmatism in converting the proposition "all truth works" into the proposition "all ideas which work are true." The saving value of Vedāntic gnosis, the truth of that experience, lies in its power to satisfy the complete nature of man. Truth is known by action,¹ not merely by cognition, and both have to be confirmed by feeling or realization. The powerful influence of Vedānta rests on this fact that

Vedāntic speculation had more than a mere textual basis. They were designed to meet the case of the teacher to whom some function or mission was entrusted for the welfare of the world Those who had been eminent in knowledge were empowered, even when it was complete, to preserve the sense of individuality, without laying up fresh fruit.²

Absence of Ethics and Doctrines of Karma and Punarjanma

The critics denounce the law of karma as a law implying determination of the present by the past, hence productive of fatalism. But fatalism in the sense of determination by some outside mysterious, uncontrolled power has no place in Vedānta. It denounces those materialists and atheists who proclaim the rule of chance or accident, and, instead, postulates self-determination of the individual by the laws of karma and punarjanma. Though rejecting the conception of God despotically fixing the "fate" or "lot" of each man, Vedānta also does not suggest impersonal and mechanical working or a godless universe, because it believes that God does rule the universe, but not capriciously, being guided by these moral laws which form His nature.³ As Vedānta distinguishes the past (prārabdha), present (kriyamān) and future (sañcita) aspects of karma it does not wish to ignore the element of determination in human life. But it gives support to morality in the form of self-determination at two levels. At the level of

1. In spite of Advaita's doctrinal rejection of karma as sādhana, action is indispensable part of its discipline with reference to sattva śuddhi.
2. Estlin Carpenter, *Theism in Medieval India*, p. 341.
3. vide supra, pp. 86-90.

the empirical ego or *jīva*, the pattern of his internal and external conditions is made in accordance with his own past karma, and at the level of transcendental self or *Ātman* also it is the self alone which remains undetermined by any thing (*swarāṭa*). Vedānta distinguishes *kartā*, karma and *phala* in the moral sphere and allows primacy to the *kartā* over the karma, and voluntary choice of his own ends by the *kartā* (*abhyudaya* or *moksa*). Even when beings are said to be determined by their own nature¹ and a distinction of divine and demoniac² natures is made, that is not to be understood as the doctrine of predestination of some to good and others to evil, but as the operation of an earlier karma producing these differences of nature.

The problem of freedom and necessity in moral life is faced in Vedānta. *Prārabdha* karma appears as destiny, *vidhi* or *daiva*, but is not all powerful. At the empirical level Vedānta advanced the other hypothesis of *puruṣakāra*, which does not displace fate or *prārabdha*, but makes it operate.³ The theological form of the argument is that unless such freedom of effort be conceded the injunctions and prohibitions of the scripture will be valueless,⁴ i. e., karma, according to Vedānta, only determines the outlines of present life (*varṇāśrama*), which is the sphere of continuous action with certain limitations of circumstances and opportunities, allowing full scope to freedom of moral choice and moral activity.

What is most essential to morality is the philosophical conception of the "bonds of action" or the "endless consequences of conduct;" ethics demands that every defect and gift should find a positive desert, and some way in which it was earned.⁵ The karma doctrine is certainly a necessary product of the theory of retribution. It was satisfying to the Vedānta logic as a principle regulating life in an orderly manner, while having salutary effects on socio-moral life. But the "legalism" which equates

1. B. G., III, 33.

2. B. G., XVI, 1ff.

3. According to the *Vīrmitrodaya*, one theory is that *daiva* alone, another that *puruṣakāra* alone, a third theory of the wise is that both together determine success or failure of action. The analogy is that rain (*daiva*), cultivation (*puruṣakāra*) and proper season (*kāla*) together give a full harvest. Even in the case of unfavourable destiny heroic vigorous people never bend before it, but by their effort either check it or gain dignity by their undaunted facing of that destiny—*अधिकं भवतु तेजस्वी न दैवमुत्तरेत् । न भवेत्तु दैवदण्डः कश्चिन्मम विद्वित् ।*

4. vide supra, pp. 83-84.

5. Samuel Johnson, *Oriental Religions*, pp. 110-111.

penalties and awards for vices and virtues in an arithmetical equation, ignoring the higher element of mercy, does not predominate in the karma doctrine. Its origin may have been largely in the idea of recompense, but the moral sense of Vedānta was strong enough to transform it into the superior conception of reformation. Release depends upon what is done in this mundane life. The sense of moral responsibility is kept alive for the unknown future. Karma effectively connects morality with the goal of life. Also, the balance of circumstances and agent in determining responsibility, the connecting of responsibility with the inner attitude in the Bhagavadgītā, is psychologically correct in developing a sense of responsibility in the individual.

The critic who equates karma with "fate" or pure determinism by past action, "as we are so must we act," declares that there is no scope in it for the idea of duty. But the above interpretation explains how Vedānta has been able to reconcile it with duty or dharma, which is the part of the individual's karma to be discharged and worked out in the right spirit (niṣkāma). The critic now advances the objection¹ that even if the karma doctrine allows for moral activity, the motive of duty, goodness and altruism of any type is wholly selfish i. e., practicing virtue in order to acquire merit.² It may be noted at the outset that the idea of merit in future is the lowest motive, yet even it purifies the daily round, by conveying dimly the idea of basic unity of life, interrelation of all its members, from which comes the desire to assist all life towards enlightenment. And, theoretically, a reconciliation of duty (niṣkāma karma) and the hedonistic or beatific (abhyudaya or mokṣa) results of virtue is possible along the following lines. Ethical theory distinguishes between intention and motive of an act, the former being the knowledge of intermediate steps and results necessary to reach the object of desire and the latter being the desire to obtain that end. Doing of duty may have certain consequences in the future, but that does not prevent its operation as a correct motive of the good act. The critic may not reasonably insist that unless the Vedāntin is ignorant of the results of his acts (in the shape of abhyudaya or mokṣa) he

1. vide supra, pp. 278-279, where this objection was discussed from a different angle.

2. e. g., Lala Lajpat Rai in Arya Samaj, p. 87, argues that an energetic and active life is preferable to passive acquiescence in the decrees of fate, in as much as destiny is the consequence of acts. A life of virtuous activity will secure the soul a good destiny and the opposite will help to store up bad karma.

cannot be said to have been truly moral or to have acted out of a sense of duty.¹

Vedāntic conception of niṣkāma karma may be adjudged as a true conception of duty for its own sake, even in the context of the laws of karma and punarjanma.

The critic declares that the fatalism of the karma and punarjanma doctrines has involved Vedānta in the negative problem of deliverance from bondage or escape. This charge has been examined earlier,² and is but one side of the picture, the other being the actual process of deliverance as one of moral effort or righteousness. Certainly, the doctrine does not minimise the importance of morality in human life, nor does it dismiss lightly the difficulties of overcoming the world. It is a hypothesis conducive to the advancement of individual and social life; a powerful incentive to habitual right conduct e. g., there are instances in Epics and poetry where characters raise the question, for what sin am I suffering in this manner, and their conclusion is, I will sin no more.³

If the moral and spiritual values of doctrines can be judged by their applicability in the daily life of the people, then there is positive and direct correlation of the doctrines of karma and punarjanma with these higher values. Judging by the more external standard of "survival value" we find that in all periods of social and political revolutions these doctrines have not only survived, but have been turned towards the cause of progress and unity. The alleged fatalism of these doctrines has not prevented Vedānta from meeting any practical crisis. Political and religious movements for defence of faith and culture have not been discouraged or prevented by belief in these doctrines. However, it must be added that these doctrines have been combined

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1. cf., P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer, *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals*, p. 162: The moral imperative has three elements in it, according to the Nyāya analysis, knowledge of the act being the means to a desirable end, *ज्ञानं चात्मनोऽर्थम्*; knowledge that the act will not be followed by more harm than good, *तत्संयोगोऽनुचितोऽर्थम्*; knowledge of the feasibility of the act, *ज्ञानं चात्मनोऽर्थम्*.
 2. vide supra, pp. 252-254.
 3. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 314; cf., F. M. Müller, *The Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 87: Whatever we may think of the premises of karma (Deussen calls it a mythical statement of a truth unattainable by intellect) its influence on human character is marvellous. The motive of goodness is given by the thought that suffering is paying off of debts and laying of moral credit for the future. There can be no doubt that karma doctrine has met with widest acceptance and helped to soften suffering of millions and not only to encourage them in endurance of present evils, but in their efforts for future improvement.

with the doctrine of grace. The emphasis of the Upanisads and the Vedānta-Sūtra is on the doctrine of karma, but the Bhagavadgītā admits the religious motive, based on the redemptive nature of kṛpā, within the psychological and moral effects of karma. All the Ācāryas hold God to be the supreme creator and controller, but not arbitrary in the exercise of His omnipotence; the emphasis of the theists is on salvation by grace, and the influence of the karma doctrine appears in the idea of the sādḥaka deserving grace by good deeds and devotion, by purity of life and character.¹ Thus for the unphilosophic masses, who might find the inexorable justice of karma and punarjanma too hard to bear, the doctrines of grace and mercy provide a softening and palliative effect.

Absence of Ethics and Super-Moralism

Vedānta definitely postulates struggle against evil in the ethical field, but such a struggle for self-improvement and moral victory proves that man is still in the field of imperfection. In the highest stage of perfection Vedānta envisages the disappearance of the moral struggle. Both the Advaitins and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins hold enlightenment to be a rising above the ego or false self and the moral "ought."

This brings us to the very vexed question of transcendence of morality in Vedānta. The critic points out that there is a danger of the attitude, "I am a conscious principle having nothing in common with the senses: I am their witness, so let them rip."² Antinomian conduct is thought to be the inevitable outcome of the ideal of dvandvātīta. But the position of Advaita is that the ending of Mūla Avidyā is final and there can be no revival of it, while the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins also hold that after jñāna arises there can be no reversion to the empirical state. The thought of immorality is impossible in that state which is "ethics in the beginning, ethics in the middle, ethics in the end, to say nothing of the fact that minds so engrossed with divine things as the Vedānta philosophers are not likely to fall victim to the ordinary temptations of the world, the flesh and other powers."³ All texts require in the sādḥaka purity, truth and discipline, nor can the intuitive experience of Ātman in

1. vide supra, pp. 88-89.

2. John Levy, Nature of Man According to Vedānta, p. 98.

3. F. M. Müller, The Vedānta Philosophy, p. 90.

yogic meditation arise unless he is free from passion, peaceful and tranquil.¹ Such a mature soul whose only aim is removal of darkness and doubt, cannot in the nature of things do evil deeds, otherwise Vedānta does not consider him enlightened or even eligible for enlightenment.² The antinomian statements are just exaggerated expressions of this idea. We may admit that this doctrine is open to abuse, but not that it is impracticable or false.

Vedānta well understands the dangers involved in its doctrine but claims that true pursuit of truth obviates any danger of evil conduct. "How can there be possibility of wrong conduct on the part of one on whom renunciation etc. are enjoined, and who is awakened on knowing the implied meaning of 'that thou art' and aspiring after comprehension of the meaning of the sentence."³ It is said⁴ that if the jñāni argues that since knowledge cuts off rebirth he may continue passions and desires without harmful results, such an attitude will lead to harmful results of rebirth, nor is he an Ātma-jñāni. Moreover, if enjoyment of heaven is not desired, what prevents him from giving up faulty and worthless passions and desires. If after Brahma-jñāna such desires and passions persist then scriptural direction is disregarded and man follows his own desires—then what is the difference between the jñāni and the dog living on unclean food. "Therefore a knower of Truth should not desire to follow the bent of his inclinations like swine and wild boar, but by abandoning passions and desires he must raise himself to the dignity of a deva and be an object of worship and reverence everywhere."⁵ The Vedānta-Sūtra also expressly forbids the doing of what one pleases.⁶

Critics find the conception of Nirguṇa, raised as it is above both logical and moral categories, to be most liable to the interpretation of antinomianism. But in hundreds of places reality is declared to be pure, without blemish, supremely holy, spotless, stainless, good. The idea of Brahman is coloured with ethical consciousness. Only God is above impurity and unpierced by evil and man must cultivate the same purity

1. cf., Ātmabodha, I and II.

2. cf., Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, II, 296.

3. *Upadeśa Sāhasrī*, XVIII, 229.

4. *Pañcadaśī*, IV, 51-55.

5. *ibid.*, IV, 56.

6. *vide supra*, pp. 153-154.

and stainlessness.¹ It is noteworthy that nowhere is reality said to be free from the good. Vedānta would subscribe to Aristotle's conception, "Whatever relates to moral action is petty and unworthy of the gods."² Theists hold the Absolute to be a righteous personal God, and monists hold the Absolute to be above, but not contradictory of, human distinctions.

In the same spirit it is possible to understand one of the important dogmas of Vedānta that even good deeds have fruit, hence, in the highest state, karma must end. All schools while teaching a high practical morality also teach that no degree of morality can lead to the final goal. In the light of the above we can follow Max Müller's remark:³ dangerous as the principle is that one who knows Brahman cannot sin, it is hardly more dangerous, if properly understood, than the saying that whosoever is born of God, sinneth not. This was never intended as freedom in the sense of license, but as freedom that can never lapse into sinful acts, nor claims any merit for good acts, being at rest and blessed in itself and Brahma.⁴ The jñānī rises above all karma, not in the sense of despising it, but in the sense of having so absorbed it as to overcome its externality and to fulfil it in the spirit of artistic carelessness.⁵ What is required as means to the goal becomes second nature to the perfected man.⁶

Vedānta is convinced of that truth which the critic will not allow, that self-transcendence of morality is not immorality or anti-morality but a higher morality. If the distinction of natural and dynamic morality be accepted,⁷ then the claim of Vedānta that its morality which establishes the relation of man and God is not opposed to ordinary morality, must be conceded, for, in practice, it does not allow anything immoral nor raises conflicts between man and man. The man who has a vision of truth will not cease to be moral, but will be moral in a more significant way. At any rate, the insistence of Vedānta that a man who aspires to the state of Brahman must be

1. cf., Muṇḍ. Upa., II, 1, 2; II, 2, 7; Īśa Upa., 8; Śve. Upa., IV, 14 and 16; V, 15; VI, 19 and 21; B. S., I, 1, 20-21; III, 2, 24-26.

2. Ethics, X, 84-85.

3. Collected Works, p. 168.

4. Ibid., p. 180.

5. F. M. Müller, The Vedānta Philosophy, p. 90.

6. vide supra, p. 109: मुक्त लक्षणानि सत् साधनत्वान् विवर्त्तते।

7. vide supra, pp. 279-280.

perfected in the practice of lower or social morality may not be overlooked. The negative appearance of higher morality is explicable by the fact that morality is so much incorporated into the nature of the mukta as to be no longer felt to be in conflict with his instincts and desires.¹ The Kantian distinction of duties of perfect obligations which have a positive appearance and the duties of imperfect obligations which have a negative appearance, will help to throw some light on the conception of transcendent morality. All conflicts of practical life vanish from it and instead of the rigidity of ordinary morality (dharma) there is the flexible freedom resulting from Ātma-darśana. Vedānta insists on distinguishing the preparatory ethics of the purgative way from the ethics of consummation and refuses to apply the principle of individuality in the latter state, which is devoid of the conceit of moral agency and responsibility. "Its (liberation's) value lies as little in inducing a person to do what otherwise he would not have done, as in informing him of what he would otherwise not know. It consists essentially in making him what he was not before."²

Finally, Vedānta talks of supermoralism only in so far as identity with Atman is achieved. Ranade³ makes the interesting comparison between Nietzschean supermoralism which is only for the superman, the Bradleyan supermoralism which is for the Absolute, while Vedāntic supermoralism affects both the Absolute and the individual, but only so far as the individual has realized himself in the Absolute. The critics fail to do justice to Vedānta by overlooking the distinction of means and ends in that philosophy. As far as the process is concerned there is no lack of strictest morality, and if at the end there is talk of transcendence, that is so because, metaphysically, there is no

1. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 219, quotes *The Mirror of Simple Souls* as describing boldly the condition under which the soul is enabled to abandon the hard service of virtues which has absorbed it during the purgative way—"Virtue, I take leave of you for ever more I wot well your service is too travaillous O, I was your servant but now I am delivered from your thraldom." To this astounding utterance the commentator adds: "First when a soul giveth herself to perfection she laboureth busily, day and night to get virtue, by counsel of reason and striveth with vices at every thought Thus the virtues be mistress And when the soul hath deeply tasted this love, so that this love of God worketh and hath her usages in the soul, then the soul is wondrous light and gladsome . . . then is she mistress and lady over the virtues, for she hath them all within herself And then this soul taketh leave of virtues as of the thraldom . . . of them that she had before, and she is lady and sovereign and they are subjects."

2. M. Hiriyanna, *Popular Essays*, p. 21.

3. *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 306.

further scope for growth.

If objection be raised against this ideal on the ground of its undesirable effects on the popular mind in the form of incitement to breaches of morality, it may be rejoined that as a matter of historical fact, even in its popular form Vedānta has given no support to vice. It has made it clear that no one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline (sattva śuddhi), as a brahmacharin or as grhastha. Hence the transcendent ethics of the liberated yogī may be said to be a source of inspiration to and even the determinant of the ethics of the ordinary man; not in the sense that imperfect humanity may start living according to its letter, but in the sense that it receives encouragement for progress by its spirit.

Quietism and Its Causes

The charge of quietism rests on an absolute divergence of ideals between Vedānta and its modern critics. Whereas self-expression in modern outlook takes the form of satisfaction of instincts and ambitions through wealth and position, in the Vedānta it takes the form of search for mokṣa through detachment and discipline. It was not lacking in the type of effort and activity necessary for what it conceived as the highest goal. What the critic calls the quietistic life meant much spiritual activism.

A new conception of activity and calling in the world has grown in the past centuries which was unknown to the whole of the ancient world. Positive valuation of routine activity in the world existed in the past also but the valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form of the moral activity of the individual is unquestionably new; the only way of living acceptably to God is not by surpassing worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely by fulfilment of obligations which man's position in the world imposes upon him.¹ William James explains how this change has come about:² science, idealism and democracy have led to a conception of social righteousness unknown to the catholicism of the eighteenth century, in which saving one's own soul while leaving the world to the devil was not accounted a

1. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 80.

2. *The Varieties of Religions Experience*, p. 6.

discreditable scheme; today, rightly or wrongly, helpfulness in human affairs, in consequence of one of these secular mutations in moral sentiments, is deemed an essential element of worth in saintly character and to be of public or private use is reckoned a species of divine service. Purity of theopathic character in which love of God was unmingled with other loves, and breaking off of all external relations interfering with consciousness of spiritual things is no longer admired.

The above change of outlook has resulted in a new emphasis in religion and spirituality. The modern rational temper, interested only in conduct, reacts against identification of religion with dogma and reduces it practically to an ethic. Religion is defined, therefore, as emotion touched with morality.¹ But Vedantic spirituality based on mystic experience did not limit it either to a system of belief or a process of conduct. The moral content of religion is considered to be a means to, but distinct from, the spiritual goal.

Quietism and Mysticism

A leading authority on mysticism lays down the criterion of the true mystic ecstasy in the form of the fruit the mystic brings back from his vision, which must be "an ordered life in every state," more active, because more contemplative, than that of the ordinary man.² Now, fruits of mysticism are varied, temperamental differences being the determinant in this matter.³ If it be accepted that true mysticism is active, practical and not passive, there is no logical or historical evidence for denying that many mystics have been realists.⁴ After a necessary period of withdrawal into the spirit, there is an increased capacity for useful, unselfish, creative activity with reference to the very practical task of expressing the eternal spiritual order in the temporal and material life of man. "The larger vitality is not kept to himself, but he infects all with whom he comes in contact, kindles the latent fire in them, for

1. Nicol Macnicol in *Indian Theism from Vedic to Muhammadan Period*, p. 254, quotes the definition of Prof. Howison.
2. Evelyn Underhill, *Studies in Mysticism*, p. 23.
3. cf., James, *op. cit.*, p. 404: Stupor, other-worldliness, abstraction from practical life is peculiarly liable to befall mystics whose character is naturally passive and intellect feeble, but the naturally strong minds and characters are rendered more energetic along lines of their inspiration.
4. cf., Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 113.

spiritual consciousness is caught, not taught."¹ Even in contemplative mysticism the line of action is foreshadowed, in as much as the mystic coming out of his experience of unity feels it incumbent upon himself to teach mankind by setting an example and, thus, transforming it. "The vivid spirituality of mystics adds immeasurably to human spirituality. If such contemplative lives were wasted then what is the merit of sanctity and power of great and loving spirits to infect more languid souls."²

Applying the above criterion of true mysticism to the "pantheistic" mysticism of Vedānta we find that the charge of absence of fruit in the shape of useful, creative, moral activity does not stand ground. Vedānta offers many solutions from complete abandonment of action to acceptance of life and its activities with a new spirit elevating it. Having the fullest understanding of the innermost implications of action and inaction³ it does not discourage what it considers true activism. The point has been made that the mystic's aims are purely transcendental or spiritual; though not neglecting his duty he brushes aside the world and fixes his attention on divine unity. Vedāntic mysticism was fully imbued with this spirit and attempted to keep the spiritual light burning by showing others the path to the good life through the system of guru-parampara. Since Vedānta puts an immeasurably higher value on spiritual helpfulness rather than on material aid or even on alleviation of physical suffering, the spiritual mission of the mystic was the highest altruistic activity. The Vedāntic ideal of the jñāni or the jīvana mukta is the representation of the mystic who seeks solitude for enlightenment, but later returns to teach men the path of true spirituality and is wholly activist. The following description of true mysticism is exactly applicable to Vedānta: "From their ranks have come missionaries, preachers, prophets, social reformers, poets, founders of institutions, servants of the poor and sick, patient guides and instructors of souls."⁴ However, in line with all mysticism which lacks a positive valuation of external activity in its relation to the world,⁵ Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas also do not treat "fruit of action" separately as an end, but only

1. Evelyn Underhill, *Studies in Mysticism*, p. 40.

2. *ibid.*, p. 43.

3. *vide* B. G.

4. Underhill, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

5. Weber, *loc. cit.*

as means to mystic consciousness of unity. Or, seen from another angle, even theoretically, the Vedāntic mystic does not repudiate energy, since the jñāni is in possession of the energy of Brahma and no one but he can enjoy mystic peace while dwelling in activity. The Gītā gives the analogy of the lotus leaf. A distinction can be made, in passing, between the quietude or calm of Ātman and the quietening of naturalistic energies in the process of dynamic spirituality; Vedānta does not deny the latter but teaches the former.¹

It is held that the moral force of Christian mysticism is more impressive than that of Indian mysticism, so-much-so that the latter is incomplete, only half mysticism, as compared to the "complete" mysticism of Christianity which accomplished much in the field of action.² However, the critic also admits that even the latter's record of activity is not very striking since nearly all their super-abundant energy was devoted to the spreading of the Christian faith and reform of monasteries etc., not having much social and moral value in terms of their fellowmen. But this limitation of activity is excused on the ground that this activity was no doubt the medieval conception of Christian virtue.³ Should the critic be willing to grant the benefit of difference of values in the case of Vedānta also, then, it may be pointed out that the whole history of India, after the Muslim conquest, is an attempt of its mystical leaders to create a social edifice on Vedāntic teaching. No mystic failed to lead a strenuous and influential creative life after his illumination: medieval mystics came down "from the cloister to the market place" or, like Platonic philosophers, from the bright light of the sun into the dark cave, to play a role in the common life of humanity by setting the example of spirituality, which was much larger than that of the Christian mystics. Vedāntic mysticism did not shun the approach of philosophy⁴ in explaining the mystical method and goal. Since it was able to draw on the profoundest philosophy of the Vedas it was able to colour Indian life and thought, while western mysticism grew and faded like a wild-flower with little influence on European life as a whole.⁵ "In the

1. Mahendranath Sircar, *Hindu Mysticism According to the Upaniṣads*, p. 176.

2. Henri Bergson, *Religion and Morality*, p. 216ff.

3. W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, p. 339.

4. cf., *ibid.*, p. 337.

5. Sriś Chandra Sen, *The Mystic Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 164.

religious sphere, preaching, teaching and organization, mysticism is intensely practical and the number of its successes is greater in Asia than in Europe."¹

Neither in the west nor in India is social and moral reformism a direct function of the mystic goal. It is remarked:

Once and for all . . . it must be remembered that programmes of ethical reform never were the centre of interest for any of the religious reformers They were not founders of societies for ethical culture nor the proponents of humanitarian projects for social reform or cultural ideals. The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work. Their ethical ideals and the practical results of their doctrines were all based on that alone, and were the consequence of purely religious motives.²

While modern man thinks in terms of alleviating suffering through schemes of social reform, Vedānta holds it to be a consequence of finitude, to be alleviated by achieving mystic unity with the infinite good. Neither callousness nor lack of love, but a different philosophical approach prevented Vedāntic mysticism from putting its whole faith in reformism. Both Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedānta insist that the highest aim of philosophy and religion is samyagdarsana of Brahman and not discharge of moral and social obligations. Similarly the ideals of universalism and compassion are also expressed largely on the spiritual level.³ Thus, it is an unjustified procedure to compare ancient spiritual and ethical notions with the modern conception of materialistic reformism and to condemn the ancient thinkers for not working out a scheme of social service as a part of their ethics.

Quietism and Mokṣa

The critic objects to Vedāntic mokṣa because it is not redemption of society, but use of society as a means of fulfilling a selfish purpose. The present-day ideals of religious leaders are solidarity, collectivism, common life, so-much-so that the saving of individual souls is reduced to being a by-product of social welfare, in which the individual "comes out of himself."⁴ But all religious traditions are agreed in regarding the social order to be subservient to the superhuman goal, and redemption is not effected merely by human means of science, socialism or even universal love of

1. Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, 323.

2. Max Weber, *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 89.

3. cf., Stace, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

4. Josiah Royce, *The Sources of Religious Insight*, pp. 56-59.

the human type. The charge of dismissal of social aim and ethics does not trouble a Vedāntin. His spiritual goal of mokṣa takes full care of the social view. Social welfare, though not his motivating force as of the modern critic's, is not neglected by him, being a part of his training,¹ and minimisation of society is for the sake of acquiring a wider outlook. "Individualism" is essential in the form of mokṣa because the saved man of Vedānta (sthitaprajña, jīvana mukta, jñānī) has a direct personal relation to God, and not as a member of a group. He regards the social (institutional and ritualistic) aspect to be conventional. But² Vedāntic history most decisively contradicts the opinion that he was a lonely soul wholly absorbed in his vertical relation to God and opposed to corporate religion. On the contrary, social life provided the environment which affected him, though conformity to creeds and rituals was unimportant. Demands and restrictions of the community (dharma) were not neglected and the richest and most fruitful mystical experiences arose within the field of traditional religion i. e., Vedāntic yogī was the summit of a pyramid with its base firmly fixed on the earth. Having made the above point, it is still important to remember that Vedānta makes a clear distinction:

To be useful to society after God-realization or to desire social good for one's own spiritual advancement is one thing, to deny or to forget Him by being fired with enthusiasm of social consciousness is another thing, . . . to say that society affords scope for cultivation of moral virtues is one thing and to say that the whole content of virtue is due to social relations only is another.³

An ancient Vedāntin might well rejoin to his modern critic that his obsession with the material and the social instead of the spiritual and the individual, his idea of work as only productive work exploited for the profit of self and others i. e., his obsession with the social outlook and constant compulsive activity with total incapacity for prayer, worship, meditation and recreation of the soul is also a symptom of disturbance of man's proper function.⁴

In practice, the sādḥaka did not consciously seek to exceed social and personal responsibilities and on attaining the end he could not but help all those who came in

1. vide supra, pp. 103ff.

2. The following conclusions of Evelyn Underhill in *Studies in Mysticism*, pp. 25-26, apply in toto to Vedāntic mysticism.

3. V. H. Date, *The Yoga of the Saints*, pp. 6, 74.

4. Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself*, p. 106.

contact with him, spiritually and socially, either actively or passively, according to his temperament.¹ William James holds that the saintly character consists in the feeling of being in a wider field than that of world's selfish interest, sense of friendly continuity of ideal power within our life and willing surrender to it, immense elation and freedom as confining selfhood melts away, shifting of emotional centre towards love and harmonious affections, "yes, yes" rather than "no" in regard to others.² And the practical consequences of this character, in the form of asceticism and soul-enlargement, which opens out new patience and fortitude, purity, charity and tenderness to fellows, brotherly love and humility, are results not only of theistic Christianity but also parts of Stoicism, Vedānta and Buddhism.³

In the light of the above, the charges of "individualism" against Vedāntic conception of mokṣa, and of selfish enjoyment of the bliss of mystic unity at the cost of neglect of moral and social duties against Vedāntic mysticism, are far from the truth. If such results occurred, this was a perversion and not the essential character of mysticism or mokṣa in Vedānta, and no ideal should be judged by its perversions, which are really due to human weaknesses.⁴ It is not denied that abuses of the type criticised did result in Vedānta, but this was due to the fact that the conceptions of mokṣa and mysticism in Vedānta became more popular than in the west, and hence, in danger of being "stereotyped and vulgarised." But this disadvantage and defect was offset by the ideal manifestation of these ideals in the lives of a large number of leading representatives of Vedānta.

Psychology and Vedānta

We are now in a position to turn back our attention to the psychological theories of escapism. The father of psychoanalysis declares religion to be a type of delusional transformation of reality attempted by mankind to obtain the assurance of

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1. John Levy, *Nature of Man According to Vedānta*, p. 100; cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 129.
 2. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 266ff.
 3. cf., *ibid.*, p. 274: And we must, I think, consider them (ethical consequences) not subordinate but coordinate parts of that great spiritual excitement.
 4. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, *Indian Mysticism*, Intro., p. vii.

happiness.¹ This judgment on the general character of religion, which might be extended to apply to philosophy also has been implicitly rejected in the interpretation of Vedānta given in this chapter. The Vedāntic emphasis on the value of truth being determined by its consistency with all means of knowledge, the mutual consistency of reason, perception and revelation which rejects denial of experienced things as totally false, is a far cry from the neurotic method of denying reality by building up a fanciful picture of a more satisfying reality. More specifically, the doctrines of karma and punarjanma operating in the context of Māyāvāda may be charged with this type of escapism. No satisfactory solution of life's evils being discovered, and the resulting misery and despair from the inexorability of the laws of saṃsāra on the plane of reality being inescapable, the philosopher, in his impatience, jumps to the conclusion of unreality of the world, which is nothing but escape in phantasy. It was shown earlier how the Māyāvādin has been theoretically and practically able to establish contact with and to cope with reality, especially by the help of the doctrine of levels. As for the inexorable law of karma, Vedānta does not suggest escape from it by running away physically, to the end of the world, or by the despairing device of suicide, or by any neurotic process, but by a very real discipline to increase the element of spirit (Ātman) in the empirical man until all separative impulses cease. It accepts the psychological truth that all men live for the self, but its standard of judgment of man's development is the size of the self man lives for.

The psychologist interprets asceticism as an expression of the spirit of hostility against life and self. Unable to satisfy his instincts, due to the thwarting conditions of life, the individual seeks to control or to destroy his instincts and even the will to live, either literally or figuratively, and this is escape by withdrawal from or avoidance of thoughts, feelings and situations which cause pain. But this may be considered a very inadequate explanation of the spirit and even the practice of Vedāntic asceticism. In the neurotic method of withdrawal the destruction of life and world is the result of an un-lived life, resulting from adverse social and individual conditions, and such thwarting of life, in turn, results in blocking of realization of

1. vide Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, pp. 32, 42.

all potentialities because inner security and spontaneity is lacking.¹ In the Vedāntic way of life the relation of samyāsa to the other three āśramas is based on the psychological truth that the social function of the individual does not coincide with his human function wholly.² From the standpoint of the social function the normal person is one who fills the social role, does the required function, participates in the reproduction of society. From the individual standpoint normalcy means an optimum of individual growth and happiness. Vedāntic realism is evidenced in accepting that in actual societies both functions do not coincide. Hence, in the three āśramas the "normal" person is allowed to adapt himself wholly to social values. Sannyāsa, far from being the neurotic outcome of the thwarting of life's instincts by external conditions, is the logical next step following after a fully lived life, in which the individual is given the opportunity for the pursuit of individual and human (i. e., spiritual) values. Pursuit of spirituality is possible only with quiet and aloneness. Unlike the neurotic withdrawal, which is a perverse destruction of life, real or figurative, resulting in impoverishment of the individual, the withdrawal of sannyāsa is rendered essential by the normal rhythm of life for contemplation, study, remaking of thoughts and attitudes (śravaṇa, manana etc.). Though Vedāntic asceticism requires the fullest control of impulses or inner sources of needs, its insistence on the limitation of external and internal needs, withdrawal from social relations, is, manifestly, not dictated by desire to avoid hurt or disappointment, but by the positive ideal it pursues. This is proved by the enrichment of powers resulting in the Vedāntin's assumption of spiritual leadership in society.

There is a type of religious faith which is spurious in nature, being the outcome of the escapist attitude, and prompted by doubt or weakness; it has a compensatory quality.³ It has been said:

(Luther) was filled with the feeling of aloneness, powerlessness, wickedness, but at the same time with a passion to dominate. He was tortured by doubts, constantly seeking for . . . inner security. He hated others . . . he hated himself, he hated

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1. Erich Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, pp. 154-159; cf., Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence*, p. 111.
 2. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
 3. *ibid.*, p. 56.

life. His whole being was permeated by fear, doubt, inner isolation Compulsive quest for certainty was not the expression of genuine faith, but rooted in the need to conquer unbearable doubt.¹

Without accepting this psychological analysis of Luther's state of mind as correct or final it can, at least, be said that such a description would not apply to Vedāntic mentality at all. There is no hint in the religion and philosophy of Vedānta of its faith being a "reaction-formation" against a sense of fundamental doubt arising from the feeling of the isolation of the individual. In fact, the truly representative Vedāntic faith is an expression of inner harmony and certainty and relatedness to all being, hence, implicitly, affirmatory of life.

Mysticism is psychologically interpreted as a method of escape in which relief from weakness is sought by reducing the self to nothingness in subjection to some power much greater than the individual. The aim of mystical Vedānta of self-mergence in a greater entity or becoming one with Ātman or God (river and sea, salt and water) while overcoming the limitations of the individual self and offering great consolation and gratification, also results in loss of freedom, submission to fate, worship of past, what has been and will eternally be. Thus the critic would have it that the mystic lacks faith in life and denies it. But the psychological explanation of mystic mentality as escape by the method of "authoritarianism" does not do justice to it as a spiritual condition. No doubt, from the point of view of the science of psychology the loss of sense of personality is a grave defect, amounting to abnormality. But it is possible to argue that the "liberation from principium individuationis," which psychology fights shy of, is, in the spiritual sense, the condition of a new sense of freedom. Far from adopting the method of escaping responsibility for deciding the meaning of life and what he is, the Vedāntic mystic is engaged in the very arduous task of discovering this truth for himself. Psychology itself supports this possibility. It admits that the "normal" individual has really ceased to be his real self by conforming to the pattern of cultural personality.² By conformity to the social norm the discrepancy of the self and the world is made to disappear, the individual loses his sense of isolation

1. *ibid.*, p. 66.

2. *cf.*, Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Times*, p. 14.

and resulting fear. The proof of this is the rarity of true individuality, or free thinking, acting and feeling in a majority of people. The process by which this socialisation, or "loss of individuality" or "loss of ability to think, act and feel" occurs is education, example, injunction and subtle suggestion. The "normal" individual, as the psychologist admits, has really replaced his original self by a pseudo self, leading to loss of identity.¹ Here we have not only the psychological evidence for the Vedāntic doctrine of "adhyāsa" of the object over the true subject, but also for the doctrine of Ātman or the true self, the mystic realization of which alone constitutes true selfhood and freedom.

In conclusion, it may be repeated that to disentangle the theoretical causes of the alleged escapism of the Indian mind from the other causes is no easy task. The seeming truth of the charge of "escapism" constituted by passivity, unpracticalness, ascetic nature may be explained by the lack of strong and successful organization of social and political life of India in recent centuries, the failure to make full use of her material resources and her backwardness in science and technology as compared to the west, as well as the failure to meet the needs of changing times by social and political reforms.² If these failures and defects constitute "escapism" then it must be remembered that the influence of Vedāntic philosophy, throughout this long period of depression, has been directed towards keeping the emotion, intellect and spirit of the Indian people from sinking too low.

1. Erich Fromm, *Fear of Freedom*, p. 159ff.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 105.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHALLENGE OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL PROGRESS

Science and the West

To intersperse a section dealing with the impact of science on the west may, at first sight, appear an irrelevant digression. But this is a misapprehension, because modern science, though it originated in the west, is a universal fact. The way in which science came to India and the manner in which it affected its world-view is no unique and isolated phenomenon to be understood without reference to the transformations created by science in the rest of the world. In fact, a study of the latter is a necessary preparation for the correct apprehension of the nature of the challenge which scientific social progress presents to Vedānta.

Socio-Intellectual Background

Modern science as a search for general laws subsuming all facts of nature under them originated in Europe and interacted with the cultural climate of the place of its birth through all stages of its growth. And the major sociological influence moulding medieval Europe was Christianity. It may be argued that the cultural foundations of science are neither largely economic nor even social, but the partially successful attempts at living a Christian life in this world. The element of truth in the above thesis consists in the fact that for many centuries European society was unified by the idea of one spiritual social order of Christendom. Medieval society was rent by many differences, but these were counteracted by the force of common religious tradition. Christianity was the basis of the philosophy of social relationships as well as the determiner of the goal of human life, in which all interests of life, individual, social, economic and political were subordinated to "the real business of life" viz., salvation. The essence of the whole scheme was its integration of values, desires and

strivings into one all-embracing aspiration—yearning for eternal life, taking many forms, crude or exalted.¹

It is not surprising, therefore, that all arts and sciences were connected, in their origin and expression, with religious ideas. Religion explained the process and the reason of things and the world by the conception of the miraculous. But the medieval outlook allowed scope for science by using dialectical reasoning to achieve understanding and contemplation of nature for the purpose of sustaining the religious belief that the creator is motivated by love of perfection. Medieval theological speculation had developed the sense of logical order which, later, took the shape of scientific search for causal order in the natural sphere. Even the motive for scientific exactness is said to have been derived from the religious tradition. Scriptural ethos commanded pursuit of truth as a duty to God, and the whole world, being God's creation, was thought to be a worthy field of operation. The motive for truth-finding in science was strengthened by the fact that only by understanding nature could the charge of injustice or impotence against the creator be met.²

Religion was also the principal influence in the creation of the humanistic spirit, later to be interlinked with the history of modern science. It developed veneration for the highest human qualities viz., social equality, altruism, brotherhood and peace on earth in the spiritual sense, preparing the way for the operation of these qualities in the secular world, after science had provided the knowledge and the means of such conditions.

But this is only one half of the truth. Historically, secularistic science developed largely in the post-reformation Christian tradition which may be regarded as the first attempt of natural philosophy to break away from theological authority and to rely solely on facts. The fact that science was long expressed consistently with Christian dogma is not necessarily proof of a mere difference of degree in their spirit and method,³ but is explicable by the fact that the church being the only organized institution of that age could alone serve as the repository of all intellectual

1. John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 55.

2. Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 91.

3. vide G. D. Yarnold, *The Spiritual Crisis of the Scientific Age*, p. 14.

life.¹ The fact that scientific development coincided with the transfer of interest from spiritual to the natural field causing a serious rift in the religious outlook, is evidence of their antagonism.

As for the religious roots of the humanistic spirit of science, it is also to be noted that the spiritual principle of equality and universal brotherhood must have caused serious conflict within the ethical consciousness of European society, since it coexisted, for long centuries, with the phenomena of social inequality, religious intolerance and slavery. Scientific humanism, even if connected with religious culture, undermined that culture, because "the west lives on spiritual capital i. e., clinging to Christian practice without Christian belief and practice unsupported by belief is a wasting asset."² Very early in its history the ideal of humanism was separated from its Christian context and became hostile to it e. g., the religious teaching, "Truth shall make you free" had to be given a this-worldly interpretation in order to make it harmonise with science. Thus Christianity as a major sociological root of science operated both positively as well as negatively in the development of science.

Another development parallel to the rise of science was the socio-economic transformation of the feudal into an industrial society. The agricultural feudal society was self-supporting and stable. The social organization being based on the ideology of the human organism, each class was assigned a definite status and duties and had to be content with its position i. e., the various classes of land-lords, clergy, craftsmen and peasants felt no need of change. This static society made a minimum demand for science. Late in the middle ages science created new techniques of machine production by which feudal institutions were adversely affected e. g., shift to business interests affected the old system of land tenure, transferred agricultural land to financial capital and replaced importance of social titles by importance of control of labour and exchange of goods.³

A new commercial development was the multiplication of demands for inventions for improving production of goods, and this became connected with the experimental

1. J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 184.

2. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 237.

3. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 43.

sciences. The demand of feudal nobility for luxuries of oils, perfumes, spices and fabrics created merchant enterprise in different forms of trading; arising of commercial towns was the feature of the latter part of the middle ages; there was the beginning of new political forms of nation states. These developments were favourable to utilitarian science, since urban manufacture required increased use of machinery, utilised new techniques of skill, crafts and commerce, and problems of finance and statistics could be solved only by science. As the merchantilistic movement gathered strength there was a corresponding weakening of the feudal nobility, which relied only on old knowledge and methods, failing to make use of the new knowledge of science.

The influence of exploration of the world by travel, navigation and discoveries required by new commerce was profound i. e., it created a spirit of adventure, both physical and mental, broke down traditional customs and beliefs, gave a sense of new worlds to be investigated, which reacted to stimulate invention by positive observation and active experiment.¹ These combined with new political and social forms created new ideas in literature, art, philosophy and science. The spirit of freedom of thought and action permeated modern science because of the need of craftsmen and merchants who demanded freedom of activity from control of feudal forms of authority.²

Science appeared at a stage of society when large and settled communities had appeared in which its mental and material tools and standards could be used and preserved.³ The small self-contained communities were transformed by the industrial revolution into societies organized on large scale, and autonomy of communities gave place to their interdependence. Technological revolution from handicraft to machine techniques, the appearance of the factory system and new industries, deep-seated socio-economic change from agricultural to urban society was the feature of the industrial revolution.⁴

It may be that the industrial revolution arose independently of scientific

1. *ibid.*, p. 38.

2. J. G. Crowther, *The Social Relations of Science*, Intro., p. xxiv.

3. *vide* V. F. Lenzen, *Civilization*, p. 3: According to the contextualist theory society must be able to make use of the teachings of science, furnish it with new problems, and equip it with instruments for solving them.

4. *cf.*, W. E. H. Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of Spirit of Rationalism*, II, 250, 281.

knowledge and its spirit had little connection with the spirit of scientific enquiry at the early stage, but, very soon, a close relation was established between the two. Under the influence of conceptions of utility and progress science became wedded to the machine and industry to change the face of society. And this connection became an ever-widening connection bringing under its influence the whole world.¹ The two revolutions naturally proceeded together because industrialism required change in quantitative production and technique, which scientific knowledge of the physical and organic world made possible.² The industrial movement was a combination of ideas, habits and social institutions engaging human energies to give rise to increase of wealth and population and expansion of culture. Had it not had these wide ideological and sociological aspects the possibilities of modern science would have remained unfulfilled. In sum, we can say that scientific inventions, mechanical or ideological, were not accidental but appeared in response to felt needs and purposes of industrial society.³

On the other hand, there is a theory⁴ which cautions against the exaggeration of the utilitarian value of natural philosophy, since the evidence is insufficient to prove that science owes its development to economic and technological considerations alone. The truth in this theory is that intellectual curiosity did form a part of the driving force in science. And in the wider theoretical context of a philosophy of nature and rational and empirical methods, even religious and philosophical ideas strongly influenced the early scientists.

Enlightenment—Rationalism

The intellectual atmosphere in which science developed was that of rationalism. Specifically, rationalism is to be considered the first movement of modern thought, beginning early in the seventeenth century and ending in the latter half of the eighteenth.⁵ Its full flowering occurred in the Continental movement of Illumination, whose primary aim was to establish the dominion of intellect over all the faculties of

1. cf., C. E. Ayers, *The Theory of Economic Progress*, p. 297.

2. cf., John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 41-42.

3. Edward J. Urwick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 174.

4. vide Charles E. Raven, *Natural Religion and Christian Theology*, pp. 129-130.

5. cf., E. R. E., V, 310: Beginning from Bacon's *Novum Organum* (1620) and ending with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

man's mind, and thus to correct false or defective beliefs created by emotion, prejudice, superstition and blind faith.

Rationalism strenuously opposed the tyranny and corruption of church and state. It reacted strongly against misuse of tradition for oppressive purposes, because exaggerated veneration for theological speculation and religious dogma forced men to submit themselves to the will of God. The Enlightenment prided itself on its own free-thinking and toleration, protested against claims of the supernatural origin of religious authority, and recognised no divine sanction for any institution. Hostile criticism of dogma developed the habit of using reason for the destruction of religious beliefs.

Though modern rationalism was a specific movement of thought, anti-religious in its bias, in fact, rationalism has existed in all ages among a few intellectuals. Nor has it been necessarily opposed to religious beliefs because even in conflicts involving religious institutions and dogmas¹ final appeal of protagonists and antagonists alike was to human intelligence. Hence, Christian theology had not considered itself opposed to rationalism. Though the theologians had denied that unaided natural reason could demonstrate God, yet they had used science or philosophy of nature in support of God's existence. Modern rationalism arose from those very scholastic arguments,² but it developed in a different direction from older rationalism because of its alliance with science. In this form it no longer sought to discover ends, purposes and design of the creator in nature. Instead, using natural reason in support of religious faith, it ended in discrediting the latter.³

The goal of the movement of Illumination was happiness and welfare of man on earth, by enlightenment of his mind through freedom of thought and investigation of natural laws.⁴ Earlier rationalists (e. g., Montesquieu, Voltair) not only admired science as a proof of the power of the human mind to reach the truth, but also for its usefulness in achieving their secular social aims. The sense of duty became active in

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1. e. g., Christian versus non-Christian; Catholic versus Protestant; church versus state.
 2. e. g., the rigid rationalism and axiomatic method of Descartes had great affinity with scholasticism.
 3. vide infra, pp. 329-332.
 4. cf., Crane Brinton, *The Shaping of the Modern Mind*, p. 118.

the human sphere and social elements of religion were separated from purely religious duties. There was confidence that knowledge of "nature" as against the knowledge of "supernature" would free the human mind. Physical science revealed nature as a machine and gave a sense of mastery over the environment, greater interest in the world and confidence that its conquest was possible by exercising active virtues. A conscious effort was made to popularise scientific knowledge and to expound Newtonianism as an intelligible view of the whole world of nature.

Historically speaking, the scientific method and knowledge are interlinked with the rationalist idea of the universe but they are not synonymous, because scientific tradition does not allow for ultimate questions or value-judgments in its operations, while rationalists do have a complete system of answers for such questions. Therefore, even though in modern times some forms of rationalism have been specifically opposed to science while others have claimed to be based on it, all the same, modern scientific reason has developed in a way different from all the philosophical movements of its earlier days. It has combined its belief in free and independent operation of mathematical reasoning with elements drawn from empirical method and empirical philosophy. The scientific method was first laid down by Bacon, who separated the efficient cause of science from the final cause of philosophy and made experiment the source of knowledge in his theory of induction.¹ Locke's scientific spirit led him to accept the limitations of human understanding. His lead was continued in philosophy, to decide by analysis of experience what we can validly infer from it. Science, too, was an investigation of externally observed nature in order to discover abstract general laws incorporating all facts. Therefore, science was the pioneer in the empirical approach to world and experience, and this approach later spread to other fields of thought.

In spite of its limitations, changes of meanings and emphases, historic rationalism, with its reliance on reason allied with actual or potential experience within the limits of human life, has become a part of the scientific outlook. And in that scientific form it has had an incalculable effect on modern western civilization.

1. vide *Novum Organum*.

Change of Outlook

There are certain periods of man's history which may be regarded as turning points in his life, in as much as they involve a change of outlook on life and acceptance of new ends and ideals. Such periods are termed axial periods. Students are agreed that one such human transformation occurred in history with the discovery of agriculture and the domestication of animals and was expressed in the religious mythology and folklore of primitive man.¹ It is argued that mankind is passing through a second such transformation brought about by scientific and mechanical revolution and control of material nature. According to one view² the present complex social, economic and technological transformation is unique, more far reaching than the earlier transformations because of the possibility of unlimited advance within science. However, the truth is that in both cases new dimensions of indefinite potentiality, mental and physical, have opened out to man.

In the ideological field changes occur, slowly or rapidly, due to the mere passage of time. But the mental transformation of an axial period is not so much a change in ideological fashions as a rare mood of shift of human outlook to another plane of thought.³ Any new knowledge is bound to have a disturbing effect, and science has imposed on mankind the need for a radical adjustment of thoughts and actions in regard to both ordinary interests and pursuits and ultimate questions. The "common-sense" of the man on the street as well as the intellectual view of thinkers begin to be influenced by the visible and invisible results of science. In this connection it must be noted that the effects of science are much greater than the actual knowledge gained by it at a particular time, because as it permeates culture it develops the quality of resonancy.⁴ Apart from learning the new knowledge men are emotionally moved by it and the changed intellectual and emotional atmosphere, called the scientific spirit of the modern age, predisposes society to receive new ideas seeming to fit into that atmosphere.

1. cf., J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 59.

2. vide *ibid.*, p. 250.

3. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 124.

4. cf., W. E. H. Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism*, Intro., p. viii.

The mobility of modern society is both physical and mental, because men give up ancestral abodes and habits as well as traditional beliefs under the compulsion of science. The two aspects of the cultural significance of science are—it affects social organization, material requirements, methods of production, distribution and consumption, and this external change is easier to see; it also affects the metaphysical ideas of the people, and this internal change is not so easily apparent. In its material and tangible form science appears in various forms of new powers discovered by it and in its intellectual and intangible form it either comes as a general notion of the nature of things and possibilities of society, aims and standards determining motives and hopes or in a more specialised form of philosophical theories of nature and society.¹

The effect of scientific ideas and theories is both direct and indirect. The latter is more important because it operates in a more unconscious and subtle but wider way i. e., affecting a larger number of people. Directly the influence of scientific knowledge is felt by a few intellectual people who have fully grasped the facts and conclusions of science. But it is only in the course of time that such ideas become accepted by society as a whole, and, that too, in their simplified form.² Institutions become obsolete, and, eventually, this leads to conscious or unconscious rejection of beliefs by which the institutions are sustained. Social forces of conservation and stability do resist the novel ideas suggested by new knowledge but the majority of men are not in a position to make a free choice by rational comparison of the old and the new.

As stated before, till the rise of science in the sixteenth century the unity of the European outlook was rooted in the religious interpretation. That outlook was a product of the Greek world-view adapted to the medieval feudal society and Christian creed. It has been described as a "closed" world-view, internally limited by forms of philosophy, in which fixed ends were set by the idea of a final cause.³ This was challenged by science, which opposed to it the secular outlook of an externally bounded

1. Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 6, 13.

2. e. g., Newtonian synthesis of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was made popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries i. e., generally the popular mind is one century behind the advanced minds.

3. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 54.

factual world, varying and indefinite in structure. No final cause being admitted, ends were to be derived from experience of world itself. Scientific rationalism refused to accept the teleological nature of the world whole and declared that man is the maker of his own purposes in nature. No eternal purpose obstructs the freedom of man to create these purposes by discovering the structure and function of the universe. The natural order of the world is not subordinate to some immutable order of supernatural reality, but is the only order of knowledge and activity. At the same time science tended to disturb the unity and harmony of this world-order by giving a discordant explanation of experiences separately--first the physical scheme, then the biological and finally the psychological and social. This gave rise to development of science, religion, philosophy and ethics in different directions, in place of the unity of the medieval vision.

By changing the scale of human knowledge and power science has reversed judgment of attitudes, actions and values.¹ The rearrangement of priorities in human interests and modes of thinking is the very difficult task of a scientific society, which no longer accepts any idea or virtue which medieval thought considered to be good or ultimate, but evaluates each by the criterion of the new conception of social progress.

Clearly, the progress from the spirit of the medieval age to that of the modern has not been vital as the development of cell from cell, but mechanical like the swing of the pendulum.²

Effect on Religion

In the medieval synthesis natural knowledge or conception of the world was not an impediment to religion, since science was embraced within the religious scheme as a revelation of the divine. There was no problem of the reconciliation of the dualistic

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1. e. g., J. B. Haldane, *Daedalus*, p. 89: Increased knowledge of hygiene transformed resignation and inaction in epidemics from religious virtues to justly punishable offence. Also Lecky, *op. cit.*, p. 61: Doubt once universally regarded as criminal, error or damnable, now necessary condition and probable consequence of scientific enquiry. Faith once a virtue now regarded as abnormal intellectual condition, subversive of critical faculties.
 2. Fulton J. Sheen, *Philosophy of Religion, The Impact of Modern Knowledge on Religion*, p. 3.

outlook on matter and spirit e. g., astronomy and theology were one discipline and religion provided cosmological theories to explain the world. The rift in the Christian tradition began with the sixteenth century Renaissance and was clearly apparent by the eighteenth century.

Religion being the older and better established institution had the upper hand in the earlier centuries, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries science was on the offensive and forced religion to adopt either the method of defence or of counter-attack. Particular issues round which the controversies raged were merely indicative of the opposition of deeper mental attitudes. The passion for positive knowledge clashed with the tendency of faith and the objective scientific approach clashed with the intuitive religious approach. Due to their different approaches the facts discovered by science either came into opposition or were supposed to come into opposition with specific traditional beliefs. The church, fearing the undermining of its authority both spiritual and intellectual, made no concession whatsoever and continued to formulate its beliefs on concrete facts on the basis of classical authorities.¹ The ultimate outcome of every controversy on a specific issue was defeat of religion and abandonment of an outdated intellectual position.²

It was the discoveries of astronomy and physics between 1500 A.D. and 1700 A.D. which gave rise to the first conflict (e. g., Galileo and the Inquisition etc.). Scientific findings of facts and related speculations did not provide a direct disproof of details of doctrine in every case, but were in the nature of a new analogy giving rise to conceptions of new relations of man and Deity in religion.³ When the scope of natural law in the world of events and objects was extended religious conceptions of revelation, miracle, divine authority, cosmology and eschatology came to be questioned. Taking account of the scientific picture of the universe religion was forced to relinquish its ideas of origin of the world (a few thousand years ago), position of the earth (geocentricism), its form (flat earth), Biblical astronomy (material heavens, heavenly bodies as guides) etc. God was pushed to the beginnings of things by

1. cf., Abba Hillel Silver, Religion in a Changing World, p. 49.

2. cf., Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 188.

3. Lecky, op. cit., p. 318.

naturalistic explanations and became more and more unnecessary.¹ As early as 1639 A.D. Galileo's laws of motion of celestial bodies reduced the need of God as the starter and conserver of motion of heavenly bodies. Newton did not allow divine intervention in the order of nature. Laplace declared that he did not find the hypothesis of God necessary in his theory of the solar system, as the natural world is governed by unvarying law. Astrophysics rejected all notions of arbitrariness and made God the law-giver as well as law-abiding.² Apart from scientific theories based on factual data there were certain conclusions of science which were anti-religious. The mechanistic-materialistic Newtonian science negated all religious categories of values, final causes, teleologies in nature. Moreover, vast increase in the knowledge of the outer world made it difficult to find the location of the inner subject. And with the specific rejection of dualism, physical science seemed to disregard the central religious belief of human soul and its survival in another world.

Till the nineteenth century scientific findings were still confined to the realm of inanimate matter, having nothing to report directly on the human soul. But the development of biological sciences (by Darwin, Huxley) brought science into the realm of the living, and science adopted its own view of life (through Spencer, Haeckel). Newtonian science (causality, order of nature) had been forced to the conclusion of an external creator as the first cause of design in nature, as an intellectually necessary scientific hypothesis. But the long process of species-development and world as a growing organism in the evolutionary theory took the place of the creative agent. And the argument that the character of the created world pointed to an intelligent and benevolent creator was supposed to be negated by the mechanical view of evolution. The evolutionary process proved the relation of mind and body to be purely physiological and this raised doubts about the soul and salvation. Nor could the idea of immortality of unique individual soul be easily reconciled with ideas of natural selection and survival of the fittest.

The psychological sciences applied analysis to man's mental states, wherein

1. *cf.*, Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, p. 131.

2. *cf.*, William Ralph Inge, *Assessments and Anticipations*, p. 211.

his interests and values are contained. The discoveries about brain, heredity, instincts left out all reference to superhuman factors or causes, attending only to human or subjective side of religious experience. Psychological approaches seemed to arrive at the position that this phenomenon of human life has no foundation in reason, is, in fact, an irrational development. The behavioural approach minimised consciousness by insisting on mental determinism by physiological factors. The psycho-analytical approach seemed to contradict the emotional and intellectual attitudes of religion. When studied from the standpoint of laws of maturity of mind, the emphasis on subconscious physiological and psychiatric states pointed to abnormal or pathological condition. Religion was explained to be a symptom of delusional process of projection under strong emotional need.¹

Science also made a critical and objective study of origin and growth of religious beliefs and theories relating to ends or destiny of things i. e., convictions about ultimate facts. Sociological, anthropological and historical methods were used to investigate religion with reference to cultural, geographical, political, economic and social features. All such studies were strongly influenced by notions of evolution and survival of the fittest. Distinction of higher and lower stages, by tracing development from primitive rites and beliefs in the science of comparative religions, reduced religion to a "museum of dead cults," "primitive curiosity," a mere continuation of savage ignorance, superstition, fears and folkways. At best, a mere instrument of social development at very early stages of mankind. Generally, a devaluation of religious experience, beliefs and institutions was bound to result from this type of scientific treatment. Specifically, the critical and detached approach of anthropology and sociology shook the belief in the uniqueness of the Christian religion, since similarities of spirit, ideals, rituals were discovered between it and other primitive cultures. Moreover, the evolutionary principle pointed to the relativity of the truths of Christian revelation to certain stages of human development.

The real cause of the intellectual conflict of science and religion lay in the uncertainty about the spheres of the known and the unknown, and the progressive

1. cf., Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, pp. 31, 40.

encroachment of scientific investigation and factual explanation upon the latter. The religious notion of man's importance, specially with reference to his spiritual nature, was adversely affected by this process.

Copernicus abolished primacy of man's planet in the universe, Darwin the primacy of man within his planet, materialistic psychology the primacy of mind in man. Geology and astronomy contribute to biology and psychology, generally, the disparagement of importance of life.¹

But among all the concepts of religious thought the one most seriously affected was the concept of God. Findings of natural sciences appeared to destroy the force of the cosmological argument for God's existence, while Darwinian evolution destroyed the validity of the argument from design; the psychological findings showed the inspiration behind the ontological argument to emanate from the lowest rather than the highest urge of human nature. The notion of an anthropomorphic God was much shaken (because of incompatibility between idea of a universe governed by a spiritual being conceived in human form and scientific knowledge of extension and duration of the universe), and even religious thinking tended to incline towards depersonalised and philosophical conceptions of God.² A corollary of this change in the conception of the nature of God was the shift of the sphere of God's functioning to higher levels. Divine operations tended to contract from nature or every day human life to more remote, specifically spiritual sphere. But laws of psychology seemed to point to the retreat of religion and God even from such spheres.

From being the dominating force in the intellectual realm, treating science as its auxiliary, religion was reduced to an apologetic confusion before an autonomous and dominating science.³ From being an all-pervasive social influence it has been reduced to being a special domain of life, and even there it is left to the private choice of the individual. Arts and sciences could not remain permanently under religion's domination and guidance; the spheres of faith, morals, arts and philosophy had to be separated from science and redefined, because they do not admit the same proof or

1. C. E. M. Joad, *Return to Religion*, p. 123.

2. cf., Barbara Woottan, *Testament for Social Science*, p. 116: Agnosticism would call God "unknown first principle." Even theologians call God "shapeless vapour or undifferentiated ooze."

3. Abba Hillel Silver, *Religion in a Changing World*, p. 12.

certainty as scientific demonstration. This initial separation enabled natural science to focus attention on the tangible world for material progress while religion was enabled to rid itself of the handicap of the dead body of antiquated scientific notions, which vitiated its ethico-spiritual influence in the modern age.¹

Though the historical struggle reduced religion's influence on the rest of life, it continued to make a special claim on the moral life of individual and society. Its historical development had established a harmonious connection of its concepts with high moral ideals. But there could be a difference of view about the relative significance of morality. For instance, medieval theology placed greater emphasis on dogma and less on morals; the scientific outlook values a religious system of belief solely because of its influence upon acts and relations of mankind. It was found possible to stress the moral bearings of Christianity, to bring into prominence germinal ideas of early Christian ethics, previously in the background, and to make them consistent with the spirit of the scientific age. Though science seemed to provide a reason for good conduct independent of the ultimate end of religion, yet the latter has been changed by the former into a new form, whose most prominent feature is the moral duty of making the world better. Thus, religion has become related to man's actual condition in this world as well as to his possible condition in the next, is judged by conduct not by beliefs and its function is thought to be to teach men how to live as members of society.

Modern religion is, therefore, not only in the world but is also conditioned by it. The centre of attention has shifted from the theological and cosmic problems to human and social, because, whereas in the ancient and medieval ages the chief adjustment of religion had to be to nature which was beyond the comprehension or control of knowledge,² now the application of modern knowledge for social progress and resulting social conflicts create the need for adjusting religion to social changes.³

The fact is that welfare of scientific society depends on human factors more than on nature, and fear reenters human life due to inadequate control of social and psychological environment . . . the scientific prophesy is that future religious impulse will become more connected with social organization.⁴

1. F. Muller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*, p. 42.
2. cf., Bertrand and Dora Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* pp. 46-47.
3. cf., John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 625.
4. Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, p. 135.

There are not wanting thinkers who go a step further in limiting the field of religion. Noting the historic trend towards reduction of number of thoughts and deeds displayed under religious form, they question even the belief that religion is essential to right conduct and right relations in the world.¹ They would banish religion even from the sphere of individual and social morality.

Natural Religion

The rationalistic apotheosis of reason and its equation with nature, provision of scientific tests for reasonableness of belief and practice gave rise, in the first stage, to the conception of natural religion—a religion free from transcendental elements, the antithesis of traditional supernatural religion which was based on revelation.

Belief in God was common among both scientists and philosophers in the early days of science, made possible by adoption of Cartesian dualism. As late as the end of the eighteenth century William Paley thought it reasonable to use the classical simile of the watch-maker and the watch to prove that nature operates according to God's will. Neither scientists nor philosophers saw any inconsistency between the materialistic-mechanistic view and idea of divine purpose, design in nature or human responsibility. The visible world of nature was the book in which God revealed his power, wisdom and goodness. God was the final cause of natural law which was the efficient cause, and the cause of reason through which alone knowledge of these laws was possible. For the men of New Learning the certitude and truth of science depended on knowledge of God and on that alone.

The implications of scientific knowledge and rationalism in the religious field were worked out in the Deistic movement in England.² The deistic thesis rested upon belief in the absolute right of individual thought to investigate religious truths and confidence in the competence of unsupported reason to attain indubitable certainty in that field. The inquiry into sources and sanctions of religious faith was not occasioned by need to give a more adequate interpretation of religious experience, but by

1. vide James Cotter Morison, *The Service of Man*, p. 12.

2. vide E. R. E., IV, 533: From 1688 A.D. till the end of eighteenth century.

the purely intellectual motive of removing contradictions within contemporary knowledge. Growth in knowledge of nature and of religious phenomena in other parts of the world made readjustment of current views of world, society and God imperative, with a view to achieving a unified philosophy, subsuming the whole of human experience under it.¹ This non-religious motivation of deistic thought is evidenced by its reliance solely on rational inference and rejection of intuition or the experiential aspect of spirituality. Its attempt was to remove the opposition between secular and natural, on the one hand, and the sacred and supernatural, on the other.

The deistic debate passed through certain stages beginning with Locke's attempt² to establish the reasonableness of Christianity. He raised all the issues³ which were debated for nearly a century. The first major issue was: what is the nature and source of truth revealed in the act of faith? Deists allowed no externally communicated knowledge resting on divine authority; knowledge of God or truth was possible, but it must be truth of reason. Not only is Christian belief not opposed to reason, but there is nothing in it which is beyond the reach of reason⁴ i. e., natural reason was found competent to declare the truth of what is revealed in the scriptures,⁵ because it laid down the standards whereby true religion could be distinguished from superstition.⁶

The second major issue was: how does God reveal Himself? Deists allowed a general revelation through nature and moral order and the life of man, but rejected the special revelation of God through the "saving fact" of the historic birth of the Son of God. Since the claim of mystery of religious truth and its supernatural origin was founded on prophecies and miracles in the Bible they tried to demolish these grounds of Christianity. Critical analysis of such "external evidences" brought them to the conclusion that they were not authentic or credible.⁷ Principles of historical

1. cf., *ibid.*

2. In 1695 A.D.; though he himself was not a deist he provided the chief inspiration of the movement.

3. e. g., need to separate the essential from the non-essential elements of faith, to emphasise its moral element rather than the credal, to regard miracles and prophecies as merely external evidence of scriptural truths.

4. *vide* Toland, *Christianity not Mysterious*, 1696 A.D.

5. *vide* A. Collins, *Discourse of Free Thinking*, 1713 A.D.

6. *vide* M. Tindal, *Christianity as Old as Creation*, 1730 A.D.

7. *vide* A. Collins, *Discourses on Grounds and Reasons of Christian Religion*, 1724 A.D.; also Woolstone, *Discourse on the Miracles of Our Lord*, 1727-1729 A.D.

criticism widened the gap between natural and traditional religion. Thus deism began by defending Christianity as a true form of natural religion and gradually became the champion of natural as against revealed religion.

Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the originator of the deistic movement, investigated the natural instinct of man in its intellectual aspect, by supposedly examining human experience in history.¹ Five a priori principles or axioms of natural reason, communicated by God to man, were discovered by him: that God exists, that it is man's duty to worship Him, that promotion of better living or virtuous conduct is the true goal of worship, that man has the duty to repent his sins, that in the next world man will be dealt with i. e., rewarded or punished, in accordance with his life in this world; and these formed the principal articles of deistic faith.

The destructive treatment of the Deity of Christian revelation was, thus, accompanied by attempt at the construction of rational Christianity, in which moral teachings of Christ were given great prominence.² Reason was thought to be self-sufficient in establishing belief as well as in enforcing moral laws. The argument was that conduct which earned happiness for man after death was identical with the conduct which gave him happiness in his present life.³ In seeking to avoid the extreme implication of scepticism in rationalism the deists were forced to limit religion's function to promotion of morality by giving it the support of divine authority.⁴

Humanism

Closely interlinked with the rise of science and rationalism was the philosophy of humanism. The transition from medieval to modern thought had its historical root in the group of scholars in the age of Renaissance calling themselves humanists. That sixteenth century humanism was primarily literary, aiming to emancipate thought and education from the narrow scholasticism of medieval church by appealing to classical literature of Greece and Rome. Though not productive of any change in social and economic life it did have intellectual repercussions. The centre of attention was

1. De Veritate.

2. vide T. Morgan, *The Moral Philosopher*, 1738 A.D.

3. vide Chubb, *The True Gospel of Jesus Christ*, 1738 A.D.

4. vide Shaftsbury, *The Moralists*, 1709 A.D.

shifted to secular type of thinking by the revival of the classical interest in things of the world, it reduced every thing to human dimensions and rejected all superhuman or supernatural ends. Though not directly connected with science at its inception humanism did serve it by rediscovering the works of Greek scientists. However, it was not till the seventeenth century that the conviction that only observation of nature could yield that body of knowledge which could save man from the ills of empirical life, became part of humanistic thinking.¹

The form of humanism which provides the living philosophy and values of the scientific age arose in the eighteenth century as an intellectually inspiring ideal, in close relation to positivism and rationalism. Comte considered interpretation of human experience and betterment of human life to be the primary concern of philosophy and asserted the adequacy of human knowledge for this end; art, science and literature must have reference only to what is useful for human purposes.

Broadly speaking, there are two alternative choices open in regard to the end of life on earth viz., worship and service of God or veneration and service of man. Humanism started from the premise that the end of man must be man and nothing else. It had to make a further choice between service of a select group, glorification of a particular type of social organization or betterment of life for all. "Humanism is a system of thought or action which is concerned with merely human interests (as distinguished from the divine) or with those of the human race in general."² It concentrates on the solution of man's conflicts, doubts and needs, using only the tangible things man encounters in the course of his experience as means to the attainment of the good life and happiness. Man as a creature of the earth is to be treated as a naturalistic personality i. e., a complex of mind and body. His significance and position in the universe is to be deduced with the help of physical, biological, social sciences. And he is to be helped to achieve his essential nature of goodness by provision of favourable earthly conditions i. e., the end is human welfare in the natural, spatio-temporal world by enjoyment of all earthly potentialities.

1. cf., John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 212.
 2. *Oxford Dictionary*.

Specifically, the goal of the eighteenth century humanistic thought and activity, was the creation of a community of all human beings aspiring towards a common end viz., socio-economic regeneration. The idea of humanity is not a mere abstraction but a most real entity. The ideal was the social individual, not the unique individual of religion. And humanism derived its values from the hedonistic principle of enjoyment and social good, rather than from the idea of salvation in some ideal world or infinite and eternal life.

Perhaps, more even than faith in man, faith in reason, in its universal connotation, is what inspired Comtian humanism. Though rationalistic free-thought of the eighteenth century had no logical connection with the practical acceptance of this world only, yet it did come to this conclusion. Since the critical approach was able to destroy the religious meaning of moral obligation and its religious sanction of divine will, it was, somewhat illogically, thought to support the secular sense of moral duty. Herein it found a strong ally in the humanist ideal of betterment of mankind. Thus humanistic rationalism was led to use methods of science in the treatment of all problems, material and social. Comte announced that his system of life and thought was to be based on the sure, certain, precise results of scientific methods. By such positive knowledge all sciences were to be humanised i. e., linked with the ideal of humanity.¹

Modern humanism also established a relation with religious culture. Comte's sociology required embodiment of spiritual principles in certain institutions as the fundamental condition of a stable social order. The Religion of Humanity must be the regulator of individual and collective life in order to achieve full harmony with man's intellectual growth. Humanism offered itself as an infinitely superior alternative to religion by negating dualisms of body and soul, temporal and eternal worlds, religious and worldly interests in theological religion, by criticising the supernaturalism and metaphysics of traditional theology and by rejecting the magical and miraculous content of religious discipline. Humanity cannot be made the unifying object of religious

1. cf., Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Bk. I, aphorism 1: Now the true lawful goal of sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers.

devotion unless belief in the Deity is destroyed.¹ When natural laws are known there is no need to refer events to the agency of some mysterious, supernatural will. Positive religion is more compatible with the demonstrated truths of natural science than all other religions of human history. With the extension of science over whole of life and world, the humanist religion will also expand to cover all moral actions and relationships of mankind.

Agnosticism--Secularism

Four attitudes are possible in regard to ultimate reality: it exists and can be partly known; it does not exist as proved by metaphysical arguments; it exists but cannot be known; it cannot be known whether it exists or not. Properly, only the last two attitudes may be designated as "agnosticism." The agnostic way of thinking is as old as philosophy itself but it was only in the nineteenth century that this distinctive name was applied to it by Huxley:

When I reached intellectual majority and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist, a materialist or an idealist, a christian or a free thinker . . . the one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain "gnosis"—had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence, while I was sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was insoluble . . . so I took thought and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of "agnostic" . . . as suggestively antithetic to the "gnostic" of church history who professed to know so much about the very thing of which I was ignorant.²

Unlike the confidence of earlier rationalism in reason, agnosticism was a movement of thought³ admitting that the scope of intelligence is limited. And, that while theology must be put outside these limits the subject matter of science is fully within the limits. It also pointed to a hypothetical first cause of things, unknown and unknowable.

Secularism was also a product of early nineteenth century thought,⁴ having affiliations with non-theistic trends of the previous century. The explicit aim of this movement was to evolve a philosophy of thought and action without any reference to God or another world, to serve as an adequate alternative to the religious philosophy

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1. vide James Gotter Morison, *Service of Man*, p. 101; *Service of God* to be replaced by *service of man* i. e., *theolatory* by *anthropolatory*.
 2. *Collective Essays*, V, 239-240.
 3. Popularised by Leslie Stephen through his *Agnostic's Apology*.
 4. Leaders of this movement were Holyoake and Bradlaugh.

of life and conduct. It was confident that ethics could be worked out on purely scientific lines of mathematics, physics and chemistry i. e., principles of conduct and human welfare must relate only to tangible and known conditions and things in order to be of any value. The end of man's life is to improve human life by using material means only. Such an end was more immediate, certain and sufficient than any mysterious, other-worldly end provided by religion, therefore, worthy of man's moral effort.

It was natural that the agnostic and secular thinking should find support in each other. Both movements had their source in the practical attitude of mankind, which keeps it absorbed in concrete interests and activities of life. As philosophies, both aim at providing the logic for limitation of life and thought to the tangible, hence, primarily material aspects of life.

Clearly, both the Agnostic and Secularistic movements were inspired by doubt. Doubt has played an important part in modern philosophy as a means of knowledge and was not always opposed to religion.¹ But the deistic, humanistic, agnostic and secularistic movements paved the way for denial of the reality postulated by religion. Nor was this only a non-absolutistic scepticism in the sense of opposition to the prevailing or conventional conception of the Deity in order to establish some other more consistent conception. The cumulative result of all modern trends was to give rise to an authentic scepticism i. e., an absolute, unconditional, deliberate and avowed rejection of the idea and reality of God from the whole of mental and practical life.

The deistic movement was an unstable compromise between scientific determinism and theism, inspired by the desire to avoid materialism and scepticism. It failed to establish an independent system of natural religion either from the theological or the rational standpoint and ended in that very position it was seeking to avoid. It left behind certain legacies viz., principles of appeal to human reason, of historical criticism, of application of scientific-rationalistic method to both secular and sacred spheres, which, in the long run, undermined belief in traditional, revealed conceptions of the Deity.² The question was raised: Is belief in natural or rational

1. e. g., Cartesian doubt ended in positive conclusions about the reality of the religious object.

2. E. R. E., IV, 538.

religion necessary, after all? Neither did the deistic admission of after-life, advanced for moral reasons, prove satisfactory to reason. Furthermore, the deistic attempt to stand without the support of spiritual intuition i. e., witness of saints¹ and theological authority i. e., metaphysical principles, meant that it was cutting itself off from the experiential source of spiritual truth. This fundamental religious element being given up, deism could not remain distinct from the secularistic movement of social or cultural activity.

Agnostic and secularistic systems, though intending to adopt a position of suspension of judgment on ultimate reality, in principle, moved towards the conclusion of the non-existence of God and rejection of religious experience. Agnostics insisted on positive proof of the object of religion, relativity of human knowledge and limitation of intellect; and were bound to come to the conclusion that man knows nothing and can know nothing about the Infinite and Absolute of religion or metaphysics. At best, we know the "that" and not the "what" of God and to attempt to think of the unknowable is blasphemy. Materialism was another line of argument adopted by agnostics as the interpretation of ultimate reality and as a methodology. The secularists also held that matter is the self-existent, eternal, uncaused ultimate reality. Notions of matter and motion were opposed, as counter-absolutes, to the immaterial and transcendent being of religion.² The materialistic and mechanical theory was allied to empiricism, which contributed not a little towards the same conclusion, by minimisation of a priori reason in philosophical thought. And agnostics and secularists insisted on limiting interests to the empirical world. Science had refused to accept unquestioningly any truth or reality received at second-hand as in revelation or tradition. It also proceeded on the conviction that there was no other knowledge possible apart from the model in physical science. This positivistic apotheosis of the scientific method and attempt to construct the whole sphere of life and thought on scientific principles, was bound to end in admission of the insolubility of the problem of ultimate reality, and specially the rejection of the theistic conception in regard to it.

1. vide supra, pp. 324-325.

2. e. g., Holbach's *System of Nature*, 1859 A.D., substituted matter and motion for God, and was called "The Atheists Text-Book."

Scepticism in religion became a strong formative intellectual force in the nineteenth century because it was restated in terms of humanism and took account of major trends i. e., growth of science and rationalism. It was no longer negative as it had been in the classical period, but a constructive component of science and humanism. Several systems of thought regard atheism as a liberating doctrine for speculation, enquiry and management of practical affairs. To many rational minded people such a value as human welfare or common good appears to be an adequate substitute for religious objects or ends. The deists had first criticised the "vermicular attitude" or the degradation of man in religion, and humanism reestablished man's value in a scientific and secular setting. Its hostility to religious authority and dogma and, even more, its curiosity about this world, its absorption in this-worldly interests contributed towards disbelief in religious truth.

Attitudes

As has been seen above, the early centuries of the scientific revolution in Europe were characterised by a conflict between religion and science, more radical than in any other period of history. Earlier ages had also contained sceptics i. e., men lacking in piety and devotion, but this attitude was either due to intellectual and social difficulties or temperamental causes, and limited to a few thinkers in society. Modern scepticism takes the form of large-scale rejection of the traditional religion. Irreligion is the normal attitude and doubt is not confined but a ferment of the whole population.¹ The "commonsense" of the common man instinctively believes that the whole truth about the whole world is known or can be known by science, and his indifference and contempt for religious truth is due to this belief.²

Three attitudes are broadly discernible in regard to religion. Some people hold to the "verbal" truth of religious dogma and myths, some others take an evolutionary view of religion, and still others break away completely from religious faith because they either consider it impossible to arrive at any rational conclusion about the fundamentals of religion or are unable to harmonise their religious and scientific

1. Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 130.

2. C. E. M. Joad, *The Recovery of Belief*, p. 39.

beliefs. These attitudes may be termed the believing, the discriminating and the incredulous, respectively.¹

The average man is non-intellectual i. e., ignorant about the essence of both religion and science. He never discovers any logical incompatibility between traditional beliefs and scientific knowledge and accepts both blindly. His attitude to traditional religion is one of superstitious faith. The intellectuals, on the other hand, have been subjected to nearly two centuries of questioning in regard to religious beliefs and find it difficult to achieve faith. This section of society is comprised of scientists, artists, writers and practical minded people, who either reject religion outright or relegate it to the background and direct their practical energies to activities of the scientific age, political, economic, social, scientific or artistic, and their intellectual energies to the achievement of a non-religious philosophy of life. Since religion is unable to justify itself by scientific standards of evidence, an aggressively scientific approach not only leads to loss of religious faith in the thinker, but also to attempts to destroy religious faith in others.

The middle section, also composed of intellectuals, stands midway between belief and disbelief. Its believing spirit consists in willingness to believe, but its sceptical spirit stems from incapacity to believe in the present forms of religion due to deep and insistent doubts. Such doubt is an expression of piety, a kind of loyalty to claims of the spirit.² Such thinkers are aware that in every period of history men have been faced with the necessity of making their inherited religious beliefs consistent with contemporary scientific knowledge in order to reach more satisfactory intellectual positions. But their confusion arises because they cannot decide what is to be the role of religion in the new world and society. They do not know what to change in religion and how much to change and on what basis to change.³ The danger is that instead of restatement of religious truth in a more satisfactory way, they may mistake intellectual or scientific interpretations for religious.⁴

1. E. R. E., X, 663.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 42.

3. Abba Hillel Silver, *Religion in a Changing World*, p. 16.

The Idea of Progress

In the most general sense, change in outlook on life from the religious conception of a perfected condition after death to the rationalist idea of natural perfection here and now is brought out in one basic modern doctrine. The doctrine of progress has been the dynamic motive power behind social progress in Europe since the eighteenth century. The seventeenth century advanced the abstract intellectual generalisation of the idea of indefinite extension of knowledge, the eighteenth century provided the instruments as well as the idea of human capacity to achieve progress. These theoretical and practical factors combined to change the face of society. Further development in the conception and method of social progress occurred in the nineteenth century, with utilisation of more detailed and scientific efforts by leaders of state and society. While use of machinery and technology proved the possibility of abundance and advancement, the knowledge of other cultures arising from the overseas expansion of European nations strengthened the humanistic idea. Thus, the idea of progress was a dangerous and revolutionary speculation in the days of Roger Bacon, confidently stated three hundred years later by Francis Bacon, but progressive changes in science and manufacture made it a lasting truth—a platitude in the nineteenth century.¹

Mental acceptance and moral approval of the idea by the popular mind occurred gradually as it was given concrete and external expression in social life. In the nineteenth century there were good socio-economic reasons viz., growth in knowledge, wealth, power, political and economic systems, to foster belief in unilinear progress. The concrete movement of progress was given conceptual support of new ideas and ideals of humanitarian and welfare type, to provide the purpose and motivation of the doctrine for the masses.

Three elements constitute the idea of progress: the conception of an ideal goal of human life; the establishment of causal connection between the conceived goal and empirical life of man; lastly, the conviction that man is approximating that goal through the course of history.

1. J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 3.

The destination of the human species as a whole is towards continuous progress. We accomplish it by fixing our eyes on the goal, which, though a pure ideal, is of the highest value in practice, for it gives direction to our efforts, conformable to the intention of providence.¹

One of the most famous definitions of progress was given in the eighteenth century by Condorcet in his Sketch of the Intellectual Progress of Mankind: the goal of human life is the unity of mankind, the equality of men in happiness and improvements of the capability of man individually and of society as a whole indefinitely, for nature has set no limits to human hopes in this regard. This idea of progress contained certain assumptions viz., belief in the perfectibility of man who holds the key of destiny in his own hands, belief that there is no limit to human welfare if only man overcomes past errors by rational cultivation of nature, belief that progress must inevitably result by accumulation of knowledge.²

Ancient civilizations had progressed by the discovery of new knowledge and the development of arts and crafts, attaining high degree of perfection in these fields, but the idea of progress and the method to bring it about is a distinctive development of the modern age. The notion that man develops from the lower to the higher stage is the opposite of the ancient notion of man's decline from an original state of perfection. Study of history had showed the Greek philosophers that man had evolved from a primitive condition to the civilized condition by growth of knowledge, but this conclusion was counteracted by wide-spread popular belief in the degeneration of the race. The purpose of knowledge was to enable the philosopher to transcend the present life and to enter into the world of reality by achieving philosophic wisdom, rather than to help human society to achieve progress on earth.

The medieval outlook being primarily religious, did not conceive the idea of improvement of society in this world by a process of increase of knowledge in time. Its attention was fixed on the happiness of a small, spiritually developed part of mankind in another world viz., the saved, through the divinely ordained event of the birth of Christ in history.³ The Christian conception of progress was internal, though

1. Kant's criticism of Herder quoted by F. Marvin in *The Living Past*, p. 216.

2. John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 381.

3. J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 21.

having some outer reference to social life also.¹ The medieval religious outlook, like the ancient philosophic, held that man is not strong enough to attain perfection at the earthly level by his own effort, but that freedom from the imperfections of earthly life can be achieved by reaching a high spiritual level. Thus the modern theory of progress was novel, almost heretical, from the standpoint of orthodox tradition.²

Till the Renaissance and Reformation the ancient ideal of stability of the existing order prevailed in Europe, since change from a state of perfection was bound to be retrogressive. But the one unanimous assumption of all modern philosophies of progress is that change is a desirable thing. The world is neither static nor complete but growing through passage of time and events of history. Though originally (e. g., by Descartes) it was held that knowledge of the natural world would be completed in a not very long period of time, by the eighteenth century the endlessness of scientific knowledge was accepted. This not only caused the world and society to change, but to change constantly, because application of new knowledge to society is primarily a transforming and not a conserving influence. Social instability resulted from this institutionalisation of scientific rationalism during eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when unutilised ideas and techniques of many centuries were applied to economic activities. The constant growth of society was not comprehended in any new synthesis or stable social order. The very rapid rate of growth of science and its applications caused the spirit of change in thought and action to pervade society, even when its basis in individual or social need was lacking. Since fuller realization of human ideals depends on change, change or newness itself became an irresistible value³ in every field. Philosophical forms of evolutionism embodied the idea of change by discounting the changeless and permanent reality in favour of cosmic and human "becoming."⁴

Another basic assumption of the doctrine of social progress is that all human

1. vide Nicholas of Cusa quoted by F. S. Marvin in *Progress and History*, p. 10: "To be able to understand more and more without end is the type of spiritual wisdom—let a man desire to understand better what he does understand and to love more what he does love and the whole world will not satisfy him."
2. cf., W. Macneile Dixon, *The Human Situation*, p. 186.
3. cf., Robert Andrews Millikan, *Science and the New Civilization*, p. 72.
4. cf., A. W. Benn, *History of English Rationalism*, IV, 13.

problems are ultimately solvable, if only reason is allowed to counteract emotion and prejudice in the interest of objective scientific investigation.¹ Behind the idea of progress lay the "scientific spirit;" to Bacon's conviction that knowledge is power was added Descartes' conviction of supremacy of reason, invariable constancy of natural law and final certainty in knowledge through the analytical scientific method, and thus all practical and theoretical bases of the modern "scientific outlook" were laid. Theories of science were woven into a scheme of philosophy to produce the Comtian and Spencarian conceptions of social progress. "All modern utopias point to the possibility of utilizing science and its products, to make the world perfect, instead of using ancient conceptions of justice or medieval religious conceptions of grace and redemption to make the world perfect."²

Medieval thought considered the aspiration to over much knowledge for its own sake as sinful pride in man, "Scientia inflat." Practical and useful knowledge was opposed and subordinated to the spiritual and philosophical, as medieval tradition was committed to the contemplative ideal. But Bacon rejected the view that reason's task is merely to support truths of faith or to reconcile qualitative world-experience through its rational categories. In fact, its task is to discover and not to demonstrate truth. And natural knowledge discovers not the universals and eternal of speculation and theology, but changing specific and concrete phenomena. So long as science and speculative philosophy used identical methods viz., deductive, to reach the truth, there was no clash between them, but when science shifted its approach to the inductive, not only were the findings of science bound to differ from those of scholasticism, but even its uses. It was applied to utilitarian ends: "Knowledge is to be valued according to its usefulness."³ Instead of pursuing knowledge of revelation and speculation, difficult to acquire, available to a small number of men only and of no use in the practical conduct of life, man should engage in the pursuit of the more easily acquired scientific knowledge, which gives him power to understand and to

1. cf., J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, Intro., p. xi.

2. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, p. 58.

3. Baxter, *Christian Directory*, 1625 A.D., Vol. I, p. 13, quoted by Harold Laski in *Faith, Reason and Civilization*, p. 64.

manipulate natural forces for the satisfaction of his needs.

The doctrine of progress carries the assumption that mankind knows the direction in which it is moving and also the ends to which that movement will carry it. Roger Bacon hoped to use science and the machine for some of the wonderful works of art and nature in which there is nothing of magic:

Instruments may be made by which the largest ships . . . will be carried with greatest velocity . . . chariots may be constructed that will move with incredible rapidity . . . instruments of flying may be formed . . . as also machines which will enable men to walk at the bottom of seas.¹

End of knowledge is "endowment of the human race with inventions and riches."² Bacon and Descartes looked for progress in arts and sciences which would lead to mitigation of human suffering. Health, happiness and enhancement of life on earth by cooperation of mankind is generally the desirable outcome of social progress. Eighteenth century scientific achievements and improvements of arts were related to inevitable improvement of society and morality, and all sciences were integrated with the science of morality at the apex. The idea of intellectual progress was turned into the idea of general progress of man by proving that evils of human life are not caused by innate imperfection of human nature or the essence of things, but are merely caused by ignorance and prejudice. Science which tells us what is the cause of evils has also the capacity to remedy them. Rationality of man and unlimited growth of happiness as well as virtue were axiomatic beliefs. Progress is the slow, steady and inevitable elevation of the nature of man.

The doctrine of progress looked to mankind for rational i. e., purposive guidance of its own destiny, immediate as well as remote. Though earlier (sixteenth to eighteenth century) scientists found belief in divine guidance a stimulus to scientific progress, gradually the scientific mind became conscious of human self-sufficiency. In the past men accepted the existing order, natural and social, with resignation because they did not question God or unseen teleology, but the scientific outlook refused to accept the natural and social environment as the divinely ordained, fixed and final condition of man. "Man is saved by his own strength." He must realize his

1. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, p. 55.
 2. Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, p. 245.

own responsibility, exercise initiative, resourcefulness in making nature an instrument of his will and in shaping the course of events by his own decisions i. e., instead of trusting that there is a higher purpose operating in the moral order of the universe, he must put intelligent purpose into it.

Rejection of blind fatalism and confident appeal to possibilities open to the free will of man clearly depends upon the extent and form of human knowledge. Man's dissatisfaction with things varies with the amount of his knowledge and control over them. The scientific mind remained optimistic in the face of nature's mystery and determined to discover its truth. Thus, the "divine discontent" of the scientific spirit expressed itself in determination to shape both nature and fate.

Early in the seventeenth century (e. g., by Jean Bodin) a new vision of history was conceived having reference only to life on earth and no connection with another life. Comparison of ancient civilizations showed the superiority of the latter; unlike the ancient belief in the idea of a perfect condition of man in the past, they held that mankind is still in its early stages and possibility of perfection rests in the future.¹ The past was full of ignorance, superstition, savagery. Only when its contributions have been destroyed or, at least, modified can the reform of mankind occur. The historical method and historical thinking gave rise to a new interest in the future.

It was an axiomatic article of belief of all the thinkers of progress that the historical process is progressive. Since the developmental principle is inherent in the nature of the universe, its laws must be discernible in history, as are laws of physical phenomena. And such ascertainable laws must be searched for with the help of various sciences.² The idealists discovered the necessary course of reason in human history i. e., humanity is one perfectible entity, its historical advancement consists in its becoming more and more rational. The sense of totality of history and development in a single direction following a teleological principle, was explicit or implicit

1. cf., J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 282.

2. e. g., Geography (climate and topography affect human development), Economics (laws of production etc.), Politics (theories of justice and liberty), Psychology (human nature itself is the source and limit of progress).

in a majority of thinkers of the modern period.

Unlike the ancients who considered progress to be an illusion the moderns considered it to be a reality. They discovered both the fact and the ideal of progress from their study of human experience in history, though admitting that the ideal is in advance of facts. Since all organisms grow by immemorial development through gradual steps, the evolutionary spirit in the sciences gave rise to conviction of inevitable human and social perfectibility, and, at the same time, supplied the complementary idea of interaction between the environment and the organism, so necessary to the doctrine of progress. In its very nature the world must move in a single direction, become more adjusted internally and externally, its values must grow by the very passage of time. Nor did the thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries calculate progress in terms of centuries, but optimistically looked forward to the abrupt advent of a new age of happiness and enlightenment. This spirit of optimistic confidence strengthened the feeling of human responsibility for progress, while supplying the necessary motivation for self-reliant effort.

Science, the Agent of Progress

Science in its widest sense is regarded as the chief agent of social progress. Development of knowledge of nature proved that human intelligence can enter all universes of thought and action. Rational understanding and control of environment started from the sciences of matter, spread to the more complex biological region and finally extended to the still more complex sphere of human and social phenomena.¹ As science provided new powers for satisfying human needs, eighteenth century rationalism confidently worked for the reorganization of society to secure definite objects. The equation of scientific evolution with social spirit is evidence of the confidence in progress.

Scientific social progress rests on the assumption that only things consciously designed can be essential to human purpose and that social institutions, being man-made, can be remoulded in the desired way. Historically, purposive social changes have

1. J. D. Bernal, *Freedom of Necessity*, Intro., p. viii.

been initiated and manipulated by individual agents or groups of various types, rulers, saints, reformers, colonisers, businessmen or missionaries. And, in the past, methods of philosophy, dogma, exhortation, inspiration and intuition were combined with various types of external instrumentalities and pressures to achieve the goal of progress. The eighteenth century (e. g., St. Simon, 1760-1825 A.D.) gave rise to the technocratic ideal i. e., social organization planned and constructed by technical experts, as if it were in a workshop. The resultant product of the "scientific social technique"¹ would be the social machine, to be regulated by scientists. The notions of "social engineering," planning society according to a "blue-print" arose from the approach of scientific mechanical mindedness. All programmes of modern utopias bear this character, in which science estimates existing needs, available resources and means for solution of the problems² in the most objective manner.

In the nineteenth century the idea of progress became connected with sociological sciences, as the means of guidance and planning of society had to be based on the knowledge provided by such sciences. According to Comte, the order of human progress in all respects being a corollary deducible from the order of evolution of thought and science, at last, the positive science of sociology may be founded on previously developed systems of physics and biology to make human regeneration possible.³ General tendencies of social life are discernible inspite of indeterminateness of human will and laws of social transformation may be formulated. Comte attempted to discover natural laws of civilization like those of gravitation for social physics.⁴ Psychological sciences discover inborn goals in the nature of man, and these are connected with the whole of organic nature in biology i. e., not the machine but human nature must be the foundation of the social philosophy of change. If the problem is the making of a perfect social order to ensure happiness of all, both psychological and social sciences must find ideals in sympathy with innate strivings, appetites and abilities. "No laws outside human will guide social destiny, though laws reveal limits

1. cf., Bertrand Russell, *New Hopes for a Changing World*, p. 27.

2. vide Wilhelm Röpke, *The Social Crisis of Our Time*, p. 157.

3. G. H. Lewes, *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences*, p. 23.

4. *Early Essays*, pp. 147-149, 157.

as well as possibilities of action."¹

Upto the present time, human society has been changed by instinctive striving of groups, by trial and error methods operating within the field of unknown factors. But now, having acquired through social sciences appreciation of ends and means, the conscious manipulation of individuals and groups is possible, with a view to alter patterns of thought and action to achieve better adjustments to new situations, rather than to leave such adjustments to operation of custom and sentiment. This is the logical working out in social sciences of aims of physical science viz., prediction and control of phenomena.

With the passage from the physical to the psychological and social spheres science must cover not only the environment i. e., developments in industry, wealth, population, but also resulting changes in forms of thought and life i. e., in human nature itself. For the scientific claim of conscious control and direction of the social process is, in the last resort, based on the control of the individual minds. Science is confident that its study of body, life and mind gives it the power to improve physical, mental and moral powers. The model according to which man is to be shaped is prescribed by science and the same objective methods and principles are to be applied to cultivate human nature as are used in other departments. "Anthropotechnics" will solve the problem of improvement of man.

The two pronged approach of science includes control over production or breed as well as control over moulding process of human nature. As to the first, the anthropological sciences give rise to eugenics and hope of controlling and manipulating the quantity and quality of human organisms.² As to the second, directly by means of scientific system of education, and indirectly by control of internal and external environment the desired character will be produced. Robert Owen asserted that the rationality of the human race and character of everyone can be recreated through new creation and arrangement of external circumstances³ i. e., a new spirit of charity,

1. L. T. Hobhouse, Social Development, p. 325.

2. Bertrand Russell, Icarus, p. 48; cf., Mary Adams (ed.), Science in the Changing World, pp. 126-127.

3. Crane Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern Mind, p. 127.

kindliness and love could be produced by creating a society based on principles of justice, freedom and truth and a natural environment free from harsh conditions.

Such are the claims of science in regard to social progress. In actual effect, the application of scientific knowledge and techniques to human life, social, economic and political, in the west, produced a highly organized industrial society operating on the principle of mechanisation, increasingly extended to newer fields of individual and social activity. There has been sufficient evidence of external, specially material progress and even social welfare, but no proof of human perfection.

Twentieth Century Doubt

Faith in scientific social progress as an axiomatic and, therefore, indisputable dogma has disappeared in the twentieth century. Uptil the last century there was dispute only in regard to means to be employed to achieve the end of progress, but now both means and end are under dispute and doubt. To many it seems that scientific civilization may not necessarily go on moving along the present direction of its development unlimitedly, but may stop developing after a certain stage of advancement or even destroy itself. This is expressed in the sense of "crisis" in many minds.

Progress is not an inevitable result of universal evolution, as optimistically assumed by eighteenth century rationalism, but a particular form of development of a particular society, not necessarily identical with "human progress." Limits to human thought and action are being discovered in the very nature of man as well as in the elements on which science operates.

Doubts also arise due to disappointment of the hopes that progress of industrial society resting on economics, education and democracy will bring about peace and harmony, and technology will end all needs. After the rejection of the medieval religious ideal the scientific spirit set about the realization of humanistic values of a better life in this world, by amelioration, material prosperity, general welfare, social justice, equality, liberty, brotherhood and peace. But the confidence of the masses in these ideals and values is shaken by the very progress of science and resultant "materialism." The question is asked, does science make life in the world better

or happier, and answered in the negative.¹ Science when applied to the problem of social progress creates as many difficulties as it resolves: it both enriches and complicates life. The beneficence of science being weighed against its destructive effects, there is a new understanding that every development contains potentialities of both evil and good.² The rational organization of society, after showing good results at first, begins to show diminishing returns, after a while. Among the evil effects of the intrusion of science into society are the intensification of warfare, exhaustion of natural resources, control of men's minds by scientific methods which overlook the claims of the individual.³ Many fear that man is submitting to vast, deterministic forces, natural and human, created by science.⁴ Doubts about power of science to conquer and control human nature and society create pessimism. It is also beginning to be apparent that all the negative consequences of the application of science to social progress cannot be resolved by a merely quantitative increase of scientific knowledge.

Such doubts are voiced in the notion of lag between different aspects of life and society. Scientific age is apt to think of progress materialistically (i. e., economic) or mechanically (i. e., technology) or scientifically (i. e., discoveries), but even it is beginning to realize that the "crisis" or "breakdown of civilization" is occurring in its moral, spiritual and cultural elements. There is a strong feeling that social problems arise mainly due to failure of moral wisdom to match the growth of technological science.⁵ Highly progressive science demands incessant and quick change of individual and social states, and this leaves man in a permanent condition of instability.⁶ Nor has the development of sciences relating to man and society enabled us to determine the optimum rate of change to allow for balanced growth of external and internal aspects.⁷ Science has failed to prepare man by way of self-consciousness and self-discipline for the responsibility implied in the scientific

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1. vide J. D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, p. 7; also Bertrand Russell, *Impact of Science on Society*, p. 31.
 2. cf., Bertrand Russell, *Human Nature in Ethics and Politics*, p. 199.
 3. *ibid.*, p. 20.
 4. cf., A. D. Thomson, *Man in Society*, p. 146.
 5. cf., Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 211; also *Impact of Science on Society*, p. 120.
 6. cf., Josiah Stamp, *The Science of Social Adjustment*, p. 7.
 7. cf., Lewis Mumford, *Programme of Survival*, p. 33.

command of external world, therefore, he becomes a victim of the very tools which he employs¹ or uses science in a socially destructive way.

"Moral and cultural lag" is the admission that science has failed to actualise human values in society. The earlier centuries of science assumed the end products of the law of progress, such as, liberty, good-will, justice, equality and human felicity to be absolute as well as inherent in that law. Difficulties seem to arise because of the inadequacy of the scientific method to deal with ultimate questions and the concentration of scientific energies on the objective at the cost of the subjective i. e., valuational or directive parts of life and society. Choice of transient or narrow goals because of absence of a proper hierarchy of values obstructs the aim of remodelling of society. To many thinking people it appears that the scientific age has not discovered any better values than those expressed in essential beliefs of religion and the fault lies with the scientific failure in helping individual and society to adapt themselves to these values.² The hope of reinstating traditional belief which is expressed in the "apologetic attitude" of science is not so much the logical outcome of new scientific findings as a product of the pessimistic social temper,³ and it is a proof of the fact that the real distance between science and values remains unbridged.

In spite of these qualms the scientific spirit is, in general, still confident in its capacity to satisfy human need and to obtain happiness without reference to any other method. It may grant that it is a fallacy to universalise the relative developments of a particular time, place and society by giving the historical process an "ontological" status, and that the attribution of social progress to changes in man's nature has not been proved by historical facts. Yet it still insists that Condorcet and others were not far wrong, since infinite perfectibility does not necessarily refer to perfection in the near future. The fact that high expectations have not yet been fulfilled due to absorption in partial and conflicting ends is of secondary importance, the primary thing is that we realize the possibility of progress more generally and clearly. Moreover, allowing that progress rests more on ideals than on

1. cf., Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 24.

2. cf., Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, pp. 316, 317.

3. Lancelot Hogben, *The Nature of Living Matter*, p. 28.

facts, science still considers man rational enough to respond to the conception of human good. Such a valid ideal as that of progress must not only ultimately appeal to the human will but must also prevail in human life.¹ To the extent to which the improvement of the earthly lot of man has been recognised as a moral duty in the modern world to that extent the hope of science to ensure progress has not been given up. Nor is the self-confidence of science shaken when it is faced with the fact of its own destructive by-products. It argues that most of the evils adduced by its critics² are not novel creations of science, but ancient human evils, which have not obstructed human advancement in the past. The real question is whether negative consequences of scientific social progress create conditions of such disorder as to make further progress impossible. Admissions of difficulties of progress are not productive of an attitude of dejection in regard to progress but of further effort to avoid such consequences.³

Some protagonists of scientific social progress admit that due to the complexity of the social process, which is the outcome of the activities of innumerable individuals and infinite number of known and unknown factors, the inevitable course of human destiny or law of development in history is not discoverable and that, therefore, it cannot be used to predict or to control progress. But even the nature of contingency and unforeseeability in human life does not point to the conclusion of despair; for the fact of progress is plain in history. Science has helped man to advance step by step from the primitive condition by producing results in economics, arts, literature, law and all other human aspects. The twentieth century qualifications of the high hopes of Bacon and Descartes are not so much indicative of pessimism regarding the final outcome, as of lack of knowledge of what has occurred, of the source of new power and of how it might be used.⁴

Modern civilization is so complex that it postulates the need of science as a

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1. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 337.
 2. vide Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 204: Loss of religious faith, malignant use of material power, degradation of race due to differential birth rate, suppression of aesthetic creativeness.
 3. cf., Wilhelm Röpke, *The Social Crisis of Our Time*, p. 24.
 4. F. S. Marvin, *The New Vision of Man*, p. 138.

primary condition of survival.¹ Science may not be given up without large-scale change in the manner of life and frustration of creative urges. The vast and far-reaching effects of science make some regard it as the solution of all problems and others as the source of all evil, but none can deny that science has come to stay.

It is argued that the troubles of modern scientific society are not due to the nature of science but due to misapplications or inconsistent applications which have produced unintended and highly undesirable results inspite of its power to predict and control the future. And science is not to be held responsible for the wrong use of its power by men who lack the scientific outlook and the altruistic spirit.² Therefore, "I think we must retain the belief that scientific knowledge is one of the glories of man and fear of knowledge is more harmful than useful, . . . inspite of its destructiveness science is a liberator by its nature from physical nature and destructive passions."³

The theory of progress was from the beginning linked up with organization of society i. e., the idea that continuation of automatic progress depends upon perfection of certain institutions, therefore, the present evil effects are attributed to defective social, political and economic institutions.⁴ Most people are convinced that if some proper "arrangements," laws and institutions could be worked out man would be enabled to attain his ideal of the good life. Apart from the fact that there is bound to be an element of truth in the contention that evils of scientific society are due to the fault of "system," the psychological effect of this rationalisation is to provide a way of escape from the sense of responsibility for achieving the far more difficult progress in the moral and spiritual sphere. Be the case as it may, this explanation does not indicate any loss of confidence in science. The full perfection of the culture of the scientific age lies in the future in which adjustment of social organization, national and international, to scientific knowledge will have been made.

1. cf., Mary Adams (ed.), *Science in the Changing World*, p. 87.

2. cf., Bernard Lovell, *Science and Civilization*, p. 82; also Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, pp. 174-175; Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 276.

3. Bertrand Russell, *Basic Writings*, p. 724.

4. cf., H. Levy, *Science, Curse or Blessing?* p. 17; also J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 880; F. M. Muller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*, p. 111.

The argument proceeds: since misuse of scientific benefits is largely due to defective economic system and political institutions the remedy lies with economists and statesmen.¹ But science must be a positive factor in political and economic organization; many thinkers (e. g., G. H. Wells) have depicted utopias in which scientists and psychologists satisfy all needs and eliminate all conflicts. In short, the remedy is greater consciousness of "social responsibility of science" and directive control of scientific knowledge and scientists in social change.

Suggestions for "filling in of gaps," supplementation of science by other methods or "rationing" or slowing down of scientific discoveries and inventions are rejected out of hand, as it is not admitted that inadequacies or defects of scientific progress are either inevitable or uncontrollable. The lag between scientific advance and ethical development must be made up by science only, linking itself to morality. Evils of science can be cured by more science, more thorough, efficient and universal application of science in every field of activity and thought.² Despite its present negative consequences man must continue to put his faith exclusively in the operation of reason and will in the rationalistic and scientific way.³

The scientific mind concedes that the development of social sciences leaves much to be desired. But it is argued that the reason for the unimpressive record of social sciences in building a harmonious society is the adoption by them of the naturalistic and evolutionary methods, which led to the neglect of society as a system of thought and ideas. The positivistic conception of social sciences made them useless as guides of emotional, moral, aesthetic and spiritual aspects of social life. At this point, their supplementation by humanities is essential in order to make them effective agents of social progress.⁴ Were social sciences to avoid mechanism and materialism by this device they could help to realize the precious values of spirit. Granted that factors of social progress are very complex and difficult to produce, it is the social sciences, rather than philosophy and religion, which can make effective the social

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1. cf., J. D. Bernal, *The Freedom of Necessity*, p. 11; also Julian Huxley, *Scientific Research and Social Need*, p. 276.
 2. cf., Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, p. 148.
 3. Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 138.
 4. cf., Wilhelm Röpke, *Civitas Humana*, p. 135.

ideas and values in the scientific age. "It is altogether possible that with the increase in knowledge . . . people can be expected to come to that faith in scientific accuracy and completeness of social knowledge . . . as readily as they now adopt the new appliances" ¹

Modern Science and India

The foregoing survey of the impact of science on the west during the last four hundred years will enable us to understand the full meaning of the impact of science on India. However, the analogy is not exact: inspite of similarities in the two cases there are also striking differences in the manner in which science has been received in India and the effects it has produced.

Unity of Traditional Outlook

Ancient and medieval culture was a many-sided adaptation to life, in which science, philosophy and social institutions were in harmony with each other. The traditional world-view placed the sciences and social organization in the sphere of the relative, practical, contingent knowledge, in which there was full scope for development and adjustment. They dealt with questions of social welfare, physical well-being and, generally, had pragmatic significance as aids in the art of living here and now. The sciences i. e., Upavedas and Vedāngas began early in history, in the Sāma- and Atharva-Vedas, and evolved along many directions of mathematics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, astrology, biology, physiology, anatomy, psychology and ethics. ² Uptil the middle ages research and experimentation were at the root of physical sciences and not merely a priori assumptions. Social theories were also scientific, though not using modern standards of exact evidence and statistical calculations. ³ These were woven into folk-ways, usages, traditions, festivals, instruments of work, education, government, law, business, arts and religion i. e., the realm of evaluation was continuous with that of coherent cognition, values being embedded in the social structure; and this harmony of sciences and social, aesthetic, moral values and institutions

1. Leonard D. White (ed.), *The New Social Order*, p. 129.

2. Kewal Motwani, *Science and Society in India*, p. 2.

3. W. J. H. Spret, *Science and Social Action*, p. 152.

constituted dharma.

This complex and total integration was made possible by the operation of ultimate principles, which linked together different orders of experience. The sciences were the empirical expressions of and constituted the only way of approach to the spiritual-metaphysical principle in this synthesis, for people of different levels of development. The vision of the one-in-many expressed itself in all aspects of culture. Though the translation of the ultimate principle into social life and thought must have made for loss of some "imponderable value,"¹ yet the synthesis was a real one i. e., of man within himself, of man in the group, of sciences with metaphysics and religion.² The outcome was an "ideational culture" which supplied individual needs, social ends and means i. e., provided the solution to problems of normal human life and gave opportunity for development of individual and society on a wider scale than could have been possible through the purely rationalistic-positivistic sciences of that age. It is necessary to repeat that though the spiritual was in the foreground of thought, the positive, secular and material were never neglected. The synthesis can be fully appreciated only by investigating social, economic, political, international institutions and ideals in the midst of which spiritual-metaphysical literature flourished.³ In fact, the spiritual, which gave continuity and universality to all aspects of culture, was, in turn, humanised and secularised by being transformed into ordinary life and thought through the instrumentality of the natural and social sciences. "It was the great Indian achievement of culture that a religion of pure contemplation, deliberately denying social values, could flourish without destroying those values and could even serve as guide and refuge for them."⁴

Modern Science

The long-unbroken scientific tradition in India became decadent because widespread interest in scientific inquiry and applications of science ceased in the eighth century A.D. India remained ignorant of scientific developments and attendant

1. G. L. Mehta, *Understanding India*, p. 4.

2. cf., Kewal Motwani, *India, a Synthesis of Cultures*, p. 200.

3. Banoy Kumar Sarkar, *Creative India*, p. 63.

4. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and Culture*, p. 98.

transformations of socio-economic life of Europe, from the sixteenth century onwards i. e., until the nineteenth century it lived in the pre-scientific age. Nor did its contact with the west, after a lapse of some centuries, immediately bring to it benefits of modern science, since political considerations tended to put into the background all other considerations in that relationship.¹ Gradually the understanding dawned on the Indian mind that British rule was a symbol of power derived from superiority in science and technology and a new trend of thinking was set free.²

There are two ways in which a people might change through their contact with other peoples:³ the purely internal or mental change is change in the set of mind; the purely material change is brought about by exchange of goods, acceptance of foreign instruments, techniques, habits, styles. A really significant change in world-view can only come about by the coincidence of new mental attitudes with extensive external changes. Science was to affect India in both ways. But interest in and need of science arose first from the practical standpoint i. e., with the introduction of new methods of communication, transportation, incipient development of new industries and connected economic and political organizations. There was, so to say, "second-hand contact" through foreign merchants and foreign arms.⁴ It is a debatable point whether the western nations were primarily instruments of scientific machine-power or of human ideals and values, but mental contact with science was made when Indian leaders determined to master modern scientific knowledge in all its manifestations of social life, philosophy, art and culture through education, administration, law etc. At the opening of the last century the idea of education in modern science was conceived and executed non-officially⁵ and officially.⁶ The growth of Indian nationalism made for demand for greater science and technology, which became a reality only in the twentieth century

1. cf., D. P. Mukerjee, *Modern Indian Culture*, p. 204.

2. cf., Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 81.

3. cf., Edward J. Urwick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, pp. 133, 134.

4. K. M. Pannikar, *Foundations of New India*, p. 64; also Arnold J. Toynbee, *The World and the West*, p. 54.

5. e. g., *Hindu College, 1817*, founded by David Hare and R. M. Roy for "tuition of sons of respectable Hindus in the English and Indian languages and in the literature and science of Europe and Asia."

6. e. g., *Bentinck's Act, 1834*, envisaged interest in knowledge of and advance in science; *Macaulay's minutes, 1835*, laid down the content of education to be literature and science of the west.

due to exigencies of world wars and prepared the Indian society, after independence, to take a practical interest in development of scientific knowledge and application of scientific technique to the solution of the problem of national reconstruction,

When in the seventeenth century, Indian society was overpowered by modern science in its practical form viz., military and technological, it was at the lowest depth of its own spiritual culture. The concentration of modern science on the material and the temporal and its claim to absolute independence was bound to be antithetical to the traditional concentration on the eternal and the spiritual, and the subordination of the sciences to the highest knowledge. The ancient and medieval homogeneity of Indian outlook was adversely affected by modern science. Moreover, habits and customs of Indian social life and its ethico-spiritual values were not adapted to scientific methods and were repudiated by science. Science in its forms of technology, industrialism and connected ideas of rationalism, liberalism, nationalism created a ferment in India. The impact of modern science and the machine on the thought and activity of medieval western society had resulted in a conflict of its social and ideational aspects. Unlike the west where this strategic factor of change was, at least, internal,¹ in India it was wholly external. Therefore, India's adoption of the scientific approach and methodology contained the possibility of even stronger conflict or "adharma."² And, in fact, the introduction of this foreign element brought about a series of dislocations in the social field as well as reoriented value systems in the ideational field.³ Secondly, science came to India in a much shorter period of time

1. Christopher Dawson in *Progress and Religion*, p. 234, controverts this theory by the thesis that European tradition is a compound of two cultural trends—scientific trend (Greek) turned along new lines not having the dynamic social power peculiar to religion, plus Christianity. Neither is spontaneously native to Europe, as the Vedānta is a native creation of India, hence the nineteenth century attempt to substitute physical science for religion.
2. Kewal Motwani, *Science and Society in India*, Intro., p. xii.
3. Arnold Toynbee explains the law of cultural encounters in *The World and the West*, pp. 68, 70: when a travelling cultural ray is diffracted into its component strands—technological, religious, political, artistic—by the resistance of a foreign body social on which it impinges, its technological strand is apt to penetrate faster and further than the religious, since a trivial strand arouses less resistance in the assaulted social body However a loose strand of cultural radiation like a loose electron or a loose contagious disease may prove more deadly when it is disengaged from the system within which it has been functioning hitherto and is set to range abroad in a different milieu.

than in the west. The rapid combination, in India, of various stages of its development in European history viz., Renaissance, Reformation, rationalistic and secularistic movements, or the near simultaneity of the scientific revolution, the socio-political revolution and the industrial revolution¹ was bound to create vast upheavals.

Rapid and radical changes occurred. The traditional social organization postulated practically self-sufficient rural communities, localised relationships, agricultural economy, hereditary handicrafts, but the new science and machine-culture postulated large-scale industrialised production, urbanisation, quantitative values and monetary basis of economy. The agricultural system embodied a certain meaning of life in terms of the continuity of man with land, the animal kingdom and the religious outlook of tradition. The functioning of the individual adjusted to this structure of society was disrupted by scientific technology and mechanisation.² The possibility of the transformation of feudal social structure and economy of rural self-sufficiency was created during the Muslim period, but the actual change of social, economic and political system into the industrial system based on scientific technology took place under the British rule.

The socio-ideological background of modern science in India has a resemblance to the corresponding background of science in Europe. In both cases the scientific spirit encountered an outlook and pattern of society dominated by the element of the "spiritual" contained in the religious traditions of the respective regions. In both cases beginnings of science were marked by disruption of external aspects of life viz., feudal and caste systems, agricultural economy. And the destructive effects of the scientific outlook on the more internal aspects viz., set of mind, ideas and values, followed closely upon the first stage of disruption of the traditional way of life.

Rationalism—Liberalism

Many trends of thought and aspirations go into the making of the modern Indian mind, its ideas and ideals. No conclusive harmonisation of the trends has emerged, nor

1. Which had occurred in three separate centuries, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, respectively, in Europe.

2. cf., Kewal Motwani, India, a Synthesis of Cultures, p. 200; also T. Walter Wall-Bank, A Short History of India and Pakistan, p. 55.

can it be predicted with certainty which beliefs and values of the past will continue in the future and in what combination with new elements. "Modern" in the sense of secular, liberal, rational, scientific, technological approach was appropriated by the nineteenth century intellectuals from the western influence. The principal factor influencing the nineteenth century was the rationalistic movement of eighteenth century Europe, which had stressed the individual's right of free thought, was intensely interested in science, concentrated on man's problems and their solutions and sought moral improvement of society without any reference to religious ideas. The new system of education gradually exposed Indian society to the theoretical and practical consequences of European liberal ideas of individualism, general good, democracy, freedom. There was a direct connection between the movement of national independence and notions of intellectual freedom, assimilated through the writings of modern European scientists and philosophers.¹ A class of liberals arose inspired by the urge to evolve a rationalised, modernised Indian society grounded on principles of truth, liberty, justice and scientific reason. As the ramifications of these principles became more and more evident in the Indian setting there was gradual and imperceptible modification of social goals and values in consonance with them. Thus, the intellectual setting consisted of modern education, unity of the English language, rationalism, liberalism, discovery of past history interpreted by a new humanistic spirit and development of nationalism.

Rediscovery of ancient Indian thought was accompanied by search for new and universally acceptable concepts of thought in India's own culture, first in the field of religion. The search was conducted through reason, in the form of active intelligence, techniques of observation, analysis, comparison and selection and the result was an interpretation of the scriptures contrary to tradition. Rammohan Roy invoked the "good sense" of his people to examine the scriptures "with a proper and moderate use of reason."² This very rationalism led to the rejection of revelation and its infallibility³

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1. cf., Milk Raj Anand, *Is There a Contemporary Indian Civilization?* p. 67: Indians were inspired by Bacon, Harvey, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Newton, Boyle, Locke, Spinoza, Dalton, Kant, Hegel, Diderot, Voltair, Mill and Burke etc.
 2. *The English Works of Raja Rammohan Roy*, p. 7.
 3. e. g., Devendranath Tagore's *Covenant of the Brahma Samaj* denied divine origin of Vedic truths, though not its historic value.

i. e., there was the collapse of theological authority in 1850 A.D., needing no long debate as in Europe.¹ The conception of natural reason as the source of religion gave rise to the argument that not any word of man but only natural intuition is the basis of Brahmaic religion. The real pioneer of rationalism in philosophy and religion, as apart from rationalism in social affairs, was Vivekanand, who rejected authority and uncritical faith in revealed word, long dominant in Indian thought. He was sceptical of even the highest religious truth not subject to verification by reason and experience. He took only that much of Vedas as agreed with reason. Ranade argued that religious beliefs and attitudes must be practical and earnest reason. It must be noted that unlike the deistic movement in England the motive for application of reason to religion was not purely intellectual viz., removal of contradiction between new knowledge of nature and religious belief, but was partly due to the need, among leading thinkers of Indian society, for giving a more adequate interpretation of their religious experience. Be the case as it may, the conviction gained ground rapidly that all things must be brought to the final judgment-seat of reason, both in the sacred and secular realms. "Every line of scripture gains by criticism. We have no other guide besides reason to distinguish revealed and non-revealed."² This general conviction derived its strength from the ancient assertion of continuous, progressive revelation, in which the Vedas were never a closed canon,³ as well as from the fact that the Śāstra was now thrown open to the independent interpretation of all classes and conditions of men, from whom it had been previously kept as a closely guarded secret.

The long-range effect of rationalistic criticism and scientific approach was not dissolution of religion, as was the case in Europe, but a revival of religion, consciously basing itself on its own highest principles of the past.⁴ Excess of indiscriminate attack on religion brought a reaction in the form of purified Vedāntism. In keeping with the historical pattern, the sects founded in the nineteenth century merged into and raised the level of the newly established conception of the universal religion of

1. *vide supra*, pp. 324-326.

2. M. K. Gandhi, Presidential Address to Indian Philosophical Congress, 1930 (Dacca: A. R. Wadia, 1930).

3. S. N. Dasgupta, "Philosophy of Dependent Emergence," C. I. P., p. 253.

4. K. M. Pannikar, *The Foundations of New India*, p. 28.

Hinduism.¹ After one or two abortive attempts² the common Vedāntic basis of Hindu religion and life was brought to the national consciousness by Vivekanand. Rationalism discovered the genuine universality of spirit in religion to be resting not on logical propositions about God, soul or immortality, since dogmas are merely symbolic and not historical or literal truths, but on spiritual experience which is the common birth-right of all men. Protestant, reformatory approach in religion stressed lack of mediation between God and man and equality of all men in reality. This rational religion was not presented as a creed derived at second-hand through medium of books or individuals (priestly class), but as derived from Vedāntic experience and conception of direct perception of God. The idea of this truly spiritual universal religion replacing the popular religion which exploited the principle of the supernatural in various forms of occultism, was the inspirational force of not a few progressive minds. The Vedāntic movement taught anew the conformity of all shades of religious belief³ to the all-embracing Advaita philosophy. As the twentieth century advanced, reorganized religion developed a truly national character and a general body of doctrines receiving universal assent.⁴

In the west, orthodox theology and the church had either ignored or controverted or persecuted scientific discovery. But an easier adjustment of religious thought and scientific knowledge was made in India. In contrast to the conflict of religion and the intellectual revolution of science in the west every aspect of modern enlightenment in India and every movement to remould society was based on the idea of doing it through religion. Scientific rationalism was largely critical of social aspects of life connected with religion and did not oppose purely theological beliefs and their implications. The reason for this was that religion was never shackled in India and retained

1. e. g., R. M. Roy first suggested the idea of universal religion. K. C. Sen wanted to make a "national religion, a universal religion, an apostolic religion" in his *New Dispensation* of 1881. And later thinkers have expanded that idea.
2. e. g., Dayanand's search for the universal religion in Śruti only and rejection of Smṛti; R. M. Roy's attempt to revive the philosophy of Vedānta which took too many different shapes to be effective. vide supra, pp. 59-61.
3. cf., H. H. Das-Gupta, *Studies in Western Influence on Nineteenth Century Bengali Poetry*, p. xxiii; *New Hindus*, sceptics, agnostics, positivists, monotheists, all found consolation and inspiration.
4. K. M. Pannikar, *The Foundations of New India*, p. 44.

the liberty which is the condition of growth; it was society which provided the fixed point necessary for such variation and became fixed and immovable¹ and was in need of reform. This development reflects the difference of emphases in religion: the contrast between the rigidity of theological dogma in the west and the rigidity of custom as exemplified in proper functioning within the established social order in India made the "growing pains in theology . . . largely western."² Religion in India sought to prove the consistency of its beliefs with the new knowledge.³ Discoveries of physical, biological and psychological sciences were not found to be antithetical to essential religious truths.⁴ The latter were connected with human experience and not committed to any theories about natural facts in such a way as to stand or fall with them. For example, the evolutionary theory might contradict the theories of creation and development of the universe, but did not affect the nature and meaning of the realization of reality. Indian thought generally and Vedānta specially held jñāna to be the highest and i. e., spiritual experience as genuine and free experience, and "did not countenance religious faith simply because of failure or limitations of science."⁵ And this acknowledgement of knowledge as the key to salvation was discovered to be akin to the spirit of modern science. Because of the emphasis on the value of truth in religion there was no extreme bifurcation and conflict of faith and reason, religion and science in India,

1. Vivekanand, Complete Works, IV, 292.

2. Thomas S. Kepler (comp.), Contemporary Religious Thought, p. 159.

3. e. g., Keshav Chandra Sen in Epistle to Indian Bretheren: "Science will be your religion . . . above the Vedas, above the Bible, astronomy, geology, botony, chemistry, anatomy and physiology are the living scriptures of God of nature, just as philosophy, logic and ethics are scriptures of the God of the soul—in the faith every thing is scientific" Vivekanand saw the triumph of human nature in science and expressed his religious and philosophical thoughts in new metaphors gleaned from scientific discoveries in physics, geology, astronomy, mathematics, biology. Dayanand was eager to prove that ancient scriptures far from opposing science, themselves contained truth of modern science. Aurobindo found room for theories of evolution and relativity in his spiritual vision.

4. vide Vivekanand, op. cit., IV, 295, 296: The Hindu sees that under search-light of modern thought his own philosophy alone stands. He does not have to torture texts or commit intellectual dishonesty to save his religion. All that is weak in his scripture may be admitted so, was so meant by ancients to help the weak. They discovered an all pervading, ever-expanding system of religion which can accomodate all that has been discovered in the realm of matter. Hindu begins to appreciate that scientific discoveries so disastrous to limited schemes of religion, are rediscov-eries on the plane of intellect and sense-consciousness of truths his ancestors discovered in intuition and superconscious plane.

5. S. N. Dasgupta, Religion and the Rational Outlook, p. 10.

as had been the case in Christian culture. Since religious teachers had never despised reason though appealing to a deeper consciousness, since the priestly class had monopolised knowledge even of theoretical and inferential type found in natural and social sciences and had not combated it in the name of religion, that traditional attitude was conducive to easy adjustment to the findings of science. In fact, among the makers of modern Indian thought can be counted many religious thinkers who were actually members of monastic orders.

Impetus to change from medieval to the modern age came from the critical outlook on the past, aroused by awakening of reason and scientific judgment. Rammohan Roy brought out new canons of criticism and interpretation from Hindu thought to liberalise further the nineteenth century rationalism. His followers conceded that the religious condition like all other aspects of the world is a process of development and can be evaluated in its historical stages.¹ Scriptures might claim to come from God, but they are only human documents, conventions and devices of seers who found it necessary to lay down truth to enable men to live more abundantly. The case for verbal inspiration or divine dictation was no longer acceptable. This spirit of critical evaluation and discovery was turned against old laws, beliefs, institutions, ethical norms and practices. This was the revival of the ancient spirit of criticism after many centuries and it recognised that truth might be known by new approaches as well as by old paths. Scientific research of ancient texts and reconstruction of history was started by western scholars, and this historical method resulted in rediscovery of India's achievements in practical and intellectual spheres and of the unity of the religious culture in history. But historical criticism of religion did not centre round questions of historical validity of miracles and prophecies underlying revelation.² In fact, the non-historical nature of religious truth was adduced as evidence for its universality.³ The reaction to scientific rationalism was unlike the reaction in the

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1. e. g., Keshav Chandra Sen used principles of evolutionary process. There is a law of history of religion as of institutions and beliefs, by which religion is moulded.
 2. vide supra, pp. 325-326.
 3. vide Vivekanand, op. cit., III, 183, 184: Historicity of founders being doubted historical religions tumble down. Vedantic sages were only discoverers and preachers of those principles which they illustrated in themselves. Not through persons but through principles can humanity be brought to one way of thinking.

west because of the nature of the Indian religion which was discovered to be "a quest not a creed." Such controversies as the one which raged in Europe over the historicity of Christ would seem to a spiritually minded Indian largely a waste of time. According to Aurobindo, so long as we can know by spiritual experience the inner Christ, live uplifted in the light of his teaching and escape from the yoke of the natural law by the atonement of man with God, historical questions do not matter.

In the authentically dynamic traditional spirit, dormant for many centuries, of adjustment of dharma to the development of knowledge and to the changing conditions of society in every age, serious thinkers insisted that advances in reason and science must be incorporated into new forms of social ideals and social relationships i. e., humanism necessitated change in the patterns of thought as well as in patterns of human relationships in modern times. Search for sound principles of action led to "modernisation" of religion, which showed a strong socio-ethical tendency. The rational minded reformers refused to compromise with intellectual and practical shortcomings of religion, such as polytheism, idolatry, caste, superstition etc. Nor was their rationalism purely theoretical, but led to the practical removal of many irrationalities in social relations and activities i. e., there was no isolationism of reforms in societal reshaping of India, but it was an all-round approach. At the same time, the scientific spirit rejected monasticism and insisted upon interdependence and mutual obligations of religion and society. The character of the religious renaissance was to discover how best religion could be useful for society i. e., a functional view of religion developed and the tendency was to shape religion according to political and economic movements for social betterment, individual welfare. From among the Vedāntic Prasthānas the Gītā was interpreted along lines of socio-moral idealism, with emphasis on its activistic teaching. Rationalism brought into the foreground and reinterpreted the social content and values of religion, and united both religious and secular minds round the notion of the dignity of the individual, expressed through the moral outlook. It might give rise to agnosticism in regard to religion or metaphysics, but was never negative or destructive in regard to the operation of ethical standards in society, though there might be a difference as to the standards themselves.

Secularism in the west is associated with a deliberate attempt to formulate a philosophy in terms of non-religious categories. It was a movement directed against religious teaching, against the influence of religion on public life, against the special status of religious organization i. e., deliberately anti-religious in its bias. In India, rationalistic reform of social customs and institutions began within the fold of religion but gradually came to the conviction that though historically connected with religion these were socio-legal phenomena, subject to change. The emphasis was on the necessity of separating religion from customs and institutions in order to reform society. The specific argument was that social institutions had no religious sanctions.¹ This was a move in the direction of secularisation of life as interest in religion was decreased by such a separation. Later the conviction became wide-spread that social reform is hindered by religious approach, and better achieved by remaining altogether aloof from religious organization. Shift of attention to political activity retarded both social and religious influence. And liberal ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity rather than religious principles were made the ground of later demands for reform. Moderate and extremist political thinking disagreed about the relative priorities of socio-religious reform on the one hand and political rights and freedom on the other. While it would not be correct to say that modern nationalism replaced religion as a chief factor in human and group relations,² it became clear that religious ideology counted less and less as the basis of social life.³ In the twentieth century the view prevailed that religion should not enter into principles of social policy and state action which are motivated by the desire to give justice to all sections of society. The secular Indian state allowed for the functional importance of religion in the individual's life but not in the social reorganization.⁴ Secularism was discovered

1. e. g., Keshav Chandra Sen agitated for secularisation of marriage and the Civil Marriage Act, 1872, was the outcome; Dayanand's critical appraisal of caste dissociated its present shape and functioning from Vedic religion and related it to the functional principle; Vivekanand argued that no destruction of religion was necessary to improve society, whose state is not due to religion but due to misapplication of religion, which could be proved from our old books.
2. vide Baron, Modern Nationalism and Religion, p. 7.
3. Ronald W. Scott, Social Ethics in Modern Hinduism, p. 12.
4. cf., M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, August 24, 1947: The state should undoubtedly be secular, everyone should be entitled to possess his religion, religion is a personal matter.

to be an element of the Indian tradition in two ways. On its mundane and practical side religion covered every aspect of life and its prescriptions were based on psychological and social realities of the past. On its spiritual side it supported toleration based on the conviction that others may have a different approach to life's goal equally valid for them.¹ Respect for all religions was part of the traditional outlook² which issued in the idea of "equality of all religions" in modern times. Thus Indian secularism did not exalt irreligion, nor was it tinged with the anti-religious bias of western scientific rationalism, rather "the religious impartiality of the Indian state is . . . in accord with ancient religious tradition of India . . . based on the principle of diversity in unity."³ Hence, transcendence of the purely this-worldly or purely material view is a feature of secularistic attitude in India. At its worst, this means that secularists whose professions are not logically founded tend, under stress and strain of crises, to fall back on remedial rituals and practices of traditional religion. But at its best, it means that even the most thoughtful secularists do not necessarily find themselves antipathetic to spirit. "A purely secular philosophy of life is considered enough by most of us—but it must have the background of spiritual values and standards of behaviour and this is the realm of religion."⁴

It will be noted that scientific rationalism produced consequences in the field of social relationships and actions as well as in the field of religious belief and practice resembling, in certain respects, the happenings in the west. No long debate ensued on implications of particular scientific theories in regard to the nature of God, man and origin of the world in India, but the general effect was to rationalise, secularise, socialise and moralise religion as in the west. The differences were due to the peculiar nature and form of religion and tradition on which the scientific outlook operated in India. The narrowing of the operation of the religious principle in social

1. vide B. G., IV, 11: *ये यथा साम् प्रपद्यन्ते तान्स्तथैव भजामहेति।*

2. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, Occasional Speeches, First series, pp. 393, 394: Ashoka's rock edict XII: "One who disparages another's religion to glorify his own over all others injures his religion. Verily concord of all religions is meritorious, स्वसाध्यः." Akbar declared: "Various religions are divine treasures entrusted to us by God. We must love them as such. It should be our firm faith that every religion is blessed by Him. The Eternal King showers His favours on all men . . ."

3. S. Radhakrishnan, The Recovery of Faith, p. 202.

4. J. L. Nehru, Unity of India, pp. 179-180.

life was counterbalanced by deletion of the more irrational theoretical and practical aberrations which had grown within its fold, and by the discovery that Hinduism, far from being a primitive tribal ("national") religion as it was regarded by its critics in the nineteenth century, is "one of the higher religions" of the world.

Attitudes Towards Religion

It is idle to try to effect successful social change without reliable knowledge of varying effects on religious attitudes in a given culture pattern, brought about by the introduction of a different methodology and outlook. At the same time, it is difficult to form an exact judgment of the religious condition of a society, involving, as it does, the knowledge of theological, philosophical and literary thought and effort, as well as the religious beliefs and practices of the people. A further complication is created by the "hospitable" treatment given to every type and shade of religion in India, so that blind superstition coexists with extremest rationalism and atheism. In the past the religious and cultural difference between sections of society was not so much of quality of knowledge as of information and opportunity, but the intellectual revolution of the nineteenth century bifurcated the educated from the masses both in degree and kind of knowledge. And even within the ranks of the intelligensia there developed different attitudes towards religion ranging from complete adherence to radical reformism or rejection. As the agents of change members of a society are psychologically subject to the necessity of keeping the stability of their personality, therefore, there is differential rate of change of views and parts of culture brought about by acceptance of science and its instruments.¹

The rationalistic scepticism of nineteenth century European thought was as destructive in its influence on the Indian intelligensia as it had been in Europe. The first evidence of the weakening of religious faith was criticism of religious foundations of social institutions and practices, and attempt to disconnect society and culture from religion. Indifference to observances of religion combined with absorption in political, social or economic activity. Avoidance of fundamental questions beyond reach of

1. Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, p. 294.

scientific rationalism and concentration on social problems as a moral duty followed. In time, politicians, economists, scientists and even reformers found religion no longer necessary in working out their ideal of good society. They thought it neither helpful in the solution of empirical needs of modern life, nor conducive to development of modern knowledge. Its dogmas were obstructive to curiosity and free thought; its belief in supernatural agency led to social irresponsibility and hindered progress.¹ The intellectual rationale of religion carried no conviction to them, the moral rationale of religious duties also became meaningless to them, they rebelled against religious discipline and allowed it to fade without replacing it by a different religious discipline. A limited number of intellectuals, not confined to any particular section of society, were, thus, totally alienated from beliefs, gods, temples and rites of religion. It is to be noted that the scepticism resulting from secular approach meant not only decline of religious faith, but also loss of faith in the highest reality of philosophy and disinclination to devote one's energies to attempt its realization.² The reason for this is that Vedāntic idealism is thought to lead to the dissolution of the self by the feeling of oneness with the principle of the universe without a compensating increase in the knowledge of that universe, while the modern intellectual is more interested in discovery, exploration and even the contemplation of the yet unknown principles governing the universe by retention of the boundaries of the concrete self. Metaphysical-intuitive thought may lead to the Impersonal Absolute, but critical-analytical thought of science allows its acceptance only as an intellectual assumption and not as an article of belief.³ Even those who do not deny the validity of Vedāntic idealism are discontented with it, because, while the growth of science, industry and technology necessitates the idea of the reality of the world and energetic action in it, the doctrine of the sole reality of God is conjoined to the false philosophy of Māyāvāda and the deterministic doctrine of karma, which produce despair, helplessness and pessimism. The need of the modern age is for a practical outlook and new kinds of activity and Vedāntic fatalism signally fails to meet it. Therefore, the "idealist view of life"

1. cf., J. L. Nehru, *Discovery of India*, p. 622.

2. Beatrice Pitney Lamb, *India, a World in Transition*, p. 123.

3. cf., Nehru, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

is rejected by the pragmatic minded rationalist.¹

There is a thesis² that in the past the dualism of impersonal metaphysical reality, on the one hand, and the positivistic-secular spirit, on the other, penetrating deeply into the popular mind gave India a split personality. On the contrary, it would be more correct to believe that dualism is in reality a modern phenomenon arising from the attempt of scientific-secular minds to break away from the integrated outlook and the ideal of harmonious personality of traditional religion. The reason for this is that for the majority of the educated the coming of science did not mean the adoption of the genuinely critical temper or the acceptance of scientific rationale other than a superficial, mechanistic approach to life's problems. The spirit of inquiry in rationalistic minds lacks strength to carry through the change of outlook to a satisfactory conclusion because it attempts to divorce itself from its cultural, religious roots instead of taking the latter into account. In this process it is torn between dharmas of traditional outlook and the new rationalistic tradition being created since the nineteenth century, with the consequence of mental frustration. Dualistic thinking or compartmentalisation of antithetical ideas and notions is the expression of this unresolved conflict e. g., belief in free-will coexists with fatalistic belief in determination by the course of stars;³ belief in the reality of the world coexists with belief in its illusory nature; belief in bettering the human condition in this life coexists with fatalistic conception of karma and punarjanma; and effort to raise the standard of living coexists with the belief that economic progress is "mere" materialism.

New notions of scientific rationalism have only inspired a few individuals of the educated class, but have not reached deep down to the level of mass consciousness. For the larger part of society there is no rational system of thought and purposes, for it is still at the level of habitual conduct, traditional motives. The majority lack the practical initiative and intellectual expression for change of outlook, and continue to derive their strength from the traditional pattern of behaviour which covers every

1. cf., K. M. Pamikar, *Hinduism and the Modern World*, p. 83.

2. vide R. M. Lohia, *The Great War in Hinduism*.

3. cf., R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 347: Ambiguous attitude to science, even while science knocked at our door the sacred almanac with its star-readings held the ground.

aspect of their mundane life. This does not affect their sense of personal freedom adversely, hence there is the absence in the masses of that type of frustration which afflicts the intelligensia as a result of unresolved conflict of tradition and new knowledge.

"Hinduism abundantly vigorous many-sided, over-ridingly important to the majority, misunderstanding to think that India approaches religious matters casually."¹ As against the alienation of a few from religion there is the phenomenon of growth of cultless or non-sectarian and non-dogmatic religious faith. Religion, shorn in the nineteenth century, of its anti-social and unspiritual practices and beliefs, has successfully kept its hold on the non-intellectual public. They do not regard it as a mere appendage but as a necessity of life. The force of bhakti is strong and still connected with egalitarian ideas in social life, as it has been throughout history. The fundamental convictions of the masses are still: the belief in the supremacy of Ātmā; reality of another life, karma and its phala; a philosophical view of the transient character of life, which gives rise to resignation towards life's ills, some of which are considered to be curable and others not. Among the community of intellectuals only an insignificant minority call themselves atheists. Unlike the west where religious indifference is widespread among intellectuals, in India the majority have no hesitation in openly exhibiting the powerful hold of religion upon themselves.² There is decreasing stress on ritual, but continued devotion to religious observances such as morning exercises, daily reading of scripture etc., and devotion to religious teachers, holy men from whom guidance is sought by their educated disciples.³ Religion rather than any secular faith is still the most effective source of comfort, solace and saving experience in life. The role of the religious man has been vitally significant in the formation of the world-view in the past, and present consciousness continues to be moulded by the wisdom of the long line of religious guides. The doctrine of āśramas is regarded by some as an anachronistic superstition. But its powerful hold on the Indian

1. Beatrice Pitney Lamb, *India, a World in Transition*, p. 123.

2. Edward Shils, *The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation*, p. 64.

3. K. M. Pannikar, *The Foundations of New India*, p. 244.

mind is seen in their attitude towards the last two āśramas. Few may observe it in its literal form, yet in an attenuated and secularised form the āśramic image represents the right pattern of life, for many preserve a disposition for that life in the form of desire to go into the "forest" and admiration for those who take the leap or for those activities in which the qualities of the last two āśramas, such as transcendence of the self, detachment, renunciation, escape from routine and compromise of mundane life, find expression.¹ Another proof of the continuing power of the religious outlook can be discovered in the propensity to ask ultimate questions and to disquietude in the face of "antinomies of life."² The sense of ineffable transcendent power in the self or in the universe or what is called the "sense of the numinous" pervades the Indian consciousness. Thus the spiritual reference remains valid for a vast majority either in the form of traditional religious belief and conduct or in new ways thought out by individuals for themselves.

Members of a society are under the influence of a deep, subtle and all-pervading process of enculturation below the level of consciousness. The Indian "climate of opinion" has been formed by elements of Hindu religious thought, to which significant additions have been made from other indigenous and foreign cults and religions. Leaving aside the question of mutual influence for the moment, it may be asserted that the religious point of view of Hinduism affects all groups e. g., Christians, Muslims, Parsis etc.³ And its reinterpretation in the light of science and scholarship has only strengthened the conviction of the necessity of retaining the Hindu base of traditional outlook. Doctrines of Vedānta, as the essence of religion, may not be understood by the uneducated masses, are rejected by certain schools, but still form the basis of many attitudes and assumptions. Vedānta gives to each what he is fitted to receive and is variously interpreted by minds at different levels of culture and intelligence.⁴ Religious presuppositions unconsciously colour the reasoning not only of the avowedly religious but even of the avowedly secular minds.⁵ That is, those who explicitly reject

1. Shils, op. cit., p. 66.

2. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 2.

3. cf., R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 66.

4. cf., Percival Griffiths, *Modern India*, pp. 26, 33.

5. vide *Conversations with Nehru*, pp. 30-31.

religion still submit to its sway, not by way of accepting or rejecting single ideas or dogmas, but by showing its effect in the general direction it gives to life and ideas.

Perhaps it is more in their religiosity than in any other sphere that the Indian intellectuals evince their rootedness in what is central to their culture. It is no exaggeration to say that it is impossible for an Indian of Hindu descent to cease to be a Hindu.¹

The persistence of the religious spirit and of religion as a social force can be understood if it is remembered that the fact of falling short of ideals in attitudes and conduct does not negate the ideals, nor exhausts their meaningfulness in relation to all mental operations of men. Thus the general and long-range faith of the majority remains unshaken inspite of negative attitudes or actual violations of religious norms of thought and action in daily life.

In the traditional outlook no distinction was made between internal and external aspects of religion, except at philosophical levels. But the critical-analytical modern mind searches for the essential elements in the mass of "accidental" or "inessential" elements constituting the total structure of present religion. Increasingly a distinction is made by thoughtful people, not always clearly, between religion and spirituality, the first being equated to the external paraphernalia and accretions around religion, and the second with its experiential aspect and resulting state of mind and character in the individual. Even the extremest sceptic is willing to concede the necessity of the latter while rejecting the former.

It was in the nineteenth century that the Indian spiritual culture first came to be contrasted from western materialistic culture.² Broadly, the difference of western and eastern characters was discovered to be the difference between action and contemplation, rationalism and mysticism; and the question was asked as to whether they were absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable or complementary and reconcilable; and in the latter case should they be coordinated in a balanced way or should one be subordinated to the other.³ Vivekanand first discovered this difference but he was also the

1. Shils, op. cit., p. 64.

2. cf., Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 61; C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 299; F. S. C. Northrope, *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 434.

3. cf., René Guénon, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 48.

first to insist that a combination of spirituality and material progress was necessary for the growth and reformation of Indian society.

In the twentieth century, strong exception is taken against this classification which has been taken up by many apologists of Indian culture and society. The criticism is that characterisation of "spirituality" is mere self-deception because it cannot be proved that spirituality was operating on a wide-scale in social life in the past.¹ And in modern times a majority of people do desire the material achievements of the west, even while deprecating its "materialistic values." Indian character and philosophy is equated to spirituality simply by way of compensating for lack of worldly goods.² But it is a fallacy to conclude that material backwardness is equivalent to spirituality,³ just as it is a fallacy to conclude that material prosperity is equivalent to lack of spirituality. The general feeling is that a connection can be established, logically and factually, between material affluence and spirituality. Under these conditions, the facile distinction of the scientific materialism of the west and spiritual-contemplative values of the east is outdated and persists only due to the spirit of rationalising pride in the Indian mind, or due to the fact of intellectual lag in which thinking in every field, political, economic and social, pays lip-service to religious terminology due to lack of any other effective substitute.⁴ According to one explanation the description of the Indian mind as addicted to religion was an invention by the west for its own purpose of exploiting material affairs, and the religious or spiritual label is merely a popular error, fiction, myth or legend.⁵

In the first place, all those who have supported this classification have not made spirit and matter exclusive of each other, nor equated the first with the east and the second with the west categorically. It is not denied that spiritual power is the

1. K. M. Pannikar, *The State and the Citizen*, pp. 16-17.

2. vide J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1949-1953*, p. 367.

3. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Freedom and Culture*, p. 54.

4. vide Mulk Raj Anand, *Is There a Contemporary Indian Civilization?* p. 118: The intellectual set which is against uniformity of technological, urbanised, bureaucratic social order is keeping room for "spiritual restlessness" to allow for eccentricity or just hanker after clever use of phrases, mere logic-chopping to compete with western philosophy.

5. D. P. Mukerjee, *Modern Indian Culture*, p. 5.

key to western progress, be it tangible or intangible.¹ On the other hand, there is the conviction that Indian society and culture were also built upon the foundation of idealistic principles. But to demand identity of experience and categories of interpretation in the west and India, to prove even the common spirituality of the human race, is irrational.

All proofs lie in realization. Europe cannot think that the East found some deep basis of reality on which to build our institutions. But civilization is no nebulous spirit of abstract speculation—but involved an inner sense of vision of infinite in all finite things.²

Nor is the acceptance of "materialism" contained in the authentically scientific spirit and approach considered to be incompatible with truths of spirituality, rather is the former one aspect of the latter.

Were one to keep in mind that man's progress is not uniform but multi-form, judgments of superiority and inferiority of cultures would lose their weight in regard to the development of different aspects of society and individual. Were one to give up thinking in unfounded terms of unbridgeable gap of spiritual east and materialistic west and, instead, think in terms of the difference between traditional outlook in which the religious element predominates and the modern in which the secular element predominates, and the greater prevalence of the former in India and of the latter in the west, the force of the objection would be abated.³ For the former distinction may be discounted as a product of "rationalisation" of the Indian mind or by the proof that ancient India was developed in material goods and secular knowledge, vitality, power and joy of creative life,⁴ but the latter distinction remains a valid one. Conceding the fact that religion and spirituality are not identical it can still be asserted that the continuance of religion as the giver of meaning to life for a large majority implies that the belief remains unquestioned in principle that the proper relation of spirit and matter is that of subordination of the latter to the former.

1. vide R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 161; M. K. Gandhi, *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, August 3, 1934.

2. R. N. Tagore, *Nationalism*, p. 63.

3. In making this point the intention is not to insist that this present difference of emphasis in outlook is necessarily permanent or unchangeable.

4. vide Mukerjee, *loc. cit.*; Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, pp. 70, 226.

Secondly, serious Indian thinkers estimating the scientific outlook and its consequences are convinced that this so called "western" character is not a rounded whole in itself. This accounts for the fact that while welcoming science as an instrument of higher knowledge and human welfare, they distrust the extreme "materialism" and "secularism" in which it operates. The critical attitude is certainly directed towards the deficiencies of Indian outlook and society but also towards the good and bad aspects of scientific social development in the west. Modern doubt regarding future progress of man even in the west implicitly carries the recognition that the ultimate test of progress is not science and technological advance, but moral and spiritual growth.¹ And similar questioning in India is really thinking beyond scientific progress to the conclusion that the purely scientific solution of social-human problems can never be ultimate.² Therefore, doubts are not always to be dismissed as anti-scientific obscurantism, or retreats from science in revivalism, but as post-scientific developments, a shift to another, inescapable level of life's problems.³ "Spirituality" or "philosophy" appeals to the Indian temperament and tradition. Where this is not merely "escapism" or "rationalisation" it should need no justification or apology. Because knowledge of both the religious tradition of India and the operation of scientific rationalism in western society points to this conclusion that it is "uneconomical" to reject "spirit" or "philosophy" in the name of science and then to be forced to return to it when science fails to produce the synoptic view or the integrated life.⁴

Some Indian thinkers have not been able to escape the temptation to regard "spirit" as everything and to deprecate efforts to improve external and material conditions of life. But intellectual honesty demands admission of the fact that, in the final analysis, the values which the past "spiritual" philosophy of India stressed covered only one part of reality, and the other is precisely that part which the scientific mind has investigated in its physical and social sciences. The critic is justified in arguing that over emphasis on Indian "spirituality" fails to take into account the

1. *vide supra*, pp. 343-348.

2. *cf.*, Mukl Raj Anand, *Is There a Contemporary Indian Civilization?* p. 134.

3. *vide infra*, pp. 446-447.

4. *cf.*, Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 5.

one-sidedness of this character. Realistically, the problem is to maintain the proper superiority of "spirituality," together with the obvious fact that all men do need material satisfaction. Hence, "we in India must realize that provision of physical necessities is not materialism, but the precondition of civilized life. But the west also must learn the 'wisdom of the East.'"¹ If India failed to achieve harmony because it tried to unite people under the form and not the spirit of religion, then the scientific approach also suffers from the same fault of social disruption because it tries to unite people under social and material conditions rather than by moral and spiritual laws.² The "scientific outlook," too, can suffer from narrowness in building its programmes on merely tangible aspects of life. "Life based upon mere science is attractive to some men, it has all the characteristics of sport, it feigns seriousness, but it is not profound."³

The problem before many thoughtful minds is how can India adapt herself to the modern outlook without losing anything of real value in her ancient heritage? In a general way, many who think in terms of a radical transformation of Indian life question the validity of "spirit," which was paramount in traditional context, as a source of knowledge of the world and its interpretation in the modern context. In a specific way, the question also arises which operative values to take from the "spiritual" traditional outlook, how to take, can they be taken out of their historical setting of the social experience of the past and be blended with present needs?⁴ Another difficulty is that integration cannot be forced, at the same time adaptation of old to the new does require an attack on old attitudes and beliefs.

Ideals and values are variable in degree due to contact between different minds within a particular society, and variable also in kind due to contact between different societies having different interests and activities. In the first situation ideals, as modifications of one original conception or type, exist side by side. And even in the second situation there is parallelism of cultural ideals, one of which may spread over

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1. G. L. Mehta, *Understanding India*, p. 27.
 2. R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 243.
 3. R. N. Tagore, *Nationalism*, p. 76.
 4. Anand, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

large areas of society, not by extermination of earlier ideals, but as a resultant product of two cultures.¹ The success of the new outlook and idea-system depends upon its reasonableness, not in the sense of being really wise or otherwise, but in the sense of appearing right in relation to the present needs of society. The scientific-rationalistic outlook appeared more reasonable and tended to displace the traditional religious outlook because of its greater relevancy to the human demand for material satisfactions. Secondly,² there is the factor of prestige i. e., the new ideas must come from an acceptable authority. The scientific outlook had established its validity by practical results in European history, therefore, the authority of the "superior" western culture seemingly established its indubitable superiority over the traditional religious outlook.³

Possibility of synthesis of religious outlook and methods with the goals and results of scientific rationalism lies in the evidence of history, which, throughout, gives proof of flexibility, adaptability as the explanation of the survival of Indian culture.⁴ The conclusion is drawn: "synthesis is India's manifest destiny."⁵ The synthetic approach to life is not only a fact but a matter of principle, since it is discovered to be the essential nature of reality itself. Philosophy supports this genius for synthesis: the belief that spiritual insight is superior to logic and that all things are in ultimate unity gives rise to a universalism which holds the ultimate good of man to be above all restrictions of time, place and culture. This predisposes the Indian mind to assimilate the good from other cultures, to freely accept new ideas and to reconcile on the intellectual plane and even on the social and political.⁶

The need for synthesis is accepted by all leaders of Indian thought on the ground that no people can pursue their own lives unaffected by others. The injection of the new outlook and idea-system into the Indian world-view is to be welcomed as a liberating force for the human mind and body, necessary for all-round development of man.

1. S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, p. 357.

2. Edward J. Urwick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 133.

3. cf., F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, p. 266.

4. cf., Percival Griffiths, *Modern India*, pp. 17-18.

5. Kaval Motwani, *Science and Society in India*, p. 64.

6. cf., Vera Michales Dean, *New Patterns of Democracy in India*, pp. 2, 13.

The West is necessary to the East. We are complementary to each other because of our different outlooks upon life Therefore if it be true that the spirit of the West has come upon our fields in the guise of a storm it is never-the-less scattering live seeds that are immortal.¹

Admittedly the unity of outlook and life attained can be of different kinds.² But it is not sufficient to attain unity only at the primary level of natural and mechanical resources by utilisation of the scientific method. Unity at the secondary level of personal, aesthetic and religious values requires a blending of old tradition and new knowledge. Furthermore, this points to a fusion at the tertiary level of the still more subtle mental unity of the intangible realms of theology, metaphysics, pure science, which level of unity of outlook may be attained by very few minds indeed.

Behind the demand for synthesis is the recognition that the lag of individual and social conscience behind material progress is more harmful to social advancement than any physical, political or economic deficiency i. e., a balance between objective and subjective elements is essential.

A union of the spiritual and other fields of life is difficult and yet I have often wondered if there is any real hope for the world unless there is some kind of combination of the two, . . . what is lacking inspite of scientific progress is the spiritual element, that which holds and restrains the great power let loose by the discoveries of science.³

It is true that the consciousness of the moral and spiritual lag does not have the same practical connotation or psychological overtones as in the west, since the material progress which India has to parallel is not yet an actuality. Yet the awareness of the danger of such a lag does give urgency to the problem of synthesis.

Synthesis is also possible because science is universal. The method and products of scientific rationalism can be detached from the cultural context of the west and transported into Indian conditions.⁴ Objective observation shows that its development in Indian society and culture is not likely to follow exactly the lines of the historic pattern of the west. It is agreed that contact of cultures must not mean transformation of Indian outlook into a pale copy of the western. The distinctive self of India

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1. R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 15.
 2. Gidding classifies three kinds of cultural unity in *Principles of Sociology* viz., primary, secondary, tertiary.
 3. J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1953-1957*, p. 426.
 4. vide Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, p. 294.

(swadharma, swabhāva) must not be lost or deliberately discarded as totally worthless. To learn western science and technology, but not to become like Europeans i. e., to retain individuality, separateness of being by retention of the special cultural heritage, of which religion is the key, is the ideal of many.¹ "To live in character means to live in integrity with culture, at the highest level of discrimination and perceptiveness."²

Admittedly such a synthesis must be not only intellectually satisfying, but also emotionally inspiring and moving in order to influence action.³ As a matter of actual fact only a few have been able to assimilate the spiritual-moral values from the cultural heritage and to harmonise them with economic and social values of the modern age by using science objectively, but they have been makers of new religion and society. Their synthesis served as the inspirational force, carrying the process of creation of new society further by gradual stages, even though they did not follow any one line of synthesis. Modification of traditional outlook and culture was forced on the nineteenth century intellectuals because "where as the contact of the west with other countries has been external, in India the west has, so to say, entered into the very bone and marrow of the east."⁴ Rammohan Roy's synthesis based on his knowledge of many languages and literatures included science, reason, humanism and the essence of Vedānta as the basis of Indian progress. The middle path prefigured by him, arising from the wisdom and resilience of Indian tradition, showed the way of accepting western science and social ideals without giving up the deepest insights of Indian society. The twentieth century thinkers have also been modernists and reconcilers since they were convinced that the highest spiritual truths, as distinct from narrownesses of social practices and institutions, would never obstruct a genuine and organic assimilation of worthwhile values of western culture. Two qualifications must be admitted in regard to their syntheses. Firstly, the union of religious ideas with scientific ideas and liberal humanistic values is incomplete, uncertain and not widely accepted in society. Secondly, the

1. cf., Aurobindo, *The Unity of India*, p. 158.

2. Bernard Eugene Meland, *Faith and Culture*, p. 11.

3. cf., Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

4. G. K. Gokhale to Universal Races Conference, London, 1911, quoted by K. M. Pannikar in *The State and the Citizen*, p. 21.

momentum of the reformed religion of nineteenth century having appreciably slowed down, the acceptance of new ideas and values stands in danger of becoming merely uncritical and imitative without reference to Hindu cultural elements or to presently existent realities.¹ It was Tagore who revived the idea of fusing vital elements of tradition with inner forms of west, a genuine unity of science and spirituality summed up in his mantra drawn from the Upaniṣads, *असतो मा सद्गमय*.² Gandhi made his religion practical, connecting it with social, secular activity in order to establish the ideal of a better world. Nehru achieved a synthesis through historical insight and stress on science and humanism. Other intellectuals³ have also achieved rationalistic syntheses on a religious basis, but along positivistic lines. The modern idealism represented by the practical object of attaining human welfare is shown to be in line with the ancient idealism of the doctrine of puruṣārtha, in their speculations. Whereas the western enlightenment tended to reject or to ignore the intangible-unseen in determining the truth of the tangible-seen, Indian rationalism attempts to link the deepest experiences of spiritual life with scientific, rationalistic, humanistic goals.⁴ Betterment of the world, spiritualisation of the world community is combined with the goal of salvation. It is true to say that "the most significant feature of Indian social life is the combination of what Max Lerner calls the metaphysic of secular promise with a desire for ultimate spiritual liberation."⁵

It is necessary to note the difference even among those who adopt a balanced approach to the problem of synthesis. The stress keeps shifting between external and internal elements of the ideal syntheses presented. Some emphasise the vital elements of tradition and religion as the operative principle of this synthesis, while others emphasise the predominance of the scientific element i. e., transformation must be mainly through science, though the Indian spiritual values and liberal modern ideals

1. cf., Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 194.

2. *Towards Universal Man*, p. 243.

3. e. g., Bhagwandas, Coomarswamy, Kodanda Rao etc.

4. vide J. L. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 626: It is, therefore, with the temper and approach of science, allied to philosophy and with reverence for all that lies beyond that we must face life. Thus we may develop an integral vision of life which embraces in its wide scope the past, present, with all their heights and depths and look with serenity towards the future.

5. K. M. Pannikar, *The Unity of India*, p. 244.

must be harmonised with it. Similarly, some (e. g., Gandhi) view the present and future as a continuous pattern of harmony with the past, while others (e. g., Nehru) aim at a more decisive break with the past in order to be free from its evils.¹

There are periods in the history of a nation when it attempts to break away from its traditional beliefs and customs and to direct its life by new values and goals. But attempts at a complete break from the historical heritage are bound to fail because no society can start its life from a "clean slate" i. e., free from the burden of the past in terms of racial memory and historical traditions. Every culture is so laden with a "qualitative, meaning-complex" arising from conflicts, discoveries, resolutions, hopes of the by-gone generations that the attempt to dissociate from the structure of past experience leads to cultural disorientation or breach of a sense of continuity in the individual's mind. On the notion of "continuity of culture" two misconceptions are: that the future is "mere" continuation of the past; that continuity and renewal can be completely overlooked. For instance, the first effect of the new learning in India was to create the attitude, "Breakdown everything old and raise in its stead what is new."² As a reaction to this there was a swing to the other extreme viz., revival of old forms of thought and social patterns in their "primitive purity." The fact is that there is a deterministic element in social progress since the past does exercise an influence, but there is freedom in as much as present choice of goals and values decides which element of the past will become actively influential in shaping the future. Or it may be understood in the following way: the starting point of change viz., past heritage, sets some sort of limits on the possible range of choices and changes in the present. Moreover, were there total discontinuity i. e., lack of living tradition, any reconstruction would be artificial and unenduring, since it is self-evident that one can only build where there is something real in existence.³ Hence, the extreme radicalism which attempts "to form autonomous decisions" is deflected by the still influential tradition to give results not exactly foreseen.⁴ "In history there is no revolution

1. Frank Moraes, *India Today*, p. 10.

2. Slogan of Hindu College, 1817.

3. René Guénon, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 39.

4. Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, p. 148.

that is not a restoration."¹

The notion of total discontinuity being untenable, it was doubtful, both in principle and practice, that the Indian society could break with past social, ethical, intellectual and aesthetic values and forms upon adopting the scientific outlook and approach to social development. The nineteenth century illustrates the truth of this principle: because beginning with headlong preference of intellectual minds for anything new it ended in innate, obstinate refusal to be a party to its own cultural annihilation.² All serious modern thinkers have adopted a balanced view towards the past, regarding its achievements, not as immutable and absolutely true for all times, but as something to be continuously selected from and remoulded in the light of new experience. Present ideals and values are sought to be affiliated, negatively and positively, with the past ones. The above conclusion stands notwithstanding difference of degree in attachment to the past inheritance exhibited among thinkers.³

Some might deny that scientific technological knowledge can be grasped in terms of familiar religious tradition and values, because the latter are anachronisms in the modern age. But the advantage of this translation or synthesis far outweighs its disadvantages. For when the people transform the new knowledge and concepts into the mould of ancient and beloved wisdom the danger of lack of spontaneity, artificial manipulation and degradation of both the old and the new forms is obviated.⁴

If the aim be the building of an integrated personality in an integrated society, both the scientific and the traditional outlooks can contribute different elements to bring about this result. Positive, purposeful synthesis requires a sense of man's affinity with reality, and this is one of the significant truths contained in the traditional thought. It teaches that matter and spirit grow out of one reality; moral and physical laws of development are similar, and man must understand both parts of his

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1. Chesterton quoted by A. H. Silver in *Religion in a Changing World*, p. 196; cf., Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 164; Horace: *naturum expellas furca tamen usque recurrat*, you may throw nature out with a pitch-fork but it will keep coming back.
 2. Harandra Mohan Das-Gupta, *Studies in Western Influence on Nineteenth Century Bengali Poetry*, p. x.
 3. *vide supra*, pp. 376-377.
 4. Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, p. 312.

nature for self-fulfilment. The universe is so coordinated that the self-fulfilment of one does not negate the self-fulfilment of another. Rationalistic, humanistic ideals of individual liberty, equality, brotherhood, economic plenitude, social justice, are supported by religion through its central ideal of spiritual freedom and oneness.

Perhaps, historically, tradition was not linked with such socio-economic values, but far from being antithetical to these values it is seen to be complementary to them on the spiritual plane.¹ Philosophy and religion are uniquely consistent with scientific trends² and no compartmentalisation of religious faith and scientific reason need be called for.

The modern Indian mind is under obligation to harmonise the finest elements of its classical Vedāntic heritage with the scientific spirit in all spheres of thought and action and of spreading this synoptic view throughout all sections of society.³

Social Progress and Science

There is a difference of degree between societies in regard to acceptance of the principle of change, which is a necessary element in the idea of progress. Tradition was not committed to the value of change on the social level i. e., presented a static world-view. But in the nineteenth century need for change became powerful enough for reformers to plead for social transformation on the ground of restoration of pure conditions of the past. The people remained largely ignorant of and unaffected by such progressive ideas, though social life was beginning to change somewhat by the operation of new forces i. e., there was increasing sensitivity towards economic, political and social rhythms which had not previously been part of Indian experience or practice.⁴ The rising tempo of the struggle for political freedom in the twentieth century helped in familiarising popular consciousness with the doctrine of change, in place of immemorial and immobile tradition, since the zeal for reform of social evils overcame inertia, apathy, resignation and complacent acceptance of existing institutions and customs.

1. cf., R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 184.

2. cf., J. L. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, pp. 16-17.

3. These remarks of Karl Jaspers in *Origin and Goal of History*, pp. 225-226, on Biblical religion and its spiritual paramountcy in the new order of the future apply to Vedāntic darsana in toto.

4. Romesh Thapar, *India in Transition*, p. xiv.

Even in the most backward sections of society the tendency of automatic resistance to all innovations declined. By the very fact of a changing world, respect for the status quo, represented by eternal order of things (*sanātana dharma*), lessened and society became less inhibited in regard to radical change of socio-economic conditions in the interest of advancement.

Nor was theoretical support for qualitative change of traditional social pattern altogether lacking. Reinterpretation of the Vedāntic canon showed the idea of renewal of social order—after the inevitable decline of its institutions a radical change is necessary to restore the disturbed social harmony.¹ The adaptation of this doctrine of social change to modern developments is a significant element of modern thought. It is accepted that social organization and relationships as well as material conditions must change with the changing conditions of life.² Wide vistas of limitless social progress in the future opened out before certain minds,³ though it would be wrong to assume, without qualification, that the doctrine of progress has gripped the mass-mind to change their outlook in any radical fashion i. e., there is uncertainty in regard to the extent and degree of belief in the doctrine.⁴ Nor is it anticipated by any serious student of social change that scientific social progress will necessarily or rightly destroy all old techniques, relationships, institutions or value-patterns of the traditional outlook.⁵ The doctrine of progress presupposes the negative condition of preparedness in individuals and groups to break up old customs and institutions, as well as the positive condition of a new thought-system to take its place in the thoughts and emotions of the people. In regard to the former condition, scientific rationalistic approach is certainly a major factor in the destruction of the old way of life. But in regard to the latter condition, the issue involved in large-scale social transformation being the alteration of the world-view and not merely a quick change in perspective on self and society,⁶ the scientific approach is less effective as evidenced by resistance

1. B. G., IV, 7-8.

2. K. M. Pannikar, *The Foundations of New India*, p. 74; cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Society and Religion*, p. 10.

3. vide J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1949-1953*, p. 96.

4. cf., Kusum Nair, *Blossoms in the Dust*, p. xiii.

5. Wilfred Malenbaum, *Prospects for Indian Development*, p. 40.

6. *ibid.*, p. 48.

to change and continued adherence to old ways of thought.

Historically, social thinking and leadership in India has been the monopoly of religious men and religious organizations, and later of philosophers, law-givers and men of learning, whose secular thought was coloured by scriptural view. Social transformations occurred within the traditional pattern of group life, inspired by urge to survive under difficult conditions of external attacks and internal disruptions and took many forms.¹ The ascetic rigour of mystics challenged the defects of the contemporary social order in older and stabler periods of society. In the nineteenth century the moving spirits of change were the philosophical and religious reformers who became active. And even in the twentieth century questions of social change were seen as moral and religious issues. The religious minds (e. g., Tagore, Gandhi) drew upon ancient and modern religious values, such as universalism, toleration, compassion, good means for good ends as inspirations of their reformatory activity, while the secularists tended to justify their advocacy of radical change without religious reference. It may be concluded that in a society functioning within limits of its own traditional pattern i. e., "closed society,"² religious and moral forces are effective agents of social creativeness, but in a revolutionary or dynamic society going beyond its traditional order, other forces also assume prominence.³ But, in order to utilise the lessons from history it is necessary to combine the spirit of progress expressed in tradition, while using the means suggested by modern science, in all spheres of economics, society, administration, politics etc.

At widely different times and in widely different parts of the country there have arisen religious leaders in India whose aim was spiritual good and whose endeavour it was to place within the reach of all, the means of achieving such good. Each such effort was non-violently conceived and non-violently conducted, . . . and, not infrequently, its organisation bore signs of careful forethought and attention. Essentially the same means employed in the pursuit of economic good, have . . . greater promise of attaining the object . . . provided the effort is scientifically guided.⁴

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1. vide Mulk Raj Anand, *Is There a Contemporary Indian Civilization?* p. 81: Continued creativeness under political changes or attempts at emotional survival against the sañkalpa or pain of outer events, or genuine renewal of living impulse or sometimes mere repetitious revivals, sometimes renescent efforts in history.
 2. As against this is the view of Herbert Miller in *The Use of the Past*, p. 326, that despite its apparent quietism and timelessness Hinduism is an open religion, in that respect better suited to an open society.
 3. cf., Eugene Kohn, *Religion and Humanity*, p. 101.
 4. *General Report of Rural Credit Survey*, pp. 529-530.

In the nineteenth century the Indian people were regarded as passive spectators of history, humbly accepting their position in life (dharma) which God and karma had assigned them, and submitting resignedly to natural and social ills. In the twentieth century the potentiality for initiative, self-discipline, self-sacrifice and service was developed during the fight for freedom. Indian thought with its emphasis on individual contemplativeness, choice of action for which man must assume responsibility, effort for self-improvement eventually ending in liberation from mundane conditions, was enriched in meaning in this new context. The realization gradually dawned on the popular mind that man is capable of working on his environment to make changes, which traditional outlook had believed to be beyond control of human effort. The attitude of submission to mysterious fate declined as means were discovered to control forces moulding society.

The karma doctrine was discovered to be newly relevant in terms of human welfare, individual freedom and social change. The idea was that man's future destiny being in his own hands the Indian must take upon himself the task of fashioning the constitution of new society by critical examination and correction. Individualism, responsibility, decision-making were new attitudes spreading in society. The idea of progress became linked with the idea of human responsibility; instead of relying passively and apathetically on divine will or even on the operation of social forces to produce inevitable progress, positive and conscious fostering of chosen social factors by collective efforts for collective ends gradually crystallised in the ideal of planned progress. After independence, thought, theories, political programmes and actions were directed towards planning development to ensure scientific social progress in India.¹ Optimism in regard to man's responsibility and capacity to ensure his progress by his own powers was not absolute however, but was balanced by practical limitations of resources and results as well as by intellectual conviction regarding limits of human effort, physical and mental,² which is ingrained in the Indian mind by its belief in the doctrine of karma and its phala.

1. vide J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1953-1957*, p. 165: Planning is science in action.

2. vide G. L. Mahta, *Understanding India*, p. 27.

The guiding principle of belief in progress, the goals towards which efforts are directed as well as the values these goals are meant to realize, might be summed up in one word, viz., humanism.

Philosophy revolves round man—the modern mind, that is to say the better type of modern mind is practical, pragmatic, ethical and social, altruistic, humanitarian. It is governed by a practical idealism for social betterment . . . yugadharma is this: Humanity is its God and social service its religion.¹

Humanism, not militant but synthetic and universal, was the operative influence in the thinking of the father of modern Indian outlook. Vivekanand expressed love of humanity more genuine than that expressed in the humanism of the positivistic kind; moreover, his religion of humanity became highly concrete, having the power to move him to realize "the universal man and the Absolute" and the inalienable sovereignty of the self. It inspired self-confidence and belief in human dignity and activism. The twentieth century liberal and progressive mind was imbued with the idea that society is truly progressive only when the majority have achieved harmony in personal life and human relations, which is the goal of striving.² Even the religious mind came to accept that man must seek fulfilment on earth by spiritualising himself as member of a society of spirits.³ Special emphasis was laid on opportunity for all, for personal development leading to self-realization, by all leaders of modern Indian thought.⁴ Democracy came to stand for recognition of man living and working in freedom, and value of all men regardless of differences i. e., basic equality and dignity of all human beings. Similarly, the central conviction of the socialistic pattern, with its objective of good life for all, is a vague understanding of man as an integrated living subject to be safeguarded from the danger of being treated as a lifeless object of mechanical manipulation. All thinkers specifically make the independence, welfare,

1. J. L. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, pp. 536, 680.

2. cf., *ibid.*, p. 20: The real problems for me remain problems of individual and social life, of harmonious living, of a proper balancing of the individual's inner and outer life, of a deep adjustment of relations between individuals and between groups, of a continuous becoming something higher and nobler, of the ceaseless adventure of man.

3. vide M. B., XII, 300, 20, quoted by S. Radhakrishnan in *The Religion We Need*, p. 16: "To you I declare this holy mystery, there is nothing nobler than humanity."

4. cf., Mulk Raj Anand, *Is There a Contemporary Indian Civilization?* p. 134: In advanced European countries the intelligensia is in despair about the future of man, whereas Asia and Africa must inevitably have faith in man as an equivalent to faith in life itself.

happiness of man the end of social progress.¹

Some thinkers base their love of man on religious experience and philosophical principles. The Vedantic doctrine of unity of reality was seen to involve the unity of all being, allowing for differences as well as for equality on the basis of belief that all are the children of God or Reality. Traditional thought gave importance to the individual as a spiritual being.² Though he was required to discharge social obligations yet the claims and authority of society were defined and limited by dharma. And social good was only the means to individual good (paramārtha or perfection of the soul).³ At the same time the danger of negation of social good was obviated by the insistence that the highest duty of each is to act so as to strengthen social solidarity. Humanistic rehabilitation of the individual as the pivotal point of social progress is a restatement of that idea in a new form. Some thinkers object to the revival of the idealistic philosophy of Vedānta as a support for humanism, though they might concede that humanistic principles were not altogether unknown to the religious thoughts of India, such as Buddhism, Bhakti philosophy, Sikh and Islamic thoughts. Still others wish to base the humanistic approach on purely rationalistic, scientific and secular grounds. They reject the religious reference altogether: since the object is advancement of society or a welfare state, this must be understood as the economic good of the group, rather than the individual's spiritual good.⁴ But it cannot be conceded that the bulk of the intelligensia, let alone the masses, have accepted the humanistic principles freed from the religious overtone derived from the traditional outlook. In spite of this difference of premise between religious and secular minds, there is a near unanimity among them that "the individual is the chief consideration" round whom the

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1. cf., K. G. Slayidain, Gandhi, Life and Works, pp. 207-208: Where ever you are in doubt or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test, recall the face of the poorest and weakest man whom you have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him, will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him to control over his life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to swaraj for the hungry and spiritually starved millions. Also J. L. Nehru, Speeches, 1953-1957, p. 25: At the same time it has always to be judged in terms of human welfare and the only real yard-stick we can employ is the happiness of our three hundred and sixty million people.
 2. cf., R. N. Tagore, Towards Universal Man, p. 85.
 3. cf., J. P. Narayana, Towards Struggle, p. 85; also Tagore, op. cit., p. 89.
 4. cf., Anand, op. cit., p. 118.

programme of scientific social progress must be built.¹

The presupposition of modern ethico-religious or even purely socio-economic activity is a common awareness of human values. In the nineteenth century it appeared in the form of liberal political ideals and in the twentieth century in the form of democratic socialistic pattern. The faith of humanism is that society can be guided towards the goals of toleration, unity, brotherhood, national and international co-operation, equality and other freedoms resting on truth and justice.² The focus is always on the well-being and enrichment of the human self in society.

One assumption of the modern age is that every society would like to improve its economic position and it can do so only by following scientific procedures. In the past when India was more advanced in science it was superior to the west and its present inferiority is no trick of providence but the falling behind in science.³ It is a mere matter of time before India catches up with the west in scientific knowledge and method.⁴ The differentia of the west and India being modern science, it is held as self-evident by many that the universal spirit of science must be accepted, sooner rather than later, as the indispensable auxiliary to social progress. As early as the nineteenth century it was recognised that "as improvement of the native population is the object of the government it must promote liberal enlightened system of instructions embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, astronomy and other useful sciences."⁵ India must also enter a new era of power (shakti) given by science: the dharma and the karma-yoga of the modern age is to control social progress to predict and direct welfare by scientific knowledge of social processes.⁶ According to Jawaharlal Nehru:

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1. vide M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, February 1, 1942; J. L. Nehru, The Unity of India, p. 181.
 2. vide The Constitution of India, Preamble.
 3. R. N. Tagore, The Universal Man, pp. 237-238; cf., Bency Kumar Sarkar, Creative India, p. 442: Equation of positive science is: Asia (1600-1700) is equal to Europe (1400-1600) and in socio-economic life Asia (1600-1750) is equal to Europe (1600-1750). Then the west forged ahead and the industrial revolution (1750-1850) created a new civilization. Hence Asia 1850 is equal to Europe 1750 i. e., one century behind.
 4. cf., G. Sarton, The Life of Science, p. 163.
 5. Ramohan Roy quoted by Anand, op. cit., p. 67.
 6. Kewal Motwani, Science and Society in India, p. 36.

Science is the spirit of the age, the future belongs to science and to those who make friends with science and seek its help for advance of humanity . . . politics led me to economics and this led me inevitably to science and the scientific approach to our problems and to life itself. It is science alone that can solve the problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of superstition and deadening custom and tradition And so I hope that in the days to come India will again become the home of science and not only as a form of intellectual activity but also as means of furthering the progress of her people.¹

Modern studies of history find evidence for the conclusion that material progress is directly related to development of scientific knowledge² and the conviction grows that India must contribute to the latter in order to achieve the former.³ The problem is: how to bring science and its applications to every part of the country and people in order to benefit them physically and mentally. The other problem is: how to put society under the guidance of science. There is also talk of the duty and responsibility of scientists to fabricate the new social order, to mould it under their direction.

Since the west has raised its standard of living and won prized benefits by application of scientific knowledge, industrialism is equated with progress and is offered as the solution to all problems of all societies.⁴ There is the determination in India to end her backward condition of poverty and ignorance by applying scientific technology and compressing the stages of socio-economic progress of the west over the nineteenth century into a shorter period of time.⁵ Even in the last century many progressive minded thinkers (e. g., Ranade) were enthusiastic about prospects of changing the social structure by development of industries and in the present century the nationalists subscribed to the same idea. The conviction is wide spread that "no country can be politically or economically independent unless highly industrialised, nor can it maintain high standards without aid of modern technology in almost all spheres."⁶ "Now in India, we are bound to be industrialised, we are trying to be industrialised, we want to be industrialised. We must be industrialised—greater wealth, greater production."⁷

1. J. L. Nehru, *The Unity of India*, pp. 175, 177.

2. cf., K. M. Pannikar, *The State and the Citizen*, p. 67.

3. cf., K. M. Pannikar, *Common Sense About India*, p. 9.

4. cf., Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, p. 253.

5. cf., Thapar, *op. cit.*, pp. 261, 263; Percival Griffiths, *Modern India*, p. 133.

6. J. L. Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 490; cf., Subhas Chandra Bose, *Cross-Roads*, pp. 51-52.

7. J. L. Nehru, *Independence and After*, p. 133.

But others reject the idea that industrialism is the true means of achieving progress. They (e. g., R. M. Roy, Tagore) are more cautious in their optimism regarding the possibilities and scope of scientific technique. While allowing for introduction of the machine in Indian economy in place of outmoded techniques for the end of furthering her true interest, they yet recognise the necessity of combining it with some elements of agricultural economy, village self-sufficiency and value of hand-crafts. The alternative road to social progress is symbolised in the Gandhian non-technological system of economy and life. It, too, takes its stand on humanistic principles and contends that scientific discoveries (steamships, telegraphs etc.) are not indispensable to permanent welfare: rather are they used as instruments of greed and man is sacrificed to large-scale efficiency system, submerged under centralised control. Science is opposed to humanism as dead machine is opposed to millions of living machines.¹ "It is beneath human dignity to become a mere cog in the machine and to lose individuality."² The objection to scientific social progress or industrialisation is, precisely, that it makes the machine its symbol, with exploitation as the result.³ Gandhi was convinced that the adoption of modern industrial methods and practices cannot be combined with practice of spirituality and idealism in a nation. It is impossible to spiritualise the machine: human and humane spirit is lacking in the man behind the machine,⁴ and factory civilization is productive of a society based on the non-humanistic principle of violence.⁵ "Sages have said that it is impossible to accomplish. The west has failed to do it and India cannot accomplish the impossible task."⁶ Far from industrialisation being a boon, it is a menace to India and the world. "I do not believe industrialisation is necessary in any case for any country."⁷

The protagonists of scientific social progress subscribe fully to the premise of progress in terms of the humanistic principle. It is conceded that material progress, high standards must not be at the expense of the spirit of man or creative energy, fine

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1. M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, September 14, 1935; cf., R. N. Tagore, Nationalism, p. 41.
 2. M. K. Gandhi, Economic and Industrial Life and Relations, I, 12.
 3. M. K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj.
 4. M. K. Gandhi, Young India, June 29, 1921.
 5. ibid., November 13, 1924.
 6. ibid., June 17, 1926.
 7. M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, September 1, 1946.

things of life ennobling man.¹ It is even admitted that technological society poses certain threats to the realization of the humanistic ends. "Problem of modern civilization is that industrialisation leads to concentration of power—how to reconcile this with individual freedom."² Deindividuation and brutalisation of individual man in twentieth century cannot be denied. The remedy suggested is: democracy and socialism. All the humanistic ideals are fostered by democracy and "I am convinced that the only key to the solution of the world's problems and of India's problems lies in socialism . . . not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific economic way."³ There is a general conviction that industrialism is too productive to be consistent with any other system than socialism for the age of plenty.⁴ After independence this conviction crystallised in the concept of the socialistic pattern of society.⁵

The protagonist of non-technological progress concedes that democracy and socialism are corollaries of the humanistic principle, but is not convinced that these are adequate safeguards against the violation of the humanistic ideal by the scientific approach. Socialisation merely reduces the danger of machine production i. e., concentration of production and control in a few and its attendant minimisation of the individual, but not wholly.⁶ True democracy and socialism consist in minimisation of technological and mechanical elements to the extent wherein they provide necessary amenities of life but not at the cost of displacement of the human being and his labour. Science can be made a part of village, self-contained, agricultural economy, manufacturing goods only for use and using machinery they can make and afford in order to foster social progress⁷ based on the genuinely humanistic principle of non-exploitation or non-violence.

But the protagonist of technological development considers schemes for revitalisation of village life, handicraft and agricultural autonomy to be but another name

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1. J. L. Nehru, All India Congress, Indore, 1957.
 2. J. L. Nehru, Standing Committee of the National Development Council, 1956.
 3. J. L. Nehru, Essays, II, 82-83; cf., J. P. Narayan, Towards Struggle, pp. 65, 88.
 4. G. D. H. Cole quoted by Narendradeva in Social and National Reconstruction, p. 19.
 5. Annual sessions of the Indian National Congress, Avadi, 1955; Bhavnagar, 1961.
 6. M. K. Gandhi, Harijan, September 29, 1940.
 7. *ibid.*, August 29, 1936.

for the cult of poverty and backwardness. This is the negation of the goal of social progress and cannot be made the national goal. "Simple living and high thinking is an escapist cry of a poverty-stricken people who delude themselves that though poor they are superior in mind."¹

Present day (scientific industrial) civilization is full of evils but it is full of good . . . to destroy it is . . . to revert to miserable existence . . . and psychologically we who have eaten of the apple of Eden cannot forget the taste and go back to primitiveness.²

It is insisted that science and technological methods are not only consistent with but the only possible means of achieving true social progress. The industrial age has laid down the basis of material well-being which makes cultural and spiritual progress easier for larger numbers, and, consequently, the realization of humanistic goals and values.

In essence, the debate centres round the opposition of two approaches to social progress: one in which the emphasis is on the objective conditions, control or shaping of the environment through knowledge given by science, to which the subject must adjust; the other in which the emphasis is on the subject, shaping of mentalities and values of the people, so that they may assert their wills to shape the external events i. e., social and political changes. This difference of approach is reflected in the different definitions of social progress and the difference of the relative importance given to the individual and group in this process.

In the objective approach individual welfare is a by-product of social advancement and clearly the tendency is to equate scientific social progress in India, as in the west, with the development of her economy by technological means.³ Scientific approach concentrates all its energies on enabling all to live a materially good life. Progress ultimately amounts to the establishment of economic democracy and this aim is a social objective which nothing must be allowed to hinder.⁴ It is pointed out⁵ that it is a new thing in India to think in terms of economic goals as worthwhile for the individual and the group,⁶ this is linked up with emphasis on society rather than on

1. K. M. Pannikar, *The State and the Citizen*, p. 65.

2. J. L. Nehru, *Autobiography*, p. 511.

3. cf., Percival Griffiths, *Modern India*, p. 231.

4. J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1949-1953*, p. 95.

5. N. V. Sovani and V. M. Dandekar (eds.), *Changing India*, p. 315.

6. cf., J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, III*, 67.

the individual subject, which latter attitude is regarded as outdated and unscientific.¹

In the subjectivist approach society is treated as the instrument of individual advancement; institutions are tested by the test of whether they bring out the best in man. Over emphasis on material, specifically economic factors of growth generally negates vital aspects of individual and social life. Fallacy lies in equating progress to external change in environment rather than in the individual.² Protagonists of this approach are willing to delay economic progress so long as real progress understood as transformation of individual mind and spirit is ensured. Their logic is as follows: material well-being is not to be neglected. "Satisfaction of needs is a great thing—giving freedom in the material world, conferring on man benefits of greater range of time and space."³ More, "for the poor the economic is the spiritual. You cannot make any other appeal to those starving millions."⁴ "Talk to them of modern progress, insult them by taking the name of God before them in vain."⁵

Certainly, no moral welfare without satisfaction of daily wants. But from this a big jump to say that material progress spells moral In a well-ordered society, absence of starvation, adequate means of livelihood are the tests. (But) economic progress in the context of materialistic craze is the opposite to progress.⁶

The solution offered is the deliberate reduction of wants and satisfactions in order to promote happiness and contentment. "Real value lies not in multiplication of materials but in spiritual fulfilment."⁷ Or, if one wishes to avoid religious terminology, it implies that though legitimate physical demands must not be neglected, these must be subordinated to higher ones i. e., individual's moral well-being must not be subordinated to exigencies of economic or even social progress. The assumption that material gains lead automatically and directly to better life must be rejected in the field of social relationships, and ideologically established values, goals and sanctions of Indian society. Material progress points to its own transcendence in raising

1. Nehru on Gandhi, p. 192.

2. cf., R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 63: Progress is to be judged only according to aim. Train makes progress to terminus station—but full grown tree has no definite movements, its progress is inward movement of life.

3. R. N. Tagore, *Nationalism*, p. 35.

4. M. K. Gandhi, *Young India*, May 5, 1927.

5. M. K. Gandhi, *Harijan*, September 15, 1927.

6. M. K. Gandhi, *Economic and Industrial Life and Relations*, I, 3.

7. R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 64; cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society*, p. 227.

ultimate questions of values and ends. And even the protagonist of the objectivist approach concedes:

Our difficulties are not only external, but of mind and spirit, . . . we obviously must have progress in having the essential things of life, . . . we are harnessing science for the service of the nation. Yet a doubt arises in my mind as to whether material progress really constitutes a remedy for our problems. It is at best only a partial solution What are we aiming at and where are we heading for? I feel that unless we answer these questions we are apt to go astray.¹

Summing up the issue of the debate: if human welfare and happiness be understood in terms of the development of some inner quality in the individual, can it be said that scientific social progress leads to that end? The protagonist of the objectivist approach confidently answers in the affirmative. The intellectual and material conditions resulting from the application of science to life, unmixed with any religious measures,² do ensure that end. The protagonist of the subjectivist approach, however, raises doubts. He points out that the essential feature of modern life seems to be conflict of humanism and science. The latter has failed to provide a coherent conception of human life. Its positive and pragmatic nature tends to ignore uniqueness and inwardness i. e., basic spirituality, and thus negates the essence of the humanistic principle. Humanism must be dissociated from the unqualified scientific approach and be linked up with an idealistic philosophy in order to get a rounded view of human life.³ By mechanical means of socio-politico-economic adjustments facilitated by science there is "social advancement," but the question of the individual remains open⁴ and demands supplementation of science by spiritual wisdom contained in the traditional religious outlook.

1. J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1949-1953*, pp. 160-161.

2. vide J. L. Nehru, *Autobiography*, p. 192.

3. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 259.

4. vide R. N. Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, p. 92: Who is to realize this progress if not the individual.

CHAPTER V

THE MEANING OF PROGRESS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE

In the preceding chapter it has been seen that in India as well as in Europe science and the scientific outlook have advanced the claim, firstly, to serve as the sole agent and technique of individual and social development and, secondly, to serve as a complete philosophy to explain life and experience. It becomes necessary to examine both the practical and the theoretical challenges thrown out by science to the traditionally spiritual world-views of the East and the West.

Meaning of Progress

Progress: A Time-Concept

The modern doctrine of progress rests confidently on the assumption that the historical process is a "redemptive" process. The passage of time will reveal to the discerning mind the whole meaning of life. One clear pattern emerges viz., by gradual development of human powers every problem of individual and social life will be solved and freedom from all evils will be obtained; at the same time, by accumulation of efforts man will be able to overcome his imperfections of ignorance and vice.¹ Rationalistic and liberal minded progressivists of the secular or non-secular type look to the fulfilment of human life in the future, by the development of scientific knowledge and its applications. There will be continual unfoldment of the "indwelling Logos or Reason" by which disorders of human life will be brought under order. Mankind's goal is not to achieve the heaven of religion but to establish a heaven on earth by historical evolution.

Chronologically, the doctrine of progress arose before the evolutionary doctrine, but discovered a natural ally in the latter. Evolution offered an alternative

1. cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 2.

explanation to the theological doctrine of creation at a particular time by divine fiat. Time and becoming take the place of God and His grace in determining human salvation. It shows how from the sub-human level to the highest human level the temporal process controls development of types. And the description of the process is also indicative of the direction of change desirable in the world, materially, intellectually and ethically.

In support of this doctrine can be adduced the obvious fact that there is progress towards inclusive ends in human life—knowledge increases, technology advances, human relations become more complex. The logic of modern history proves life to be capable of self-impelled, self-determined growth both in the individual and the group.

Under the over-powering influence of this doctrine even sceptics are forced to take a dynamic view of history and the efficacy of human effort in it. But the hope that everything refractory in human nature may be brought under subjection of the inclusive purposes of mind is the culminating error in modern man's misunderstanding of himself.¹ The idea of progress as merely a matter of time is "modern idolatry."²

The axiomatic belief in advancement of good in time tends to ignore the fact that increase in human powers opens out possibilities of both greater good and greater evil. Not only are victory and defeat reversible facts e. g., the dialectical theory of evolution makes the end or synthesis, at one stage, become the means or thesis generating its own antithesis, at another; but it must be understood that "the problems of man's life in space and time will but recur in different forms at every level of his achievement."³ For, in the evolutionary terminology, every increase in order and equilibrium, or virtue and wisdom, implicitly contains the possibility of the opposite. History shows only the commingling of both good and evil, not the gradual erosion of evil by good.⁴

In less superficial theories of progress the historical fulfilment of man is located in some distant point of time in the future. But inevitable progress being

1. *ibid.*, p. 14.

2. T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 190.

3. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Human Nature and Destiny*, I, 187.

4. *vide* B. G., XVIII, 48: सर्वैरम्भाहि देवैरा अमर्ताविरिवावृता ।

conceived with reference to future time they ignore the real and full significance of the past. Present achievements are over emphasised but values and strivings of the past are not treated on their merits, since they are regarded as errors or anachronisms to be outgrown. "So modern man has become unhistorical in the deepest sense;"¹ philosophical outlook does not admit the idea of scientific progress that what comes later is better. The "better" is not a "time-concept" but a "value-concept," in relation to which no one of the three orders of time should be given any necessary, "a priori" advantage over the others.

On the one hand, the doctrine of progress in spatio-temporal realm implies that salvation is thrown open to all, and, on the other hand, it also implies that each historical stage invalidates the progress of the past stage. This involves a sacrifice of all the past generations of mankind for the sake of perfection of the future race; but this conclusion is unacceptable to moral consciousness of man.² It shows lack of sympathy for the past and lack of hope for the present, which is neither encouraging nor inspiring for moral effort. The positivistic conception of progress is inadmissible because it excludes a solution to the tragic torments, conflicts, contradictions of mankind and generations.³

The historical doctrine does not resolve the paradox of "the human situation" but evades it. The difficulty arises because man's subjection to time is not transformed into complete control over time and history. On the one hand, no limits can be set for the development of human faculties, mental capacities and qualities, and, on the other hand, limits are imposed over all powers of the individual by the fact of death. This ambiguity is sought to be overcome by postulating "social immortality." Superficial modern theories seek the individual's fulfilment in the group and the more profound theories seek it with reference to historical process itself in which posterity is substituted for infinite and eternal life. The idea of social man is the alternative to the idea of immortality of soul. "Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells the sense of the whole In its presence we put off

1. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man In Search of a Soul*, p. 228.

2. cf., Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilisation on Trial*, p. 254.

3. Berdeyaev, *Meaning of History*, pp. 188-190.

mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is a fit symbol of this."¹

It follows that historical progress means progressive improvement of social heritage from one generation to another, but apart from this no evidence can be given for actual improvement in human nature. The individual is viewed only as a part of the community and there is allowance of "social progress" rather than of individual. To the question: can there be improvement in society with reference to the spiritual life of its members, the doctrine of historical progress would reply that its interest is not in establishing relation between the individual and some eternal and infinite fictitious entity outside the temporal process, but the perfecting of man as a fully socialised or humanised being, which is possible by development of human capacities in history. This reply overlooks the essential human self, wherein alone unity with self and with others i. e., socialisation, is achieved; and though this unity is influenced by time and events, it also influences these, in turn.

The extremely other-worldly view that the meaning of existence has no reference to the spatio-temporal world whatsoever² may be rejected. But religion does find world and history valuable for spiritual growth, though their operation is mysterious. It does not admit the perfecting of wisdom, virtue and power at any one point of time, but looks forward to an end termed "transcendence of history" i. e., a state of being where in the meaning of existence is revealed. This is the real meaning of other-worldliness.³ The conception of progress resting on the transformation of inner man gets over the limitation of the historical theory which puts perfection and meaning of life in a future time.

The historical progress must also be understood in terms of an end, which is the final stage of the process. But there are two meanings of "end" which need to be made consistent in human life. The end of life as the last event of the historical process is death. This is distinct from end of life as the highest value or perfection. This is an experience of eternal truth in religion to which time is irrelevant. Tension

1. John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 332.

2. cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History*, p. 15.

3. cf., Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

between time and eternity is expressed in all the religions because life as subject to nature (history) is equal to ceasing to be and history moves to this end, but as subject to spiritual pull it moves to purpose of life; and as "finis" conflicts with end as "telos."¹ Religions point in varying degrees to the truth that life bounded by time and death is intelligible only with reference to something further. That is, the end as fulfilment needs to be viewed from the religious standpoint of eternal and infinite. The sanction and meaning of life does not lie in history or future time (which only moves to physical dissolution) but in attainment of meaning or eternal values and incorporation of these into temporal purposes in order to create a harmonious pattern of life.²

It is argued that the historical process provides a concrete, dynamic and novel standard of the end, as opposed to the abstract and static "eternal truths" of religion which are intuited spiritually and merely point to "impossible perfectionism"³ of sainthood. The answer to this objection lies in this "impossible possibility"⁴ that man, even in his imperfect, finite state is able to grasp the idea of unconditional perfection, and to approach it by effort of self-discipline. The temporality of human life is conjoined to non-temporality through man's capacity to hold ideals, by which he transcends the limits of the present conditions. The whole of history is a proof of unceasing effort to express the unlimited and unconditional in human life. "We do need a fixed and absolute standard of value. Nor is it an answer to say that all values are relative and ought to change. Spiritual progress must be within the sphere of a reality which is not itself progressive."⁵

It must be repeated, however, that there is transcendence of time and history only through these phenomena, and not apart from them.⁶ If this be true, the eternal is not to be thought of as a mere prolongation of time, but, at the same time, it is also not unrelated to time and materiality. The difficulty of the paradoxical

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Human Nature and Destiny*, II, 254.

2. *ibid.*, p. 310.

3. T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 118.

4. *ibid.*, p. 188.

5. William Ralph Inge, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 31.

6. *cf.*, Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 256.

situation in religion viz., "at one time I am eternal, at another time I am in time," is cleared if man is realized to be living at two levels, having a two-fold nature.¹

Subject of Progress: Individual or Society

Another important question relates to the subject of progress. The scientific outlook regards good to be obtained by society as a whole. It rejects the idea that a concrete and inspiring conception of humanity is unattainable.² On the contrary, science shows man's life to be a part of a universal process, thus expanding the meaning of the "unity of man." The shift from the individualistic standpoint of religion or philosophy to the social standpoint took place under the influence of scientific rationalism and humanism. Evolution supports this substitution because it does not allow for the isolated individual in the developmental movement. Idea of social perfection is a real possibility in the evolutionary process as against the unreal "fantasies of soul-salvation in religion."³ Though it is true that the perfected social system must allow the individual's needs and satisfactions to be adjusted to those of the community, the progress is above all social, in which the self-assertive nature of the individual has to be subordinated to the interests of social well-being. Scientific societies strengthen the societal as against the individual aspect of their development since they function through various associations into which the community is organized.

Modern psychology has developed the conception of the group-mind, over and above the individual, in which the biological perpetuation of the group is supplemented by perpetuation of strivings and hopes of its individual members. This strengthens the idea of society as a real person. The argument is that it is a misconception that progress is immanent in the individual under divine guidance. On the contrary, psychology reveals the element of tremendous inertia opposing all innovation to be inherent in the individual, only groups can associate under external environmental pressures for creative purposes. The major factor is not so much the relation of individual to individual as the relation of the individual to the group, and social progress is

1. Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, pp. 214-215.

2. cf., F. S. Marvin, *The New Vision of Man*, pp. 140-141.

3. Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, p. 58; cf., Robert A. Millikan, *Science and the New Civilization*, p. 78.

assisted by emphasis on the social basis of principles of conduct.

All ideal objects of a truly moral mind must be transcendent of it. So the objection is raised that society or humanity cannot make itself the end of its own progress, because it lives on a natural plane. But this objection cannot be sustained. For society to aim directly at its own fulfilment is not to be regarded as "group egotism." The individual's progress requires him to go outside himself into a larger whole. But humanity as the mind of the whole creation can have self-fulfilment or harmony within as its goal,¹ without any loss of moral idealism.

It might be conceded that "group-mind" in the form of the total cultural heritage does influence the individual, but it cannot be allowed that there is a real entity such as the Great Being of Comte or Group-Mind of social psychology or Humanity over and above its parts. If progress be harmonisation of life in the light of some transcendental principle, then the replacement of "God" by "Humanity" or "Society" cannot be admitted as an improvement. These latter are abstractions; concentration on them destroys the welfare and freedom of particular, concrete individuals.² For example, since freedom was regarded as a quality and function of a "real" social organism there arose the nineteenth century fallacy that "the individual can be forced to be free." Moreover, the conception of society as the subject of progress does not prove an index of the level of development of man, except at early stages of evolution. And the more complex societies by concentrating on the improvement of the general obstruct the real development of particular men. On the analogy of natural struggle, when the struggle becomes social in complex societies the lot of the individual is worse, because he is ignored for the group.

The reason for the emphasis on society is clear: organized science looks to changes in large-scale social institutions, outside of the human self, and is less eager to tackle the problem of changing the individual. It is easier to concentrate on the "large letters" in which the individual is "writ large," because individual welfare and happiness does depend on vast, impersonal processes, mass activities and attitudes,

1. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 109.

2. cf., Bertrand Russell, *Basic Writings*, p. 683.

group purposes and ideas of scientific societies. Yet it must not be forgotten that the "fundamental principle" of social progress is the individual. If the extreme view of certain forms of religion and philosophy that the individual can attain his own progress in his inner life, without any reference to society or mankind, is only a half-truth, then, the opposite view of "outward" progress of the social whole is also a half-truth. And, "since the social point of view represents a distant application of fundamental principles, it cannot be the domain where readjustment of the modern world should begin. That would be to begin from consequences instead of principles."¹

Humanistic emphasis in social progress has led to the crystallisation of thought round the concept of human personality as the highest value. The ideal of self-perfecting of man is deeply ingrained in the human mind, ancient or modern. The conception of the expansion of human life in happiness, freedom, creativeness is inspiring to the modern world, which looks forward to a future age of humanity, wherein scientific knowledge and technique will have been subordinated to the achievement of the above end. Nor is the subject of progress the particular "enlightened" person of the religious age, as much as the "generic person," the very last term in the physical, organic development of the human community.²

If the real subject of progress is individual man then it might be asserted that science has hitherto done little to liberate the inward self. Without setting limits to applied science, physical and social, it would still seem that science can do little to make man better as a conscious rational-spiritual being.³ Though it is argued that knowledge, experience and instruments of living cannot be accumulated without changing the nature of man, therefore, there is evidence for human improvement in history,⁴ yet protagonists of scientific social progress fail to see that science has not helped in comprehension of that larger universe into which the individual must emerge in order to retain his freedom and essence. Scientific development may bring

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1. René Guénon, *The Crisis of the Modern World*, p. 100; cf., Edward J. Urwick, *The Social Good*, p. 62.
 2. Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, p. 183.
 3. cf., C. E. M. Joad, *Recovery of Belief*, p. 75; Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 24.
 4. e. g., T. H. Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* argues for deepening and extension of moral consciousness in the course of history.

unity of the objective world but not unity of man, which is possible in terms of essential change in man.

It is essentially the individual personality which can serve as the locus of progress, because only the individual can realize values. It is the individual consciousness which becomes more comprehensive, more enlightened, even more "social." Therefore, as between the order and stability of society and the expansion of the individual, priority must be given to the latter in determining the goal of civilization.

Admittedly, the individual is dependant upon the level of development and constitution of society. Few can escape the jurisdiction of habits of thought and action, the ethos of their society. And to demand fulness of individual life to the neglect of social development is to empty life of its content. The balanced approach requires that both individual and society be made subjects of progress. Neither religion nor science can save one without the other; but freedom and progress of one does not automatically follow upon that of the other.

The difference between the individual per se and individual as a member of society is a vexed problem for which social scientists and psychologists give no satisfactory solution. The individualistic doctrine insisting on a fundamental antagonism of individual and society or dichotomising the self-regarding and other-regarding tendencies in man, is a superficial doctrine having no basis in fact. Social instincts and society are certainly included in ultimate conditions of social welfare, but are not, themselves, guiding principles,¹ since the perfection of social relations and social structure is also a means of real progress.² All processes require an external or institutional framework, both material and non-material. And society constitutes the very soil, air and light in which the intrinsic nature of the individual may develop.

Since man fulfils his destiny in a social way it is possible to advance the ideal of "social individualism." In social process we pass from unification of

1. cf., G. E. M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 351: The condition of social excellence is not constitutive of social excellence.

2. cf., F. M. Müller-Lyer, *The History of Social Development*, p. 350: Existing epoch of perfecting of society is prelude to second phase of perfecting of individual.

individual's personality to social synthesis.¹ Or this may be put in another way: progress is development of proper relations of three constant factors viz., individual, community, humanity, each passing into the higher stage as a real part of the spirit of man. Nevertheless, it is necessary to insist:

It is one thing to suppose that individual can enjoy the best life only in a community having certain qualities, but quite another to suppose that apart from good in individual lives there remains something good or bad belonging to the state or society or humanity as a concrete living entity.²

Keeping this caution in mind, it may be admitted that social individualism makes room for the development of humanity, if the latter be understood as a qualitative concept residing, not distributively but collectively or in its wholeness, in each individual.

An objection is raised that the religious conception being essentially spiritual or individual's progress, religions are anti-social and discount social progress. But the spiritual search is connected with social life and activity; in fact, science itself finds religion to be a social institution.³ As pointed out before,⁴ if purely social progress were the objective, conceivably past generations would be doomed to lower life for the sake of the future body-social, but the history of religion shows that its emphasis on worth of individual soul has not been the cause of sacrifice of one generation for another. True, religion insists that real culture must be of the individual, but social culture is a discipline necessary to subserve that end.⁵ There is a conception of the individual as "a replica of the universe" and religious training and discipline expands and reconciles the microcosm with the macrocosm.⁶ True human progress is transformation of the narrow, selfish outlook on life into an all-inclusive, universal outlook.⁷ Spiritual energy can be and has often been transmuted into love and harmonised with the progress of society.

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1. vide L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 109: Rational good is harmony of feeling, willing and thinking in the individual and harmony with society, because harmonisation of impulse means the self cannot be taken out of relation with others.
 2. Bertrand and Dora Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, pp. 255-256.
 3. vide C. E. Ayers, *The Theory of Economic Progress*, p. 218: No system of spiritual mores has ever been other-worldly, in the sense that it is always the preservation of society here and now that is at issue, through the adoption of the way of life offered.
 4. vide supra p. 393.
 5. cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 119.
 6. cf., T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 215.
 7. उदार-चरितानाम् तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ।

Nature of the Subject

Our understanding of all human problems and the humanly possible is dependent on our idea of man. Religion takes a general view of man as a trinity of body-mind-spirit or a threefold being consisting of the vegetative element held in common with the plant-world and revealed in the economic function; the animal element held in common with the organic world and revealed in social organization; the specifically human element revealed in the life of moral, intellectual and spiritual striving. From the standpoint of the *summum bonum* the element of spirit is held to be uniquely distinct from the body-mind complex, which is the constitution of the empirical individual.

The scientific outlook views human nature as physical-organic-social. It seeks to exhaust man's essence by making him an object of study in physiology, psychology and sociology, recognising the authenticity of no other element transcending these aspects. The religious search for the "original self," lying beyond the feeling, willing, thinking and social self i. e., the physio-psychical self, is considered to be the very negation of the human self.¹ Science rejects the Cartesian dualism of body and soul and the correlated conception of the unique quality of each man, for the "unique soul" eludes the grasp of its methodology, and, according to it, logically rules out any kind of knowledge of rational purpose in human life and relationships. It concentrates all its energies on the search for laws of man's nature and relationships based on graspable (measurable) similarities and differences. Or if the unique character of man is admitted, it is expressed as the special rational-social aspect of man distinguishing him from animals.

Science argues that the independent self of religion, the "uncaused cause" is a mere abstraction. Self is to be regarded as a sociological phenomenon: relations with other selves is implicit in the very growth of man as a human person. Man is a product of interaction of hereditary traits and culture, both of which are social in nature. Instead of concentrating on what man is, science concentrates on society, studying man

1. vide Arthur James Todd, *The Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 58, 72: The religious self is "unselfed being," a mere "asmuch of God's kingdom" or "leverage of the supernatural."

with reference to the effects his acts and thoughts have on others and vice-versa.¹ Social sciences are committed to the enquiry into conditions of the social self as a unit of the whole, in regard to social progress. Qualitative life of the individual as an end-in-himself, emphasised in religion, is declared to be merely "subjective" or "private" and not the determinant of the ultimate standard of progress. Modern social and psychological thought has developed new idealisations of personality-types having reference to the social structure e. g., the "economic man," the "industrial man" with tools and machines to augment his faculties.²

It may be conceded that man is biological, social, economic and political, yet it is difficult to concede that any or all of these are equivalent to "the nature of man" or "ideal self." Man does belong simply to himself as is revealed in his consciousness of isolation and alienation, is not merely a member of a group or culture. The duality in man's nature is that he is at once a unique individual and a member of society. The aims of the social self resting on socially controlled and educated feelings and tendencies differ from the ideals of the "real individual." Thus the "principle of progress is the conception of the individual as definitely supra-social."³

Man's dual nature can be expressed in another way. One part of him seeks activity and satisfaction of the instinctive, biological and social type, the other part takes him beyond these to meanings and purposes of his objectives, and conditions which are expressed in the midst of the former. After the history of society and conditions of present existence are fully known man still doubts whether all is exhausted, whether he has reached the end of all things. "Man's tendency to go beyond his given self shows self-transformation to be veritably human character."⁴ Self-transcendence means man's ability to change his physical and social surroundings and ultimately his inner self in his attempt to know himself. But transformation is of two types:

1. cf., John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization*, p. 92: I do not say that the social is the whole, but I do emphatically suggest that it is the widest and the richest manifestation of the whole accessible to our observation.
2. cf., Karl Marx quoted by Burns (ed.), *German Ideology*, p. 211: "Men may be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion or anything else. They begin to differentiate themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization."
3. Edward J. Urwick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 190.
4. Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, p. 19.

"static," as when human nature is given and change is in terms of environment and society; and "kinetic," as when change in the nature of man is sought for. Moreover, the kinetic process is not to be understood merely in terms of development brought about by passage of time i. e., change from childhood to adulthood or development of physical and mental capacities. The real kinetic process is transformation by spiritual rebirth.

In all progress the agent must surpass his present condition. In human life alone this process becomes a conscious and deliberate one. That self-transcendence is a fact is proved by the capacity of man to rise above external disasters, to develop a universal outlook beyond his narrow self-interest, "to lose his life in order to gain it" in ideal causes. Finally, in spite of the obvious fact of the perishability of the physical frame, the existence of man as a physical body functioning in a physical world, there is, in addition, an urge or constant going beyond to something of which only a few individuals have a clear vision.

The essentially "human" interests of man e. g., art, philosophy, ethics, religion, cannot be explained without the principle of self-transcendence. The only alternative principle of explanation is that of survival value. The evolutionary process discovers these interests and achievements to be unfavourable rather than favourable developments in the struggle for existence. In fact, they are explicable only if some element of human nature goes beyond the limits of the conditions of existence. Modern scientific outlook adjudges longing for life beyond the physical, the psychological and the social to be puerile, arising from egotism inconsistent with its positive knowledge. But the growth of intellect and the seeming infiniteness of knowledge in science further intensifies the urge. The very rational capacity points to the ability to transcend the self, by turning the self into an object; man's power to deny life in the form of self-inflicted death or in the forms of life negating philosophy¹ are additional evidences.

Man can transcend his contingent, historical self in infinite regression, and, according to religion, this process must end in life in God i. e., man cannot realize

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, I, 2.

himself or find the final meaning within himself or even in the world without reaching beyond both self and world towards a transcendent reality. Even political¹ and social thought and ethics are in agreement as to the need for self-transcendence. And, if man is real and his experience has any truth, then his self-transcendence into spirit must also be real and true.

The methods of self-transcendence may differ, depending upon the standard of human nature and instruments at man's disposal. In ancient and medieval periods it was brought about by moral and religious means alone, but now the forces of science may be harnessed to this endeavour. " 'Be yourself' is nature's first injunction to man, 'transform yourself' was a second, 'transcend yourself' seems up to now her final imperative."²

In the modern age the full significance of the human person is expressed in the phrase, "dignity of man" i. e., he should never be treated as means but as an end, so that he may perfect his essential nature by over-coming all obstacles internal and external. There are two standpoints from which all such obstacles of human experience, specially experiences of evil and suffering, may be explained. The scientific approach is personal, practical and immediate, and the philosophical approach is impersonal, ultimate. Science considers the metaphysical or religious explanation to be mere rationalisation, acting as "psychic anaesthesia" i. e., teaching patience and resignation. It will not allow inadequacies, evils and imperfections of life to be ultimate and it hopes to change man's condition by naturalistic methods.³ The scientific age has not only attempted positively to increase comforts, raise standards, increase pleasures of body and mind, but also to cure pain and disease. The treatment of suffering and evil through certain socio-economic developments seems to support this scientific hope, as well as the underlying assumption that evil and suffering are not inseparable from human nature and can be corrected by mental techniques.

Science claims: "It is man's gradual conquest first of space and time, then of matter, as such, then of his own body and those of other living beings, and finally

1. vide Walter Lippmann, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society*, p. 334.
 2. Lewis Mumford, *The Transformations of Man*, p. 172.
 3. cf., John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 172.

subjugation of the dark and evil elements in his own soul."¹ That the scientific doctrine as explanation of evil and misery is superficial if not false, and that its approach rests on abstract conceptions is evidenced by the failure of techniques of social and individual perfectionism. Great progress has been made in curing ills of mankind, ending many social evils, but this does not fulfil the scientific claim of overcoming all afflictions of man by the operation of reason through scientific activity alone.

The objection is raised that scientific progress has merely altered miseries of man, but not ended them. Scientific optimism seeks to get over this difficulty by arguing that every advantage gained through progress may have a corresponding weakness or pain arising from it, but the conclusion from this is not pessimistic acceptance of inevitable evil and imperfection. Rather does this lead to the conclusion that evil is neither static, absolute nor irremediable, since its form can be altered. Progress brings to light the difference of lower and higher miseries of man and suggests new standards of eradication.² Psychology explains the higher frustrations arising from conflict of matter and spirit to be due to internal causes i. e., in terms of antecedent experiences, and hopes to understand and control all reactions of mind and body under conditions of mental excitation. But science fails to grasp that the source of frustration and evil is human nature itself and not any particular event or condition. Though different degrees of frustration and misery may be admitted but the fact is that no human being is totally free from it and because of the unity of the race this is a racial character.³

Scientific optimism makes too much of the "dignity of man" and not enough of the "misery of man."⁴ Religion is rooted in the experience of the past ages and has a profound comprehension of this human malady. It does not allow physical or biological welfare to be equivalent to happiness and contentment, insisting that even if society were free from evils of poverty, crime, disease etc., it would still be miserable until

1. J. B. S. Haldane, *Daedalus*, p. 82.

2. Herbert F. Miller, *The Use of the Past*, p. 48.

3. cf., Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness*, pp. 15, 17.

4. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 3.

it arrives at spiritual fulfilment, however that may be understood. The charge against religion is that it pessimistically exaggerates the idea of life and world as a "vale of sorrow." It must be remembered that the pessimistic view regards man as "tragic" not because he is necessarily unhappy, but because of the inner contradictions e. g., values of inner being, goodness, beauty and truth do not conform to phenomena of the outer world, nor can moral and spiritual perplexities be resolved by man through his own powers and capacities. Thus the validity of this view depends upon analysis of human experience, which shows that complete happiness in human life is not possible because no complete harmony can be reached in empirical life. Religion does not question the right or power of science to reduce evil and suffering, but it denies the validity of scientific programmes, be they political, economic, educational, psychological, when they claim to bring an end to this human plight, and give rise to intellectual, moral and social complacency not supported by facts. And, in the words of a protagonist of science:

We may permit ourselves larger hope of abatement of essential evil of the world, but I deem it an essential condition of realization of that hope that we set aside the notion that escape from pain and sorrow is the proper object of life. To cherish good bearing the evil is the part of courage.¹

The End of Progress: Material or Spiritual

According to one theory, progress can be sustained without reference to an end i. e., particular means or steps may be admitted referring to particular ends of individual and society, but there are no ultimate ends of human existence.² This position is seemingly strengthened by the fact that in social life there is often the mistaking of means for ends e. g., leisure, comfort, money are considered ultimate by those who lack them, but are, in fact, means to something else.³ The argument runs that in the past religious and philosophical influences led to the misconception that social development is the operation of some mysterious spiritual force in human life, but there is no evidence for any inner, absolute law of progress pointing to an end set by divine will. What is rejected in this theory is the conception of a transcendental end of

1. T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 84.

2. cf., Bertrand Russell, *Basic Writings*, p. 582.

3. cf., Edward J. Urviek, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, pp. 24-25.

human life viz., reality as uniquely inner and spiritual quality and eternal verities etc., and progress as movement towards this preconceived "consummatory state."¹ At the same time it is insisted that denial of an "ultimate end" does not imply scepticism in regard to progress, which may be conceived in terms of realization of value in human life. There is a continuous and cumulative development of science and following upon it an increasing integration of society and culture, which is sufficient evidence for human progress.²

But every rational agent and every rational act must be for the sake of some good which is regarded as the principle of finality. Even power over nature has meaning with reference to human ends. By the very law of the mind we cannot conceive means without an end. So strong is the metaphysical demand that those who deny a "transcendental end" for the individual are compelled to transfer it to the race.³ Though it is denied that advancement of knowledge in science is governed by any idea of progress as an aspect of some ultimate end, yet the concept of "unity of science" is clearly dictated by the ideal of "total realization of knowledge," which is a "consummatory end." Similarly, the scientific aim of betterment of human life is dictated by the ideal of human perfectibility, which is also such a "consummatory end." The argument that progress is possible without an end confuses change with progress. All progress implies change, but change is not necessarily progress. There is progress only when there is an ideal to be achieved, whether it be apprehended dimly or clearly. Therefore, progress is not purely a scientific matter.

Next arises the question of the criterion of social progress. In civilization progress may be of different kinds i. e., in terms of knowledge and power or in terms of more complex and efficient organization of men and resources or, again, in terms of expansion and elevation of human nature i. e., transformation of man.

The scientific spirit concentrated on the achievement of the first two ends and treated the last as the corollary of the first two. Broadly speaking, the two types of criteria may be put under the heads of external-material and internal-spiritual or

1. C. E. Ayers, *The Theory of Economic Progress*, p. 122.

2. *ibid.*, p. 123.

3. *vide supra*, pp. 393-394.

objective and subjective.¹ As seen before, the idea of progress coincided with material prosperity brought about by advance of scientific knowledge and new social organization following upon it i. e., harnessing of nature to man's material needs developed industry, increased wealth and comfort in Europe. It was natural to equate the goal of progress with the material criterion, and, more specifically, the material was taken to mean economic progress. Though there might be difference of opinion as to the scope and content of the "economic," it is something which the whole world wishes to experience. All shades of secular ideologies, conservative, liberal, radical, as well as religious thought, accept that economic well-being is a worthy moral ideal to strive for. Science understands the general objective of society to be provision of the best possible physical, biological and social environment for everyone. But this requires large-scale supplementation of what nature provides for man, which practically amounts to treating the economic as the whole life activity of modern society.² Scientific advances became largely connected with the economic since its methods and controls are easiest in the economic sphere. This may be called the fundamental value of scientific society: its all-absorbing, over-riding concern to increase material well-being by economic enterprise.

"The belief in the good life as goods life came to fruition in the scientific and technological age."³ There arises the serious conviction that infinite supply of things, rather than development of certain qualities in man, is equivalent to infinite happiness. Scientific outlook has produced a "sensate culture;" one in which the economic element relating to the satisfaction of physical needs comprises the totality of culture, and in which the emphasis is on the utilitarian or hedonic standard of the end.⁴ The tendency is to value all things for their instrumental quality with reference to this end, rather than for their intrinsic quality. Almost all social thinkers of the nineteenth century elevated the utilitarian standard to a point wherein it

1. vide supra, p. 388.

2. cf., Aurobindo, *The Ideal of Human Unity*, pp. 261, 262.

3. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, p. 105.

4. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, p. 523; cf., *Viṣṇu Purāna*, IV, 24, 21: In the age of Kalki property alone confers rank, wealth is only source of virtue, outer happenings are confused with inner self.

tended to become a substitute for all other human values,¹ so-much-so that human needs were measured by the standard of comfort rather than of happiness. Since comfort is a property of the physiological or nervous system, it is more easily measured in quantitative terms, by the sciences, than happiness i. e., the criterion of the end was the minimum adequate standard of living.

The element of truth in the material standard is the simple wish not to starve, the well-founded conviction that it is difficult to be good, wise, happy when desperately hungry.² But the scientific outlook exaggerates this truth into an equation of material well-being with perfection of happiness, virtue and wisdom i. e., fulfilment of man in world and society. Because use of material goods for realization of higher capacities in man is a moral cause of activity it jumps to the easy conclusion that material and mechanical advancement does in fact elevate man's spirit. But the fact is that few men know the ends which they want economic activity and material objects to serve. Therefore, far from such goods being used for adventures of mind and spirit i. e., as the conditions of the good life, they are expanded and used as substitutes for it. The instrumental is confused with the intrinsic good in the operation of the "material" standard.

Unlike economic progress which is continuous, moral and aesthetic progress is discontinuous i. e., progress is not an all-round phenomenon and advance in one direction may be accompanied with retrogression or stagnation in others.³ This raises the question of the cost of progress, when measured by the standard of "material well-being."⁴ There is disagreement in regard to the definition of "material" progress, and the disagreement is even greater in regard to the extremely nebulous and complex phenomena of social and individual progress. Even if, for the sake of argument, it is conceded that some agreement can be reached about a particular material condition being superior to another, this is generally attended by so many changes in other spheres that the total result is adverse e. g., all members of society may become more affluent

1. cf., Bertrand and Dora Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, p. 48.

2. Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 230.

3. vide supra, p. 344.

4. cf., Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, p. 229.

while there is decrease in individual freedom or increase in incidence of mental and physical disease. Thus the "material" is not a bad indicator of welfare but the material cause effects non-material welfare in such ways as to cancel its effect. When a society concentrates on men as "instruments of production" in order to increase economic welfare it tends to minimise their character as "ends-in-themselves."

This limitation is found in scientific social progress, not only as an actuality but as implicit in it, even in principle. Social good is many-sided. Science claims authority over the physical, biological, psychological and social aspects, but declares the spiritual to be outside its province, and it is here that the meaning of ends, values, ideals of man are to be discovered. Scientific mechanical mindedness obscures the reality of the human condition by diverting attention and effort towards pursuit of material security, similar to those resulting from the solution of mechanical problems. So much is this the case that it might be correct to assert that science seeks to discount the idea of social development, unless it is restated in scientific terms as an engineering problem i. e., ends being given on other grounds, science can provide the solution.¹

Obviously an essential element of social progress must be freedom from conflict and unsatisfied desires. And it can be shown that this condition cannot be achieved through economic and material means alone. Even on the practical plane no limit can be set for unrestrained human desires, hence the goal of satisfaction of desires is an impracticable and unrealistic goal. Science increases this difficulty because it, too, creates more desires than it can satisfy.² Secondly, science aims to satisfy human needs by organization of men and materials, but unchecked expansion of human appetites for goods has no logical or factual connection with harmonious organization of social life. This is not to deny that science and machines do satisfy desires on a large-scale, but to point out that in creating vast power and riches science also gives rise to conflicting interests of groups. "But the unique quantitative achievements of technical civilization do not disembarass it of the eternal problems of ordered

1. Richard L. Meier, *Science and Economic Development, New Patterns of Living*, p. 139; vide supra, p. 341.

2. vide Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, p. 304: Religion of increasing wants.

society"¹ The solution of the problem of "satisfaction" and "harmony" lies in limitation of desires, at some point or another. And true harmony of society and individual does not consist in satisfied desires,² but in agreement over conscious purposes, which agreement arises from denial of self-centred interests and discipline of desires by each individual. Neither the scientific confidence in its ability to satisfy desires for material things, nor its assumption that such a satisfaction is equivalent to total satisfaction of human desires³ has been validated by the experience of the scientific age.

The protagonist of the "material" standard declares that despite the difficulty of seeing material progress "steadily and whole" and of balancing its benefits and evils, it is still a good strategy to begin with a reverent view of material achievements of man.⁴ It is because economic ends are treated as merely instrumental that economic activity gives rise to undesirable forms of materialism. Were such ends regarded as essential and ultimate for man they could be idealised. Economic thinking does embody valid conceptions of progress since value is its chief concern and, therefore, economics must be regarded as a moral science.⁵ But, according to another interpretation, it is a misconception to regard economics as a study of causes of welfare and progress of communities.⁶ It may have moral connotations if combined with ideas of happiness of individual and society, but what is primarily relevant to economics and economic activity is quantity of goods produced and consumed, kinds and amounts of work done etc. Hence, it implies no value-judgment and economics is not a moral science. What ever be the conclusion as to the character of economics as a science the fact that economic philosophers have had to import within their discussions of social problems ideals of moral welfare and some times even subordinate the economic to the moral is a proof that the "economic" or even the "material" cannot explain or control the world and society wholly. Since no clear cut separation can be made between the "material"

1. *ibid.*, p. 301.

2. *cf.*, Bertrand Russell, *Icarus*, p. 7: Gratification of desires does not enable men to bring their worse passions and desires into submission to the better.

3. *cf.*, S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society*, p. 61.

4. Herbert F. Miller, *The Use of the Past*, p. 49.

5. C. E. Ayers, *The Theory of Economic Progress*, p. 225.

6. I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, p. 79.

and the "non-material" there is a presumption that "material well-being" is favourable to general progress.¹ But the mere interpretation of civilization as the manifestation of physical, biological and economic principles misses the fundamental fact that civilization is the expression of spirit.² And the increase of the "material" in scientific society has, in fact, been linked up with an unhealthy condition viz., neglect of other goods. Therefore, any serious and whole-hearted adoption of "a reverent view of the material" carries the implication of deliberate lowering of spiritual or ideal standards viz., the "flowers of civilization" variously described as charity, love, beauty, peace, holiness etc.

Nothing fundamental is decided upon reaching material goals i. e., man's destiny, his relationship to society remain open questions.³ Without minimising the importance of the value of scientific knowledge and discoveries, it is still obvious to serious thinkers that discovery of detailed facts about the world does not lessen the world's mystery, nor serves to plumb its depth. The economic historian claims to make a valid judgement of the level of civilization from the food or clothing or modes of production in a society. But origins of civilization are only partially explained in terms of economic history, and completely explained only in terms of the whole experience of man,⁴ and the principle direction of human development does not lie in the material end i. e., "the increasing complication of things."⁵ Progress in any sphere of life cannot be called progress unless it helps to make men better i. e., is extra-material. For instance, "it is not mere material goods that men need, but more freedom, more self-direction, more outlet for creativeness, more opportunity for life, more voluntary cooperation and less involuntary subservience to purposes not their own."⁶ The decisive point of human existence is control of fact by thought, having mental and physical capacity and freedom to choose worth-while ends. One significance of the materialistic, intellectual phase is as an experiment to see how far and where human

1. cf., Oliver Lodge, *Science and Human Progress*, p. 30.

2. cf., J. S. Haldane, *Materialism*, p. 109.

3. cf., Richard L. Meier, *Science and Economic Development, New Patterns of Living*, p. 240.

4. cf., Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, p. 59.

5. F. S. Marvin, *Progress and History*, p. 187.

6. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 43.

consciousness would go through external intellectual control of nature with physical intellectual means, without intervention of higher consciousness, but it is difficult to go beyond this to maintain that materialism is itself a spiritual thing.¹ The fundamental nature of the goals set by political economy was questioned by Ruskin, who said that there is no wealth but life, which includes all powers of love, joy and admiration.

According to one view, the two ends, material and spiritual, are diametrically opposed; they cannot cooperate or combine with each other.² Such an absolute opposition of the two types of ends or functions cannot be sustained. Both are efficacious as working guides to ordinary living at every point. Spiritual activity, even in its very specific religious form, is not divorced from material and organizational setting.³ All spiritual thinkers try to bring the spiritual meaning of life into effective integration with ordinary living or physical reality and to overcome the opposition of the two by the conception of the latter as an imperfect embodiment of the former. The spiritual end involves harmony of consciousness with reality, the material ends and activities are significant to the extent to which that spiritual aim is realized in man's life.⁴ Thus spiritual activity becomes a general attribute of human existence, related to commonplace needs and decisions. The immediate problems of men may be political and economic, requiring solutions at their own levels, but they are always traceable to their background of the moral, metaphysical and spiritual, and adequate answers can only be discovered if the wider philosophical meaning of life is kept in mind. "No doubt man cannot rise above the earth without powerful material-mechanical aids, but the latter cannot gain its true direction, until mankind has learnt by its

1. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 7.

2. vide W. E. H. Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe, II, 395: It has again and again been recognised that political economy represents the extreme negation of asceticism. The watchword of the second philosophy is mortification, that of the first is development. The second seeks to diminish, the first to multiply desires; the second acknowledges happiness as a condition of the mind, endeavours to attain it by acting directly on the mind, the first by acting on the surrounding circumstances; the second by giving the greatest intensity to the emotions produces the most devoted men, the first by regulating the combined action of society produces the highest social level.

3. cf., Bronislaw Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization, p. 49.

4. Edward J. Urwick, The Social Good, p. 10.

means to turn its face towards heaven."¹ The "material" is the limiting factor in external life and activity but not in the development of inner nature of man. All the same, changes in the "material" have some how to be related to inner capacities, and this is made possible as a result of search for truth in science, history, religion and philosophy etc.

Meaning of Spirituality: Traditional and Modern

A question is raised at this point: if the spiritual end is fundamental how has it been possible for the scientific outlook to ignore or to deny it? This leads us back to the different conceptions of spirituality in the traditional and modern outlooks on life. For many intellectuals spirituality is no longer identical with the religious tradition. Those who wish to deprecate it either equate it to emotion as opposed to intellectual knowledge and activity or go to the extreme extent of rejecting it as the merely unrealistic, having nothing corresponding to it in objective reality or subjective experience. Those who are still willing to admit the efficacy of this conception and its function in human life equate it with moral idealism, disregarding the element of the super-empirical perspective altogether. The religious conception of man is replaced by the new conception of personality² with emphasis on social activity and social virtues.³ Modern psychology has specialised in the study of traits of the fully mature personality to interpret the spiritual nature.⁴

The rationalistic spirit holds the highest meaning of spirituality to be found in terms of value. "When it is recognized that under guise of dealing with the ultimate reality, philosophy has been occupied with precise values embedded in social tradition, the task of future philosophy will be to clarify men's ideas as to social and moral ends."⁵ Idealism does not maintain so much that all is spirit as that all is to be interpreted in the light of spiritual principle i. e., human values. And spirituality is defined as devotion to ideals discernible in human nature, which can be

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1. Henri Bergson, *Two Sources of Religion and Morality*, pp. 334-335.
 2. cf., Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 45.
 3. vide supra, pp. 323-324.
 4. cf., J. S. Haldane, *The Sciences and Philosophy*, p. 112.
 5. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 26.

brought into existence by man's efforts. "It is . . . in our active ideals of truth, right, charity, beauty . . . and fellowship with others that we find the revelation of God"¹ i. e., spirituality, in the modern sense, is that something greater than man, which he tries to embody in his life.

It is widely recognized that when ever man is interested in something other than mere life of senses or devoted to something other than his selfish welfare there is religion, be it art, science, philosophy, patriotism, humanitarianism. Culture draws same awe and enthusiasm as once did the spiritual; creativeness in art and literature becomes end-in-itself.²

The equation is easy to explain: in the active striving for and enjoyment of values and cultural objects is found the nearest equivalent to the psychological conditions of spirituality. There is self-expression or continuous completion of the personality as a whole (not merely the incoherence of conflicting purposes) which can be made consistent with the fulfilment of others. Nor is this sense of spirituality adversely affected if values be regarded as relative and not absolute. For the reality of the augmentation of values is not in doubt even if the values be relative to social forms.³

In spite of the preoccupation with the psychological, it is not incorrect to hold that the scientific mind fails to keep in touch with the inner self, wherein spirituality and spiritual freedom are experienced. The externalised approach of science regards internal as merely subjective, therefore unimportant, as compared to the objective realities of life. The real problem is to separate the spheres of the psychological and the spiritual and not to confuse them. Though modern psychology now admits in its theories of personality the idea of self-actualisation or realization or "urge to personality" i. e., transcendentalism of self, which was always postulated by religion, still it is important to note that the theological conception of the soul falls outside the empirical facts of psychology.⁴ Nor does psychical research alter the scientific conception of man and his position in the universe in the same significant way as does religion. The connection of the psychological and the spiritual is an enigma not

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1. J. B. S. Haldane quoted by Raymond B. Cattell in *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 78.
 2. Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 127.
 3. cf., J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 705: Values are social constructs.
 4. cf., Edward J. Urwick, *The Social Good*, p. 201.

resolved by positivistic psychology.¹

Exaggerated confidence in intellect gave rise to the over-simplified moral version of spirituality. The purely moral view of man considers the overtones of spiritual life in piety, worship, contemplation to be irrelevant. It is an "arrested moralism" which makes moral consciousness the summum bonum of spiritual ascent.² Similarly, higher types of cultural activities and interests, mental, aesthetic and vital, enable man to transcend his narrow selfish nature, call forth intense loyalty, dedication, sacrifice and, therefore, may not be adjudged as purely idolatrous. But still it is a mistake to confuse them with spirituality because they lack its essential quality. This is proved by the fact that when they are treated as substitutes for religious faith and devotion they suffer from two difficulties.³ Firstly, such ideals and activities save men from fear of physical or mental crises by absorbing them in ideal causes, but not from the crises themselves. "Instrumentalities, organizations of freedom based on experience and logic fail only in illness, death and catastrophe, hence empirical knowledge is supplemented by religious doctrines."⁴ Secondly, such ideals and activities, however idealistic, are not totally free from egoism and do not make for the spiritual meaning of freedom.

The spiritual end is not merely expansion or training and refining of mental faculties to endow man with new power. It has a quality and value apart from all its uses and rewards in external life, in terms of fulfilment of the self. Hence it is worthwhile for its own sake, and those who accept it will not allow its sacrifice for and subordination to any value or virtue whatsoever.

Religion stands for the spiritual aspect of human nature at a level higher than found in "root interests" of man, such as science, art or pure philosophy. It is neither pure intellect, pure emotion nor pure will, but an integration and transformation of them all. The modern progressive creed stresses reason at the expense of other

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1. e. g., spiritual consciousness of alienation from the divine is absolutely distinct from psychological sense of separation from fellow men; similarly, spiritual bliss resulting from ending of alienation or from experience of unity with the universe is not a subject of psychological study at all.
 2. Bernard Eugene Meland, Faith and Culture, p. 27.
 3. *ibid.*, p. 159.
 4. Bronislaw Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization, p. 176.

elements of man's nature; but if the goal is realization of man as a whole the religious meaning of spirituality may not be disregarded. It also provides ample scope for truth, value and higher forms of interests and activities in the end it seeks, but they are not merely relative to social structure and needs as much as based on insight into the nature of ultimate reality, resulting in an attitude of "non-attachment and disinterested virtue."¹

The objection is that such spirituality, if not unreal, is too abstract; its instinctive realization or metaphysical proof gives no power to it to achieve its aims in society.² This objection can be easily answered: absence of material content in the concept of spirituality has not lessened its power of giving rise to new relationships of man or in creating different patterns of society, as proved by the whole history of religion. Spirituality is a powerful social force.

Moreover, spirituality is a real attribute of human experience. Beyond individual and social needs, both physical and psychological, human beings do strive for spiritual satisfaction. All religions are unanimous that it is "a natural state of man," not less than the outward or material activity supported by scientific reason.³ Were it an unnatural or abnormal condition it could not be embodied in natural life on such a wide-scale, whether by way of harmony with it or of contradiction with it.⁴ The scientific approach seeks to cut off this dimension altogether or retains the letter but not the spirit of the quality.⁵ It is called "supernatural" in a derogatory sense, simply because the scientific method can neither reveal nor explain it. But the absolutistic claims of science cannot be admitted.⁶ Hence two extremes must be avoided

1. Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 6.

2. J. D. Bernal, *Freedom of Necessity*, p. 64.

3. cf., C. E. M. Joad, *Recovery of Belief*, p. 114: The Bible contrasts spiritual and not supernatural to the natural. Paul says: that which is spiritual comes after that which is natural and in the seventeenth century Cole remarked, "Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual for the spiritual is the most rational; where reason speaks it is the voice of our guide It is also true in religion, to follow God and to follow right reason is all one."

4. cf., C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, pp. 218, 251: Since spirit has to deny and overcome obstruction of physical facts the very conflict of the material and spiritual in life proves it to be an incomprehensible something as part of mental life.

5. vide supra, pp. 414-415.

6. vide infra, pp. 423ff.

in accepting spirituality: the mistake of divorcing spirit from the world of nature; and the mistake of equating it wholly with the "nature" of science.

Science rejects spiritual freedom as being a denial of culture and life, because it requires the breaking of the bonds of worldly goods, freedom from body and its desires to a greater extent than science likes. But the "negation" of spirituality is only apparent as spirituality positively postulates a higher conception of life and culture than that prevailing in the world. It cannot be denied that religious life and discipline may be inspired by spiritual insight into essential mystery and appeal of what human life has in it to become.¹ From the individual standpoint the highest benefit to each man comes in that self-development wherein body, mind and spirit evolve in their natural course. And from the social standpoint the "iron law is that apart from some transcendental or spiritual aim the civilized life either wallows in pleasure or relapses slowly into barren repetitions with waning intensities of feeling."²

Limitations of Science

Science and Its Application to Human Life

The greatest contribution of science is the scientific attitude itself. The approach, i. e., how and in what spirit investigation is carried out and the findings interpreted, rather than actual content of knowledge, is the test of the scientific attitude to life. Authentic science is actuated by curiosity, aims at truth single-mindedly, and submits to the dictates of facts with an orderly, disciplined and open mind. Man needs knowledge for its own sake as in science to satisfy him physically and mentally. Pure science is described as the most godlike activity of man.³ But such a truly all-comprehensive spirit arises from a rare combination of factors and motives, and the lack of even one of these destroys the universality and authenticity of the scientific attitude. Hence, in actual life only a very few profound minds have possessed the scientific spirit.⁴

1. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 221.

2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 108.

3. Bertrand and Dora Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, p. 187.

4. cf., William Ralph Inge, *Assessments and Anticipations*, p. 209.

In previous ages science was valued as a means to understand the world, and also as a part of spiritual training of the mind, but, in the scientific age, it is valued as a technique to change the world without any reference to the spiritual principle whatsoever. The truth i. e., the reality and power of thought must be demonstrated in practice. According to Marx, the contest as to reality and non-reality of a thought which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question; philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it. Thus the test of truth tended to be displaced by the test of utility.¹ Science receives attention and respect from the vast majority for its by-products i. e., techniques and results. According to one theory, science may have originated in disinterested human curiosity, but was soon permeated by the pragmatic and the utilitarian spirit. According to another theory, the very origin of science was due to practical considerations and it was later that it became transformed into a disinterested search for truth. This difference in regard to source of origin does not affect the judgment that the present value of science rests largely on the practical advantages it confers in business, industry, finance, economics, politics and other spheres. These were once its less important effects, but have now become its most important causes. "Its applied aspects have deeply entered life and by useful devices have interwoven it into habits, desires, inseparable from the economic and social structures."²

The pragmatic aspect of science is rooted in the human motive of love of power, its techniques and mechanisms produce and increase power, and it attracts the lover of power who wants to change the world.³ The universality of science may be remotely related to fundamental impulse of curiosity, but it is directly related to the desire to control events and things for use and profit. People do not care whether science is true or not, so long as it enables them to see or to do what they wish to see or to do.

The dissociation of popular consciousness and true scientific spirit amounts to this that people living increasingly in a world made by science are in complete

1. cf., W. Clifford, *The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*, pp. 7, 151.

2. Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, p. 120.

3. Bertrand and Dora Russell, *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, p. 98.

ignorance of the mechanism controlling life.¹ It is an anomaly that the science which gave rise to and sustains the modern society is becoming rare, inspite of the increasing tempo of discoveries and inventions. The reason for this is that very few men understand either its technological devices or its theoretical constructions i. e., science characterises the modern age in a form in which it ceases to be science.² Possibly the scientific technique could be practiced and its products used for a time without understanding the spirit. But it is questioned whether any civilization could survive or function if a majority of its members have virtually no understanding of the thing upon which its existence depends.

It is argued that scientific knowledge being cumulative allows for progress, as it can be taught to the individual, but in the case of religion and ethics there is no progress because their truths are not cumulative and require to be relived in each generation.³ But it is clear that a curious similarity obtains between the situations of science and of religion. In their deeper aspects they both affect the thought and behaviour of the common man, but are above his head. Confronted with the powerful unknown phenomenon of science the man in the street tends to raise science to mystical heights.⁴ Scientists are new authorities replacing theological authorities, and their dicta are new sources of revelation rivalling religious revelation. Science points towards a system of sanctions based on inexorable natural law as an alternative to religious sanction of divine command. As in the past most people were content to carry on religious ritual, convinced that they would produce results without any interest in knowing how they were produced, so also in the scientific age men adopt the methods of scientific operations of activities without knowing the reasons for doing so or mastering the theory to the extent of improving it or applying it to new situations.

It is argued that as all men are philosophers, consciously or unconsciously, so is everybody a scientist. This assertion is subject to serious qualifications. The true scientific motive of knowledge for its own sake and desire to be objective is not

1. J. D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, p. 87.

2. Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 94.

3. L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Development*, p. 309.

4. cf., J. D. Bernal, *Science in History*, p. 909.

accepted universally, nor by larger numbers of men in any society.¹ The scientific attitude is unnatural to man, since most of his opinions are not derived from objective considerations, nor does he have the capacity to verify them by rational, empirical tests as do the scientific specialists. In the very nature of things popular appreciation of science is not critical, but a matter of blind faith. Nor can the average man be satisfied with scientific rationalism alone, at the present stage of human development. Many scientists are optimistic about the imparting of science through the system of education, but others admit the uselessness of trying to imbue the masses with the scientific outlook. For the psychological motives of enthusiasm and optimism behind the scientific quest for knowledge cannot be imparted. Only facts about nature can be imparted; and the naturalistic philosophy in a dogmatic form. This failure is only partly attributable to defective system of "the breakdown of communication between specialists and laymen," but more to the fact that science must inevitably be diluted and even distorted into a form of superstition and mythology in order to percolate to the masses; "the scientific age is one of rampant ignorance, frivolousness, superstition."² The mere increase of scientific knowledge does not ensure the rationality and purity of scientific opinions and actions. "There is no justification of the notion that the scientific age means that more people think and act scientifically. Methods, results and ideas of science more widely penetrating in the form of jargon, having little influence on basic patterns of behaviour."³

It is a justified conclusion that, as in the case of theology and metaphysics so in the case of positive science, the value of knowledge is more of the emotive nature than of the empirical nature.⁴ Both religion and science are approaches employed by man to gain the goal of self-understanding and self-perfection, but due to the fact of rarity of both pure religion and pure science their truths, when applied to the regulation of social relations and ethical activity, commingle with contrary elements and motives, and produce a mixture of good and bad results.⁵

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1. cf., John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 31.
 2. J. S. Huxley, *Religion Without Revelation*, p. 95.
 3. A. V. Hill, *The Ethical Dilemma of Science*, p. 76.
 4. cf., I. M. D. Little, *A Critique of Welfare Economics*, p. 69.
 5. cf., F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*, p. 215.

Increase in human liberty in every sphere was expected to be one of the elements of scientific social progress. But it has been noted that a striking by-product of the application of science to society has been progressive decline of freedom. Theoretically, science was to subserve man but practically, man has often been sacrificed to the exigencies of applied science. As pointed out earlier, the spirit of the latter is derived from the principle of utility and not from the principle of truth and, therefore, it has given rise to oppression. According to Tolstoy, if the arrangement of society is bad and a small number of people have power over the majority every victory over nature will inevitably serve but to increase that power and that oppression. Progress understood as scientific social system created by rational planning and control is an expression of "lust for power" and not necessarily altruistic. Since the time the scientific method was generally recognised as an instrument of social progress no society has been prepared to use it in a purely idealistic way.

Science and its techniques increase the importance of organization and authority and not so much of man, whether superior or average. The vastness of the organizations in scientific society produces a feeling of helplessness in the individual. Scientific organization aims to fit man into the social machine, almost to treat him as a product of matter and machine.¹ As the powerful social organization becomes more planned, artificial and mechanical there is corresponding minimisation of individual initiative, effort, originality and responsibility.

The necessity of collective effort on the widest scale to satisfy human needs means that in order to escape the control of natural necessity by use of science, man has to submit to the control of society. "The mechanical mind has a passion to control everything except itself, 'controlled society,' 'controlled economy,' 'controlled industry.' The appeal of scientifically controlled society working with precision is very great."² And thus, science and the machine become instruments of repression rather than of freedom.

A paradoxical condition prevails within scientific society. It shows the

1. cf., Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, p. 172; Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, p. 100.

2. L. P. Jacks, *The Revolt Against Mechanism*, pp. 142-143.

phenomenon of disintegration into separate units dependent on others i. e., on the one hand there is loss of individuality in the mass and on the other loss of a genuine sense of community and social unity;¹ on the one hand there is increasing inter-dependence of men on each other and on the other lack of means of common control over the social mechanism. This control requires elaborate knowledge and technique, expert administration under government, and, thus, the very attempts to control social organization for the sake of increasing the individual's liberty, serve but to create further powers to be used against him. "Scientific development and philosophy of despotism though separately treated are connected at every step in the philosophers of science—Hobbes, Descartes, Machiavelli And the cult of autocratic power was supported by increase in non-human power supplied by science."² The premise of thought and action in the doctrine of progress is that it is not through great emancipation but by the use of authority, composed of alliance of government and science, that progress will come.³

One-Eyed and Colour-Blind

The scientific approach allows for the possibility of the organization of experience only in circumscribed fields and denounces the Absolute postulated by traditional religion and philosophy. But, inspite of the apparent abolition of all absolutes science has itself become an absolute, in terms of its method, principles of interpretation and content. As long as material objects were regarded as primary data of scientific investigation the distinction of material and spiritual phenomena could be maintained, but now science claims to organize the whole of experience on the principle of "democracy" i. e., will not allow exclusion or priority of any particular experience over another. Categories typical of science are applied to everything and the "universalistic" spirit is reflected in the ideal of "unity of science."⁴

1. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith, p. 17.

2. Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man, pp. 176, 171.

3. Walter Lippmann, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society, p. 7; vide supra, p. 348.

4. cf., Joseph Needham (ed.), Science, Religion and Reality, p. 371: It will never renounce attempts to bring everything under one system of laws. Dualism of matter and spirit, even inorganic and organic is abhorrent to its monistic outlook.

Every period of history has its own favourite approach to knowledge. But man's tendency to exalt his own method and his own knowledge as the solution of all problems of reality is the most frequent cause of error in philosophy.¹ Science declares that all other methods, being based on inability to face dangerous truths bravely i. e., with its own impartial objectivity, are dogmatic, obscurantist and false. But it forgets the truth of Whitehead's remark that the obscurantists of any generation are in the main constituted by the greater part of the practitioners of the dominant methodology and today, scientific methods are dominant and scientists are the obscurantists, as were the scholastics and religious methodologists of the medieval age.

The scientific method had no means for investigating or interpreting experiences of intuitions, values, significance of things and the aspects of mental life and social relations in which the latter are important elements. But such was the dominating influence of the scientific outlook that in the nineteenth century, even the social sciences exactly imitated the techniques of natural sciences. It was Comte who committed the fallacy of the uniform method of science by applying it to social phenomena and later it was extended to investigate and to understand every phenomenal experience, however intangible, with the result that there was accumulation of exact knowledge at the cost of depletion of meaning in regard to them. "Such positivism, scientism and technicism is a pathology of intellect which overreaches its sphere and tends to subjugate spirit and society to inappropriate categories."²

Since the opening of the twentieth century scientific methodology has had to moderate its absolutistic claims on the questions of nature of reality and human life. Heisenberg in his statement of the principle of indeterminacy admits that the path of science is a path of renunciation i. e., it has had to renounce the aim of bringing the phenomena of nature to one way of thinking in an immediate and living way.³ This limitation of self-confidence is dictated by the fact that, firstly, even within its own sphere it fails to explain certain phenomena e. g., why the inorganic realm operates as the medium of life, how did life originate from the inorganic, why there are various

1. cf., Mary Adams (ed.), *Science in the Changing World*, p. 37.

2. Wilhelm Röpke, *Civitas Humana*, p. 53.

3. cf., Albert Einstein and Infeld, *The Evolution of Physics*, p. 125.

types of organic beings and how to bridge the gap between one type and another? Secondly, it cannot disprove "positively" the realities which are beyond its own sphere. "Science as a way of describing reality asserts nothing about that which is outside the limits of its observation; anything else is not science, it is scholastics."¹

Science proceeds on the basis that valid perception is through sense-perception and intellect is the only reliable and valid instrument. Secondly, the inductive method of science gives successful working hypotheses, which when sufficiently confirmed by observation and experimentation i. e., empirically, acquire the status of natural laws, which are necessities of thought for all time, demanding absolute assent. This absolute confidence of science in the possibility of certain knowledge based on inductive reasoning has been challenged. Hume pointed out that the method of induction may lead to error and that inductive logic used for obtaining new knowledge is non-verifiable i. e., laws are more or less probable but not certain. And Newman also showed that scientific laws have only a high probability. Einstein admits that since perception only gives information of external world indirectly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative means. It follows that our notion of physical reality can never be final. Certainty and definiteness of science are only in regard to its abstracting procedure and method of statement; there is no certainty in regard to its content. All scientists are aware that scientific principles operate "within the limits of error," but they neglect this in drawing conclusions about the scope of natural law. The result is the fallacy of identifying the "reign of scientific law" with the "reign of particular scientific law."² Even if the scientists avoid the pitfall and continue to regard their principles as hypotheses and tools, the layman tends to regard them as all-comprehensive dogmas.³

The success of the scientific methodology is due to the materials on which it operates, which are the obvious and striking phenomena, not hidden by the depths of life and experience. It started by organizing the ordinary experience and confined itself

1. J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science*, p. 76.

2. F. Sherwood Taylor, *The Fourfold Vision, A Study of the Relation of Science and Religion*, p. 44.

3. cf., Aldous Huxley, *Science, Liberty and Peace*, pp. 28-29.

to connections and regulation of successions of obvious occurrences.¹ The Kantian analysis had proved science to consist of both rational and empirical elements, but since rationalism was supposed to be confined to phenomena there occurred emphasis on the empirical or truth of sense-perception only. Scientific empiricism is limitation of investigation to a narrow range of immediately perceived sense-perceptions, isolation of itself within a small point of spatio-temporal field, therefore false. A true empiricism must add to these perceptions more intangible experiences of mankind. No hard and fast line may be drawn between the empirical and the non-empirical but ultimately a distinction remains. But science has deliberately cut itself off from a major province of experience, and has confined itself to the tangible, measurable and analysable subject matter.

Relying only on empirical truths science has relegated truths of reason to mere speculation and truths of intuition to superstition.² In thought and conduct it rejects claims of independent reason in favour of experiment and observation, but it is irrational prejudice on its part to ignore a priori, necessary knowledge and to rely only on the contingent truths of sense-perception. Similarly, total rejection of truth of faith fails to do justice to the contributions of intuition in all fields of thought and action, including science itself. Truth has many approaches; were this not a fact the ancients could not have discovered so much about man, world and destiny. Science in its psychological phase now admits the error of its earlier condemnation of all other experiences and approaches, not useful for its purpose. "Real" and "unreal" are admittedly relative to particular interests and spheres of experience.³

"Scientific methodology refuses to reason below some ultimate mechanisms."⁴ It regards the mechanical categories of cause-effect as final principles of interpretation and will not introduce any non-causal principle such as volitional determination. Its explanation is from present to the future, in terms of efficient causes only, leaving out final causes or purpose or "why" of things. Attempts to explain experience at

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1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 117.
 2. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, p. 252.
 3. Herbert Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure*, p. 261.
 4. Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

physiological level of motor-action and psychological level of causal determination of conscious states¹ fail to extend the scope of the mechanical scientific explanation, which includes psychological causation as well as physiological. Nor is the limitation overcome by arguing that science does seek the purpose of events and organs, because "scientific purpose" is a function in the "economy of the whole" mechanism only. The purpose of a machine can be discovered by science and it is that of its operator, but this is pseudo-teleology and not the true principle of teleology.² The inquiry, "What are laws of purposive activity and how can their outcome be predicted?" which is possible in science, does not exhaust the whole essence of purpose. It cannot be allowed that science by relating phenomena and by giving coherent, concise descriptions of how things behave has explained the world in any deep or satisfactory way: it merely refers things to an earlier point which is true but not exhaustively true explanation.³

In the seventeenth century the scientific method shifted intellectual concentration from quality of reality to the quantity of reality, both practically and theoretically. But the freeing of the mind from the "tyranny of the qualitative" in scholastic thought, was but an extreme reaction in the opposite direction. The whole subject matter of science was made to consist of "a view of one-eyed and colour-blind man."⁴ Since the truth of quality could not be grasped in terms of mechanical stimulus-response, cause-effect formulas, qualitative experiences were declared to be either unimportant or unreal. It is argued that the initial limitation of science to the quantitative approach was only due to the fact that it was the easiest starting point of rationalisation of experience in science,⁵ but, in actual fact, this method is not only treated as an instrument of investigation but also as the principle of interpretation. Moreover, science does not allow the distinction of measurable and non-measurable. This argument fails to ensure the ultimate extrication of science from its "obsession with the quantitative," since its tendency is to overcome the above distinction by including the latter into the former i. e., quality is treated as a quantity.

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1. Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 156.
 2. William McDougall, *Modern Materialism*, p. 41.
 3. C. E. M. Joad, *Philosophy for Our Times*, p. 89.
 4. Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 253.
 5. Herbert Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure*, p. 200.

Science has taken over all objectivism and relegated subjectivity, as a supposedly inferior thing, to philosophy. But objectivism is a serious defect of scientific methodology. Firstly, the attempt to dispense with all subjective knowledge of the mental attitude in investigation of natural and social phenomena destroys the concrete relation of the human being to the world. Secondly, it reverses the order of things; it includes the inner into the outer world, whereas self-observation reveals that the earlier reality is the inner world and the outer is included in it. Thirdly, the world is integrated in different aspects and no separation can be maintained between subject and object. Even science is forced to admit implicitly that its abstracting procedure is incapable of covering all regions unlimitedly, by removing the reason for ignoring the subjective aspect. Till the nineteenth century it disregarded all mental operations because they were "subjective." But now it has realized that creative activity in science, as in art, religion, philosophy, arises from a common subjective source viz., consciousness. Furthermore, it is conceded that as the scientific method interferes with the object through the experiment, the subject is an important causal factor intervening to change the objective world. No purely objective method is possible:

Those who search for truth starting from consciousness as a seat of self-knowledge with interests and activities not confined to the material plane, are just as much facing hard facts of experience as those who start from consciousness as a device for reading the indications of spectroscopes and micrometres.¹

The objectivist method of science is not exhaustive and needs reinforcement and refinement by subjectivistic or "humanistic" treatment of all aspects.

The scientific treatment should reveal knowledge faithful to the human experience of nature. But "its obsession with analysis reduces the meaningful variety of life to units of time, space, matter and to some monistic conception beyond these."² It fails to establish correspondence between reality and its physico-mathematical, organic generalisations. Therefore, scientific theories cannot be called either true or false but only "convenient or inconvenient economies of thought." "The method of science is detached from the familiar world, a symbolical method, and it is false expectation that what science reveals must be like familiar forces and

1. Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 271.

2. Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 153.

materials."¹ In raising this objection it is not forgotten that philosophy and religion also have proved that the commonsense view is not necessarily true, but this does not automatically justify the scientific procedure of abstraction. In any case, we are justified in asserting that science, too, suffers from the scholastic error of making its abstract generalisations real and relegating the concrete experience to a secondary place. The loss of integrity due to this is in need of correction. And the need is sought to be met by the idea of the unity of sciences, but this notion is merely the end product of its peculiar abstracting approach, whose limitations can only be overcome by joining it to a totally different approach. "A society failing to burst through current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a limited period of success, but science is impervious to the criticism of Berkeley, Hume and Kant because its peculiar abstractions work."²

Materialism and Mechanistic Determinism

From the "one-eyed and colour-blind" method employed in science the only possible conclusion could be materialism and mechanism. The generalisations made at the inception of science in the seventeenth century gave rise to the idea of material particles in space and time, subjected to certain laws of motion. Scientific rationalism was influential enough to force philosophy to regard this as the most correct representation of the natural world. And this same interpretation was extended to the fields of biology, physiology and psychology e. g., attempt was made as early as Hobbes, Bentham³ and Adam Smith⁴ to form a science of human behaviour according to the Newtonian model. This led to the transference of the qualities and values of the object to the subject, individually as well as collectively.

There are philosophical and non-philosophical forms of materialism. Berkeley called any philosophy materialistic which believed in the real existence of matter. The definition was later narrowed to mean that nothing but matter exists. In a more general yet clear form it also stands for the belief that material things and interests

1. Eddington, op. cit., pp. 8, 241.

2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 59.

3. e. g., universal laws of mechanical motivation.

4. e. g., gravitational laws in economics.

are of primary importance. Efforts are made to prove that there is no logical justification or connection between scientific concepts and popular, subversive materialism. The argument is that science does not claim that the essence of reality is exhausted by matter-motion or that the latter are anything other than intellectual tools necessary for scientific investigation. If, then, in the absence of sufficient evidence man turns into a materialist, he does so due to psychological reasons. The charge is explained away by declaring that it arises from mere ill-will, prejudice, jealousies between different groups and societies. Or, if the charge is admitted, the motive is explained to be a general rather than a subjective one viz., the psychological law of irrational mental reaction.

The irresistible tendency to account for everything on physical grounds corresponds to the horizontal development of consciousness in the last four centuries . . . a reaction against the exclusively vertical perspective of the gothic age under the delusion that more is known about matter than about metaphysical kind.¹

Moreover, it is generally admitted that socio-economic motivation behind materialism and mechanism continues to operate on thought and actions of scientists and non-scientists alike.

It may not be denied that the essence of scientific spirit is partially constituted by the principle of rational order. But it may also not be denied that it specifically carries with it certain implications viz., that the only useful data in constructing a world-view are the observed and the experimental; that the observable must be expressible in mass, length, time; that the inexpressible is to be set aside pending explanation; that man is only different in complexity from biological and inorganic phenomena; that purpose and design are absent.² Thus the limitation of science to the tangible and its use of methods appropriate to it only, justifies the judgment of "de facto" or practical materialism of science. And there is a definite connection between scientific materialism equated to "the model of the billiard ball" and materialism equated to the conception of material ends as more important than spiritual.³

A change is said to have come upon science in the twentieth century. The older

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1. G. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, pp. 201-205.
 2. F. Sherwood Taylor, *The Fourfold Vision*, p. 53.
 3. T. R. Miles, *Religion and the Scientific Outlook*, p. 74.

science believed that it was looking out on a real, external and substantial world of material bodies and thought its job was to discover what its nature was. The Newtonian formula was considered a direct and exact reading of the world's nature. In the present century physics is no longer concerned with the description of the external world. The outcome of relativity, quantum theories and wave mechanics is to negate the old idea that science is penetrating deeper into the nature of reality. Since science is forced to hold such contradictory theories that light is both wave-like and particle-like the substantial integrity of matter is destroyed and, it is said, this gives scope for an idealistic and even spiritualistic explanation of the world.¹

It is also asserted that the old materialistic philosophy is outdated by science itself, and if still held, the reason for this is sheer intellectual, metaphysical lag. The new physical theories deal only with structure or form of the world or with operations of science in bringing experience into a logical order. But from this a fallacious inference is drawn that science is still apprehending an existent, external and independent world, which is its cause. The assumption in this reasoning is that this fallacy may be easily corrected by the exercise of a little care and effort by scientists. But this may be questioned: Whitehead has pointed out that the confusion of misplaced concreteness was introduced into the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century by juggling with its abstractions, and this is the very precondition of the operation of the scientific methodology and the advance of natural knowledge. The very confidence of science in the results of well-established induction rests on the assumption of persistent objects underlying it i. e., realism is the basis of science.

It may be allowed that science has ended the superficial antithesis of matter and spirit, made at the beginning of modern science. Since its own idea of matter becomes hazy it confesses that matter and spirit share one thing in common viz., difficulty of definability. However, this confession fails to destroy the self-confidence of science in regard to discovery of the nature of the external world, nor does it

1. vide Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 192: The classical theory of matter is used on monday, wednesday, friday and quantum theory on tuesday and saturday. According to William Bragg, may not their philosophy take the form of religion on sunday and science on other days, though admittedly the parallel is not exact.

necessarily create in the scientific mind a sense of "wonder, mystery and reverence" of the mystical sort, about the fundamental elements of the physical world,¹ as some scientists would claim. Firstly, it may not be forgotten that progress in science is cumulative; the new physics has not negated any fundamental truth in the Newtonian science, but has merely supplemented it by filling in the gaps. Secondly, non-insistence on objectivity of material particles puts no obstacle in the way of physical science as long as there is an infinitely differentiated external world for its operation. Scientific rationalism still condemns attempts to bring back non-material principles as purely non-scientific superstitions, "gratuitous hypotheses."² The picture of the disappearing reality of phenomena is nonsense for the scientist who can handle the material world the better for new physical and biological theories. The public is being deluded into believing that idealism rules in science at a time when materialism is winning all along the line.³ If it is remembered that materialism is not a scientific theory about matter but a philosophic view of world and life which considers reality to be external to consciousness and to be discoverable by the use of the senses, then it will be understood how inspite of the fact that the latest science regards matter to be non-material the latest form of materialism is as materialistic as the old form.⁴

The principle of determinism is interlinked with the method of physical science. In the abstract world of scientific reasoning there is rigid sequence of cause and effect; cause being known all can be foretold down to the last detail of infinite time i. e., universal determinism is due to unvarying physical law of science:

(This) is a reflection of the determinism of the method of inference in science, where mathematics is the model of exact reference; from a mere study of method it could have been predicted as to what world-view would emerge and the moral sympathy of natural law is with the view that everything in the future is already foretold in the past.⁵

At first determinism in physical science was hailed as a support of human freedom as it increased man's control over nature, but its extension into psychological

1. Robert Andrews Millikan, *Evolution in Religion and Science*, p. 15.
2. J. W. N. Sullivan, *Gallio or the Tyranny of Science*, p. 37.
3. J. D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science*, p. 89.
4. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 22, 52.
5. Eddington, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

and social sciences gave rise to fear in regard to its theoretical and practical implications of human determinism. The scientific explanation of man left only the physiological mechanism controlled by physico-biological law or determined by heredity etc., to be used and moulded by sciences. Mere replacement of the analogy of mechanism by analogy of life in the social sciences cannot change this conclusion to any appreciable extent, because "if science declares that man is no more than fortuitous course of atoms, the blow will not be softened by the explanation that atoms are the Mendelian unit characters and not material."¹ Man remains a unit of the natural world mechanism and determined by its causal forces.

Not only popular thought but even scientists hold that scientifically determined universe threatens freedom of will in man. The only way to overcome the defect of human determinism is to discover that science is not mechanically deterministic, otherwise the defect will increase rather than decrease with the development of science. It is declared that the study of sub-atomic behaviour disproved this conclusion in its very stronghold viz., physical science. Relativity and quantum theories challenge the scientific doctrines of the closed universe, replace the confidence of science in the certainty and objectivity of its knowledge by the idea of random happenings. Unpredictable and indeterminate character appears to be inherent in the nature of things. As earlier, complete determinism of material universe could not be separated from determinism of the human mind, so atomic physics can be said to end determinism, not only of nature but of man, as its objection to free-will is seemingly withdrawn.

But it is a fallacy to use a scientific principle to prove or to disprove the question of human free-agency. If it is a false assumption to regard scientific law as a statement of objective fact² then the "principle of indeterminacy" cannot be adduced to negate human determinism. The resolution of this problem does not lie in either denying freedom and holding to causality (as in older physics) or in invalidating the causal law and finding freedom everywhere (as in modern physics). The solution must be found at the philosophical level and not at the scientific. Science cannot have it both

1. *ibid.*

2. *vide supra*, p. 431.

ways: in one aspect to assert that its laws are not descriptive of reality in order to overcome the difficulty created by its own contradictory findings and in another aspect to assert that the laws are descriptive of reality because that would support a popular conclusion viz., human freedom. In fact, the latest developments in physical science neither add nor subtract anything from the earlier science in regard to this important issue.

Furthermore, science has changed its idea about determinism and indeterminism. Early science held that "accident" (indeterminism of phenomena) was simply a case of order not yet understood i. e., everything was potentially determined in scientific knowledge. The latest science has discovered that "accident" and "order" both fall within the limited field of scientific reference itself. A wider generalisation thus brings even indeterminism within the scope of science, without allowing room for any non-scientific principle of interpretation. "The conclusion of science is that there is neither exclusive determinism, nor exclusive random movement in world and history, the general shape of both is known but the boundaries are uncertain in a calculable way."¹

In the same way, some doubt has arisen about the concept of cause, which dominates both the scientific and the popular minds. There is a difference of opinion among scientists: some (e. g., Eddington, Schrödinger) believe that the concept of cause and, therefore, the mechanistically determined universe has been disproved finally by new findings; others (e. g., Einstein, Planck) consider that the principle of causality will be retained in its reinterpreted form. But this difference is irrelevant to the issue of determinism as it is "possible to have faith in causal mechanism and yet to find a cause a fiction,"² just as it is possible to believe in materialism and yet to find matter to be non-material.

In other ways also it is possible to show that determinacy rules in science still. If the human and the social are not separated from the material environment, but are continuations of it, then all developments will be internal and the operation of

1. J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science*, p. 92.

2. *ibid.*, p. 63.

cause and effect will be thrown on the purely physical plane. New developments in science help in the complete destruction of Cartesian dualism and the modern version of materialism facilitates the transition from the inorganic to the organic; and this extension of the scientific field is fulfilment of the aim of the founders of modern science that science must take the whole universe within its scope. It is only complexity and lack of expressed social need which has prevented the deterministic methodology from being fully applied, but this does not mean that it will not succeed.¹

On the other hand, it is possible to adopt a certain view of scientific law and freedom which will get over the difficulty of human determinism. For instance, modern astronomy and biology seem to repudiate indeterminacy, but freedom is not such indeterminacy or absence of cause or absolute spontaneity, rather is it to be understood as determination by or subjection to knowledge i. e., calculable factors. Therefore, scientific law does not hinder autonomy of will.

Another interpretation might be that the only true solution of the problem of reconciling the "reign of scientific law" with freedom is in terms of scientific belief that freedom remains unreal unless we have knowledge which allows us to act i. e., science enables man to increase his working freedom which is the only true freedom. This is clearly a pragmatic solution.

To assess the value of such interpretations it is necessary to find out whether the balance of control that scientific knowledge makes possible lies outside or within man. It is insisted on behalf of science that the deterministic philosophy is the cause and not the effect of science and its instruments, but it would be correct to judge that both scientific thought and scientific practice² point towards determinism. And the philosophical objection against scientific materialism and mechanistic determinism has not been invalidated by the history of science.³

1. H. Levy, *Science in an Irrational Society*, p. 80.

2. *vide supra*, pp. 422-423.

3. *vide Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man*, p. 415: Almost all representative thinkers of the west denounced the non-human results of materialism and mechanism (Blake, Ruskin, Arnold, Emerson, Whitman, Thoreau, Melville, Dickens, Howells, Hugo, Zola, Mazzini, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Ibsen).

Science and Values

One of the perennial questions of human life relates to the kind of life men want and what they want to get out of life: the explicit goals include values. Values suggest worthwhileness of some object of striving. They are not dismissed as merely fanciful and wishful creations or as incomprehensible realities behind phenomena; modern thought regards them as the most meaningful parts of human experience, the supremely determinant principles of life, to be attained and fostered in their fullest range¹ through effort and conflict. Ultimately all values can be subsumed under the trinity of the good, the true, the beautiful.

"Value" must constitute an important test of any age of knowledge and activity in human life. It is necessary to determine how science has affected values, both in actual fact and in its theoretical implications. The scientific outlook relying on a special kind of scientific reasoning tended to avoid the search for values. It was not merely negatively inadequate, but a positive obstacle to the proclamation of values, which it considered to be non-empirical propositions. The early scientists believed truth to be absolute and inseparable from the values of faith, goodness, beauty, therefore, they proceeded with an unquestioning confidence in the scientific method. The theory of the two realms viz., material and spiritual, was able to obscure the anomalies of the situation e. g., Bacon was interested only in facts or what is, and avoided the problem of value judgment i. e., what ought to be. Descartes, too, separated the physical from the moral world: this enabled science to carry on its work without showing up the contradiction with religious and moral beliefs. The deistic compromise avoided a direct conflict for a time by the distinction of the ultimate purpose of knowledge viz., the exaltation of the divine creator, from its immediate purpose viz., finding of the scientific truth about the world of nature. But the separation of the positive from the normative sciences and the positivistic bias i. e., insistence on the all-sufficiency of the scientific method and knowledge to satisfy all demands of life

1. vide Shepard B. Clough, *Basic Values of Western Civilization*, p. 1: Values relating to aspects of human activity, individual, social, institutional, religious; relating to uses of energy and resources (economic); relating to relations in society; relating to system of knowledge (epistemological); relating to aesthetic factors; relating to problem of progress in attainment of basic values (action values).

led to the failure of that compromise and to the denial of relation between science and value. The increasing popularisation of scientific method not only "freed the mind from the authority of value judgments in wide spheres where such freedom was essential, but even extended to areas where submission to value was imperative."¹ Since science claimed to rest only on motive of satisfaction of curiosity and increase of efficiency and power, its effect on specialists and laymen alike, was to produce either scepticism or, at least, lessening of reverence for other values than truth. And paradoxically, this was one of the striking features of the scientific age inspite of its emphasis on the moral and the social.

The scientific approach has certain features conducive to this result. Firstly, the equation of science to mathematics led to this sharp distinction, as subtle mathematical and experimental concepts replaced commonsense, qualitative view of the world. Secondly, the uncertainty about the sphere of science or limits of the demonstrable created difficulty in deciding positive and negative values and gave rise to the idea of relativism. Thirdly, the misconception arose that beliefs and actions based on value concepts are subjective, arbitrary and incompatible with objective science. Scientific objectivism was interpreted to exclude all desires, needs and, consequently, values as objects of these urges. Scientific method does not admit the relation of subject and object and proceeds on the basis that understanding and control of the object makes no difference to the subject and that the object has no value, therefore, it cannot be related to values.² Fourthly, confinement of science to certain principles, and scientific abstractions from human experience left out values as one of its factors. The materialistic and mechanistic approach tended to invalidate freedom of will, effectiveness of ideals, moral effort and discipline for conservation of values. "The material-bound language of science is inappropriate to describe absolute values."³ Fifthly, scientific classification did not include the elusive mental and spiritual life. Values are not physical objects nor effects of natural causes, but mental objects, therefore they were adversely affected by the scientific principle of universal

1. Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, p. 73.

2. S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man*, p. 376.

3. G. E. M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 137.

determinism. Questions of ends, purposes and significance so closely bound up with values, though parts of human personality, could not be subjected to scientific investigation.

Science deprived the natural world of the value-meaning which the medieval age had deemed necessary to sustain moral, aesthetic and religious spirit. Medieval science was a study of purposes and ends in nature, which were thought to be operating according to the will of its divine creator. Modern science sought only facts in nature. Thus it became committed to the distinction of facts and values. Prophets and philosophers established the connection of moral consciousness and will of God; science revealed the indifference of nature to moral standards. From experience, only a part of which is within the scope of science, we can only know that this or that is the case, but we cannot infer what ought to be i. e., science can give no absolute certainty about the best way of life, which is the essence of the concept of value. Kant pointed out that the distinction of "is" and "ought" could not be explained by purely natural causation.

However, attempts were made to give a secure status to values, specially moral beliefs and distinctions by trying to derive them from scientific assumptions. The argument was that since values are not imaginary constructs only, they can be discovered by examination of nature i. e., ethics and even aesthetics can be made a branch of natural science. In the past the aims of life were discovered by sheer trial and error methods or by intuitions of individuals or by unconscious strivings of groups, but scientists tried to discover them through scientific rationalism alone. The principles of biology, psychology, sociology and economics give us laws of human behaviour from which standards and limits of values, positive and negative, can be deduced, like "the need of food is deduced by observation of behaviour or introspection of urges."¹ For instance, it was argued that the evolutionary doctrine proves life to be one continuous process, having room in it for consciousness and values. And all phenomena point to the organic-inorganic movement of the world to lead to a predetermined course. One

1. Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 88.

attempt to justify moral value¹ came to the conclusion that we ought to promote evolution in the direction biology shows i. e., the standard of values is assistance or non-assistance of the evolutionary process.

But this identification of values with the direction of evolutionary movement contains the fallacy of illegitimate importation of norms into a mere description of empirical phenomena. Bradley has pointed out that the one criterion for Darwinism is success or the prevalence of whatever happens to prevail, without any regard to its character, and this leave us in the end no criterion at all. The evolutionary law gives no pointers unless we arbitrarily pick and choose our facts, nor does mere complexity have greater value, moral or aesthetic. Neither can any conclusive evidence be discovered for belief in development of species towards one definite end.²

Earlier thinkers such as Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, did apprehend weakening effects of evolutionary theory on values, specially moral character and conduct.³ Though some scientific minds have discovered wider vistas of aesthetic and moral values in it,⁴ yet a majority of scientists and non-scientific public have not been impressed by its implications and possibilities for human freedom and striving towards values. The reason being that in its popular form the evolutionary theory explained values and purposes by identification of the natural with the savage and the organic with the primitive,⁵ because it concentrates on beginnings and historical stages of things, not on ends or perfected conditions, which are the repositories of value.

In so far as scientific speculation on value implies that science helps to realize values its validity must be admitted. Value judgments have to be made in concrete situations of knowledge of the world and oneself. Criteria of value must also be deduced from total conditions which do include scientifically established facts. Then also, science is very useful in an instrumental capacity where the question of

1. vide C. H. Waddington, *Science and Ethics*, p. 138.

2. cf., T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 127.

3. vide *ibid.*, pp. 81-82: Evolutionary ethics professes to explain morals, but social progress means checking cosmic at every step by substitution of ethical process. Practice of ethically best involves a course of conduct in all respects opposed to that leading to success in the cosmic struggle for existence.

4. e. g., Julian Huxley would consider man a microcosm whose notion changes with the macrocosm's evolution.

5. Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, p. 351.

connecting norms and facts arises. Such a connection is inevitable as the distinction of value and fact is not rigid. Even in scientific investigation of facts assessment cannot be overlooked altogether, and science implicitly seeks the values of intellectual integrity etc., while values derived from deeply hidden sources in the individual and the universe have to be fitted into scientifically established facts. Any value however intuitively revealed must be put forward in intelligible terms. It is reasonable to demand that ultimate values be not essentially opposed to our most exact and factual view of the world.

Practically, the problem of social progress is: how to bring the guiding principles viz., values, in close relation to all ordinary purposes expressed in social organization, so as to minimise, if not to end, conflict of interests. Science is needed as an efficient and expert counsellor to build values into effective conduct, institutions and culture, as it provides the "know how."¹ Incorporation of correct values into individual personality and social fabric depends much on creation of favourable external environment. Scientific knowledge gives power, whose intelligent use can create such an environment and, thus, conserve values on the largest scale in society.

Therefore, it is urged that scientific thinking can be profitably extended to the field of values, from which it was excluded so far. Relations of cause and effect, means and ends in human life must be determined on the basis of new tools and sources of power provided by science. And one of the most important applications of science must be to give context to our judgment of means and ends in regard to value judgments. None of these contentions invalidate or take away from the force of the thesis that science must be made subservient to highest human ends or values, and that science while it is excellent as a helper is not so as a guide.

This is to insist that ethics and aesthetics are outside the direct scope of scientific investigation. The naturalistic claim that it is a mere matter of time before the physical, psychological and social sciences will advance to a point where all values will be created by them² is not validated by fact or logic. Principles of ethics

1. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, p. 270.

2. cf., J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science*, p. 53.

and aesthetics are not logically derivable from the scientific process, nor can all value judgments be related to science by any development of that process.¹ One difficulty in logical deduction of moral values from scientific facts lies in the fact that the quantitative scientific methodology ignores the essential i. e., subjective, qualitative aspect of value by turning it into a psychological² or sociological³ question of how man holds values. Or it asks: why did they act in a particular way in a situation of alternative choices, which is a kind of historical analysis not identical with the ethical problem at all.⁴ Another difficulty is that conviction of rightness of value in moral consciousness is not equal to logical necessity as in science. Hence, absolute certainty of science cannot be found in the field of values unless recourse be had to some extra-scientific principle.⁵

The extent of separation between science and value is admitted in the phrase, "ethical neutrality of science."⁶ In view of this situation, the scientific outlook must either wrongly derive values from scientific principles or fall back on sheer emotion and instinct, urges and desires. This procedure is not free from the danger of leaving reality without ideals.⁷ And failing to find the method of achieving a value-system men fall back on the influence of immemorial tradition, which embodies the collective wisdom of society. None of these procedures satisfy the whole nature of man, which includes the need to establish the rationality of values, but that rationality is not to be a product of scientific induction alone.

All this does not take away from the fact that scientific activity is itself animated by value considerations. Value judgments do apply to facts dealt with in science, as these facts are having highly significant results in human life. Since science has enlarged control as well as knowledge of nature, and has increased and intensified possible effects of action, the valuational problem takes on new dimensions. The

1. cf., James B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man*, pp. 97-98.

2. vide Barbara Wootton, *Testament for Social Science*, p. 182.

3. vide C. E. M. Joad, *Recovery of Belief*, p. 145.

4. e. g., the confusion is clearly exemplified in the statement of C. H. Waddington in *Science and Ethics*, p. 101: I cannot see that there is any real distinction between the problem "how did I make my ethical choice" and "how shall I make it now."

5. A. Campbell Garnett, *Religion and the Moral Life*, p. 14ff.

6. cf., Julian Huxley, *Scientific Research and Social Need*, p. 157.

7. cf., Albert Schweitzer, *Civilization and Ethics*, p. 41.

possibilities of misuse of scientific knowledge and power are greater by far than the misuse of any other knowledge and source of energy. The cleavage of scientific knowledge and needs of life being found dangerous, the problem of relating science and values assumes urgency and protagonists of scientific outlook plead for values, spiritual betterment and moral advancement.

The value of scientific enterprise arises from objectively significant ideals, which do make a moral claim upon the individual's energies. Nor does it fail to develop valuable qualities in man, such as devotion to service of humanity, renunciation of personal pleasures and contempt of worldly values, development of intellect over other mental operations. Humility, faith, sincerity, love of truth are required by both religion and science.¹ The issue, however, is not whether scientific activity is a school of many virtues and promoter of values, but whether or not the criterion or the act of valuation is explicable or justifiable by science.²

The set of values specially favoured by scientific society includes stress on rationality, utilitarianism, universalism and individual worth.³ Its nature as a moral enterprise involves rational operations (principles of scientific thought are coherence, uniformity, commensurability in its world of facts). Every value-system exalts truth and science undoubtedly takes truth for its ultimate standard. It is allowed that religious teachers and philosophers have been agents of truth in history but protagonists of science insist that love of truth in science alone is a real, dynamic, generative force of progress.⁴

On the other hand, it is pointed out that this inquiry into truth has a negative aspect also, in as much as the feature of intellectual purity, disinterested concern for truth alone contains in it the lack of control and knowledge of the agent.⁵ This deficiency is exemplified in an internal contradiction of values within the scientific spirit. Its truth-value, which is the end of pure or theoretical activity of science is

1. J. W. Dawson, *Modern Ideas of Evolution*, p. 19.

2. *vide supra*, pp. 440-441.

3. Bernard Barber, *Science and the Social Order*, pp. 62-66.

4. John Beattie Crozier, *Civilization and Progress*, p. 438.

5. *cf.*, Lewis Mumford, *The Condition of Man*, p. 251: The great lack of who is to control the controller or to know the knower.

contradicted by the power-motive or utility-value, by which practical operations of science are governed.¹ This inner contradiction of values is sought to be removed by the device of "socialisation" of science. It is argued that recognition of the social roots and social consequences of science will create that sense of social responsibility in science, whereby the proper balance of values within science can be maintained.² But this shallow device does not strike at the root of the anomaly in science. Utility-value predominates in science and inevitably depreciates its idealism. And the intellectual integrity of science is, in the long run, also discovered to be governed not so much by the truth-motive as the utilitarian motive,³ since science cannot succeed on any other terms. The truth of this judgment is supported by the fact that the "integrity needed in the discipline of science and laboratory is not really enforced by it, as it fails to create any real change of being or depth of culture of self; cautiousness and accuracy in reaching conclusions are not related to any real sensitiveness of man."⁴

Scientific objectivism professes to eliminate values and purposes in the name of truth but reimports them illicitly by claiming exclusive value for its own activity. This absolutisation of the value of science tends to obscure its connection with other needs and values, with which it is interacting continuously. It is one among several important human goals and its values are not derived so much from its specific activity as from the more comprehensive values of the society in which it operates. Its moral and social character does not make it the exclusive source or preserver of values. Values do not fall within its field,⁵ but it falls within and forms a part of the total field of values.⁶ Science is beginning to admit its limitations in regard to values i. e., it envisages meaning of life in multi-dimensional terms and accepts that other activities may be complementary to its task. So the problem is no longer of ending the

1. cf., Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, pp. 273, 275.

2. cf., Julian Huxley, *Scientific Research and Social Need*, p. 279.

3. This is the very charge levelled against religion: Bertrand Russell in *Basic Writings*, p. 600, says, I can respect the man who argues that religion is true and, therefore, ought to be believed, but I can only feel profound moral reprobation for those who say that religion ought to be believed because it is useful (utility in social and moral spheres). cf., Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and the Religious Quest*, p. 58; C. E. Ayers, *The Theory of Economic Progress*, p. 286.

4. Mary Adams (ed.), *Science in the Changing World*, p. 232.

5. *vide supra*, pp. 440-442.

6. cf., Wilhelm Röpke, *Civitas Humana*, p. 75.

opposition of science and values as of understanding which values are realized and promoted by science and which other values by other approaches and activities. In the words of a modern protagonist of science it may be concluded: it must become an essential of man's evaluational outlook to realize that scientific intellect and scientific will alone cannot make a good life.¹

Science and Darśana

The rationality claimed by all philosophies ultimately stems from the imperative under which they operate: "Man, know thyself."² But self-understanding has two aspects: man knows himself as an existent being ("I am" is an a priori knowledge, needing no proof), but is continually seeking to know his essence. This fundamental knowledge of man is linked with that of life, and is distinct from the fundamental knowledge of matter. A view of reality explaining man's nature and significance in connection with life, world and reality is designated darśana or siddhānta in Indian philosophy.

A darśana has its roots in impressions, experiences, impulses and desires aroused in man through his physical and social environment. It terminates in a goal of good life towards which his vision moves him. And the relation of the experiences and the goal is established by a particular means of realization of the goal, which the vision imposes on man. Darśana is a theory of the whole life which constitutes wisdom as distinct from knowledge, by whose help man can plan his life, direct his conduct. Man is prompted to lead one kind of life rather than another due to the direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious effect of his darśana on his outlook. A whole people develop "a common way of life depending on a common view of life, standards of action and values . . . because the way of life is moulded according to the way in which man apprehends reality."³

Hume raised the question of the "ultimate why" in regard to moral conduct, but this can be extended to life in general. The scientific spirit dismisses the question:

1. Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 278.
2. cf., Boethius quoted by Aldous Huxley in *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 185: "In other living creatures ignorance of self is nature; in man it is vice."
3. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and Culture*, pp. 48, 58.

it is unanswerable, therefore, not worthy of attention.¹ Whenever the scientific mind is faced with a question about the meaning of the world as a whole, it can but assert that the question has no meaningful content at all.² It is held to be an emotive question, not valid or significant, since no conceivable evidence available to the empirical methodology of science can enable science to answer it.³ Science prides itself on its superiority in not tormenting itself by asking such questions which ought not to be asked about first cause, creation, ultimate reality or suffering.⁴ Its seeming tolerance of philosophical differences in regard to ultimate questions is, in effect, an expression of its total disregard of such problems.

From a practical standpoint also, the scientific spirit confining itself to pursuit of immediate tangible needs of life, has no interest in the ultimate question. "All have confidence in the value of knowledge to enable man to live wisely in the world--in preventing him from wasting his time and his energies in chasing illusions, in enabling him to direct his thinking and his acting towards realities instead of towards will-o-the-wisps."⁵ Men expect science to end concrete sufferings and burdens and do not subject it to the pressure of discovering solutions of abstract problems. Its opposition to religion and philosophy is expressed by its acceptance of a world in which all questions have not been answered, nor need to be answered,⁶ because all questions have no direct bearing on "human welfare" with which science claims to concern itself exclusively.

But the very fact of living and acting in the world raises ultimate questions in the human mind. The agnostic or sceptic outlook of science considers it possible and desirable to play the game of life regardless of how life is looked at, as "comedy or high tragedy or plain farce," but the problem of terms of reference of life to the universe forces itself on man's attention.⁷ To raise and to answer the ultimate

1. cf., Barbara Woottan, *Testament for Social Science*, p. 180.

2. cf., Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 84, 86.

3. cf., R. V. Sampson, *The Progress in the Age of Reason*, p. 247.

4. Julian Huxley, *Man in the Modern World*, p. 160.

5. Robert A. Millikan, *Science and the New Civilization*, p. 150; cf., Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, p. 121.

6. cf., Herbert F. Miller, *The Use of the Past*, p. 362; T. G. Masaryk, *Modern Man and Religion*, p. 28.

7. Abba Hillel Silver, *Religion in a Changing World*, p. 21.

question amounts to almost an instinct in man,¹ because it relates to self-fulfilment of man's life. Scientific attempts to live without a "reference" or darśana is an over-simplification, which excludes the most important aspect of human life. In spite of scientific scepticism man has to make a judgment of his total situation and everyone has a solution, complete or incomplete, worked out within himself, in thought, word or deed.

Science condemns this kind of mental activity. It is held to be a type of rationalisation by which man escapes from his obligation to face life's limitations, shortcomings and uncertainties bravely and to lead an active life in the world. But this identification of a necessary life-function with ideological escapism is sheer extremism on the part of science. It is a function which is "primarily a window for attaining a world of being"² and as much a duty of man as the "realism" or "activism" approved by science. On the other hand, the life of action may often be one long frantic attempt at escape in action from the haunting presence of questions man cannot answer but by his very nature cannot escape.³

To live rightly man must know, not only through the instrumentation of reason but in a complex way through the nature of his being, how to fulfil himself in the values of life.⁴ Even scientific study of man in society has revealed that he does not live a "simple" life of only physical satisfaction; questions about intangible facts of life have arisen inevitably in human life, individual and collective, and all cultures have given an answer, conceived and expressed in different degrees of clearness and discrimination. In the light of this "wisdom-dimension" all experiences and relationships are referred to that which is of ultimate importance. This does not mean that every man is impelled to relate his darśana consciously to the widest context of life. A majority of mankind can get on without reflecting on the origin and destination of the universe. A very simple expression of darśana is enough for many. However, at the minimum, some judgment on man is made by all, which carries them beyond definite facts

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1. e. g., Bradley remarks that metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what is believed upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.
 2. C. E. M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 269.
 3. David Meccord Wright, *Democracy and Progress*, p. 67.
 4. Aurobindo, *The Ideal of Human Unity*, p. 173.

supplied by psychology, sociology, anthropology etc. Peace of mind, inner content, even efficiency and creativity depends not merely on ending physical and mental suffering but on resolving doubts and mental contradictions by discovering an adequate darśana to give meaning to life.¹

The need for darśana increases rather than diminishes with the growth of scientific knowledge and its application to social progress. The human mind ever seeks after a unified understanding of diversities as a part of its creative functioning. The multiplication of disconnected perspectives in physical and social sciences creates a strong demand for philosophical unity (in scientific terminology, "unity of science"). The increasing complexity of the scientific method, knowledge and society raises the question: why are things what they are?² Thus while discounting darśana science creates such complex and contradictory situations, throws man into new life conditions, wherein, more than ever before, the need for darśana becomes apparent in newer ways.³ The philosophical problem has, therefore, merely changed its locus and dimension, but has not disappeared in the scientific age. What and how to accept the scientific social system and world order, in order to lead a fully self-realized life, is the major problem of modern darśana. Such attempts are objected to as anti-scientific attempts to revive out-moded irrational traditional beliefs, but are in fact post-scientific developments, showing "obscure wisdom" as the search for reality continues in metaphysical terms. The modern age urgently demands a more completely comprehensive philosophy; so much is this the case that though modern men of thought may deny the need of God or religion, none can deny the need of a reasoned philosophy.

Admitting the necessity of darśana, a further point of issue arises. Science makes the claim that a complete philosophy based purely on scientific laws of nature and of conduct, free from all psychological and logical fallacies can be worked out. Physical, human and social facts and events must be understood in their environment in this world and must not be referred to anything beyond. Science is still incomplete, but, rationally, it alone is best fitted to give a philosophy of a connected whole of

1. cf., Corliss Lamont, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, p. 1.

2. cf., Julian Huxley, *Scientific Research and Social Need*, p. 276.

3. cf., Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, p. 3.

experience, because only the patient, laborious methods of science can solve the mystery of world and life. It insists that the present limitations of its knowledge on this point do not justify the shortcuts offered by poetry, religion or philosophy, because many of their doctrines have been definitely shown to be fallacious, mere wish-fulfilling, self-deceptive, arbitrary assumptions, not reliable knowledge. Not only will scientific philosophy have the certainty and necessity of science itself, but it will avoid the staticness, abstract perfectionism, disconnection with the concrete and physical world which, according to it, characterises traditional theology and philosophy. Thus science is competent "not only to provide all men's needs, but its theory may show how important features of the universe may be summarised in a few formulae, so that everyone may carry in his head the theoretical equipment to solve from first principles any ordinary problem of life."¹ It is confident that in the future it will replace religious and metaphysical philosophies by its own positivistic philosophy of all life and experience.²

Historically, the separation of modern science from philosophy was not accidental but deliberate. Traditional philosophy was found to be an obstacle to investigation of nature. Science cut loose from philosophy and questions of reality or first principles, with Descartes. This divorce set science free in certain respects, but also had the negative consequence of making science operate without reflection. Philosophical thought receives no support from science, whose scepticism in regard to meaningfulness of world tends to undermine even scientific rational activity. Science can be linked up with an absolutely unreflective view of world and life.

Scientific ability to record, to classify, to analyse observable natural phenomena has not been matched by the ability to answer questions of meanings of those facts, let alone the meaning of existence. Handicapped by evolutionary and mechanistic assumptions the scientific investigation of human phenomena stops at the bounds of the inner life, which contains the vision of the whole. Scientific explanations have proved very useful means of achieving many objectives, but their admittedly partial

1. J. G. Crowther, *The Social Relations of Science*, Intro., p. xxvi.

2. vide John Beattie Crezier, *Civilization and Progress*, p. 264.

nature disqualifies them from serving as a philosophy. The fallacy lies in confusing scientific knowability of objects of the world with the philosophical knowability of the world as a whole. And the unfounded confidence of science in its own efficacy in this respect leads to elevation of proximate scientific knowledge into definitive and final meanings.

It is essential to distinguish between knowledge and wisdom.¹ Science does contribute knowledge concerning nature and man, but not wisdom or the vision needed in life i. e., an integrated philosophy of whole life.² And the rule of scientific knowledge is not equivalent to the rule of wisdom based on the vision of the soul, such as advocated by Plato in his philosophic state. "If therefore, a scientific civilization is to be a good civilization . . . it is necessary that increase in knowledge should be accompanied by increase in wisdom . . . a right conception of the ends of life. This is something which science in itself does not provide."³ Science expects to transmute the relativism of truth, which it itself has supported, by a more extensive and intensive knowledge of individuals and societies, until the whole of truth or wisdom is revealed. But this expectation is based on a superficial equation of technical efficiency with absolute truth. Limits of knowledge are not due to insufficiency of time given to pursuit of truth but due to limits of human nature, in other words, relativism of truth is beyond the rational solution. That the distinction of knowledge and wisdom is true is proved by "the paradoxical situation of the scientific age: vast knowledge combined with the conviction that we know not what we most wish to know."⁴ Scientific rationalism gives no answer to ultimate problems of beginnings or ends, mind-body, soul-destiny. There is a tendency to think that science has made our experience more intelligible, but the world has not become less mysterious.⁵ The scientific interpretation of the world is not only incomplete in fact but even in principle, because every addition of knowledge only makes more insoluble the question of why and wherefore. Nor is this a temporary feature in science but a permanent

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1. vide B. G., VII, 2: vijñāna and jñāna.
 2. cf., J. L. Nehru, *Speeches, 1949-1953*, pp. 430-431.
 3. Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 12.
 4. W. Macneile Dixon, *The Human Situation*, p. 34.
 5. J. S. Haldane, *The Sciences and Philosophy*, p. 165.

character.¹

The solution is not the putting together of multiple knowledges of various sciences, for that presupposes the prior existence of what it seeks to effect i. e., co-ordination of specialised scientific knowledge requires wisdom, which being absent, harmony or unity of view is impossible to attain. Secondly, such an artificial approach would produce a philosophy of little value for a highly cultivated and balanced personality.² Social disciplines have given enough knowledge to man to know that further knowledge is not the answer to the problems of wisdom,³ but so great is the reliance on science that a multiple approach grounded on deeper knowledge of human nature runs in danger of automatic dismissal.⁴

Scientific knowledge destroys the familiar picture of the world i. e., in its theoretical aspect it ignores facts and concentrates on abstractions, allowing man no means of knowing himself as he is or world as it is.⁵ Furthermore, the rapid changes in scientific theories themselves lead to the conclusion that not only is there no final solution of the nature of the world as such, but that even scientific theories are to be regarded as hypothetical descriptions only. The failure of earlier naturalism to give true freedom of largeness of vision was due to its failure to perceive its real power to lie in its freedom of thought rather than in its hypotheses.⁶ But the admission of modern science that its theory is irrelevant in regard to the nature of reality and world does not prove its relevancy in regard to meaning of reality and world. In the light of this, the conclusion is justified that further findings and inventions of science "will not add to our metaphysical understanding, except to those who choose to see it that way."⁷

It is true that there have been attempts at a scientific philosophy by Locke, Hume etc., but they only dealt with limited parts of science i. e., mathematics and physics, and cannot be said to have given a philosophy of science as a living whole.

1. cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 123.

2. cf., L. P. Jacks, *The Revolt Against Mechanism*, p. 64.

3. *vide supra*, pp. 348-349.

4. Lewis Mumford, *Programme for Survival*, p. 50.

5. *vide supra*, pp. 428-429.

6. J. D. Bernal, *The Freedom of Necessity*, p. 94.

7. William S. Beck, *Modern Science and the Nature of Life*, p. 284.

Scientific thinking requires no debate on the nature of reality or man for its operation. But indirectly it does suggest a philosophy whose conclusions about man, world and reality illegitimately transcend the scientific hypotheses on which they purport to rest.¹ Nature and world can be subject to other interpretations than the naturalistic or mechanistic one which science supports.²

It must be admitted that the practical power and utility of scientific knowledge has no connection with the validity of its philosophy, which falls within the intuitive and subjective sphere of meaning.³ Hence the conclusion: in the very "minimal commitment" of man in scientific society to construct a philosophy of life, science can be of little direct service to man.⁴

Need for Religion

"At one time, in all countries, religion has assumed the glory of having civilized the people" by being the potent force of social discipline, regulator of force, ambition, greed and lust, the fosterer of speculation and values⁵ i. e., it was the creator, conservator and dynamic energiser of society. But religion's function as the central ordering force of culture is considered as a utilitarian argument. And critics tend to dismiss this historical justification offered by all religions for their existence. However, a scientific assessment must involve investigation of what religion does or does not do for man, and the historical reference is relevant at this point. Moreover, the balancing of the positive and negative contributions and effects of religion on man and society requires greater impartiality and acuter insight than generally displayed by its critics.

Firstly, "the fact of the religious vision and its history of persistent expansion is our one ground of optimism" in regard to it.⁶ The very fact of long-standing existence is evidence of some human need it fulfils. It is argued that needs

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1. cf., Russell W. Davenport, *The Dignity of Man*, pp. 142ff.; vide supra, pp. 429-435.
 2. cf., Alfred North Whitehead, *The Making of Religion*, p. 126.
 3. cf., Bertrand Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, pp. 102, 273.
 4. James B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man*, p. 110.
 5. Arthur James Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 48; cf., James Beattie Crozier, *Civilization and Progress*, p. 13.
 6. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 192.

solved by religion may be mistaken or otherwise satisfied or even altered by passage of time, nor is the need bound to exist for all time or to be experienced in the same way by all individuals and periods of history.¹ At the outset, the objection of changing human needs is met by noting that religion itself has been a changing phenomenon; there is no fixed stereotyped unchanging religion,² to meet the changing needs of man.

Paradoxically, while the modern scientific age raised a doubt about the need of religion, it also expressed the religious idea. Both rationalistic and non-rationalistic movements of Europe and India showed the independent foundations of religion in human reason by pointing to its internal, universal, metaphysical and moral aspects. Decay of dogmatic religion does not settle the question of the role of religion in modern life, because it is unanimously agreed that the empirical foundations and functional value of religion do not obviate the possibility of perversion and degeneration.³ The "wave of disbelief" is also accompanied by newer conceptions of nature and methods of religion; a religion to complement the scientific outlook on life and the aspirations for harmony in scientific society.⁴ That the need for religion is a common feature of the twentieth century is evidenced by attempts of those who have lost faith to construct new religions, "so much so that it is suspected that science is being taken for a new religion."⁵

Nor has there been anything to parallel the scientific revolution in the modern idea of the good life, where the religious solution still appears as a real alternative. It seems obvious to many that new knowledge demands an adaptation of the religious tradition as a supplement and not a rejection of the total tradition.⁶ The conclusion is that though "men think they can do without religion . . . the question simply is, which one will you have."⁷

1. John and Mavis Blaszczak, *Modern Society*, p. 268.

2. This is, however, only half the truth about religion. Its protagonists insist that no development has occurred in the world of knowledge powerful enough to shake its essence.

3. cf., H. J. Paton, *The Modern Predicament*, p. 386; Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 30.

4. vide supra, pp. 332-333, 372-377.

5. Charles A. Beard (ed.), *Wither Mankind*, p. 65.

6. cf., Wilhelm Röpke, *The Crisis of the Modern Age*, p. 7.

7. Aniel quoted by H. D. A. Major in *Civilization and Religious Values*, p. 41.

Rationalistic science assumed that religion is an accidental epiphenomenon, persisting only because of its functional value in society and bound to be eliminated by the development of reason in man. However, ideologies are not changed so much by logical refutations but by experience of life. We note the operation of some other element than scientific utility in religion viz., its role in experience in terms of intellectual, emotional, volitional satisfaction it offers. Nor should decay of religious faith coincident with advance of positive knowledge be interpreted as "degeneration" in human nature, having an eliminating effect on the need for religion. On the contrary, continuance of the religious impulse may be regarded as evidence for existence of a special constitution of human nature which determines that man's reaction to world take the form of religion, this is proved even by the investigations of comparative religion and psychology of religion.

This is not to argue for any separate religious instinct. It develops out of common sensations, perceptions and mental activities when they are cultivated upto a certain point by discipline.¹ Normal psychological experience is the source of religion as well as of science² and the validity of religion depends upon its being an essential feature of ordinary experience.³ It may be correct to demand that as a human fact religion should be explicable by the laws of the mind, but this cannot be done in terms of any one principle alone i. e., of emotion or the herd or sex instinct. In regard to the latter interpretations it may be pointed out that to trace religion to its instinctive source does not deny its solemnity or profundity; it is a solution of life's problems at the intuitive level, giving each individual an entirely sound adjustment.⁴ The many facets of human nature are integrated in religious intuition, which represents a vital energy of man, by which man can regenerate himself and become master of himself. Science substantiates truths of psychological principles revealed by the religious quest.

If religion is a normal psychological experience, it has still to be proved

1. cf., C. E. M. Joad, *Return to Philosophy*, p. 220.
2. cf., J. S. Haldane, *Materialism*, p. 184.
3. cf., Arthur Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 326.
4. Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and Social Progress*, p. 192.

that this experience is not exceptional or individual but a universal human experience. The objection is raised that even if religion supplies the need for a permanent transcendental reality in human life the need itself is rare in individuals or groups, and religion tends to vanish or get assimilated in other interests and activities. And if there is insistence on a specific experience as the ground of religious faith, that will restrict religion to a few exceptional prophets, saints and mystics. But this conclusion need not be drawn from the premise, as, for example, man can be made musical or artistic only if capacity to appreciate sound or colour is innate in him, but the ability to enjoy music or art is present in different degrees—from minimal to maximal—in men of differing mental powers and developments.¹ And the social environment and culture are powerful determinants of the qualities that will develop in the make-up of its members. Similarly, possession of religious experience implies existence of conditions that allow the existence of the experience viz., capacity for religion in man, but this does not ensure that all men will be equally religious. In this sense it is correct to speak of "the ineradicable religious instinct of human nature."² Otherwise, no man could be made religious, as no trait or experience really foreign to man's nature can be acquired.

The human mind is under necessity of reconciling antithetical facts of life on pain of disruption of personality. The first fact to which adjustment has to be made is death. Religion advances the concept of immortality, survival, eternal life as well as a method to obtain it. Scientific rationalism views this concept biologically as mere will to survive, as ethical judgment on earth, as due to tendency for wish-fulfilment or due to separation from loved ones or frustration of desires and ideals giving rise to hope of compensation.³ It is argued that the religious solution to the problem of death would become superfluous were the economic system such as to ensure abundance for all, were the social system built on a cooperative principle such as to discourage selfishness in its members, were medical science advanced enough to lengthen

1. Clement G. J. Webb, *Religion and Theism*, p. 26.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Religion We Need*, p. 16.

3. Corliss Lamont, *The Philosophy of Humanism*, p. 81.

life.¹ But suffering and death are more powerful facts than what the over-simplified scientific logic and solution would lead us to assume.

Firstly, even if the religious solution be "wish-fulfilment" we have to deal with the fact that it is something which man's nature invariably expresses i. e., it is normal human experience which science seeks to eliminate. Secondly, there is the need for interpreting experience in terms of feeling and meaning (i. e., religion says survival of soul) as well as factually (i. e., science says disease), and the two interpretations are not functionally irreconcilable but supplement each other. Introspection reveals present purposes, ends, ideals, values to be indissolubly linked up with the religious solution, in origin and fulfilment. A positive attitude to life demands that the conceptions of immortality and eternity be taken seriously and balanced with the temporal.

Harmony of the full man in religion is an individual achievement, but is realizable in society. Man's natural non-adaptation to existing things, both internal and external,² is the source of religion. "The normal process of life contains moments as bad as any, . . . to realize this is to realize the consolation of Deity."³ "Frustrations, mental conflicts, unsatisfied desires i. e., psychologically a certain ill defined residue of desires in each leads to the religious experience."⁴ Failure of the pleasure principle as well as the failure of other ends of action considered to be good, that is the breakdown of schemes of value as also the gap between the ideal and the actual gives rise to the soul's cry, "What shall I do to be saved?"⁵ Religion arises and functions as a balance or compensation against life's ineradicable imperfections and limitations.

The pessimism engendering quality of religion is objected to on the ground of its life negating effect. But this aspect is balanced by its optimism creating capacity which is the individual and social "response to disorganizing fear and adversity

1. vide J. B. S. Haldane, *Daedalus*, pp. 54, 73.

2. e. g., ignorance, selfishness, fear; calamities, disasters, disruptions.

3. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 325.

4. Raymond B. Cattell, *Psychology and Social Progress*, p. 193.

5. F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, pp. 158, 160, 161.

and disaster."¹ It gives a sense of freedom springing from infinite possibility of life, rise of humanity to higher realms, and confidence of man in his own value. Rationally speaking, science and nature give no assurance or optimism for the future. They offer security only to the extent their laws and operations are submitted to. Bergson considers religion to be self-preservative effort of life to safeguard man against pessimism and despondency resulting from recognition of the limitations of human knowledge and powers. It counteracts these negative attitudes by making man face life more realistically i. e., without exaggerated complacency and pride of intellect and achievements.²

Justification of religion and religious concepts in terms of "strain-limits" of cognitive, volitional and conative life and activity is objected to on the ground that this does not prove the availability and usefulness of the religious solution.³ But this objection cannot be admitted: religious history supplies proof that the method of religion did serve as the means to the end of personality-integration for man.⁴ Nor could religion and religious experience accomplish such adjustment viz., harmony, equilibrium, removal of stress and strain of inner conflict, sense of integration and, finally, adjustment to the infinite,⁵ if it were an abnormal or neurotic condition of a few individuals only. Clearly the value of religion for society and personality as an aid to adjustment is not wholly replaceable by science.⁶

Religious experience is associated with a sense of value, which establishes its supremacy over other facets of psychic life. Its special domain is human personality and its values. We may expect to find, as we actually do, that great values of human life are given in all the religious traditions. Religion more than science is concerned with the whole man and cannot ignore this element, as does scientific specialisation. Even in the theory which makes religion depend upon sense of value⁷ it is

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1. Bronislaw Malinowski, *Freedom and Civilization*, p. 208.
 2. cf., J. G. Bennett, *The Crisis in Human Affairs*, p. 34.
 3. J. Arthur Thomson, *Science and Religion*, pp. 20-21.
 4. cf., Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, p. 150.
 5. C. Miller, *The New Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 81.
 6. cf., Bertrand Russell, *New Hopes for a Changing World*, pp. 12-13.
 7. e. g., idealistic thought considers religion to be morality transformed by devotion to some supreme good.

admitted that difficulties of scientific secularism in explaining the origin, content, standard and sanction of values can be avoided by accepting the divine as the supremely worthy object of devotion beyond self, which religion offers. "It is a perfectly justifiable working hypothesis that world-purpose (God) offered by religion is not hostile to the best we know (values) and religion is connected with worth and worship of it."¹ The anti-religious outlook may reject the religious object but it must retain the religious spirit of devotion to ends (values), beyond selfish satisfaction of the individual, which commands and invokes a spirit of service.

The certainty arising from logical necessity of scientific knowledge is also sought in the sanction of value-experiences, but may not be found unless traced to some religious ultimate.² "Without religious truth ethics becomes the art and theory of prudent self-aggrandisement."³ It has been shown that habits and conduct related to ethical and other values cannot be wholly determined by scientific knowledge in principle.⁴ And on the other hand, as a matter of historical fact, a majority of men do derive their standards of value as well as submit to sanctions drawn from religious sources. Values and encouragement of efforts for their realization is the special sphere of operation of religion. And this conclusion remains unchanged even if it is insisted that values are not absolute or eternal but provisional and relative.

It is necessary to guard against invoking purely non-religious motives in justification of religion i. e., in terms of its function as source and sanction of rules of conduct or as the principle for the organization of society.⁵ It is to be remembered that above and beyond its value creating and preserving function religion represents the reaction to man's search for transcendent and permanent reality.⁶

The world has need of religion or philosophy which will promote life, . . . if it is to be fully human it must serve some end . . . in some sense outside human life . . . impersonal and above mankind, such as God or Truth, . . . aim at something like a gradual incarnation, a bringing into human existence of something eternal.⁷

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1. J. S. MacKenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 172.
 2. cf., Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 94.
 3. S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, *The Concept of Man*, p. 80.
 4. vide supra, pp. 440-442.
 5. cf., Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 263.
 6. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 191.
 7. Bertrand Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 245.

It is argued that the persistence of the religious impulse does not prove the existence of its supernatural object. Admitting the justification for the question of truth of such a reality, since its affirmation does have an objective reference, the following answers may be suggested. The widely felt conviction of God's existence is *prima facie* reason for believing that it is not a mere delusion. Secondly, if the object which satisfies religious need did not exist it is hard to explain the existence of the need. For man did not create the need itself, which must be correlated to some real nature of things.¹

If there were no being to which the conception of God in some measure corresponded, man would not succeed in adjusting himself to his environment by belief in God Idea of God may not be adequate . . . but every philosophic believer in God is ready to admit that our conceptions of Him are symbolical.²

Thirdly, it is seen that the case of God's existence is similar to that of the reality of the external world. The latter is proved by its relation to experience i. e., in terms of feelings and values it gives rise to. Similarly, the former may also be regarded as proved in relation to life in terms of the sense of the sacred and the holy to which it gives rise.³ Modern psychology proves that our awareness of the real through experience is a confirmation of the belief in that reality beyond the psychic level.

It may be possible to dispense with the anthropomorphic representations of the supernatural reality in society, but not with the aspect of transcendent experience in the sense of gnosticism, because the latter is related to metaphysical and emotional elements essential to human life. Religion does not survive because of its logical force i. e., proofs of existence of God, but because its discipline trains and refines man's insight to the point at which it recognises the transcendent reality when it emerges.

Religion is evoked not merely out of curiosity, but out of vital concerns, and within its own sphere it produces valid ideas. But the psychological analysis of the operations of consciousness only partially explains the goal of religious striving.

1. C. E. M. Joad, *Recovery of Belief*, p. 91.

2. W. K. Wright, *Student's Philosophy of Religion*, p. 357.

3. cf., W. B. Selbie, *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 298.

It retains its significance and influence because man aspires after the meaning of life and the responsibility it entails. Scientific knowledge of the world and the power of control it gives over moral and social life fails to clarify the perplexing mystery of life i. e., the unknown and incomprehensible conditions of human destiny. Religion makes sense out of human life by including more facts and experiences than science does. This is possible because science proceeds by ignoring irrationalities and limitations of reason, while religion is not thus committed to intellectual clarity only. "It takes in its stride discontinuities, bafflements of existence and does not allow this to be a source of embarrassment to the enlightened mind."¹

Man's intimate and personal character, his total reaction to his environment, his awareness of fascination and terror of universe and of his solitariness in it, in terms appropriate to the scale and quality of his new knowledge and to vast changes effected by it is a superhuman undertaking.²

In short, the task of religion is to express both the mystery and the meaning of life.

All religions teach a darsana or a vision of life adjusted to time, place and society. Apart from creeds and rituals and institutional factors they contain deep and vital impulses, mystical in character, which comprise the essential part of their vision.³ A system of meaning and evaluation expressing truths about man's nature and destiny is derived from the historic experience of the people, and is conveyed even in the popular mythological forms of religion. Religion was able to discover great ideals of truth and perfection early in man's history because these ideals arise in inner life of man, where he first meets the problem of his destiny.

Sociology discovered that there has been a development of human mind from the theological stage of feeling and emotion through the metaphysical stage of reason to the final positive, scientific stage of experimentation. Hence, arose the belief that ideas of the latest stage must displace the false anthropomorphic and abstract ideas of the earlier stages completely.⁴

It is true that science is the last in time to suggest a conception of world-

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1. Bernard Eugene Meland, *Faith and Culture*, Intro., p. vi.
 2. Charles E. Raven, *Natural Religion and Christian Theology*, p. 200.
 3. cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Kalki*, p. 37.
 4. cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History*, p. 57: Incoherent fumbings of theology must be rejected for rational analysis of metaphysics and that for empirical coherence as the full meaning of life.

whole, but it is wrong to conclude that the last must necessarily be the best or most correct. Scientific knowledge does not invalidate the genuineness of the religious explanation in favour of scientific nature or the philosophical cosmos. All three aim at knowledge and no one of them can be wholly separated from the other two. Such knowledge served in the past directly through religion and philosophy, now indirectly through accumulation of scientific knowledge, the interests of a philosophy of life, in the absence of which man could hardly live and act as a human and social being i. e., certain fundamental postulates of human existence were discovered by the human race in its infancy which are only now being supported by scientific findings.

No progress in ethnology will be achieved until scholars rid themselves once and for all of the curious notion that every thing possesses a history; . . . until they realize that certain ideas and certain concepts are as ultimate for man as a social being, as specific physiological reactions are ultimate for him as a biological being.¹

If we study the ancient statement of the ultimate problem we find that it is more or less unchanged and has not been improved upon in the scientific age. The scientific solution of that problem appears to be different from the religious or the metaphysical solution. But deeper analysis proves that while science gives better techniques for maximal realization of values, it does not add to the essential truth of the ends, ideals revealed in religion. Progress in science may be new discovery, but progress in religion is achievement of the ideal.² And this is the reply to the assertion that science alone is progressive because each achievement is added to the last and supercedes it, whereas art, philosophy and religion are unprogressive because truth is not cumulative there but has to be relived in its totality. Attempts to return to "natural wisdom" or religion prove that it does give meaningful answers to the mystery of life. It is important to note that wisdom is a dual process. It consists in passing from simplicity of childhood to adult maturity, but also in returning from sophistication to simplicity³ i. e., the theological solutions of the ultimate problem given in the "childhood" of the race must be incorporated into the positivistic solutions of "scientific adulthood." "Simple theology is no less true than the more

1. P. Rodin quoted by Aldous Huxley in *The Perennial Philosophy*, p. 27.

2. Abba Hillel Silver, *Religion in a Changing World*, p. 61.

3. vide Br. Upa., III, 5: षोडश्या बाल्येन ।

generalised conceptions of metaphysics and physics e. g., 'sunrise' may be nearer truth than 'galactic rotation.'¹ Nor is the objection tenable that ideas constituting an advanced philosophy of life could only be stated at the positivistic stage in exact scientific terminology, for "the essential needs of the perennial philosophy can be stated and answered in very simple language or even without it."² Since religion at any level of development is the central element in a consistent philosophy of thought and action, it is justified in claiming universal validity. And "it is to be hoped that all insights and values of the past in religion are not forgotten in the face of some crude, raw uncriticised positivistic philosophy."³

Reconciliation

Though the long-standing conflict of science and religion seems to imply their ultimate incompatibility, yet in view of their historical roles neither can be given up wholly. Religion may be of the type to debar science by making man concentrate on his inner self or it may allow scope for study of nature. Similarly, science may contradict certain religious beliefs, but may agree with certain others. Despite the increasing distinctiveness of their natures, functions and spheres both are forced to adjust their differences due to the popular consciousness of the human need for them, and for social unity resulting from their adjustment to each other. "To imagine that science and technical progress alone can solve all problems that beset mankind is to believe in magic . . . of the very unattractive kind that denies a place to the human spirit . . . a form of witchcraft."⁴ That is, without religion man cannot find value or meaning in life, but, at the same time, without science he cannot live in modern progressive societies.⁵ On all hands it is admitted that a new relationship of harmony between them is urgently needed to be worked out i. e., religious faith must be made consistent with the latest scientific knowledge and scientific discovery must be promoted along lines of the best religious practice. No contradiction can be allowed

1. Herbert Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure*, p. 263.

2. Huxley, *loc. cit.*

3. John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 574.

4. A. V. Hill, *The Ethical Dilemma of Science*, p. 76.

5. *cf.*, Arthur James Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, p. 247.

to prevail between them without adversely affecting integrity of thought and purity of action in society and its members.

Religion which does not touch science or a science which does not touch religion are mutilated and barren. This does not mean that either can be a substitute for the other but that science of the religious man must be scientific and the religion of the scientific man must be religious.¹

Nor can the synthesis of scientific and religious truths and values be criticised on the ground of eclecticism. It need not be a mere juxtaposition of inconsistent ideas,² but a real harmonisation of the spirits of both. Or even if the method be eclectic, its validity cannot be questioned since it is required by the need for a satisfactory philosophy of life i. e., the principle in the light of which reconciliation must take place is human nature and destiny itself.

The antagonism of the two is an actuality, but is not necessarily ultimate or destructive. In actual fact their continued conflict has not prevented the steady advancement of either. According to the dialectical principle of evolution the antagonism should be interpreted as an inevitable stage in attaining a higher synthesis, by the elimination of the false elements of both.³ That science need not be anti-religious or anti-philosophical is proved by that fact that scientists and philosophers⁴ though opposed to theological religion, were able to reconcile their science with religion and philosophy in different ways. The possibility of reconciliation in the future increases because both have changed their forms and stands. Religion no longer insists so much on dogmas as on the reality of the spiritual experience. It has ceased to fear applications of scientific methods to the investigation of its own phenomena as a danger to its reality. Science has also moderated its claims: perhaps its descriptive formulae or explanations are not final. Positive knowledge may not fill the whole region of thought. Its procedures and expanding field may not encompass all of human nature and relations. "Nescience is not the antithesis of science but religious sentiment."⁵ Since science is now more inclined to admit the possible value

1. Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 348.

2. *vide supra*, p. 364.

3. Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 186: In logic a contradiction is a sign of defeat but in evolution of knowledge it is a step in progress.

4. e. g., Darwin, Spencer, Hume, Kant, Comte.

5. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 16.

of the all-embracing or the synoptic view of world, and religion and philosophy are willing to concede the necessity of the analytical scientific procedure for detailed knowledge of the world, the way is open for a synthesis.

The real problem is to reconcile the spirits of both with each other. But most people are not so much troubled by the antagonism of scientific and religious outlooks, as by their apparently contradictory accounts of matters of fact. The confusion is created because ultimate concepts in both fields are contradictory of commonsense view of the factual world. However, the modern world having accepted scientific accounts of the world continues to support the supposedly realistic, naturalistic accounts of science as against the supernaturalistic accounts of religion. "But this way of looking at things is neither good science nor good theology nor good philosophy."¹

Thinkers of both groups are inclined to give science the dominating role in laying down conditions of reconciliation, and religion is expected to follow the conditions thus laid down by scientific knowledge. Popular mind also tends to adjust religious beliefs to latest science. Since the subject of scientific study is finite, limited and specialised there is no cogency in going from any particular scientific finding to metaphysical belief.² "Short-cuts from science to theology are not justified by either science or religion."³ Such a procedure was earlier characterised as a fallacy of metaphysics⁴ and does not prove religious concepts, but only that the false prejudice of the materialistic mechanistic phase of science against religion has been removed and there is scope for a formula of reconciliation. But no true synthesis will be achieved so long as greater importance is given to scientific procedures and results, either implicitly or explicitly. For, man may not turn to religion merely because of loopholes or gaps in science,⁵ but must accept the autonomy and genuineness of spiritual experience on its own ground.

From the psychological angle, another attempt at reconciliation takes the shape

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1. Joseph Headham, *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 9.
 2. e. g., Kant pointed out the limitation of reason in regard to God, freedom, immortality.
 3. Gerald Holton, *Science and the Modern Mind*, p. 58.
 4. *vide supra*, pp. 433-434.
 5. *cf.*, William Ralph Inge, *Assessments and Anticipations*, p. 112.

of limiting religion's field to the emotional element as against the rationality of science. This dichotomy results in depriving its ideas of all "intelligible content in such words as transcendental, sublime etc., which may cover up the fact that these ideas point at nothing."¹ Another attempt consists in limiting religion to moral exhortations and worship, which have no concrete reference, and thus avoiding the possibility of clash with positive knowledge i. e., religion is sought to be retained as a matter of mere social policy, for the sake of good conduct. However, the tendency is to oust religion even from this field of moral exhortation and social reform by secular scientific approaches to these problems. All such artificial, makeshift attempts at compromise are bound to fail because they involve a surrender of vital element in religion viz., its reference to the mystically discerned super-empirical element of world and life.²

Reconciliation is also sought in terms of dualism. Being of a different order, scientific investigation does not interfere with religious conclusions. They are separate in method (e. g., observation and experimentation opposed to contemplation) and objectives (e. g., knowledge and power over nature as against certitude arising from fulfilment of nature). Or the separation of realms in terms of matter and spirit is thought to avoid clash between them. But religion and science cannot be treated as explanations of two separate worlds of experience, because that will still leave the question of relation unanswered. The mind cannot accept the hypothesis of two unrelated orders of existence, nor can it accept the difference of methods applied to one order of experienced world. Religion makes absolutistic claim to cover the whole truth about the whole world, and this includes matter. Similarly, the scientific method and knowledge is all-embracing, covering the whole range of experience including the spiritual. Compartmentalisation into a scientific and a spiritual realm and concession of separate truth in each, cannot be the principle of reconciliation because it is this which has brought about lack of co-ordination in modern society. "Agreement by delimitation of territory is to be rejected as unsatisfactory dualism of fact and value,

1. Max C. Otto, *Science and the Moral Life*, p. 177.

2. cf., J. S. Huxley, *Religion without Revelation*, p. 44.

appearance and reality, knowable and unknowable."¹

It is argued that religion and science can be made compatible by the philosophical distinction of necessary and contingent truth. Science stops at discovery of immanent order, unity, simplicity and continuity in nature while further investigation yields religious truth i. e., uniformity of nature is a necessary condition of rational life, which the religious man interprets as activity of God and the scientist as the "reign of natural law." The difference of the two interpretations is covered by saying that explanation must be in terms of the higher or necessary spiritual truth, but this does not cancel any of the contingent laws of nature. Though it is objected that the difficulty is not overcome simply by calling laws of nature God's laws, yet there is no irrationality in regarding natural law (whatever it may be in the present stage of scientific knowledge) as the testimony of God's presence and operation in nature.² And if the distinction of the two truths be denied by the assertion that "detailed content of ultimate and necessary truths is to be provided by science only,"³ this claim of science commits the fallacy of equating the whole with the sum of its parts.

If the two interpretations be considered complete explanations of existent and external reality they are obviously alternatives and cannot both be true. But if each be an interpretation in different terms of relations between experiences there is no inconsistency between them. Since concepts of science and of religion are not copies of reality i. e., literally true, but are suggested by direct experience and both are admittedly symbolic truths, science demands rather than excludes other facets of reality and experience interpreted by different approaches. "Each explanation is true of its own limited (angle of) experience, though it is possible that future knowledge may be so far developed as to make both coalesce in a single system."⁴

The problem of synthesis has been posed in terms of the relation of faith and knowledge. To define faith "as belief in something for which there is no evidence on

1. Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 348.

2. cf., Gerald Holton, *Science and the Modern Mind*, p. 59: Einstein believes that the only basis of "cosmic religion" is natural law.

3. Errol E. Harris, *Revelation through Reason*, p. 23.

4. Herbert Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure*, p. 360.

emotional grounds¹ is to condemn it by initial predication. Faith may not be identified with the irrational. It is not equivalent to knowledge, but neither is it necessarily opposed to it. Using a different approach i. e., drawing on a different source of knowledge it can come to conclusions consistent with scientific knowledge. There must be a reason for belief;² neither can one achieve faith by sheer force of will, which has no authority outside reason, nor can it be purely emotional without any element of cognition. At the very least, faith is not independent of the negative criticism of intellect and its limits must be set by the latter, though it may not be entirely derived from it. Rational probability of the truths of faith may be regarded as a significant part of its value.³ Parts of religious faith are proved by logic (i. e., metaphysical arguments) but, beyond this, it supplies evidence of experience (which may be considered a scientific test). Religions hold faith and knowledge not to be exclusive of each other, and all aim at enlightenment. Nor is it absolutely inconceivable that faith may be achieved in terms of reason even in the modern age. Many thinkers have talked of the possibility of rational faith.⁴

On the other hand, rationalistic science is not lacking in a faith of its own.⁵ Its premises are also assumptions based on faith, and are not provable by logic. Laws of scientific reasoning e. g., uniformity of nature or induction of the law of causality cannot be validated by observation or by reasoning.⁶ It is a mere article of faith that all knowledge will be tested by experimentation. Clearly, there can be no ultimate rationale of objects of scientific thought.

In all fields knowledge alone is the basis of freedom, but it is faith which inspires the search after knowledge. And knowledge, in turn, provides the motivation for formulation of new faith.⁷ Faith expressed in tradition has to be appropriated by each individual through his own independent reasoning. Therefore, while it may be

1. Bertrand Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*, p. 215.

2. cf., C. E. M. Joad, *Recovery of Belief*, p. 13.

3. cf., A. Campbell Garnett, *Religion and the Moral Life*, p. 124.

4. vide J. S. Haldane, *Materialism*, p. 221; Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 20.

5. e. g., Planck considers the guiding principle of science to be faith and Russell holds science as pursuit of knowledge to be implying faith.

6. vide supra, pp. 425-426.

7. e. g., śraddhā and jñāna mutually interact and intensify each other.

conceded that faith is not universally valid knowledge¹ like that of science, yet it does exist in each individual mind in the form of rational self-conviction.

The harmony of reason and faith is a fictitious problem, because it is only reason whether theological or scientific, that creates absolute dogma The true, real and permanent problem is . . . to assure stability of mind and conscience It is not science that can suffice to secure this stability . . . we need faith . . . and faith has never been anything but firm adherence to the life of spirit. It is the faith which is a profound sense of reality and a vision of the ideal, that urges on religion, science, morality and art to ever-new progress.²

Fragmentation of experience into limited spheres of knowledge and activity by science gives rise to the idea that an all-comprehensive view of integration of knowledge and belief is unnecessary. True, it may not be possible to bring back the self same unified world-view contained in medieval thought, but reestablishment of unity of spirit and even of a unified world-outlook of a different type is not impossible.³ The spirit of science is one with finer religious experience inspite of the apparent conflicts of objects of belief. In regard to the latter, it is to be noted that religion has dimly discerned the eternal unity of ultimate reality and never ceased to emphasize it, though science has contradicted many of its formulations in regard to it. Science also points to that one reality behind the experiential process, difficult to apprehend or to represent. It proceeds with belief in the universe as a homogenous whole. But this "unity of world-whole" presupposed in scientific knowledge is the very truth which religious faith grasped much earlier in history. "Like philosophy and religion science attempts systematically to satisfy the craving for explanation in terms of plausible theories because they postulate existence of identity behind diversity."⁴

The source of this sense of unity is the unity of human nature itself. According to T. H. Green:

1. vide Karl Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, p. 10: The distinction of universal and absolute knowledge.
2. Alfred Loisy quoted by Vergilius Fern (ed.) in *Religion in Transition*, p. 165.
3. e. g., James B. Conant in *Modern Science and Modern Man*, pp. 99, 110, argues that formulations to include values, physical science, biology, cosmology within one scheme at the present state of knowledge go too far and even the possibility of such a formulation in the future or the "argument in principle" must be rejected. But he implicitly accepts the necessity as well as the possibility of such a world-view when he later advances the "provisional hypothesis" that the "minimal commitment" to construct a philosophy of life demands some degree of attachment to religious tradition.
4. Aldous Huxley, *Ends and Means*, p. 280.

The human spirit is one and indivisible and the desire to know what nature is and means is as inseparable from it as the consciousness of God and the longing for reconciliation The scientific impulse on one side and the faith that worketh by love on the other, exhibit the same spirit in different relations A proposition which asserts divine causation for any phenomenon is not exactly false, but turns out on strict analysis to be unmeaning . . . but the very existence of science is a witness to the reality of the spiritual, though, this, just because it is the source of knowledge, cannot be its object Thus everything we know is known to us as a constituent of one world. Hence arises the conception of what we call the uniformity of nature, which, though only recently formulated, is really involved in all knowledge whatever"¹

We cannot insist on different views of world and man in religion and science without destroying the unity of vision. This sense of unity may be retained if we note that science sees life as a unity of mind-body and spirit, while religion sees it from the other angle as unity of spirit-mind and body.² Social philosophy looks to an integralist view in the future, which will combine the sensory-rational with the direct-suprarational element as basis of future world culture.³ "Instead of binocular vision (double truth) there should be monocular vision for a better view of reality,—perhaps a stereoscopic view. Neither scientific nor religious eye should be ousted but philosophy must make them consistent."⁴

Following the command implied in the dictum of Lord Acton:⁵ "We can found no philosophy on the observation of four hundred years (of science) excluding three thousand (of religion and metaphysics)," modern man must seek satisfaction of the impulse to unity through *darsana*. Broadly speaking, there are two mental approaches: the all-embracing one which searches for reality in what is regarded as the noumenal; and the detailed scientific one which searches for reality in the phenomenal. The faith that the latter will help to bring about the former or that the findings of the latter may coalesce with the former is neither baseless nor irrational. If religion be regarded as a total conscious attitude to life, science in the narrow sense is an indispensable factor in it, and in the wider sense in which science includes philosophy, it is identical with it.⁶ Thus the predominantly inner view of religion is

1. vide F. S. Marvin, *The Century of Hope*, p. 225.
2. Victor Branford, *Science and Sanctity*, pp. 32-33.
3. Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, p. 298.
4. Errel E. Harris, *Revelation through Reason*, pp. 29ff.
5. *Study of History*.
6. Harris, *loc. cit.*

reconciled in a valid way with the predominantly outer view of science through a new view of nature and human destiny.

Once religion was the sole provider of means for achieving a darsana but now there has occurred a division of efforts between science and religion. Darsana must be rooted in the traditional religious vision of inner perfection for the motivating power derived from emotions to inspire men, but must have a factual basis of knowledge of environment, to which it must adapt itself externally in order to attain the goal of life i. e., meaning of life is related at one end to rationality of science and at the other end with the super-rational reality of religion which is validated by being lived in human life.¹ Religious belief, science and philosophy cannot be separated without nullifying the search for truth because they are all partial and fluctuate into each other.

The universal validity and authority of religion as well as science depends on the metaphysic they embody The only difference being that science can rest on its practical value and general descriptions, so can leave its metaphysics implicit while religion as direct longing for facts of existence to be justified by nature of existence cannot do without it.²

Both science and religion must assimilate themselves in a new philosophy to satisfy reason, emotion and will of man. But, at the same time, neither pure science nor pure metaphysics aiming merely at intellectual harmony can take the place of living experience which is the distinctive quality of religion.³ "The eternal rhythm of spirit is the circle of science-philosophy-religion from religion-science-philosophy."⁴

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1. vide Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Godly and the Ungodly*, p. 142: Witness (validation) by living in agapeistic love (Vedantic sarvātmaabhāva).
 2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 71; cf., S. Radhakrishnan, *Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 20-21: Philosophy must be a theory of life, significant for religion, which must depend on philosophy or is an application of metaphysics to life. Philosophy must explain religion. But instead of making philosophy religious, we should make religion philosophical. If thought does not give us a religion, still we cannot believe what we like. A religious creed not having a rational philosophy is bound to fail.
 3. cf., Barbara Wootan, *Testament for Social Science*, p. 172.
 4. Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 183.

CHAPTER VI

THE POSSIBILITY OF REORIENTATION IN THE VEDĀNTA IDEAL

In the last two chapters the claim of science to serve as the foundation of a regenerated society has been refuted. Its conceptions in regard to the nature of man, the relation of man and society, the meaning and goal of progress are found to be distortions, if not wholly defective. Above all, its failure to recognise some trans-natural reality in world and man is a serious fallacy, which produces internal and external conflicts within a scientific society. The claim of science to serve as a complete philosophy of life is usurpation of the function of darśana. Science can neither take the place of philosophy nor can it do away with the need of philosophy. Therefore, its unwarranted claims stand in urgent need of correction. The possibilities of Vedānta as such a corrective must now be examined: is it a philosophy of true humanism; of the nature of man and his dilemma of freedom and bondage; of moral life and the ideal of man; of the meaning of religion and attainment of human values; and of a positive attitude towards the phenomenal world?

Spiritual Humanism

Introduction

Renaissance humanism was anthropocentric humanism, centring round the principle of "man as measure," and finding elaboration in the idea of man's need for many-sided blossoming in happiness and social welfare. Its naturalistic bias appeared in the revival of the Greek conception of man as the centre of his own life as well as the centre of the cosmos. Till the nineteenth century it had as its object the study and furtherance of concrete human interests of the widest range of experience, including every act, knowledge, imagination and emotion.¹ It claimed to use the integral nature

1. A. W. Benn, *History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 105.

of man, satisfy human reason and preserve freedom by the use of human powers alone.¹ But this meant rejection of all kinds of hyper-intellectual experiences and absolutistic knowledge, and also tended towards the destruction of integrality of human personality and reduction of concrete reality to illusion.² As seen earlier, humanism found a natural ally in secularism which regards the world as the only sphere of man and rejects every transcendent element from man's nature and action.³ But concreteness requires unification of the transcendent principle with the empirical, the absolute with the relative, the universal with the individual element in human experience.⁴ Nineteenth century humanism failed to attain its own ideal; in attempting to treat human nature and social life in a purely positive, rational, scientific and naturalistic manner it substituted over-simplified and false abstractions in place of the living complexities of reality. As a reaction from the religious world-view it stressed all the elements previously neglected, such as matter, material values, natural knowledge. At first there was a reversal of relation between the spiritual and the natural realms and finally the total deletion of the former from life and knowledge.⁵ Twentieth century humanistic thought, however, became aware that replacement of the God-centred medieval world-view based on revelation and divine authority, subordinating all human thoughts, acts and feelings to that authority, by a science-centred world-view based on the concept of man and human progress supported by the evolutionary doctrine,⁶ was no guarantee of humanisation of life. The history of humanism shows that the standard of value became more and more external to man (economic, technological, material) and improvement of technique in every department of life was not the measure of enrichment of human personality; use of natural energies alone has distorted the energies of science and obscured its real gains and creative function in life of man in society.

In the nineteenth century the earlier concentration of thought on outward universe had begun to be supplemented by the turning of thought towards man and his

1. F. G. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx and Studies in Humanism*, p. 5.

2. *ibid.*

3. *cf.*, J. W. Evans and L. R. Ward (eds.), *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*, p. 181.

4. *cf.*, Viscount Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism and of Other Subjects*, pp. 5, 68.

5. *cf.*, Evans and Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

6. Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 17.

inner nature. Humanism was forced to concede that a "penumbra of cosmic consciousness" remains in life. This type of "religious humanism" insisted that there must be "a Copernican revolution in religion; religion was to be based on what science shows man of universe and himself."¹ The religious sense of mankind could survive by finding its object in the natural world and such an object was humanity perfected through creative imagination and action.² A transcendent end could be admitted viz., the good of humanity, to which the individual is to be subservient. This would give a totally earthly religion of a good life in a good society, denying "mystery" in human life and specially the idea of a "supernatural being" behind the mystery. The distinction of sacred and secular cannot be sustained. The "theocentric" other-worldly, salvational, spiritual life and supernaturalism inherent in the theistic conception of the divine plan and planner, a personal agency behind the universe and closely connected belief in immortality of soul and future life must be dispensed with.³ This humanistic religion aimed only at proximate ends to the exclusion of ultimates, absolutes or final ends, which were considered to be non-concrete and non-existent. Relative truths are concrete because they are related to space, time and conditions, therefore, only they are reliable measures to distinguish truth from falsehood. And such relative or proximate ends of human life can be made sufficiently broad and inclusive to explain and to inspire all human activities. Or it might be said that God's purposes are to be sought in the sphere of significant human activity alone.⁴ Through the activities of art, science, philosophy and religion the "cosmic perspective" can find expression and man can engage in furtherance of positivistic values, here and now.⁵

Neo-Vedantins of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have no objection to the "Copernican revolution" in religion i. e., the future religion bearing the impress of the scientific and technological age in its symbols, rituals or creeds. The emergent religion of the future must take advantage of the knowledge-explosion in

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1. Roy Wood Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, p. 278.
 2. H. W. Carr, *Changing Background in Religion and Ethics*, p. 221.
 3. cf., Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 19.
 4. H. G. Wells, *Anticipations of the Reactions of Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought*, p. 296.
 5. cf., Sellars, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

constructing a theology i. e., a frame-work of facts and ideas, to define man's sense of right and wrong more clearly, to focus the feeling of sacredness on fitter objects,¹ because truth alone sets man free. But the issue is precisely this: the secular, scientific, naturalistic, sceptical, homocentric humanist truth is found to be insufficient for the needs of a future man who is distrustful of the "intoxication over things."² And the neglect of "more-than-human" cannot meet the needs of new freedom based on strength supported by wisdom.³ As argued before, religion is as much part of man as science and may not be replaced by it. At the same time it is essentially "super-natural," in the sense of not being a part of world, society or culture, but an inner spirituality which is universal and transcendent. Since any experience within man's field of experience cannot be said to be beyond it, Vedānta should not be called "super-human" or "super-natural." Though a higher form of experience not easily attained by man, it is still human and natural.

Ātman or fullness of being is the inmost core of man; when seen as permeating the entire world it provides the principle of harmony and gives rise to the feeling of identity with all. Neo-Vedāntins point out that attempt to unite human life at the cost of this most vital element is really profoundly inhuman. It is no artificial unity of form, symbol, ritual, creed, but unity of spirit, preserving the individuality of each person within each religious brotherhood and each religious group within the spiritual brotherhood of man.⁴ While Vivekanand and Tagore think it necessary to go beyond historical Hinduism to attain universal religion or spirituality Gandhi did not think it necessary. And Radhakrishnan agrees with Tagore to "stick to Religion and to let religions go." Aurobindo holds that the hope of human unity is chimeral unless man transcends his present nature, not through a universal religion i. e., a system of intellectual beliefs, but through a spiritual religion of humanity. If humanism desires unity of man with himself and society, unity with the rest of life and universe, a developing and not a static unity, diversity as well as unity, then spiritual

1. Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 26.

2. Clement G. J. Webb, *Religion and Theism*, p. 60.

3. Huxley, *loc. cit.*

4. Vivekanand, *Complete Works*, II, 373; cf., Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

humanism rather than naturalistic or anti-religious humanism is the answer, for it is spiritual humanism which is unitary rather than dualistic, universalistic rather than particularistic, global rather than divisive.¹

Neo-Vedānta would dissociate itself most definitely from religious humanism of the naturalistic type. In the first place, the latter in seeking to unite the spiritual and the material in human life aims at reform of religion by humanism. The Vedāntin insists that humanism must be reformed by Vedānta i. e., instead of "naturalising of the spiritual, there must be spiritualising of the natural."² In the second place, Vedāntins while agreeing that religion is an expression of human spirit reflecting the cosmic consciousness, and attendant emotions and impulses,³ hold that to narrow down this experience to "sociality" or to "human functions furthering values" is to miss the point of this experience. Nor can humanism be a substitute for religion. "Few people will be able to make a satisfactory religion out of worship of humanity."⁴ Religious experience is contact with the ultimate in human life. The religious humanists are inconsistent in denying this ultimate, since they do admit cosmic perspective which points to such a reality. On this point Vedāntic humanism has certain affinities of approach and general conclusion with a specifically Christian humanism, which finds the meaning of true humanism in the spiritual experience of Jesus and aims at a socio-temporal realization of the gospel. But Vedāntic humanism goes beyond the purely transcendent supernaturalism of theism. Its vision of the real may be expressed in theistic or super-theistic creed or philosophy, but in both forms it holds God to be man's own true self and not a supreme being and power dominating him from above and impoverishing his life. Thus it is that Aurobindo declares that he does not feel called upon to answer the strictures of humanists on the conception of the Divine as an eternal omnipotent power who created the world and governs it like an absolute and arbitrary monarch, since this Christian and Semetic conception is not his position.⁵ And even in a strictly theistic position like that of Tagore God's immanence saves

1. Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 14.

2. Roy Wood Sellars, *Religion Coming of Age*, p. 247.

3. *ibid.*

4. Chandra Shankar Shukla, *Gandhi's View of Life*, p. 105.

5. *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, Second series, p. 293.

Vedānta from the charge levelled against "supernatural theism."

Humanism has become an integral part of modern thought, but the problem is to determine what exactly is true humanism. Some¹ among those who hold religion as a necessary element of human life would contrast religious or theocentric type from the anti-religious or anthropocentric type, while others hold that homocentric humanism can be religious and is to be contrasted from theism or theocentric anti-humanism. We have also to take into consideration the fact that since all experience and philosophy must depend on the human constitution it is necessarily anthropomorphic, therefore humanism is merely a choice between good and bad anthropomorphism.² Tagore holds that man is interested in the Absolute not in its transcendent purity but in so far as it comes to man in his heart and life i. e., the Absolute humanised. And Radhakrishnan's interest is in the Absolute as it is intellectualised. Aurobindo's superman will use the power of the Absolute to make a better world and Gandhi applied reality i. e. truth and non-violence directly to world-affairs. Therefore, Neo-Vedāntins might accept the classification of anthropocentric humanism provided the "anthropomorphism" is permeated by spirituality and is a complete or concrete anthropomorphism. However, to avoid an ambiguous and unhelpful tautology it is preferable to call Vedānta theocentric or, better still,³ integral or spiritual humanism or, more briefly, Vedāntic humanism.

A study of tradition convinced the Neo-Vedāntins that a deeper and higher form of integral humanism was rooted in the spiritual and idealistic thought of Vedānta from its very inception, and this was universalised in every strata and mode of Indian life and strengthened by medieval developments in religion. They were convinced that the inner logic of this philosophy could realize and accomodate all real gains of mankind without perversion of spirit or dishonest rationalization or loss of essential character. By original interpretation, creative imagination and moral energy they proved its width of humanistic outlook. Emphasis on existence which is also truth helped to understand its power of synthesis of the whole range of human and spiritual knowledge,⁴

1. e. g., Jacques Maritain.

2. F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx and Studies in Humanism, p. 138.

3. Since "theocentric" is too closely identified with Christian theism.

4. cf., Viscount Haldane, The Philosophy of Humanism and of Other Subjects, p. 92.

and capacity to welcome all truths, lowest to highest and even opposite positions. New facts, ideas and values were shown to be characteristic conclusions of Vedāntic principles by previously unforeseen transformations and developments within itself and within the incorporated elements. Scientific knowledge and social life-conditions were organically related to morality, art and politico-economic idealism.¹ The integral character of Neo-Vedānta was not syncretistic in the sense of Toynbee viz., deliberate adoption of foreign gods in a given religion, but in the sense of breadth of all-inclusiveness natural to it; it remained essentially Vedāntic in every aspect and did not derive its essential character from that which it included viz., science, evolution, social philosophy, politico-economic ideology etc.² A well-integrated philosophy and culture syncretising various concepts and assimilating humanistic values into Vedāntic spirituality is the contribution of Neo-Vedānta.

Integral Vedānta appears as a total philosophy of life. In the Pūrṇavāda of Aurobindo integral philosophy and integral yoga incorporate principles of man's psychology, all his present experiences as well as the future implications of developing physico-social reality in a combination of science, metaphysics ethics, religion, logic, idealism and materialism.³ Radhakrishnan's philosophical or intellectual Advaita stands for the fundamental continuity of philosophy and religion and this widened Vedānta metaphysic covers practical problems of man in the present age to establish humanism in the form of harmony and unity of man, society and world. The humanistic approach of the early nineteenth century Vedāntins was primarily social but Vivekanand integrated Vedānta in its religion and philosophy and expanded it into practical Vedānta. From the metaphysics of Advaita followed the attitude of heroism, combining

1. This is denied by Herbert F. Muller in *The Use of the Past*, p. 361.

2. Vincent Sheean, *Lead Kindly Light*, p. 289; vide R. N. Tagore, "Atma Parichaya," *Quest*, (1961), trans. Buddhadeva Bose: When we receive consciously, the process involves endeavour on our part, we are sensible of what we imbibe. This gives us the impression of receiving more in the same way as the small bonus is more pleasing than the regular salary. Deep down within our being has entered all we received as Hindus; it is part of our flesh and blood and woven into the pattern of our sensibilities and that is why we are unable to recognise it as a distinctive gain and are more keenly aware of what we learn at our English schools, however meagre and superficial it be. It is absurd to imagine we can annex the world renouncing our own foothold on this world.

3. cf., Haridas Chaudhuri, *The Philosophy of Integralism*, pp. vi-vii.

love of all with strength and courage to serve individual and social ideals. Tagore brought out the ethical and social possibilities of Vedāntic humanism, but his stress was primarily aesthetic-cultural, as a consequence of conceiving the real as a personality, whose supreme joy is in creation of rhythm and harmony i. e., beauty. Gandhian humanism is primarily humanism of action rather than of ideas or words.¹ His discovery of truth was simultaneous with the discovery of a moral imperative; knowledge and virtue were identified in him.² "Without making a fetish of consistency I am a votary of truth at the given moment and truth must be evolving in daily practice."³ He worked out the implications of Vedānta siddhāntas of reality, world, man and salvation in individual and social action. Therefore, to attempt to confine his personality and work, the exemplification of his philosophy, into a particular classification viz., social reformer, politician, moralist or philosopher, is to fail to do justice to the wholeness and concreteness of his humanism.⁴ It is a blend of religion, philosophy, ethics, socio-economic-political elements, combined with a totally novel scientific humanism of experimentation with life itself in its every phase and aspect. ✓ Gandhi's contribution to Vedāntic humanism is complementary to the intellectual interpretation of its siddhāntas in the works of other Neo-Vedāntins. His unique commentary-by-life stands witness to its truth as an all-comprehensive philosophy of life.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand takes his stand on religion, but religion confined to priests, temples, dogmas, books or rituals cannot but fail. Ideals of universal religion can become living in the nature of man and society and move them to action as a power of

1. cf., Reginald Reynolds, *To Live in Mankind*, p. 94.

2. cf., Stanley Jones, *Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 108.

3. M. K. Gandhi, *All Men are Brothers*, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 219.

4. e. g., Benoy Gopal Roy in *Gandhian Ethics*, pp. x, 7, distinguishes three layers in the mystery of reality viz., spiritual which is coming face to face with inner-most core of reality; religious which is coming nearer to it; and ethical. Gandhi is put on the third level and distinguished from a mystic or religious leader because the ideal of mokṣa was not his chief concern, communion with *Īsvara* on the religious plane or with the Absolute on the philosophical was not his *sādhana*, but ethical excellence like that of Buddha was his goal, and discipline, for which his religious convictions were merely ethical and religious supports.

Firstly, such separation of morality, religion and mysticism is against the very essence of Vedānta and secondly, it ignores the most essential motivating force of his personality, viz., spirituality.

good only by embracing what is good and great in the world and allowing for infinite scope for development.¹ On the other hand, humanism which affirms unity of aspiration and power in the self of humanity fails because it seeks to narrow the self either in its spiritual or in its secular aspect. The human spirit desires universality i. e., fulfilment in all its completeness, without imposing limits or exceptions. And this may be attained by bringing together two one-sided historical solutions of the problem of life viz., the spiritual solution arrived at by ancient Indo-Aryans by analysis of mind and the scientific solution arrived at by the Greeks by a similar analysis.² Vedānta is challenged by the modern age to become more truly integral in form and spirit, to become broad, to go out, to amalgamate, to universalise itself. Since expansion (physical, metaphysical) is the sign of life, the choice is to expand or to degenerate, a choice between life and death.³ When Vedānta emerges from its narrow groove of exclusive spirituality it discovers that the more generous humanistic conception of life, secular and spiritual, is but a logical interpretation of the truths of its own ancient books.

Throughout history the most potent motive power of man has been faith in himself: the new religion will say that the atheist is one who does not believe in himself, as the old held that the atheist is one who does not believe in God.⁴ That interpretation of Vedānta which took the sole reality of Brahman as an excuse to devalue manhood and life is false; instead, Vedāntic metaphysics, the doctrine of oneness is the true ground for restoration of self-confidence and faith in all humanity, which is declared by modern philosophy, science and psychology, therefore Vedāntic spirituality is to be built round man-making.

It is man-making religion that we want. It is man-making theories that we want. It is man-making education all round that we want. Here is the test of truth--any thing that makes you weak, physically, intellectually, spiritually, rejects that position Truth is strengthening, truth is purity, truth is all knowledge.⁵

Weakness and inactivity cannot heal human weakness, therefore, no good comes out if man

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1. Complete Works, II, 67.
 2. *ibid.*, III, 270.
 3. *ibid.*, III, 316.
 4. *ibid.*, II, 299.
 5. *ibid.*, III, 224.

prostrates himself, thinks he is miserable, low, helpless, dependent on mercy of God and nature. Strength and fearlessness provide the only solution and the Upaniṣad asks man to be strong; abhih, fearlessness is used over and over again for God and man. To believe that none is really weak, the soul is infinite and omnipotent, and to live every moment in the light of this conviction is viveka, which gives the requisite strength and courage for the human task in the midst of a strange nature and the strangeness of man's self. Only such self-conscious action can deify and transform life.

But Vedānta teaches faith in man only as a corollary of faith in God. The "adamantine foundation" of man's strength is the real inner nature of soul, on which alone attention is to be fixed and not on the external attributes and secondary advantages flowing from it. The latter approach concludes in worship of man as synonymous with God, a wrong estimation of human powers discovered by reason and science. But man is to "bow down to God and not to man, God is God—not man is God."¹ The forward march of civilization depends on the faith that men are sparks of the Divine; and degradation is due to loss of faith in God in man. If from the highest to the lowest men are joined (yoga) with infinite life, power and goodness there cannot be loss of heart. To pour water on this root is to water the whole tree of human life; the west may more quickly realize this truth than the Orient which has already exhausted itself in formulating the idea and producing a few cases of individual realization.² Be that as it may, the fact is that faith in power and possibility of mankind remains unfulfilled unless connected with the vision of God i. e., truest exaltation of man is his character as abode of Divinity; religion's aim is to draw attention to this and education's aim is to reveal potential perfection.

Tagore

Tagore affirms humanism as his philosophy. The great destiny of man is not negated by human imperfections and social discords. "I cannot commit the grievous sin of losing faith in man, accepting the present defeat as final Unvanquished man

1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 851; cf., Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekanand, p. 421: We are the servants of God who by the ignorant is called man.

2. Rolland, loc. cit.

must retrace his path of conquest, despite all barriers to win back his lost heritage.¹ This faith in greatness, freedom and coming together of all mankind is the outcome of the faith in the immanent Greater Person, the Supreme Man-God. Indian philosophy realizes dignity of man in his spiritual identification with God, otherwise man would be like an animal belonging to the gods.²

Universal humanity is no abstraction but a concrete objectiveness of living truth, which cannot be proved to its own units as cells of body never observe the body. But the positive truth of solidarity would be concretely evident to the observer who could take in at one glance an immense view of all space and time occupied by innumerable human individuals engaged in evolving a common history.³ This solidarity is the basis of the integrating vision, the concrete humanism which rejects nothing of experience, life and knowledge as alien to itself, nor leaves out of its province any true ideal or achievement of man in the past or present. Science has made the world more generous (humanistic) by achieving the infinite in the heart of the material world. The God-given swaraj is to grow great, inherit the universe by uniting law of universe with law of mind.⁴ But to make this truth truly human, science must submit to the "rule of harmony" and the "rule of rhythm" in life i. e., the moral law. The without can truly improve with the improvement of the within viz., light of spiritual personality of man. Concrete humanism involves dual aspect: the collectivist ideal of the west to be transfigured by the creative ideal of the east and the spirituality of the east to be restated in the light of the scientific vision and organization of the west. Only by grasping the spiritual aspect of humanism in Indian thought and culture are we able to balance with it the secular aspect of humanism, to attain the universal concrete outlook of true humanism.

Religion is the root of all things; humanity can never deny this primal urge. The nature of fire is to burn, of man to fulfil religion. It has its genesis in man's desire to be released from limitation of what is—completeness of reality lies in an

1. Towards Universal Man, p. 359; cf., Gitanjali, 69.

2. Man, p. 47.

3. Sadhana, pp. 47-48.

4. Towards Universal Man, p. 234.

endless contradiction of what exists and what should exist, to be attained by living where men live. India long accepted that this is a state of realizing man's relationship with all through union with God.¹ This religion of man is a higher humanism, no mere intellectual conviction but an outcome of our inner realization of the presence of creative divine reality.

This spiritual experience is to be apprehended in the general mould of Vedāntic thought of the Upaniṣads. Its essentially humanist, liberal, spiritual attitude in regard to life-death, peace-bliss and the deepest yearning of the soul helps to interpret, clarify and enrich humanism. There is no illogicality in this application of ancient ideology to modern human need:

All great utterances of man have to be judged by spirit, not letter . . . the spirit moulds with the growth of life in history. The Indian scriptures are not merely of archaeological interest—nor is the meaning of living words of great hearts exhausted by one system of logical interpretation, but has to be endlessly explained by commentaries of individual lives.²

The Vedas, Upaniṣads, Bhakti and Vaiṣṇava movements form one continuous tradition which was deepened by the Buddhist and Jain tradition. The latter's emphasis on love gave new content to Vedāntic universalism, by providing for altruistic ethic, minimising necessity of renunciation, giving the values of humanity, catholicism and toleration to man's daily life. "The teachings of the Upaniṣads and Buddha to me are things of the spirit . . . awaiting their confirmation in my own special testimony, which must have value because of its individuality."³

Gandhi

Gandhian humanism is faith in possibility of highest development of good in man and of the unity of mankind based on truth and love. This is not an affirmation of arrogant rationalism, since experience shows the merely intellectual conception of man and life to be inadequate, but an optimism born out of experience of divine essence in man. The continuous experiment of life proves the reality and value of both. If divine presence be claimed in the universe it must have its source in human dignity,

1. Sadhana, p. 15.

2. *ibid.*, pp. vii, viii.

3. *ibid.*, p. 7.

therefore, God cannot over-rule man, nor can man discard inner divinity. Without an experiential break in thought or action man can pass from God to love and service of man. "I trust man only because I trust God. If I had no God to rely upon I should be like Timon, a hater of my species,"¹ and "my creed is service of God and therefore, service of humanity."² Humanism must be transformed from an abstract love of humanity in general to love of concrete living beings regarded as spirits of truth and goodness. This alone accounts for the humanistic faith that right will prosper in the end, though there be no evidence for it.³ There is no permanent inelasticity of spirit in human nature, it is bound to respond to noble and friendly action i. e., the good effort of man himself can counteract the imperfections of human nature and society. All life in essence or supreme spirit is one and men are working consciously or unconsciously towards realization of identity, each man is the self of every other and all that separates is mere illusion. This is the sole metaphysical ground of the humanist conception of unity of man. All are members of one vast human family, not divided into water-tight compartments. The goal must be friendship with the whole world, for the world is not worth living in if it be not one world.

If egoistic reason declares that it has no use for religion that is like a man saying he breathes but has no nose.⁴ Reason or instinct or very superstition makes man acknowledge some relationship with the Divine. The rankest agnostic or atheist has need of a moral principle, even a man who disowns religion cannot or does not live without it.⁵ The highest religion is, theistically speaking, divine government of world, for fullest life is impossible without immovable belief in living law in obedience to which the whole universe moves. This is the religion which binds man indissolubly to truth within and ever purifies; the permanent element in man's nature which counts no cost too great in order to find full expression; leaves the soul utterly dissatisfied until it has found itself, known its maker and appreciated true

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1. All Men are Brothers, p. 96.
 2. Young India, October 23, 1924.
 3. All Men are Brothers, p. 102.
 4. Hindu Dharma, p. 122.
 5. *ibid.*, p. 131.

correspondence between the maker and itself.¹

Study of religions gives a glimpse of "rock bottom" unity of religions, a glimpse of absolute truth, lying beyond the dust of creeds and faiths.² Though this universal or humanistic religion is not necessarily the Hindu religion, yet it is not necessary to go beyond the historical religion to make it prevail. The common heritage of man from all the chief religions of the world are the eternal verities of Hinduism.³ The tradition can be widened to include the best of Islam (brotherhood) and Christianity (love and service) as in the past it was broadened by Buddhism and by Jain ethic.

The truth of Hindu religion is represented by the Vedānta: its origin (mother) and "guide" and "dictionary of life" is the Gītā. One Upaniṣadic mañtra (Īśa Upa.,1) gives the essence such as to satisfy even the atheist, the philosopher and the economist, and anything inconsistent with the mañtra may be left out of Hinduism. When this is applied to life it appears as the truly humanistic religion of truth⁴ and righteousness or non-violence.⁵ This religion is the root of Hinduism.

Universal truths of sanātana dharma acquire a power by long usage and sacredness associated with their use. Ideas and truths like human beings have their evolution from stage to stage in the contents they hold i. e., in their implication; they vary with the experience of each individual and every age. The fundamental principle of life and reality is ancient but it must be restated and extended to revolutionise society, and this is not a negation of the truth or law but its fulfilment in higher terms.⁶ Truth and non-violence are not new teachings, but are as old as the hills.

What is required is experimentation with them on as vast a scale as possible. This

1. Young India, May 12, 1920.

2. Hindu Dharma, p. 226.

3. *ibid.*, p. iii.

4. *vide ibid.*, pp. 66-68: It is impossible to give a description of God, I have come to the conclusion that for myself God is Truth and further that Truth is God. The sanskrit word for Truth literally means that which exists, Sat. For these and other reasons the definition is Truth is God, the inevitable means of which is love or non-violence.

5. *vide ibid.*, p. 180: The central teaching of the Gītā is anāsakti which transcends ahimsā. But he who would be self-less has necessarily to practice ahimsā i. e., ahimsā though not going beyond anāsakti is included in it as a necessary preliminary. While man is in flesh and treads the solid earth he has to practice ahimsā. In life beyond is no hiṁsā or ahimsā.

6. J. B. Kriplani, Gandhian Thought, p. 178.

process is aided by the spirit of restless search for truth or scientific enquiry in evolving discriminatively a truer system of life and thought.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan castigates all developments of positivistic humanism viz., naturalism, scientific materialism and mystic nationalism, as one-sided falsehoods. Humanism created a division in man's nature and life by insisting that moral-intellectual categories exhaust man and world and by trying to found society on scientific-secularistic basis alone. The attempt to banish the spiritual Absolute from thought and life by positive criticism results in a rational world of selfish individualism.¹ The unrest following upon the failure to establish creative individual and social life, peace on earth through economic and political (rational) arrangement, is confession of failure of self-sufficient humanism.

Humanism also claims to be a satisfactory religion, but "it fails to induce the great mood which the great gift of life demands."² Firstly, it cannot make death trivial, service significant or give hope in pain and suffering i. e., it fails to eradicate sorrow. Secondly, it does not suffice when ultimate issues face man or crises shake him. Even in the ethical field its standard of the golden mean is too mechanical to discriminate qualitatively between good and evil. It lacks faith, fervour and zeal for moral righteousness which comes from conviction of deathless existence. It entirely lacks the élan of traditional religion because man cannot be religious without feeling his relation to that which transcends the finite and the inconceivable. Humanism tries to sacrifice the mystical and transcendental elements. But a religion whose centre is man, not God, is never a strong one.³ The wholeness and harmony of life demanded by humanism comes only when man is identified with spirit, hence humanism must sublimate into religion.

The task of the present generation is to develop a form of humanism more critical, inclusive and sensitive than the old. That true humanism must embrace the whole

1. "The Spirit in Man," G. I. P., p. 478.

2. An Idealist View of Life, p. 69.

3. *ibid.*, p. 72.

world, since man is now spectator of man.¹ The mind of man i. e., categories and ideals, and organization of the world i. e., institutions, must be shaped so as to make them appropriate to the world-consciousness. Unity of man involves mastery of relations within oneself and with fellow men i. e., essential humanity. The Daemonic element in man's nature (vileness, wildness, cursedness) hinders this and can be cured by establishing liberality, understanding and freedom in a central place in man's life,² and, by the accord of minds and hearts thus created, establishing justice, love and greatness of man in society. Heroic action is needed, which is not possible without hardihood, austerity, discipline, renunciation, humanity and tolerance. All this involves restoration of truth of spirit. The assertion of mind over life and matter must be supplemented by assertion of spirit over body, life and mind, and this unity must become one with the world spirit immanent in all, in order to make man truly human.³ Only the religious spirit can irradiate man's life from within to renew the face of earth.⁴ Such a religion is also universal, the perennial wisdom (sanātana dharma) common to all religions, since men are alike at deepest level of spirit however unlike they may be at level of body-mind-talent-tastes;⁵ it is the most inward essence or foundational spiritual experience of historical religions, to be actualised by the transformation of each and by the fellowship of all. They clothe reality in various images and if their visions were to fertilise each other mankind would acquire a many-sided perfection—the spiritual radiance of Hinduism, faith and obedience of Judaism, life of beauty of Greek paganism, noble compassion of Buddhism, vision of divine love of Christianity, spirit of resignation to the sovereign Lord of Islam⁶ are complementary aspects of reality and man.

There is no conflict between the religion of spirit and a reasonable humanism; if we do not identify religion with world and life negation and humanism with ethics and social progress they are found to be organic to each other.⁷ The strength of

1. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. vii.

2. Occasional Speeches and Writings, First series, p. 49.

3. Kalki, p. 47.

4. "The Spirit in Man," loc. cit.

5. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, p. 80.

6. ibid., p. 75.

7. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 75.

religion does not depend on dogmatic supernaturalism e. g., Hinduism recognises that ideas of God are only interpretations of experience, religious creeds correspond to theories of science, therefore there is natural affinity between provisional, empirical, undogmatic scientific spirit and tolerant hospitable Hinduism.¹ Religious truth is not opposed to reason and "reverence for truth" in religion is the highest human value; religion, science and humanism were sisters in ancient India and Greece, and they can combine today.² A truly humanist philosophy must relate science to religious ideas i. e., intellectual and spiritual aspects, to become the formative element of human culture, whose inner aspect viz., spiritual value, is rooted in religion while the outer aspect is dealt with in science. Such an integration is possible because each man is both religious and rational³ i. e., he has faith in the unseen and longing for union with it, and also faith in reason and criticism of all beliefs he lives by. Indian wisdom is essentially spiritual and necessary for reeducation of the human race, but the inherited pattern of thought has become sterile and, therefore, must look outward for inspiration. There is nothing wrong in absorbing the culture of others, if only we enhance, rouse and purify the elements taken over and fuse them with the best in our own. By this procedure a spiritual renaissance may be produced i. e., unity of man, a world community struggling to be born.

Radhakrishnan's evaluation of religion is determined by his preference for the apprehension of ultimate reality as proclaimed by Upaniṣadic ṛṣis and, within that tradition, preference for its Advaitic interpretation. If religion be understood as individual's striving to realize himself in highest spiritual value, then the whole of Indian philosophy and all of Vedānta is religion. Vedānta is not a religion but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance. It is adequate in terms of depth, comprehensiveness and rationality to serve as basis of true humanism. Firstly, though the dialectic of religious tradition, logic and life gave scope for many forms and stages, they were related to the background of Vedānta; the absolute standard of all sects were the three Prasthānas, corresponding roughly to faith,

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 86.

2. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 294.

3. *East and West, Some Reflections*, p. 120.

knowledge and discipline. Vedānta is Brahma-vidyā, yogasāstra and Kṛṣṇārjuna-saivāda, truth, way and life, aiming to produce the truly human man i. e., the wise man, at once rational, ethical and spiritual.¹ Secondly, a close and objective examination proves that respect for individual, love of wisdom and veneration for divine life is the basic element of Vedānta, therefore there is no need to make a special plea for personalistic (humanistic) values implicit in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā.² Its rationality consists in respect for man and devotion to truth closely allied to feeling for reality—an imperishable Absolute. Thirdly, an idealistic philosophy alone can bring together science and religion, reason and faith, the secular and the spiritual.³ Reality is spiritual, "not irrational, blind, irremediably miserable blunder."⁴ The universe has a meaning and ideal value, which is the dynamic force, driving power of universe. The world is intelligible as a system of ends. Philosophy points to the end of religious experience. At the same time, it has to be freed from the presuppositions of religious dogmas and proceed on rational grounds to reach the inescapable conclusion of absolute idealism.⁵ The anti-absolutist objects that universality of law, unity of whole, relative unreality of particular jeopardises all vital interests of human spirit but such an objection rests on psychological confusion of political absolutism with philosophical absolutism and consequent transfer of undesirable effects of former to the latter.⁶ To establish humanism on foundations of Advaita Vedānta is more possible than to do so on the basis of naturalistic relativism.

Advaita or absolute idealism only means that the one reality is pervading the whole. And humanistic philosophy must take its stand on the unity of universe and human life. Experience or sense of kinship is natural to man if not interfered with by separatist individuality created by intellectual consciousness. If science teaches us anything it is the organic nature of universe. We are one with the universe that has

1. The Brahma-Sūtra, p. 9.

2. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 381.

3. cf., ibid., p. 804.

4. An Idealist View of Life, p. 15.

5. In Schilpp, op. cit., p. 790, Radhakrishnan answers critics by the assertion that there is no inconsistency between criticism of interference of religious dogma with pursuit of philosophy and recognition of value of religious experience for philosophical interpretation.

6. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 47, viii.

made us. Idealistic metaphysic—Upaniṣad—says that every unit of nature is a micro-cosm reflecting in itself the entire all-inclusive macrocosm. If there is law, order, our lives are solid with the world.¹ The unity and wholeness of Vedāntic idealism was corrected in some of its expressions by Buddhistic emphasis on deeper spiritual life and purer ethics. That idealism is the most comprehensive attitude of spirit, temper of mind, whose central principle is possible perfection of man, inherent divinity, solidarity of living beings with each other and life of God.² And this is true humanism.

In following the tradition of Advaita Vedānta it is not necessary to accept its interpretation in every detail of doctrine because "philosophy is produced more by our encounters with reality than with the historical study of these encounters."³ History is both continuity and advance. The debt we owe our ancestors is to study them, but continuity is not mere mechanical reproduction. The philosophy of the present must be relevant to the present i. e., it must be in relation to time, place, circumstance, stream of history reflected in living and changing mirrors of men's minds. The immutable truth which claims universality and does not recreate its forms becomes a dogma and a hindrance to progress.⁴ In differing from ancient teachers reason and experience must be the guide. And true interpretation is that which "wrests from words the thoughts that underlie them,"⁵ to throw light on problems of existence. "Creative logic" discovers the logic of ideas, draws out inferences, suggests explanations and formulates theories. This procedure has the full support of the Vedānta doctrine of scriptural testimony or āpta-vacana (inspired utterances of men illumined by light of God). The Upaniṣads say that pure knowledge or experience baffles linguistic logical descriptions, is only inadequately described through symbols, the timeless truth being apprehended as a temporal event. Since psychological validity of that experience differs from philosophical validity, which is conveyed through language etc., there is much scope for re-understanding and revaluation of scripture.

1. An Idealist View of Life, p. 56.

2. Kalki, p. 68.

3. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 7.

4. The Brahma-Sūtra, p. 8.

5. Indian Philosophy, II, 671.

Aurobindo

Aurobindo holds modern humanism to be a civilized reversion to the Hellenic ideal of a mental being in a material life, an individual and social culture of reason, an intellectual-critical interpretation of life, utilitarian, organized, constructive and governed by science.¹ Its exclusively human-terrestrial view of world has unduly limited man's scope. Life in general and human life in particular is more than logic and humanism is wrong in holding rational-intellectual stage as last and highest development of manhood or society.² The materialistic-vitalistic formula of man and mechanical unity through the principle of standardisation have proved inadequate for humanity's need.³ Progress is the significance of human life or evolution into richer being. But experience shows that humanistic education, intellectual training and social machinery have not changed man. Not even the highest enlightenment and rational will of man consenting to a new socialised life will succeed in this object. Scientific reason rejects the truth that matter and force are real only as parts of reality or divine being; and denial of God as illusion of imagination or agnosticism of thought ends in bankruptcy of things of spirit in life. All this points to the fact that intellectual reason must be treated only as a mediator between life-body and something higher if it is to help in human unity and progress, but it cannot mediate progress by itself, because it turns downward and outward in determining the law of life, while a different faculty turning upward and inward is needed for future evolution of man, which requires a more perfect balance of inner and outer being and freedom of man than achieved under humanistic culture.

At the same time, it must be granted that religious cultures of the past have also failed to achieve this goal, being characterised by narrow exclusive vision, isolated action in the individual, limited working in the social order; marked by too strong an asceticism and not working for definite amelioration of earthly life; having only individualistic ideals of perfection and liberation.⁴ Distrust of intellect and

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1. *The Life Divine*, II, 923.
 2. *Evolution*, p. 133.
 3. *The Life Divine*, II, 924.
 4. *Evolution*, p. 35.

excessive other-worldliness allied to an exclusively supra-terrestrial view was an opposite exaggeration demanding only a colourless unity of spiritual existence, nullifying creative action and divine manifestation. It cut short human fulfilment above by not proceeding to the highest oneness which includes both unity and diversity, and below by not allowing proper amplitude of sense to its presence in the material world.¹ By refusing to admit matter as a real part of the reality of God's being and by denying nature as an illusion of sense, monism of inactive reality ended in bankruptcy of life. This points to the conclusion that religion as it has been in the past cannot be a mediator of human progress, individual or collective. It is always imperfect because there is a mixture of man's spirituality with endeavour coming in in trying to sublimate ignorantly man's lower nature; thus, all religions are a little off-colour, now there is need for a larger opening of soul into the light.²

Humanism is not faced with an alternative of past errors of religious view and culture and the confusion-suffering of a world moulded by exclusive reason.³ In a sense, religion must be the directing light and harmonising law of life, but only as it is in its inner nature i. e., a cult of spirituality opening to deepest life, to indwelling soul and Godhead. Religion is dimly and ineffectually beginning to realize that this alone is the common element and bond of all religions. Spirituality was expressed by paganism in its light of beauty, largeness of life and many-sided perfection, by Christianity in vision of divine love and charity, by Buddhism in the path of greater wisdom, gentleness and purity, by Judaism and Islam in faithfulness in action, zealous devotion to God and by Hinduism in opening up the largest and profoundest spiritual possibilities in man; all these spiritual or God-visions must embrace each other.⁴ The new synthesis of religious thought and experience, accepting all forms of religion because of faith in the One is the wider Hinduism, sanātana dharma, the most sceptical because it questioned and experimented the most; the most believing because it had the deepest, most varied and positive spiritual knowledge—not a dogma but a law

1. *The Life Divine*, II, 470.

2. *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, Second series, p. 56.

3. Haridas Chaudhuri and Fredric Spiegelberg, *The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo*, p. 319.

4. *Thoughts and Glimpses*, p. 40.

of life, not a social frame-work but a spirit of past-future social evolution—is the basis of the future world-religion, having many scriptures, Veda, Vedānta, Gītā, Upaniṣads, Darśanas, Purāṇas, Tantra, not rejecting the Bible or Koran but having the most authoritative scripture in the heart where the Eternal dwells i. e., in inner spiritual experience through the law of jñāna, bhakti, karma.¹ The hope of mankind lies in this universal religion, which is not a system, creed, belief, dogma or outer rite, but a truly spiritual religion of humanity.

Philosophy is intellectual search for the truth, values of things, and religion attempts to make them dynamic in the soul of man; the former is a barren light and the latter superstition and obscurantism if each is alone.² This danger was avoided in India by close cooperation of Vedānta and religion because the values in which religion sought to realize its faith through the method of yoga were also those which philosophy discovered to be the highest. Both agree that humanity can be uplifted only if a total spiritual direction is given to whole life and nature. And this change is not something alien to man's existence or radically impossible, because that something to be attained is here in man's being.

Exaggerations of European thought studying laws of matter, nature and man's existence by intellect, and the exaggerations of Indian spirituality seeking God by ignoring his intention in humanity can be overcome by integral development of human possibilities in individual and collectivity through interchange, not of form but of regenerating impulse and their harmonisation.³ India must admit selected ideas, methods and cultures of the west at their best, but these must be imported with changes and reservations dictated by different conditions.⁴ The three truths of humanism⁴ are the importance and truth of the physical world i. e., it must be accepted that the universe first presents to man a material face, and it is a primary though lesser truth of man's being; its just claims and values must be fixed. Secondly, the scientific method of knowledge which does not impose (adhyāropa) idea and imagination on

1. The Ideal of the Karmayogin, p. 5.

2. Ideals and Progress, p. 67; cf., S. K. Maitra, Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy, pp. 49-51.

3. Ideals and Progress, pp. 60-61.

4. vide Evolution, pp. 47, 29-31.

knowledge i. e., reason purifies instincts, crude beliefs, prejudices and brings light; science is right knowledge of process, a part of total wisdom pointing to deeper truth. Thirdly, it gives importance and truth of earthly life, human endeavour, evolutionary meaning i. e., a creative humanisation of life—progress, freedom, humility and great ideals. All this amounts to saying that Prakṛti as well as Puruṣa must be accepted if antinomies of human life are to be avoided; "a touch of earth is always reinvigorating to a son of earth, for supra-physical knowledge can be mastered only by keeping our feet on the physical."¹ Bifurcation of philosophy into agnosticism and illusion because of its domination by rational intellect is ended by making material thought complementary to idealistic. Philosophy must discover the truth and law of world-process, develop its potentialities, ideals, institutions and organizations, but integral view of Vedānta shows this law and truth to be neither purely material nor mental.

The problem of philosophy is to restate the ancient truth of self to embrace, dominate, transfigure mental-physical, vital life of man. The goal of perfecting humanity is dependent on utilisation of science in development of outer material of life while seizing on Vedāntic knowledge of inner realms and beyond. Integral Vedānta or Indian thought in its fulness is true humanism, perceiving the possibility of divine life in the world to justify science (intelligible aim for cosmic-terrestrial evolution in future) i. e., it solves problem of man's life here and now; and also to justify religion (transfiguration of soul into the Divine) i. e., it solves problem of man's ultimate destiny in terms of ultimate spiritual reality.²

Vedānta must take a supra-cosmic view of world because only by a touch of the Absolute can man arrive at his own absolute.³ Only one part of humanity belongs to terrestrial humanity, another and more real part is much in excess of humanity.

*The humanity of man cannot be highest Godhead, for God is more than

1. *The Life Divine*, I, 11.

2. *ibid.*, II, 32.

3. *ibid.*, II, 471.

humanity, but to be found and served in humanity also."¹ And the Absolute is arrived at not by excluding cosmic reality. It is true that if a man enters world-transcending consciousness, the pure, inactive, silent self of Advaita without intermediate transitions in the cosmos he receives a sense of unreality of world and life. It is Buddhism which upset the balance of old Aryan thought and gave rise to the revolt of spirit against matter. This was the great refusal over-shadowing Indian thought for two thousand years.² However, the hidden message of ancient Vedāntic (Upaniṣadic) realization is not soul's transcendental flight from the rounds of birth and death, liberation from earthly life, as was depicted by older commentators, but emergence and development of the ideal of world-transformation through evolution. The stress of the Gītā on the dynamic nature of the soul leads naturally to this terrestrial consequence.

The Anthropological Question or the Nature of Man

Introduction

Any philosophy of life must start with the question of the nature of man. The problem of religion is the problem of man and its humanistic goal is summed up in the two maxims: "Know thyself" and "The good individual in the good society." Both make the human self the ultimate reality and organization of social life the field of its action and development. Modern thought is unanimous that the future of human civilization rests upon the renewal of search for knowledge and perfection of man's self, for man's control of inner life is, at least, of equal importance with the control of outer nature. Not even the most sceptical thinker can deny the principle of the self and

1. Evolution, p. 133.

S. K. Maitra in *Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*, pp. 55ff., argues that integral religion differs from the religion of humanity, the religion of inner realization (mysticism) and even Tagore's religion of "Greater Man" in setting the standard of religion according to what man is destined to be, hence man, his ideals and institutions are not the goal of evolution; secondly, it makes cosmic realization rather than individual the goal.

It may be noted that throughout this section all Neo-Vedāntins have argued that man's reality lies in something that transcends his present condition, inner, outer, individual or collective. They would accept the definition of true humanism as transcendence, not taking individual or world at its face value, but discovering man's norm and nature to be the hidden Divine. Secondly, all of them have admitted the goal of cosmic liberation. Therefore, we see no objection to characterising integral religion as truly humanistic, as Aurobindo himself admits here.

2. *The Life Divine*, I, 28-29.

Vedānta is that higher humanism which puts man at the centre of its speculation, analyses the "I" and makes self-knowledge its goal by the path of inwardness.

Different philosophies reach different conclusions as to the possibilities of man, because they diverge on what constitutes the essence of human nature. The problem is to find the "complete man" rather than the "human animal" of science or naturalistic evolutionism. If man's personality is conceived as a centre of consciousness connected with a physical body, scientific analysis itself has destroyed the significance of it by breaking it up into its elements. Unless the human self is related to some other principle than physical, biological, psychological principles the attempt to attain it is bound to fail.

A paradox of life is that to attain a goal man must aim far beyond it. Therefore, man's sense of himself must be more than pure humanism in the subjective sense of the term. Far from allowing that man is human only when divorced from the more-than-human Neo-Vedāntins insist that he is human only where he is more than himself. "When God makes a prophet, it is said, he does not unmake the man."¹ The inclusion of the "super-human" or spirit in man's conception makes the meaning more concrete and comprehensive; this real self must be distinguished from the purely human or historical self i. e., spatio-temporal-causal personality determined by the order of nature. Philosophically speaking, humanism is rooted in existence i. e., man emanates from and depends upon the foundation of pure being. In the spatio-temporal world he is alienated from his real nature i. e., self-obsured. His suffering results from good and evil deeds and he passes through many grades of imperfections in time and space through rebirth. Beginning in ignorance he is meant to end in reality, knowledge and bliss. The central metaphysical principle is that only that reality by which man's existence is possible can enable him to know what is within him.

In his existential reality man's nature is a duality. The natural element constitutes the separate individuality in accordance with which he has aspirations and ends natural to human life, for whose attainment he depends upon society and is a part of it. The spiritual element is the universal reality of all things and the very

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 68.

interiority of man's self. Union with God or real self is the source of man's trans-natural aspirations and ends for which he does not depend on society, nor is he a part of it.¹ Therefore, within man's composition is the coexistence of perfection-imperfection, sat-asat, Brahma-Māyā. Neo-Vedānta starts with man in his mixed reality and aims to subordinate the infra-rational to the rational and to illuminate the rational, in its turn, by the supra-rational, so that he is opened to the descent of the Divine into him.

A philosophical synthesis of God, nature and self is needed in order to avoid division of man and nature. Creation is mysterious welling forth of reality or an involution in which all grades of existents and qualities of nature are actualised and formed. Evolution explains how man's continuity with the world is not destroyed, but uniqueness in the rest of creation must also be preserved i. e., neither can man be wholly naturalised nor can nature be wholly humanised. Religious humanism differentiates the human from the natural and the animal by stress on valuational activity and the ethical element. This is the hall-mark of human nature, connected with free-will, unrestrained by constraint of super-human or super-natural kind. Rationalism sees man as perfection of human reason, hence the "crown of nature." Neo-Vedāntins go along with humanism in regard to the uniqueness of man in the scheme of things represented by freedom, greatness, ethical-aesthetic consciousness, but do not attribute these to reason alone. Even rationalists are forced to concede the fact of spiritual aspiration in man as distinct from all other qualities. Ātman or inner unity of spirit transcends the physical, vital and mental; it does not depend on external determination but aims at freedom. Presence of this real self does not nullify any lower element or faculty of man, which remain channels for its realization, though it does determine the order of precedence.

Rational humanists insist on the recognition of ultimate value and independence of finite human personality. But what is essential in man is the conflict within the self, the overcoming of the natural, physical, animal self to reveal the spiritual or

1. J. W. Evans and L. R. Ward (eds.), *Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*, pp. 22, 39.

real self. The peculiar structure and function of the mind separates man from the spirit and the sacrifice of the lower self restores it. Nor is salvation through such sacrifice of ego "destruction" or "escapism." All narrow ties, partial elements must be broken for man to be released into truth, freedom and unselfish activity and thus, to be truly human. Therefore, what is called loss of individuality is attainment of true individuality, through "dilating man into the world" and "concentrating man in the world."¹ The Vedāntic sage aims directly at the humanistic goal of unity and expression of self founded on knowledge of reality or Ātman. Vedānta is right in setting as the end of human effort expansion of microcosm to transcend self, to fuse with not-self in harmonious dynamic peace.² It insists that to know the individual means to know the one universal in him and in all.³ True humanism demands a metaphysics which does not depress human personality and Vedānta meets that test. It does not decrease interest in human individuality and its characteristics, though it does discourage interest in personality or empirical self by not considering it of metaphysical significance. It is the highest form of humanism in which the spirit-element in man is referred to a more ultimate principle viz., the universal spirit.

Vivekanand

According to Vivekanand, of the many riddles perplexing man's mind the most intricate is himself. As a starting point and repository of all man knows, feels or does, there will never be any time when his own nature will cease to demand his best attention. "It is grand to know laws of stars and planets, infinitely grander to know laws governing passions, feelings, will of mankind. To understand the subtle working of mind belongs to religion."⁴

1. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, p. xii.

2. T. H. and Julian Huxley, Evolution and Ethics, p. 215.

3. cf., P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 416: The unifying principle of all must be the highest universal. Advaitins do not accept the category of jāti but they do admit sāmānya, which is one only and the whole of reality. As the most comprehensive universal Brahman is not abstract, but at the same time, it is not concrete as a crown of a system of universals. All admit that it is too great for thought. The theists admit distinctions within it of self and nature i. e., sa-jātiya bheda, though Brahman remains more than a system of all universals. There is identity of universal and particular and ultimately only one universal or particular.

4. Complete Works, II, 64.

World products and beings are manifestations of God, but in different degrees as the sun is reflected better by water or mirror than by other objects.¹ This explains both man's continuity with nature and his uniqueness. The Vedāntin is proud of the human condition: "the human body is the greatest body, higher than animals or angels (devas) because only through this condition is freedom possible."² Due to the revelation of the Divine in man as a unity of spiritual nature he is endowed with possibility of spiritual freedom or independence of world (nature and society).

There are two conceptions of man as spatio-temporal being: in the first, man is a body and has a soul in which the emphasis is on body, enjoyment of senses and objects, the future life is a continuation of the present and worship of God is a means to it; in the other, man is a soul and has a body, the former is the goal and the latter is a means to be used for getting better things.³ Vedānta says, "Man (as a soul) is an infinite circle whose circumference is nowhere, but the centre is located in one spot i. e., body."⁴ Death causes change of centre from body to body. Science teaches that physical individuality is a delusion, the body being one little continuously changing body in an unbroken ocean of matter, and Vedānta teaches that the counterpart of physical body, the individual soul is also a delusion. Both body and thought are finite, coming from limitation. Body is understood in an inclusive sense: the gross or external covering dissolves quickly; the fine or internal covering of the mind—intellect, ego—remains for aeons. Both together constitute the natural pole⁵ in man, distinct from the spiritual. Tendencies of body are derived from heredity i. e., physical configuration, but of mind are caused by karma. Mental or physical blows or karmas leave combined impressions of pleasure-pain, good-evil and this is character; the purpose of such blows is to discover real power i. e., knowledge in the soul.⁶ Vedāntic humanism holds man to be the creator of his own imperfect being. The philosophic principle is that nothing that ends can be without a beginning, and nothing that

1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 85.

2. Complete Works, I, 142.

3. *ibid.*, IV, 10.

4. *ibid.*, II, 33.

5. *cf.*, *ibid.*, III, 334: In the west mind is the soul, in India *antahkaraṇa* is only the tool of *jīva*, by which it works on body, external world.

6. *ibid.*, I, 25, 27.

begins can be without an end, therefore there is no absolute beginning, but the wheel of finite existence set in motion by man's own act in the form of rebirth, can be stopped by him alone.

This present human condition is the covering over of the pure self by ignorance.¹ This obscuration is further deepened by evil deeds and made less deep by good deeds until self recovers full consciousness of its pure nature i. e., obscurity means soul joined to nature becomes an individual, heroism consists in rising above the natural pole by discipline or *sādhana*.

Within the very constitution of man as mind-body is the divine, real man or *jīva*, *ātmā*, *jīvātmā*, which is neither a creation nor a compound, but being simple is neither born nor dies, *anādi-ahanta*.² Religion teaches through symbols, fables, allegories the one lesson that the human soul is perfect in its very nature. Men are "children of immortal bliss, free spirit, blest, eternal."³ Evolution seems to repudiate that man is in separation (degeneration) from what he is. But if purity were not his nature he could never attain it. For anything not perfect by nature if it attains to perfection that perfection will go away again.⁴ Vedānta insists that man knows his self when he knows God.⁵ An apparent contradiction marks human nature as also the universe: unity and variety play in each other and one cannot be conceded without the other. The unity is the real being and knowledge in man and that is the being and knowledge of God.

Humanism insists that the human personality must be recognised as ultimately independent in status. But relative manifestation as such cannot be admitted as independent or final, except in its return to its highest absolute condition. This is possible because historical existence of man is never separated from his real nature.

1. cf., *ibid.*, I, 8: It is not right to say Vedānta shirks the question of why soul thinks itself imperfect when it gives the explanation in terms of *Ajñāna* or "I do not know." To explain the human situation as due to the "will of God" is no answer, in fact less satisfactory.

2. *ibid.*, I, 395.

3. *ibid.*, I, 9.

4. *ibid.*, III, 377.

5. cf., *ibid.*, II, 432: The Brahmin asked Socrates what is the highest knowledge? Socrates: To know man is the end and aim of knowledge. "But how can you know man without knowing God."

The "I" of man is the universal (God, *samaṣṭi*) which is one with the universe, and on the other hand "I" as "so and so" (*individual, vyaṣṭi*) is a limited idea and not the real self.¹ The former involves no loss to man, nor is it a condition of unconsciousness as stock or stone. If happiness is to enjoy consciousness of a particular small body, ultimate of happiness is only reached in a state of universal consciousness. Vedānta demonstrates that misery comes from the idea of individuality i. e., separate being of man from man, nation, earth or atom.² To discover himself, this state of man is to be got out of, as without disintegration the seed (individual self) cannot become tree (God or real self). Vedānta proves that the individuality whose loss is condemned by rational humanism is not a fact, it never has been; man i. e., finite thought, feeling, will, mind, body is ever-changing, and changeful individuality is a contradiction in terms.³ Individual must be in unchanging infinite condition. Nor can there be two infinities, so there is only one individual i. e., infinite, and not many. Therefore, man is only individual after he has by struggle to live in others or in universal consciousness become that universal, and not when he feels himself to be a particular being with ideas (*upādhis*) of "me" and "mine" attaching to himself.⁴ "Individuality in universality is the plan of creation. Man is individual at the same time universal. While realizing the individual nature can be realize even his national or universal nature (*sarvātmabhāva*)."⁵ The first principle of reasoning is that the particular is to be explained by the general, the general by the more general, until the most universal concept is reached⁶ i. e., the real self of *sat, cit, ānand* being known all particular individuals are known in the whole or real nature.

Tagore

Tagore declares that in the course of evolution the vague nebula of consciousness in animal becomes concentrated in man and is declared as: Here am I.⁷ Man's

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1. *ibid.*, I, 340.
 2. *ibid.*, II, 153.
 3. *ibid.*, III, 416.
 4. *ibid.*, II, 80.
 5. *ibid.*, VI, 87.
 6. *ibid.*, I, 366; cf., *ibid.*, I, 148.
 7. *Man*, pp. 6, 7.

history begins with answers to the question, "What am I?" Dharma is that principle which holds man firm i. e., the nature of essential quality and the ideal or ultimate purpose of man is to understand his dharma. As science brings into harmony heterogeneous complexity of the external, man's search for the central principle of unity viz., an outlook on the widest possible field or expansion of consciousness, is commanded by the Upaniṣads: Know thine own soul.

Man is a compound. The human self exists simultaneously in two worlds and must retain the truth in each; these are the worlds of earth and God, a relation of the "this" and the "that,"¹ finite in its expression and infinite in its principle.² The Atharva-Veda declares that in truth man is more than he appears. Just as the atmosphere can be described as the surplus or soul of the earth so is the complete man described as tripādasyāmṛtam i. e., in three parts infinite and in one apparent. Science also says that in a near or partial view the self will be seen as flat, detached, egoistical but in a distant or whole view it will be found round i. e., continuous with world. The scriptural condemnation of "sinfulness" or "nature" in man becomes meaningful only if he has a dual aspect viz., a spiritual, human or personal aspect over and above the natural, animal or physical aspect.

On the surface of man is the ever-changing phase of individual self. At the natural pole of being man is one with stocks and stones and has to acknowledge universal law of nature.³ Realists would try to reduce all reality and even man's reality to the physical. The latter is expressed in man's inanimate body and its animal needs of hunger and thirst. But the animal man is a half-truth, so also is the mental nature i. e., the necessity to find reason in things, because the mind is limited by sense-organs and objects.⁴ Thoughts of man and movements of bodily organs constitute only a part of man. The whole or complete man is not the physical body or mental organization but the deeper unity, the Personal Man fulfilling itself in love.⁵ Even humanists must grant the value of ideals in the process of self-creation of man, which points to the

1. Personality, p. 85.

2. Sadhana, p. 81.

3. *ibid.*, p. 69.

4. Personality, pp. 3, 66.

5. *ibid.*, pp. 38, 3.

spiritual pole: the everlasting reality of eternal spirit in man's soul, which is beyond direct knowledge.¹ Men are the children of light; man is true where he feels his infinity, where he is divine.

Humanity is of nature and cannot be regarded as a self-enclosed organism producing all developments from within its own isolation. All attempts of spirit to be independent of nature are like walking on a single rope of humanity. From his highest to his lowest element man's experience is entirely dependent on nature for its sustenance; in fact, the proportion of the natural to the trans-natural in man's life is as the proportion of water to the land in our globe i. e., the former is predominating.² There can be no uncompromising civil war between man's personality and his external world because nature finds meaning or its law in spirit and spirit finds expression in nature. Nature in its concrete aspect is both habitation of man's spirit and store-house of power. They are face to face, interconnected as friends, the world asks to be loved as personal being and not as utility.³ In the life of the Tapovan the Indian sages were in constant contact with it, their life-object was to realize harmony of feeling and action with it. Earth, water, light, fruits, flowers and beings are not only natural phenomena to be known scientifically and used materially but to be loved with feeling of joy and peace through spirit of sympathy; only through this kinship could man free himself from alien prison walls within which he lives.⁴

Only what is truly related to man can be made his own, the kinship with nature is no anthropomorphic hallucination; reflection of grotesque exaggerated image of man in time, but a feeling in the depth of mind that there is no break in unity. Kinship is due to man and nature having their source in one principle superior to both, from which both derive their value and harmony by being transformed from apparent antagonism into organic relationship.⁵ Divine being is grasped as super-abounding (bhūmā) and giving forth in action (līlā) out of love and joy of creation, for Himself and for man. The whole breaks into plurality for its relation in the two aspects of self and not self.

1. *Enchiridion*, p. 69.

2. *The Religion of Man*, p. 174.

3. *Personality*, p. 3.

4. *Sadhana*, pp. 4, 3.

5. *Personality*, p. 113.

The reality of nature in man and outside man is a reflection of the same power of Brahman (Jivana sakti, Prāna śakti) as is the reality of his spirit. The world without and the intellect within are manifestations of the same sakti. Having known this, man experiences the unity of nature with the human mind and also the unity of his own mind with God.¹

"Let me assert my faith by saying that this world consisting of what we call the animate and inanimate things has found its culmination in man."² The Absolute reveals itself in the whole creation, but its greatest joy is in its special and incomparable manifestation in man. Nothing is wholly unreal, but the object is not real as the subject, for it is not in the starry heaven or beauty of flowers, but in the soul of man that there is perfect revealment. The "superstructure of self" arising out of indeterminate depth of foundation is broken and man stands alone as individual, absolutely unique: "I am I."³ Indian thought held the sense of superiority of man in the scale of creation not because of man's power of possession or physical-mental prowess but because of power of union (love) of the human soul.

The essentially human qualities are freedom, greatness, moral-artistic nature. When man abandons brute strength he discovers his real manhood i. e., power of freedom of spirit. By turning from outside to inside he upsets nature's balance in the rest of creation. Animals are bound by natural necessity (in terms of self- or race-preservation), but in man there is a clash with the world of nature, the divine in man does not rest in embryonic (natural) life of self as final. Science guides man's rebellion against the given world, rule of nature's law; the non-reconciliation to the absoluteness of nature leads man into the world of spirit.

As the foremost creation of the creator man himself is a creator. And in creating life his initiative lies in his magnificence i. e., in wanting more than nature.⁴ His passion is for greatness (bhūma) for the immense (virāt). As the

1. cf., The Religion of Man, p. 93: Gayatri—Let me contemplate the adorable splendour of Him who created the earth, the air, starry spheres and sends the power of comprehension within our minds.

2. *ibid.*, p. 103.

3. Sadhana, p. 41.

4. Personality, p. 88.

boundlessness of the divine surplus is expressed in the eternal world-process so is the surplus in man expressed in creative effort of knowledge, art and all activity. Furthermore, the uniquely human quality in man is his humanity. Animal life is unmoral, but man's life is either immoral or moral. Only human life has dualism of is and ought, not animal. Character is the element in man's personality which fights with animal habits and instincts. This trans-natural quality makes man conscious of his personality as man and is called the second birth.¹

Man's suffering is due to non-realization of his true principle or dharma. All his misfortunes are caused by obscuration of inner man by searching Him (the one in his inmost heart) in external forms, in money, fame or enjoyment—thus making a stranger of his own self.² Unable to go beyond personal surroundings man fails to achieve truth of world and of his own nature. Distracted by fragmentary view he does not see world and self in the true aspect of unity. Avidyā is this limitation of consciousness, a negative force which makes man see the self as unconnected with the ultimate reality. Factors like stupidity, ignorance, insanity oppress man's intelligence and disturb harmony between his rational mind and universe of reason—this is error. And exaggeration of passions upset man's personality, obscure the harmony of individual spirit and universal spirit—this is sin. In all instances there is obscuration of the vision of the one in many, the obstruction of the universal man in physical, natural and spiritual aspects.³

Human life, individual and collective, in space and time, is subject to bondage of death. When viewed in its negative aspect "death is monistic" i. e., does not point to anything beyond. The temporal is so bound. "Death rules only in the land of the immediate present . . . there is decay, frustration and sorrow Real bondage is bondage of time where . . . (man) is prevented from transcending the present."⁴ In spite of the obvious fact of death, the deeper unity, the soul, the personality of man asserts the truth of immortality, amṛtam, as distinct from survival. This is the

1. Personality, pp. 80-81.

2. Man, p. 23.

3. The Religion of Man, p. 179.

4. V. S. Narvane, Modern Indian Thought, p. 225.

creation of the supreme being: "Thou hast made me endless, such is thy pleasure,"¹ and the deepest expression of the infinite in man immediately felt and realized. From this positive standpoint death is the complementary to life, in the life-process itself. "Death is the bride-groom whose only bride is life."² It is the principle of change, it makes things grow, decay, and without it the self would remain static, untransformed, hardened, narrow. It makes possible the gradual perfection of the individual.

This frail vessel thou emptyest again and again, and fillest it ever with fresh life.

.....
The time that my journey takes is long . . . leaving my track on many a star and planet.³

The bliss of reality makes present life and the next equally desirable; through medium of death there is passage from joy to joy in newness and freshness.

The humanism which seeks to affirm the greatness of the finite self and denies the infinite is really false, characterised by the fault of anthropomorphising, and is falsified by the suffering of the heart of the infinite (soul) in the midst of worldly (finite) success. A truly anthropomorphic humanism must avoid this fault by not over-exalting the finite. When the Vedanta declares, "I am He," it is achieving this criterion. This is not the prodigious egoism of the magnification of the worship of the isolated ego, anthropocentric humanism (for glorification of the ego is the prerogative even of animals) but the worship of the all-comprehending immensity (bhuma) within man's soul, quite detached from the ego,⁴ otherwise it would be sheer selfishness.

The whole cosmos is seeking its truth of ever-becoming humanity and man in human society is also seeking to realize himself in the world-man. The Upanisads hold the key to this cosmic consciousness to be consciousness of the soul as apart from consciousness of self. The latter is an obstacle to salvation.

I came out alone on my way to my tryst. But who follows me in the silent dark?

.....
He is my own little self, my lord, he knows no shame; but I am ashamed to come to thy door in his company.⁵

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1. Gitanjali, 1.
 2. Gardner, pp. 138-139.
 3. Gitanjali, 1, 12.
 4. Man, p. 4; cf., Sadhana, p. 7.
 5. Gitanjali, 30.

It tries to strengthen itself through possessions, aggrandisement and gratification-- but this expansion by acquisition is still in the region of nature and diversity. In truth, expansion of the self in desire is mere contraction, and by training of mukti man achieves the personality of soul, which is the region where separateness is secondary and unity is primary. Cosmic consciousness or "widening of the range of feelings"¹ is achieved by expansion of the soul in love.

Tagore refuses to call realization of self self-sufficiency, therefore self-transcendence cannot contradict self-realization. It is transcendence or and of the finite self and realization of the big self. The sacrifice for the sake of fulfilment is no sacrifice ending in destruction, but the mere casting off of bonds i. e., freedom, just as the seed attains the true dharma by bursting out of its shell to become a tree, or as the sacrifice of oil enables the flame-light to establish the relation with all things. The transcendental value of the ideal and the utter prostration of self are complementary.² This is not to be thought of as a negation, but as a dedication for rising above pride, hatred and fear and positively gaining the world in truth, which is the abiding happiness of man. In reference to the merely finite self death is feared and the vanishing of the self has nothing delightful about it, but in reference to the real self death is the most beloved as it appears in its positive or constructive form i. e., it is synonymous with attainment of the object most desired by man, and joy proves that the death and disappearance of the petty self puts man in touch with positive truth whose nature is infinitude.³

Ending of the individual state is synonymous with attainment of personality in and by each individual. Personal "I" must have a perfect relation with infinite personality. It is merely spiritual pride which uses man's name i. e., infinite, to insult man, but it is falsified by the fact that the spiritual world is built out of man's life, will, through suffering and failures. Therefore, true humanism must not allow truth of finite self and its values to be lost. The religion of man is the

1. *Sadhana*, p. 19.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 152; cf., Gardener, p. 46: You are all my world, I am lost in you. Also *Gitanjali*, 98: Nothing will be left for me, nothing whatever, and utter death shall I receive at thy feet.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Intro. by Tagore, p. xii

reconciliation of the Personal Man, the universal human spirit in man's own individual being. Advaita holds that the Absolute Person is the only reality and the finite self is not real in its separateness. "We must become Brahman—our existence is meaningless if we cannot realize the highest perfection that is."¹ But each self has a special place in the universal self, wherein lies its purpose and greatness. Man's longing to keep his uniqueness intact is really the desire of the universe acting in him. There is a difference between Brahman and the individual soul though this is called illusion. Man is ever to become Brahman, the river can become the sea but not vice-versa. The truth of man than which there is no higher truth is the personality or the self-conscious principle of transcendental unity in man apprehending all details of facts that are individually his in knowledge, feeling, will and work.² To know the One within as one in all reveals the truth. But it is no negative universalism, belonging neither to one, nor to another; not an abstract soul but man's own to be realized in others. If it were not singularly his it could not be true, if it were not intimately his it could not be real.³ The relational world of true personality must be both individual and universal. Man's world is his but it is also another's. It is not only in his own individual personality that reality is contained but in an infinite personality. The universal is opposed to the individual and not to personality. Personality is expressed in finite form in man and is also compatible with the infinitude of God. Humanism rests on the ultimate reality of the human person as well as of God.

Gandhi

Gandhi holds that dharma defines man's mission on earth as knowledge. Man is not born to explore avenues for amassing riches to explore means of livelihood, but to utilise every atom of energy to know his maker, or, in other words, religion in its broadest sense is self-realization or knowledge of self. Hinduism abhors stagnation. Knowledge is limitless and also application of truth. To know the entire meaning one need not wade through the infinite Vedas. The sages taught, "As with the self, so with

1. *Sadhana*, p. 155.

2. *The Religion of Man*, p. 117.

3. *Personality*, p. 67.

the universe," it is not possible to scan the universe as to scan the self; to know the self is to know the universe.¹ This is no impossible ideal but man's birth-right and prerogative. He has lost his paradise only to regain it.²

Philosophy holds that God manifests himself in innumerable forms in nature and every such manifestation commands man's spontaneous reverence. And implication of Darwinian evolution in terms of continuity in nature breaks the distinction of animate and inanimate. Man can improve his destiny by making use of nature outside and in his own make-up. The body is given to man on the understanding that he should render devoted service to God with it, hence it is his duty to keep it pure within and without and render it back to the maker in a state of purity. The communion of man with God is aided by taking what the five elements have to give him. He must employ the easiest and simplest way of deriving benefits from earth, air, water, sunlight, ether, as complementary means. It is not nature as such but its wrong use that binds man. Just as the sleeping man's self is not the agent of sleep, but nature, so the enlightened detaches "self" from all activities. Nature is not unchaste, it is when arrogant man takes her to wife that of these twain passion is born.³

Acceptance of man's connection with inanimate and animate nature does not nullify his unique position in the world arising from the presence of spirit in him, which reveals itself through consciousness, reason, conscience, will, emotion. When an appeal is made to man to copy or study nature he is not invited to follow what reptiles do or even the king of forest does. He has to study nature at its best i. e., his regenerate nature, though it requires considerable effort to know what regenerate nature is. In eating, sleeping, in the performance of other physical functions man is not different from the brutes, what distinguishes him is ceaseless striving to rise above the brute.⁴ Unlike the animal, God has given man the faculty of reason, and all men, good and bad, are such as animals are not. But reason has its limitations, as things of fundamental value to man are not obtained by reason alone, but by spirit. Spirit is dormant in

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1. Hindu Dharma, p. 21; vide Br. Upa., II, 4, 56.
 2. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 144.
 3. Mahadev Desai, The Gita According to Gandhi, p. 325.
 4. My Non-Violence, p. 235.

brute, he knows no law but physical might; men in their present stage are partly men and partly beasts, therefore they believe that violence, retaliation is the law of their being, whereas scripture holds it not obligatory, but permissible. It is non-violence, restraint which is obligatory, and highest perfection is attainable only with highest restraint. Nature or dignity of man requires strength of spirit i. e., obedience to the higher law on moral plane. Suffering, not the sword, is the badge of the human tribe, and the duty of renunciation differentiates mankind from the beast;¹ the former can respond to the call of spirit and rise superior to passions (selfishness and violence) they have in common with brute nature; and this is the fundamental conception of Hinduism which has years of penance and austerity at the back of discovery of this truth. The alternative before man is that as soon as he awakens to spirit within he must either progress to ahimsā or rush to his doom.² Human nature will only find itself i. e., know its own real nature and be perfected, when it fully realizes that in order to be human it has not to be beastly or brutal i. e., it must renounce violence, to show spirit in its purity.

Individual man is a composite of body and spirit—neither element is ultimate, but both are expressions of one reality, God. Body is part of nature, growing and decaying, inheriting its traits from parents, on which the environment acts. The aptitudes and relations of man constituting the limitations of his life are results of saṁskāras he carries from previous lives, whose laws are inscrutable and subject of endless search, though not fathomable by anyone. Man's existence as embodied being i. e., natural-biological organism is purely momentary (for what is hundred years in eternity).³ Life is in the midst of death which reduces man's body and works to nought. But the significance of death changes if he recognises his kinship with God and works for His schemes. All perishing then only seems. Death and destruction are then, but only then, but change and development.⁴ The positive role of death becomes possible

1. From Yervada Mandir, p. 81.

2. Harijan, August 11, 1940.

3. From Yervada Mandir, p. 68.

4. cf., Young India, February 2, 1922: Death is an eternal verity, is revolution, and birth and after is slow and steady evolution. It is as necessary for man's growth as life itself.

because of rebirth. Rebirth is as certain as the existence of the present body, therefore, even a little effort is not wasted. And through this process alone the real nature of man, and thereby even the humanist goal of unity may be achieved i. e., man as purified spirit shall be enabled to hug all humanity in friendly embrace.¹

Vedanta declares that men are not the changing minds and bodies, requiring sleep etc. but deep down is the being, the witness pervading the countless bodies.² All embodied life and specially man's is incarnation of God, the Urdu saying is that Adam is not God, but he is a spark of the Divine. Therefore, the real man or soul is this "amāsa" or "dāsa" of God, rather than all the changing attributes of the individual.

Self-knowledge consists in rising above nature, body, ignorance. Philosophically, this is the notion of the ending of ego or separate individuality. There is no destruction of the finite self as long as it is finite and taking birth. Individualism is the thought of "I," or of the body as "I." It is inherent in unmanifest Prakṛti. From individuality springs the cohesion, dhṛti of all the atoms in the body to hold together.³ The ideal state is impossible without overcoming the ego completely, and ego cannot be got rid of while man is tied down by shackles of the flesh. The process is as follows: since the nature of man is not immutable but has limitless possibilities, spiritual development consists in giving up fears. Man is rightly afraid of animal passions, anger and the like, which are internal foes. Such old saṃskāras are controlled and erased by mental struggle and external fears cease of their own accord when the "traitors within the camp" are conquered. The centre round which the fears revolve is the body and they disappear only when man gives up attachment to the body. From the standpoint of truth, desire for enjoyment creates bodies for souls. When the desire vanishes no further need for body remains and the cycle of birth and death ends, the omnipotent soul is no longer confined. The undeluded man is he who casts off individualism or ego, feels no longer the shock of inevitable things like death, pairs of opposite, caused by sense-contacts. The field, the kṣetra (body) subject to all

1. Young India, April 2, 1931.

2. Bapu's Letters to Mira, pp. 143-144: यत्कालं जगत्सु घृष्टि मर्तेति तिलो जित् इति जित्कालं न च भूत संग्रहः।

3. Desai, op. cit., p. 316.

manifestations has to be abandoned in the end by enlightened and unenlightened alike.¹ This principle of total annihilation of body i. e., desire, is the sine qua non of salvation. But descending from the field of salvation to that of family, country and world of humanity, we find the ideal of self-sacrifice and self-abnegation inculcated throughout the world. Selflessness is complete freedom from regard for one's body and such self-effacement makes all beings feel safe from that man.² When man has thus reduced himself to dust, only then he realizes his self or God of Truth.

But ending of individualism is not blankness and negation, as supporters of individuality assert. For self-realization cannot be assertion of oneself as one likes, assertion of individual lusts, whims and passions. This is false and unreal individuality, "but the real life of self comes out of the ego, brought about by the law of purification through suffering."³ The wider consciousness arises in man when body, even intellect and reason are subordinated, "as the condition for the growth of the wheat is that the seed should perish."⁴ When man shatters the chain of egoism and melts in the ocean of humanity he shares its dignity. To feel he is something is to set a barrier between self and God and to cease feeling so is to become one. The drop in the ocean partakes of the greatness of the parent. By the utter extinction of egoism arises universality of being (Advaitam) and equality-consciousness (samatvam) and this is mokṣa in which man is the very image of Truth or Brahman.⁵ The real self of man which he has to see face to face or with which he has to identify or within which he has to lose his self is the Divinity residing in man's heart, and it comprises all universe and man.

Radhakrishnan

According to Radhakrishnan, to know oneself is all man can know and all he needs to know. Human beings are at the stage of self-consciousness and vijñāna, in which there is no illumination of consciousness though there is much knowledge of

1. *ibid.*

2. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 199.

3. *Young India*, January 19, 1921.

4. *ibid.*

5. *To an Indian Capitalist*, p. 52.

material, vital and even mental world. One view of man is that he is a biological-physical entity launched into the river of life without his consent, and this is exaggerated into naturalism and secular humanism. The other view is that man is a spiritual being, the most concrete embodiment of the Divine with sense of values and hunger for eternity, and this is exaggerated into artificial super-naturalism. True humanism must reject the first where it makes man a sum of partial views given in physiology, chemistry, psychology, economics, statistics, biology, anthropology or fiction, and must insist that man be a whole i. e., a personality including and transcending the sum of the parts. Religion is this kind of self-knowledge, because it seeks God who is found most easily in man's soul. Hinduism studies facts of human life in depth in a rational manner. Real religion may exist without a definite conception of the Deity, but not without attainment of true status of individual—mokṣa is Ātma-prāpti lakṣaṇam.¹ Similarly, philosophy is not speculative idealism but knowledge of actuality, cosmic and individual—Ātmānam viddhi.² It enquires into the nature of man, destiny, origin, not by putting together results of specialised investigation or logical generalisation but practically or concretely, by relating thought organically to life and anxieties of human beings. Vedānta when translated into ethic of self-realization i. e., unity of God, nature and self, is the fulfilment of the most urgent need of true humanism.³

Vedānta conceives⁴ the evolution of the real in man and world and establishes both unity and difference between them. In the progressive self-revelation of reality matter or anna is the lowest manifestation, explaining the inanimate world. It forms the basis of and is supplemented by the next manifestation viz., life or prāṇa. But the vital itself remains unaccounted for in merely physico-chemical terms and is supplemented by mind or manas, which has the same relation to life as life has to matter i. e., psychology is related to life and organism in order to become concrete. Nature is objectification of reality with distinctions of minerals, plants animals, life, but

1. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 20; cf., Recovery of Faith, p. 113.

2. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, p. 47.

3. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 4.

4. vide The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 413-416.

this empirical variety should not hide inner, non-objective, metaphysical reality common to all. All manifestations of reality are found in each being and the under-fixed traits of human form are contours of materiality, organization and animality i. e., matter, life and mind filling the world are also in man and he partakes of all forces in the outer world. This gives him affinity with the planetary, physical, plant and animal systems. He shares with plants growing power and with animals moving-sensing power.

Though man is carved out of the continuum of nature and not from a different kind of substance, yet it would be false to regard man simply as an animal grown up; for he is an emergent from the world-process of the real, whose essence is not found in quieting down into instinctive life or unconsciousness. Mind or perceptual consciousness of animals or infants lacks the power of synthesis i. e., self-consciousness, which is the function of the next higher revelation of the real viz., vijñāna, whose relation to mind is that of universal to the particular or of thought to sense.¹ Man's peculiarity is to interrupt the continuity of nature, and this interruption begins with reflective consciousness, though it does not end there. Śaṅkara says that man is vyutpannacitta, reflective being with understanding and will, the power to pierce the veil between the eternal and non-eternal, good and evil.²

The rest of nature is not troubled by hopes and fears of an uncertain future, or inevitability of death. Also, man puts individual preference over natural at-onement, and this knowledge of death and isolation breeds an inner division, tension in his nature. He is aware of his own fragmentariness and always trying to overcome it consciously, to reestablish order and harmony of all his parts. A similar tendency operates unconsciously in sub-human forms, but man assumes active agency in that process. His "spirit" resists all forms of death--blind instincts, unthinking custom, dull obedience, intellectual inertia, spiritual dryness.³ Chief evidence for this peculiarity of man's nature is provided by consciousness of value and problem of morality. Man is dharmakṣetra i. e., having knowledge of right and wrong and capacity to decide right

1. *ibid.*, p. 420.

2. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 593.

3. "The Spirit in Man," *C. I. P.*, p. 501.

or dharma. The whole world is a battle ground of the moral struggle, but the decisive issue lies in hearts of men where battles are fought constantly.¹

What is called the individual human self is made up of body, senses, mind and sense-objects, but none of these is identical with the "I" substance or subject, the ever-present background of all. These constituents of personality i. e., mind-life-body complex are upādhis or the de facto habitation of empirical self, and, inconceivable though it is, Ātmā has nothing to do with the individual's life-history it so faithfully attends and accompanies. It is the screen for mental facts to play on, but they cannot be said to grow out of it. The relation of subject to attributes is inexplicable. Humanism considers the empirical or psychological self (jīvatmā) to be a sovereign good but it is the objective aspect only. This ego-sense is the "constituent condition of actuality," an "organized teleological unity," but it gives an illusion of exclusive unity, marked off from the rest in space and time by the body.²

At any one stage a person is a cross-section of growing entity whose content has a specific character, because different selves are organized in different ways and degrees. Under the sense of difference the temporal process is inevitable. Therefore, the individual is a historical becoming, he is here and now as a result of what he was and did in an earlier period of personal history. The way to realization is slow, it is the crown of patient effort through many lives, in each of which man may take a forward or backward step.³ But the series of births and deaths or change in natural pole of man is not change in soul. The crude theory of materialism which denies future life is inconsistent with the emergent view of self.

Throughout nature life is preserved and continued through incessant renewal. At zoological level the end is perpetuation of species, at human unique individuality through incessant renewal. Broken lives require to be renewed through forces that reintegrate creation. A principle of science is that if we see a certain stage of development in time we may infer a past to it. Rebirth is change within a general structural progression. Death is not a unique event in our progress but part of a continually recurring rhythm of nature, marking a point in individual's history where self assumes a new set of conditions.⁴

The essence of the individual is the plan or pattern he is attempting to

1. The Bhagavadgītā, p. 79.

2. An Idealist View of Life, p. 267.

3. *ibid.*, p. 122.

4. *ibid.*, pp. 287, 290.

realize i. e., the principle of *jīva* is *Ātmā*, the Divine dwelling in man, inner light, concealed witness, enduring from birth to birth, untouched by decay.¹ It is a focus of the one great light in the individual, but a partial focus, not fully brought out during historical existence. The infinite God is manifested in finite existence throughout time; scholastic theologians tell us God is present in creatures by "essence, presence, power."²

The ultimate assumption of human life is spirit, and proof of this is life itself. For if somewhere within man there were not the absolute certainty that the Divine is, he could not live, his life is not lived within its own limits, he is God-man. Were the real utterly transcendent to the self of man it would be impossible to apprehend it even dimly. At the centre of man's being is something akin to spirit, so that God's revelation and man's contemplation are two sides of one fact. The constancy, *tādātmya* of man and God is the conviction of all spiritual wisdom,³ not based on mere inference but on an experience in which barriers of self and ultimate reality drop away. The validity of this is hinted at by man's inquietude, "divine discontent," with purely human or finite ends. The hypothesis of exclusive psychological self leaves no scope for ideals which point to spirit or an invisible community of finite selves. Efforts of man at self-transcendence point to the incompleteness of man at the level of *vijñāna* in which there is the problem of finitude and pluralism, the dualism of self and not self, higher and lower, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* at phenomenal level cannot be an irrational surd incapable of being eliminated; the self struggles against the not self until the distinction of both is overcome in a unity of reality or *ānand*.⁴ Vedānta declares that evolution does not end at reflective consciousness, but the next stage is joy, the fruit of spirit, the distinction between intellect and spirit or *jīva* and *Ātmā* in man is as the distinction between animal and plant.

Man is *Ātman*, which is non-different from Brahman, but the descent of God into conscious being of man is a veiled manifestation, different from the self-conscious

1. The Bhagavadgīta, p. 43.

2. *ibid.*, p. 33.

3. An Idealist View of Life, p. 103; cf., Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 25.

4. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

being of the Divine. He appears far away because soul is immersed in the alien (objects) and finds it difficult to get self-knowledge (subject). To assert the self other than the true reality of God is Avidyā, fall, original sin.¹ This assertion of purely historical self makes man "once-born," liable to sorrow of historical succession, jarāmarana. He suffers the conflict of the divine and undivine in himself, as the stream of his mind flows in two different directions of virtue and vice. Because of Avidyā or ignorance he becomes a victim of selfish desire or kama, following which there is agony of finite creature in time and world of karma.² Man has freedom to realize his destiny i. e., true self, and his abuse of that freedom by stupidity and sin, the consequent sorrow and suffering does not destroy that heritage, though it postpones its arrival. In fact, the universal distress consequent upon Avidyā is a metaphysical necessity for restoration of Vidyā, because it points to reality of Ātman and gives man the aspiration to attain it.

Vedāntic self-realization is identity with the supreme spirit in man, a reality transcending the distinction of subject and object aspects of man's nature; this gives rise to the charge of destruction of individuality, but the problem is unreal. It was long ago admitted by Vedānta³ that if the individual self is deprived of bodily and mental experience it is indeed destroyed. Those who think the highest point is attainable in pure subjectivity forget this lesson. But this danger can be avoided if the universal self in man is shown to be the true life of all and not a mere abstraction-- it must embrace all facts of nature, histories of experience of small selves and also transcend them i. e., it is the Subject that is the universal ground in all individuals. The negative method of Vedānta shows it to be not finitude i. e., self-sufficient, and the positive method finds it in the being of all.

Eternal life is opposed to the temporal and spatial, hence to the narrow individuality of the saṁsārīn. All efforts to reach the universal standpoint while

1. An Idealist View of Life, p. 111.

2. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 47; cf., Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 43: Intellectual knowledge produces both self-consciousness and self-will and gives rise to anxiety, fear, which is bound up with cleavage in life.

3. vide Chān. Upa., VIII, 3-12.

retaining the individual are doomed to disappointment.¹ The commensurability between God and man is not facile, but a breaking of all limits of normal self, an interruption of routine self. A strong sense of individuality is necessary for action but it need not be confused with individualism (isolated distinct existence), which is a state of unstable equilibrium. By such devices as knowledge, art, morality and religion there is progressive self-enlargement of man. As long as man is still seeking or evolving in his empirical, self-contained being universal spirit is still the "other," but for one who has attained to it, spirit is here and now² as the universal life of individuals, races, nations, through the mind, reason, heart, love, will and power of man.³ The highest sense of humanity is to discover each in whole and whole in each.

The two elements of selfhood (uniqueness, eachness), universality (allness) grow together until the most unique becomes the most universal.⁴ Nothing in man's experience can be said to be individual or real without qualification except the spirit which includes both persons, selves, environment and objects. The Absolute Spirit is the only *res completa*, only individual, a unity passing through the highest to the lowest elements, progressively manifesting through particulars.⁵ All phenomena of the universe are only accounted for because the relation of the one universal *ānand* to all evolutes is that of higher and lower, the higher including the lower.

For the individual human being *mokṣa* is negatively freedom from hampering egoism and positively realization of identification with fullest life consciousness. When all limiting adjuncts are removed he is not dissolved in super-personal Absolute, nor removed from the world but enters into partnership with God in cosmic activity.

In my scheme individual is not absorbed into the unity. There is unity in personal love, but God and man remain distinct, so one cannot be spoken of apart from the other until the cosmic process ends. The liberated individual retains his distinction though possessing universality of spirit.⁶

As a free subject, *Puruṣa* or *kṣetrajña*, the human self is universal in the individually unrepeatable form. He is a union of the universal infinite and the universal

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1. *The Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 91-92.
 2. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 302.
 3. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, pp. 32, 352.
 4. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 274.
 5. *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 442.
 6. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 799.

particular, not a part of the whole but a potential whole. The subject fills itself with universal content and at the end achieves unity in wholeness, and then continues to return to embodied existence for the sake of embracing and transforming into harmony all individual manifestations of the whole. Thus personal universalism is the ideal of man, for without it the world would be forever unredeemed. But impersonal universalism is the highest salvation. Loss of individuality does occur, but only when the world is redeemed; the world fulfils itself by self-destruction.¹

Aurobindo

Aurobindo argues that creation is metaphysically an involution by self-projection of the absolute reality or God i. e., existence, consciousness-force. In the order of involution first is the Supermind in which the three aspects of the Absolute are not divided; then mind where knowledge of object is by division from it and relative to thought through over-mind which is capacity for total assemblage of things; then the three stages of higher, middle and lower vital-life i. e., obscure passions and instincts, through the psyche; then a further plunge of life into matter in which consciousness is wiped out but oneness remains. To the extent to which spirit has descended into the world can the world evolve, but in reverse order. Genetic evolution locates man in process of cosmic evolution to determine his present status and gives an indication of his future destiny. There is a leap from one to another grade of evolution even in physical forms, which science acknowledges as the missing link.² From the psychological side there is a leap from metal-form fixed in the in-conscious, inanimate principle of matter, to plant-level fixed in subconscious action of the principle of life, to animal organism fixed in vital-sense mind, to the level of man fixed in mind, which is the reflection of the principle of intellect.³ Between the highest animal and the lowest man there is a deep gulf to cross viz., from sense-mind to intellect-mind. The latter expresses itself in reflection, ideas, consciousness of art, religion, ethics, feelings etc., and contains the aspiration to transcend itself

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 304, 306.

2. *The Life Divine*, II, 506.

3. *ibid.*, II, 508.

into something higher. The difference from rest of nature is the freedom and superiority of man in nature, but the difference is to be made part of the larger truth of man's solidarity with the whole world (including even the physical), which is the real freedom of man. This is hinted at by the principle of continuity as a two way process in nature. There is no sharp difference because the higher principle does not abandon the lower grades, nor does the lower mean an entire absence of the higher i. e., life takes up matter and mind takes up sub-mental life, the mind of intelligence takes up the mind of life and sensation.¹ All lower elements are included, transformed and integrated by the dominant principle of man's present being i. e., mental consciousness, and will be integrated to perfection by the dominant principle of man's future being i. e., Divine or Supramental consciousness. Man stands midway between the beginning and end of evolution in nature i. e., "normal" humanity is something abnormal in nature, a miracle, but it is provisionally normal only, because it is a "semi-divine" nature, which arising out of the animal, is on the way to becoming wholly divine.²

Existentially, man's structural aspect reveals a horizontal cross-section of immense complexity, infra-rational and supra-rational elements. Here his nature is understood in a three-fold classification. Sub-mental and sub-conscious is the material basis, including a larger part of life and body; the subliminal is revealed by psychology as having unexplored faculties, experiences and actions, and this is the inner being of mind, life, physical body when the psychic entity supports them; but the highest reality hidden yet exceeding them all is that which is vaguely called spirit, God, over-self, super-conscious.³ Metaphysically speaking, the phenomenal self is a veiled manifestation of sat-cit, vijñāna and ānand of the Absolute, all inseparable from one another. Matter or lower manifestation of sat is the body of man and life is the lower manifestation of cit-śakti using the body or material form as its vehicle; soul is manifestation of ānand and mind is manifestation of vijñāna (Supermind) or ātma-jyoti (self-luminosity). The true rule and way of being of man, his swadharma, is to shape world and self (body, life, mind) by his soul-power, the highest representation

1. *Ibid.*, II, 510, 506.

2. *The Human Cycle*, pp. 290-291; cf., *The Life Divine*, II, 523, 524.

3. *The Life Divine*, II, 326; cf., *Evolution*, pp. 17, 21.

of transcendental individual self in evolving nature. By man is meant this uncreated indestructible soul or puruṣa that has housed itself in mind and body made of its own elements. Therefore it is essential to distinguish the two persons: the anīśa (Upaniṣad) and kṣara (Gītā) is the apparently mutable soul in nature (Prakṛti) enjoying it i. e., affected by particular part of universe, and swabhāva i. e., existence is phenomena, space, time, causality or being attached to particular individual or jīva; the Īśa or Akṣara is the immutable spirit above nature, watching it i. e., its enjoyment is beyond phenomena because it is self-existent. A third Puruṣa is the Lord of all (characters, ideas, experiences, sensations of all creatures are in it), above the first two; it supports but is not the determining limit of individual existence (kṣara) because the intermediate principle is the real self (Akṣara) i. e., divine unity with God which makes freedom inalienable to man.¹

Religious belief in immortality is a self-evident necessity, if man is to rise above identity with body, life, mind. But true immortality is eternity of self-extension without beginning, end or succession i. e., timeless immortality by knowledge of self in non-becoming. Secondary immortality is perpetual continuity of temporal existence, life to life, world to world, a time-immortality, by knowing self in becoming.² On its spiritual side man's birth is a complex of spiritual person (eternal) and soul of personality (cosmic mutable being). But isolated assumption of life in man's body cannot be assumed nor can the soul be made a wanderer from field to field with unfettered choice. The fact of birth can be understood only if the opposition between life and death is an error of intellectual mentality.³ Death is a process of life, disintegration of substance and renewal in process of life, not a cessation of life but breaking of the material of one form of life to serve as material for another, because form limits the possibility of experience (infinite experience on finite basis) which is a necessity of embodied life. The individual phenomenal self is held together by the principle of heredity and rebirth. The former is the machinery of outer visible process of physical, inconstant evolution by which the form of body appropriate to its

1. The Ideal of the Karmayogin, pp. 47, 45.

2. The Life Divine, II, 243.

3. *ibid.*, II, 568.

form of consciousness is obtained. But the latter is the machinery of invisible process of soul-evolution, by which there is ascent to higher forms of consciousness in higher forms of body i. e., it is a process of assimilating, discarding, strengthening, rearranging of old characteristics and motives (personality). It is a legitimate philosophical presumption that where we see in time a certain stage of development, there must be a past to that development of personality and also a future.

The phenomenal self is a veiled manifestation of the Divine being, hence its condition is described as ignorance. Vijñāna is power of Vidyā and mind of Avidyā both in conjunction and continuity for purpose of infinite phenomenal self-manifestation. Through a three-fold division of consciousness there is lapse from vijñāna to ignorance. The Divine mind allows forms to appear as if self-contained, but is not deluded itself. The new factor in its descent is Avidyā, the ignoring faculty, veiling and separating mind's action from Supermind, perceiving the limited and the particular instead of the unlimited and the universal, or particular in an unpossessed universal and not both as phenomena of Infinite.² The phenomenal self then views the world from its own standpoint of individual soul, excluding others; exclusively identifies itself with particular, temporal, spatial action and loses sight of unity of time, force and substance. This condition of ignorance is further aggravated by identification with a particular body. The object of human life is to accept the illusion of Māyā or exclusiveness of ego, but only to transcend it in higher Māyā or Vidyā, by which self-knowledge and self-realization is attained.

Even materialistic psychology points to the root of our mentality and action in a deeper source, a greater self. But only if that hidden source is concealed consciousness can an endless vista of self-knowledge and enlargement open. "Know thyself" is basic psychological urge of integral yoga, a theoretical and a practical science centring round the question, "What I am at present, what can I become in future and how can that be achieved?" The practical motive is not utilitarian but a disinterested search of life and consciousness, growth for its own sake. Aim of nature in each

1. *Ibid.*, II, 552.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 201.

individual is to be fully, but full awareness, rather than unconsciousness, half-consciousness or deficient consciousness is true being. To be without force or with half force or deficient force is to diminish existence, and the force means will of being and becoming in conscious action. Finally, to be is to have full delight of being, without diminution.¹ Again, to be is to be universally, for restricted ego is imperfect existence, force and delight. But this universality means one is also transcendently i. e., above all conditions of body and world.

Psychology is gradually admitting that man may pass from egoistic consciousness, separating existence into cosmic consciousness in humanity. Through yoga he may arrive at universalised consciousness (Supermind) whose operation is the key to all activities and all minds, further he may enter world-transcending consciousness superior to cosmic existence.² The objection is that individuality has no ultimate status in Vedānta, but this applies only to Māyāvāda, which holds mokṣa to be disappearance of an unreal individual or ego into real self or Brahman.³ Ancient Vedānta indicates that cosmic source of individual self's distortion into ego is only due to its being rooted in lower nature. And integral Vedānta allows that even the ego has significance in the scale of individual and cosmic evolution. Progress of mind, growth of soul and even the collectivity depends upon it. Nature invented it so that man could disengage himself from incoherence of mass or collectivity,⁴ and binds his experiences and relations into a contradictory and incoherent world by making ego the centre. Were the individual self (individuality) identical with this ego, transcendence of the latter would end personality, action, life. But turning inward it is discovered that behind the superficial ego-formation is the conscious Puruṣa. When the former is abolished there is no emergence of spiritual person into world Puruṣa. He still individualises while embracing wider consciousness; it is consciousness of self which at once cosmises in the world and individualises through individual Puruṣa.⁵

The nodus of life is the relation of three general forms of consciousness,

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1. *ibid.*, II, 889-891.
 2. *Evolution*, p. 26; cf., *Ideals and Progress*, p. 20.
 3. *Letters of Sri Anurobindo*, First series, p. 65.
 4. *The Life Divine*, II, 488.
 5. *ibid.*, II, 91.

individual, universal and transcendent or supra-cosmic, the first two being included in the next higher. Liberation is the realized unity of the three in the individual, the individual is, therefore, ultimately important.¹ Furthermore, a continuation of the illumined individual in the action of the world is imperative, for manifestation of the transcendent in the individual is also the means of the universe becoming conscious of itself. Were the individual not to continue distinct from the world and Supreme even in freedom the world would be eternally unredeemed and cutting the "knot of ego" would be a supreme act of egoism i. e., attachment exclusively to individual salvation. Liberation is prevented from being expanded egoism because the true individual is a three-fold unity: a vertical unity enjoying the Divine in transcendent consciousness; a horizontal unity always capable of mutuality with other individuals by enjoying the Divine in cosmic or universal consciousness; a lateral unity reproducing its liberated state at other points in the multiplicity.² The three messages of Vedānta are indicative of this: "I am He" is realization of oneness with the transcendent; "That thou art" is realization that each and every individual is constituted by that oneness or transcendent self; "All this is Brahman" unfolds the truth that whole and parts are very extension of sole existent reality.³

A further objection might be that the spiritual person remains as liberated, purified, perfected in heavenly existence, but is a self without a personality, an impersonal Puruṣa i. e., all gnostic individuals will be the same in being and nature. But in gnostic consciousness personality and impersonality are not opposed principles as they are not in reality. It is true that in spiritual development there is a stage of dissolution into vast impersonality with no ordered key to dynamism of action in outer life, but the descent of Supermind (unity of truth-knowledge, truth-will) establishes outer and inner harmony of the spiritual individual. He will be a Puruṣa unveiled, infinite universal being revealing its eternal self through significant form, expressive power of an individual and temporal self-manifestation, but in perfectly harmonic form. This will neither be what is now meant by a personality or pattern of

1. Evolution, pp. 45, 46.

2. *ibid.*, p. 49; cf., *The Life Divine*, II, 96-97.

3. *The Life Divine*, I, 81.

being marked out by settled combination of fixed qualities, a determined character, nor a capricious, impersonal flux, but an individual nature-manifestation of his true being, though not the whole being.¹ The conception of jīvana muktī does not disallow even the embodiment of the Supreme Person, though the body must be a fit vehicle of perfected consciousness.² According to the principle of evolution, persistence of an unique and pure individuality is assured.³

Freedom and Bondage

Introduction

A humanist philosophy must tackle the problem of relation between man and the ultimate principle of the universe, however that may be conceived. Vedānta studies this problem psychologically and metaphysically. In the latter case it appears as an inexplicable, mysterious coexistence of freedom and bondage. This is the paradox of man's life: on the one hand he is pressed down with self-created bondage and on the other constantly aware of the immanence of absolute freedom in himself. Starting from the premise of freedom of supreme reality to limit itself in world and nature Vedānta passes to the conclusion of human freedom as determination of man by his real self. Anything else is not freedom.

In the sphere of nature law operates, and to this man must submit. Karma determines his present condition i. e., in the realm of facts he is determined and immanent. Karma includes natural, human, divine law and is not to be understood merely in terms of human conceptions of fairness and justice or reward and punishment ideology based on barter and exchange principle.⁴ To treat it in the latter, mechanical way is to equate the universal law of compassion and moral harmony into soulless fate.

1. *ibid.*, II, 854, 856.

2. *cf.*, *ibid.*, I, 314.

3. *cf.*, Nathaniel Pearson, *Sri Aurobindo and the Soul Quest of Man*, pp. 22, 50, 88: As we see that an atom of matter has given way to living cell without becoming mutilated and the cell in turn has become subordinated to new essential centre ego, so we discern that the ego must itself open to surrender its domination and exclusive sense of individuality to the emerging consciousness of higher being in man, being but a step towards unity ending in all-embracing divine consciousness. But then the ego will become a subordinate integer of yet greater wholeness—unity of lower nature of man to serve higher will and law.

4. P. D. Mehta, *Early Indian Religious Thought*, p. 393.

Neo-Vedānta links it with operation of universal energy, therefore goes beyond the individualistic conception of it; causes, responsibility and consequences of individual acts are interlocking with acts of others¹ and this explains growth and evolution. Acts of one are acts of whole. Karma reflects in all the acts of each, yet each is a karmic unit undergoing results of his own act. But as the possessor of self or spirit he has the power to rise above nature's determination, to make future karma and even to counteract past karma by spiritual and moral effort. This is the realm of free creativity, transcendence. Vedānta's solution of the human paradox is: in so far as man is natural he is a determined being, in so far as he is and realizes himself as spirit he is free.

The doctrine of liberation also covers the question of man's freedom in spiritual life in connection with divine grace. Metaphysical denial and affirmation of freedom does not destroy initiative and self-effort in spiritual development. Responsibility is wholly man's to respond to the call of Atman and to progress in the path of faith. The whole process consists of the beginning condition of ignorance and imperfection, the initiative of the individual for liberation, his resistance to and surrender to God's love and finally, his acceptance and utilisation of divine mercy. This process is consistent with the humanistic belief in reality and freedom of human self.

The problem of human freedom also covers the question of evil in human life. Neo-Vedāntins take a comprehensive view of evil as covering every human failing or imperfection or ill. They prefer to take a realistic view of it i. e., evil and its correlate viz., good, are both relative but real parts of the world and are equally sustained by the one reality, and not explicable by two separate principles. The latter procedure is dualistic and yields the illogical conception of finite God.

Spiritual humanism must deal with evil at two levels viz., of bondage and liberation or grace and non-grace. It is necessary to establish responsibility for negative exercise of will i. e., commission of evil. The sole reality of God does not make God the agent of evil, for the karma doctrine establishes human freedom or initiative in the line of evil-doing, which occurs under false conviction of separate

1. vide infra, pp. 536, 541.

being. Therefore, evil which is an empirical actuality must be ended in transcendental reality, since the latter is a unity or universal consciousness and being. In other words, evil is real but not ultimate or absolute. Liberation means going beyond the moral state into perfected condition of both knowledge and will, hence transcendence of morality does not mean license for evil, but the negation of the very cause of evil viz., divisive consciousness.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand declares with Vedānta that the whole universe is working for freedom from which it comes, in which it remains, to which it returns.¹ The universe is a result of a struggle for freedom, which is perceived to be going on from atom to man, from insentient lifeless particle of matter to highest existence on earth, that is the human soul. In the former the striving for the goal is unconscious, in the latter conscious. Man represents the principle of freedom in its highest form and all achievements of culture in every field are linked with advance of freedom i. e., in science, art and religion the original impulse and the end is one and the same viz., liberation. The universal human dissatisfaction resulting from struggle for goals points to freedom as an ultimate goal. Ideals come to man from beyond limits of sense, but they are not wholly expressed nor can they be given up without lowering life to brutishness. The struggle for them causes great suffering, and can be explained and resolved only in terms of Vedāntic conception of life in truth.² Longing for these goals gives rise to idea of absolute free-being (Sacchidānand) which is the fundamental element of human consciousness. The very idea of such absolute freedom makes man struggle against his external and internal limitations, at first instinctively, unconsciously and later with higher consciousness and understanding of the real nature of his life and universe.

Though every moment man feels free, otherwise his life is not worth living, yet a little thought shows that he is a machine and not free.³ Since both freedom and bondage come into human consciousness they are equally delusive or equally true.

1. Complete Works, I, 107.

2. *ibid.*, II, 111.

3. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 163.

Materialists hold the idea of freedom to be delusive and idealists say that the idea of bondage is delusive. But Vedānta replies that man is free and not free at the same time. He is really free, real man (Ātmā) cannot but be free, but when man comes into earthly historical existence of name and form he is bound. The universe is a part of existence limited by mind, senses etc., it is subject to laws relating to space, time and causation.¹ Freedom means being beyond cause and effect.² But internal (mind) and external (physical) nature are both bound by one and the same law. Were not mind subject to causation it would be irrational. Nor can free-will be asserted while denying operation of reason. Will, mind, matter are all within Māyā. In fact, matter and mind are one substance, interchangeable, different only in the degree of vibration: one vibrates at low rate and the other at high rate. Nature is homogenous, different only in its manifestations and subject to law throughout. Free-will is a misnomer, because mind and will come into being only when real man is bound and not before.³

Ātmā is ever free, boundless, eternal, but due to identification of mind with its vṛttis (waves in maze of space, time, causality) the soul loses sight of its nature of freedom (inseparable from immortality which is above the law of nature).⁴ Not by running away from nature, which is a combination of opposites, but by facing it boldly and mastering it through knowledge and seeing through it to the real ground can man attain freedom; the Baconian dictum that nature is to be conquered by obeying her i. e., knowing her laws, operates in science and in religion. Vedānta puts it thus: nature is destroyed by jñāna, then soul realizes, "I am free," "I am what I am" and free agency is established.⁵

Vedānta holds man responsible for attainment of spiritual freedom. The goal of man is freedom from slavery to matter and thought, but any control over these which is not voluntary will defeat itself. There is, of course, the mystery of the situation that someone comes to faith (Ātmā, mukti) by God's grace without seeing or hearing about spirit, another remains plunged in doubt after witnessing the extraordinary

1. Complete Works, I, 93.

2. *ibid.*, I, 254.

3. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 163.

4. Complete Works, VI, 33.

5. *ibid.*, IV, 33.

powers with his own eyes. One must persevere, so that grace of God may be received. But there is and is not a law of grace. The pure in body, mind, speech, strongly devoted, discriminating of nitya and anitya, persevering in manana, nididhyāsana, upon them alone comes the Lord's grace, and this is the element of law in grace. But God is not subject to natural law, is called ocean of compassion exhibited without relation to merit and cause, and one seemingly sinful may have grace unsolicited. One may argue that he had puṇya from past life, but the mystery cannot be denied. Reasoning or demand for law is in Māyā, but grace is outside it and therefore not conditioned. In the light of this, Ramakrishna advised reliance like that of a dry leaf on the mercy of God. The wind of grace always blows, but what man needs is to unfurl his sail¹ in order to go forward, otherwise he does not catch that wind. Failure in spiritual development is not due to lack of divine grace but due to failure of human effort. Man must make his own future in spiritual life. The problem of relating grace and human effort (freedom) is relevant only in the theistic position. But in the monistic position there is no scope for grace. Here, salvation has nothing to do with God's grace, freedom already is, nitya mukti.² By sādhanā or spiritual exertion man attains his goal.

Advaita holds spirit as sole reality transcending nature and life and rejects free-will at the ultimate level, but this does not cancel human responsibility in regard to order of good and evil action at the phenomenal level. Not by denying the supreme causality of God but by affirming it can man's freedom in its full measure of goodness be established. It is to the measure that man receives from the freedom of Ātman that his freedom is real. But Vedānta holds man unequivocally responsible for his karma. The argument that because man is an instrument of God, therefore He is responsible for all human acts is mere cant. Neither can the truth of this argument be established by reasoning alone, nor does such a rational conviction last for more than one moment. In everyday life man is an egoistic agent. "Free-will notion has been established in man's mind by God, otherwise the non-realized people would have become

1. *ibid.*, VI, 436.

2. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 375.

more and more involved in sinful acts, not feeling responsibility."¹ The idea that God is giving us wicked impulses, inciting evil actions is mere creation of egoistic desire for self-gratification. It is ill-digested Vedānta in which man takes credit for good and blames God for evil. The nearer truth is to think that good comes from God and responsibility for evil rests on human will. Vedānta teaches that no one has created the ego-will but man himself is the creator through karma.² Metaphysically speaking, good and evil are both conditioned manifestations of the soul, but the test by which they are distinguished is that evil is the more external coating, good is the nearer coating of the real man, so he has to cut through the outer layer to reach the inner and beyond that to the self.³

Realization of the real self of divinity creates in man awareness of his instrumentality. This is the situation when after repeated analysis the ego vanishes, free-will is seen to be an appearance. The experience that the Lord is the cause of everything cancels wilful persistence in wrong doing. The fallacy in the argument that the realized man can commit sin is the ignoring of the fact that God cannot take a false step. Vedānta insists that so long as God keeps the ego-sense in man, differentiation of good and evil, virtue and sin remains for him, and duty of pursuing the one and avoiding the other holds good; this is true not only at spatio-temporal level of existence but even at level of Ātman. It might be conceded that even after God-realization man keeps his ego-sense of pure sattva. The bhakta keeps the "servant-ego" and the jñānī the "knowledge-ego," and under this ego man shuns evil and enjoys only the godly.

Tagore

Tagore takes his stand on the reality of the Supreme Person as self-determining creator, and the ultimacy of the individual self. God has bound himself in the process of cosmic creation. He is not free because bound by His nature of truth (Satyamūrti) and freedom by virtue of His ānand. Vedānta holds Brahman as the material and efficient

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1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 305.
 2. Complete Works, VII, 272, 273.
 3. *ibid.*, II, 283.

cause i. e., ultimate reality or existence is also the highest law or dharma. "The infinite being set Himself for self-expression the self-imposed limitation of the law of space-time, form, movement. This is the universal law of reason (science)."¹ As a true poem is not constructed according to rules of rhythm and metre but is an expression or creation, so is the world not created according to previously formulated law, but is an expression of unity diversifying itself. The law is formulated with creation and the Supreme Person is the law of natural laws.²

Human self derives its freedom from God's love and desire to share his power with man. The principle of freedom in the eternal nature of divine creativity reveals itself in the empirical or spatio-temporal field in the evolutionary process, which is seen to be moving through many states of matter, life, mind to maximisation of freedom in man. At the human level law of natural necessity is pierced by law of freedom and this contradiction is reflected in man's science, art, morality. But his failure to realize his ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, due to intellect's failure to grasp the whole, makes man crave for a working probability for realization of freedom. "Freedom is all I want."³

Vedānta resolves the paradox of freedom and bondage thus: though man appears bound by natural environment he realizes the infinite as free spirit only. "As link in natural chain man is subject to necessity, as member of spiritual realm of ends, free."⁴ Human self must submit to nature's sway because the "I" is related to "not I" in a medium common to both. Therefore, it cannot be happy with a fantastic universe of its own creation. It is clearly best that all that the human will can do is to deal with things by following their own laws; it cannot be the law of things. Universal law is the instrument of the eternal will and man's will is the smaller instrument through which he is a creator in his outer and inner environment. Subjection to universal law for expression of joy and freedom is really transcendence of law, as bondage in the arms of the beloved is joy.

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1. Personality, p. 54.
 2. Creative Unity, p. 35.
 3. Gitanjali, 28.
 4. Sadhana, p. 69.

The truth we should know is that evil in physical, intellectual or moral life is not ultimate, but only infinity reflected within bounds.¹ Sin or moral evil is an attitude of life which takes for granted that the goal is finite, that there is separate individual existence. The only positive is unity of reality and such characteristics of human life are negative, not stationary or fixtures. Life instinctively takes a view that the positive infinite in man will overcome the negative evil, inside and outside or both. Man has unshakable faith that direction of humanity is from evil to good and the theory of absolute evil is an intellectual or sentimental pose. The method is for the individual to establish contact with infinite consciousness and whole universe.

Liberation means ending of natural and self-created obstacles to freedom.² Lack of freedom is due to spirit's alienation or imperfect realization of unity (ignorance of non-duality) and freedom is union with the creator and his creation. Extremely pessimistic religions try to end communion with nature to prove man's self-sufficiency, but true freedom is not destruction of government but freedom of government. Soul's second birth does not sever relationship with nature but establishes freedom of relationship. When thus freed from blind envelopment nature is illumined for man.³ When intellect's relation to world of nature is thus perfected so is the will's relation to the moral world. In the region of will there is discord of untruth and unrighteousness but such evil must come to an end in its career of discord. Possibility of negative freedom (license) exists to make positive freedom possible. For the time being freedom of self turns its back on realization of unity, but cannot cut itself off permanently. The will becomes free externally from guidance of pleasure and internally from domination of narrowness of self-desire. The normal process of soul's progress is from individual to community, from community to universe, from universe to infinity. And harmony of the universal leaves no room for untrammelled desires of rampant individualism to pursue their destructive course, but leads them on to their

1. *ibid.*, p. 47.

2. *Man*, p. 61.

3. *Personality*, pp. 93-94.

ultimate modulation in the Supreme.¹ The seer or the liberated does not ignore natural or moral law but discovers and submits to that infinite joy in which all are born.

Some say that man's nature is sinful and liberation can only be by divine grace. But mysterious, unsolicited free grace of God cannot be accepted because it implies an imperfect relation of human and Divine in which there is only power and coercion on one side and passivity and gifts on the other.² Unless both God and man are real and free there is no meaning in postulating their unity as the Vedānta does. Only a free entity can have relation with another entity; only a free self can come to God. Furthermore, since true spirituality is a relation of love between God and man, there must be perfect equality or partnership in which each gives to and takes from the other out of his abundance. There must be equal joy for man and for God and Vaiṣṇava Vedānta declares boldly that God has to rely on human souls for fulfilment of His love.³ Thus soul attains meaning not by compulsion of God's power but by uniting with God in freedom through love. Because God's will is love's will and therefore free, it can have joy in union with another will which is also free.

Grace is God's life flowing in its own outpouring of self-giving and coming into human life at the point where it is searching for freedom i. e., the soul, which is free to disown God. God stands aside from the human self with boundless and watchful patience waiting to be invited in.⁴ Man's misery consists in his self-obscured, lost-in-desire state. As a creature of narrow self he is blind to the infinite. When in the midst of darkness, death and untruth he cries out, prays for a smile of grace—this is the surrender waited for by God. Man's willing surrender to the infinite will is the commencement of the union. He must freely choose a life of cooperation with God, only then can God's love or grace fully act.

Gandhi

Vedānta holds Brahman as the final ground of all appearances which may be understood as dharma or law from the scientific and moral view-points, truth or reality

1. The Religion of Man, p. 197.

2. Personality, p. 101.

3. *ibid.*, p. 102.

4. Sadhana, pp. 41-42.

from the epistemological and God from the religious view-point.¹ Combining all these view-points Gandhi declares that God is not a person: Truth is God and God's law and God are not different as are the earthly king and his law. It is impossible to conceive Him as breaking law for "God is the image of the vow, would cease to be God if He swerved from His own law even by a hair's breadth i. e., God is bound by his own nature of law, hence it may be right to say that God does not rule, He withdraws Himself, as it were, from the universe."²

God permits man to assert himself by saying with impunity, "I do not believe in God," but breach of law carries inevitable consequence of punishment, not vindictive but purifying and compelling i. e., denial of God does not free man from operation of law. God and His law abide and govern all things. Therefore He does not answer in detail every request of man, but without doubt he rules every action, literally not a blade of grass moves without His will. Power of God or Truth over-rides all man's intentions, plans and carries out His own plan. He is the greatest tyrant since under cover of free-will he leaves man a margin so wholly inadequate as to provide only mirth for Himself at man's expense.³ The free-will man enjoys is less than that of a passenger on a crowded deck.⁴

But this determinism by law does not make man feel cramped in any sense. He has freedom which inanimate nature does not have, because of the presence of law. Law exists outside man in nature, but also inside him, in his intellect, will and emotion. He who cares to know God's law in nature by God's law of reason and love in man and moulds his acts accordingly will get the benefit of this law. And the outer freedom attained will be in exact proportion to inward freedom of man (extent of submission to law of Truth). The law of karma is inexorable. The present life is governed by the past, but the future must by that law of cause and effect be affected by man's action in the present. Thus he feels the choice between two or more courses and is bound to make the choice.⁵ Since man has made his own tendencies which drive him by his own

1. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 298.

2. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 246.

3. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 61.

4. *Harijan*, March 23, 1940.

5. *All Men are Brothers*, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 84.

actions, therefore, by human effort it is possible to annihilate karma's effects. In this world nothing is ever done without direct action. Fatalism of karma has its limits. It is only after man has exhausted all remedies that he leaves things to their fate. Finally, freedom as imbibed through the central teaching of the Gītā shows man making his own destiny in the sense that he has the choice as to the manner in which he uses that freedom, though not control over the results. The creator has given limited control over means, though none in regard to freedom to control ends.

Gandhi does not speculate about the meaning of freedom in the ultimate sense, but is deeply aware of the implications of freedom in regard to moral life of man. No metaphysical justification can be given for the moral dualism, nor any rational explanation of evil. It is beyond limited reason to know why it exists and what it is, it is enough to know that both evil and good exist. Could man account for evil he would be coequal with God.¹ Humility requires man to accept the real existence of evil in human life. At best, reason can only say that it is proof of God's long-suffering and patient nature that He permits evil, though not having any evil in Himself; He is the author of evil, yet untouched by it.² To say that God permits evil in this world is not pleasing to the ear, but if He is held responsible for the good He has to be responsible for the evil also. The moral difficulty in understanding this lies in considering God as a person. He transcends description. Here law and law-maker are one.

Though in strictly scientific (metaphysical) sense God is at the bottom of both good and evil i. e., there is no difference of both in reality, yet for human purposes good and evil are distinct and incompatible, symbolical of light and darkness. And even from the human standpoint they are not of equal reality, for, good is self-existent while evil is a parasite living around good and should die without support of good.³ It may be said that evil is good misplaced, since it has no separate existence.⁴

Relativity of good and evil to the human situation does not destroy man's responsibility to distinguish the two. The good at the particular time is good and the

1. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 66.

2. *ibid.*; cf., Chandra Shankar Shukla, *Conversations with Gandhi*, p. 37: Nothing can possibly exist without His allowing it.

3. *Marijan*, September 14, 1947.

4. Shukla, *loc. cit.*

reverse is evil. The distinction is man's but not for that reason unimportant. Human thoughts follow some law the scriptures try to enumerate. Man entertains those thoughts and has to repulse them. His life is sustained by assuming the imaginary duel to be real and progress depends upon putting right the inverted order of things created by God. The doctrine of karma makes man fully responsible for siding with good and shunning evil, as often as he distinguishes the two. And God democratically leaves man unfettered and free to make his own choice. Duty is to prefer the harder, upward path rather than the easier downward path. Evil can be removed by standing wholly outside it, on the solid ground of unadulterated good. In doing so man identifies himself with his real nature or God.

In regard to the spiritual goal a similar combination of initiative and effort as to action, and dependence on God's will as to results, does not coerce man to turn to Him. "Those who wish to deny His existence are at liberty to do so. He is merciful and compassionate and allows freedom If any disdain to bow He says, 'so be it,' my sun shines no less, my clouds will rain no less for them. I need not force them to accept my sway."¹ But all scriptures hold that perfection or freedom from error comes from grace and without it complete mastery over thought is impossible. Had this reservation not been made by Divinity men would have developed swelled heads.² But there is a condition for the operation of grace viz., surrender of man to God's will. No niggardly acceptance of the inevitable will appear pleasing to God. It must be a thorough change of heart. He is a jealous lord and protects man and enables him to withstand the world only when he appears before Him in a spirit of full surrender³ best exemplified in nature's effortless and tireless operations under the will of God. "We think the sun is inanimate . . . however his example of tireless energy implies that if we completely surrender to His will and really become ciphers we voluntarily give up the right of choice and need not suffer wear and tear."⁴ Vaiṣṇava Vedānta insists on a supreme effort of devotion and self-surrender and Gandhi declares:

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1. Hindu Dharma, p. 63.
 2. Harijan, February 29, 1936.
 3. Young India, September 3, 1931.
 4. All Men are Brothers, p. 85.

It is for God to take our broken barge across the stream, but it is for us to put in our best effort . . . to plug a hole in its bottom . . . to throw out the water. In that case the barge will float only when there is God's hand behind it. I would say, therefore, that man must make an endeavour and result depends on God's grace.¹

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan argues that the historical existence of man is a continuity in space and time until the end is achieved. And the continuity is a product of law. Science has displaced magic and tells us that nature's course is not determined by man's pleasure, ghosts or spirits, but by law. Laws of nature, physical, biological and psychological, comprehensively called karma, have reference to consequences of deeds or effects of causes. Though not ultimate or absolute, karma has an indispensable function in divine economy and belongs to the created world.² Anthropologically it can be said that a divine power controls the process, God is the Lord of Rta.³ And there is no arbitrariness in its operation, since it is the expression of Absolute's nature. The divine mind freely expresses itself in the form of this mechanism, therefore, it is not subject to the law of nature.⁴ This is the meaning of its non-ultimacy, but in the phenomenal sphere regularity is wrought in the natural sphere and justice in man's very nature through every word or deed because law allows for no loss of activity, effort or energy and infuses life with a sense of eternity. At the human stage it connects with the past so that history stretches to indefinite periods of past time, binding man to physical and vital conditions of the world, giving ordered growth, continuity of good and evil.

Vedānta rejects blind necessity or fate. Neither is God an impersonal abstract determining power, nor is man a puppet, and everything finished before it starts.⁵ At the same time there is no capriciousness in world and human life. Were freedom total non-determination it would destroy all life, instead, a rational freedom means that man has power to control nature, mind and society because of their uniformities. Therefore, law cannot be denied by libertarians and a demand for freedom has to reckon with a

1. Chandra Shankar Shukla, *Gandhi's View of Life*, p. 67.

2. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, p. 42.

3. vide Śve. Upa., VI, 11: कर्मविनाश

4. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 124.

5. Schilpp, loc. cit.

universe of order and regularity. True freedom is not power to act as man likes; for man's will is not independent of his self, but determined by the self, not in its fragmentary nature but in its wholeness. In its retrospective aspect karma gives continuity of self in time, relevance of will and act to the past and moral responsibility. The past cannot be cancelled but it can be utilised. It is the condition of development but not unalterable destiny, since its use is not predictable. Thus, in its prospective aspect karma allows creative freedom of self.¹ The mixture of necessity and freedom in human life is brought out by a simile: past karma is the hand of bridge dealt to man, rules of the game of life limit him, but he is free to make calls and some choice always remains even till the very end. A good hand can be destroyed by unskilled play, and, on the other hand, a bad hand need not be attributed to the frown of fortune.² Dualism of man's nature allows determinism or karma and heredity to prevail in the realm of not self (including the self-confined ego, psychological and social automatism), but freedom or bursting out of the circle of nature in so far as man is subject. It is the spirit in man which gives man freedom within the limits of his nature. The future has to be made by the present, so much so that even the past can be given a new form i. e., the freedom of the subject can be so expanded as to freely utilise the not self for its own purposes.

The most convincing proof of free-will of the self-conscious individual is the presence of sin and discord in man's life.³ Sin consists in assumption of independence of finite self and consequent hostility to universe or not self, putting trust in perishing things. Intellectually it is called error and morally evil. Its essence is self-will or opposition of finite to infinite.⁴ Evil is a necessary factor in the world because it challenges the fighter to come out of it, similarly pain and suffering are indispensable incidents in development of the soul i. e., evil is possibly required for greater good or reign of law in universe, or the overwhelming goodness of the universe requires orderedness, which may demand suffering and other facts seemingly

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 276.

2. *ibid.*, p. 279.

3. Schilpp, *loc. cit.*

4. *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 449-450.

irreconcilable with order and plan. But this interpretation is possible if man's life is not only as it is seen; karma and punarjanma suggest the value of world in terms of preponderant goodness, which is not affected by the actuality of evil etc. Absolutism does not call evil an illusion. It is as real as the finite self and the finite world, which is beginningless and endless saṁsāra. At the same time, the principle of freedom in man requires him not to submit to it passively but to struggle against it. In other words, evil is real to the extent that it requires effort to transform it. Man's self-analysis shows him his own paradoxes: the disorders of flesh, errors of senses, perversions of heart, debased instincts; he detects sin as incomprehensible necessity, something older than his will for good. But it is only a fact of empirical discovery and not a metaphysical reality.¹ In other words, man cannot cling to evil for all time—it is an unstable equilibrium, opposed to the nature of things, negative, self-contradictory, and the principle of death. Morality alone expresses the true nature, as only the good, the positive and the very principle of life can prevail. Thus evil is real, but not permanent i. e., not having immortal life in transcendental spirit. It is unreal in the sense that it is bound to be transmuted into the real.² Absolutism allows evil to be the essence of moral life, but it is not prepared to grant it as the essence of divine life; were evil real then the appearance of evil conquering good will also become a fundamental reality and if this is so there is no chance for man to gain victory over evil, because the absolutely real cannot be negated. The plain man does not know that granting the reality of evil will involve absolute supremacy of evil in the world-struggle.³ Humanist confidence in victory of good over evil can only be sustained in the absolutist position.

Through struggle and suffering man passes from freedom to choose between good and evil to the higher freedom to abide in steadfastly chosen good. This answers the objection against negation of good and evil in the Absolute. Morality is exceeded and not negated because mokṣa is more than ethical goodness though not achieved without it. Similarly, perfection is the death of "moralistic individualism" but not of

1. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 51.

2. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 118.

3. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 33.

morality.¹ There is passage from selfish individuality to universalism, from self-absorption to unselfish life of love. In terms of transformation of consciousness, the wholeness of feeling, willing, thinking makes life free from error or perversion, therefore a pure disinterested impersonality incarnates. The liberated has no unfulfilled desires or objects to aim at. Freedom from moral obligation or duty of such a being means that moral virtue is not abandoned but has become very nature.²

There is no contradiction between operation of karma and exercise of grace. God's aspect of sovereign justice (Śiva) is expressed through fixed law, never broken by Him. It runs its course so long as man persists in sin-selfishness, for God cannot deny Himself, even in the spiritual world there is law, as the love of God has a method of working; His power and omnipotence is not irrationality. However, Vedānta does not exaggerate justice at the expense of love of God. Religious life remains meaningful—prayer is not evasion of law, because forgiveness of sins is possible—both mercy and justice are embodied in karma and there is scope for atonement through sorrow and suffering.³

God as sustainer of universe (Viṣṇu) shows Himself ever ready to help man. This is His aspect of graciousness, love and eagerness to take man back to Himself. But even God acts with a peculiar delicacy in regard to human beings; man's distinctive being limits God's interference with his development.⁴ He is anxious that each should come to Him of his own free choice, therefore, He does not impose His commands on man (yathā icchasi tathā kuru), never compels, but woos man's consent; by full consent only is integral surrender made to Him. He waits for man's heart to turn towards Him and cannot offer aid against human will, nor can He save unless man repents.

Prapatti is the doctrine that man cannot win the grace of the Lord by his effort and it leads to intense pietism. It teaches total reliance on God to deal with man as He elects. Surrender is the easiest way to self-transcendence, for then God is the saviour and man's responsibility ceases. He has a sense of seemingly outward help

1. Indian Philosophy, II, 621.

2. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 118.

3. Hindu View of Life, pp. 72, 77.

4. The Bhagavadgītā, p. 48.

coming to him, for his soul cannot deliver itself from the trap into which it is caught by its own effort. To make out that salvation is not something man can earn or deserve it is said that grace is entirely free and spontaneous gift of the Supreme, but grace is not an arbitrary dispensation of a distant Deity. Salvation is not automatic but dependent on human effort. Utter and complete self-giving is nature of divine activity but power to benefit from it depends on capacity of the recipient.¹ Therefore, the emphasis is on function of morality to earn eternal life. Bhakti requires active faith and love. Gītā is inclined to the doctrine of free-will, moral effort, for total surrender cannot be effortless, unintellectual. Spiritual life depends as much on man going to God (man's ascent to God is liberation) as on God coming to man (God's descent to man is avatārā).² Mokṣa is development of the Divine in man, not so much a gift of grace. Psychological analysis shows that redemption means God's action in development of the soul from within and not from without. Grace and development are two aspects of the same thing, though the former suggests something like a spiritual miracle or crisis, while the latter implies continuity of God and man.³

Aurobindo

According to Aurobindo, indeterminability of the infinite reality implies no negative imposition of incapacity i. e., limitation on reality. Rather is it positive i. e., infinite freedom within itself from limitation by its own determination and from external determinations to determine itself infinitely.⁴ Supermind in its action as lord and creator sees universe as a single indivisible act of knowledge. This truth-consciousness is source and keeper of law in the world. The Divine does not act arbitrarily; though free from bondage to His own laws He acts by laws, processes. Nor is the law arbitrary because it is expression of a self-nature, compelling truth of real idea of each thing in its inception, which truth is not mechanical, mathematical or outward but spiritual. The whole development or creation as self-manifestation of the Divine is predetermined in its self-knowledge and self-working by its own original

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 337.

2. *The Bhagavadgītā*, p. 377.

3. *The Heart of Hindustan*, p. 105.

4. *The Life Divine*, II, 46-47.

truth, but actual development and progress implies succession of time, relation in space, regulated interaction of related things, to which succession in time gives the aspect of causality.

Freedom and determination are in reality two sides of the same thing— fundamental truth is self-determination of cosmos and in it the self-determination of the individual. Either individualistic ego i. e., surface mind of ignorance conceives free-will as independent will acting on its isolated account, liberty without any determination than the choice of the unrelated moment, thus ignoring the relation of man's being with cosmic being,¹ or seeing only the phenomenal process of nature i. e., overwhelming determinism, it fails to see the other term of biune reality viz., freedom.² But in the evolution of nature plasticity (freedom) sets in as life emerges out of matter, increases with growth of mind, therefore man has at least a sense of free-will, choice of action, self-movement. It is an authentic power of choice mostly in relation to man's own nature, but made dubious, illusory due to being mixed with nature's machinery; made subject, dependent, relative and restricted by his own formations and imperfections due to mixture of old and new consciousness. As man frees himself from nature or Prakṛti by going upward and away from mind to spiritual self or Puruṣa, the side of freedom comes to be first evident and then complete when he unites with the Divine. However, even when completely free, free-will does not act in isolated independence because it will be included in universal being and dependent on all-over-ruling transcendence. Freedom is ending of mechanical determination by making the individual will an instrument of cosmic and transcendent will above nature. It means real participation of individual in working of universal consciousness-force. The individual Puruṣa is master of its own executive energy and at the same time conscious partner, agent and instrument of cosmic spirit in working of universal energy, which works through him while he also works through her.³

The popular notion of karma as moral and mathematical justice in nature must be elevated to higher level of reason. Karma as justice in nature is not to be limited to

1. *ibid.*, II, 771.

2. *vide* Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, pp. 375-376.

3. *The Life Divine*, II, 962.

inseparable equation of two values—moral good and evil and vital-physical good and evil only. Nature's responses are in essence natural relations, very complex actions of cosmic energy, not explicable by one factor viz., a universally governing moral law. Karma must be based on the ground that all energy (works and deeds) in nature has natural consequences. Therefore, continuity in life in rebirth is not fortuitous and inexplicable but law of karma and work of nature gives meaning to the total force of existence, natural character and action, and in this sense it is acceptable to philosophical reason. The law of being is the same for all, because existence is one self, mind, spirit and energy but there is variety, therefore there is group energy, ground for group-karma of mankind affecting the individual karma and vice-versa.¹ Evolution of individual is interwoven with universal evolution, and the old individualistic idea of karma must be discarded. Karma and rebirth though running on their own lines for each are intimately one with universal energy, self-knowledge and do not abolish oneness with other lives and beings, with God and humanity.

Karma is the outer machinery or instrumental cause for the evolution of psychic being apparently taking birth, but not the fundamental cause of terrestrial existence, because the soul when it entered this existence had no karma.² Karma cannot be the sole determinant of circumstances of life working in cosmos because the latter is not wholly mechanical. The determinant must be the spirit, self, soul in man, the truth of his being, while karma is law and process for its purpose. Action belonging to the field of Prakṛti in man, covering mind, life, body is the sphere of karma's operation, but soul or Puruṣa is the giver of the sanction or anumantā of that karma, and creates a destiny to modify the original plan or physical fate. Even if karma be understood as will of God or fate it leaves room for freedom as will and action of the present create fate of future. Moreover, even past karma can be modified, except certain strong effects (utkāṣa karma), and even in regard to these karmas spiritual attainment is stronger.³ On entering spiritual life old predetermined destiny begins to recede because man unites with the divine will which can annul what it has created.

1. The Problem of Rebirth, pp. 121, 124-125.

2. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 524: Anādi karma is rejected.

3. *ibid.*, pp. 559, 560.

In cosmic and human evolution, besides the two factors of cosmic or karmic law and divine compassion acting on as many as it can through the net of law and giving them their chance, a third factor of grace operates, more incalculable, but irresistible. And spiritual destiny is the divine election ensuring the ultimate future of man; the doubt is only about the vicissitude of the path and the time taken for the process. Freedom from bondage to nature is not only through dawning of knowledge in individual consciousness but through a radical transformation. Spiritual evolution effects changes gradually, and has to be supplemented by divine grace i. e. descent of Supermind, divine light in greater and greater intensity and purity in man's being culminating in supramental change. Grace can act at any moment suddenly and man has no control over it because it comes by a will incalculable by human mind. It is not divine reason, acting not-differently from lines of human intelligence, for it does not act by rule, even according to cosmic law, and all spiritual seers have distinguished law and grace.

The question is, however, as to whether grace operates by itself or is there any other factor? The significance of spiritual evolution lies in this that the Divine can lead but does not drive; there is internal freedom to some extent, permitted to mental being man to assent or not to assent to divine direction. The Master of man's works respects his nature while transforming it, does not work arbitrarily or capriciously, but through nature, which, though imperfect, contains the material for perfection in a disordered way. Since perfection as well as liberation is the aim, the divine work in man is done according to his weakness, and not according to the purity and strength of its source (grace).¹ Until some union with the Divine is reached the element of personal effort must predominate. In truth, it is always the higher power acting and the sense of effort is effect of the egoistic mind imperfectly identifying with divine force. Still it is clear that for descent of divine power there is needed the call from below with a will to recognise and not to deny the light when it comes.²

Conception of grace is significant only if reality be approached as personal.

1. The Synthesis of Yoga, pp. 244, 252.

2. The Mother, p. 84.

The impersonal cannot guide or help, but is inactive, aloof. Impersonal truth has to be found and used, it does not trouble to hunt after man.¹ While relying on grace man must do some enabling sādhanā. There is no doubt that he will reach grace if he is sincere and aspires intensely after it; though in the relation of the two it is clear that no amount of effort (tapasyā) can force grace, nor can it be demanded as a reward. At the same time, the descent is not indiscriminating, having its own discrimination, seeing right person and moment. Fitness for state of grace is prepared through the method of yoga, behind thick veil. First there is total surrender and submission of lower consciousness i. e., consent to change of vital and mental nature and later there is much effort to utilise and develop that which has been received in order to reach perfection.

Truth of free self-determination of reality and of man's freedom in cosmos as spiritual self raises the problem of why there is imperfection in world and man's life. Theistic religion supposes an arbitrary personal Deity, wholly transcendent and external to the world, imposing evil and suffering on creatures capriciously by fiat. No theory of extra-cosmic and moral God can explain evil satisfactorily² for it points to dualism of ultimate reality or finite God. Integral Vedānta changes the form of the problem by making God's relation with the world immanent and the question only remains of how Sacchidānand admits seemingly positive negations of its self.³ Half of the moral difficulty disappears by holding self-infliction of the sole existence I. The Divine is here, pervading and supporting the burden of the fall of separated consciousness into ignorance. Imperfections of ignorance, error falsehood, limitation, suffering, grief, pain, weakness, wickedness, incapacity, division, discord are not disproofs of divine being, consciousness, power, knowledge, will and delight. The self-limitation of the real of which these are consequences is not fundamental but a practical division from reality.⁴ Therefore, to reality these are reverse terms of their luminous opposites

1. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 266.

2. The Life Divine, I, 113-114; vide S. K. Maitra, Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy, pp. 90-91.

3. The Life Divine, II, 129; cf., Maitra, op. cit., p. 110: General problem of evil relates to "how" not to "why," the only answer to the "why" is that He did create it, the purpose must be contained in God, therefore, "why" is reduced to "how."

4. The Life Divine, II, 131.

while to man they are notes of a discord creating separativism.¹ Evil is real as fact of man's experience in cosmos and even his positive-practical sense of it is necessary to its complete value. This avoids one extreme Vedāntic view which holds evil to be unreal because a product of ignorance in the individual and having no cosmic status. Its reality consists in this that when separated consciousness has reached its last result in inconscience, the soul arises out of it to evolve blindly to lost Divinity. The soul in humanity is drawn upward in this play of imperfection (which includes deficiency of all divine degrees of good, delight, knowledge, truth, beauty, power, purity); this līlā is a paradox but not a cruel or revolting paradox.² What appears irrational, unethical to human intellect becomes necessary for working out of supra-intellectual cosmic purpose, total good.³

Because evil is a real feature of the phenomenal world it does not follow that, therefore, it must remain for all time. It is one side of nature, but to say that all things are fixed in their statutory and stationary law and man in his imperfection, will mean that life loses its significance. While the mental part of man recognises imperfection, the psychic part rejects it, for it cannot be the law of life on earth, and the law of man's being is to evolve by struggle against it. Evolution cannot stop until reversal of the process of creation is completed in the status of Absolute Spirit. And if evolution is accepted eternal existence of evil cannot be asserted. By a process of relating opposites to a harmony and their transfiguration into something effecting their opposition a state of consciousness is attained where death is only change in immortal life, pain a backwash of universal delight, limitation a turning of the infinite upon itself, evil a circling of good round its own imperfection, not abstractly, but in actual vision.⁴ When gnostic individuality governs character, life, actions, the conflict of opposites, problem of good and evil does not remain. Oneness with truth and with others in knowledge and feeling is the essence of spiritualised nature, and laws of love, justice, truth, goodness are no longer imposed from outside

1. *ibid.*, I, 62; cf., Maitra, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

2. *The Life Divine*, II, 140.

3. *ibid.*, II, 43.

4. *ibid.*, I, 63.

with struggle, but substance of nature, "swadharma of swabhāva."¹ Knowledge and will are one. Freedom is guarded by knowledge and order is imposed by truth of being. Liberty is not infringed by imperative order of this thought and action because order is intrinsic and spontaneous; but liberty of knowledge is not freedom to follow falsehood or error, as the latter are alien to supernature. The universal truth of being manifesting itself freely, automatically, is in very nature essential universal good manifesting itself.

Discipline

Introduction

In the discipline of spiritual life stress is on the harmonisation of the traditional yogas or sādhanās i. e., samuccayavāda. Integral yoga stresses significance of emotional element in man so as to balance the one-sidedness of abstract rationalism. And search for God through love (bhakti) leads into fruitful paths of conduct or universal ethic (karma-yoga) acceptable to humanism. Aim of humanistic dharma sādhanā is a reconciliation of man within himself, man and world and man and God, when purified reason passes into purified emotion and ends in union with all through creative activity. Aesthetical humanism of Tagore is a conviction that artistic activity of human life is a reflection of the creativity of reality, therefore it is a coordinate spiritual discipline, a path to the Divine. Gandhi undogmatically concedes that the truly aesthetic man may arrive at truth through pursuit of beauty, though for the majority truth is first and beauty follows after. Aurobindo allows beauty in creative art to be an approach to reality only when soul-value predominates over aesthetic, vital or mind-value in it,² and this is the general attitude of the Neo-Vedāntins.

Classical Vedānta made contemplative life superior to active and reserved it for a few, while the majority of men remained immersed in mundane activities. This ideal associated with renunciation (sannyāsa) and asceticism (tapas) opposes world to

1. *ibid.*, II, 857, 859.

2. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 414.

spirit, body to soul, sensibility to reason. Freedom of spirit in contemplation became escape from material world and its activities and values. Neo-Vedāntins go along with anti-religious humanism is rejecting negative, superstitious, sterile, other-worldly asceticism and contemplation, based on idea of unreality of body and world. All castigate this ideal and insist on a decisive break from tradition at this point.

On the other hand, secular humanism insists on the participation of all in the goods and values necessary for perfection, but ignores altogether the contemplative principle at the summit of human intellect and will. Neo-Vedāntins rightly insist that a merely active life is not spiritual. It is not undisciplined activism or mere expenditure of physical energy which unites man to the ground of his being.

Humanistic Vedānta finds the perfect solution of this age-long conflict in a harmony of the two ideals. Wisdom is balance of knowledge and practice, theoretical and practical knowledge, contemplation and action, in both secular and spiritual life as means to achieve the final end. No work need be purely secular, nor is there hierarchy in the form of work, but all socially useful work is noble. However, they all insist that the true harmony of means and ends can be discovered only in the path specially laid down for spiritual perfection i. e., sādhanā.

Spiritual activity is inward and does require an attitude of contemplation and solitude, but since spirituality is true only when shared with mankind and not confined to inner life of personal virtue, it cannot be sought for only in solitude.¹ Human perfection is love of God or Ātman, opening the self to the fulness of this love to descend and overflow, so that man continues God's work in time. A new dimension of spirituality is discovered: only the experience of the One (in contemplation) can avail in interrelatedness to others (in action) and contrariwise, only interrelatedness can give meaning to inner experience of the real.² Neo-Vedāntins would subscribe to the conviction:

The state of a solitary is that of a being who should be self-sufficient . . . who lacks nothing (āptakāma); and that . . . (is) the definition of one who is perfect. Solitude, therefore, only benefits the contemplative who has already come to perfection Man could not be exercised in . . . virtues without help of the

1. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, p. 115.

2. Eugene Kohn, Religion and Humanity, p. 121.

society of his fellow beings, . . . it follows that social life is necessary to the exercise of perfection The life of solitude if it be adopted rightly is higher than social . . . but if it be adopted without previous exercise of that life it is most perilous, unless divine grace supplies what in others is acquired by exercise.¹

Neo-Vedāntins argue that positive asceticism i. e., renunciation, detachment and discipline based on the love of God is the very essence of truly humanistic spirituality. But nothing in the renunciation of worldly knowledge, pleasure or selfish mental and physical desires militates against selfless love and service of man, devotion to social welfare. Even an objective scientific view must allow that such asceticism is the very condition or law under which all work of service and creation takes place. By contemplative life based on highest energies of inner being and by active conquest, transformation, sublimation and assimilation of world to spirit, is freedom of spirit attained. Neo-Vedāntins exalt the traditional ideal of King Janaka as the true model for modern life.

But inspite of this emphasis on the harmony of contemplative and active life Neo-Vedāntins did not allow the spirit of Vedānta to be perverted. Jñāna is the end, which is experience of union with God. Man works (karma-yoga) in order to find his real self i. e., happiness lies in wisdom and freedom of expansion into spirit. True humanism insists that the purpose of action is to lead man to the realization of inner benefits of the soul.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand did not deviate from the spirit of Vedānta. It is Jñāna-Kāṇḍa only which has for all time commanded recognition, leading men across Māyā and bestowing salvation on them by practice of yoga. Its validity remains unaffected by any limitation of time and place or person. It is the eternal and universal religion of man. The traditional paths of spirit must now supplement each other. They are not separate roads but sections of a single road, which must be travelled simultaneously towards the goal of unity. This formula was no discovery of mere intellectual discrimination, but illustrated by his teacher's life. The old teachers were one-sided and stressed one or

1. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, II, 188, 8, quoted by J. W. Evans and L. R. Ward in *Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*, p. 8.

the other path, and they were right because niṣṭhā or devotion to one ideal is very important. But Ramakrishna combined the best part of yoga, bhakti, jñāna and karma in a new spirituality. That spiritual experience, many-sided and integral, was such that there could be no analysis or assignment of relative merit to the traditional mārgas as means to the attainment of Ātman; "through it Ramakrishna was able to pluck three fruits from the tree of knowledge—compassion, devotion, renunciation."¹ Jñāna-mārga cannot afford to ignore the value of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta and lessons might be taken even from the heterodox systems to humanise Vedāntic spirituality e. g., Vedāntic intellect must combine with humanising power of great heart and soul of Buddha. The difference between jñāna and bhakti is merely preliminary. There is no reason why both cannot be utilised and retained in spiritual experience. "Bhakti is cool like the moon, jñāna is hot like the sun, but sometimes the sun rises before the moon has set," and, on the other hand, vijñāna or bhakti comes after jñāna i. e., love follows upon knowledge of God.²

The contemplative ideal has a high place in Vedāntic tradition. It is noble in so far as it embodies the Indian ideal of teaching through life, not words, which allows no stirring external activity and bears fruit only in the life of those ready to receive them. Religion is here not a motive of social conduct but intense search through internal discipline for realization of truth in this life. But a purely contemplative faith must now give way to the ideal of new karma-yoga of service. Even without belief in God, by the simple power of good action a man may be brought to the same point as the man of devotion or thought, though with faith the goal is more easily attained.³ Thought and action strengthen each other. And search after truth is identical with search after freedom. Dynamic activism in spirituality is derived from the teaching of Ramakrishna and the scriptures. Ramakrishna declared that to remain immersed in samādhi is small-mindedness; this is but a trifling thing and must be transcended in the higher stage of vijñāna. The ideal is something like going up and down the stairs after reaching the roof. To selfishly seek one's own well-being or

1. Romain Rolland, *The Life of Vivekanand*, p. 101.

2. *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, trans. Nikhilanand, pp. 29, 850.

3. Rolland, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

salvation is to be satisfied with a one-sided ideal, the goal must be to be all-sided i. e., to enjoy the Lord in all works, contemplation and action. Nor is this contradictory to the teaching that karma-yoga or niṣkāma karma though valid is definitely a mere means, a preliminary step, which may continue, but may also be dropped after the end is achieved. In most cases work is altogether dropped. Acts of charity and compassion and relief of suffering are not forbidden, but the wise feel that "God is the doer," and only sense of instrumentality remains.¹

Man must pass through activity in order to attain to perfect calm of serenity. Vedānta teaches that tamas or inertia must be overpowered by rajas or energetic action (worldly goods and welfare) to aspire to higher state of salvation. Gītā teaches the inactivity which means freedom from passions of selfishness. All duties of the world are noble if sanctified by spirit of selflessness or heroism. Therefore no duty may be called menial, each man's work is as good as that of the highest. The basis of the truly active life is that since men are souls as well as bodies they can negatively cultivate sense of detachment from idea of material gains and also positively work under impulse of universal consciousness. From the Vedāntic realization of the self in contemplation there is the greatest gain to both the human organism and to society, because such a man who has achieved the state of the witness (i. e., mukta puruṣa is detached) is the one who enjoys the world from outside. He alone can work without desire even for heaven or for gaining praise or avoiding blame. "One who in the greatest silence and solitude finds the greatest activity and in midst of intensest activity finds greatest silence of solitude is inactive."² Therefore, the spiritual ideal must be a combination of immense idealism and immense practicality of one who is one moment deep in meditation and the next cultivating the field. Realization must sometimes lead to loss of outward sense and sometimes to dancing. The sannyāsī will not sit under a tree, but will astonish the world with energy and true method of work. It is useless to say that the man who lives outside the world is greater, for it is much more difficult to live in world's activities and to worship God. The former

1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, pp. 304, 379.

2. Complete Works, I, 32.

should not think that the latter does not worship nor the latter that the former is a vagabond.¹

Vedānta holds that renunciation or sannyāsa is religion—not only negative dispassion from the world but also positive longing for God. The karmayogin renounces fruit of works for self, the rājayogin renounces nature through experience of it. The jñānyogin's renunciation is the hardest—recognition by the sheer force of rational conviction of the whole of solid nature as illusion and thus to tear himself from bondage to nature. Renunciation in bhakti-yoga is easy as the mighty attraction to God makes all other attractions vanish. True sannyasa follows from the Vedāntic conviction that God or soul is the most real. Conversely, it is certainly true that no knowledge of Brahman is possible without sannyāsa. And sannyāsa must be both internal (spirit) and external (form). It may be conceded that it can come gradually in the course of spiritual practices (tapas) but generally such a process is an expression of the attitude that there is no hurry for religion. One in whom desire for knowledge is great enough will renounce gr̥hastha immediately.²

Tagore

Tagore holds that though it seems contradictory to say that one's own nature is to be realized through effort, dharma-sādhanā discovers the hidden truth constituting the well-being of the soul, as scientific discipline discovers the hidden forces of nature for man's well-being. Realization is not gradual acquisition, but complete envelopment by Brahman as the arrow penetrating the target. Not through concentration of mind or knowledge only but through whole life or perfection of being is God or Truth attained i. e., the removal of all impurities from body, mind, heart and will:

I shall ever keep my body pure, knowing that thy living touch is upon all my limbs.
Keep all untruths out from my thoughts, knowing that thou has kindled the light of reason in my mind.

Drive all evil away from my heart and keep my love in flower in . . . thy seat in the inmost shrine of my heart.

Reveal thee in my activities, knowing it is thy power gives me strength to act.³

The love permeating religious consciousness is no mere sentimentality but

1. *ibid.*, I, 40.

2. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 439.

3. *Gitanjali*, 4.

knowledge in general synonymous with ānand i. e., "truth and joy permeating creation."¹ Sādhanā overcomes dichotomy of cognitive and affective aspects of consciousness: knowledge is apprehension of truth as a unity. "In knowledge as such duality of subject-object remains, but in love the distinction of unity-duality, subject and object vanishes."² Through the ancient ideal of bhakti the blurring vision of "I" and "mine" is removed, therefore, love is higher than jñāna though not devoid of it. The true relation of a person to Supreme Person is the understanding (jñāna) of love. We do not love because we do not comprehend or rather we do not comprehend because we do not love. This love-comprehension is testified to in ānand. Far from satisfaction and intellect being opposed as intellectuals think, logic is subsequent to enjoyment. From standpoint of reason comprehension of ultimate reality is called knowledge, from standpoint of love it is called human experience or perfection of joy.

Beauty and joy of art is a revelation of companionship of man and reality.³ Conversely, creative activity is an integral part of spiritual discipline, a pathway to God. It purifies man's soul, "sets man free from their desires i. e., helps them forget their bonds, reveals eternity."⁴ The joy of true creation embodies the philosophical vision (jñāna), reveals the ideal truth; it is fidelity to the soul in nature.⁵ Art builds man's true world i. e., that in which he feels his infinity and divine unity.

Religion in its active heroic aspect in the west aims to conquer both worldly welfare and immortality by force of will and deeds of sacrifice, whereas the Indian path to serenity of infinite peace and immortality is through inner concentration and pacification of desire. But in both cases the neglected (unrealized) ideal can lead to disaster.⁶ It is possible to separate perfection of being and doing to some extent, so that outer work may produce good results, but inner perfection of personality through contemplation has an immense value for individual as spiritual freedom, and for humanity as an endless ascent. The danger in exclusiveness is that "he who is too busy doing

1. Sādhanā, p. 106.

2. *ibid.*, p. 114.

3. Creative Unity, p. 9.

4. Cycle of Spring, p. 18.

5. Personality, pp. 27, 38; cf., S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, p. 100.

6. The Religion of Man, p. 87.

good finds no time to be good¹ for action in which the soul extends itself and exercises power in the outer fields neglects the inner consciousness, becomes meaningless and therefore destroys the soul by multiplication of materials. The ideals of "action for actions sake," "dying in harness" separate the goal or spiritual totality from the path and thus make the goal of no account.

On the other hand, the doctrine prevailed in India that the infinite is found nowhere except in metaphysics (jñāna-mārga). Many realized Brahman in meditation only in His aspect of completeness, determined not to see Him in evolution. They opposed law to joy, action to freedom, since activity is on the material plane and restrictive of free spirit. Advaita called karma Ajñāna since Brahman is niskriya and even Dvaita, while allowing independence of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, held God to be not bound by karma.² The ideal of pacification of desire through meditation may become the peace of death. By turning up one's eye-balls, sitting with closed breath, staying far away from man, it is not truth which is gained³ but the profound depression of lazy seclusion or deprivation of full commerce with life.⁴ God is not realized in self-intoxication of untruthful, cowardly, selfish escape from the human responsibility of aiding in humanity's progress.

The Gītā ideal of karma-yoga did not stem the current of asceticism, unreality and evil in culture. Extreme asceticism is false exaggeration of Vedāntic ethic resulting from neglect of Advaita idealism. The samyāsī translates unity into extreme inactivity and callousness. He disregards the Soul united with all souls, the Mahātmā (Humanity) in all men, while giving up the ego attached to materials.⁵ But human dignity requires a balancing of renunciation with acquisition. True renunciation means not rejecting but rising above pleasure and enjoyment. Human relations and duties which are necessary for only limited periods of life are not, therefore, false or illusory. True vairāgya is a state of mind in which the limiteds are seen in their proper perspective in the unlimited i. e., bhūma and, therefrom, the disappearance of

1. Stray Birds, p. 184.

2. Shantiniketan, p. 173.

3. Man, p. 55.

4. My Reminiscences, p. 269.

5. Man, p. 48.

attachment to the former. Therefore, deliverance is not in renunciation but in freedom felt in the bonds of delight of senses of sight, hearing and touch.

Sacred lore teaches true spirituality or calmly balanced strength in the correlation of the within and the without.¹ Īśa Upaniṣad declares that Brahma is infinite being and becoming at the same time, therefore, true life is only through work expressing the soul, and soul is realized in the Supreme Being through renunciation of self and union with all in action. Brahman is ānand but joy without play of joy is no joy at all and activity is this play of joy. Therefore, the Brahma-jñānī who has joy of Brahman must also have all his activities in Brahman, who gives both the desire and strength to man to work with Him in His activity and exercise of His goodness and love. The pervading spirit of the Indian mind is to realize and to affirm reality, to see and to salute God in all. Jñāna is viśva-jñāna in the form of action of Īśvara-śakti completing itself.² Awakening of that jñāna-drṣṭi which does not deviate from viśva is vijñāna. The one is in the many; the mystic realizing the central harmony finds no mystery beyond the present, finds infinite no thin nonentity void of all content, but operating in nature, family and society. The experience of Divine Humanity compelling practical activity in the world through disinterested service and bliss of communion with reality becomes a new relationship of love with the world. The opposition (dvandva) of the wholly outer orientation (Prakṛti) and sole refuge in inner self (dharma-naitika) is overcome in spiritual life (ādhyātmaika). When ānand illuminates the inside and the outside the conflict (saṅgrāma) is replaced by līlā and jñāna, bhakti and karma become one whole.

True dharma-sādhana is the golden mean between action and contemplation, doing and being, work-intoxication and God-intoxication. This ancient ideal must be renewed in the context of modern life, and there is no impossibility in the actualisation of such an integral ideal of life.

Gandhi

Gandhi compared the preliminary discipline necessary for an individual

1. Sadhana, p. 127.

2. Shantiniketan, p. 175.

qualifying for spiritual experiment to a scientific course of instructions indispensable for scientific experimentation; without such a discipline the claim of right of conscience leads only to untruth which bewilders the world.¹ Man must learn to live by self-direction or effort of will rather than by mere habit. By great study and perseverance only is physical nature moulded and mastery over it obtained. Ceaseless and pure striving depends upon purity of self, life and heart. The struggle is directed both against outer and inner evil, to develop passion-free thought-speech-action and to rise above currents of love-hate, attachment-repulsion.² Tradition lays down practice of yama and niyama (cardinal and casual virtues).³ Therefore, search for God or Truth must be conducted through vows. Devotion to the vow of truth is the sole justification of human existence, and all activities must be centred in truth regardless of cost. To see the universal and all-pervading spirit of truth face to face the individual must identify with every thing i. e., love the meanest creature as oneself. Therefore, the path of truth necessitates the vow of ahimsā as means. The application of talents to anything other than truth i. e., ministration of senses or self-gratification is unfaithfulness to truth. Therefore, brahmacharya is search of Brahman through complete control of senses and resulting freedom from passion. Since God never stores, the truth-seeker may not hold anything against the morrow and the vow of aparigraha is repose in God's providence. Moreover, love and exclusive possession cannot go together. Theoretically speaking, perfect love means perfect non-possession. Body is the last possession, but in actual life this is always with man and he can only try for the ideal by self-renunciation. It is self-evident that knowledge of truth or love is impossible with stealing, therefore, the vow of asteya follows, which is to be interpreted as not taking more than the individual needs. Patañjali's five great disciplines derive from absolute truth, but when the corollaries of the grand principle are worked out in the modern age the disciplines are expanded into eleven.

1. Young India, December 31, 1931.

2. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, pp. 75-77.

3. Hindu Dharma, p. 21.

4. vide ibid., p. 145: Satya, ahimsā, asteya, brahmacharya, aparigraha, śarīra-śrama, aśwāda, abhaya, sarva-dharma-samānata, swadeshī and aspreśyata.

The ideal of renunciation differentiates mankind from the beast.¹ Spiritual realization depends wholly on this way of life; renunciation precedes spiritual certainty. To believe that God pervades the universe (Īśa 1) means man cannot enjoy anything not given by Him; since He is the creator of numberless children it behoves the individual to renounce everything at God's feet. This is not physical renunciation but second birth. Renunciation is to be sought for in and through action. It is not abandoning the world, retiring to the forest, but a spirit of detachment and altruism ruling all activities of life.

Mortification has also been held the world over as a condition of spiritual progress and in its complete form means literal denial of self i. e., giving of oneself without reservation to God. Spirit and flesh pull in different directions and man has freedom to use either force. Mechanical refusal to act does not avail, but only intelligent action in a detached manner viz., an incessant crucifixion of the flesh frees the spirit. But mortification is a necessity only when the flesh rebels against spirit, when it has come under subjection and can be used as an instrument of service then it is a sin. In other words, there is no inherent merit in mortification of the flesh.² It has well-defined limits, can be both wise and unwise, and beyond limits its prolongation is folly.³

The psychological law is: as long as one derives comfort and help from any thing one should keep it, otherwise unsatisfied want would make trouble for one. Mortification and renunciation must only discipline body, appetites, instinctive actions for the soul's purpose. And in their true form they issue in a positive condition of joy and love. True renunciation and self-sacrifice (yajña) is not burdensome or annoying but productive of beatific vision, immortality and joy in the fulness of time i. e., joy has no independent existence but depends on the attitude of life. Similarly, the nature of love is tapasyā and tapasyā is non-violence or self-suffering.⁴ For both the individual and the nation the highest joy comes through pain voluntarily borne by

1. *ibid.*, p. 51.

2. *My Religion*, p. 299.

3. *My Non-Violence*, p. 30.

4. *Young India*, June 12, 1922.

oneself. The discovery of this nature of self-sacrifice (tyāga) and self-suffering (tapasya) made the ancient rsis greater geniuses than Newton, greater warriors than Wellington.¹ Therefore, the spirit of sannyāsa must be accepted but not its outer form of physical renunciation, withdrawal from society, non-action in the human sphere. True sannyasa is not other-worldliness or inertia, but the ideal of dedicated work in sacrificial spirit or worship through love and service based on the distinction of sreya and preya. In this form it can become a discipline for all and not only for a few. Hitherto, out of sheer inertia it was taken for granted that non-violence i. e., renunciation and self-suffering is possible only for a few who take the vow of non-possession and allied abstinences. But though the votaries alone can carry out research and declare new possibilities of eternal law governing men, it must hold good for all. The many failures are not of law but of followers who do not know that they are willy-nilly under that law.

The Gītā teaches wisdom through love and service. God cannot be found in temples or idols nor by abstinences. He can be found only through love, not earthly but divine. Bhakti consists in pursuit of truth.² Worship is to observe God's law till it becomes second nature. "Love without Truth would be blind and narrow. Truth without Love would be mere unrealized ideal."³ It is perfected i. e., liberated from narrow limits by knowledge and moral effort. Since true devotion giving consciousness of God in a purified heart is a rare thing, the religion of service is suggested as means. He who would be a bhakta must serve the suppressed and poverty-stricken by body, soul and mind and this is true prayer or worship.

Swaraj is for the awakened jñānī not for the sleepy and the ignorant. Man alone can worship God with knowledge and understanding, and no true salvation is possible if devotion is devoid of understanding. But pure knowledge tends to run riot, therefore, the Gītā insists that devotion must accompany it as primary. Knowledge without devotion will be like misfire.⁴ The discipline of love and suffering presupposes the keenest

1. Nehru on Gandhi, p. 48

2. From Yervada Mandir, p. 5.

3. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, p. 77.

4. Mahadev Desai, The Gītā According to Gandhi, p. 129.

intelligence (discrimination), wide-awake consciousness. Furthermore, philosophy is not merely wisdom about reality, but its application to life.¹ There is no question of comparison between darsana and deed. The function of darsana is to enable the deed to be done, and to steady and purify the soul. It is no substitute for right doing, but an encouragement for it. Man assimilates jñāna only through action, buddhih karmānuseriṇī.²

The object of the Gītā is to show the most excellent way to attain self-realization—that matchless remedy is renunciation of fruits of action—round this sun revolve devotion and knowledge and the rest like planets. No one has attained the goal without action or the path of dynamic humility. True humility is a life of constant endeavour. As God is constantly active without rest, to become one with Him man's activities must be unwearied. The drop in the ocean knows no rest. To become one with ocean (God) means no rest, nor need for rest, even sleep is action as God is in the heart. This restlessness constitutes the true test—the key to peace is this never ceasing agitation.³ Niṣkāma karma is detachment of freedom of spirit from action even while the body is engaged in action, done without selfish motive of desire for return, whether spiritual or temporal, without depression or exaltation i. e., under calm judgment. The traditional path of karma or yajña is likely to grow with growth of knowledge, experience and change of time. Literally, yajña means worship, hence sacrificial act or act of service. In this sense every age may and should have its own particular yajña. The new meaning of selfless, non-egoistic disinterested work, in other words, action rooted in love and ahimsā is bread-labour—only after bodily labour for the sake of service has man the right to live.⁴ A man may engage in farming, spinning or any activity without departing from this path, so long as the work is for common benefit. Life is to be filled with sātत्वika mental and physical activity, and discrimination of good and evil activity shows that true yajña must be directed towards welfare. Therefore, the nature of the activity must be socio-public rather than

1. cf., Hindu Dharma, p. 214: Philosophy without life corresponding to it is like a body without life.

2. *ibid.*

3. From Yervada Mandir, p. 68.

4. Young India, September 20, 1928; vide From Yervada Mandir, p. 50.

individual-private. Rather than swādhyāya, mantra, japa, yoga, āsana, puja and other elaborate ceremonial, work may be done in any field of life, public, patriotic, philanthropic, economic, political, so long as it is disinterested work, truthfully and non-violently done.¹

The life of activism without faith is of no use, it is like an attempt to reach the bottom of a bottomless pit. By faith is meant living, wide-awake consciousness of God within, arising from bhakti or contemplation on God which has become as natural i. e., second nature as breathing. But the purely contemplative approach is to be eschewed. There is a school of philosophy which teaches complete inaction and futility of all effort. But this cannot be accepted in its verbal sense. "If I could persuade myself that I could find Him (God or Ātman) in a Himalayan cave I would proceed there immediately. But I know that I cannot find Him apart from humanity."² The life of solitary meditation is subject to dangers of disquietude resulting from forcible repression of desires and from unreal fancies. To attain the kingdom of heaven or mokṣa it is not necessary to take shelter in a cave. The cave-dweller can build castles in the air, he hovers round the world on the wings of thought and has no peace, whereas a dweller in a palace like Janaka has no castles to build and may have peace in the midst of pomp and circumstance. The mystic path of meditation and solitude aiming at identity of self with God must combine with the path of service aiming at dissolution of ego in the will of God. Revelation of Truth occurs in moments of intense concentration, but solitude is not indispensable to realization because the individual can have capacity to remain deeply meditative even when surrounded by people. Man must know the cave he carries round with him, while his sadhana must be work and experimentation in the busy haunts of men.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan argues that intellectual discipline only is not enough; spiritual discipline is essential because the key to discerning thinking is purity of being.³ If

1. J. B. Kriplani, *Gandhian Thought*, p. 219.

2. *Harijan*, August 29, 1936.

3. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, p. 376.

man is part of the Divine, what he needs is an awareness of his true nature, but vijñāna, rational intelligence, has caused a split in his nature which is to be overcome through discipline of yoga-sāstra i. e., all energies must be yoked together by most intense concentration of personality. Disease obstructs the body's harmony with the environment, error the rational mind's harmony with the universe of reason, vice the harmony of will with universal will, but training of yoga overcomes the defects of every part of man's nature. It exercises the powers of the soul and prevents them from atrophy or destruction. And philosophy, art and literature also help in purification of inner being. The three paths or yogas are intellectual concentration through meditation, emotional detachment through worship of God and ethical dedication through development of love and sympathy. And the three stages of yogic development are ethical preparation, ascetic practice i. e., yama-niyama of yoga and concentration and identification.

The teaching of the Gītā is peace and integration through duty. Karma-yoga is an independent and coordinate discipline meant for all, and not only for a madhyama-adhikārī for whom renunciation is dangerous. The purpose of man is to obtain release as well as to work in the world.¹ Therefore, the sādḥaka has need for both action and knowledge of the supreme. The three-fold end of life in the Hindu view shows fullest appreciation of varied life activity.² The karma-mārga started with the duty of performance of prescribed rites but concluded in the Bhagavadgītā with the position that all tasks done with disinterested dedication are sanctified. Karma or yajña is not ritualistic piety and ceremonial sacrifice, but sacrificial action in general by which man dedicates wealth and deeds to the service of one life in all. That work only has the breath of soul which is an offering not purely of external thing but of inner subjectivity, which negates particular self-consciousness and holds fast to the inner purpose to bring it forth to outward view.³ When man works, ploughs or paints, sings or thinks, he will be deflected from disinterestedness if he thinks of any extraneous consideration of fame or income. Nothing matters except the good-will i. e., the

1. The Bhagavadgītā, p. 66.

2. Religion and Society, p. 72.

3. East and West, Some Reflections, p. 118.

willing fulfilment of God's purpose. Yoga is skill in act, because there is dedication to God and detachment from the finite ego and results. Secondly, skill in action results from the end of "sarvabhūtahitarata" which requires a change in the whole pattern of life. Working for good or welfare is not to give physical comfort but to help all to attain to true nature.¹ All activity more than egoistic is such service. Even the apparently egoistic activity may have this nature, as for example, the solitary hermit who saves himself by his effort saves the world by example. "Service" is to be defined broadly as any action which helps others at cost to oneself in time, thought, money, done out of love of humanity and this love is expressed in service and suffering for others.

The central principle of spiritual life is heart. By devotion a state of mind is attained wherein man is detached from the world and directly united to God. Worship of the unmanifest is difficult, but relation of love and trust to Personal God (bhakti) is not "amore intellectualis" (jñāna), which is more reflective and contemplative; though sustained by knowledge it is not knowledge. Nor is the soul's surrender to God a "flight from the alone to the alone," a total detachment from the world, but an active love (karma) for the Divine who enters the world to redeem it.²

Pure and transcendental wisdom is the goal of spiritual effort but the intellectual pathway is not, for this reason, superior to the other two, as some think. The saving knowledge is different from scientific or speculative, though not discontinuous with them. They are partial truths dispelling darkness of mind. The highest state can be attained through jījñāsā or disinterested passion for truth, wherein man forgets self in contemplation of the universal principle of existence. The knowledge must not be mere knowledge of the ideal but a vision of spirit coming out in life of action. Mere knowledge is vain without love.

Inward activity of contemplation (dhyāna) allied to asceticism (tapas) and renunciation (tyāga) is characteristic of religious life, too deeply entered into its texture to be regarded as a mistake. To regard asceticism as superfluous, contemplation

1. The Bhagavad-gītā, p. 187.

2. *ibid.*, p. 58.

as perilous, is to fail to understand the high destiny of man.¹ Man though a member of a community is also individual, the solitary side of his being is distinct from the social and it is here that he is most human. As in science, philosophy, literature or art the insight giving birth to the unique is a product of individual contemplation, so in spirituality, awareness of God is attained in leisure and contemplation, for spiritual freedom is an essentially private end.² Man is to be *Ātmavān*, to unfold his own awareness. And every seeker after truth is called upon to make a monastic cell in his heart and return into it everyday. The cult of the interior-life is no fad of the Oriental mind, all religions ask man to retire from the world, to be alone,³ in order to engage in *dhyāna-yoga*, the method of concentration and meditation. The mind is held away from the world's undertakings, sunk into spirit of freedom from pressure of work, there is a kind of ingathering, recollecting, single-minded concentrated relating of self to self in silent meditation, an act of close attention ending in encounter with unconditioned being.⁴ The emphasis is not on retirement from the world but on renunciation of self, to which retirement may be one means. The passivity is apparent only because there is intense concentration of consciousness. It is more correct to hold the opposite of outward action to be inward action. Transformation of being needs besides meditation in silence and quiet a persistent endeavour to raise the quality of the soul. Man is made up of many elements, capable of good or evil, charity or hatred. The latter are due to hardness of heart, wilful disobedience. There is struggle until control of passions is transmuted into spiritual energy. Yoga is not aimed to kill but to control the body by abstinence from sensual indulgence, for the yogic ideal of the perfect body is beauty, grace, strength. The enemy of the soul is not body, but bondage to body and appearance of asceticism is due to need of disciplining it. The essential quality of *tapas* or asceticism is denial of selfish desires and it is accompanied by joy of self-conquest. Its test is not hedonism but spiritual happiness, with suffering as its chief means.⁵ As a means of purification suffering is self-imposed and voluntary

1. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, pp. 107, 114.

2. East and West, Some Reflections, pp. 24, 54.

3. An Idealist View of Life, p. 112.

4. Recovery of Faith, pp. 168, 172.

5. East and West in Religion, p. 108.

until man becomes perfect and shares in God's work; tapas for self-development or world's welfare is only seeming suffering of the sādḥaka or siddha soul.¹

For greater self-control, cultivation of interior-life and concentration on reality man sometimes retire from the world, but monastic life (sannyāsa) itself is not the summit of spiritual perfection. Exaggerated asceticism and contemplation is no longer slaying of ego-sense and detachment of the mind but synonymous with fleeing the world and society out of despair from its disorders. The individual aspect of religion becomes exaggerated into indifference to material conditions, and asceticism as rigorous self-mortification is a war on the life-process, seeking the soul at the risk of destroying the species.² When attachment to God leads to indifference to the world, its problems and duties, this tragic divergence between exalted ideal and actual life³ gives rise to the charge that religion is an opiate, making man indifferent to the world's woes.

On the other hand, to exaggerate the social aspect of man and to treat religion as a means to social welfare is an opposite mistake. Self-sufficient humanism fails to note that the essence of human life is attainment of spiritual freedom. Merely to deal with the existent world i. e., the transitory and the ephemeral, to take pride in sheer realism and hard-headedness is escapism in another form.⁴ In humanistic culture the activist man far out-reaches the reflective, psychology gives prominence to conation, religion and philosophy to social activism, and all of them lead man away from self-possession. Such activism defeats its own purpose of inner development and outer progress. "Empty agitation"⁵ or energy without vision of the real nature of man and world carries the moral danger of degeneration in savagery and builds neither the self nor the world.

True religion agrees with the social idealism of humanism that eternal life is to be realized on earth.⁶ This means that though the contemplative and active

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1. *The Heart of Hindustan*, p. 99.
 2. V. S. Narvane, *Modern Indian Thought*, p. 257.
 3. "The Spirit in Man," *C. I. P.*, p. 476.
 4. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 803.
 5. *Religion and Society*, pp. 73, 74.
 6. *East and West in Religion*, p. 104.

principles are distinct they imply each other and work together. Evidence for this is found in the fact that thoughts govern history only when applied to practical problems, e. g., creative ideas of artists, thinkers, religious teachers are conceived in solitude and meditation of self-sufficient mind, but such thoughts are the very essence of action. A similar conclusion is reached from the standpoint of the nature of man. There are two conflicting tendencies in man—isolated individual life, unity and universality—and these have to be reconciled. Man is both natural and spiritual i. e., an embodied spirit, therefore he has to accept the condition of body or nature viz., activity.¹ Contemplation and action are both means to stabilise or purify his nature. Contemplation evolves the spirit, and action in the form of service transforms life. The nature of reality and its relation to the world also supports this conclusion. Vedānta holds the cardinal doctrine of essential interpenetration of God with the world. "We cannot divide eternity and time, for the lowest details of existence are channels of immortal life."² The one is in the many, therefore, contemplation of God, the highest universal, is meaningless without embodying itself in work for man, the finite particular.³ Vision of reality in contemplation is but a fleeting vision unless it is made a permanent faith and experience of the seeker by being worked into life i. e., contemplative knowledge awaits completion by other elements of life. A complete man is one who apprehends the self or supreme spirit and returns to the concrete and controls life. Religious life must be a rhythm of withdrawal into individual solitariness and return to the life of society. A perfect equilibrium is needed because neither the individual can submit to total annexation by society and its functions, for if individuality is lost all is lost, nor can religion's aim be merely reflection and ecstasy. The true representatives of spirituality are those contemplative seers who work with intensity of purpose and conversely, the most efficient servants of humanity are those who anxiously cultivate the interior-life.⁴ They become imbued with practical energy, sinking their roots in God and raising their branches in the world. The

1. Religion and Society, p. 71.

2. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 804.

3. The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, p. 77.

4. An Idealist View of Life, p. 72.

Gita holds the highest aim to be a union of high thought and just action.

The man of the world is lost in varied world-activities, throws himself in mutable world (ksara). The quietist withdraws into the silence of the absolute (akṣara) but the ideal man of the Gītā goes beyond both extremes and works like Puruṣottama, who reconciles all possibilities in the world without getting involved in it.¹

Aurobindo

Aurobindo argues that nothing can be taught to the mind not already potentially contained in the soul of the creature. Man knows the Divine because it is already in his soul. Because of this the soul is said to be witness, upholder, master, but it is so only in theory; so long as it consents to ignorance, it is not so in practice, and nature predominates over it. To regain his lost mastery a lot of tapasyā (concentration) and sādhanā (disciplined effort) is necessary. Self-attainment is the secret goal, self-knowledge is the means and increasing consciousness is the process.²

Integral yoga is a product of the absolute liberty of experience and of restatement of the knowledge and combination of the three traditional paths and other lines of sadhana.³ Haṭha-yoga is valid so long as the perfecting of the body and increasing of the play of life-force in it is for the purpose of making it the instrument of spirit's manifestation. Rāja-yoga is valid if liberation and perfecting of mental being from emotional-sensational life and mastery of the total range of thought-consciousness is for the purpose of using the energy released in yoga-samādhi for knowledge and mastery of the world. Tantra-sādhanā is also valid if yogī's will to mastery of nature, liberation, perfection and beatitude lays stress on divine potentiality. The purpose of traditional jñāna, bhakti and karma yogas was to take one main principle of human mind and to turn it to the Divine, but the three need not be exclusive. Integral yoga follows the line layed down by the Gītā in a three-fold process of an act of total self-consecration to the Divine, detachment and self-knowledge in order to see that God works in man i. e., renunciation of separate independence; finally, perceiving of all things and happenings in God.

Traditional karma-yoga aims only at liberation from phenomenal activity by

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1. The Bhagavadgita, p. 72.
 2. The Synthesis of Yoga, p. 2.
 3. *ibid.*, p. 5.

surrender of works and results to supreme will and cosmic energy, but integral yoga aims at spiritualisation of human will and energy. There is both static and dynamic identity with inner presence. The key principles are equality through inner renunciation of personal desires, a surrender which delivers man from divided ego, and oneness and static peace, inactive beatitude as well as dynamic force.¹ Its rule is niṣkāma karma whose test is absolute equality of heart and mind to all results and reactions of perfect self-existent peace within. The essence of karma-yoga is sacrifice of a triple character—of works, of love, of knowledge; sacrifice operates when heart, will and mind of knowledge associate with law gladly. The will in life has appearance of something impure in it because desire-soul is substituted for real psyche, unlike love and knowledge which are pure in essence and become degraded only when mixed with that will. It does not follow that the remedy is to split works of sacrifice and do only works of love and knowledge and to leave works of will and power. When the whole of life becomes a conscious sacrifice, such a disciplined will evidently leads to highest devotion for God—love and communion in thought, will and actions with the Divine are also essence of integral bhakti. Since karma-yoga demands constant remembrance of one liberating knowledge and its externalisation in work, a self-dynamising meditation of this kind will end in uninterrupted vision or jñāna. Thus dedicated works pave the way to love of Master of works and knowledge of His being.

Traditional jñāna-mārga is an intellectual inquiry into the nature of self to discriminate self from not-self and to realize the supreme self. It confines itself to discriminative thought, concentrates only on idea of self and is indifferent to emotions, activities of life-body, and dismisses the external environment. Integral yoga adds the aim of conquest of cosmic existence through realization of supreme self in oneness with all and world as play of consciousness, because it sees not only the self-existent self of all, but also that as a conscious time-spirit, self-extending in space.² It will not separate sacred and profane knowledge. All knowledge so far used for satisfaction of mental-vital interests may be used if spiritual consciousness finds

1. *The Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 52.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 31, 78.

in it the timeless eternal and its manifestation in time. There need be no distinction of para and apara vidyās because integral jñāna-yoga discovers the working of divine consciousness and creation through the sciences of knowledge and enters the ways of the Divine in practical sciences.¹

Knowledge must lead to acceptance of love as well as works. Bhakti-mārga of the Gītā and jñāna-mārga of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad gather up everything spiritual in man to a single exaltation. Concentrated love is immeasurably profound, concentrated wisdom is wider profundity, but it cannot be called deeper.² The opposition of bhakti and jñāna is a product of false opposition of the vital and the mental. The vital finds mental dry, without rasa, and the mental finds emotional to be blind. But when the psychic and higher plane knowledge predominates their knowledge is welcomed for the support it gives to emotion, and higher thought and consciousness rejoices in bhakti. Self-surrender comes more through love and bhakti than through Ātma-jñāna but with Ātma-jñāna the complete surrender becomes possible.

The intellectual mind and static self conceives the Divine as impersonal, but the soul and heart and dynamic being of man needs Personal Divine, something as precious as mind's loyalty to its own conception of what the true may be. Integral yoga accepts bhakti as necessary to perfection and gives it the highest place, not as unpurified emotionalism or as mere experience but as a state of heart and soul when psychic being is awake and prominent. Traditional bhakti-mārga abides in concentrated love of God and is indifferent to activities of thought, without any will except worship of Beloved and service of the temple.³ Integral bhakti does not end in such a total absorption of exclusive love and delight in God, but extends to all beings; it is purest when all activities are poured into infinite joy, all life an adoration of all; not excluding forms of individual love, ties between souls. In individual and universal love man escapes from ego by widening his self through sympathy, good-will, universal benevolence, love of mankind and of creatures. In the discipline of integral bhakti-yoga this love has to be taken up in the love and adoration for Universal Divine and delight

1. *ibid.*, pp. 116, 112-114.

2. *Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series*, p. 44.

3. *The Synthesis of Yoga*, pp. 30, 31.

in the Transcendental Anand. Such supreme love is a creative power, can be silent and unchangeable or rejoicing in eternal forms and experiences.¹ Perfect union of love with God must bring not only perfect knowledge of Him but also service of the Divine in all.

In religious and ethical discipline there is a constant conflict with vital instincts, dynamic life-powers in man and the development of material, economic and practical interests, almost an attitude of complete hostility.² The truth of asceticism is that the state of conscious realization at the summit of our possibilities is silent and inactive self, and it must form an essential element in human perfection, so long as intellectual and vital habits remain unliberated from animalism. Tapasyā or concentration of will rather than loose absence of control is the true rule for establishing self-control in the vital nature and right order in the material field. But if practiced for its own sake or beyond a certain point it leads to discouragement of indispensable life energy, rendering vital instincts inert, feeble, narrow, inelastic. Renunciation and detachment from the world following from this ascetic and inert discipline is not true. In fact, there is no importance in the idea of renunciation which demands giving up of what is valued by an effort of will. But true vairāgya as a sense of dissatisfaction with the world is perfectly admissible, even indispensable to integral yoga, because only when man is disgusted with the insufficient and imperfect gifts and activities of the world will he turn to high ideals of true-beautiful-knowledge-consciousness.³ Ascetic and renunciatory discipline is remote from earthly life, makes a quarrel between earth and heaven and spirit more and more sterile. Its stress on sorrow-suffering, austere mortification, gospel of vanity of things is pessimistic denial of spirit. Besides, its goal of individual salvation as recompense of

1. *ibid.*, p. 136.

2. *The Human Cycle*, p. 201.

3. *More Lights on Yoga*, p. 68; vide *The Ideal of the Karmayogin*, pp. 34, 37: The principle of nature requires getting rid of powerful tendencies, *vṛttis* by exhaustion of *bhōga*, their domination and weakening by *nigraha* or control, finally, getting rid by self-dissociation, *saṁyama*. True discipline requires step by step process, otherwise there is hypocrisy, *mithyācāra*. The *saṁyamī* is one who realizes himself as witness soul of phenomena only, having passed from *vairāgya* in the form of crudest disgust to supreme indifference, *udāginatā*, ending in highest state of *laya* (disappearance of *vṛtti*) or *līlā* (leaving it to God to use this *vṛtti* for His purpose).

the aspirant's renunciation and tapasyā makes it no true guide and law-giver of mankind. The ancient ideal of the ṛṣi—one who has lived fully the life of man and found supramental truth, is the true guide.

The Gīta admits the ideal of departure from saṁsāra into Brahman as a possibility, but jivana mukti is the possibility of living freely in the Divine and acting in the One. There are some who have no strength to descend for divine work after having once ascended while others descend the spiritual ladder as well as ascend it.¹ The competition of either/or between the ideals of action and of contemplation and meditation is a trick of the dividing mind belonging to the old yogas. Work done in increasing yogic consciousness is a means of realizing as much as meditation and both must combine. Since God as seer and knower is not despiser of or separate from God the Master of works and energies, contemplation and action, idealism and pragmatism must go together to bring about progress and perfection of man. The first stage in liberation of soul is its foundation in citta-sūddhi, peace-calm of saintliness, silence, quietude of eternal and infinite, but its consummation is lifting of peace into bliss of dynamic, perfect experience of beatitude. Peace and ecstasy become one.

By itself meditation is only a preparation. Perhaps it is felt necessary to withdraw into exclusive concentration of inner being, shut oneself in solitude from the life of ignorance, but only as a temporary measure. And it cannot be imposed on any one as a principle. The gospel of inactive contemplation, absorbed meditation stops at the first stage and is insufficient to transform being. All traditional yogas are insufficient because they aim only at realization beyond the cosmos and none at world and its values. Their's is a "subjective spirituality" which minimises commerce with the world and only aims at the easier task of spiritualising the inner and more self-sufficient parts. To be objectivised, the individual must project the world and take its influences into his own environmental being to transform them and to return on the world they come from² i. e., inner falsehood and disorder must be conquered as part of similar forces in the outer world.³ Integral yoga aims at such dynamic spirituality,

1. More Lights on Yoga, p. 18. Ramakrishna called these jīvakoti and Īśvarakoti.

2. The Life Divine, II, 812.

3. The Synthesis of Yoga, p. 32.

kinetic in free world-action. External life is the acid test of inner life created by yoga. By action alone can outer nature down to the physical nature be transformed and the same consciousness in inner and outer action be obtained.

The purely contemplative ideal understands "release from work" as quiescence. In reality it means not bodily cessation but the realization that it is nature and not man which is working in man for self-expression of infinite power. Action is first means of self-development and fulfilment, and even after it remains as means for fulfilment of divine intention in world. It means that though there is no binding necessity of desire to work, yet cessation of desire does not end work, for the major part of universal work is done without interference of desire, by calm necessity, spontaneous law of nature.¹

At the same time, the danger of thinking that action in itself is the truth must be guarded against. Advocates of action think that by human intellect and energy making an always new rush everything can be put right, but the present state of the world after a tremendous development of both is proof of emptiness of the illusion. Insistence on action is absurd if one has no light by which to act. Yoga must include life and action but this does not mean that it must accept it with its ignorance, misery and confusion of will, reason, impulse and instincts.² Even humanitarianism, activism, philanthropism as such do not form part of karma-yoga, nor are they in harmony with it.³ At the same time, it would be an error to split up work into religious and worldly-ethical, all can be raised to spiritual height. The ideal of karma-yoga covers the entire range of nature's activity in man, internal, external, mental-bodily, great-little, from toil of hero to toil of cobbler, labour of sage to simple physical act of eating, seeking of self by thought, adoration of the highest by action of heart, gathering of means, materials and capacity for use in service of man and God.⁴ It is not the form of work or mere activity but consciousness and godward will which is the essence of yoga.

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1. *ibid.*, p. 270; cf., *Ideals and Progress*, p. 21.
 2. *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, First series, p. 94.
 3. *ibid.*, Second series, p. 8.
 4. *The Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 168.

Vedānta Ideal of Man

Introduction

The doctrine of divinity of man is a source of inspiration or degradation according to the type of humanity regarded as the ideal.¹ Vedānta holds the personality of the religious man as the only real experience of religion, because the universal truth becomes concrete in the experience of the individual when the gap of knowledge and existence is reduced to the concrete nature of humanistic outlook.² Psychological humanism insists that no aspect of man's nature or life be neglected in the attainment of his goal i. e., there must be integration of human personality in its totality. But wholeness or harmony does not consist in a merely negative juxtaposition of mutually opposing elements or in eliminating of contrasts (for no part must be sacrificed, nor must the whole be sacrificed to any part) or even in a merely normless balancing of passions. It must be a positive process of refining the different elements of the human self, retaining them all at their best i. e., a consummation of all in the highest longing. Nor must this harmony be an intellectual ideal, but a direct experience of unity through all faculties of man. Neo-Vedānta presents the conception of the ideal man as a unique balance of mind-body-spirit i. e., a perfection of elements of human nature—reason, will, emotion and intuition or spirit. It is scientific in insisting that human nature can be thus transformed through discipline, once we realize what it is.

The vision of non-compartmentalised life, ideal of integrated personality necessarily follows the realization of the one spiritual ground of all beings. The experience of universality, sarvātmabhāva, leads to unique power of creativity in ideals and interests—personal, social and eternal. Private salvation is a contradiction in terms, since being saved means getting out of isolation, privacy, egotism into the all-embracing oneness. Therefore, the transformed personality serves to bring about a dynamic transformation of other men and the world.

The conception of jīvana mukta raises some logical difficulties about how

1. Burnett Hillman Streeter, *Reality*, p. 176.

2. Viscount Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism and of Other Subjects*, p. 92.

limitation of physical body may coexist with absolute freedom of spirit. This problem of dualism is not sought to be solved by far-fetched interpretations of Vedāntic texts.¹ Aurobindo's doctrine of integral evolution allows for perfection of physical, vital, mental elements to house the perfected spirit. But the significance of the conception lies in the suggestion that perfection means luminous combination of enlightenment and devoted humanity i. e., the ideal has become real in a person, who while sharing mortal limitations still attains to blessedness of freedom and brings the same to entire mankind through his life.²

Vivekanand

Vivekanand insists on the unification of all elements of human nature in the spiritual means employed as well as in the spiritual state attained. Equilibrium and synthesis in spirituality is his genius.³ The goal is universal man, combining the powers at present fragmentary and shattered. The perfected ideal of man is harmony of philosophy, mysticism, emotion and will. In this harmony (yoga) all forces of man's nature converge and stimulate his being. By the worker a union between man and whole humanity is achieved, by the mystic a union between higher and lower self, by the devotee a union between himself and God of love and by the philosopher union of all existence.⁴ Thus sādhanā ends with the union of man and world.

Tagore

In the discipline of truly religious life the man must be more and more harmonised within himself and with the whole outer world. The ultimate reality is no qualittless reality, but a Being comprehending all things human in knowledge, action and will.⁵ The realization of such a Supreme Personality or "whole self" leads to the perfect balancing of the sādḥaka's own character. All isolated impressions, momentary impulses are brought to completion by being subjected to spiritual wisdom. Liberation is passing from distraction to a unity of soul, wherein all conflicts are reconciled

1. vide infra, pp. 836-837.

2. Tagore Centenary Volume, p. 395.

3. Romain Rolland, The Life of Ramakrishna, p. 310.

4. Complete Works, II, 386.

5. The Religion of Man, p. 206.

and knowledge, love and action are harmonised. "Wholeness" is a rejection of any type of specialisation which mutilates the complete ideal¹ for the sake of any part of man. The complete man is not to be sacrificed to the patriotic man or even to the merely moral man. This is no abstract ideal but a concrete fact of experience. Religious consciousness is experiencing the relation of love between man and God in which occurs the synthesis of the limited and the unlimited, strength and beauty, form and feeling, human and divine, faith and reason, science and wisdom, theoretical and practical reason, renunciation and indulgence. Such an integrated man is "one who has a mind for all, one with universal perception, viśvamanah."²

Gandhi

From a subjective point of view Gandhi's mind strove after a balance of emotion, will, thought through practice of religion. The means of salvation i. e., jñāna, bhakti, niṣkāma karma do not buy or are not media of exchange of salvation, but as means and ends are identical or almost so, extreme perfection of means is salvation. More specifically speaking, truth and non-violence cannot be used by the dense, therefore, pursuit of them is bound to result in an all-round growth of body, mind and heart, otherwise either the means are untrue or the individual is untrue. From the rational standpoint the only proof of religion having any force is the pragmatic one.³ Not words but life must speak. And the transformed character and conduct of long line of saints, prophets, resulting from realization of divine presence within is a testimony to deny which is to deny man's very self. To them God is no God who merely satisfies Himself. He rules their heart, transforms it and expresses Himself through every act.

The ideal man is a creation of art. Harmony in nature, harmony of perfect goodness in man and harmony of love in society is the standard of art. "The star-sown heaven and infinite beauty in nature is greater than art, but the music of the harmony of pure life is the greatest and truest art" i. e., highest manifestation of harmony is in the thought, feeling and conduct of a perfectly free and good individual, e. g.,

1. *ibid.*, p. 33.

2. Tagore Centenary Volume, p. 127.

3. Hindu Dharma, p. 105.

Jesus was a "supreme artist" and also Muhammad because both saw and expressed Truth and grace of expression naturally came.¹ Thus the term "creative personality" is no mere expression of the self of man in its present state of conflicting desires and goals based on aversion and attraction but the expression of true self realized through spiritual discipline, whose best results lie in perfect harmonisation of inner being and outer act. By such a harmonised man alone can mankind and world be remade from discord of untruth and violence into harmony of truth and love.

Radhakrishnan

Perfection of personality is attained by self-knowledge or truth but only when these are won by self-transformation. In regard to the highest ideal humanistic technique is insufficient because the spiritually liberated man is a new species not to be mistaken for the finest fruit of humanistic culture² viz., physically perfected manhood, or a fully instructed mind or completely sensitive conscience. The problem of personality is created by conflict of body and soul, but it is a provisional dualism, which can be ended by a vital unity of both in spirit i. e., liberation means victory of spirit over nature of man as it is at present. Spiritual experience as distinct from mere religious feeling of dependence or worship or awe engages the whole person. The individual is no longer a more or less unified bundle of faculties and desires because all faculties and energies are utilised. Body, life, mind and intellect are no longer separated but rendered pure and raised to their highest extent by being pervaded by divine light. Change of centre from egoistic self to God means establishment of contact with the creative principle of life, coincidence with divine will, mind and being of peace and calm so that all questions of reason and irresolutions of will³ and aberrations of emotions come to an end. Wisdom of jñāna is this change of consciousness, an illumined mind, changed heart and transformed will, which composes various elements of man's nature internally,⁴ so that he becomes a single indivisible unity of universal self. And at the same time his community with the rest of the world is

1. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, pp. 232, 95.

2. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, p. 146.

3. "The Spirit in Man," C. I. P., p. 492.

4. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 61.

restored. This is expressed negatively in freedom from fear as the individual's nature corresponds to the environment and positively as joy and harmony of life. Yoga is the term used not only for the process but also for the result of balancing human nature, body-mind-spirit, subject-object, individual-social, finite-infinite.

The liberated is his own master-piece; having attained fulness, maximum expression, pure being and unburdened free activity he becomes "an artist in creative living."¹ Since the barriers of individual and the universal are broken, there is creativity in cognitive, aesthetic and ethical activity, in the spiritually quickened life. Social creativity is paramount; as the vehicle of divine life such a life is "social-minded" and expressing itself in service and sacrifice for world's redemption—Buddha and Gandhi do not forge a solitary destiny. Indian tradition holds as the ideal man one who has progressed from selfish individualism to self-annihilation through extinction of prejudice, hatred and ambition, whose emotional life is expressed in the love of God, not of personal likes and dislikes, who perceives oneness, wholeness of humanity since his mind is freed from superstition, unreason, whose activist energies are devoted to positive service of humanity and to over-coming evil by loving all, who has inward brotherliness, non-injury and forgiveness (ahimsā).²

Aurobindo

Aurobindo defines true spirituality as awakening of inner reality, spirit, soul; to know, feel and to be the greater reality pervading the world and man's being, and as a result to convert the whole being. This is very different from humanistic ideals of high intellectuality or idealism, ethical turn of mind or moral purity and austerity, and even different from religiosity or ardent, exalted emotional fervour. These are all preparatory disciplines, purifying and giving suitable form to nature, but belonging only to the mental level.

The aim of yoga is not merely to spiritualise man but to supramentalise being and nature through affirmation of right and sovereignty of spirit. There is a triple

1. *ibid.*, p. 65.

2. *The Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 54, 108.

transformation of man.¹ The first stage is opening of consciousness to the Divine by power of psyche to purify and change being i. e., loss of ego-ambition. Such psychisation is a conversion inward to bring out inner mind, inner vital, inner physical. Present nature is made over into soul instrumentation by attainment of right vision in mind, right impulse and feeling in the vital, right movement and habits in the physical. The second stage is universalisation of being on all planes up to the over-mind i. e., ascension upward, conversion and turning down of higher light, knowledge, power, force, bliss, purity, down to the lowest elements of life and body. Spiritualisation is established descent of high cosmic consciousness and change of whole consciousness to it. The third stage is union with the Transcendental Divine through Supermind-consciousness, to surrender oneself for its descent to earth nature. This is supra-mental transmutation in which man goes beyond original ignorance, where conversion is no longer needed. According to the degree of psychisation and spiritualisation different types of exalted personalities are produced. Spiritualisation of thought, emotion, aesthetic being, ethical formation gives rise to the sage seer (living in spiritual mind-thought), devotee (living in spiritual aspirations of heart, self-offering), saint (moved by awakened psychic being in inner heart), soldier of spirit (using vital-kinetic nature driven by spiritual energy for God-given work, mission, service of the divine power, idea and ideal).² While the spiritual man has discovered his soul and founded his self and life on it and has joy of it only, the gnostic being starts from this basis but turns ignorant becoming into luminous becoming of knowledge, realized power. Gnosis is the effective principle of spirit, highest dynamis of spiritual existence, therefore, the gnostic is the consummation of spiritual man.

Gnostic individual is a totally integrated man having made effective the realization of harmonic unity in his outer and inner life and in group life. His thinking, living, acting is governed by the power of vast universal spirituality. He sees all from standpoint of spontaneous inherent oneness, therefore his own will, ideals, feeling and sense are made out of the stuff of that total being and actions proceed on

1. vide *The Life Divine*, II, 728; also *The Riddle of This World*, p. 6; *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, First series, p. 56; *More Lights on Yoga*, p. 1.

2. *The Life Divine*, II, 7-8.

that basis. Having realized the principle of Supermind in unity filled with diversity his universal knowledge of truth-consciousness, without bondage to inferior forces or distortion of that Truth, envelops all things in their own place without confusion, clash or infringing of boundaries in a relation of diversified but total harmony. Such a life is a work of art, a working out of multitudinous order. Expression of spirit in gnostic life may be through simplicity or extreme complexity and opulence, or in their natural balance, for beauty, plenitude sweetness, laughter, sunshine, gladness are also expressions of spirit.¹ Conversely, gnostic life being perfected into power, possession, conquest, creation, joy, love, beauty, this sense of life is fully revealed in creation—aesthetic, dynamic, mental, life creation or material creation.² This ideal of a liberated here and now on earth, being not detached from body, life, mind, as in traditional conception, but completing these in his cosmissed being, acts in all human instruments of nature, and has the capacity to raise the world and humanity to highest status.

Religion is Realization

Introduction

Vedānta concentrates on man's experience of the supreme principle of his and world's being. This meets the humanist test viz., the scope allowed for the "practice of the presence of God."³ The "human" must be rooted in existence and in Vedānta the ultimate ground of all is Existence itself. In knowledge this appears as realism i. e., knowledge must follow the existence of things in science or in religion. But in regard to the object of spirituality realism remains dissatisfied with logical demonstrations which fail to give indubitable knowledge. The answers of purely philosophical and scientific reason to the problem of existence are not relevant to spirit. But to deny that proof of the real is possible either by arguing from world and experience to God or by arguing from the Divine to the human must not be construed as denial of mind's capacity to attain some truth. There cannot be any destruction of intellect since the

1. *ibid.*, II, 942.

2. *ibid.*, II, 828.

3. Viscount Haldane, *The Philosophy of Humanism and of Other Subjects*, p. 88.

existent universe resting on first data and inferences from it have to be accepted.

In general, Neo-Vedāntins retain the distinction of aparā and parā vidyās. The status of the former is raised by them because science has destroyed the necessity of using religion as a scientific explanation and device of explaining nature. They differentiate the knowledge dealing with nature from that dealing with man. Science is valid in the field of the visible and relative aspect of reality. And Vedāntic cosmology can be replaced by scientific-realistic explanation of the world without detriment to its ontology. The former or "apara" order of knowledge is porous and transient, the latter or "para" order is permanent and unconditioned. But the first must serve as a real step in the path leading to the goal. The "real" must be brought into relation with the "ideal," the "finite" with the "infinite." Indubitable certainty of knowledge arises only when separation between knowledge and reality, truth and being (existence) is ended and realism must be satisfied by such absolute coincidence revealed by direct entry into the real. The end of spiritual knowledge is not a mere contemplation by the subject or spectator of its object viz., the scheme of spatio-temporal existence, for its own sake, but a restoration of that object to pure existence.

The test of reality is the actual living of it. Here knowledge cannot transcend experience. Reality is no longer abstract as in rational science or rational philosophy but the concrete act of Being of God in all forms, highest to lowest. It is an intuition not opposed to reason but a completion or consummation of it i. e., attainment of "a deeper and more plastic reason." True humanism is attained only when rationality and mystery are thus combined in existence—which means that science and metaphysics must be brought together in the pursuit of salvation and end in the religious intuition of the real.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand holds with Vedānta that knowledge is inherent in the mind and comes from it with the suggestion of the external world. It is not to be acquired from without, being the innate nature of the soul and essential birthright of man. Ātman is the repository of infinite knowledge. Modern analysis shows that when mind reacts with

favourable space-time and causation, manifestation or development of consciousness of knowledge occurs.¹ The only medium of knowledge is the mind, but concentration of mind's powers may sometimes be directed to external things and sometimes on internal self.² Para and apara knowledge apply to this difference of objects and the consequent difference of method. But the difference is only of degree since the same knowledge is in different stages of gradual development. Apara or cosmology must exist within phenomenal state in which things come in a regular order discovered by science. There is a difference between this state of manifestation of the real called knowledge and the light of the Absolute in itself. However, the latter includes the former or relative knowledge; just as a piece of gold can be changed into all sorts of coins, that state can be broken up into all sorts of knowledge.³ Nor can it be argued that the parā vidyā is counter to aparā vidyā or the preliminary, for the latter attains truth in its own way. All that it means is that the yogī concentrating on his inner nature (heart, mind) is ignorant of science, while the scientist concentrating on the book of knowledge is ignorant of the parā vidyā, but through both runs the unity of knowledge (Absolute) at which they meet.

Vedānta insists that all knowledge is based on the experience of what is: even inferential knowledge or science appeals to experience of every man and religious truths to experience of particular persons. Experience is of different kinds. Religious truths i. e., God and soul, are facts, though not perceived by external senses or by reason, as are tables and other objects because they fall outside the scope of these sources of knowledge. Hence they remain indecisive, neither proved nor disproved. Nor can knowledge arise only on the basis of authority, for that would reduce religion to a doctrine, creed or book. The meaning of faith is not blind adherence but that the mind should not be ruffled by vain arguments, since mere intellectual assent is no better than atheism. However, rational philosophy may be a preparation, if it is continuous with religious experience and even shaping the intuition of truth or wisdom rationally. Religious experience begins where philosophy ends.

1. Complete Works, IV, 364.

2. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 358.

3. Complete Works, IV, 368.

Philosophy or Jñāna-Kānda or Vedānta means God is seen, therefore, it is the rationale of religion. Both must be inseparable, otherwise religion is mere superstition and philosophy is mere dry atheism.¹

Experience is not only the source of knowledge but also the end of knowledge. Doubts are removed, certainty is attained when "I have seen God, I have seen soul."² Identity of spirit and God is a realization in a super-conscious state of soul in which knowledge is by being and becoming. Any attempt to disprove the real self on the ground that it is not known is fallacious. It may be that the soul possesses a thing without being aware of it (the Ātman is the permanent ground of self in waking, dreaming and deep sleep), therefore, it possesses it better than if it were aware of it. In fact when there is discursive knowledge of it, it is possessed as a thing separate (in ajñāna there is alienation from real self), when there is no such knowledge of it, it is a real possession (non-knowledge at level of jñāna is unitive knowledge ending sense of separation).³ Yoga teaches that higher state than reason. To make reason out of the incongruity of human life, reason must be transcended, but scientifically, step by step, into a real inspiration which fulfils, not contradicts, reason.

There is scope for knowledge of the real because there are many who have realized it, and thousands will realize in future.⁴ Man is properly religious only when he has this direct perception of spirit, here and not hereafter. The *ṛṣi* state is seen to be no mere fiat of God's will or superior intelligence, but that very knowledge which has to be gradually worked up to; and these men called the "prophets" are but illustrations of this spiritual principle which all must work for. Since Advaita holds that the goal is already realized, no one is debarred from it, and this implies that it can be realized in all conditions of life.

Tagore

Tagore insists that God must be known as self-evident reality i. e., an experience not needing proof. Proofs do not create conviction but only support it. From

1. *ibid.*, VII, 47.

2. *ibid.*, I, 10.

3. Flotinus, *Enn.*, IV, IV, 4, quoted by Romain Rolland in *The Life of Vivekanand*, p. 377

4. *Complete Works*, II, 377.

the fact of peace and beauty in the midst of movement and endeavour, diversity and striving we may pass to the Divine who stands behind all, from the fact of the knowledge of all objects we may pass to the world mind, from imperfection or insufficiency of the finite self to perfection of the infinite. But the inferential Being is to be felt like light is felt, to illumine all knowledge of self and nature.

Reason does reveal truth of reality. It discovers the law of substances and things. Science is a true achievement of the mind.¹ It opposes magic by its belief that there can be no flaw in the laws of the world. The person who holds the truth about the apple lies in the endless counting is pulled up at each number, what next? He can stop counting only by discovering the law of gravitation—this is happiness.² It is rationalism seeking to simplify things into their inner principle of oneness i. e., it is a mysticism in the realm of universal knowledge emancipating mind from the bonds of sense (appearance) to the freedom of reason (reality) enabling mind to dwell on the infinity beyond distinction of dualistic qualities. But though it occupies itself with the immensity of the knowledge-world it deals only in the impersonal aspect of the truth of existence. A similar mystico-rational approach in the spiritual sphere also ends in transcendence of the truth of personality.³ Impersonal science and cosmic philosophy may legitimately enquire into the question of the origin of existence, but that is not connected with man's dharma.

The intellectual standpoint and the ideas of truth from it are abstract as in scientific and theological reasoning. Some lose their sense of mystery at the root of all delight by discovering the uniformity of law in the diversity of nature. Law itself is a limit and the mind succumbs to the tyranny of law in escaping from the tyranny of facts. It is but the first step towards the freedom which is harmony. This achievement of intellect is like the railway station, the station platform is not man's home.⁴ His resting place is in his truth i. e., God, to which science cannot take him. The soul's search in the objects of the empirical world is bound to fail since the

1. Sadhana, p. 99.

2. Towards Universal Man, p. 244.

3. The Religion of Man, p. 189.

4. Sadhana, pp. 97, 99.

Supreme is not an object. Neither does the analytic pursuit through successive addition of partial knowledges through eternity reveal reality. Nor is the truth of world in masses of substances or numbers of things. Hence it becomes mere tautology to say that God is unknowable when intellect leaves out the person who can and does know Him.

Spiritual teachers urge man to comprehend by his soul the infinite spirit in the depth of the changing facts of the world, and artistic nature urges man to realize the manifestation of personality in the world of appearance.¹ Upaniṣads show a note of certainty about the spiritual meaning of existence because they are based on experience of spiritual life. In the paradoxical nature of the assertion that Brahman cannot be known but He can be realized, lies the strength of the conviction from personal experience. And it is an experience through sādhanā of the real nature of Ātman as non-different from Paramātmā in a relation of love. Realization is possible because oneness is already in a state of absolute completion. The soul has a light of its own by which to reach the infinite. The vision of the Supreme One in one's own soul is direct, immediate intuition, not based on any ratiocination or demonstration or debate. God is seen everywhere, inside and outside, in direct intuition unaided by sense perception. "My eyes strayed far and wide before I shut them and said 'here art thou.'"² He is seen, felt and used in life. Brahman is intuited through ānandam. Only joy reveals that infinity of reality; the test by which reality is apprehended is joy i. e., satyam is ānandam. Soul soars in the infinite, feels that it is not able to come to an end of her attainment (i. e., Vedānta holds that infinite being cannot be possessed), this is supreme joy. Only joy reveals the positive aspect of absolute unity as comprehending the multitude in an inner perfection permeating the content i. e., the intensive quality of harmony. Reality or Brahman is knowledge in its completeness, by whole being, which does not contradict the intellect but transcends it³ e. g., whatsoever element of metaphysical speculation is not merely a logical deduction but a realized truth, is not excluded from the ultimate truth. The abstract impersonal findings of intellect are reconciled in the comprehensiveness of the concrete Personality revealed in the

1. The Religion of Man, p. 99.

2. Gitanjali, 12.

3. Sadhana, p. 159.

intuition of love and joy.

Gandhi

Gandhi insists on reasonableness of religious experience. The real is the existent, but the existent is for man and must not be irrational. That religious doctrine which does not appeal to reason may be rejected.¹ To ask anyone to believe without proof is as unreasonable as to ask an intellectual person to believe without proof that the sum of three angles is equal to two right angles. Authority must be subjected to reason. Scriptures cannot transcend reason and truth; they are intended to purify reason and to illuminate truth.

Religion may be reasonable but ultimately the nature of reality transcends intellect. It defies rational proof because it is not a thing of perception through the senses. Being not outside this exterior case of man it defies exterior proof.² God will not be God if He allowed Himself to be an object of proof by His creatures. Nor is any definition in terms of logical concepts possible since God has infinite facets and is not the same to all. The nearest description of reason is that God is Truth. But this is unapproachable and cannot be reached. Unknowableness of God means only knowable to the limited extent of man's intellect. Scientists call the unseen force unknown. But the unknown is not necessarily non-existent. The inability to prove the "what" does not negate the "that" of God, as even in ordinary life people do not know who rules or why or how he rules, but they know that there is a power that certainly rules.³ Therefore, in dealing with living entities dry syllogistic methods lead to bad logic and even fatal logic. It reaches not final truth but only an approximation. Rationalism is admirable but when it claims omnipotence it becomes a monster.⁴ Intellectual knowledge takes man through many stages in life, but only faith saves in a crisis. Philosophy or spiritual knowledge which is still intellectual must not be confused with spiritual attainment. The former is a matter of knowing scriptures or engaging in philosophical discussion while the latter is matter of

1. Young India, February 26, 1925.

2. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 75.

3. My Religion, p. 35.

4. Young India, October 14, 1926.

"heart culture."¹ There is a limit to man's progress in intelligence, there is no bound to the development of the heart. And the heart arrives at conclusions for which the intellect subsequently finds the reason i. e., logical argument follows conviction derived from intuition.²

Thus it is possible to reason out God's existence to a limited extent. The historical proof is that "the wise and the foolish have proceeded on the assumption that if we are, God is and that, if God is not, we are not."³ Belief in God is co-existent with human kind and that existence is treated as more definite fact than that the sun is. Authority of the most perfectly developed spirits among mankind is valid proof. Faith is appropriation of reasoned experience of people whom we believe to have lived pure life of prayer and penance. The formula is: rejection of every demand for faith where a matter is capable of present proof and unquestioned acceptance on faith of that which is incapable of proof except through personal experience. Further, there is a necessity for a creator of the created world. It is proper to believe in the parent of the whole creation and the orderliness in the world, unalterable law governing everything cannot be blind since it governs living things, and this intelligent principle or law is God. Moreover, the idea of God as Truth must necessarily imply the existence of Truth because Truth is the regulative principle of thought and its existence is implied in every reasoning.

Truth or God may be questioned if it is merely an intellectual deduction, but becomes a certainty (faith) when experienced through "heart," "conscience," "inner voice." It is a feeling, dim perception of undefinable mysterious power pervading all.⁴ Reason is not suppressed but due recognition is given to something higher than reason, the still small voice within which sanctifies it and makes it "sober reason."⁵ Belief in God is based on this faith transcending reason and "realization" so called has this faith behind it. A living and immovable faith alone can reach to full spiritual height in man. Divine knowledge is not borrowed from books, but definitely realized in oneself

1. All Men are Brothers, p. 104.

2. Hindu Dharma, p. 151.

3. Young India, October 11, 1928.

4. *ibid.*

5. *ibid.*, October 14, 1926.

in a more real sense than the five senses can ever produce. Sense percepts are false, deceptive, however real they appear, but realization outside the senses is infallible. God is a direct experience, whose existence is more certain than the fact of oneself and others because it is a knowledge of identity rather than of duality. Knowledge of God or Truth is non-different from God or Being, and this is the cardinal principle of Vedāntic experience.

Neither does knowledge of science in regard to truth of nature and its operation contradict the "scientific" discoveries of spiritual truth.¹ True science does not contradict reality or God nor does true religion set bounds on the operation of scientific reason in nature and life.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan agrees with humanism that religion is no longer a problem of particular dogma, but the question of whether there is spiritual power or chance behind nature and the drama of history.² True religion must be apprehension of this reality and not conception of it as an ideal. Stress on personal experience of the Divine or essential nature of reality, contact with creative spirit or vital power gives it the character of an "open religion."³ Śruti is supra-individual, universal, direct experience, active participation in eternal truth and its timelessness means that reality is timeless in origin. A definition of it is not needed except for those who are religious at second-hand. "That" which is directly experienced is interpreted as "what" for them in tradition. And Indian thought admits that the ineffable permits a graduated scale of reasoning and interpretation from the most impersonal to the most personal. Smṛti expresses human need for diversity of expression but does not affect religion or reality.

God is not a logical concept or conclusion of syllogism; the so called proofs are descriptions, definitions or mere language.⁴ Such theories of reality are results

1. cf., Vincent Sheean, *Lead Kindly Light*, p. 201: Atomic energy did not surprise him, since he considered the dissolution of matter at some point. There was nothing he did not accept without tremor in Hindu philosophy or modern science.

2. "The Spirit in Man," *C. I. P.*, p. 483.

3. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 63; cf., *My Search for Truth*, p. 11.

4. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, pp. 62, 22.

of critical reflection, merely confirming what is apprehended in another way.¹ Rational proof from general premises yields only an inference of a supreme first cause, which dialectic can build no stable conviction, since God remains a mere hypothesis or possibility.² All such proofs conceive God as an objective reality, but God is not real as an actual thing in space and time, therefore, knowledge cannot be derived from senses or logic based on them. To attempt to make religion rational in this way is to misconceive its character, for the ultimate truth which is the criterion by which all realities, relative truths are measured is not to be demonstrated. All predication depends upon the ineffable. Existence is not a predicate, not definable, but given, too subtle for logical proposition, essentially inconceptualisable. It is not the function of reason to give proof of the determination of the indeterminable.

The most important point about religion is the conviction of prophetic souls, not an invention, but as self-revelation of God in their souls.³ Conclusive proofs of God's reality is given in factual content i. e., spiritual experience is attainable. Hence the authority of Vedas is an authority of fact. And the experience cannot be confined to the temporal-spatial sphere but requires a non-temporal and non-spatial Good. Knowledge does derive from experience but limitation of experience to senses is false empiricism. There is no first principle which permits deduction that only through the senses may the real be apprehended; mystical experience, bodhi (supreme enlightenment), prajñā (transcendental wisdom), absolute knowledge, beatific vision are experiential verifications of faith in God's existence.⁴ If on this empirical base i. e., experience of the object of religion, a philosophy of religion be founded it may be convincing. From reality of spiritual experience and function of religion it is legitimate to infer the reality of the environment in which the function finds its use. The ontological and moral arguments have value in the fact that such convictions give trustworthy knowledge of ultimate reality. There cannot be ideas without experience of the objects of which they are ideas and it is not illegitimate to pass from the idea to

1. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, p. 63.

2. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 86.

3. *ibid.*, p. 219.

4. *Schilpp, op. cit.*, p. 131.

the object referred to. Similarly, fact of religious experience alone proves God as universal mind working with conscious design, creator, giver of order, principle of progress and goal of evolution. The historical world-process is inexplicable from within itself--inadequacy of naturalism¹ points to creative spirit or power to explain creativity. The causal argument must be taken not in the sense of God's temporal priority to the world, but as His logical priority. God is the real as that which the mind is obliged to assume as the operative principle of all existence. For qualities of existence, order, purposefulness, development demand an ontological foundation. The imperfect-impermanent cannot subsist by itself. The is-ness of things indicates their identification with it.² The teleological argument may be rejected in its crude form which seeks to justify each product in terms of purpose, but not when it says that order and movement suggest a plan rather than luck. The rational purposive character of the world³ suggests will and purpose behind it, gives a presumption of reality of spiritual ground.

The whole course of Hindu philosophy is a continuous affirmation of the truth that reality is accessible to the human mind in its integrality, samyag-jñāna.⁴ The ancient tradition is that this integral insight is apprehension of reality with directness and immediacy or knowledge by identity of "that" and "what." Advaita talks of aparoksa, non-sensuous and immediate knowledge arising from intimate fusion of mind and reality. Intuition is that most superior knowledge, parā vidyā, subjective and personal because bound up with individuality which must not be lost. And it arises from a high degree of purity of psychological-moral organism, moral asceticism or perfection of

1. vide *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 239, 241; Scientific treatment is true and possible because nature is a net of interconnected events, each being individual and social. Order and continuity, progress and change are its features. Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 37, 38; The world-change cannot be easily accounted for by scientific principles, which explain particular events only and not the reason for it. It controls a fraction of the world only not the whole of it. The Gītā declares, अव्यक्तादीनि भूतानि, व्यक्तमव्ययानि भारत, उपव्यक्तं निश्चिन्तयेत् तत्र का परिवर्धना . Occasional Speeches and Writings, Second series, p. 76; The distinction of the sphere which science explains and that which it cannot will always remain. However, belief in spiritual reality does not begin in gaps in scientific knowledge, but the experience of mystery inherent in the way the world works.
2. *Recovery of Faith*, p. 82.
3. *Nār can phenomena of evil, ugliness and error be brought up as inconsistent with this argument.*
4. *My Search for Truth*, p. 28.

knowledge and living through dedication of all powers. Intuitive knowledge arising in such perfected being is not invalid because unverifiable scientifically or incommunicable, for it is "self-establishing, self-evidencing, self-luminous."¹ The saint's certainty is strange and simple.

As to the existence of such a source of knowledge, the only proof, negatively, is that the intuitive principle cannot be thought away and, positively, in everyday life the force of love is this kind of knowledge,² as also aesthetic experience. Integrated activity of mind in creation of scientific genius, poetic insight, ethical consciousness, shows intuition to be a true form of knowledge. It is intuition which supplies man with universal major premises viz., ethical soundness, logical consistency, aesthetic beauty of the universe, without which his life would come to an end. The greatest illustration of intuition is awareness of self by a direct sort of identity with it—self-knowledge is inseparable from self-existence—and all other knowledge is inferential as compared to this. Such intuitions of self are as rational as faith in physical world or intellectual scheme in science.

If Brahman is beyond intellect and only grasped by aparokṣa, the latter is presupposed in discursive knowledge as its completion and fulfilment. Different aspects of consciousness have different types of knowledge or function. Manas gives perception, vijñāna gives logic, ānand gives intuition.³ Perception gives outward properties of an object, intellect discerns laws of which it is an instance, intuition gives depth and meaning to object. The first two taken together give awareness of superficial, discernible aspect and the last of the intimate individuality of the real. Or, in other words, intellect reveals rationality and intuition grasps the mystery of the object. Intellectual accounts are not false but do not grasp reality in its fulness. Thought grasps not the unreal, but neither does it grasp the absolutely real. Antinomies of cause-effect, substance-attributes, subject-object, truth-error are due to intellectual separation of terms which are related. The final word of intellect is

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 92.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 156, 139.

3. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 790.

plurality and independence of the individuals—were the mind to remain at it, it would be false philosophy and bad morals.¹

Similarly, if intuition is taken alone, in the sense of anti-intellectualism, it too is useless.² To avoid obscurantism it must be fitted into intellectually tested knowledge. Its content must be not illogical, nor must it be an apology for doctrines which cannot be justified on intellectual grounds. As activity of whole being it cannot be gained by mere intellect, although it is equally true that it cannot be gained without it.

Intellect will be dull, empty, unfinished, fragmentary without intuition and intuition will be blind and dark without intellect. Their relation is that of part and whole. Intellect precedes i. e., leads up to intuition and also succeeds it i. e., translates into its own language the content of intuition.³ Preparation of reflective knowledge, previous study, assimilation of facts, laws is needed for intuition and after arising out of this matrix of knowledge it needs intellect to communicate it. Moreover, it has room in it for rational conception if they submit to a little re-adjustment and reinterpretation. Both are thus vitally united, without a break in continuity; and in moving from intellect to intuition the mind is not moving in the direction of unreason, but getting into deeper rationality.⁴ Intuition is creative thinking or thinking so hard that it becomes viewing or, if reason be taken in the most comprehensive sense, it is possible to talk of "rational intuition." In either case, it has to be admitted that intuition is beyond reason, not against it, not alogical but supra-logical.⁵

These different but complementary means of knowledge must bring together wisdom or *jñāna* and detailed knowledge or *viñāna*. Only by comradeship of scientific knowledge and metaphysical truth can man grow in insight. That is, if philosophy is no intellectual game played for its own sake, but a pursuit of salvation, therefore, ending in intuition of reality. Absolute reality contains both the spheres of knowledge

1. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 55.
2. "The Spirit of Man," C. I. P., p. 483.
3. *ibid.*, pp. 487, 483.
4. An Idealist View of Life, pp. 152, 153.
5. *ibid.*, p. 47.

(revealed by reason) and mystery (revealed by intuition), therefore, there is no incompatibility between science and metaphysics, both having the common goal of Truth or God,¹ and this conclusion must be acceptable to true humanism.

Aurobindo

According to Aurobindo, while realism (science) holds knowledge to be objective, integral yoga regards it as subjective. In fact, all knowledge and experience is in a sense psychological, coming through the manas, therefore subjective.² The original way of knowing native to self is by identity of subject and object but by the intervention of ego this is replaced by indirect knowledge of physical contact and mental sympathies.³ Vedānta holds mental ego to operate through mixed activity of reason confined to the circle of sensible experience and its laws, as well as through pure action of reason going beyond the appearances to general conceptions. This is the passage from physical to metaphysical knowledge. When mixed and pure reasons operate then out of the original direct knowledge arises derivative knowledge by direct contact with object and knowledge by separation from object of observation, but still connected to the other two types; and, finally, completely separative knowledge. Spiritual knowledge of reality is a mode of knowledge by identity i. e., knowing by becoming.

If the intellectual mind be made the source, standard and judge of all experience the question arises whether it is less or equal or greater than the Divine. If greater then there is no reason to seek the Divine; if equal then the spiritual experience is quite superfluous, if inferior then it cannot challenge or judge the Divine. The fact is that the Divine and the mind are not the same thing and spiritual truth escapes finite logic.⁴ Mental functioning asserts externality of individual consciousness to the object it examines, hence shutting out knowledge of what lies beyond it. Its search for knowledge is in terms of three categories, individual self, nature, cosmos or world, and their tertium quid God. But the knowledge of the world is narrow, imperfect, lacking in significant interpretation and of the self even more imperfect.

1. Occasional Speeches and Writings, Second series, p. 200.

2. The Riddle of This World, pp. 27, 28.

3. The Life Divine, I, 74, 75.

4. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, pp. 287-288.

The inability of reason to seize the secret, plan, pattern of action of the Supreme's manifold existence, of science to guide the uses of powers because it lacks vision of reality is *Māyā* (illusion). Mental thought always intervenes to give its own type of mentalisation about the Divine. The intellectual approach states general spiritual truths, thoughts, beliefs, emotions and reflections, the logic of absolutes and relatives and their relations i. e., it can arrive only at certain "constructed figures" to represent that truth, which figures are not concrete, intimate and indubitable. It is incapable of ultimate certitude here because whatever it believes it can also doubt, therefore, mentalising or enquiry about the Divine cannot by its own right bring the Divine. It ends in agnosticism if not in outright denial. But this attempt to stifle truth, which is obscure to logical thought, as obscurantist superstition, is itself a kind of obscurantism.¹ Besides, agnosticism points beyond its own defined truth. What is knowable by limited thought is knowable by a supreme effort of consciousness, therefore, the unknown is not the unknowable.

The decisive avenue of entry to the real is intuitive spiritual experience and realization, which may either use or dispense with other means developed by nature in its evolution viz., religion, occultism and spiritual thought.² Faith is not so much a mental belief put before the mind or sense in the form of an unsupported assertion, but a dynamic intuitive conviction in inner being of truth of supersensible things through this subjective experience. Indian thought gives highest place to this knowledge; Veda is *pramāna* in respect of transcendental facts granted by divine vision, *divya-darsana* or *ātma-darsana* or *divyānubhava*. When man achieves this seer-vision, *ṛṣi-jñāna*, then he knows reality.

Intuition is present at the beginning of things, in their middle and in their consummation. Reality plunges into different planes of the world, therefore secret consciousness works by hidden intuition proper to each plane. The intuition in matter holds material world into action, the intuition of life guides the play and development of life. In man it operates according to the stage of his inner development. Intuition

1. *The Life Divine*, I, 5.

2. *ibid.*, II, 688, 691ff.

in general is non-sensuous direct experience, but its value depends upon the source or level of consciousness or nature of psychic being, caitya-purusa, from which it emanates.¹ Mind is a lapse into Avidyā from Supermind or Vijnāna of Brahman, with the intermediate plane of over-mind linking them.² In integral yoga man rises from mind to over-mind through three stages in the process of spiritualisation, each of which has its own form of intuition. Intuition arises even in the mental level, catches some aspects of truth directly though not completely or with certitude, being mixed up with mental stuff, misapplied, mixed with half truth in practical application.³ Because of its flashy character, particularity, limited range and lack of cohesion, it is dis-trusted by men of intellect and scientists. Above the mind is the higher-mind whose substance is unitarian sense of being, powerful mental dynamis of knowledge and action. Here, intuitive knowledge is formulated by self-existent all-awareness manifesting some part of its integrality and harmony of knowledge in thought form, without self-critical ratiocination, logical notion, step by step conclusion or deduction-inference mechanism. It is cognition, mass-ideation or system or totality of truth-seeing at a single view. The next higher level of illumined-mind does not operate primarily by thought but by vision to which thought is subordinated. Its perceptual power of inner sight is more direct and greater than of thought, seizing the substance of truth and not only the outline and significance of her figure. The third level of intuitive-mind gives the united completeness to the first two. Intuition as power of consciousness is yet nearer and more intimate to original knowledge by identity. It is a result of penetrating and revealing touch which carries in it both sight and conception, as part of its natural consequences. Intuitions of all three types are subject to invading mixture of a mental coating, therefore, calling for the activity of discriminating intelligence under the process of reasoned conclusion or verified conjecture, though this process discounts their utility as intuitions. For an intuition passed in judicial review by reason ceases to be intuition.⁴

1. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 131.

2. The Life Divine, I, 327.

3. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 131.

4. The Life Divine, II, 798.

What is needed in order to coordinate cognition and separated activities is to connect consciously the intuitive-mind with its supra-rational source. Over-mind is the super-conscient delegate of Supermind in nature and life to the mind of ignorance. It contains conception, sight and intuition of the previous three levels of consciousness raised to their highest and largest power, and adds to them cosmic width of consciousness, of which all thoughts, feelings, emotions and sensations are felt to be waves. Its intuition arises when predominance of centralising ego-sense is entirely abolished in the sense of boundless universal self. Over-mind intuition has light, certitude, effective truth, lacking in the best mental intuition. But its play is like that of all minds, a play of possibilities; although it acts in the knowledge of the truth of these possibilities rather than in ignorance, it works out these possibilities through the independent evolution of their own powers. Over-mind has the illimitable capacity of separation, combination of powers and aspects of all-comprehending unity i. e., although its basis is cosmic unity, its action is an action of division and interaction. Its principle of global knowledge may operate selectively and not totally, therefore, even intuitions of over-mind may give comprehension of the universe under one aspect, but fail to give knowledge of another aspect. It needs the integral character of Supermind-intuition, the harmonic coexistence of different characters and powers in a single reality to complete it i. e., to eliminate the very basis ofnescience and possibility of downward pull or gravitation of inconscience.

The different levels and types of intuition indicate the scope and relation of reason and intuition in the knowledge of the real. Ordinary cognitive procedure is necessary to master problems of material existence, but intuition is needed for self-realization and guidance. And even in regard to spiritual intuition, up to the level of the over-mind, critical examination by impartial reason may be necessary to eliminate illusory intuition. Aid of reason is needed to give order and articulation to mystic intuition, and thus it was that the age of intuition in early Vedānta was succeeded by the age of rational metaphysics. Joining of intuition to reason is a necessary stage of spiritual development, but it cannot be regarded as the highest. When the defects of mental stuff have been removed then spiritual intuition would

not need the support of reason or intellectual procedure. The end of mankind is freedom from present dependence on intellect by intuitive illumination of its consciousness by Supermind. Its fourfold power would appear as revelatory truth-seeing, inspiration of truth-being, truth-touch or immediate seizing of significance, true or automatic discrimination of orderly, exact relation of truth to truth i. e., it will perform all actions of reason including logical intelligence with its own superior process.¹ Though such intuition of truth may appear either void of reason or mystery of magic to finite reason, yet reality is not constrained to work under that narrow logic alone.² Far from being irrational spiritual intuition is larger and more plastic reason. For it admits all criteria of truth set up by reason: firstly, coherence and harmony; rational activity seeks to eliminate contradiction of ideas and conflict of human reason but the intuition of an original and ultimate consciousness alone can go beyond segmenting reason of finite cognition to a unitarian view of diversity, an integral all-embracing vision which makes non-contradictory the contradictions of finite reason.³ Secondly, universality is the ground of coherence and harmony, not the abstract formal universality of intellectual enquiry but that of universal, impersonal truth inhering in the individual-personal consciousness, when the latter consciousness becomes instrument of the Divine. As in aesthetic experience so in spiritual, truth springs from the quality of personal experience itself. Integral evolution of levels of being and consciousness means that neither physical, vital nor mental consciousness is cast off in the spiritual, hence spiritual intuition conserves the fruit of intellectual activity; both are included and harmonised in one creative movement.

Human Values

Introduction

No philosophy can object to the humanistic goal of whole-hearted effort to make the best of human life. Certainly, the goal of man is neither power, nor mere

1. *ibid.*, II, 799.

2. *ibid.*, I, 393.

3. *ibid.*, II, 218.

numbers, nor efficiency, nor material experience, but greater fulfilment, fuller achievement and fuller environment. Humanism declares that values are inalienable to human life as distinct from animal. But the point is that the naturalistic bent gives no congruous explanation of the origin and justification of values, since the scientific account of the world is non-teleological and non-intelligent.¹ According to Schiller, the undiluted positivistic approach tends to pass through the state of agnosticism to scepticism and thence to pessimism which implies that inherently things are perverse; life, happiness, goodness, beauty, knowledge are illusory. The differentia of philosophy from science consists in its being value-centred, not existence-centred.² Humanism is forced to concede that ethical principles must be subject to a more inclusive criterion, which may also be the logical ground of other values, but not discoverable in any scientific law or natural evolution.³ The idealistic spiritual philosophy is causally related to belief in and pursuit of human values. The Neo-Vedāntins are confident that the three great values of human life viz., beauty, goodness and truth of natural law are derivable from Vedāntic theory of reality. Reality is sat and it is also satya. It is that from which all things emanate and into which they are recalled. Sat includes the whole province of reality—outer-inner worlds, but it is also the purpose, final cause for which all finite things strive. In other words, reality as truth is the good and that which man ought to become. Moreover, the world has to be understood with reference to this ultimate criterion of truth i. e., in terms of harmony and this constitutes beauty. Thus, existence is the superficial core of reality, the deeper one is value or ānand.⁴ Sat-cit-ānand is three dimensional value; beauty and goodness imply consciousness and bliss, and truth as transcendental existence, fullness of being implies all three, though at empirical level human experience shows their difference, independence and special quality.⁵

Religious consciousness also apprehends God as satyam, śivam, sundaram. A supreme personality of absolute perfection of values. The Neo-Vedāntins find in the

1. Arthur James Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, pp. 248, 274.

2. *vide supra*, pp. 436-445.

3. Julian Huxley, *The Human Frame*, p. 78.

4. S. K. Maitra, *Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*, p. 381.

5. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 423.

three forms of the ultimate reality or aspects of divine personality the counterparts of the three forms of mental functioning. Perfection of cognition or knowledge perfectly accordant with will is satyam. Perfection of conation, freedom of will from desire is sīvam and perfection of emotion is love or unalloyed joy together with sense of unity (charity and beauty) and the union of the three is the perfection of human self. Tagore insists that beauty as created and composed of ānand is an ultimate and independent aspect of the supreme personality and Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan agree with him. Gandhi is not inclined to the aesthetic aspect of reality to the same extent. Worth of beauty in human life is not to be ignored, but it is not an independent attribute of either human life or reality. It is a derivation from truth-goodness nature of the real, and the generality of mankind discovers beauty and goodness as by-products of search for truth or beauty may also be a product of the good¹ e. g., love, sympathy, loyalty, compassion, self-denial, inner discipline give both moral satisfaction and aesthetic pleasure. Vivekanand holds artistic creation as the witness of the beautiful in human life, the purest (least selfish) form of happiness in the world. "Of a truth, Art is Brahman. God is the sum of all harmony and because of that there is harmony in world and nature."²

The humanistic objection³ is that the absolutist claim of unity of truth is not an operative truth; the human truth is only that which is the best answer for the time i. e., essentially progressive and improvable, in the making of which every man has a hand and no one uses force i. e., infinite variety of truth is relatively valid for different persons and situations, and toleration must result. Vedānta satisfies the standard of humanism as it ensures unity and diversity of human truth. Absolute truth when reflected in nature and society, science and other branches of knowledge or grasped through the empirical mind, appears as different and even contradictory truths. Relative truth is partial truth and admits of objective standards of validity such as correspondence, coherence and even workability e. g., Gandhi makes workability in terms of non-violence the test of truth of belief. But the absolute truth surpasses all

1. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, pp. 97, 230.
2. Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekanand, pp. 298, 299.
3. F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism, Philosophical Essays, p. 273.

these tests and unites all truths, being itself the identity of reality and knowledge in intuition.

Vedānta not only gives an irrefutable metaphysical foundation for ethical value in conduct but also the psychological impulses issuing from that reality sufficient to ensure negative-positive action in individual life and society. It is the philosophy of transcendence of self and that is also the meaning of morality. Moral law is inseparable from human nature but must also be shown to be the law of complete man i. e., dharma. Reality is Advaita, the one self or the Supreme Person, immanent in all. Realization of that unity and its expression in life is ethics. Only universal consciousness ensures and justifies imperatives of love, charity, non-injury etc. If it be objected that there is no direct connection between religious experience and moral principles the Neo-Vedāntins would deny this. At the same time, it is true that in the practice of religion the intuitions of religion are not lived up to, because spiritual truth is mixed up with natural, including physical, vital and even intellectual elements. Hence the moral strength of a philosophy is not in direct proportion to the logical strength of its metaphysic.¹ Therefore, there is scope for rational inquiry to discover new moral ideals, principles and rules, implied in the spiritual unity which is realized.

It is not sufficient to prove that morality is founded on spiritual reality. True humanism requires a completion of the circle by the proof that spirituality is founded on morality alone. Vivekanand's aim was to link the ancient spiritual discipline (sannyāsa) with a moral life of service and he declared welfare of the Indian masses to be more important than self-realization. And all other Neo-Vedāntins followed his lead of karma-yoga through worship of Daridra Nārāyaṇa. The asceticism of the spiritual man is the vision of a better life on earth, realized by struggle, self-suffering and work for welfare of all.

The Vedāntic idea that each individual has the capacity and certainty to work out his personal salvation and none is condemned to eternal imperfection, is interpreted to mean that each must aim at public salvation. The suggestion of sarva-muktj

1. Huxley, op. cit., p. 116.

in Siddhāntaleśa Saṃgraha is converted by Vivekanand and all others into a siddhānta of Neo-Vedānta and by means of that doctrine the spiritual morality, karma-yoga, is connected with humanism or religion of service. The passage from individual to universal salvation establishes a metaphysical correlation of individual good and social ethic and the good life is seen to combine self-development (atma-lābha) with the welfare of the whole (loka-saṃgraha).¹

The problem is this: Vedānta holds that human values bind man to "ego" of life, but humanism requires conservation of values discovered and created in the course of human life, even in the ultimate reality. Humanism rejects all absolutes, which are thought to destroy relative values, and insists that within the metaphysic of relativity alone can reason discover standards to which epistemological, ethical, aesthetic activity of man might profitably conform. But the "relativity" doctrine is not acceptable to the Neo-Vedāntins. Firstly, intellectual standards do not wholly explain any of the three great values, which contain elements or features of the trans-rational type. Secondly, relativity points to intellectual and moral individualism, solipsism, nihilism, not consistent with the spirit's apprehension of oneness or universal-cosmic being, consciousness and bliss. Reality or God is immanent in values but also transcendent i. e., not the combination of the three but a "Divine More" e. g., the nature of human good is to always demand a struggle against ego. In other words, ethics is characterised by the distinction of the real and the ideal and self-assertiveness of partial truth. But reality is identity with ideal perfection or universalism in which ego and struggle against it i. e., morality is transcended. Similar is the case with relative truth and beauty. The difficulty pointed out by humanism can be overcome: at the empirical level Vedānta distinguishes negative from positive values and insists on man's duty of pursuit of the latter as means to attainment of reality. And, according to Radhakrishnan, even when the transcendental level is attained in liberation moral and other values are to be pursued as long as the world lasts i. e., values have ultimate cosmic significance. Aurobindo's argument is that though the Absolute negates

1. cf., T. H. and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 215: It will overcome the conflict of self and society while allowing the individual to experience the highest intrinsic value of human life (spirit).

relativity of value as well as relativity of disvalue (Vivekanand calls *Māyā* dualism of all pairs of opposites) it does so in different ways i. e., negation of human disvalue is by exclusion, but negation of human value is by sublimation; and apprehension of absolute reality is identical with perfection or absoluteness of value.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand argues that reality or absolute truth does not obliterate distinctions in the empirical level. Oneness of reality is not sameness or uniformity of forms. Variety is sign of life and many different standards and truths can coexist. The question is: can contradictory truths be real? Vedānta is not afraid of the paradoxical situation and answers in the affirmative. The many truths are parts of universal truth, embody it and typify it.¹ From this follows another conclusion that truth seen from different standpoints can be truth and yet not the same truth. There is no contradiction in terms here, as one absolute truth must necessarily be various when seen relatively, as an infinite number of possible photographs of the sun taken at various steps of a journey to the sun are all different according to space, time and condition, yet true from their own positions and as far as they go. Vedāntic absolutism allows for growth in knowledge. Man does not move from error to truth but from lower truth to higher truth.² Besides allowing for variety of relative standpoints in human life it also provides the solution for the danger of conflict in society resulting from this variety. A million radii converge towards the same centre in the sun. The further from the centre they are the more distance between them, at the centre they all meet and differences vanish. The only solution is to approach the centre, not argument or quarrelling.

Ethical theories, moral attitudes, greatness and goodness of human nature, mercy, justice, fellowship are explicable only if there is something beyond the philosophy of epicureanism (hedonism); and even a rational utilitarianism cannot explain them better than the Vedāntic metaphysic postulating the universe as one link in an infinite chain, and Vedāntic practice ending in realization of this unity by

1. Complete Works, II, 363.

2. *ibid.*, I, 384.

man.¹ The test of religiousness is love and charity for the race (humanism), not as a merely sentimental platitude, but as a feeling of oneness of human life. The aim is not only the negative one of ending of warring creeds but that man as a whole should positively love, understand, identify himself with the life of humanity.² This is achieved only through love and realization of God, not before. For, to love the *vyāṣṭi* (particular) man must first realize the *samaṣṭi* (universal) in which the smaller unities are found. The *jñāni* aims at wholeness of things i. e., one Absolute by knowing which all is known; the *bhakta* to realize one generalised Being in whom to love the world, and the *yogī* to realize one generalised form of Power to control the world.³ Ethics is manifestation of this oneness, which is summed up in the intuition, "that thou art." When the universal self is seen then universal love, sympathy is possible because from Love (*Ātman*) the universe comes, in It remains, to It it goes. One ethical precept, one idea of duty is accepted by all mankind: the positive injunction to love carries with it the prohibition of injury to any being, non-injury to others is virtue and injury is sin. But only Vedāntic metaphysic can provide the logic behind this precept. The Absolute is infinite; there cannot be two such, hence each soul is part of that Soul. Man's self is one with the self of others, therefore, in injury he injures his self, in love he loves his self. Love is identical with the expansion of self's life and hatred is contraction or law of death.

Vedāntic injunction, *ātmavat sarvabhūteṣu*, is not to be confined to books, but to be made a part of experience to vindicate moral law.⁴ The error in all ethical systems without exception is the failure to teach the means whereby man may refrain from wrong-doing. It is a tremendous psychological problem involving not only control of unconscious tendencies, but attainment of the super-consciousness whereby man becomes conscious of himself. The smallest attempt at this viz., yoga is not in vain, and to the extent to which man attains to that spiritual development he has morality.

The definition of morality is, "That which is selfish is immoral, and that which

1. *ibid.*, I, 188.

2. Romain Rolland, *The Life of Ramakrishna*, p. 206.

3. *Complete Works*, III, 81.

4. *ibid.*, VI, 288.

is unselfish is moral."¹ Separate selfhood and ethics hold in *Māyā* because there is variation. Yet even in *Māyā* there is the tendency to go back to the One, as expressed in morality of all nations, as a constitutional necessity of the soul. It is a foolish notion that loss of little individuality means loss of morality or hope for humanity, as if everybody had been dying for humanity all the time, whereas history shows that benefaction i. e., well-being of mankind and moral good flows from those who had no thought of their little individuality. Their watchword is, "Not I, but thou," the motto is not "self" but "not self." All the codes say, "I must hold myself last." Vedānta teaches renunciation, destruction and not construction of individuality on the natural plane, since the infinite never finds expression on that plane. The ethical ideal is self-annihilation. The one-force theory of Vedānta is the source of good, strength, avoidance of fear and despondence. The individual self is the cause of misery, differentiation from others in attachment, anger, and with attainment of oneness he gives up this self for the least, as the phenomenal world or separateness disappears.²

The two standards of spiritual morality (*karma-yoga*) are good of the universe and one's own liberation i. e., *ātmanh mokṣārtha jagadhītāya ca*,³ which are equivalent to the Kantian principles of perfection of self and happiness of others. The latter standard or religion of service follows easily and inevitably from the attainment of Atman. There is no distinction between realization of divinity in man and the consciousness of universal suffering as the motive of service. Only by that realization can the depth of man's misery be grasped, and the sad feeling of contrast between that divinity and the present ignorant state of man pricks the heart to serve mankind.⁴ But the true motive power of desire to do good to the world must be clearly understood. It is foolish to talk of doing good unless it arises from the conviction that it is man's privilege to help others. Service must be done incessantly because it is a blessing to the individual, since the man helped is God himself. Service of *jīva* with

1. *Ibid.*, I, 108.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 365.

3. *Ibid.*, IV, 251.

4. Rolland, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

the idea that he is *jīva* is compassion, *dayā*, but service with the idea that he is Self (Lord, Brahman) is *prema*. *Śruti*, *Smṛti*, *pratyakṣa* hold *Ātman* to be the one object of love. And Chaitanya linked "love to God and compassion to *jīva*." Dualism distinguishes *jīva* and *Īśvara* but monism holds the distinction to be bondage. Therefore, the principle is love, not compassion; service, not pity.¹

One half of the moral circle is to pass from realization of God to man, *jagadhītāya*, the other is to pass from man to God, *ātmanh mokṣārtha*. The circle is completed thus: spirituality must lead to morality and morality must lead to spirituality. The more man loves and serves man the nearer he is to God. The Vedānta message is: if one cannot worship brother man, the manifest God, how can he worship the unmanifest. And human relations can be divinised. One attains one's own good viz., *bhakti* and *mukti*, by doing good to others. There is no other way, none whatsoever: "You are God, I am God and man is God. It is the God manifest through humanity doing everything in this world. Is there a different God sitting high up somewhere? The only way of getting our divine nature manifested is by helping others to do the same."² *Śāstra* says who serves servants of God are His greatest servants, therefore, highest form of *bhakti* is worship of the poor as *Nārāyaṇa*, in every place and at all times. There must be no passivity in dealing with divinity and it must be one's business to remove all indignities of the world, all humiliations of society by which human life is afflicted.³

Vedānta holds that all souls must eventually come to salvation by getting out of *samsāra* into a heaven, according to dualism, or to a condition perfectly free from imperfection, according to monism. There comes a time for everyone to realize the self. Everyone is Brahman, higher and lower is but degree of manifestation and all will have manifestation, *kalenātmani vindati*—"In time that is realized in one's self."⁴ The fact that every soul is destined to perfection in the end does not preclude help from outside. The motive of service is inevitable as when *sarvātmanbhāva* arises one cannot

1. Complete Works, V, 102; cf., The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 85.

2. Complete Works, VI, 280, 281ff.

3. Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekanand, p. 306.

4. Complete Works, VI, 411.

but treat others as one's self. The goal is knowledge and happiness, and both constitute freedom, but no one can have liberty until all (ant or dog) have it. World must be liberated before man leaves the body, then only will he be established in eternal truth.¹ As the ancients renounced the world to seek their own salvation the moderns must renounce their own salvation to help others. The new idea is that to go ahead of others in salvation is wrong. Man must learn that he cannot get salvation for self if he does not seek it for his brothers.

Tagore

Tagore does not regard reality as an opposite to the world, negating all its qualities and achievements, but as a "Divine More" which accepts all values within it. Thus, when the Deity of death comes

She comes and takes all that I have to the last grain; I ask her to take me.
But she says "no"—the boat is laden with my gifts, no room is left for me.²

The self left behind is the person, name and form of natural and social self, but the soul realized within as the supreme soul of all continues unbroken. The self is the vehicle of the "gifts" of man i. e., his values. The creative activity of God is expressed in man through activity of seeking, finding and suffering to make and unmake values.³ Realizing his relationship with the Supreme Person man is inspired to create, to reveal this Divinity (Humanity) in varied manifestations of truth, beauty and goodness.

Truth of man is ultimate because reality is identical with truth; sat is satya. The image of this aspect of reality is found in the irresistible fact of laws of nature ordained by Him for all time. At the empirical level of dualistic knowledge it is possible to distinguish the real from the true. Man may pursue the real as opposed to the ideal, but in either case his goal is truth. Truth of facts themselves presupposes existence of an ideal truth, perfected knowledge of all-knowing universal mind. The scientist says that truth is independent of human mind, this is a mystical belief, natural to man but inexplicable. The explanation may be that the ideal truth

1. *Ibid.*, VII, 161.

2. *Fugitive*, 17.

3. *Sadhana*, pp. 132, 123.

does not depend on individual mind but on the universal mind which comprehends the individual. Science contradicts itself by saying that truth exists apart from humanity, science too works with the logical machinery of man to attain truth. But if humanity is the Supreme Person then the difficulty is overcome. Science represents but the rational mind of universal man--truth of being.

The concept of a personal-creative reality explains the urge for realization of aesthetic value in human life. Somewhere in the world system there seems a great concern over man's delight, which shows that over and above the meaning of matter and force there is meaning conveyed by touch of personality. Creative activity has got the dual role of expressing personality and also of creating i. e., developing the inner self. By freedom to create man finds joy in contributing to the concreteness of world-music. The joy element predominates in the ultimate reality and reveals itself in the emotional side of man's nature, love, joy, delight. Boundlessness, superfluity appears in God and man as play, which is creation of beauty through love. This is the explanation of genesis of creation and of the origin of all art. The greatness born of surplus is not expressed in any one kind of fulfilment but comprehends all efforts of human bravery, grace, strength.¹

The three values are coordinate aspects of the real, though not always so in empirical life. Their real significance and enrichment consists only in their relationship. The true and good are meaningless abstractions unless connected with the beautiful. Creation is a perpetual harmony between infinite ideal of perfection and eternal continuity of its realization. Beauty is this ideal of perfect harmony which is the universal being. Therefore, jointedness rather than disjointedness of world is the truth i. e., goodness of peace and love is more true than conflict and hatred and this is so because truth is one. Morality and aesthetics are both ultimate and express different phases of reality. "The stream which comes from the infinite to flow towards the finite is the good (morality) . . . its echo which returns from the finite to the infinite is beauty."² Far from being opposites they may be regarded as negative and

1. Man, p. 57.

2. My Reminiscences, p. 224.

positive aspects of the Supreme Person. Revelation of unity in passive perfection in nature i. e., rhythm of proportion is beauty, and active perfection in spiritual world is love or rhythm of world. The feeling of a touch of personality is the centrifugal impulse making man break out in ceaseless flow of reactions—songs, pictures, poems, images, festivals; the centripetal force attracting man into groups and organizations in every activity of life.¹ Creation of beauty is expression of universal dynamic rhythm, a unifying force, enhancing life's significance. It carries eternal reassurance of spiritual relation to reality, awaiting man's response in the activity of love. It unites man, nature, society and God.

"Personality" or the "limitless value of Humanity" in the individual is the basis of ethics. The person or immortal soul, the "whole self" as distinct from one side of nature is the spiritual ideal, which alone explains ethical distinctions and moral effort in empirical life. Unless ethical life is reinforced by the energy of the immortal Puruṣa within the soul goodness and moral value are appearances.² An abstract qualityless reality has no meaning for the human world, the true infinite is both supremely real and supremely good i. e., śivan and śāntam, as all things are in harmony with one another, hence the spiritual life is equivalent to the good life. And the good means the most comprehensive life man can have by virtue of the inherent power of moral vision of wholeness of life; moral nature is vision of true self seen as continuity in time and also not restricted to the self. In spiritual experience the soul is seen within one's own self and God as one with that soul. Further, he who sees all in his own self and his own self in all does not remain unrevealed. The ancient Vedāntic vision of God was such a vision. The seer said, "I see," and lived according to the vision of unity. This is the testimony of the Great Whole, complete truth of man. "He who is One . . . who is in the beginning and in the world is Divine, may He unite us in the relationship of good-will (righteousness)."³ The solution of the moral problem lies in cultivating the art of at-homeness in the whole, sarvānubhūti. Merging of the individual self in the self of humanity through extinction of desire, anger, greed and

1. Personality, p. 70.

2. Man, p. 56.

3. Sadhana, p. 49.

infatuation means an ascent from selfishness to unselfishness.

Ethical life is not explicable in terms of egoism, even of the enlightened type. No form of egoism or cult of might is ultimate. Egoism is self-defeating because it is based on falsity. The egoist lives in an unreal world because he fails to understand it. By failing to understand his own self he underrates everything else and thus fails to have the joy arising from truth in unifying himself with others, cannot enter the world of harmony. The roundness or continuity of truth, which is seen only in morality-in-society or altruism¹ is contradicted by vehement self-assertion. Life has an extended meaning only for one who lives for an idea, for country, for humanity. To live the life of goodness is to live the life of all.² Only when self is divested of its egoism does it become *viśvakarmā* i. e., working for all in a universal way, however small in extent. Conduct no longer in one's self-interest is the true conduct, like a child's delight in work, "overflow of superfluous energy or joy."³

Similarly, the hedonistic standard fails to satisfy truly because of the shifting significance of pleasure-pain criterion, which depends on the attitude of mind. So much so that the meaning or weight of the two standards at lower levels is quite reversed at higher levels. And even universal or enlightened hedonism suffers from the materialistic fallacy. It leads man to the needs of mind-body i. e., expediency or utility, which is not his nature or his end, as proved by the fact of the expenditure of an immense amount of time and resources by man to prove that he is not a mere catalogue of endless wants. When the mind is bent on making use of the world it loses its true value, makes it cheap by sordid desires, similarly, desires blind the individual to man's truth. To define man and world at market-value (utility) is to be cruel to him, to make him small by stealing from his humanity.⁴

Through anti-egoistic and anti-utilitarian activism freedom and renunciation of self acquire a new meaning. Giving up is not under compulsion of self-interest but in joy of giving due to widening of self. Perfect love is freedom of one's own self and,

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1. Personality, p. 42.
 2. Sadhana, p. 57.
 3. Gitanjali, 60.
 4. Sadhana, p. 108.

therefore, working for love is freedom in action, which is the ideal of the *Gītā*. Vaisnava bhakti ideal connects love and bliss of reality. Similarly, the Buddhistic infinite is one whose meaning lies in its positive ideal of goodness and love as the way to nirvāna. Brahma-vihāra, living in the infinite is maitri¹ i. e., friendship, love, pity, charity, goodness are the true motives of conduct. The beneficent mind is that which shows the wants of another self to be the inherent wants of man's own self, nihitārtha.²

Religions aim at liberation of man. Buddha first declared that salvation is for all men. This combined with the ideal of bhakti gives the true goal of conduct. Love must not remain an abstract motive but concrete in the form of practical service of man. The ending of suffering is the goal of Indian thought, which implies alleviation of material, mental and spiritual suffering. The luminous assertion of life and immortality in Vedānta, impulse to joy and love is the very ground of insight into sorrows and griefs of humanity through profound sympathy. And the token of love is a mighty sword by which the liberated sallies forth to meet the adversary of mankind viz., evil.³ He lives in the world to transfigure it i. e., to make it a better habitation of God. Divine immanence requires removal of all injustice, because man as spirit is not a means only but an end. So long as there is suffering and insult in humanity no individual can win his escape. The goal is not individual liberation but freedom of humanity for which great men have told us that they are born from age to age.

Not only is ethical value ultimate, but there is also no distinction of primary and secondary between religion and morality. Can spirituality be totally unrelated to selflessness (morality) or be attained by withdrawing from the world and chanting the Holy name in the sanctity of isolation. There is no spirituality in cultivation of suffering for some ultimate gain (for wealth or for welfare in the next world), only through suffering for the sake of love and joy does one attain self-transcendence and apprehension of the universe i. e., apprehension of the Supreme Person is in the realms

1. Man, p. 66.

2. Sadhana, p. 132.

3. Gitanjali, 52.

of knowledge and ethical consciousness simultaneously. As intellect freed from self-interest discovers the world of universal reason i. e., truth (of science) with which man must be in harmony to satisfy his needs, the will is freed from limitations i. e., becomes good. This good-will extended to all men, at all times discerns the world transcending the moral world i. e., discipline of moral life ends in ultimate truth and truth is that through which goodness finds its meaning.¹ Therefore, the more man acts morally and makes actual the latent, the nearer he comes to the distant yet-to-be.

Gandhi

The Gandhian conception of reality allows full scope for origin and preservation of all values. In fact, the latter necessarily follow from the definition, "Truth is God." This is absolute truth which the finite imperfect mind of man cannot know in its fulness. But far from negating truth in man's life it necessitates continuous pursuit of that reality. "Truth is by nature self-evident. As soon as you remove the cobwebs of ignorance that surround it, it shines clear."² And truth-value in human knowledge is dynamic and developing. "Constant development is the law of life, the man who tries to maintain his dogma in order to appear consistent drives himself in a false position."³ Truth itself is complete and static but in knowledge man has clearer and clearer idea of truth. Reality also ensures acquisition of truth by man. Living faith in God or Truth has solved large number of puzzles of life. The very search for truth becomes interesting and worth-while. Man embarks on the search because he believes there is a truth and it can be found by diligent search, meticulous observance of all tried rules of search—history does not record failure of this.

Assertion of absolute truth does not mean that content of truth is identical for all. Even if God is Truth He is known in different forms by different names. And if Truth is God even then the difficulty of knowing it remains. If it be "the voice within" then different and contrary truths are inevitable because they come through media of minds whose evolution is at different levels. Jain logic rightly implies the

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1. Personality, pp. 82-83.
 2. Young India, May 27, 1926.
 3. All Men are Brothers, p. 227.

many standpoints of truth. The seven blind men were all right from their respective points of view and wrong from that of another and right-wrong from point of man who knew the elephant. Subjectivity or relativity of truth does not debar a universally acceptable objective method of decreasing ignorance, conflict, error and of increasing truth-value. Knowledge of subjectivity must increase respect for others' position and engenders humility about one's own. What appears truth to one, may not appear truth to another, hence patience i. e., self-suffering. The true doctrine is of vindication of truth by suffering oneself and not by making the opponent suffer. Man may not try to eliminate what is "untruth" to him by destruction i. e., violence is excluded. That is truth in the long run which is founded on non-violence.

Religion is inseparable if not identical with morality or goodness-value. "I reject a religion in conflict with morality, . . . religious sentiment when it is . . . immoral."¹ To lose the moral basis is to cease to be religious. There is no such thing as religion overriding morality. Man cannot be untruthful, cruel and incontinent and claim to have God on his side. Though true religion and true morality are inseparable, yet religion is to morality what water is to the seed.² To be moral it is unnecessary to believe in an extra-mundane power called God and in this sense it can be said that morality is not impossible without God, but if God be the unseen power within, nearer than nails to flesh, that is indispensable to morality. Starting from intuitive knowledge of reality as Truth the whole of morality and all virtue in man may be deduced. "One thing took deep root in me--the conviction that morality is the basis of things and that Truth is the substance of all morality. Truth became my sole objective."³ It is impossible to observe any principle of life without truth. By centring on it all other rules of correct living come without effort and obedience to these will be instinctive. It is to be remembered that there is not only truth of idea but also truth of fundamental moralities i. e., goodness-value is implied in belief in Truth-God. Hence goodness is not an attribute of God, but it is God. Apart from Him goodness is lifeless, also all morals. To be living in man morals must be cultivated

1. Young India, July 21, 1920.

2. Ethical Religion, p. 49.

3. All Men are Brothers, p. 11.

in their relation to God. Man tries to become good because he wants to reach God. Similarly, God is love because experience of life shows that the nearest approach to truth is through love.

Morality is performance of duty. The highest duty is service which is impossible without ahimsā and this alone is the way to truth.¹ Departure from morality lands the truant in endless misery. But the difficulty of practice should not be confused with his belief. It is the condition of success in search for God since it alone removes all obstacles. Means and ends are convertible terms.² They are so intertwined as to be impossible to disentangle, nevertheless ahimsā or love is means and Truth is end. Truth or God alone is. Desire for mokṣa (Truth-realization) is the root of activities for the individual, the world is more interested in the fruit (moral conduct), but for the tree (individual) the chief concern should not be the fruit but the root. He must concentrate on the depth of his true being and nurse it with the water of love and suffering. Ethical religion shows indispensability of spirituality to morality and of morality to spirituality.

Immanence of God in every one means that the individual must identify himself with every human being, binding himself with everyone and with God. Scientists say that without the presence of cohesive force amongst the atoms that comprise the globe it would crumble to pieces and would cease to exist, and the name of that force among animate beings is love. Man has to learn to use that force among all that lives and in this consists his knowledge of God. Repulsion exists in nature but she lives by attraction. Mutual love enables nature to persist, man also lives not by destruction, but by the principle of mutual regard between individuals and nations.³ This principle issues negatively in the motive of harmlessness to all. Men are children of one creator and the divine powers within them are infinite. To slight a single human being is to slight these divine powers and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole world. The positive motive must be love and beneficent action to all. *Law of complete love

1. Hindu Dharma, pp. 57, 13.

2. Young India, December 26, 1924.

3. *ibid.*, March 2, 1922.

is the law of my being."¹ This conclusion is also reached by remembering the nature of man as body and soul. The body is a machine whose motive power is soul, therefore it works best not under utility or force but when the will of the creature is brought to greatest strength by its proper fuel viz., love and affection. And love understood widely is compassion, charity, forgiveness, toleration, sympathy, friendship.

Reason offers egoism, hedonism, utilitarianism as standards of conduct, but Vedānta searches for a higher standard in consonance with the real nature of man. Morality is certainly the nature of man, but the moral law revealed within is the revelation of divine truth in each individual, which carries its own sanction to enforce obedience to it. Selfishness is working for one's own community and it can never do good for the individual. The highest motive is the desire for well-being of all God's creatures. Not egoism or even utilitarianism, but "universalism" or "cosmism" is the standard. "Not the good of the few, not even the good of the many, but it is the good of all that we are made to promote if we are made in His image."² The "good of all" includes utility or the good of the greatest number and even the egoistic principle because man will serve himself with the rest,³ but it parts from the other two principles at many points in demanding sacrifice of self from the Advaitist, which cannot be logically sustained in the other two positions.⁴ The non-dual soul delights in renunciation of physical comforts and its own pleasures in the form of ahimsā. The hedonistic standard must be rejected. The standard must be such as to break down all barriers preventing the expansion of limited existence of individual towards the infinite i. e., the standard must be spiritual perfectionism.

Oneness of reality and, therefore, of humanity means that no single virtue or act aims at welfare of individual alone. Conversely, there is no moral offence which does not directly or indirectly affect others. Hence goodness or badness of the individual is not his individual concern but of the community, nay of the world.⁵ An individual may not gain spiritually while those surrounding him suffer. Advaita means

1. *Ibid.*, March 9, 1920.

2. *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, 1933, p. 350.

3. *Ethical Religion*, p. 36.

4. *Young India*, December 9, 1926.

5. *Ethical Religion*, p. 55.

if one gains spiritually the whole world gains with him and if one falls the whole falls to that extent. Therefore, religion which is only a means to individual salvation or jiva-mukti is no use, and must be introduced and applied for the whole world as well. Not only the physical body but even the social body is the habitation of spirit and to spiritualise-moralise the latter is to develop oneself. In fact, man becomes great i. e., grows, exactly in the degree to which he works for welfare of his fellows. There can be no individual development or liberation of a single bound soul in isolation, only reform of individual with reform of world, all must be liberated together. In practice this means that the nearest humanity is to be made an instrument, colleague and companion of the individual's self-liberation.¹

Karma-yoga of Vedāntic tradition points to the goal of sarva-mukti through national service or the religion of service of humanity, of the poorest, not only as one way, but the only way for self-realization and self-perfection.² God is neither in heaven nor down below but in everyone. The whole world is His creation and man is part and parcel of the whole, therefore, God cannot be found apart from the rest of humanity. And He is found more in the lowliest of His creatures than in the high and mighty, therefore, one cannot do without their service. Service of the poor is no favour to them but to oneself, as in discharging a debt the individual lightens his own burden.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan describes human life as a search for values of truth, goodness and beauty. The mind seeks to apprehend unity and coherence or the laws of truth in science, it seeks harmony and beauty of world in art, it seeks worth and goodness of universe in morality. Each value has its specific character, seeming to be absolute or independent of others, since values cannot be arranged in a hierarchy.³ Humanism is attempt to make the good life available to all men by establishing these values on earth. But in admitting the reality, ultimateness of values it is implicitly accepting

1. J. B. Kriplani, *Gandhian Outlook and Technique*, p. 349.

2. Hindu Bharma, p. 404; vide *All Men are Brothers*, p. 24: The religion of service is the only way to God; it became service of India because it came naturally to me without my seeking it and I had an aptitude for it.

3. *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 199, 200.

the extra-mental, because they are not merely dreams or empirical accidents, but explicable only in relation to the spiritual structure of things. Metaphysics must show that they are intrinsic to the nature of reality. And it is idealistic philosophy alone which holds the universe to have valuational meaning, to be intelligible as a system of ends. Vedāntic idealism holds values to be inseparable from the truly real or spirit, whose phenomenal variations they are, and even Indian realism is not in serious disagreement with idealism on this point.¹

Positive approach of Vedānta to the Absolute as fullness of Being and world as being and non-being means that all positive elements of value are preserved in reality.² Secular wisdom provides the three ends of life as ethical, economic and artistic, and by accepting these Vedāntic spirituality becomes bound with human values. That the values are not only ultimate in world's purpose but supreme realities, not subjective fancies but objective and sovereign facts, is brought out by experiencing them as attributes of God or by holding them to be thoughts of the Divine which man thinks after Him. There must be a supporting mind of the values. The three features of spiritual experience are reality, awareness and freedom i. e., reality is Saccidānand.³ In terms of theistic religion the personal God is known as wisdom (Brahmā), love (Viṣṇu) and goodness (Maheṣa), intuited as satyam, sundaram, śivam.⁴ The creative energy, the principle of life in general which inward intuition reveals is defined as Love or God Himself. God is the timeless spirit attempting to realize timeless values on the plane of time. The ideal of the cosmic process is real in one sense but awaiting realization in another i. e., fact in one sense and possibility in another. The values the cosmic process attempts to achieve are only a few possibilities contained in the Absolute. God is the definitisation of the Absolute in reference to the values of the world. But reality is both immanent and transcendent. The Absolute though "totally other" than empirical qualification, is the embodiment of value. However, God or universal consciousness is not reducible to either intelligible, ethical or aesthetic activity.

1. *ibid.*, pp. 17, 16, 71.

2. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 397.

3. *The Heart of Hindustan*, p. 61.

4. *Occasional Speeches and Writings*, Second series, p. 33.

Religion is an autonomous form of experience ending in spiritual certainty, to be judged by its own standard, whether it gives certainty to values, meaning to life, confidence to adventure or not.¹ The object of spiritual life is not merely a unity or sum of three values. When the three lose their incompleteness they cease to be supreme realities and become merged in their completion as parts of God's being. To apprehend the immanence of God is to realize values as aspects of God. But immanence does not make striving for them meaningless. God is present in everything in different degrees, more revealed in organic than in inorganic, in consciousness than in unconsciousness, in man than in lower creatures, in good man than in evil, from which follows the humanistic (ethical) implication of duty to increase degree of God's presence (value) in oneself and environment.²

Reality and truth are one, sat is jñāna. And jñāna is self-valid knowledge, ideal, absolute. It is not possible to think what is not true. Belief in validity of human thought is implicit in every thinking being and error is non-thought due to passions clouding thought. Absolute truth comes to man with absolute certainty, but this is in his historical context and need not be universally valid. Absoluteness of truth implies relativity of all formulations.³ Absolute truth is prior to distinction of subject and object, idea and thing, thought and reality of the mental or reflective level of man viz., vijñāna and the very possibility of logical thought depends upon it. Philosophically speaking, logical knowledge is Avidyā or non-knowledge, valid only till the intuition of identity of subject and object arises.⁴ But it is not cancelled because it cannot adequately grasp reality. Were all knowledge intuitive there would be no need for logical tests, it would be its own immediate witness, but actual knowledge is dualistic because subject reaches object through intermediate mode, here existence is not incorporated in thought (truth) and demands for verification of truth by various standards arise.⁵ The satyaswarūpa of Brahman denotes both the truth sought and spirit in which it is sought in human life.

1. My Search for Truth, p. 10.

2. Hindu View of Life, p. 70.

3. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, p. 811.

4. An Idealist View of Life, p. 145.

5. *ibid.*

Self-sufficient humanism using purely natural means makes moral value a product of human need, social or individual, but it fails to convince, since only a philosophy which affirms that human nature is rooted in the universal nature of things can give moral fervour. Service of the ideal must be demanded by the cosmic scheme. Metaphysical foundation is essential because as one thinks ultimate reality to be, so one behaves, vision and action go together. A profound ethical theory must have conviction of reality of ideals. And certainty of moral law requires the highest end from which all others are derived. If that conviction and that end is religious then ethical humanism is but acted religion. Therefore, the ultimate explanation of right conduct, rationale and justification is to be found in something beyond itself.¹ Vedāntic religion is realization of unity with the whole and ethics is expression of it in man's life.²

Absolutism accepts transcendence of moral value in the highest state. Reality is not an extension of the ethical but a new dimension. Good and evil are rooted in activity of historical progress, but reality is lacking in nothing, it is non-historical and non-active.³ The difference of ethics and mokṣa is the difference between indefinite progress in time and final attainment in eternity. A difference exists between progress and perfection, temporal development and eternal life, time extended and time suspended. In one there is improvement of human nature in the other reorientation of it. To attempt to reach the latter by means of the former is like the attempt to reach the point where the clouds touch the horizon by running. From the standpoint of psychology, the change is from ethical individualism to spiritual universalism. Moral growth consists in correction of individualistic point of view and when it is complete the moral as such ceases. Morality aims to raise one above individuality into impersonal spirit of the universe. As long as a trace of individuality clings to the moral subject the lifting up is partial.⁴ The moral ideal is unreachable by remaining merely at that level. The finite-infinite that characterises morality ends in spirituality

1. *The Religion We Need*, p. 9.

2. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 157.

3. *Hindu View of Life*, p. 64.

4. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 626.

which also ends exclusiveness of individual separateness.¹

The critic objects that absolutism allows only relative status to morality and goodness-value and not absolute validity. The objection is true, but since the moral situation refers to the world of individuals and is valid for it and since the world is rooted in reality, therefore, morality has ultimate cosmic significance,² lasting as long as the world lasts. Even Advaita does not prejudice goodness-value at empirical level. The empirical world is not negated by the Absolute's transcendence of the finite, nor is the historical process nullified because in spiritual experience man rises above "terms of reference" applicable to that process. Here *Māyā* signifies the ethical imperative of duty to shake off bondage to unreal value, by throwing off the illusion which makes man pursue physical satisfaction or even corporate self-seeking, and to seek the highest reality which is the highest good. As to the necessity of morality for attainment of reality, it cannot be denied that ethical life is indispensable or essential prerequisite for perfection and for transcendence of the ethical process itself³ i. e., morality is not super-imposed by an arbitrary fiat of the divine despot, but is the natural discipline of man. It is the conduct by which human nature i. e., intellect, will, emotion is disciplined, and without such discipline no realization of true self as identical with supreme reality occurs.

The apparatus of utilitarianism, hedonistic (egoistic) or idealistic (universalistic), does not fit into the consciousness of the Vedāntic seer. Evolutionism may be accepted as the standard, but not so much in terms of biological or social development as in terms of spiritual evolution. The primary test of conduct is the good, not as pleasure of self or even of the greatest number, but as discovery of the real self and its perfection. Idealistic or spiritual perfectionism is the standard, but it cannot be said that moral life is primarily individualistic and the social orientation is indirect or secondary. A metaphysical-logical correlation can be established between individual and social perfection.

Indian philosophy asserts different degrees of salvation, but complete and

1. *The Philosophy of the Upanisads*, p. 101.

2. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 803.

3. *ibid.*, p. 288.

final release of all is the ultimate one. Divinisation of man's life, individual and racial is the goal of great religions, mokṣa, nirvāna, kingdom of heaven are the ideals. The consummation of the world-process occurs when every man knows himself to be immortal. The world becomes a community of fully realized spirits. From the standpoint of the nature of the Divine, personal immortality meaning personality with its body, and conditional salvation meaning election of some, cannot be accepted.¹ The doctrine of grace is not identical with the latter since the supreme is the same to all beings. Universal salvation is a certainty if God's infinite love is not a myth.² Divine patience is inexhaustible, each soul is precious and if some are lost God's omnipresence and all-comprehensive character of His goodness becomes problematical. This does not cancel the distinction of virtue-vice, good-evil, but only means that no one can be ultimately lost and every man has a chance to realize his destiny.³ The respect for individual as individual is the religious demand that all have to be revealed as sons of God and universal incarnation is the goal. From the standpoint of perfection, whatever else salvation may be it must be coherence and harmony of the organism and environment, since any discord and conflict is contradiction of perfection. The end of harmony is first fulfilled by overcoming the struggle of spirit and flesh, but is not complete so long as any unredeemed element remains. Warring elements in men and the conflict of individuals must be ended in the unity of life. Therefore, perfect freedom is impossible in an imperfect world. In a sense the ideal individual and the perfect community rise together.⁴ Thus the standard of both the moral and spiritual levels is individual perfection, jīva-mukti, but this is inseparable from world perfection, sarva-mukti.

The central precept of morality is love. Were exclusiveness and difference fundamental then there would be no use in asking men to love neighbours or hope of achieving unity of world. Only if all are one in reality can this call to love have meaning.⁵ Religion is realization of the universal self in oneself and in others i. e.,

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 285.

2. *Hindu View of Life*, p. 125.

3. *East and West, Some Reflections*, p. 29; cf., *The Heart of Hindustan*, p. 105.

4. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 307.

5. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 84.

apprehension of reality of other souls as one with the inmost soul of oneself; and this as not only known or willed but as revelation of full life. Religion reflects both God and man and love of God and love of man are the inward and outward sides of the same experience. Or it might be said that when man's spirit is united within its self it must end in unity with others, yasmin sarvāni bhūtāni ātmaivābhudvijānatah. The natural fruit of jñāna or ending of tension or division within self and universe is abhaya and ahimsā i. e., awareness, sympathy, freedom and love are theoretical and practical features of religion. Non-injury to creatures is the most comprehensive criterion of ethical life. It is the principle of love expressing through forgiveness, sacrifice, tolerance, pacificism, patience. And the social expression of the inward fearlessness, peace and power of the spiritual mind is service of love. A fundamental harmony is seen between the unseen power inspiring history and nature and man's relation with his fellows. Contemplation of the eternal in which all dwell gives warmth and support to service of all creatures, jagad hitāya Kṛṣṇāya ca.¹ Insight into final purpose (spiritual perfection) gives a certainty that it will prevail as well as inspiration for utmost effort to make it prevail i. e., fusion of the finite and infinite creates a sense of mission in the world. Bhakti tradition sings of God as Daridra Nārāyaṇa, having no wants yet clothing Himself in human form so that man may serve Him. This means that one may not lose himself in inner piety or be at peace while the world is in need of help against poverty, hunger, nakedness. The imperfect order is a challenge to take up the social responsibility, to save the world by working for well-being. Whole-hearted striving for justice and equality and acceptance of individual's responsibility for that end follows from deep piety towards life.²

Aurobindo

Aurobindo holds that man's character as a thinking-spiritual being is to shape the world of life and matter for higher purposes. Ideals and sense of values are "the very stuff of Divine Life." The soul grows through striving for truth, goodness and beauty. But the merely human or even cosmic vision does not represent the fullest

1. The Bhagavad-gītā, p. 187.

2. Recovery of Faith, p. 166.

truth of values, because they are translations or reflections of reality into lesser truths of universe or time-experience. Man arriving at his most perfect self finds it one with some great self, soul of truth, goodness, beauty in the world he calls God and religion aims at this spiritual presence.¹

Integral Vedānta asserts the undoubted existence of one and eternal truth, from which others derive and through which they find their right place and relation to the scheme of knowledge. All science and philosophy and drive towards knowledge aims at accord with the principles of absolute truth, but no single formula, philosophy can shut it up or find it by intolerant exclusion of truth of other systems. The mind's tendency is to declare each to be independently supreme. Here the law of contradiction is valid, as opposite statements cannot be true of the same thing, at the same time, in the same place, in the same respect, from the same standpoint and same purpose.² Conflicting truths have their value and validity, but their very relativity points to highest and widest reality, for variety testifies to infinite aspects of the Infinite, each a partial glimpse or whole of one or more aspects of reality, which have to be sublimated, fused into their original indivisible absoluteness. The Absolute does not destroy relative distinctions between opposite values and truths for practical purposes.³

Aesthetic being is not the whole of man or his sovereign principle, but it is an indispensable condition of self-perfection. As a psychological sense it represents the principle of self-creation, self-expression. Aesthetics is founded on man's attempt to mould himself in harmony with the eternal beauty and delight of reality. Beauty is not identical with ānand, but a form of it, created by and composed of it. In creative arts it is not a product of vital or rational mind but springing from roots of life i. e., behind all its forms is the soul of beauty desiring contact with absolute beauty in all things i. e., nature, life, thought, art. Therefore, it is that it becomes the approach to reality when soul-value predominates over aesthetic (rasa) or vital or mind-value in it,⁴ and at a certain stage of yogic consciousness the

1. The Human Cycle, p. 191.

2. The Life Divine, II, 109.

3. *ibid.*, II, 107.

4. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 414.

universe is seen as beauty because of the experience of divine ānand hidden in it. But the vision of universal beauty does not reduce all to single level, gradations and hierarchy exist in all beauty, which depends on ascending power of consciousness, vibhūti and ānand expressed in the object.

Ethical being is not the whole of man's being or even three-fourths of life, but is the necessary condition for self-perfection. It represents the essential principle of energy, tapas of reality. Tapas is the energising consciousness-power of cosmic being creating and manifesting world force, will, energy, power and dynamism. And ethics aims at harmony with eternal nature, light, love, strength and purity i. e., its purity is aspiration to God's pure being, its sympathy-charity is movement towards infinity and universality of divine love, its truth and right is seeking after unity with the law of divine knowledge and will, its strength is edification of divine strength and power.¹ Analysis of ethical conduct shows an ascending scale of standards.² When the mind is dominated by vital element the standard is first sensational and individual i. e., the hedonic in which the motive is personal needs, preferences and desires. At a higher level the utilitarian-social standard prevails whose motive is the good of the collectivity and it solves claims of individual and society. But neither hedonic nor utilitarian standard is ultimate. The intellectual mind provides rational criteria of law, cosmic or karmic, and the principle or ethical system—an ideal ethic of absolute justice, righteousness, love, right, selflessness, reason, power, beauty or light. It is impossible to justify absolute ideals unless the inner being is related to eternal absolute good, which imposes its influence on lower sense and will. The highest good is found to be highest bliss in nature and effort, but not identical with the pleasure-standard (gratification of desires). It is also not identical with utility because relations with oneself and others are occasions of ethical growth but ethical being is determined by relations with God.³ Similarly the real sanction behind the categorical imperatives of ethical law is inward, for the soul-personality as distinct from the rational mind is not satisfied with merely moral

1. *The Human Cycle*, pp. 191, 189.

2. *vide Synthesis of Yoga*, p. 177; also *The Life Divine*, II, 384.

3. *The Human Cycle*, p. 184.

distinctions and points to supramental truth-being, where unification of total man and absolute ideals become real¹ i. e., identity with the Divine reveals possibility of individual consciousness for enrichment and growth of personality, by enjoyment of what is of abiding worth viz., three values in absolute form. This is the state of cosmic consciousness i. e., all objects are seen as parts of subjective existence. And the Divine is seen, felt, heard in all forms and the latter in His own vast self of Being. This oneness gives the true solution of right action, right relation with others.² Cosmic sympathy is part of inborn truth of being and man is occupied with the good of all, their joys and sorrows are his own, self-fulfilment lies in fulfilment of one in all, without contradiction of his own and others' good. The Vedāntic ideal of a liberated here and now i. e., jīvana mukti is perfection of complete being of the individual and also capacity to help raise the world to higher status. In integral yoga and integral divinisation no divine being emerges in an undivine universe. In supramental consciousness the jñānī is one with earth-consciousness, therefore he transforms material nature into divine by truth-consciousness and truth-force i. e., individual perfection is prelude to cosmic perfection.

Morality cannot by itself give entry into spiritual consciousness, because it tries to form character by construction of mental ideals, standards of virtue, merits and demerits.³ In its essence it is imperfect because in it the real and the ideal are fundamentally opposed i. e., it presents a partial view of truth. Secondly, it asserts the partial view as complete. This self-assertiveness of partial truth i. e., egoism gives rise to ethical disvalue. Ethics is a construct of good in a nature smitten with evil born out of ignorance. The cure lies in rising through moral life to a state of non-egoism. Spiritual development means dropping one form of egoism after another. At the end, egoism being abolished in universal standpoint through transcendence of both, ethics, as such, is no more. Evolution supports this conclusion. Since the whole of nature does not submit to ethical principle i. e., material does not operate by law of good and evil, animal (vital) is infra-ethical, even man is only half ethical and above

1. Synthesis of Yoga, pp. 187-188.

2. The Life Divine, II, 409.

3. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 91.

man may be the supra-ethical, to which the ethical impulse of humanity is a means.¹ The below hides secret good in all things, which man tries to deliver through ethical instinct and ideal, the above hides eternal good exceeding relativity or partial conceptions. Supernature must transcend values of present ignorant nature, but since the latter is derivation from the former, not pure ignorance but a half nature, therefore it is reasonable to suppose that the truth of it will appear in higher life, no longer as standard or ideal distinct from the real, but as elements transformed, uplifted out of ignorance into true harmony of luminous existence.

Humanism might argue that value must be real only with reference to empirical human existence without reference to any Absolute. Because if the latter is admitted the reality of value is jeopardised or both value and disvalue have to be granted to be the very essence of reality. But this argument is false. As for disvalue, it does not inhere in the order of the universe in the same way as value, since it is the result of ignorance and cannot exist with power of infinity, eternal being and self-existence i. e., fundamentally in reality, where ignorance is not. Or, in other words, since evil and falsehood are relative to self-assertion of personal consciousness as separate from world and persons, they must disintegrate in final experience of non-dual reality.² As for value, only its relativity will be cancelled not its truth. Good and truth and beauty are inherent aspects of supreme self-existence. Their relativity arises from an experience in which knowledge is surrounded by ignorance. When value is perceived by a direct act of supramental consciousness, relativity will not apply to it. It is true that relative good and truth will be transcended but in a radically different manner from their opposites i. e., transformed by a process of integration and not by exclusion.³ When relativity of value and disvalue ends, the absolute of value alone remains. Relativity of ethical good and evil is overcome in spirit which is perfect good. And transcendence of relative truth and falsehood and relative beauty and ugliness leaves behind perfect truth, perfect beauty, respectively.

1. *The Life Divine*, I, 115; cf., *The Human Cycle*, p. 186: Nature in man and world is infra-ethical (rational), ethical (rational) and at summit supra-ethical (rational).

2. G. H. Langley, *Sri Aurobindo*, p. 74.

3. *ibid.*, p. 73.

Vyavahāra and Vedānta—The Phenomenal Implications of Vedānta

Introduction

Humanistic realism insists that unless philosophical truth offers solutions of practical as well as theoretical problems of life it would not be worth enquiring into. Philosophy must be practical or directed towards life and action in the spatio-temporal world. Vedānta holds the subject-object world to be comprehended in reality; Ātman created world for the sake of enjoyment,¹ and even Advaita speaks of the empirical world as vyāvahārika sattā, meaning conduct, action, usage and business. It becomes encumbant upon upholders of vyāvahārika sattā to show how it is built by action.² Neo-Vedāntins grant that dualism of spirit and life in world would lead to a gradual perversion of both, and that humanism is right in rejecting the separation of secular-sacred, time-eternity, soul-flesh, and right in asking in what way realities of human life help in attainment of the best life.³ In ancient Vedāntic society (Upaniṣadic period) runs a strong sense of value attainable in earthly life and the pragmatic aspect is no less important than the metaphysical. And once again, as in the age of its origin, Vedāntic spirituality, while deriving its strength from another order, must apply itself to the things of the world, work out social goals and principles to guide relationships of individual and society, one group and another. Social consciousness which had been long in the background due to rigidity of dharma is a strong motive with the Neo-Vedāntins giving rise to the outline of a humanistic social theory, thus contradicting the view that Vedānta in general is merely a philosophy of inner life having no scope for world or culture, and Advaita Vedānta in particular is opposed to the idea of man in world and society. The problem of humanism is to discover the most comprehensive conception of human destiny by which knowledge and action may be integrated to guide man's progress to its goal of a fulfilment-society. The significance of Vedānta as a philosophy of social culture lies in proving the harmony, worth and dignity of man, society and world in so far as they are illuminated by the power of

1. Br. Upa., I, 4, 3.

2. F. T. Raju, "The Inward Absolute and the Activism of the Finite Self," C. I. P., p. 524.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, Recovery of Faith, p. 49.

spirit emanating from supreme reality itself. Human suffering would never decrease unless certain fundamental Vedāntic conceptions viz., suffering is due to Avidyā or confusion between self and not self, eternal and transient, pleasant and good, are accepted as fundamentals of thought and conduct in any philosophy of social reconstruction.¹ The Neo-Vedāntins expand the ideal of dukha-nivṛtti in terms of social, political, economic and ethical life in a way quite commensurate with humanistic standards.

At empirical level Vedānta allows full scope for pragmatic values, it has no desire to escape from any natural human pursuit of life, since reality of spirit is to be expressed only through nature, world and materiality. The external aspect of development of man in society means appearance of creative forces in individual and collective history directed towards true ends of life and Neo-Vedāntins give a new width and direction to such ethical, political, economic, material ends. These are neither unreal nor evil but man is required to change his attitude towards them. Nature is to be treated as part of spirit, to be transformed into spirit and the natural values to be transvalued in the spiritual. This means that the end of the social order and all temporal activities is attainment of spiritual freedom. The approach to social development is in the following spirit: "Our precept in studying history as a whole should be to relegate economics and politics to a subordinate place, for religion, after all, is the serious business of human race."² In determining the status of activities and goals of the secular order it is noted that they have a dual character. In relation to the ultimate truth they have an instrumental value—they develop the condition of a good earthly life to make its attainment possible. At the same time they are not merely means or stepping stones to purely religious aims. There is an authentic significance of worldly functions; law, politics, government, economics have also an intrinsic value. Their validity consists in this that though they are parts of the spatio-temporal world they are to be guided by moral-spiritual principles rather than by the natural-material, and this feature makes them true functions and goals, at their own level, worthy of human concern.³ The socio-economic-political order must be idealistic-moral rather

1. Harīdas Bhattacharya, "The Principles of Activism," C. I. P., p. 97.

2. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial*, p. 94.

3. Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism*, p. 85.

than realistic-amoral because the latter contradicts the requirements of spirituality as well as humanism viz., regard for human personality and rights of the last and the weakest man in society.

In spite of emphasis on the unchanging essence of reality Vedānta does not deny change in empirical life, nor does it prevent development of new manifestations and expressions of its principles. Social theory may not depict an unchanging utopian social order, but only an ideal which is dynamic according to the Gītā ideal of yuga-dharma. There can be no one law or principle—diversity of ends and methods, different forms of common life in every period is essential. But only those manifestations are logically consistent with Vedānta which are based on increasing harmony, order, peace and unity, while the opposites are contradictory. In general, every social order must aim for the good of its members in terms of liberty, equality, justice, prosperity, friendship and unity. It cannot be admitted that the idea of absolute truth as transcendental spirit and natural life as preparation and medium for expression of spirit (here or in another life) counteracts the conception of democratic social structure based on the dignity of human self, confidence in ability of reason and human energies to satisfy all needs.¹ For the ideal of self-realization points to a society of free and happy people, without wants. Vivekanand said that it is an insult to teach religion or philosophy of self-realization to a starving man. Liberation must be spiritual, but also social, political and economic. All the essentials of democracy are contained in the Vedāntic metaphysic: unique value of the individual and organic relationship of one with another rests upon the one spirit manifesting in all; democracy means participation of all in culture by equal provision of rights.² The Neo-Vedāntic doctrine of the nature of the phenomenal as unity-in-difference is a logical foundation of the humanist ideals of equality and liberty; unity points to equality and difference to liberty of individuals within groups and of groups within the whole human race. Vedānta advances the principle of autemany, swaraj, of man in conformity with the law of his nature (Ātmā) i. e., man is the subject of rights for self-development and

1. vide Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 101.

2. cf., Charles Grey Shaw, *The Precincts of Religion in the Culture of Humanity*, p. 25.

self-government. Equality, samatvam, is founded in men's virtual oneness in reality: transcendently all are equal as spirit, therefore, worthy of equal treatment and respect. Though equality is primary, Vedāntic realism allows for fruitful inequality at empirical level, in as much as the highest truth is open to participation of all but opportunity is in accordance with capacity and condition of life, swadharma and adhikāra. The functioning of democracy on a global scale can become a reality only when man's place in the world is determined by the light of spirit and the power of love of spirit. Preserving the loyalty towards smaller groups while expanding the loyalty towards larger and larger groups is the very meaning of Vedāntic evolution as well as of democracy. Awakening of faith, intelligence and love through discovery of spiritual reality leads to ending of individual and collective egoism, which is the cause of all narrow hostilities among men. Toleration of historically determined differences of individuals and peoples is an inevitable by-product of this development. Vedānta provides a frame in which world-conflicts are seen to be not struggles of absolutes but stages in a continuous process of evolution moving towards the goal of freedom, truth, love and unified life. The ideal of loka-saṅgraha, unity of mankind, is identical with brotherhood and brotherly love is of the essence of spirit.

The general characteristics of a social order consistent with spirituality as well as humanism are: subjectivity i. e., the unique or true subject is the centre round which society moves; communal quality i. e., the good or welfare of all (every subject) is the aim of individual and collective action; decentralisation i. e., the principle of self-government or fulfilment of needs by self-effort at every level of group-life is the general form of collective action; cooperation i. e., combination of all for satisfaction of economic and every other need of society is the method of social functioning.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand argues that Vedānta is a life-giving idea, and only by its practical application and effective operation can society be regenerated, because it provides the most rational of all bases for philosophy and ethics and their sanction in one

infinite.¹ Tradition has fatally limited its character by hedging it about with a highly complex and difficult metaphysic. Due to the mould of scholasticism a general idea developed that the Upaniṣadic teaching is only meant for forest-life and recluses. Śaṅkara left it in hills and forests, and it was worked out only in the spiritual plane and nowhere else. But now the time has come to forget that it is a rahasya of monks in caves and to make it practical, bring it down to the people and scatter and broadcast it in the work-a-day world and society. For the Śāstra which cannot show a ray of hope to men's hearts in the every-day world, in daily toil, disease, misery, poverty, despondency of penitent self-reproach of the down-trodden, terror of the battle-field, in lust, anger, pleasure, in joy of victory and darkness of defeat, finally, in dread night of death, is no Śāstra at all and humanity has no need of it. Scripture and tradition support the new synthesis of practical Vedānta, because it allows that Karma-Kāṇḍa comprising social customs and observances must change in form, only Jñāna-Kāṇḍa endures. And the only authoritative commentary on the Vedas, the Gītā applies Vedānta to everyone, in all occupations, according to the changing needs of society.

Karma-yoga combined with the goal of sarva-mukṭi contains a complete social philosophy, both theoretical and practical. In the new form of spiritual discipline, detachment (vairāgya) is not to mean ignoring of human suffering, nor is renunciation (sannyāsa) meaningful in the context of deprivation of necessities of human life. Since man cannot "believe in a God who will give . . . eternal life in heaven and who cannot give bread here" material needs are primary, for which men must be taught to work through the medium of education² "Sannyāsa is to lay down one's life for others, to stop sorrow, to bring peace, to equip masses for the struggle for existence, to accomplish well-being of all through diffusion of spiritual teaching."³ Political thought and action was expressly excluded from Vivekanand's works and life, yet his principles of purification, cooperation, solidarity and corporate strength of Vedāntic activity for revival and restoration of social order had implications for political life also.

1. Complete Works, III, 189.

2. Vincent Sheean, Lead Kindly Light, pp. 372-373.

3. Complete Works, VI, 466.

There are two foundations on which society may be built and there is a wave-like motion of both in history: to found social life on social necessity, materialism and realism is to stand on things as they are and to seek a secure footing on these; to found it on religion is to look beyond the material and to boldly begin life there apart from the other.¹ There is no guarantee that any civilization will last unless based on religion and goodness of man, which does not exclude but includes a strong material base. Infact, *everything goes to show that socialism or some form of rule of the people, call it what you may, is coming on the boards. The people will certainly want satisfaction of their material needs, less work, no oppression, no war, more food.*² Vedānta holds the best gifts of man to be spirituality, secular knowledge, saving of life and food, in that order of importance, therefore, society must be built on all four pillars. The secret of Vedānta is: believe in the self first, then believe in anything i. e., wealth, knowledge, power will follow.³ But this does not mean that religion is merely a social engineer. The question is asked what good is religion to society. Here society is made a test of truth, which is an illogical reversal of relationship. The reason for this is that society is a state (baby) of growth through which man passes, were it permanent the baby would always remain a baby. No perfect man-baby is possible and a perfect society is a contradiction in terms,⁴ while Truth is perfection. Therefore, social utility cannot be the test of truth. But at the same time, highest utility does flow naturally from Vedānta, since the happiness sought by all is only found and enjoyed in its highest form in spirit. Truth does not pay homage to any society, ancient or modern, but society has to pay homage to truth or die: that society is the greatest where truth becomes practical. By worship of the absolute greatness in man represented by spirit all standards of culture, civilization and justice are sustained and shine, by forgetting it they lose lustre and fall away into ambiguities. Hence the imperative of Vedānta is that every society or state must be based on the recognition of this all-powerful presence latent in man, and all human

1. *ibid.*, III, 156, 189.

2. *ibid.*, V, 132.

3. *ibid.*, III, 426.

4. *ibid.*, V, 119.

interests must be guided and controlled by the ultimate ideal of spirituality in order to be fruitful.¹ It is also to be remembered that the grand truth of spirituality is working all the time in human life, whether it is discovered or not, as in the law of gravitation. Thus people often work for the same ends and fail to realize the fact e. g., law, government, politics seem to operate according to their own principles, and they are legitimate human activities but it has to be admitted that they are not final in any way and point to a goal beyond which law etc. are not needed.

From the Vedāntic truths that the whole universe is only self with variation and growth in discord is succeeded by more perfect harmony, three ideas are discovered on which society whose centre is the individual in his true nature may be built: freedom (if the individual's freedom limits others he is not free), strength (weakness is misery) and sameness.

It is culture and not mere knowledge, whether secular or sacred, which withstands the shocks of disaster, and society advances in proportion as education and intelligence is spread among its people. Since words and intellect but constitute a smaller part of man and his personality is the larger part, the ideal education does not polish the outside, but creates the spiritual fire which ignites society and by it alone faith in self and through that faith in inherent Brahman is roused. The motto of Vedānta is: "First let us be Gods (by power of spirit) and then help others to be God. 'Be and make.'"² "Individuality is my motto, I have no ambition beyond training individuals through stress on liberty, courage, chastity, sin of self-deprecation."³ The objection that this stress on personality-making contradicts Vedāntic doctrine of ending of individuality as the condition of freedom cannot be sustained. Because the samāṣṭi is Virāta, Hiraṇyagarbha or Īśvara and sacrifice of will, freedom and happiness of the vyaṣṭi for its own sake must be sacrifice of a will etc., which has been highly developed. There is no glory in sacrifice of beggarly or powerless will. Only the brave can deny the self, not cowards. The highest value is human dignity and human freedom.

1. Romain Rolland, *The Life of Vivekanand*, p. 306.

2. *Complete Works*, IV, 297.

3. *ibid.*, IV, 308.

The new order of things is salvation of the people by the people. The best service of man is to educate the people to help themselves. New ideas will open their eyes to world development and they will work out the solution of their own problems, as every man and nation must do, otherwise all ideas are impracticable. This may take more time in India where the people have been governed by kings, and could not learn to combine to accomplish common good, to concert intellect, to conceive ideas of popular rights, or develop the power to think and act for themselves. Faith in Vedāntic self has not been carried even slightly into practice yet, and were it to deluge society other ideas and powers would follow.

Vedāntic cosmology holds that the course of creation, nature and motives of man is due to balancing of two forces in nature. The world is a product of lost balance (asāmyāvasthā) of the three guṇas: on the one hand is the principle of differentiation making for more and more separate individuals, and on the other is the equally potent principle of unification bringing all into one mass.¹ Of the two, the latter is more basic in religion and ethics. The last word of Vedānta is "one universe" which through senses is seen as matter, through intellect as souls, through spirit as God. All three are equally necessary stages of human life, one does not deny but fulfils the other.²

The doctrine of equality appeals to the heart; though man's common humanity is not seen, he is sure it exists. As part of that "humanity" he is equal or one with others, as a separate individual different, unequal. The particular purpose of religion is the dying out of variation in a realization of unity. This is neither possible nor desirable as long as life lasts; at the same time, metaphysics postulates that the unity already exists and does not have to be created, and only because of its existence is variety or difference perceived.³ The principle of morality is to see God equally in all different external forms and thus to overcome the relativity of existence.⁴ And religious discipline expands man into spirit, in which alone he is one. Therefore

1. *ibid.*, I, 111, 429.

2. *ibid.*, II, 253.

3. *ibid.*, I, 432.

4. *ibid.*, I, 443.

until God is seen everywhere, no equality exists for man. Non-difference or equality is the essential character between man and man, since each is a wave or manifestation of an infinite ocean of Sacchidanand. Difference between lives is not in kind (animals, men and gods), but of degree of weakness-strength, virtue-vice, heaven-hell, life-death. And equality means non-contempt of the less developed manifestation. There is no reason for any to consider himself above others in body or ideas, since everyone acts according to his nature and all are in process of growth. Therefore, Vedānta lays down that each should be treated not as what he manifests, but what he stands for i. e., equally.

The question is, if all are "human i. e., real self" why are they not all equal? The answer is that inspite of essential equality inequality is made by man in human society by erroneously letting more power, brain, wealth, make a difference in treatment of man. Vedānta and experience show that all evils come from relying on differences at the cost of underlying equality, oneness i. e., ignorance, inequality and desire are the three causes of human evil following each other inevitably. Asamatvam is the way to bondage because no man or nation can attempt to gain physical or mental freedom without physical or mental equality. Samatvam alone is the way to freedom. It is a contradiction for the world to think that inequality and bondage is the way to equality and freedom. Therefore, the idea of privilege (caste, birth, wealth) is the bane of human life. All privilege is tyrannical and Vedānta cannot admit physical or mental and specially spiritual privilege.¹ But this practical conclusion of Vedānta has been least active in India in the past and is more than ever necessary in a world where claims of privilege are intensified with extension of knowledge and power and wealth consequent upon it.

The plan of the universe and life is unity-in-variety. One truth is adapted to varying circumstances of different natures. It is the ignorant who think that there is only one way to know, his own, and from this way of thinking follow all forms of authoritarianism and tyranny of one man over another. But the wise allow that truths vary, standards of conduct and aspirations must necessarily be different. Each must

1. *ibid.*, I, 422.

try to conceive the truth according to his highest intelligence, an ideal best for his own mental and physical constitutions, therefore different standards are to be applied relative to circumstances and spirits of man, and not used to condemn those for whom they are not fitted. Liberal spirit demands that neither the theist, pantheist, monist, polytheist, agnostic nor atheistic ideal be rejected, but each may claim equal right of opportunity and duty to model himself on the broadest scale.¹ This coupled with the ideal of samatvam is the truest foundation of freedom, rights and duties in society. The principle is neither social equality nor inequality but that every one has the same right to develop i. e., freedom of thought and action in every way. If there is equality in nature there must be equal chance for all (rights) and if greater for some and for some less than the weaker should be given more chance than the strong, and this principle is the very negation of social inequality. Further, the idea of one existence, one universe and one life carries within it implicitly the extension of the idea of responsibility towards society. Each is responsible for evil everywhere in the world. Since none can separate himself from his fellow-beings, good is solidarity (loka-saṅgraha), evil is separateness. And in this oneness man may not divide rights from responsibilities.² India must complete the practical realization of the scheme of human progress laid down in perfect order by the ancients: solidarity of man, inborn spiritual nature. That plan alone is practical which does not destroy the individuality of any man and at the same time shows him the point of union (one spirit) with all others.

Tagore

Tagore argued that slogans of reason, progress, liberty, covering indifference to the ancient Indian spirit could not be the proper foundations of society. For the soul of India was struggling for no particular material object, wealth, comfort or power, but for awakening to full consciousness in soul-freedom—freedom of life in God—thus ending enmity, competition, attack and insult. The remedy of many social ills lies in restoration of personality in civilization—but it is not the personality

1. *ibid.*, IV, 302.

2. *ibid.*, IV, 49.

of the scientific-social humanism, as the infinite worth of individual proclaimed by all religious teachers. The judgment of the scale of values to be employed in the social order is the primacy of the spiritual standard over that of wealth, power or utility. The continuance of humanity depends upon the embodiment of this principle in the individual and in the organization of society on a world-wide scale. Only those races will prosper who for the sake of their own perfection and permanent safety are ready to cultivate the spiritual magnanimity of mind which enables the soul of man to be realized in the heart of all races. And it is to be hoped that the next civilization will be based not merely on economic and political competition and exploitation but on world-wide social cooperation and spiritual ideals of reciprocity.¹

The Infinite or God is no additional object among man's other possessions, but an escape from incessant gathering of belongings. The Upaniṣads say that to realize everything in Brahman is not to seek something extra, not to manufacture something new but to realize the meaning of all. The entire world of persons and things is given and all powers have their meaning in the faith that by their help man is to take his patrimony or his inner reality i. e., nature and society are means to infiniteness of finite beings.² The tragedy of human life is the vain attempt to stretch limits of things which can never be unlimited i. e., to reach the infinite by adding rungs to the ladder of the finite. Man has to outgrow possessions, and history shows that renunciation is the deepest reality of man. This means that whether the nature of the world be material or not, it is man's duty to transfigure it, so that the natural is no longer the enemy of God or the denial of Him, but is fashioned into a symbol and instrument of spirit.³ The order of priorities is changed and matter is given its due place as medium of life and spirit.

The human life built on law of nature subordinated to moral law gives rise to a society based on "rule of rhythm" and "rule of harmony" e. g., if the Indian view is retained that all life, economic, intellectual and social, should reflect spirit of religion then beauty and utility, good and happiness will not conflict and no amoral

1. Personality, p. 182.

2. Sadhana, p. 137.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore, p. 44.

social order would emerge.¹ In this connection the distinction of public and private morality, means and ends must be rejected in social life.

We cannot say family life, commerce and business, international politics are three different things. It is unmoral to think that moral principles have no place in politics. The state is not an end higher than moral law. Spiritual-moral belief must be determinant of socio-political action in the interests of truth itself. No objection to the principle that morality is greater than force and expediency can be admitted on the ground of difficulty of practice, because that which is known to be truth in theory can also be proved true in practice.²

The principle of future society must be that which is revealed by a study of history. Despite clashes, militant preoccupations the major objective of India was integration of conflicting forces striving for unity of differences without destroying the individuality of the many i. e., the emphasis was on the common denominator. To feel this oneness in oneself and in the wider world outside, to establish that oneness in the midst of diversity, to discover that unity by knowledge, to establish it through work, to realize that oneness through love and to preach that oneness by one's own life, India has been doing this through many hindrances and misfortunes.

The first conclusion from this principle is that individuality or differences of individuals and peoples must be encouraged, for this is the very sign of humanity.

It is only when man feels his individuality that he has the urge to be great, otherwise he loses himself in the many. There are no distinctions among sleeping men, but on waking the identity of each shows itself in various ways. Even a small entity, as soon as it gets to be aware of its true individuality, tries hard to preserve itself intact, such is the law of life.³

Which means that the first object of education is preservation of individuality or culture in its living totality. On each race the duty is laid to keep alight its own lamp to illumine the world. To break any people's lamp is to deprive it of its rightful place in the world's festival.

Development of human individual and society does not take place in isolation but in the difference or variety within a unity. Consciousness of relationship dawned at physical level, deepened at mental level, widened at moral level and comes to ultimate meaning when there is separation and harmony between the individual one-in-one (this) and the universal one-in-infinity (thou). To establish friendly relationship

1. *ibid.*, p. 130.

2. *Towards Universal Man*, p. 196.

3. *ibid.*, p. 143.

between human beings is the supreme effort of evolution and the object of true education is to establish harmony of man and world, man and man, man and all existence through knowledge which is followed by many faceted creative activity. Religion points out the ways and means of transcending petty relationships in home and village to feel identity with the world. It asks every member of society to remember friendly relationship with God, saints, ancestors and entire human and animal world, to know that each nation is but a limb of the universal man, to acknowledge and accept every body, to realize the unity of all without disturbing individual character and prestige of any. This is not forging of unity by imposing uniformity in life, nor mere arithmetical unity, but a combination of personalities in love, which requires working out of the meaning of brotherly love in terms of justice in all institutions of society.

Equal regard for all in economics and politics is derived not merely from toleration and respect for differences of viewpoint, but from the feeling that all are creations of God and in that universal unity all sectional interests have their proper place. Just as a cell has distinct life and also shares in the corporate life of body, so each is unique and has a place in Divine Personality. Personality is found in persons and nations, the people are living beings with their distinct characters, therefore men must not be exploited by men, nor nation by nation. This constitutes the truth of democracy, which rejects special privilege based on wealth or birth and discrimination in politics. But concrete idealism allows for differences of duties and achievements to combine with equality of opportunity. But inequality is healthy only within limits. The solution of this problem does not lie in abolition of property, because it is the medium of expression of personality and of highest social training. The institution of property must rest on admission of duty to people.¹ The ideals of sanctity of soul and respect for property serve to harmonise the law of individual possession with the law of common use. Abolition of claims of superiority and inferiority from all spheres and specially from the spiritual is necessary not only in the interest of social concord but of truth itself.

Swaraj or autonomy is the God-given nature of man. Swaraj is to feel within

1. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

that the country exists—not by fastening on the outer crust of life parasitically or claim homeland because one is born there but the true nature of the homeland is to be created by human wisdom, will, devotion and action. As the architect of the universe has to find Himself in His handiwork so must man spread inner spirit to vast outer region, to apply to it thought, action and service. Such autonomy or creative activity alone fulfils the individual, through which he becomes responsible for his own welfare. Similarly each nation works out its own destiny in autonomy. Opposition to the suppression of personality and creativity means rejection of all regimentation and standardisation as well as denial of rights to individuals and nations. The latter means loss of real culture or wealth and power in the inner soul, self-possession, self-sacrifice and acceptance of social obligation to other men. Furthermore, moral law decrees that to strike at others means that the blow comes back to the striker. And the world is impoverished in energy and virtue by denial of rights of self-development to any individual, group or nation. Denial of rights to others and weak submission to deprivation of rights stems from the same cause. "Those brought up in misunderstanding of the world-process i. e., not knowing it as one with themselves through relation of knowledge and love are trained as cowards into hopeless faith in the ordinance of some incomprehensible destiny and submit to deprivation of human rights without struggle."¹ Alienation from self results in lack of freedom in the socio-political sphere, but world and life being real and united in the Supreme Person, spirituality does not allow for such deprivation or resignation to injustice, servile conditions and misery of fellow men, and insists on utmost effort for the happiness of the many through a good polity, civil, political and economic rights. But the struggle for establishment of rights in society and world is not so much to be viewed in the narrow light of limited interests as in the light of truth itself.

Our vanity makes us think that there is a battle between contending rights—the only battle is the eternal one of vindication of truth. What is good and true for all we see to be established inspite of obstacles and contrary forces, but the extent of progress has to depend on efforts for its furtherance through strength.²

Justice requires that there be distribution of common goods necessary for human

1. The Religion of Man, p. 187.

2. Towards Universal Man, p. 130.

personality i. e., equal rights, but each must subordinate himself for the personal life of others. The incentive for self-renunciation through performance of duty is derived from the infinite person in man.

Society is an organism of which we as parts have . . . individual wishes . . . but there is that other wish . . . which does its work in the depth of the social being . . . for welfare of society. It transcends the limits of the present and the personal . . . (and) is on the side of the infinite. He who is wise tries to harmonise the wishes that seek for self-gratification with the wish for social good and only thus can he realize his higher self. In its finite aspect self is conscious of its separateness . . . in its infinite aspect it wishes to gain harmony.¹

Study of history proves that perfect arrangement of interdependence gives rise to freedom i. e., there is no external means of taking freedom by the throat apart from the inward process of losing oneself, which leads to it. And only in the light of spiritual unity can individual's duties and obligations to society be consistent with his dignity. As man is essentially spirit, principle of unity holds good in all departments of life e. g., when he is identified with the family his service is not indignity, when government represents one's own will it is not foreign and the individual is saved from humiliation in relation to it.

The principles of non-exploitation, non-regimentation, autonomy and justice constitute the truth of a democracy representing both infinite being and the will of the multitude. Such a democracy is communal (personal) and cooperative (reciprocal, interdependent). The former is another characteristic revealed by the study of Indian history which is wholly consistent with demands of spiritual humanism. The Indian pattern of life was never state-centred but society-centred. The ideal is a swadeshi samaj or self-governing social community based on the principles of social cohesion, integrity and self-reliance. Communal life is the very opposite of monism of collective life in state, which is based on the principle of power and organization. The state being different in nature and function from society, India survived because she defined welfare of society largely as a non-political function and entrusted it to the community and not to the state, consequently, social prestige was derived from social approbation following signal service to the community and not from the state.

1. Sadhana, pp. 83-84.

The truly humanistic society must have this communal character because its principle is love and not fear. The latter is merely a negative deterrent while love is the positive and real uniting force--the love of spirit. Only in such a system can rights (enjoyments) of the many end in obligations (renunciations) of the many; work for self is work for all because the community is the ground where relations are extended from self to others, present to the future. Such a personal relationship can be established by decentralisation and by a balanced social organization. In a natural condition community, village and town are in harmonious interaction. Food, health and fellowship flows from one, wealth, knowledge and energy from the other. In a mainly village-civilization individual is unimportant, in the town-dominant civilization the individual is all powerful and the community negligible. The broken communal life must be made whole.

Reciprocity is another characteristic necessary in a humanist society. Isolationism must be replaced by cooperation with the world. Cooperation is the solution of all social discords and economic problems of production-distribution,--combination of many to earn a living is known as cooperative system--the solution of poverty and stagnation. India's self expression must be through creative-cooperative activity in every field. Cooperative self-determination in concrete form with its resultant inward experience of glory and pride is a solid foundation of swaraj. Its absence within and without i. e., denial of health, education, wisdom and joy, is the root cause of all demands. To think that swaraj can become a reality inspite of poverty of spirit is absurd.¹ And extending the principle of cooperation on a world-wide scale it is discovered that a people can be fulfilled as much by cultivating its own soul and strength from within as by contact with aims and patterns and processes of others. Any special culture wholly dissociated from the universal is not true. In other words, there is no satisfaction any longer in beating the drum of one's individuality in seclusion, the urge in the soul is to make the individuality an adornment of humanity.² Only through development of racial individuality can one truly attain to universality,

1. Towards Universal Man, pp. 274, 284.

2. *ibid.*, p. 155.

and only in the light of spirit of universality can one attain perfect individuality. In terms of political life this points to a world-whole; in unending flow of unfolding of human consciousness, the unity represented by nationalism must be transcended into universalism. Ages of human history are moving towards this ideal. Scripture says that the Divine comes as a guest claiming homage, the great and the true of humanity is waiting to be invited and received within our homes. We must acknowledge the obligation of offering it hospitality i. e., bringing together of energies and achievements of different peoples in the future effort of humanity to understand itself and to make itself a clearer reflection of the Divine, out of which it has evolved and towards which it is moving.

Gandhi

Gandhian ethics, sociology and politics are direct applications of the philosophy of reality, world and man; both philosophy and its applications grew simultaneously through a life of varied activity in which thought, feeling and action worked in harmony.¹ Spiritual law does not work in a field of its own, on the contrary, it expresses itself only through ordinary activities of life. Religion is not one of the many activities of mankind, but the self-same activity may be governed by the spirit either of religion or irreligion. And every act of the religious man must derive from God because God rules every breath.² The common belief is that religion is opposed to material good or its pursuit, but the Gītā draws no line between salvation and worldly pursuits. On the contrary, it has shown that religion must rule even worldly pursuits and what cannot be followed in day-by-day practice is not religion. History also supports the scripture; there has been no really religious movement in the world without its social, economic and political consequences.³

Psychologically speaking, the mind cannot be divided into watertight compartments called social, political, religious. All act and react upon one another. "My life is one indivisible whole, all activities run into one another and rise in

1. Dhirendra Mohan Datta, *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 73.

2. *All Men are Brethren*, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 84.

3. Chandra Shankar Shukla, *Conversations with Gandhi*, p. 53.

insatiable love of mankind."¹ The love of mankind or idealistic attitude must not be visionary but practical. Since religion is not meant merely for rishis but for common people and religion which does not take account of practical affairs, or help to solve them, is no religion, therefore religious matters must be put before the world in their practical form. Conversely, the highest realism lies in spirituality i. e., religious truth passes the pragmatic test. "If any action of mine claimed to be spiritual and proved to be impracticable, it must be pronounced to be a failure. I do believe that the most spiritual act is the most practical in the true sense of the term."² The practical bearing of religion is seen in daily social contact requiring that the individual lose himself in continuous service of all life. Without identification with the limitless ocean of life realization of truth is impossible, hence there is no escape from social service or happiness without it. And political activity was the direct consequence of social because the latter was impossible without the former. Modern life is largely political, hence it must come within the purview of the religious soul. Because politics encircles like a coil of a snake from which man cannot get out, therefore he must wrestle with it. Apart from this inescapable physical necessity the positive aspect of religious life i. e., identification with the whole of mankind also made active political life a spiritual necessity.

Secularism does not contradict the concept of practical spirituality, it only means that no outer authority may determine inner spirituality. Here religion and state are separate because religion is a personal affair and state has nothing to do with it. It looks after secular welfare but not the individual's religion. Secularism is merely eschewing of denominationalism but not of fundamental ethics common to religion; the state makes a demand on the individual that he live for service, not pleasure and, in consequence, it can only subsist on the basis of strong sense of unity of spiritual ideals, understood not in terms of sectarianism, but in the sense of ordered moral government of the universe.

Secularism of this form does not demand unity of a common faith but a unity of

1. Harijan, March 2, 1934.

2. *Ibid.*, July 1, 1939.

true love viz., respect for others' faith and willingness to cooperate with them. The metaphysical rationale of toleration is that though God is one, He appears differently to individuals; even as a tree has a single trunk but many branches, so one perfect religion becomes many through the human medium.¹ It also means that religions are different roads converging to the same point, it matters not what road is taken so long as all reach the same goal and if a man reaches the heart of his own religion he has reached the heart of others too. Therefore the golden rule of conduct is mutual toleration. Conscience cannot be the same for all, therefore everybody must have freedom of conscience. But toleration must be more than a patched up thing or mere truce; it must be a union of hearts and equal partnership. Non-violence teaches the higher toleration of respect for other faiths as for one's own, "looking with equal eye on all."² Progress towards truth is possible because all religions are imperfect and in the process of evolution.³ Such toleration does not mean indifference to faith but intelligent love of it or spiritual insight, which is ready to admit and to overcome defects of one's own faith and considers it duty to blend it with every acceptable feature of other faiths.

Integration of spiritual and secular life takes place in the collective life as well as in the individual. No dual set of values must prevail. And culture must be humanisation, moralisation, spiritualisation of the group. "Moral man in an unmoral society is a contradiction, hence to make life meaningful individual and social morality or good must be harmonised by subjecting both to one standard. The higher law of soul force makes intelligible a well-ordered society."⁴ It is a fallacy to think that this law of life is only good enough for the individual and not for the group. In fact, it is no cloistered virtue, but applicable as much in the forum and the legislatures as in the market place i. e., in socio-politico-economic order. History furnishes proof of the operation of truth and moral law in families and communities and there is no

1. From Yervada Mandir, p. 4; cf., All Men are Brothers, p. 80.

2. All Men are Brothers, p. 88.

3. vide Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekanand, p. 339; In Council of Federation of International Fellowship, Sabarmati, January 13-15, 1928: All religions are equal; all have some error; all are as dear to me as Hinduism.

4. Young India, October 1, 1931.

reason why there should be another law for the nation.

In other words, all social functions must have their roots in and be determined in their nature by spirituality. However complicated and controversial a problem may be it does not fall outside this principle. And the philosophy of means and ends meets the criterion of true humanism; it does not neglect demand of reason in the ends chosen in socio-economic-political life, but concentrates on rectification of will or the means. Social ideals are ends which are worthy of pursuit, calling forth activity to conserve their value. They must be good, but true humanism discounts those which are acquired by unworthy means. The Gītā doctrine of niṣkāma karma supports this, since karma is the means and the fruit to be renounced is the end. Though renunciation of fruit does not mean that fruit will not follow. In fact, scientifically speaking, only moral means are justified in secular activity, since every act produces the end in the form of appropriate fruit. Ethics also finds no justification for non-moral means and even the standpoint of political utility reaches the same conclusion. Therefore, the conclusion is: as the means so the end and there is no wall of separation. There is no exception to the proposition that realization of the good is in exact proportion to that of the means and man's immediate responsibility is right conduct.¹ Political philosophy, technique and organization must be corollaries of religious-moral truth, since apart from the latter politics kills the soul. Similarly no sharp line may be drawn between ethics and economics. Economics that hurt the moral well-being of all individuals or a nation are immoral, therefore, sinful.² That economics is untrue which ignores moral value, for true economics is not against the highest ethical standard, just as true ethics must also be good economics (utility) if it is to be worth the name. Therefore, there must be introduction of moral value into all economic activities. One contention is that since socio-political and economic life belongs to the temporal-contingent world and is subject to risks in the actual life of things, moral laws may be utilised only to the extent that they are consubstantial with vital pursuit of ends of human life but not in amoral movements of life i. e., it is dangerous to impose

1. Nirmal Kumar Bose, Selections from Gandhi, p. 37.

2. All Men are Brothers, p. 163.

apolitical or non-economic moral laws on amoral conceptions of politics or economics.¹ But this must be rejected because, philosophically speaking, goodness (love) is the basis of existence, hence natural and moral law do not conflict due to pre-established harmony. Reality is a natural order and a moral order as well, hence there is no gap between right and useful.

Since social life in all its forms is part of sadhanā for the higher purpose its ends are not independent ends. The test of every work is: will this promote my spiritual progress? The question "will this lead to the progress of India?" is covered by it. The country cannot rise by a step that will not lead to spiritual progress.² On the principle that the greater includes the lesser the political (national independence) and economic (material) freedom is included under spiritual freedom.³ Politics and economics concern the nation's welfare and are of concern to the seeker of God, therefore through these activities and in these spheres the individual must establish the kingdom of God. In themselves they are necessary activities and ends worthy of the individual's effort, yet they are goals at a lower level on the road that leads to the highest good viz., truth and non-violence.

The humanistic social order must be founded on the religious principles of truth, fearlessness and love instead of wealth, power and self-love. "Ours will be a truly spiritual nation when we shall show more truth than gold, greater fearlessness than pomp of power, greater charity than love of self."⁴ It must be characterised by all-sided welfare of the people, moral enthusiasm and non-violence and freedom from exploitation from the smallest social level to the world-wide level.

It is the truest humanism to hold that the principle of the political order is swaraj. Government over self is the truest swaraj and it is synonymous with mokṣa or salvation.⁵ The swaraj of a people means the sum total of the swaraj of individuals and it is attained by the same means. The first step of swaraj lies with the individual. The great truth, as with the individual so with the universe, is applicable here

1. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, pp. 213-214.

2. Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, IX, 117.

3. Rose, op. cit., p. 49.

4. All Men are Brothers, p. 221.

5. Young India, December 8, 1920.

as elsewhere. This self-control is observance of rules of morality, non-cheating, truthfulness and duty. And in the operation of moral law attempt made towards swaraj is swaraj itself i. e., the goal is not in some distant future but achieved in the very success of the present means. The state enjoys swaraj when it boasts a large number of such citizens. From the causal connection existing between human virtue and social organization the deduction is sarvodaya samaj or the development of all. Only such a social order can reconcile individual freedom and social good. "I value individual freedom, but man has to adjust his individualism to the requirements of social progress, willing submission to social restraint for the sake of well-being of the whole. 'The good of all' enriches individual and society."¹

Sarvodaya samaj is the purest democracy in which the freedom of the people does not depend on the will of an individual, however noble. The motto of liberty, equality, fraternity is the heritage of all mankind. Democracy comes naturally to the individual who is habituated normally to willing obedience to all laws, human or divine i. e., there is direct cause and effect relationship between non-violence and pure democracy, as there is a relationship between science of war and dictatorship. Because in the latter the interest of the weak is sacrificed to the interest of the strong, whereas in the former the weakest can have the same opportunity as the strongest.² If the lowest is to be equal ruler with the highest it presupposes purity of all together with wisdom which ends all distinction of caste and class in equality and unity of love. Democracy or swaraj may be defined as government by the consent of the people, ascertained by the largest number of adults who have contributed to the service of the state by bread-labour.³ This is not the equivalent of the rule of majority, because government must be based on conversion of will and not on coercion, whether by a majority or by a minority. In the case of conflicts involving moral issues i. e., in matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.

Every society desires riches but real wealth is number and quality of persons and not gold or silver i. e., its consummation is production of full-breasted,

1. Sarvodaya, p. 55.

2. All Men are Brothers, p. 180.

3. Young India, January 29, 1925; cf., Maritain, op. cit., p. 193.

bright-eyed, happy human beings, for there is no wealth but life.¹ In other words, the end of social life is human happiness with mental and moral growth (moral being synonymous with spiritual growth). This end points to self-rule or control over life and destiny by the individual and nation, which is possible in the national sphere by decentralization of political authority and production system, in all social institutions and even in means of self-preservation for the sake of strengthening the spirit in the individual. Political power is not an end, but a means to enable people to better their condition in every department of life. It is capacity to regulate national life through national representation and, in an ideal sense, perfect self-regulation would end political power, but in actual life it points to Thoreau's dictum that that government is best which governs least.² As the individual is the supreme consideration³ increase in power of state is to be regarded with the greatest fear, because while apparently doing good by minimising exploitation it does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality or capacity for self-regulation. It has to use force to bring about that good, whereas only through persuasive love can foundations of individuality be preserved and through it abiding progress for the world. Centralisation is inconsistent with the non-violent structure of society, hence swaraj or true democracy is continuous effort to be free of government, foreign or national and people's regulation of every detail of life. Decentralisation remains a negative principle of the social order unless it issues in the positive form of cooperative effort in every field of life, specially the economic, a cooperation not based on force and destruction of individuality but on reasoned and voluntary acceptance. Sarvodaya democracy is composed of innumerable villages with ever-widening, never-ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom but it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual. The outermost circumference must not wield power to crush the inner circle, but must give strength to all within and derive its own strength from it. It is a true political order in which the last is equal to the first i. e., no one is first or last, for true democracy has to be worked

1. "Unto this Last" paraphrased in Sarvodaya, p. 31.

2. Young India, July 2, 1931.

3. *ibid.*, November 13, 1924.

from below. This meets the humanistic test of unity in society, not mechanical or political but organic, with due degree of self-government, among small units without sacrifice of higher ideals, wider well-being.¹

Democracy demands jealous guardianship of liberty of thought and action of men in society. For, rights are not merely physical powers but freedoms for self-realization. The latter is the duty from which all rights spring and only in discharging that duty does man secure rights. To run after rights without performing duty is to run after will-o'-the-wisp. When the Gītā declares that action alone belongs to man and he should leave the fruit severely alone it means that action is duty and fruit is right.² In other words, the one supreme right is the right to perform one's duty, which is the only one worth living and dying for and this covers all legitimate rights. Conversely, the one supreme duty is the cultivation of non-violent values or individual self-government (swaraj) and only such a one is capable of using his rights for service. More concretely, this means that each individual must use his talents through the civil and political rights consistently with their equal use by his neighbour and no individual is entitled to arbitrary use of his gains (opportunities) i. e., there must not be encroachment upon the just rights of others, contrariwise no one can possess unjust rights in the ideal social order, "Ram-rajya of my dreams," which evolves fundamental rights of all (rich and poor) or equal justice.

The fundamental condition of the religion of truth and non-violence is justice all round in every department. It cannot be declared to be impossible in human nature because there may be no dogmatism about the capacity for degradation or exaltation of man. The Īśa Upaniṣad which sums up the substance of all scriptures points to universal brotherhood, complete surrender to God and faith in His power to supply needs; the law of non-possession and non-stealing and a positive life of dedicated service follows from its doctrine of equality. From religious point of view, all are God's children and creatures and equal in his eyes; a sinner is equal to a saint,

1. vide Maritain, op. cit., p. 157: Encyclical of Pius XI, "It is injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of right order for a higher and larger organisation to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed effectively by smaller and lower bodies."

2. Young India, January 8, 1925.

because both have equal justice and equal opportunity to go forward or backward. Metaphysically, the forms are many but the informing spirit (reality) is one, therefore there cannot be distinction of high and low where there is all-embracing fundamental unity underlying the outward diversity.¹ And morally, the oneness of mankind also arises from equal subjection to moral law. From the philosophy of unity of life the deduction is exclusion of all exploitation or injustice.²

Concretely, justice arises from the principle that the good of the individual is contained in the good of all, that all socially necessary labour is equally valuable, that each has equal right to earn his livelihood through work and the true life is one of labour.³ Idealism or equal justice involves satisfaction of only natural wants of each without encroaching on equal rights of others. This means not multiplication, but deliberate and voluntary restriction of wants, which alone promotes happiness, contentment and capacity for service. This would solve the problem of inequality or poverty: the fundamental law of nature is that it produces enough for man's wants, if everyone only took enough for himself and nothing more. By admitting the moral obligation of service, the amassing of wealth would be regarded as sin and no inequality would result.⁴ To end unjust privileges one must follow the principle of taboos whatever cannot be shared by the masses.

The ideal is equal distribution, but since this cannot be wholly realized,⁵ Gandhi worked for equitable distribution through a constructive programme. Though natural inequalities are bound to remain till the end of time man can and must avoid injustice, bitterness, strife. Talented persons can be persuaded by public opinion to place their talent at the service of humanity, out of pleasure in the exercise of native ability. They are at present the privileged, but this change in personal life means that they take the initiative in dispossession with a view to the universal

1. All Men are Brothers, p. 92.

2. Hindu Dharma, p. 39.

3. Autobiography, p. 365.

4. Ethical Religion, p. 58.

5. vide Sarvodaya, pp. 162, 165; Vinoba Bhave: no absolute equality is possible, but neither should there be any disproportionate inequality. The principle of equity is the true one i. e., the equality of discrimination like the treatment of her children by the mother, according to their differing needs.

diffusion of spirit of contentment. At the root of this is the principle of trusteeship for superfluous wealth possessed by them.¹ Trusteeship is no makeshift theory, but will survive all theories. It has the sanction of religion and philosophy. That possessors of wealth have not acted up to it does not prove its falsity.

By trusteeship spiritual equality is established in society. Socialism is defined as control by masses of the means of production and necessities and elimination of monopoly by country, nation, group or person. Real socialism was handed down by our ancestors: all land belongs to Gopal, where then is the boundary line? Man is the maker of it and, therefore, can unmake it. Gopal or God in modern times is the people. The fault lies not in the teaching, but in those who fail to live up to it. In socialism all members of society are equal. The head is not high because it is on top of the body, nor feet low because they touch the earth. Even as members of the individual body are equal, so are the members of society.² In terms of religion there is no duality in socialism. It is all unity—a perfect unity in plurality of designs. And this unity of socialistic society may be attained not by mere theorising nor by use of force and regimentation but by truth and non-violence.³

Economic idealism demands equalisation of status of all work and not relegation of labour to lower status, nor should there be any difference of physical labour and intellectual labour. But if differences of status remain then the principle to be followed is that the higher a man's status the greater is his responsibility, and that the man of lower status be given more than his due. Thus the truly humanistic social ideology must integrate the principle of democracy or the value of the individual and the principle of socialism or the removal of economic injustice through equality, fair-play (justice) and love.

The purest philosophy of Hinduism holds that the brāhmaṇa, ant, elephant and

1. Harijan, August 25, 1940; vide Maritain, op. cit., pp. 178, 190: By need of human personality appropriation of goods should be private, but by primal dispensation of goods for benefit of human species the use of goods should be to serve common good of all. Law of common use and individual possession.
2. Sarvedaya, p. 162: Vinoba Bhave: This alone is sāmya-yoga, not arithmetical equality but equality such as the five fingers of the hand have. They work in full cooperation.
3. All Men are Brothers, pp. 108-109.

dog-eater have the same status. Because all are from one universal source, Allah, God, Para Brahma, it insists on unity of all that lives, even crawling things upon the earth. This is a gidi, ~~gidi~~ conception. Only after we have restored living, real equality of men can we establish equality of man and whole creation. The religion of truth and non-violence has no geographical limits, and in order to be a living faith it must transcend love for country itself. Philosophy points not only to brotherhood of national humanity but to brotherhood of mankind and patriotism is consistent with the broadest good of humanity. Freedom, interdependence and cooperation are the constituents of brotherhood. Concretely, it means sharing of gains by all and freedom is the necessary condition of that sharing.

I want freedom so that other countries may learn from my free country; so that the resources of my country may be utilized for benefit of mankind. Cult of patriotism teaches that the individual has to die for family, family for village, village for district, district for province, province for country. Similarly, country has to be free in order to die for the benefit of the world.¹

Narrow, selfish, exclusive nationalism (patriotism) is evil, the bane of modern nations, but nationalism as the free organization of people and ability to act as one man is necessary condition of brotherhood or inter-~~national~~ nationalism. Therefore the goal of world is freedom, not in the sense of atomistic, isolated, inter-~~national~~ but in the sense of voluntary inter-~~national~~ on world-scale. No individual or nation can lead a healthy life unless all do and the deduction from this is cooperation of ideas, materials and spiritual efforts. Inter-~~national~~ cooperation must be as much an ideal of man as self-sufficiency; without relation with society he cannot realize oneness with universe. Inter-~~national~~ is the touch-stone of reality for testing faith and social and international dependence teaches man the lesson of humanity—otherwise what is the significance of the great saying, "The world is my family."²

Satyagraha and Humanism

Gandhi's satyagraha creation was satyagraha, firmness of truth, resolution of soul or voluntary sacrifice of everything for truth, not excluding life. It was no mere technique of action confined to a special kind of social situation, but applicable

1. P. M. ..., ... History of the Congress, p. 135.
2. All Men are ... p. 159

to every sphere of life, a complete way of life. Hardly any problem of day to day life or of war and peace, or political, social, religious, agrarian, labour or industrial problem failed to come under the orbit of its basic principles. Nor did any large, small or world-wide, social or individual aspect of life escape the influence of its pattern. There could be no more total view of life and greater devotion to service of man than exemplified in the satyagrahi way of life. Positivistic humanism was more at the level of thought and feeling and only partly embodied in action but in Gandhi's life it became a flood of many-sided activity.¹ Therefore, his contribution to the development of Vedāntic humanism was not in the form of theoretical justification, but of practical validation. And evidence was not only in terms of integration of individual life but of harmony in society and solidarity of the world, loka-saṅgraha.

Universalistic possibilities of Vedānta to lead to an exalted form of life in the world or a social philosophy were demonstrated by experimentations in solution of conflicts and injustices of human society, from the smallest group to the world society. The discovery of the process by which spirit could be used to transform the environment, to free life from oppression by non-cooperation with evil, to end exploitation and to establish social relations according to the principle of brotherly love was a heroic task requiring no little humanism. The claim was: non-violence is the most harmless and effective way of dealing with political and economic wrongs of down-trodden humanity. It is no cloistered virtue to be practiced by the individual for peace and final salvation but a rule of conduct in society, if it is to live consistently with human dignity and to make progress towards peace for which it has yearned for ages past.²

The philosophy, techniques and results of satyagraha satisfy the criteria of both spirituality and humanism. It does not treat man as a means i. e., it does not degrade or brutalise either party by use of violence, for non-violent persuasion aims at conversion and not vengeance; places reliance solely on the fundamental goodness of man or his spiritual-ethical nature of Ātman; liberates moral energy, thus simultaneously exalting both the protagonist and antagonist; neither does it attack the

1. Datta, op. cit., p. 74.

2. Correspondence with Gandhi, 1942-1944, (Ahmedabad: Nav Jivan Press, 1945), p. 170.

author while attacking the evil social system, since on the principle of essential unity of man the former would be tantamount to attacking oneself.

Satyagrahi spirit is truly humanistic because it requires fearlessness and strength and is not meant for the coward.¹ Since ahimsā is the extreme limit of forgiveness, it must be the quality of the brave and is impossible without fearlessness. This fearlessness is not so much the outcome of physical might as a corollary of spirituality. Man ceases to fear man when he fears God only. And in the last resort the law of non-violence or satyagraha does not avail to him who does not possess a living faith in the God of love or does not completely rely on His guidance.² The satyagrahi is impelled by God to struggle against injustice and relies on Him to right wrongs and to undo injustice.³

Humanism insists on freedom and self-effort of man to achieve his rights and goals. And active non-cooperation with injustice implies judgment of evil as evil, determination to resist it mentally and physically and not to leave the responsibility for judgment and righting of wrongs on God. Faith in God does not mean fatalistic resignation from real fighting against wickedness, but a most active fight against it—mental and, therefore, moral opposition to immorality. No one could be actively non-violent and not rise against social injustice, no matter where it occurred.

"My humble occupation has been to show people how to resolve their own difficulties."⁴ And that work will be finished if the conviction arises in mankind

1. vide Harijan, July 20, 1935: A helpless mouse is not non-violent because he is always eaten by the pussy. He would gladly eat the murderess if he could but he always tries to flee from her. cf., Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekanand, p. 358: Non-violence is capacity to resist but refraining from recourse to resistance, otherwise cowardice. I do not think of punishing or escaping from a drop of sea-spray. It is nothing to me. Yet to the mosquito it would be serious. I would make all non-injury like that strength and fearlessness. My ideal is that giant of a saint whom they killed in the mutiny and who broke his silence when they stabbed him to say, "And thou also art He."
2. vide Satyagraha in South Africa, p. 5: God plans and conducts a righteous struggle. A dharma-yuddha is to be waged only in God's name and only when the satyagrahi feels helpless God comes to his rescue.
3. vide Young India, March 23, 1922: I believe in the existence of a beneficent power that over-rides and upsets human plans, produces order out of chaos and redresses wrongs inspite of tyranny of tyrants. cf., Tagore Centenary Volume, p. 376: Gandhi did not rationalise idea of truth, simply believed in its power, sure that if he practised it and others did, by that act of truth, satya-kriyā, evil must yield to good.
4. Harijan, June 28, 1942.

that each is the guardian of his own self-respect and liberty. It is a truth that exploitation and injustice is based on willing or forced cooperation of the exploited and the solution is to withdraw this cooperation,¹ and this is open to all men i. e., for masses and not only for individuals. The weakest may partake without becoming weaker, infact, he becomes invulnerable and invincible. And, contrariwise, the weakest individual or state may render itself immune from attack by this method. But it is to be remembered that satyagrah only protects self-respect, honour of man (humanity) and not necessarily possession or property, the sacrifice of which is required. Be that as it may, the infinite moral worth of the least among men is preserved by giving scope to every person to make his own contribution.

The vindication of truth by the built-in check of non-violence means preservation of the elements of truth and right in the opposing positions and not the physical annihilation of one and victory of the other i. e., it ensures an adjustment of interests between individual and individual, between individual and group, between group and group, which is both moral and rational. A universal principle inherent in the moral universe is that apart from the two extreme alternatives of the individual, group or nation's submission to deprivation of its rights and/or its attempt to regain its rights by use of physical might or war, there is a third alternative of non-violent struggle. The truly religious man i. e., the Vedāntin sets the principle of truth and non-violence or love at the top of means of action on the mundane plane. And this makes possible a truly humanistic reversal of methods and values of life. From means of aggression and coercion man passes to novel methods of education, persuasion, spiritual resistance, patient and voluntary self-suffering.

Non-violent resistance is the perfect form of human progress—a positive, dynamic method whose very purpose is to create a ferment so as to change social conditions.² The satyagrahi life implies freedom of action to make socio-political changes i. e., social destiny by right operation of intellect, will and emotion. The social revolution is rooted in the change of heart in the individual because both

1. cf., *All Men are Brothers*, p. 190: It is my certain conviction that no man loses his freedom except through his own weakness.

2. J. L. Nehru, *Autobiography*, p. 54.

religious belief and observation of human psychology reveal that causes of injustice and conflict lie in the human heart viz., fear, anger, distrust. The foundational principle of satyagraha is training, discipline and dedication i. e., complete control of body, life, mind through the control of these causes. This method avoids the error of either extreme subjectivity viz., transformation by only the change of the individual, or extreme objectivity viz., transformation by only change of social conditions. Since both individual freedom and social enrichment is the aim the change must be in both directions. The internal dimension is changed by the psychological-spiritual approach and the external dimension by sociological method of group action and establishment of social condition and institution. Practically, this means that the beginning has to be made with rectification of thinking, willing and acting in the individual rather than with the objective conditions. Having made a correct choice between the law of force and the law of love, the truth of Ātman is reconciled with historical development through social action i. e., firstly the cosmic principle behind the whole order of things is realized within the soul. Next, it gives rise to a creative process in the social field in terms of new objectives and ideals as well as methods of their attainment. The satyagrahi technique and programme of social transformation is the practical outcome of the philosophy of Ātman understood as truth and non-violence, and its efficacy and success is dependent only upon the force of belief of the individual and social mind in that philosophy.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan defines true philosophy as practical and dynamic, an exhibition of insight rather than mere conceptual system-making, its task is a many-sided conservation of values which are permeating life. Certainly, it is pursuit of reality ending in religious experience, but it also thinks out the nature of the cosmos, right-wrong, destiny of the individual. "My conception of philosophy is somewhat like that of Marx—philosophy is related to the creative task, although in one sense it is a lonely pilgrimage of spirit, in another it is a function of life."¹ Thus, the Bhagavadgītā

1. Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, p. 6.

is not only a philosophical analysis, Brahma-vidyā or meaning of reality, but a practical programme or Yoga-śāstra. It makes the world no spectacle to contemplate but a field of battle.¹ Spiritual experience reveals that perfection is not a void, the spiritual is not an essence apart to be cloistered and protected from the rest of life, but something which pervades the private and public life of man. Therefore, nothing is to be rejected, but everything is to be refined and raised. In all higher religions, philosophical belief in the transcendent reality goes together and interacts with work in the natural field. Religious tradition of Vedānta does not separate the sacred from the secular, spiritual from social interests; for avocations of life are in a real sense service of the supreme. The ideal is withdrawal from the world into the metaphysical reality and return to the world to control it by the power of spirit.² Spiritual awareness and social efficiency are not only consistent but complementary. Whatever be the Hindu practice, Hindu religion cannot be regarded as unworldly or other-worldly. Religion is the vision of God, ethics is effort to remake life in its mould and philosophy is woven into the texture of life. Indian civilization is the effort to embody philosophical wisdom in social life.³

Religious spirit is an eternal revolutionary, dissatisfied with the state of humanity on earth or beyond and demanding a radical transformation of man and society.⁴ But the individual must change before society can change, the root of improvement is self-improvement. Reconstruction of the world follows if man undertakes the less exciting but more exacting task of purifying passions and humanising the self. The Gītā teaches that improvement in the individual's nature is the way to social betterment. Thus an enduring social order can be built only on religious foundations. This is supported by historical fact; civilizations based on truly religious forces such as endurance, suffering, passive resistance, understanding and tolerance are long-lived, while those which take their stand exclusively on human elements like active reason, power, aggression, make for a brilliant display, but are short-lived.⁵

1. Religion and Society, p. 105.

2. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 67.

3. My Search for Truth, pp. 11-12.

4. "The Spirit in Man," C. I. P., p. 504.

5. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 254.

A just social system incorporates ideals of truth, freedom, equality and brotherhood, and these are contained in Vedāntic thought. Religious culture is based on elements of self-determination, toleration, persuasion, cooperation and non-violence, which must form the keynote of any truly humanistic social order. The religious method allowed each group to attain truth through its own tradition and discipline, iṣṭa, refined crude beliefs through change of mind and nature of person by suggestion and persuasion; the search was for unity and peace in a common quest for reality and not in a common creed about it.¹ The principle for solution of group-differences and group-conflicts was harmonisation and cooperation of interests and ends, by regarding the contribution of each as equally important in the welfare of the whole and progress meant development of the best in each group without obstruction of others.

No hard and fast distinction can be made between toleration based on identity of the object known and that based on identity of method of knowing² in favour of the latter, because different methods are not absolutely exclusive of each other. Vedānta emphasises varieties of ways from time to eternity and is greatly sensitive to claims of different aspects of reality. "Toleration is the homage which the finite mind pays to the inexhaustibility of the infinite."³ The justification of the number of intellectual coordinates is seen in those rare moments when the veil is lifted to show a glimpse of the Absolute. Every religion is a living movement and no phase is final, nor can anyone claim to give absolute, changeless truth, due to its application to the human situation and variability of human nature. There must be diversity of paths in order to meet the needs of every type of human nature, but this difference is subordinate. Unity is the reality because there are not different goals; after a divergence of a few miles the approaches will unite to form a single concrete high-way. Toleration does not rest on appeal for intellectual comprehension, but is the consequence of accepting Vedāntic metaphysics i. e., realization of unity between selves; universalisation of sympathy results not from mere sentiment but from attunement to all-inclusive

1. Hindu View of Life, pp. 34, 49.

2. vide F. S. C. Northrop, Schilpp, op. cit., p. 658.

3. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 317.

Brahman, from which arises the power to see from inside into the soul of others.

Secularity of a social order rooted in spiritual values is only seemingly paradoxical. Secularity is neither irreligion nor even stress on material goods but acceptance of universality of spiritual values attained by a variety of ways i. e., freedom of conscience, respect for sacredness of all religions, and understanding and love for them. Another meaning is that religion is to be accepted as an experiential fact and to be disregarded as a theological or inferential theory of God because a vast difference exists between contact with reality and opinion about it. The secularistic conception is the recognition of the eternal as the common source of all religions and is synonymous with toleration. It fits into that attitude of spiritual humanism wherein the object of philosophy and religion is to spiritualise the physical, mental and social life of man.

Religion and philosophical tradition subordinate socio-politico-economic life to the spiritual, since real human life consists in the intimately personal aspect; the function of society is to help to realize this invisible life.¹ Unitive knowledge of God, here and now, is the aim of life; cultural life and social organization must be such as to offer fewest possible impediments to the development of truly human life. Improvement of social conditions removes temptations to ignorance, irresponsibility and encourages individual enlightenment of every man. Education must not only aim at adjusting the individual to the physical, economic and political environment but at revelation of the other world, intangible and transcending the spatio-temporal order, to which man belongs. Such education must take place in every sphere of empiric life; devotion to vocation, family, friendship, art, social intercourse, country, all help at self-noughting by which the real self is revealed. In other words, social life is the instrument or means to the goal, and even political life can serve as a spiritual discipline, though neither the political nor the social is the ultimate goal. However, it is not to be despised for that reason. For satisfactions of socio-political life are positive, though not ultimate goods, and illusions only when mistaken for highest

1. Education, Politics and War, p. 126.

satisfaction.¹ From the religious ideal of balance, of contemplation and action, and the philosophical ideal of converting doctrine into deed it follows that the individual is fully justified in putting forth his highest physical, mental and moral effort to ensure good government, efficient economic system, just social organization as means for a higher purpose, but not in a feverish, fatal preoccupation with these as ends in themselves.²

It follows that the political is not the highest category, the state exists for the good life of its members. And it is justified only when it advances common good, mānava-dharma. Therefore it is not the judge of its own conduct and is not above ethics. The rule of law is dharma, which fixes limits and foundations of authority and force. Politics is justice writ large; dharmorakṣati rakṣtaḥ hato hanti. The ideal of the state is dharma-rāja, kingdom of justice, righteousness and love.³ By developing capacity to apprehend absolute truth and by recognition of absolute obligation through reason, conscience and love, by placing interests of universal truth first and national politics second, it is possible to transcend the finitude and relativity of political life as a natural phenomenon. Spiritualised politics is applied religion, for religion includes faith in brotherhood and politics is made an effective means to render it visible. Without working out a systematic socio-political philosophy⁴ Radhakrishnan makes the Vedāntic conception of reality as a unique One the basis of humanistic political ideas.

The democratic principles of religious tradition are equally applicable to socio-political organization. Insistence on individuality must be related to the perception of equality of men as a result of the realization that heaven and earth, life and history are irradiated by spiritual principle.⁵ The dominant feature of the humanistic age is democracy and religion must be the sustaining faith of democracy.⁶ It is the most satisfactory principle, because it is not merely a political arrangement

1. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 143.

2. *ibid.*, p. 378.

3. Occasional Speeches and Writings, Second series, pp. 130, 141.

4. *cf.*, Schilpp, op. cit., p. 840: It is right that I have not developed any metaphysical theories of state.

5. *ibid.*

6. Occasional Speeches and Writings, First series, p. 192.

but the highest religion, treating the human individual as the most concrete embodiment on earth and rejecting anything hurting his individuality. Divine nature in everything makes personality sacred and an end in itself. Democracy rejects anything which negates the dignity of spirit in man e. g., oppression, tyranny, regimentation, totalitarianism or the machine.

The spirit of democracy is sensitive adjustment to infinitely varied demands of others i. e., humility by which man puts himself in the second place believing that he may be mistaken. From it follows good faith, tolerance and respect for opinion of others. Only in democracy does the state function in its true form of convenience or means to higher end and not as an end in itself. The worth of individuality means that sovereignty resides in man and not in state and the latter commands allegiance only when it obtains voluntary acceptance through free expression and choice. Public will fairly expressed is paramount and freedom of minorities is safeguarded. No individual or society is good enough to be trusted with power over another, nor any nation to rule over another. Violence and democracy are incompatible and force has evil consequences, besides distorting and simplifying things, individuals and society. To accept the religious principle seriously that men are members one of another is to make democracy real.¹

Only democracy expresses the ethical principle that the true end of man is responsible freedom. A free society means freedom to live one's life without infringing on others. Liberty is essential, for diversity is the constitution of things, to suppress it is to dehumanise the world, and this raises the question of law. Law must define rights of the poor and weak against the strong and wealthy and its operations must be calculable. It must provide for freedom of body, thought, speech and association, for justice demands power to speak one's thoughts, to act according to conscience, to do one's duty as one sees and to promote causes commanding one's devotion. Vedānta holds the true law to be that which develops from within and is expressed in the visible form of liberty. Social progress is real only when law is an expression of freedom and is perfected when man having learnt to know himself becomes spiritually one

1. *ibid.* p. 124.

with his fellows. The social law exists as mould of inner nature and the true man conforms to law simply because he cannot help it. The religious spirit helps in realization of rights, acceptance of obligations, but this is not to reduce religion to sublimated social engineering.¹

True liberty is not individual independence of social control but deliberate regulation of social forces for positive development of individuals.² Democracy is the method of reason which harmonises the delicately balanced system of individual rights and social obligations. Self-expression and social duty through the union of opposites, reconciliation, synthesis in the social field or social individualism is indicated by Vedantic principle of unity-in-difference. Responsibility of each for all is necessary in any sound social scheme. Traditional individualism is inadequate to the individual's social obligation, because it does not connect individual's freedom with his actions as responsible member of society. On the other hand, collectivism in the form of political mysticism requiring surrender of man, body and soul to the state is inadequate to humanistic principle of inviolability of personality. A new sense of social whole resulting from spiritual perception of oneness can alone ensure that adjustment is no mere compromise between individual freedom and necessities of society, but a real harmony. Spiritual awareness and social harmony are two sides of a free society because religion is founded on self-knowledge.³ Man and society are primarily related because spirit is one with the soul of all.

Spiritual equality of man demands equality and economic justice in society. Social disabilities, man-made inequalities are morally dangerous and humanism requires their destruction. Under-privileged classes, subject nations make for inevitable conflict. A social structure based on separatism of caste, disabilities of untouchability is a contradiction of Vedantic religion. An unjust social system and worship of God cannot exist together.⁴ The unexamined life, individual and social, has led to the suffering of India in as much as failure to be faithful to the democratic principles

1. Schlipp, op. cit., p. 66.
2. Freedom and Culture, p. 84.
3. Education, Politics and War, p. 110.
4. *ibid.*, p. 31.

of tradition is the cause of her subjection. Individualistic egalitarianism is a modern motive but Vedanta opposes the conception of society as an inorganic multiplicity, where all are equal in working at jobs without a sense of vocation.¹ The conception of swabhava and swadharma points not to identical opportunities, but to equal opportunities of all to bring their respective gifts to fruition. All functions are equally essential to society which is a functional organization. Individuals with varying capacities, abilities, insights are bound together in a living organic system. The principle of society and democracy is not uniformity but integrated variety in which all men are equally necessary for society, and their contribution from different stations of equal value. In terms of material goods justice requires equality of opportunity in food, health and education. A proper distribution of wealth is necessary, equal distribution is another matter. Unequal rewards for services creates barriers. An economic revolution through social ownership is less dangerous to social fellowship if brought about by method of reason and persuasion. Ethical socialism is based on consent and not coercion, therefore it preserves human values and does not merely increase wealth and material rehabilitation. Mechanics of living need material conditions, hence control, planning and regulation is essential. Nothing is wrong in the ideal which attempts state-ownership of public utilities for benefit of all. Religious idealism supports such an equalitarian society, genuinely manifesting attempt at social democracy, equal distribution of wealth and opportunity.²

One side of democracy is ensuring the individual's spiritual development by basing the social order on the principle of the sacredness of personality and the other side is drawing of the world together i. e., *societas generis humana* or society of whole human race.³ The root of our present trouble is an interdependent world worked on a particularistic basis. But history is moving towards a moral community of a single commonwealth of the whole human race. The world-structure consistent with democracy and ideal of universal religion is not a single empire with homogenous civilization, a single common will, but brotherhood of nations, differing in life,

1. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 840.

2. Education, Politics and War, pp. 13, 14, 15.

3. Occasional Speeches and Writings, Second series, pp. 295-296.

mind, habits, institutions, existing side-by-side in order and peace, harmony and cooperation, each contributing to the world its unique and specific best—the ideal is a combination of cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Human unity can be achieved only by strongly religious souls. From the beginning of the world prophets have dreamed of the unity of mankind. The Hindu speaks of *swadeshobhuvana trayam*, the Buddha sought to establish the kingdom of righteousness in the whole world, for the whole world is a sacred home, *Varānaśī medini*.¹ Spirituality removes inner and outer conflicts of life, so that nothing natural or human is alien to man. He is no longer a member of a group but of humanity. The primary patriotism of the religious man is love of humanity knowing no limits of geography or history, but only of justice, truth, freedom, fair-play, God and humanity.² The principle of universal freedom, *sarva-mukti* points to fundamental humanism, for the sage declares: while there is one soul in prison I am not free, while an enslaved community I belong to it.³ He seeks divine fulfilment not in heaven but on earth, spiritualises himself and others to establish a kingdom of spirit. On earth one family, is such a kingdom. The object of religious action is *loka-saṅgraha* or unity of world, inter-connectedness of society through removal of physical suffering and moral degradation.

Aurobindo

Aurobindo holds that the problem of thought is to find right ideas, right way of harmony; to restate eternal spiritual truth so that it permeates mental-physical life; to develop vital method of psychological self-discipline; to express spirit through mental-psyhic life in its richness and power; to seek means-motives to remould external life and society progressively in truth and spirit, to utmost harmony of individual freedom and social unity.⁴ Vedānta of Upaniṣads and *Gītā* is not purely metaphysical and quietistic, but pragmatic, meant to inspire life and rule conduct. The characteristic doctrine of the *Gītā* is the law of life or dharma and even the most transcendental aspiration of Upaniṣadic Vedānta presupposes preparation of life and

1. Occasional Speeches and Writings, op. cit., pp. 19, 35.

2. The Religion We Need, p. 25; cf., Education, Politics and War, p. 169.

3. Freedom and Culture, p. 29.

4. vide G. H. Langley, Sri Aurobindo, p. 20: The ideal of Pondicherry Ashram.

through life for immortality.¹ True karma-yoga is application of Vedanta to life, outer swaraj or social-political freedom must be founded on the strength of inner swaraj or actualisation of Vedanta, Gita and yoga in man's life. Secular activity, political or social, as such is not identical with spiritual life, but the latter demands and sanctions the former as a part of divinely ordained plan, requires work to be done as service of divine will and not out of common human motive. The principle of transfiguration of man in integral evolution throws light on the philosophy of history and social philosophy, and points to important goals in social interrelations by which humanistic socio-political ideals can be truly fulfilled. Therefore, these goals must serve as standards and guides of social progress.

The first conclusion is that the perfected community exists by perfecting of its individuals and the discovery of unity by all.² The key to the evolutionary movement is the individual because he becomes conscious of reality, while the movement of collectivity is largely sub-conscious. The historical evolution of man³ shows development of society from the symbolic, typical or conventional age (representing the sub-rational element), to the individualistic age (representing the rational element), whose latest phase points to the need of rediscovering the substantial truths and laws of life, thought and action of the subjective age which were overlaid by the previous stage. To reach the true subject man must go very deep into the subjective secret of himself and things as well as into objective forms and surroundings. Three errors must be avoided. Firstly, the self is not to be confused with egoism, individual or communal, but to be known as the one self of all, the universal or Supreme Being, "I" expressing itself in individual (vyasṭi) and collectivity (samasṭi). Secondly, though the individual is not to be confused with separate being, the realization of secret solidarity in the Divine must prevent society from wounding itself by crushing the individual. The individual is not a law unto himself, but still he is the law because a soul living in the Divine. He lives not for himself, for state, for society, for individual or collective ego, but for God in the universe through service of love.

1. The Ideal of the Karmayogin, p. 9.

2. The Life Divine, I, 931.

3. vide The Human Cycle, chap. I.

Thirdly, subjectivity is not exaltation of physical, vital or mental being only, because these constitute subjective materialism; to this must be added development of subjective idealism i. e., satisfaction in most religious, aesthetic, intuitive, highest intellectual-ethical, deepest sympathetic-emotional nature.¹ Society is to be built on such a principle of subjectivity and not on the individualistic principle.

Vedanta affirms the unknowable knowing itself as Sacchidanand and that reality descending in two essential appearances, universal and individual.² Corresponding to these three terms of revelation of the Self-Existent the phenomenal field holds the truth of cosmic being in humanity, of collective being in community and of soul in the individual.³ The three-fold goal of human life is perfection of the individual, of the spiritual-pragmatic relation of the individual with all round him and of a change in the total life of humanity or a new, perfected collective life in earth nature.⁴ The ideal life is for individual to perfect his individuality by free development from within and to respect and aid others i. e., in relation with others and the needs of humanity; the law of the community is to perfect corporate development by free development from within by helping and taking the help of others i. e., in relation with other communities and with humanity; the law of humanity is to evolve towards expression of the Divine in type of mankind, taking advantage of other two developments i. e., to become ideally one divine family while aiding the individuals and aggregations. Such obligations of man to mankind are dealt with in religion and ethics. The social evolution of human race is development of relation between three constant factors i. e., individuals, communities and mankind, and none of the three terms can be abolished. Even in the life-types nature creates the genus, species and individuals, but in human life it tries to overcome division in a sense of unity.⁵ The process of nature is to balance two poles of life, the individual or part, whom the whole nourishes, and the whole, which the individual helps to constitute. To emphasise the first makes society a mere field of growth and activity of the individual; to emphasise the second gives

1. *ibid.*, p. 72.

2. *The Life Divine*, I, 53.

3. *ibid.*, II, 919.

4. *ibid.*, II, 899, 917.

5. *The Human Cycle*, pp. 178, 179.

collective life sole importance or the emphasis may be only on the social being of man. But man is moved by nature to live for himself and to affirm individuality, and called by social-mental idealism to live for the good of the community, the unifying knowledge belongs to a principle to which oneness and integrity are native.¹

Integral evolution points to the goal of a new world of total life of humanity by evolution of truth-consciousness, consolidating a common life. The historical evolution has brought mankind to the rational stage represented by individualistic and scientific type of society. The political evolution gave the watch-word of liberty, equality and fraternity, and their social formulations in the form of democracy, socialism and the subjectivistic principle of spiritual anarchism, which must end in the true spiritual unity of man. The importance of democracy and socialism is that society and state are developing to their completeness and identity. There are signs that society is getting self-sufficient, a freely, consciously self-regulated organism through development of central authority and force, taking over specialised and separate parts of social activity.²

Nature requires distinctive perfection and development of the individual man, the human idea of the more and more luminous Person, the increasing God. The evolutionary movement is towards freedom, variation and individual development. But freedom itself evolves from the original state of instinctive, spontaneous, free and fluid association of animal life to final state of enlightened, intuitive, spontaneously free and fluid association of souls. Principle of liberty (individual, national, social, ethical) is that nature does not impose a rule from outside but impels life to grow from within, only modified by commerce with environment, hence true law must develop from within as expression of inner liberty, whether in individual or in social and national life. At latter level subjectivity principle demanded by the time-spirit is given in the formula, "to be ourselves."³ Reason as the creator and regulator of society attempted to embody the ideal in individualistic democracy. Its idea was to protect liberty by force of state and system of administration in a society where all

1. The Life Divine, II, 917, 919.

2. The Ideal of Human Unity, p. 210.

3. The Human Cycle, p. 36.

are politically equal. But through its form of education and freedom it was unable to preserve equality and this was fatal to the social idea. Freedom meant free diversity of truth of knowledge and living, and a coordinated diversity within the community, but discord was the outcome.¹ When insistence on freedom and self-expression of life, mind, soul of the individual is exaggerated into egoism of mental-vital being, it prevents recognition of unity with others. In the end even the preservation of the characteristic principle of liberty is not sure, for democracy marches to organized annihilation of individual liberty of speech, thought and association.

Spiritual equality of soul, samatā, is equanimity founded on a sense of one divine self seen everywhere, inspite of differences, degrees, disparities in manifestation. In manifestation the two sides of the truth are oneness and difference and neither can be destroyed. One truth is that all have the same Brahman i. e., basic value is in man himself and all kinds of work is equal before the Divine, another truth is that development is not equal in all i. e., the soul manifests in different degrees in man's nature.² The mental approach to equality separates oneness and difference. It may affirm the difference only. Inequality is such a mental attitude of pride, arrogance, divinely ordained superiority of birth, fixed and unalterable inequality of caste, class, race or nation, and following upon it the domination of one caste etc. over another. But this can never be more than a temporary necessity, for nature's aim in human life is not exploitation of the few by the many or vice-versa. Unreasoning, arbitrary inequalities, autocracy and denial of equality, absolutism in politics are all denials of philosophical-religious ideal. On the other hand, the mental approach may try to destroy such inequalities or differences by making all mathematically equal. But absolute equality is neither intended nor possible in nature. For all are united and equal parts of the Virāṭ Puruṣa in the nation. Yet all are unequal in function, political, social, economic. A fundamental equality of man and man, caste and caste, class and class must "render the play of true superiority and difference inoffensive."³

The logic of growth of reason in its social formulation passed from the stage

1. The Life Divine, II, 899.

2. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 590.

3. The Ideal of Human Unity, p. 11.

of individualistic democracy to socialism of industrial and economic type with equality and state as its principle.¹ Rationally it takes the collective form of regimentation, standardisation, fixing in a common mould, which ignores the complexity of man's being and its struggle for freedom, and the organized state suppresses and oppresses individual freedom by will of majority or minority. Its first motive is to insist on individual's sacrifice and subordination to external interest of state or group, which theoretically demands the good of all, but practically amounts to collective egoism, unrestrained by true and enlightened conscience of nation. The altruistic ideal of discipline of self-sacrifice and need of solidarity is distorted into loss of self in the state. Secondly, the scientific regulation of life by thorough mechanisation is based on the motive that good and progress lies in efficiency and organization of state. The latter is true and good in providing facility for cooperation, removing harmful waste and friction, avoidable injustice and giving equal chance of development to all, but such regulation makes variation impossible and interferes with man's freedom of growth.

Freedom of individual, group and race and coordinated harmony of individual forces with efforts of all in the group, all groups in the race, all races in the kind is the goal. Scripture offers the true object of human action as loka-samgraha i. e., holding together of the race in its cyclic evolution as the constant sense and sum of activity whether known or not to man. Unity is not an arbitrary idea but the basis of individual and collective existence necessary for power and fruitfulness of life, but if it takes the form of uniformity by law, order, regimentation, then the intellectual and cultural growth suffers. For uniformity is the sign of group in matter and man evolving in and out of matter begins with uniformity.² Unity requires a sound order coming from within and based on self and its laws, as well as on laws of relation to others, offering the greatest liberty for vigorous variation and self-finding. Nature's pattern is that she moulds on one general plan but insists on infinite variations. It secures variation by division into groups and liberty by force of

1. The Human Cycle, p. 251.

2. The Ideal of Human Unity, p. 15.

individuality in members of the group. Therefore, unity of society and human race must be in consonance with this law.¹ In the past there was a struggle between order-uniformity, on the one hand, and liberty, on the other, in all human formations, and in the future also a similar struggle is inevitable between the principle of authority and order attempting mechanical organization and the principle of liberty claiming a flexible, free, specious system, for control of human unity.² Any unity at social or international level based only on economic, political and mechanical-administrative need is a mere material frame-work. Another power besides external circumstance operating in nature must be realized, an internal necessity, a will and design in nature which puts it in touch with reality.

The three socio-political ideals cannot be achieved by present crude forms of external machinery of society and state while man is under influence of false subjectivism i. e., remains egoistic (individual or communal). The law for removal of egoism (domination of vital-physical mind) is one for the individual and the mass i. e., psychological forces have to be worked out, exhausted, dismissed in society and politics.³ The older forces to be worked out and dismissed from all spheres of life are despotism, privilege, exploitation, competition, fraternal strife. They come back to thwart the embodiment of the ideals in social life: liberty arrives at competitive individualism and democratic tendency fails to satisfy dreams of anarchist freedom; equality arrives at strife and then at ignoring of variation in nature in an artificial society and socialistic dead-level equality, and fails to satisfy the dream of fundamental equality; contradiction of the two principles in society means that the ego can only speak of fraternity, which is contrary to its nature, as association for pursuit of common ends and a world-embracing authoritarian state, which must fail to satisfy the dream of fraternity. Therefore, the aim of future evolution is gradual harmonisation of the three ideals by gradual process of getting rid of the egoistic developments of the same by a process of gradual self-dissociation (samyama).⁴

1. *ibid.*, pp. 296-297.

2. *ibid.*, p. 159.

3. *vide supra*, p. 567, foot-note 3.

4. *The Ideal of Human Unity*, p. 368.

To reconcile liberty and equality, liberty and authority, liberty and efficiency, individual and the aggregate, man must rise to fraternity through psychological and spiritual change. Brotherhood is the real key to the triple ideal of humanity and it exists in the soul and is not physical kinship, vital association or even intellectual agreement. The soul's claim is for freedom of self-development i. e., of the divine in man and in all his being. Soul's claim for equality means recognition of the same freedom for all. Soul's brotherhood means recognition of inner spiritual unity. The three are of the nature of the soul, for freedom, equality and unity are the attributes of spirit.¹ Unless God or highest self of all creatures is realized and possessed there can be no unity. Commonsense suggests that education of all in the ideal of the spirit is the only way to rid mind of abuses and superstitions and only in that way can society shape itself in the full, perfect spirit of Vedāntic gospel of equality. A powerful, self-conscious and universal religion of humanity as distinct from an intellectual and sentimental ideal, is recognition in men's minds and lives of a single soul of humanity of which individuals and peoples are incarnations and soul-forms—this will end separateness without destroying individuality. It must become explicit, categorically imperative as a rule of life before unity between man and man or love of mankind becomes real. The aim of all religions and of the religion of humanity viz., love, mutual recognition of human brotherhood, living sense of oneness and practice of it in feeling and life, is the ideal expressed in the Vedas and in the highest injunction of spirit on earth.² This deeper brotherhood based on love is the only sure foundation of perfect social evolution. And only when man has passed into nature of self-knowledge can mutuality (understanding), unity and harmony become the law of collective gnostic being.³

The political formulation of spiritual unity is spiritual anarchism, a perfect social state of unity and free equality established by cooperation, agreement and comradeship without governmental compulsion for its principle. Spiritually founded society, "a true inner theocracy" takes all interests which call for association,

1. *ibid.*, pp. 368-369.

2. *ibid.*, pp. 360, 365.

3. *The Life Divine*, II, 903, 916.

mutual assistance and not diversity, antagonism.¹ It will treat man as a soul incarnated for divine fulfilment here, by presenting to lower elements and members the truth of spirit in themselves translated into their own field of action, not leaving them to themselves e. g., there will be no barren contempt for physical life, denial of matter.² In fact, economic interests of human life are the ones ordinarily violated with least impunity, for they are bound up with life and their persistent violation destroys the oppressed organism or leads to revolt by nature's inexorable retaliation. At the same time, economics must not aim only at high engine of production, competitive or co-operative, but to give joy of work according to man's nature, free leisure to grow inwardly, simple, rich and beautiful life to all. Nor should politics mean a state as an enormous machine, regulated and armoured with man living for the sake of the machine. It must mean guidance of the social order by the wisest and the best by the principles of rāja-dharma.

Summary

It has been argued that the abstract approach of anthropocentric humanism fails to lead to a concrete and complete view of man's life and this opens the door for reentry of spirituality. But naturalistic forms of religious humanism are a travesty of spirituality and Vedānta insists that the element of the "more-than-human" must be treated as a natural part of man's experience. The goal of human unity will not be achieved at the naturalistic level but at the spiritual level of universality, and the process of it will be in the form of the "spiritualising of the natural." True humanism is neither anti-religious nor anthropocentric but must be spiritual and Neo-Vedānta is such a humanistic philosophy capable of developing an integrated philosophy and culture of life.

The future of humanistic civilization rests on the renewal of search for knowledge and perfection of man's self even more than on its knowledge and control of nature. Vedānta centres round this very question of "self-knowledge." To be truly humanistic the conception of man must go much beyond the naturalistic and scientific

1. The Human Cycle, pp. 286, 275.

2. *ibid.*, p. 285.

conception. The existential or historical self of man is constituted of the natural pole (object-self) wherein he is a separate individual endowed with natural needs. But to restrict man to this is to be in ignorance (Ajñāna) of his nature. It is at the spiritual pole (subject-self) that man comes in contact with the universal principle of reality and goes beyond nature. Vedānta declares man to be a duality of sat-asat, Brahma-Māya and having the aim of overcoming the asat-Māya part of him by the sat-Brahma part through spiritual evolution whose mechanism is provided by karma and punar-janma. The process of overcoming is understood differently by the Neo-Vedāntins.

Reality manifests in creation, therefore there is no discontinuity between world and man, yet man's uniqueness has to be safeguarded. Efforts of the naturalistic type of religious humanists to explain the unique valuational and ethical activity merely in terms of rationality are unsatisfactory and the Neo-Vedāntins account for it in terms of the presence of Ātman in man. Further, the effort of rationalistic humanism to preserve the independence of the finite personality is unjustified. It is this which separates man from the rest of the world and its sacrifice means achievement of real unity of microcosm with macrocosm by realization of the universal spirit underlying both. There is doctrinal difference among Neo-Vedāntins on this point.¹ It is seen that, according to Tagore and Aurobindo, both in the empirical and in the transcendental states the unique individual self is real and all that is cancelled is the egotism of man. Therefore, they cannot be subjected to any criticism from the standpoint of humanism. Gandhi and Vivekanand point out that the negation of the ego is but attainment of universal being, therefore there is no loss. Radhakrishnan shows that the first stage of negation is merely the attainment of universal spirit by the individual self and to this no humanist may object. The final state is one of cancellation of separate existence, as maintained by Gandhi and Vivekanand, but this is not so much a loss as a gain. For it is not the particular self of the humanist but the universal self of Advaita which is the only true individual.

True humanism demands that the question of man's status should be settled in terms of autonomy. It has been seen that Neo-Vedāntins hold man to be both free and

1. vide infra, pp. 867-868.

bound, determined and non-determined. In the sphere of nature, natural law or karma determines man. Neo-Vedāntins take a collectivistic view of it (acts of all are mutually interdependent) by connecting it with the operation of universal energy, as well as an individualistic view, since each remains a karmic unit (each bears results of his own acts). They have argued that in so far as man realizes himself as spirit he is free from determination by karma and is truly creative. Metaphysically speaking, human freedom consists in man's determination by his own nature of Ātman, and this is a corollary of the Supreme's nature of free self-limitation into names and forms. In specifically spiritual life the actuality of divine grace does not reduce man's freedom by an iota, since initiative rests with him to respond to the call of Ātman. From the ethical standpoint the correlativity of good and evil as parts of the world, resting on the transcendental oneness of reality, does not destroy man's responsibility while he is in the state of bondage (empirical condition); here karma establishes his freedom of choice between good and evil. Vedānta accepts the humanistic judgment that evil is real and it is man's duty to struggle against it. But it corrects humanism by insisting that evil cannot be ultimate. Perfection of knowledge and will in the state of liberation ends moral dichotomy because its cause, divisive consciousness, is destroyed, hence there is no scope or possibility of evil in mokṣa and the relativity of good is sublimated into absolute good. All these conclusions of Neo-Vedānta are consistent with the humanistic ideal of freedom.

No humanistic philosophy can afford to neglect the question of discipline of human life which accounts for the uniqueness of man in nature and his high destiny. Vedānta makes it the only means of the attainment of man's true nature. The Neo-Vedāntins have been specially successful in their aim of harmonising the traditional yogas: integral yoga stresses significance of the emotional element in man so as to balance the one-sidedness of abstract rationalism, and the search for God through-love leads to fruitful paths of conduct or universal ethics acceptable to humanism. The Neo-Vedāntins make a decisive break in rejecting the classical ideal of contemplative life because it divorces world and spirit, body and soul, sensibility and reason, thus giving lower position to mundane activities and values; on this point they are

in agreement with secular humanism. But they reject the latter's attempt to establish the ultimate value of pure activism by denying that the contemplative principle stands at the summit of all human activities, mental, volitional and emotional. A balance of contemplation and action in both secular and spiritual life must be established and such a true harmony is discovered only in sadhana. Further, spirituality is true only when shared with mankind i. e., spiritualisation or descent of spirit in man must lead to continuation of divine work in society and world. True humanism cannot find fault with a positive asceticism i. e., renunciation, detachment and discipline based on the love of God. Even a scientific view must allow such an asceticism to be the condition of selfless service of man and creative activity. But Vedānta continues to insist that it is jñāna or union with God or Ātman which is the end, and knowledge, devotion and action must have the true purpose of leading man to the inner benefits of the soul.

Humanism demands that no part of man's nature be neglected in the attainment of his goal. Neo-Vedānta represents the ideal man who has had a direct experience of unity as a unique balance of body-mind-spirit. A balance or harmony in the means employed must give rise to an end of a similar nature. The integrated personality is an universal personality; the inevitable outcome of the realization of the one spiritual ground of all being (sarvātma bhāva) is to end isolation and egotism, leading to creativity of the highest type in the form of further effort to transform man and world. The Neo-Vedāntins are unanimous in their assertion that the ideal of Vedānta far exceeds the finest product of humanistic culture.

No philosophy of life may disagree with humanism about the inalienability of values in human life. But the point is this that the non-teleological and non-intelligent account of scientific naturalism gives no consistent explanation of the origin or justification of values. The positivistic approach must end in pessimistic negation of all value. The idealistic-spiritual philosophy is causally related to belief in and pursuit of human values. Neo-Vedāntins claim that the Vedāntic metaphysic alone provides sufficient ground for all major values of mankind. The personalistic conception of God meets the need of all parts of mental functioning in the nature of setya, śiva, sundera. The impersonalistic conception is the foundation of the

values of truth, freedom, love and beauty in its nature of sat-cit-anand. The humanist objection that truth cannot be absolute but only relative to time, place and condition of person is overcome by showing how the Absolute can ensure both unity and diversity of human truth together with all standards of empirical validity and psychological principles. Similarly, it can be shown that Vedānta contains the psychological impulses issuing from metaphysical reality, sufficient to ensure ethical value in conduct in a changing world. It is the philosophy of the transcendence of self which is the very definition of morality. Neo-Vedāntins complete the circle by proving that spirituality is founded on morality alone. The doctrine of sarva-mukti links humanism or religion of service with spiritual morality.

Vedānta declares that human value binds man to "ego" of life, while humanism requires conservation of values as ultimate. The latter rejects absolutism in favour of relativity precisely for this reason that values are negated by the former. Neo-Vedāntins argue that relativity of intellectual standards fail to explain the values, point to solipsism and nihilism not consistent with oneness of reality. Relative values point to "more" than themselves. The Absolute does not negate the ultimate "cosmic" significance of values. Moreover, their "negation" in the transcendental reality does not amount to their exclusion, but their sublimation. Therefore, absolute reality is synonymous with perfection of value.

Humanism demands that philosophy must offer both practical and theoretical solutions of life's problems, and modern thinkers accept this challenge. Vedānta holds world to be comprehended in reality and Advaita Vedānta allows vyāvahārika sattā of a world resting on pāramārthika sattā. It, therefore, agrees with humanism that dualism of reality and world, spirit and life is pernicious. Philosophy must become practical as it was in ancient Vedāntic society which made a perfect balance of the pragmatic and the metaphysical. Neo-Vedāntins turn their attention to the long neglected socio-temporal aspect (dharma) of Vedāntic humanism and thus refute the notion that Vedānta is merely a culture of inner life and not of the outer life of man in society and world. By understanding the proper scope of Karma-Kāṇḍa and accepting the ideal of karma-yoga in the spirit of the Gītā a social philosophy can be worked out quite

relevant to the needs of a humanistic age. The problem of humanism is to discover the most comprehensive principle in the light of which knowledge and action can be integrated and directed towards the goal of fulfilment of man and society. Vedānta, in its social philosophy, insists that spirit is that principle which alone gives full worth, dignity and harmony of man, society and world. The Vedantic idea of mokṣa or dukha-nivṛtti is expanded in terms of a social, political, economic and ethical life, quite consistent with the standard of humanism.

At the empirical level Vedānta allows full scope for pragmatic values and pursuits of human life, because reality of spirit is to be expressed through nature, world and materiality. Ethical, political, economic ends are real and acquire a new significance when nature is treated as part of spirit and is transformed by it. All are means or instruments to be directed towards attainment of spiritual freedom. But each is also an intrinsic end whose spatio-temporal validity depends not upon the natural-material principle but upon the moral-spiritual principle permeating it. Thus determined, each one of them is a goal worthy of human striving. True humanism cannot find anything objectionable in this conclusion.

Unchanging nature of reality does not negate change in empirical life. For the latter, no unchanging utopian social order as sanātana-dharma can be depicted but only a dynamic ideal or yuga-dharma. Diversity of social forms, methods and ends are inevitable, but only those are logically consistent with Vedānta which are based on increasing order, peace, harmony and unity. There is nothing in the conception of absolute truth as transcendental spirit to counteract the conception of a humanistic social order, based on the dignity of the human self and on confidence in human energy. All essentials of democracy are contained in Vedāntic metaphysics. From the doctrine of the one spirit manifesting in all, the nature of the phenomenal is deduced as a unity-in-diversity. Equality and liberty follow from unity and difference, respectively. When the power of the one spirit pervades man and society only then will the global functioning of democracy become a reality. Neo-Vedānta brings out that a social order consistent with spiritualism as well as humanism has the characteristics of subjectivity, communal quality, decentralisation and cooperation. The triple

ideals of humanistic culture, liberty, equality and unity find fulfilment here because they are attributes of spirit. The ideal of loka-saṁgraha, solidarity of mankind and world is identical with brotherhood, and fraternal love is of the essence of spirit.

CHAPTER VII

THE VEDĀNTA IDEAL---OLD AND NEW

Certain metaphysical, cosmological, ethical and spiritual siddhāntas of Vedānta implied in the discussions of different aspects of a humanistic philosophy of life in the last chapter remain to be examined. The purpose of the present chapter is to discover whether the age-long doctrinal differences of the classical schools of Vedānta are ultimate or is there some way to bring those controversies to a satisfactory conclusion in the form of harmonious and consistent doctrines. Here, the approach of the Neo-Vedāntins is found to be very constructive; avoiding all sectarian rivalries, every one of them applies himself to the task of samanvaya though each works out a different synthesis. They are unanimous that a complete world-view, logically consistent and emotionally satisfying is already present in the apparently conflicting Vedāntic doctrines, and that that world-view is a sound foundation of the philosophy of life outlined in the last chapter.

Brahma—The Nature of Reality

Classical Doctrines

Vedānta begins and ends in the quest for reality. Two conceptions of reality are presented in classical Vedānta. On the one hand is the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, of reality as transcendently non-dualistic, because only this meets the test of non-contradiction, abādha. It is the knowledge of the indeterminate, partless and the attributeless. This absolute unity alone is the explanation of diversities, but the objective reality of the universe, its relation to Brahman and causation cannot contradict the undifferentiated, changeless, relationless character of Brahman. Śaṅkara achieves this conclusion by treating reality as the ground on which the object is superimposed. This implies a cosmic ignorance, Māyā, which veils Brahman but

does not affect it. By its indescribable functioning Brahman seems endowed with the relative character of creator, maintainer and destroyer of the world. Thus, reality as determinate is the inseparable material and efficient cause. God modifies Himself into all the appearances of names and forms without losing His identity i. e., He is not wholly exhausted or immanent in created existence but transcends His own beginningless and endless self-expressions. *Māyā* as the eternal self-concealing, diversifying creative power of God must be both different, since power belongs to person and not vice-versa, and non-different, since modifications of power are only God's. Similarly, logical notions of substance and attribute, identity and modification, transcendence and immanence are not equally real in explaining the relation between *Saguṇa Brahma* or *Īśvara* and the world, both of which are understood to belong to the same level of experience; much less adequate are these and other empirical categories such as part and whole, cause and effect, in explaining the relation when *Para Brahma* and the world are regarded at different levels of being and experience.

Śaṅkara takes the stand that reality cannot be both *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* simultaneously, nor one as cause and many as effect.¹ Creativity or *saguṇatva* is no more than accidental definition, *ṭatastha lakṣṇa*.² *Īśvara* is the determinate form of Brahman which does not contradict the essential nature of Brahman just as the ether in the pot does not vitiate the infinite nature of ether itself.³ Or *Īśvara* has the cause *Māyā* or *Ajñāna* as His condition (*Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka*) or is reflection of intelligence (*pratibimba*) in beginningless *Māyā* (*Prakṛtārtha Vivaraṇa*) with its projecting power predominating, (*Pañcadaśī*, *Tattvaviveka*) or the original (*bimba*) limited by the one-ness which is not different from pure Brahman when devoid of this relative character (*Vivaraṇakāra*). *Śaṅkara* does not deny the value of this conception and gives it the status of *vyāvahārika sattā* to achieve consistency with the teaching of the three *Prasthānas*. It is a necessary intermediary step of thought between infinite

1. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.

2. vide *Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha*, Vol. II, pp. 13, 14: Later followers of *Śaṅkara* make a distinction between *viśeṣaṇa* or quality which lasts as long as effect lasts and brings about the distinction, *upādhi* or adjunct which distinguishes but does not persist, *upalakṣṇa* or qualification per accident which remains only for sometime and effects distinction.

3. vide *Pañcadaśī*, IV, 18, 22.

diversity of being in actual perception or difference and infinite unity of Being or non-difference. Saguna is the highest step of the empirical ladder of reality and has this logical basis that all empirical objects derive sustenance from an immanent principle.¹ Intellect can only conceive that aspect of reality which is causal and immanent and helps to bring unity amidst multiplicity of experience.

Having conceded this much Śaṅkara goes on to insist that neither Śruti, tarka nor anubhava point to Saguna as the ultimate or pāramārthika nature of reality. Reality as it has got to be conceived in relation to world experience is distinct from reality as it is. The Saguna (saprapañca) and Nirguna (niṣprapañca) Śrutis have different subjects of discourse and the latter texts do negate the former according to the apacchedaka nyāya or the rule of the subsequent sublating the earlier text. This does not falsify the Saguna Śruti itself, as the Mādhva philosophers object, but only its object. There is no danger for theism from this conclusion because for upāsana the absolute existence of the Deity is not required, but only that the Deity and the devotee belong to the same level. The logical difficulty in the Saguna conception consists in proving whether qualities are different or non-different from Brahman. Moreover, every qualification imposes a limitation on the unlimited and infinite. It cannot be conceded to the protagonists of Saguna that existence is indispensably dependent on possession of qualities, for qualities are devoid of qualities but their existence is not denied. The tendency to introduce this category of unity-in-diversity has only provisional validity as a device to teach that diversity is only apparent and reality is absolute unconditional unity. Hence, Vedānta teaches that reality in its essential nature or svarūpa is akhanda ekarasa, no other than Nirguna Brahma, free from all change and qualification.

All Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins oppose the Advaita thesis by interpreting Śruti to be teaching the nature of the one reality to be Saguna. Śaṅkara's distinction of tateṣtha or kārya lakṣaṇa and svarūpa lakṣaṇa makes Brahman subject to ignorance or Māyā-sābala. Vallabha seeks to establish Śuddhādvaita by attempting to prove that Brahman free from association with Māyā manifests all causes and effects in the world.

1. Bhāṣatī, 641, 3, 10.

His power to create is non-different from Him and creation is a real manifestation of a real agent and enjoyer, Brahman. Kartṛtva or creatorship is not a subsidiary principle or a temporal character. Brahman contains all opposite qualities, therefore, kartṛtva and akartṛtva can be reconciled.¹ He Himself is the abhinnaimittopādāna kāraṇa who changes into all forms of jagat. Changes of jaḍa, jīva and Āntaryamī within Brahman are of the type of avikṛta paripāma and not of vikṛta paripāma i. e., His perfect nature remains free from defect even in creation. This theory of creatorship avoids the vivarta arsti of Advaita, which by assuming Māyā ends Advaita. Just as the straight and circular forms of serpent² do not make it different so Brahman is one in or apart from creation. Opposite Śrutis merely teach that Brahman is the substratum of opposite qualities and not that He is devoid of qualities.³ Brahman's form is not like world-forms, therefore He is nirākāra, but His form being made of pure ānand He is also sākāra.⁴ The Śruti describing Him as nirviśeṣa merely negates worldly qualities from Him and not all forms and qualities. Vallabha concludes that Śaṅkara has no authority or logic for separating Īśvara from Brahma. Śruti does not teach two forms, nor the contradiction of the two, nor the superiority of the Nirguṇa over the Saguṇa.

Nimbārka takes the stand that Brahman is both Saguṇa and Nirguṇa i. e., He is the material cause but not exhausted in creation. Unlike Śaṅkara who makes Brahman essentially inactive without quality or form, Nimbārka allows activity in respect of phenomenal world and inactivity in respect of noumenal nature i. e., the greater part of reality remains unaffected or transcendent. The relation of creation to creator is that of non-difference (immanence) and difference (transcendence) i. e., Bhedābheda. By this interpretation alone can the two types of teachings in the scriptures be reconciled.⁵ World or Māyā is paripāma of Brahman and, in its present form, neither permanent nor non-permanent.⁶ This may be the meaning of its unreality, but not in the sense of Māyāvāda which makes both creator and creation an illusory superimposition.

1. Aṅga Bhāṣya, I, 1, 4.

2. B. S., II, 3, 3.

3. Aṅga Bhāṣya, I, 1, 2.

4. Ibid., II, 3, 43.

5. Vedānta Kaustubha, III, 2, 28; उन्मयकृतिपरिहरात्

6. Nimbārka Bhāṣya on B. S., I, 4, 23-28.

The teaching of Brahman as material and efficient cause is a refutation of Māyāvāda.¹

Ramānuja takes his stand on Saguna nature of reality, as revealed to him by scripture, inference and experience. The two kinds of texts are equally valid, and in the context of the regular opposition between the two the earlier i. e., Saguna, must be accepted as predominant according to the upakramadhikaraṇa nyāya or, even better, the utsargapavada nyaya or the rule that negative texts must be interpreted in accordance with the affirmative. Brahman endowed with six attributes of perfection, ṣaḍaiśvarya, is eternally active in respect of creation. Māyā is the instrument of wonderful creation, whose adhiṣṭhāna is the Supreme Lord. It is also a special type of knowledge by which the real world is created. But the parināma of Brahman must be understood in a secondary way, sadvāraka, for He does not suffer change, but only changes through the entities, matter and souls, comprehended in the whole of which He is the inspiring principle or soul. Rāmānuja's problem is to explain the relation of the real world and Brahman. Monism is preserved because the supreme soul alone subsists in all forms, which are its body; unity and plurality is admitted in saying that one only supreme spirit subsists under plurality of diverse forms of soul and not soul; plurality is admitted, since the essential natures of soul, not soul and the Lord are different and not to be confounded.² All these mutually opposite categories, paraspara viruddha bhedādi pakṣa traya, are incorporated in Rāmānuja's position of apṛthakasiddhi in his effort to reconcile the philosophical Absolute with the Supreme Personality of religion.

Madhvācārya stands at the opposite extreme of Advaita: reality is always dualistic. The criterion of reality is that it is known through pramāṇas, which reveal it to be Saguna and savīśeṣa i. e., it is revealed as an object of a determinate nature, having parts which are related. Vyāsātīrtha argues that this nature can be proved by inferences. Brahman as a substance must have positive attributes. Even as a ground of illusion in Advaita He still has a character viz., the character of being contradicted. Further, He has a character of being object of knowledge because He is

1. *Ibid.*, 4, 26.

2. *Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha*, trans. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough (Varanasi: Chaudhamba Sanskrit series, 1961), pp. 75-76.

made the object of Vedānta enquiry. Positively, He has all excellent qualities because he who is desirous of acquiring them (sadhaka) is also capable of doing so. Negatively, He is free from defect or bad qualities for he who desires to abandon them is also capable of doing so. The Saguna and Nirguna texts are equal in value and if read together point to the nature of Brahman as full of all attributes, pūrṇatva, yet also independent or unique from everything in the world, otherwise His perfection cannot be proved.¹ Nirguna means freedom from three guṇas of Prakṛti. But guṇa pūrṇatā means possession of all excellent qualities to the highest degree in such manner that guṇa and guṇī, anvaya and anvayī are non-different i. e., Brahman is swagata-bheda-varjita or self-identical. He is nirviśeṣa because unlimited, not having only specific energy but all-powerful.² He is nirākāra because His whole form is infinite and cannot be grasped. Pūrṇa Brahma differs from Nirguna Brahma of Śaṅkara in having eight kinds of activities viz., creation and dissolution, destruction and protection, knowledge and ignorance, bondage of souls and salvation of souls.³ Creatorship or Īśvaratva is not only truth at the level of vyavahāra but pāramārthika satya itself. Were the difference of phenomenal and transcendent, apara and para realities accepted then there would be difficulty of relating Īśvara to Brahma. If they are mere names both should have the same metaphysical status; why should two be admitted at all? If they are two, then what agency creates the difference? If upādhi constitutes that agency its operation would extend beyond space and time and, then, difference and suffering would arise even in eternity. If eternity be denied to Īśvara, why should it not also be denied to Brahman? If Īśvara and Brahman are said to be identical then Brahman would suffer from defects and pains of the finites. If it be said that identity is real but difference is empirical, this cannot be admitted, since both are beyond space and time or the empirical, therefore the difference is absurd.

Vedānta teaches one reality Brahma or Īśvara who creates a real world out of primordial matter i. e., God is the efficient cause of world whose material cause is Māyā. The pūrṇatva of reality does not debar multiplicity or Dvaita. The relation of

¹ *Madhva Bhāṣya on Chān. Upa.*, III, 3, 82-87.

² *Madhva Bhāṣya on Chān. Upa.*, I, 3, 12.

³ *Aṣṭa Vyākhyāna*, I, 1, 90.

God and world should be understood in terms of five-fold difference: of Brahman from jiva, of Brahman from matter, of jiva from jiva, of jiva from matter and of matter from matter. The teaching of pure identity in Advaita involves a conception of a deluded God, *Īvara*. It makes God imperfect by identification with an imperfect world. Nor can any form of identity-in-difference save God from imperfections.¹ In fact, the category of difference alone safeguards the transcendental perfection of the one independent reality, as well as brings out the dependent nature of two other realities of soul and matter, which constitute the universe.

Vedānta is fundamentally an ontology, but the nature of reality is founded on the nature of knowledge. The differences between the absolutistic and theistic schools on the nature of reality are due to differences in their epistemologies. Śaṅkara differentiates mutable and relational thinking from the immutable character of pure consciousness. Indeterminate nature belongs to that pure cognition which underlies the determinate thought process. The subject-object relation is present in knowledge, but is not an indispensable feature of the highest cognition, which is the intuited Absolute, without any objectivity. Dynamic and synthetic nature belongs only to immanent experience but transcendental experience is an unchanging unity of consciousness. As opposed to this view of knowledge the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins deny the ultimacy of indeterminate cognition, non-relational thinking. There is merely a difference of degree between this and determinate cognition. Knowledge is synthetic and dynamic, revealing the Absolute as a self-conscious principle to Rāmānuja and as a substance subsisting through differences to Madhvācārya, having uninterrupted and continuous self-expression and self-subsistence. All Vedāntins hold Being to be the Absolute, complete and independent category, but the theists have it to be concrete, personalistic consciousness while the absolutists have it to be impersonalistic consciousness. It is clear that so long as the approach to reality or the knowledge process is conceived in these different ways, the ontological differences are bound to remain irreconcilable.

It might be noted that the theistic schools have resolved the problem of

1. *Ibid.*, III, 3, 1: वेदान्तद्वैतार्थे देवदेवो देवानामपि संभवः।

of conflicting Srutis by the method of simplification. By interpreting the Nirguṇa in the light of the Saguna they have, in effect, concluded that the former has no spiritual experience behind it as its basis. By insisting, as they do, that only that is reality which is revealed as an object in knowledge they deny validity to the experience of identity of knowledge and being. Śaṅkara alone accepts both types of experiences as a fact and tries to give place to both in his philosophy. His is a genuine logical attempt at reconciliation, however unsatisfactory it might seem to his rivals.

We should first examine in closer detail the exact position of the Saguna conception and its relation to Para Brahma, in Śaṅkara darśana. Limited as Śaṅkara was in his philosophic construction by the necessity of keeping within bounds of Śrutis he made the maximum use of the freedom which rules of exegetical interpretation allowed him. Keeping in mind the gradualism of spiritual development he felt justified in adopting the principle of levels of experience. It is conceded that the device of higher and lower knowledge is a powerful instrument to reduce Upaniṣadic thought to order, manifestly in greater harmony with its essential teachings than any other system, and choice must be in favour of Nirguṇa and Māyā doctrines implicit in the Upaniṣads.¹

Critics who take their stand on "serious theism" accuse Śaṅkara of intellectual sleight of hand in accepting a theism "stanchioned with a lie,"² because his Saguna Brahma is no more than a make-shift device to deceive the vulgar.³ What use is a theism, it is asked, which makes God but a degraded edition of reality,⁴ or offers "a pinch-beck deity" to the devotee.⁵ All such criticisms may be answered by pointing out that the theoretical position of Māyā-sābala Brahman has not prevented Advaitins, in practice, from taking their place among the most prominent theists. Nor can this be dismissed as mere inconsistency on their part, for they have admitted explicitly that meditation, worship and devotion need an object to sustain them. And any object in

1. The Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarākārya, trans. George Thibaut, Pt. I, p. ccxii.

2. Nicol Macnicol, Indian Theism from Vedic to Muhammadan Period, p. 99.

3. J. F. Plessin, Vedānta Vindicated, p. 64.

4. W. S. Urquhart, The Vedānta and Modern Thought, p. 153.

5. Lakshminar Shastri, An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy, p. 40.

the world, which stimulates man beyond the present limits of his knowledge, emotion and will, can be invoked, legitimately, as a symbol of Brahman. Sāṅkara has applied the term saguna to many different objects. It means Karya Brahma or avatāras or Hiranyagarbha or Isvara or all attributes such as sarvarasa and sarvagandha etc. or rājis who have attained Brahman or Puruṣa seen in the eye or the sun as Vaiśvānara, in short, sagunatva has different degrees of sociological and epistemological meaning and reality.¹ And it is a sound logical reason which does not attempt to imprison reality within a particular form.

The highest object of religious devotion is a perfect personality. Advaita analysis points out that "personality" cannot be predicated in the third stage of deep sleep but must be presumed to be latent. That category of thought arises from the self's sense of limitation by the activation of gross and subtle bodies in the states of waking and dreaming. The individuation of the Ātman in the manifested state invests both God and human self with personality in the above manner but also separates imperfect human personality from perfect Divine Personality. God is not to be thought of as merely an object or another finite self in contrast to the devotee, but the manifesting principle of the waking and dreaming world.² He is all wisdom, all power, all goodness and Vedānta finds all absolute, unlimited qualities in His nature.³ Therefore, there is no deliberate alliance with falsehood in conceiving the formless as formed; the finite mind can only picture the Absolute in the form of God; all perfections of creatorship, holiness and moral beauty are aspects of Sāṅkara's God, which fuses highest reality with deepest religious consciousness.⁴

The Advaita siddhānta is that Brahman is taught in two ways, as Nirguṇa and as Ananta-guṇa. The purpose of a definition is to help us to identify the object. The definitions of the object in its own nature, svarūpa lakṣaṇa, and extraneously in its accidental relation to other objects, taṭastha lakṣaṇa, both fulfil the purpose under limitation, because words only give indirect knowledge. All definitions limit but

1. V. H. Date, Vedānta Explained, II, 517.
2. vide Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha, pp. 10-12.
3. S. R. on B. S., II, 3, 7.
4. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 649.

point to the unconditional or nirviseṣa, otherwise the teaching of Brahma-jñāna is meaningless. If satya, jñāna, ānand give knowledge of swarupa, they constitute a definition, not vacyatayā or directly but lakṣyatayā or indirectly. The categories of substance and attribute carry duality into the indivisible essence of reality, therefore these are to be treated not as separable attributes, but as one with Brahman's substance. The three are not parts of reality, for in that case they would be mutually exclusive and give reality the nature of unity-in-difference. Therefore, the three without giving up their meaning in close proximity i. e., pure sat as pure cit, pure cit as pure ānand, indicate Brahman's nature by eliminating any thing alien from it, such as asat, ajñāna and dukha.¹

The definition of abhinnaimitiṭōpādāna makes reality the creator or Īśvara in the sense of adhiṣṭhāna of the world in the same manner as snake is superimposed on the rope. He is the Māyāvin who weilds power of cosmic Māyā to project world appearances, or the cause which diversifies or evolves names and forms without losing His identity. Attempts² have been made to show that Advaita cosmology makes pure Brahman the cause of the world: the swarūpa of Brahman is always the adhiṣṭhāna, therefore Brahman is perpetually present and operative as an inexhaustible source (pūrpa) behind the changes evolving from it and not a remote, solitary and abstract void. The effect being ananya from the cause it is nothing more than a form or shape the cause has assumed for its own manifestation. It is an error to consider Brahman as separate and unknowable. Another attempt³ to explain the world by Nirguṇa conception alone starts from Śaṅkara's definition of Brahman as nitya (unlimited by space and time), śuddha (unlimited by object), buddha (unlimited by Advidyā), mukta (free), sarvajña (omniscient) and sarva-śaktimān (omnipotent). This same Brahma is Īśvara, Paramēśvara, Paramātmā and mere use of other names does not make it different. All beings originate in Brahman, which has the above nature. The one non-dual is the ground of all and identical with self and all. Though Brahman transcends human thought and action in respect of its existence, nature and knowledge this does not make Him inactive, but He

1. Suresvara, Taittī. Upa., pp. 259, 260; cf., Pañcadaśī, II, 22, 23.

2. vide Shastri, op., cit., pp. 5ff.

3. vide Date, op. cit., II, 506, 508.

may of Himself act or think. His activity is self-luminous knowledge. Thinking, seeing (iksapa) is action. By tapas etc. the transcendent is linked with the immanent. Thus Śaṅkara rejects all proximate causes other than Nirguṇa as the cause. According to these interpretations it is wrong to think that Saguṇa alone can refer to the plural world, for Nirguṇa includes and goes beyond Saguṇa and stands in no need of extraneous help for productive activity.

It may be pointed out that Śaṅkara who has intuited reality as an identity of being and knowledge which admits of no action and change, who has also insisted on its indeterminability could not accept such attempts at derivation of the world from Nirguṇa Brahma. "If highest reality is beyond reason its activity is inexplicable, it is risky to deduce world from its nature Supreme spirit is infinite, creative and dynamic, from it nothing can be deduced."¹ The Absolute as cause can only be admitted as the all-inclusive locus of all different effects and in a relation of one-sided dependence or vivarta kāraṇa. It becomes the material cause only by the production of effects by Māyā-śakti and the efficient cause by association with the idea of personal creator since cause must be intelligent.² The post-Śaṅkarites were not violating the spirit of the Ācārya's siddhānta in elaborating, in different ways, the doctrine of Saguṇa Brahma as creator. Only the author of Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka takes the stand that Brahma or pure intelligence unqualified is the material cause³ and references to qualified Brahma should be understood in their secondary sense. But he too has to admit Māyā as dvāra-kāraṇa or intermediate, since unchanging Brahma cannot be the independent cause. In Padārtha-Tattva-Nirṇaya, Brahma or Māyāvin and Māyā are both material cause, from Brahma comes sattā, from Māyā jaḍatā.⁴ Māyā is actually transformed and Brahma is only the substrate of phenomena of Māyā. Vācaspati Mīśra says Māyā is the saḥakāṛī mātra of Brahma, which is the only material cause. Siddhānta-Muktāvalī makes Māyā alone the upādāna, while Brahma is called upādāna only because He is substratum of Māyā.⁵ Doctrine of Saguṇa Brahma is no unnecessary

1. P. T. Raju, Indian Idealism and Modern Challenge, pp. 76, 87.

2. P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 416.

3. Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha, p. 10.

4. *ibid.*, p. 12.

5. *ibid.*, p. 13.

importation into Advaita philosophy, either by oversight of Śaṅkara or excessive doctrinal zeal of his followers, but a necessary link in the Advaita chain of thought, which carries the inquiry from the lowest step where plurality alone is real, to the highest point where unity alone is real via the logical intermediary step of unity-in-difference. Having propounded the doctrine of Ātman-Brahman, Śaṅkara goes on to explain the teaching of world as verily Brahman. Nirguṇa appears as Saguṇa, non-creation as creation, transcendent Brahman as immanent due to operation of Māyā or the power by which manifestation is made possible.

In fairness to Śaṅkara, his distinction of higher and lower reality should not be taken in a wider sense than he intended. To him they are not existentially distinct gods, but contrasting aspects of one reality. He has condemned bheda dr̥ṣṭi¹ between Īśvara and Brahman.² Īśvara is an absolute emanation of Brahman and not merely relative to individual thinking,³ nor is He an appearance like that of the world. As wielder of Māyā-śakti He is vikāra-vartin, as dissociated He is triguṇātīta. The creative act does not make Brahman other than Itself. It remains identical (Advaita), inexhaustible (avyaya), infinite (pūrṇa) while it is creative. The Being who reveals Himself is no other than Brahman in a viśiṣṭa-rūpa. From the standpoint of Śaṅkara, the tendency to regard Brahman only in its causal form (vikāra-dharma) or to accept His nature in the universe (nāma-rūpa) as final is false. That conception of Īśvara is avidyātmaka which fails to safeguard the "Divine More" beyond the world or that in which immanence is reduced to finite world-process or that in which the inexhaustible is sought to be exhausted by some determinations, definitions and manifestations.⁴ Reality is to be conceived with or without reference to God but the difference in conception does not make Īśvara different from Brahman. The doctrine of non-difference of para and apara Brahma absolves Advaita of the charge of advocating an imaginary

1. S. B. on Taittī. Upa., II, 7.

2. cf., Madhvatīrtha, Māyā, pp. 6, 52: An analogy from science may be employed: just as apart from the human way of perceiving light is neither wave nor particle, so is the position in respect of Nirguṇa and Saguṇa. Just as it is difficult to see the position and motion of an electron at the same time similarly Brahman has both aspects but we cannot experience them simultaneously.

3. Only Siddhānta-Muktāvalī takes this extreme stand.

4. Śastry, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 45.

or unreal God.

Advaita finds it necessary to adopt the doctrine of the unknowability of essential nature or swarūpa. This is not so much to deny what is taught about the nature of Personal God as to seek the most complete knowledge of nature of reality. To stop short at the changeable aspect is a defect in the inquirer and not in the inquiry. Viveka is necessary between the real substratum and mutable qualities. Advaita worship of the Nirguṇa means that it is not unknowable. In so far as it can be taught only the method of negation is appropriate to it. Absolute indeterminism of the universal principle means that in the exposition of a purely metaphysical doctrine resort must be had to negative expression.¹ Man has the freedom to objectify reality but that supreme principle does not get really objectified, it remains pure consciousness, nevertheless. It cannot be summed up by empirical or objective categories which do, however, apply to it in an analogical sense. Negation of categories does not negate the Thing, but only a specific quality or form or condition or manner of its existence. Apavada or negation of adhyārōpa or the superimposed is an effective device for defining in all sciences and philosophies, and is equally essential in respect of reality. Unknowability, therefore, only means that knowledge of the Nirguṇa cannot be taught, but must be experienced as unity.

Samaṇvayavāda

Even amidst the greatest heat of philosophic debate the spirit of compromise never left Vedānta. The synthesising attitude tended to minimise the difference of extreme doctrines by modifying them. Adjustments were made within the Advaita siddhanta of Nirguṇa Brahman and as much of the opponent's view as could be accommodated consistently was incorporated. The principles of conciliation and synthesis of Vedic teachings were laid down early. The rules of exegesis were worked out by Karma-Mīmāṃsā to achieve the end of ekavākyatā. Later Bādarāyaṇa applied principles of systematisation to Jñāna-Kāṇḍa to achieve thought-unity or samaṇvaya.

All Ācāryas agree that the philosophy of Vedānta must be based on three grounds

1. René Guénon. Introduction to the Studies of Hindu Doctrines, p. 157.

acceptable to the modern mind. Philosophy must rest on reason more than on Śruti and pratyakṣa. Vedānta accepts inference as pramāṇa and inferential argumentations, tarka and yukti, according to agreed canons of logic are plentiful. However, examination of the huge dialectical literature shows that this means of attaining unity of thought has been fully tried out and exhausted in Vedānta. Refutation of siddhānta is met by counter-refutation in an endless debate. But validity of criticism of opponent's position depends entirely on soundness of the critic's own position. And no final agreement seems possible so long as fundamentally opposed epistemological doctrines are adopted by rival schools. Moreover, purely speculative differences cannot be reconciled merely by means of logical argumentation, except that any siddhānta might be established as a possible hypothesis. In regard to the ultimate reality all schools are forced to concede an element of mystery.¹

For five hundred years Vedānta was expounded as siddhānta based on the principle of the excluded middle, this has led to subtle dialectic, verbal disputations Therefore, method of siddhānta must change into the method of synthesis with a view to discover points of rapprochement among them.²

Different self-consistent Vedāntic systems have their historical individualities but nothing prevents them from adopting as many points of views as possible or regarding themselves as interrelated and complementary to one another.

The antithesis between the conception of reality as personal and impersonal is not impossible to reconcile. The chasm between them is unbridgeable only by pure reason or discursive thought but not by reason combined with intuitive experience. Darśana is such a combination of philosophical theory and religious practice.

Max-Müller is not right in saying that philosophy and religion must be rigidly separated. Philosophy without religion is like form without spirit and religion without philosophy is like spirit which cannot work without form. Salvation lies in a supreme combination of form and spirit.³

From the standpoint of spiritual aspiration, development and experience (anubhava), if not from the standpoint of Śruti and tarka, it is possible to adjust the truth of theism with the truth of absolutism. At the very peak of Advaitic thought Gauḍapāda admitted the highest harmony, avirecchā-yoga, avivāda-yoga, nirdvaandva-yoga,

1. P. T. Raju, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenge*, p. 76.
2. P. N. Srinivasachari, *A Synthetic View of Vedānta*, p. 108.
3. E. D. Banerjee, *Philosophical and Other Essays*, p. 177.

samatva-yoga.

Advaita does not conflict with dvaita which is the effect of ultimate reality and does not exist in swoon, sleep, trance and absence of mental activity. Dualists make it absolutely real, but Advaita is perceived by jnani. From the standpoint of the knower it is the very self of the dualist, hence there is no clash between non-duality and other views.¹

Advaita intuition finds no difficulty in admitting claims of rationalism or logic, sat-tarka, and of practical efficacy, vyavahāra. Śaṅkara has been accused of inconsistency when he adopts the standpoint of theism in refuting contemporary atheism and the standpoint of absolutism in refuting Vedāntic theism, but a more correct assessment would see in this a concretisation of the spirit of samatva-yoga. He gives due place to different facets of human experience and adopts different criteria to validate the truths of different levels of reality. Among his immediate followers Padmapāda reconciles realism and pluralism with Advaita.² Sarvajñātma Muni propounded the ladder-theory in respect of causality: ārambhavāda, pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda are the three steps over which thought passes in order to rise to the highest peak of Brahman.³ It fell to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī to formulate and to apply the principle of synthesis to different systems of religion and philosophy. He rounded off the ladder-theory in his principle of adhikāra-bheda or difference in fitness.⁴ The epistemology of Nyāya, the psychology and evolution of Sāṅkhya, the Yogic scheme of psychic discipline, the Mīmāṃsā theory of duty and the moral ideals of Jain and Bauddha darśanas unfold and find their completion in Advaita. And the Advaitic scheme of thought and discipline is to be reconciled with the various theistic Vedāntas through the device of treating the Saguṇa Brahma as intermediate purport, avātara tātparya, of Vedāntic texts and Nirguṇa Brahma as the ultimate purport.⁵

It is contended that neither practically, historically nor theoretically has samavayavāda any possibility of succeeding.⁶ While conceding the historical failure of attempts towards synthesis, it cannot be admitted that such attempts are either

1. S. B. on Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, III, 18.

2. Pañcapādikā, (Vixianagar series), p. 4: *अप्रानन्दा विषयानुभवः शिवात् वेत्ति शान्तं ततोः*
अप्रथमकालेऽप्यु जेतव्यात् पृथगिवावभासस्त

3. Saṅkṣepa Sāriraka, II, 61.

4. Prasthāna-Bheda, (Anandasrama series), p. 10.

5. Appaya Dīkṣita, Anand-Lehari, p. 33.

6. Shantinath, The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion, II, 1040-1043.

psychologically or philosophically illegitimate. Nor does success in this effort imply that all systems must accept philosophical defeat and be brought under the suzerainty of one ruling system as the crown of them all. Though philosophic debate in Indian philosophy was conducted in this spirit in the past this is not the only possible meaning or end of samanvaya. If we start from the premise that not only a single synthesis but several different types of syntheses are possible in the realm of thought, success in such attempts will be adjudged in terms of the numbers of points of view a system can make consistent with its central thesis i. e., the richness or comprehensiveness achieved. In this light, the attempts of classical Advaitins to accommodate other points of views and siddhāntas are neither irrelevant nor objectionable. Their motive was not so much the spirit of patronage as the spirit of harmony. That this is not an incorrect estimation can be proved even better by the examination of samanvayavāda in modern Vedānta.

Samanvaya in Neo-Vedānta

Undeterred by failure of past attempts at samanvaya of the siddhāntas relating to ultimate reality the Neo-Vedāntins tackle the problem in new forms. They call themselves Advaitins but each is an Advaitin in his own way. At one end of the spectrum is Vivekanand who keeps very close to the classical position, in the middle ranges are Gandhi and Tagore who use their freedom as non-technical, lay-philosophers to read their personalistic meaning into the Advaita reality, and at the other end are philosophers like Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo employing the great latitude allowed to systematisers of Vedānta to construct new systems of Advaita.

The point of departure in their thinking is the Absolute, as it has been conceived both in Vedānta and in western thought. Reality must be a unity which integrates all dualities of the experiential world. It must be infinite, unlimited and unconditional. Modern Vedāntic thought passes easily over certain antithetical characteristics of the Absolute which appeared as insurmountable barriers to earlier thought viz., the antitheses of immanence and transcendence, of all-comprehensive nature (saprapañca) and variety as appearance (vīṣṭrapañca), of difference

(Ihedabheda and Visistadvaita) and absence of difference (Advaita and Abheda), of absoluteness of time (parināma or evolution) and timelessness (vivarta).¹ The dilemma of ancient absolutism consisted in inability to reconcile the perfect completion of the Absolute with the imperfect incompleteness of the spatio-temporal world. If the attention is fixed on the latter the non-teleological endlessness of the evolutionary process presents one horn of the dilemma; if this is avoided by conceiving an ideal end which is in a certain sense an ever-accomplished reality that presents the opposite horn of an abstract, immutable Absolute wholly transcendent or dissociated from the time-process.² Logical thought rejects as impossible the assertion that reality in its complete conception is both change and changelessness. The Saguna siddhānta seems to explain the dynamic aspect of the world but not the transcendent, changeless or static character of reality, while the Nirguna siddhānta stresses the latter but does not seem to preserve the reality of the world and selves arising from it. Another aspect of the problem³ is that determination by any or all attributes is a limitation of the power and freedom of God; this conclusion of relativistic thought leaves it dissatisfied. On the other hand, indetermination makes reality transcend all positive qualities and, consequently, exclusive of finite forms and qualities. And reason also rejects as inconsistent the idea of origination of all these forms and qualities from the nothingness of indeterminate unity. Saguna Brahmavāda leads to the unacceptable conclusion of finite and imperfect God, while Nirguna Brahmavāda seems to lead to the inconsistency of "empty reality." To the Neo-Vedāntins this "impossible" of logical reason serves as a challenge. They are determined to reconcile the inescapable relativity of thought which points to the Saguna reality with the claims of partless, immediate experience of sleep and spiritual realization which points to the Nirguna reality.

All Neo-Vedāntins have broken out of the closed circles of historical schools. To remain within them would be only possible by further increasing the differences between Śaṅkara and the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins, which is not so essential in the modern

1. ~~See~~ Chandrasekhar, *The Philosophy of Integralism*, p. 86.

2. vide A. C. Mukerjee, *Self, Thought and Reality*, p. 384.

3. vide *ibid.*, pp. 389-390.

context as the task of synthesising them in a constructive way. They have implicitly and explicitly stated that it would be undesirable to retain the traditional syntheses and compositions which are partial in nature. It would be a profitless exercise of the type of *pista-pesana*. Moreover, it would be an impossible task to retain Vedantic *siddhantas* in their exact classical forms as new ideas and values pour in from every field of life, religious, metaphysical, moral, social and scientific. In a non-sectarian approach it is possible to take important truths from different schools of Vedānta as well as to utilise ideas drawn from western philosophy and science to arrive at an enriched system of Advaita, which can resolve many problems left unresolved by earlier Vedantas as well as innumerable new problems. Thus it is that Neo-Vedāntins are able to combine the categories of impersonality and personality, static and dynamic, transcendence and immanence in their Advaita reality in many-sided novel philosophies. They are unanimous in their reluctance to reject either the Nirguṇa or the Saṅguṇa conception outright, since both are expressions of real but different types of spiritual experiences.

The distinction and reality of both existent-consciousness, *svarūpe-jñāna* of Śaṅkara and attribute-consciousness, *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* of Rāmānuja, cosmic inwardness is known through our own inwardness. Thus *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is assimilated to *svarūpe-jñāna* through different types of spiritual discipline.¹

And the problem of philosophy of religion viz., reconciliation of the character of Absolute as eternally complete met in the highest spiritual experience of rest, fulfilment, eternity and completeness with the nature of God as self-determining principle in temporal development meeting the religious need for worship of all perfection,² is a challenge which fails to daunt the Vedāntic humanists of the present age. Whether as monists or dualists or holding some intermediate position, the starting point of their thought is the spiritual character of reality because absolute experience is of a super-personal and perfect self. With this is combined the idea of the reality of the objective world which is done by holding that individual objects and their relations are unreal only if they are conceived apart from reality. In other words, reality is thought of in its dual aspect of creative and non-creative. Though this

1. P. T. Raju, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenge*, p. 192.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, II, 649.

is the general position of all Neo-Vedantins the stress is different in their conceptions of reality. The following sections will show the reason for the reversal of the remarks of a modern writer:¹ the modern thinkers are perceptibly theistic and predominantly absolutistic.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand takes his stand on the many-sidedness of reality taught by Rama-krishna. It is wrong to think that God is only formless, I think He is with and without form. He may have many more aspects.² Kabir said: God with form is my mother, the formless my father. Whom shall I reject? Whom accept? Both pans of the balance are equally heavy. We do not have to make an irrevocable choice between the Nirguṇa and Saḡuṇa.³ They both lead to the same end. Through the cooling power of bhakti a part of reality takes the solid form of personal God and with the rise of the sun of jñāna it melts again into the formlessness of the Absolute. Through jñāna-yoga Nirguṇa is achieved, through bhakti-yoga Saḡuṇa. Nirguṇa and Saḡuṇa are non-different as negative and positive aspects of reality. Just as there cannot be butter without butter-milk so there cannot be negation without affirmation. As one accepts nitya-vibhūti so one must accept līla-vibhūti. One realizes nitya by negating līlā i. e., jñānī gives up identification with worldly things (neti, neti) and realizes Brahman. But one must affirm līla as a manifestation of nitya i. e., vijñānī sees that the same Brahman is Saḡuṇa, Bhagavān with six excellences and possessor of Māyā. Thus, reality is both impersonal and indivisible Sacchidānand and personal or embodiment of cit.

When I think of the supreme being as inactive, neither creating nor destroying nor preserving I call Him Brahman, when I think of Him as acting I call Him Sakti, Māyā. The distinction makes no ultimate difference. One cannot be conceived without the other, they are one.⁴

Vivekanand accepts the interpretation that two aspects of God are taught in Vedānta. The Dvaita conception leads to the Viśiṣṭādvaita and ends in the realization of jīva, jagat and Īśvara. Out of the old ideas of gods Vedānta discovers the idea of

1. Ram Shankar Srivastava, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 5.

2. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 215.

3. ibid., p. 1008.

4. ibid., p. 64.

the monotheistic God¹ who is worshipped under particular names and forms i. e., Vedānta considers each of the aspects as aspect of the one God. The dualistic phase makes God an extra-cosmic personality; the ruler of heaven and earth, eternally separated from but related to individual souls and nature, which are also separated and related to one another. Real Vedānta may be said to begin at the stage of qualified dualism. Religion goes beyond ritualism, ceremonialism, symbolism and worship of particular names and forms, from idea of God of nature to idea of God who is nature. The sense of separation ends as God is immanent in the cosmos in some mysterious relation of soul to body. The peculiarity of Vedānta is that even the personal God is personal-impersonal and beyond both. In the final stage there is a passage from the idea of God within the temple of the body to the idea that God is the temple itself, the very soul of man.² Non-dualism goes beyond relativity of soul, nature and creator into absolute oneness of spirit—the impersonal reality.

One may believe in an entirely personal God, another in a personal God who is not human, another in the impersonal. Yet all are believers. Only he who does not believe in a most marvellous infinite power can be denied the name of Hindu. Vast masses of the Indians are dualists. There are many wonderful things in the religion of the dualistic personal God apart from nature whose worship is very soothing, but it will become an opiate unless man rises higher.³ No hopes and aspirations of dualism need be lost in Advaita. Those who wish to retain the individual mind to enjoy the bliss of Saguna can strive for the triune vision of the one undifferentiated Brahman. And it is a fact that bhakti can only be directed towards the personal aspect. God if conceived must be anthropomorphic, for this is the only way for the human mind to know reality. It is nonsense to say that Īśvara is unreal because anthropomorphic. The personalistic idea covers all the ground covered by the world reality.⁴ Though it is inadequate still it is the only logical stage to the impersonal. Just as multiplicity of gods gave place to one God, God must give place to impersonality which includes all

1. Complete Works, II, 117.

2. *ibid.*, II, 128.

3. *ibid.*, II, 198.

4. *ibid.*, III, 70.

personalities and forms and is infinitely more.¹ It does not destroy but explains all of them. The peculiarity of our religion is to combine any amount of impersonal law (principle) with any amount of personality. But its fountainhead is perfect impersonality in Sruti, followed by personality in Smṛti and Purānas.

The logic of the impersonal rests on the authority of religion, philosophy and science. All religions make the tremendous statement that mind does transcend the limits of sense and powers of reasoning and carries us face to face with certain facts, which are very much more abstract than any facts of physical science. The higher the religion the purer are the universal abstractions it asks man to believe in and to realize. Impersonality is hinted at in the form of abstract presence, omnipresent being, abstract personality, moral law, abstract essence behind existence, ideal unity etc.²

The first principle of reasoning is to explain the particular by the general and that by the more general, until we arrive at the universal principle. If it be argued that personal God is the last generalisation of all, it cannot be admitted because positive qualities exclude something, therefore, we must go beyond it to impersonality. Philosophy discovers Existence as the most universal concept, Para Brahman of Advaita is such a last and highest generalisation of knowledge.³

Another scientific conception of knowledge is that explanation of a thing must come out of itself by evolution. A wholly extra-cosmic Deity or dualism cannot fulfil this criterion. The essence of matter and spirit in the universe is but the potentiality of spirit, "All this is He." Vedānta does not leave anything out of God i. e., the principle of interpretation is internal. But this holds good only if "God" is understood as the one secondless unity from which all is. The whole must be the impersonal within which are its manifestations, the various forms from lowest atoms to man, and to personal God who is the highest conception of intellect. All these particulars from man to God are only known through the highest generalisation.⁴ under which alone all

1. *Ibid.*, I, 332, 191, 217.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 61.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 368.

4. *Ibid.*, II, 377, 378.

contradictory categories can exist. Thus personal God is given a much better basis. While science asserts that all things are manifestations of one force the Vedāntin searching through mind (i. e., metaphysics and logic) came to Oneness, Essence of reality. The last word of Vedānta is one universe of which various readings exist: through the senses as matter, through intellect as souls, through spirit as God. All these are necessary stages in society, one does not deny but fulfils the other.¹ That oneness or impersonal God is the only rational religion for intellectual people.

It will be seen that Vivekanand's conception of reality does not deviate from the teachings of his master or from orthodox Advaita at any point. The difference is only in restatement in modern language, without pretence of throwing new light. Principles of logical thought and scientific knowledge are utilised to support the siddhānta of nirguṇa, nirviśeṣa, nisprapañca, nirākāra Brahman as ultimate. The status of the Saguṇa conception in his system, as in Śāṅkara darśana, is fixed at the highest point of vyavahāra. Īśvara's reality is as the reality of the world of which He is creator etc. But vyavahāra rests on and derives its meaning and value only from paramārtha. Sacchidānand is transcendental reality, conceived as immutable consciousness (cit) without relation with world, and reading of this reality as having attributes gives only taṭastha lakṣaṇa. His argument for reality of Īśvara fails to satisfy the critic whose demand is not for provisional reality but for absolute reality of God. Though Vivekanand does declare more emphatically than does traditional Advaita in favour of personality in God this concession has no great significance in the light of his denial of personality of ultimate reality. In the highest experience Personal Being would be absent, therefore, this cannot be said to be a reconciliation of absolutism with theism, in the proper sense of the term.²

Ramakrishna's teaching that one cannot think Brahman without Śakti, absolute without relative and vice-versa, and the connected teaching that both the jñānī following the path of jñāna-yoga and the vijñānī following the path of bhakti-yoga arrive at the same goal, provides the principle for accommodation of different

1. *Ibid.*, II, 253.

2. Srivastava, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

conceptions of Brahman. Vivekanand is merely following the principle of samanvaya in classical Advaita. The three Vedāntas gradually work the mind up to higher ideals till all merge in unity. We can understand this without text-torturing, religious dishonesty, grammatical twaddle by the marvellous doctrine of adhikāra-bheda. Aruṇḍhati nyaya is followed, and dualism (transcendence) and immanence are both discarded for unity. It is clear that Vivekanand relies more on anubhava than on Śruti or yukti to achieve his synthesis. Approach through Śruti is "text-torturing, grammatical twaddle." Assertion that category of unity is higher than transcendence or immanence does not serve as logic because the nature of that unity itself is in question. Sovereignty of Advaita is established by treating the doctrines of Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita as three phases in a single development. This is a corollary of the more comprehensive doctrine that one and many are one reality, perceived in different attitudes by different minds. From this follows that all modes of worship, work, creation are paths to realization. Practice of Advaita sādhanā gives scope for cosmic-realistic aspects of vyavahāra (dualism) and ethico-religious methods of Brahma-jñāna (all forms of dualism-monism).¹ Starting at whatever point of discipline, jñāna or karma or bhakti, all Vedāntins insist on developing the burning desire for God or Infinite i. e., muktigutva as the qualification for liberation. Vivekanand seizes upon this and makes it the basis of a practical samanvaya between Vedāntic darśanas, but his intellectual synthesis is not so well sustained by epistemological and logical arguments as in post-Śaṅkarite Vedānta.

Gandhi

Gandhi's Vaiṣṇava background was the major determining factor of his philosophy of religion. Features of bhakti-mārga such as piety, love and devotion to a personal God; methods of worship such as Rāma-nama, hymns, prayer and complete self-surrender to God's will; a predominantly moral attitude to the world which insists that the only approach to God is through love or non-violence expressed in the form of selfless service, seem to point to the conclusion of theism. Often he describes God as concrete

1. P. N. Srinivasachari, A Synthetic View of Vedānta, p. 96.

Person, benevolent creator, moral governor, merciful, inner voice or conscience.

On the other hand, he declares that God is without form. Since man hankers after symbols he worships the formless through form, the infinite through symbols.¹ Formulation of the formless in imagination and in stone for prayer is not forbidden for those who need it, but his preference is for worship of the formless. Moreover, the Rāma he worships is not the historical Rāma, the son of Daśaratha. The personalistic conception of God's descent to earth in human form is a partial truth for all men are incarnations or embodiments of divine principle. Rāma is no other than the eternal, unborn one without a second. As to how this could be possible, the answer has been given by Tulsidas.² Man seeks to derive benefit and shelter and this need of the human heart transforms the nirākāra into the sākāra. But the meaning of personal God or human Rāma is to be expanded into the vision of the Omnipresent.

Gandhi denies that God can be described. But he goes on to give descriptions: God is truth, love, ethics, fearlessness, source of light and life. He is conscience. He is patient, He is terrible. He is greatest democrat, He is greatest tyrant,³ Creator of good and evil, supreme good. With the theists he makes God the perfection of human virtues and excellences, but adds that such characterisations are but "our own feelings, which are weak . . . the babblings of imperfect man."⁴ All predication is limitation, therefore, he adopts the familiar method of negation to exhaust all possible attributes as inadequate. The Supreme is beyond being and non-being, all attributes, definitions and descriptions. We cannot know God, He is undefinable, transcending speech and mind. Reality cannot be reasoned. It is beyond all dualities of truth-untruth, good-evil, light-shade, violence-non-violence.

God is not known but He is experienced. We feel God as all-pervading living presence,⁵ the changeless power behind the changing all, upholding all. The unceasing movement of sun, moon, earth etc. signifies God in action. God as force is pure and undefiled consciousness, (cit). He is the idea or Law of the universe, not the maker

1. The Unseen Power, p. 99.

2. Hindu Dharma, p. 134.

3. Young India, October 11, 1928.

4. Chandra Shankar Shukla, Conversations With Gandhi, p. 27.

5. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kiplani, p. 86.

of Law, but Law itself. Law and Law-giver are one.¹ Law is also Truth. From among the many definitions of reality, Gandhi finally came to Truth as the completest. Satya is derived from sat. God is purest essence, simply Is to men of faith. "Is" is not an attribute of God but it is God itself. That Truth is the essence of Godhead is brought out in Gandhi's transition of thought from the conception of "God is Truth" to "Truth is God."²

In the final analysis, Gandhi must be judged to be an Advaitin, though in a very unclassical sense. He has expressly denied form, qualities and personality to God. It is argued that if self-consciousness plus will constitute personality then Gandhi is a personalist.³ But if these attributes are deduced from his emphasis on an intelligent law governing the universe or a living presence pervading the universe, it must be remembered that he identifies the Law and the Law-giver. This same Law is pure cit and pure sat. The essence is non-different from the Divinity. God is the only truth and all else is Māyā. Since nothing persists, therefore, we are not, God only is. All are but parts of that Truth the sum total of which is unknowable and indescribable. If it is argued that God is personal because He is accessible to man in closed relation of spirit, indwelling in the inner recess,⁴ this cannot be admitted because Advaita admission of unknowability by the mind is also a prelude to intuition ("feeling") of God as the unity of spirit in man i. e., Nirguṇa.

Gandhi passes easily from the personal to the impersonal standpoint and vice-versa. His non-sectarian and non-academic approach to reality gives rise to different interpretations. It causes certain scholars to judge him as a pure personalist and others to judge him as a pure impersonalist. The prima facie conclusion must be that he wishes to retain both positions. God is both name and nameless, form and formless, speech and speechless.⁵ He sees no contradiction between the two aspects of God. God can be both transcendent and immanent, static and dynamic. Morally, the paradox can be explained thus: He is in the hearts of all His worshippers, but not in them who

1. Nirnal Kumar Bose, Selections from Gandhi, p. 6.

2. vide Hindu Dharma, p. 66.

3. Dharendra Mohan Datta, The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 24-27.

4. vide Chandra Shankar Shukla, Gandhi's View of Life, p. 43.

5. Hindu Dharma, p. 66.

deny Him.¹ By using the terms Dvaita and Advaita in a general, non-technical way, far different from their meaning in classical Vedānta, he combines descriptions and definitions of Saguna and Nirguṇa in one, and insists that the impersonal can be the creator, while the creator is not the creator at all. It is incorrect to say that God being impersonal is not likely to perform physical activity. God's action is the operation of nature and He needs no form or body to act. The power of God lies in this mystery that though ever in action He is free from action. Creation and all beings lie in Him, but He transcends; really is not the author of it all; hence beings are not in Him. The paradox is explicable only if reality is of the nature of personal God as well as of impersonal Brahman.

Reality is inner oneness, which pervades all life and being, but at the level of experience there is duality. In God there is no duality but at empirical level we get two forms (God and matter, Īśvara and Prakṛti), called by different terms in religions.² He has no logical explanation to offer as to the relation of the two and admits its mysteriousness. Māyāvāda is implicit throughout his conception of reality. God is phenomenally real and the Absolute is noumenally real. However, since he draws no distinction of phenomenal and noumenal, Īśvara and Brahman, para and apara reality, but uses the term "God" for both indifferently, logically speaking, he fails to reconcile absolutism with theism. Yet, he is able to harmonise the two in his personality and life i. e., it is a practical balance if not a logical synthesis. He thinks of God as impersonal but worships Him as personal i. e., head and intellect incline to the Nirguṇa, but heart-emotion-will to the Saguna.

Tagore

Tagore's approach to reality is an integral approach in which God is not abstracted from the world. The positive and immanent rather than the negative and transcendental view of the Upaniṣads influences his conception of reality powerfully. The world does have an impersonal aspect: the question of origin of existence is asked in cosmic philosophy as well as in science. Impersonal scientific law discovers the

1. Mahadev Desai, *The Gītā According to Gandhi*, p. 267.

2. Chandra Shekhar Shukla, *Conversations with Gandhi*, p. 37.

unbounded cosmic activity of spirit, but this cannot serve as God.¹ Experience of this transcendental consciousness is valuable as a great psychological experience but the metaphysical formulation of ideal perfection in its unchangeable nature is the unknowable Brahman, which leaves personal man in a void. In India, some try to merge personal self into impersonal entity, without quality or definition—all activities end, the mind is a blank, without distinction of this and that, good and evil, beauty and ugliness; an ineffable blissfulness in eternal solitude of its consciousness.² Those who thus sail for the further shore of existence across humanity, and interpret Brahman as absolute truth and impersonal are not to be envied. The rational and scientific mind simplifies things into the principle of oneness (monism), which too passive and unrelated-to-self-and-nature principle of unification makes both nothing i. e., the impersonal is destructive of individuality, world-objects and relations.

When Tagore's mind is overcome by the glory of the Absolute he too tends to merge the finites in the infinite Absolute. He avoids the description of the indescribable, which, though manifesting in forms, is itself formless, or describes the Absolute in terms of the negative theology of Śaṅkara: "When a blind man asks for description of light we are driven to say that it is neither sound, taste, form nor weight."³ But, in general, his settled conviction is that negative philosophy fails to give an adequate account of the non-empirical character of reality, and the Absolute must be regarded as related to finites, not as all-exclusive, but as all-comprehensive.

The impersonal does not satisfy the religious and the aesthetic sense. For the artist the manifest form is more real than the original state of indefiniteness and religion seeks the highest value of existence in self.⁴ The impersonal may be the scientific and metaphysical truth but as a poet and as Human he can have anything to

1. *The Religion of Man*, pp. 63, 107; cf., William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 489, 492: Science separates private and cosmic aspects and dwells in the universal and impersonal. But as long as we dwell in the cosmic and general we deal only with symbols of reality, private-personal phenomena are realities in a complete sense. Impersonality is not true but the personal or religious sphere is the true one. Compared with this world's living, individualised feelings the world of general objects which the intellect (science) contemplates is without solidarity of life.

2. *The Religion of Man*, pp. 117, 190.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Intro., p. xi

4. *The Religion of Man*, p. 107.

do with it only when it is humanised. Anthropomorphism is unavoidable, for man cannot but be man. Since the phenomenal world is comprehended by the human self it must believe in a "Soul of universe."¹ Man's personality encroaches on everything, tries to transform everything which it has to the human. Founders of great religions represent a truth, not cosmic and unmoral, but human and good. The world of facts hides the human quality (Ideal Man, Man the Eternal) i. e., Divine, the perfection of which through love relation is salvation.²

Religion must be devotion to God in love, therefore dualism is ultimate. Dualistic philosophy rightly seeks to supplement impersonal with the personal Īvara. A Supreme Person must be the goal of personal religion. Reality is Personality acting upon personalities through incessant manifestations and world is mere deception unless it is a gift of Soul to soul. Goodness and morality are "appearances" unless reinforced by energy of Immortal Puruṣa within our soul.³ Our courage, fortitude, love, honour could not make us more, were not the Infinite a sum total of these. Man's communion with the Infinite leads to a personal reality possessing all moral attributes of wisdom, justice, holiness and all metaphysical attributes of unity, eternity and omnipotence. Religion is apprehension of moral nature i. e., Humanity of God.

God is the highest and best that man strives for but never attains—ideal perfection in its aspect as real moving to perfection is Supreme Person or Infinite Essence and the same is finite in manifestation.⁴ Determination is not limitation nor is personality a limiting concept. In relation to God it means infinitude and not finitude. It is universal personality as against the individual personality of man. Creation by and out of this Supreme Personality is comparable to artistic creation. This personality is self-conscious and absolutely free self-determination of God, who transcends His manifestations of nature and selves. Limitation on Him to create separate nature and selves are set by Himself for joy of play.

The final stand of Tagore is on the personalistic conception. His temperamental

1. Personality, p. 23.
2. The Religion of Man, p. 70.
3. Man, p. 36.
4. The Religion of Man, p. 107.

opposition to puritanism, asceticism and impersonal absolutism and his emphasis on the Upanisadic teaching of finites as created by and out of Infinite by its endless joy of love points to theism in religion. In philosophy, his bent is towards concrete idealism, a transcendental unity of finite selves and objects. The whole is in and through parts. An organic relation arises and exists as the finite and Infinite are objects of love for each other. Since the love relation can only exist between one self and another, there is no scope for reality to have even a tinge of the impersonal about it. As to the form in which personality pertains to the Absolute, Tagore's stand is something between the conception of personality as a quality included in reality or impersonal Absolute, and personality as a predicate of the whole nature of God. The Supreme Person, the Eternal or Ideal Man has infinite powers, ethical and metaphysical, as His attributes. But within His nature are innumerable imperfect personalities i. e., God is personal and also transcends the personal. But this transcendence is not to be confused with impersonality. Nirguṇa cannot be the love object of man. The Supreme Person he calls Advaita in the sense in which the Vaiṣṇava Vedantins also talk of Saṅgṇa Brahman as Advaita—the highest and incomparable object of devotional love or bhakti endowed with all perfect attributes in their highest degree.

It should be noted that Tagore's conception of the real as a concrete universal or unity manifesting itself in and through finites is open to all the objections against the positions of Bhedābheda or Viśiṣṭādvaita: the Absolute must become subject to imperfections of its parts. Moreover, the difficulty of limitation of the qualified reality remains; his "Infinite Personality" is too dependant on its love-relation with the finite personality of man for it to be able to escape the imperfections admittedly characterizing the latter.

Tagore's adherence to personal God is not logical but emotional and moral ("human"). "We can trust the mind which becomes intensely conscious of all-pervading personality answering to the personality of man."¹ He takes the conception of the Bhakta kavis and Baul singers as definitive. The major argument is that from the standpoint of utility for life i. e., morality, the idea of human God is superior to

1. *ibid.*, p. 102.

that of the impersonal Absolute. Fulfilment of human ideals of knowledge, love, strength is excluded from Nirguna and only possible in the Saguna which is a union of all perfected qualities. Clearly, that dictum of Hume has no meaning for Tagore that no method of reasoning is more blamable than to refute a hypothesis on the pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality.¹ The issue of Saguna versus Nirguna in classical Vedanta was not only, or even mainly, fought on the ground of the morally elevating or satisfying-to-human-impulses effect of either conception. The schools took their stand on logical and epistemological arguments supported by Sruti to establish their respective ontological siddhāntas. In short, they proceeded on the basis of pure reason supplemented by practical reason, whereas Tagore proceeds on the basis of practical reason unsupported by pure reason, to establish personalistic theism.

Tagore seems to suffer more from the dilemma of mysticism than did the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins. God is all i. e., manifested in the universe, and God is nothing i. e., abstract formless unity, inscrutable.² The emphasis on the Saguna is not so clear cut as to negate the Nirguna altogether, as is the case in earlier Vedānta. It will not do to deny the impersonal aspect.³ This does not imply any confusion or uncertainty on the part of Tagore, but the inevitability of the admission of a special type of spiritual experience viz., absolute identity of pure consciousness, as a fact. In this he makes an advance on the earlier theists who had thought it necessary to deny the very existence of that experience in order to establish their own positions. But here Tagore's progress stops, for, instead of going on to examine the relation of the two experiences of reality as object and reality as unity or attempting to synthesise the two, he simplifies matters by leaving the Nirguna altogether out of the scope of his inquiry. His distinction of the impersonal truth of philosophy and science on the one hand, and personal truth of religion on the other, is wholly arbitrary, against the whole spirit of Indian philosophy and even unwarranted by his own position: truth, power and beauty lie in that which does not debar realization of philosophical ideas.⁴

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 14.

2. *Gitanjali*, 67, 95.

3. *The Religion of Man*, p. 19.

4. *Personality*, p. 25.

This means that personality does not exhaust the nature of reality i. e., apart from his personal relation to man God is something more. Absence of denial of the Nirguna reality can produce no significant advance in his philosophy over the Vaiṣṇava position as long as he continues to insist that man can only understand or take an interest in the Absolute when it is in its humanised form in religion. Either Tagore must take his position wholly alongside of the Vaiṣṇavas and deny experience of "unbounded cosmic spirit" altogether or he must accept the Advaitin's contention that "the great psychological experience of transcendental consciousness" is a spiritual experience and examine it as such. The spirit of philosophic inquiry does not allow that he may admit the experience of another but deny it the quality claimed by it unless he has examined all the grounds on which it rests. "He does not seem to have any logical objection to the impersonal Advaita."¹ He has side-stepped rather than squarely faced the issue of Saguna versus the Nirguna conception of reality.

In the light of the above, his attempt at synthesis is philosophically ineffective. From the artificial division of "intellectual truth" of science and metaphysics and "human or moral truth" of religion it follows that, for Tagore, Saguna or personal God is the primary aspect and the Nirguna or the Absolute is the secondary aspect of reality, though how the one passes into the other is not explained. He declares that the contradiction between them is only apparent, intellectual duality is negative, for "discussions about quality remain at level of speculation only . . . do not touch God Himself."² In religion, poetical intuition and all-comprehending love there is no problem. "Only in love unity and duality are not at variance."³ "In love 'yea' and 'nay' are held together. Love has nirguna at one end and saguna at the other."⁴ Thus Tagore reconciles the negative and positive, the Nirguna and Saguna by the logic of emotion and not by the logic of reason.

Aurobindo

Aurobindo takes the stand that in an ultimate analysis of the "Opulent Absolute"

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1. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 324.
 2. "Śaṅkṛjāya," *Shantiniketan*.
 3. *S...* p. 114.
 4. "Śaṅkṛjāya," *loc. cit.*

all views of it must be taken into account. The Upaniṣads declare it to be the ineffable, yet they describe it positively, "iti, iti" or the different emergent qualities of the world, and negatively, "neti, neti" or beyond all the qualities. The second is the Para Brahma of Śaṅkara. It is an improvement on the first or the Saguna Brahma of the theists because the unmediated and unconditional is the logical prius, and Śaṅkara is right in asserting that the transcendental poise of spirit is not dependent on world-appearance but is eternally perfect. The Nirguṇa cannot be described by different attributes but its existence is its very consciousness and that consciousness is and itself. It follows that all dualism of knowledge, emotion and will, in short, personality, is the limitation or reflection of unobjective self-luminous consciousness on the mirror of Māyā-Avidyā. But Māyāvāda gives an incomplete theory of the Absolute by failing to explain rationally the relation of this ignorance to Brahman.¹ And all opposition of qualities and categories, in short, plurality, being relative to Avidyā, unreality of Īvara, jīva and jagat leads to the practical consequence of life and world negation. Śaṅkara must retain the emphasis on absolute freedom and pure transcendence in its deepest essence, but must abandon the theory of its powerlessness (static and abstract) for any real kind of self-determination (dynamic).

The Absolute is beyond causation but creatorship is real: just as a particular quality or relation may be present in a man but he is also something more than it, so the Absolute is creator and more than creator. Relational qualities are imperfect but not unreal. The world may not be experienced at the transcendental plane, but it is not, therefore, cancelled on its own plane. Were there such an opposition between the Absolute and the world, the Absolute would be limited by it and the secondless nature would be contradicted. Rāmānuja and all other Vaiṣṇavas are right in holding reality to be capable of, as well as actually manifesting itself in world forms. But in asserting the reality with form and quality they wrongly deny the supra-cosmic silence of spirit (Nirguṇa) which is experienced as pure undifferentiated consciousness of mysticism. From the metaphysical angle this denial means that the creator cannot be transcendent, but is dependent upon soul and matter (material cause) to create the

L. ... rīdas Ghandhari, *The Philosophy of Integralism*, pp. 102, 104, 106.

world. But from the religious-emotional angle of life the object of worship must be thought as perfection of all qualities i. e., as a transcendent other. And apart from this contradiction, to ignore or to subordinate the Nirguna means that spiritual realization fails to attain its highest peak. Religions have a tendency to regard God exclusively as extra-cosmic being apart from creation. Mystics discover the divine ground of nature, the pure being beyond cosmos. The former is conceived as the all-sustaining cosmic principle of unity. The latter is unknowable by intellect but apprehended by mystic experience of identity. But beyond man-imagined personal aspect, as well as beyond mystic-imagined impersonal vision of the Supreme is its pure divine nature-in-itself.¹

The Absolute is not a differenceless unity, but an ineffable multiposited unity of which unity-beyond-diversity of Śaṅkara and unity-in-diversity of Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins, the non-relational purity and the relational playfulness are two equally real poises. Neither Nirguṇa nor Saḡuṇa, nor both exhaust the Para Brahma, it goes beyond both into unfathomable mystery.² Therefore, in the absolutely transcendent nature of the Absolute, creativity expresses some imperative truth or mystically latent power of self-determination. Its purpose is not to add anything to the self-complete reality. Reality is not creative in order to fulfil or to satisfy any need, but expresses itself freely as in sportive or creative activity. The eternally self-realized being of infinite bliss includes the delight of immutable being of self-subsistence as well as mutable becoming. Force inherent in pure Existence may be at rest or in motion. Self-concentration of consciousness (Being) is stasis; its self-diffusion (Becoming) is motion. The Infinite is both spaceless and timeless i. e., transcendent and also illimitable self-extension in space and time³ i. e., indivisibly present in distributed and divided manifold. One possibility of infinite consciousness is self-absorption (not as knowledge and not as all knowledge), and another possibility is its operative choice in its power as self-limitation, expressing itself in the infinitesimal and vast forms: the Ātman or self of animals, man, energy of nature, the Puruṣa or cosmic being,

1. Nathaniel Pearson, Sri Aurebindo and the Soul Quest of Man, pp. 60-62.

2. Ghosidhari, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

3. The Life Divine, II, 58.

consciousness itself and Isvara, the omniscient divine ruler of the space-time world. Thus Brahman contains within it all relativity as forms-movements but not as mutually exclusive truths. His movement is between diversification of one and unification of the many.

The two poles of the Absolute are not split asunder in the supra-mental consciousness. Knowledge by identity is the central theory, one example of which is awareness of our own existence; and by extension of this faculty we experience truths forming the content of Brahman in the universe. It is possible to have the spiritual realization of one aspect only, but in integral experience antinomies do not exist. All powers of reality are held in harmonised play of one Existence at level of Super-mind, but at the level of over-mind each receives a separate basis of action. The Nirguṇa arrives at the absolute, ineffable last word of Existence and the Saguna at divine omnipresent Godhead, transcendent and universal. But even at the level of over-mind the purely impersonal sat-cit is seen as as true as the purely personal. Each can be a subordinate mode of the other, coexistent, correlative, complementary to the over-mind. The logical priority of the indeterminable of Vedānta to the creative principle does not make the latter metaphysically inferior or unreal.¹

The relation of Nirguṇa and Saguna, static and dynamic, Śiva and Śakti is incapable of logical formulation. Categories of substance and attribute, cause and effect, whole and part are inapplicable. It is a riddle to finite reason to which indetermination means being devoid of all determinations and incapacity for manifesting them. Oneness is understood in mathematical terms as a limiting finite unit which cannot be other than itself without losing its essential nature. Finite logic declares that reality must be either static, immutable, unmoving or limitless becoming and motion i. e., it must be either finite or infinite. But these seemingly

1. cf., Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, pp. 48, 49: Form is basic means of complete manifestation. Even if logically the formless precedes it, yet form must be inherent in mystic latency, otherwise how could it be manifested. Mind may conceive absolute as negation of its concepts, but cannot tell what is at the basis of manifestation or why it occurs. The Vaiṣṇavas do not accept the original truth of the Divine, therefore it is not rigidly impossible that what we perceive or conceive as spatial form may correspond to some power of spaceless absolute. I am only pointing out that the Vaiṣṇava position on its own ground is far from being metaphysically or logically untenable.

contradictory positions of reason are maintained by the over-mind equally as the truths of some original indeterminable mystery. As sole reality it must have some power from which all determinations come. Intellect may hold Nirguna and Saguna as opposites but to the absolute reason they are interrelated. Our difficulty must not be translated into original impossibility for the Absolute to manifest.¹ By remembering that negatives (neti, neti) and positives (iti, iti) are statements of our consciousness² we may accept that the Absolute cannot be bound to the law of contradiction or badha, which holds for partial and practical truth, thinking clearly and acting. The "impossible" of the lower (finite reason) becomes the possible and the actual of higher reason. Absolute's oneness is no longer exclusive of the other but contains the hundred, thousand, million, billion and trillion. Its formlessness is not incapacity for having forms but transcendence of forms while expressing itself in infinite forms. It is personal because indivisibly present in every person and impersonal because not limited to any one; or personal because it is experienced as having many spiritual attributes and impersonal because the attributes are inadequate to express the ineffable essence. It is transcendent of creation, as well as immanent in all manifestations as creator and inner controller. Its changelessness means that it is not bound by or exhausted by change. It is indeterminate not as being dissociated from the variegated world which becomes illusory, but, paradoxically, as the indeterminable source of all determinations i. e., as absolutely free from limitation by its own determinations and all conceptual formulations.³

It will be seen that in his Integral Advaitism Aurobindo's method for reconciling the conceptions of Saguna and Nirguna follows the Spinozistic method for solution of the problem of dualism. Spinoza reduced Descartes' two ultimate substances to the status of two attributes of one Absolute substance and thus sought to overcome their antithesis. Aurobindo reduces the conceptions of Śaṅkara and the theists from the level of final accounts of the Absolute in its essential nature to the level of

1. *The Life Divine*, II, 101.

2. *ibid.*, II, 102; cf., *Vedānta Deśika, Śatadūṣaṇī*, vāda 24: Nirguṇa is also a quality only it is negative. Both negative and positive qualifications must be declared equally objectionable or equally true.

3. *The Life Divine*, II, 38.

two aspects (poises) of the creative principle; Sacchidānand is the Absolute in its absoluteness, the indeterminable and the unconditional. This transcendental aspect is three-fourths of reality. Its immanental aspect is the Supermind manifesting some of the infinite possibilities of the Sacchidānand, by selecting of some and withholding of others by its consciousness-force. Īśvara is not the personal God of popular religion, which is but a limited representation of Isvara; it is not the active and Saguna Brahman of the Vaiṣṇavas which is but one side of Īśvara, the Nirguṇa is another aspect of Him. The Pantheos (intra-cosmic) and the Divine transcendence (supra-cosmic) are both aspects of Īśvara. Only mental reasoning confuses personal and impersonal. Person stands behind personalities and even the impersonal is the power of the personal, therefore, not to be confused with either the ego or the Divine Person like the human error¹ i. e., the Supreme Personality transcends limitations of both qualification or attributes and non-qualification or attributelessness. In short, Aurobindo's solution consists in not breaking up reality into parts, but of treating Sacchidānand as both impersonal-personal, as inseparably Brahman and Śakti, which, according to him, overcomes the difficulty of the abstract monism of Advaita as well as the difficulty of unreality (Māyā) of force.

It may be noted that just as Spinoza could not escape the necessity of explaining how there could be two or infinite attributes of the substance and the necessity of relating the two, so also Aurobindo cannot escape the necessity of showing the relation of stasis (Śiva) and dynamis (Śakti), Saguna and Nirguṇa attributes of reality. Parallelism was the answer of Spinoza and simultaneity, coexistence of the transcendent-static and immanent-dynamic is the answer of Aurobindo. He is forced, however, to admit that this position cannot be rationally explained, it is a riddle to intellect. He maintains this position, therefore, by a kind of philosophical tour de force. An appeal to higher logic is made in order to overcome this "abyss of human reason." The logic of the Infinite negates the law of contradiction where the nature of the Absolute is concerned. A higher supra-logical experience gives us the real as a multipoised unity. But logically speaking, this category is not different from the

L. ibid., 1, 9.

category of unity-in-difference and suffers from the same dilemma. The problem of Advaita is this: if the many are "really real" they cannot be reconciled with the transcendent-status; specifically, it means that the Saguna is a second reality and Nirguna is degraded. Or if synthesis is possible then the Saguna loses its quality and becomes indistinguishable from the One. Śaṅkara maintained the law of contradiction even at the level of reality and concluded the transcendent Brahman as unrelated with the finite; an analysis of dualistic knowledge showing how the Absolute and the relative may be understood as discontinuous. But Māyā-Avidyā does not contradict sole reality of Brahman, since it vanishes at Brahma-jñāna. Aurobindo argues that no principle of illusion or relative reality is needed to harmonise the static and dynamic aspects of reality. Śaṅkara's solution of intuition of absolute transcendence and intellectual (dualistic) conviction of world as product of Īśvara and His Śakti of vyāvahārika sṛṣṭi, which is non-existent in Brahman, will not do. Since Īśvara is himself phenomenon of Brahman, real only as regards world, He is rather ambiguous and exists no longer with the ceasing of Māyā. He must be made real, transcendent to cosmos, which must be a real manifestation of His truth. But inspite of this criticism, when we turn to Aurobindo's own thesis we find that he does not so much untie the gordian knot as cuts it. Instead of offering a logical substitute for Māyāvāda to reconcile transcendence and immanence the logic of the Infinite negates the law of contradiction or the dilemma itself. This would not be wholly objectionable were he to work out the laws of higher logic to prove their compatibility with the laws of human logic. He does maintain that the intuition of integral or multi-poised unity though beyond intellect is not opposed to it. But the onus of proving this rests on him. He insists that though the logic of the Infinite appears like magic to human reason that reason can conceive it by getting rid of its own abstract nature. Were this not possible philosophy would be, forever, condemned to remain at the position of agnosticism. As scientific intellect has discovered the laws of nature—it is not logically impossible to concede that the Divine has its own law of functioning. As the Infinite's reason is a "logic" it means that it is not absolutely unknowable, but can be grasped by raising our level of consciousness to the supra-mental level.

And applying that logic to the two aspects of reality Aurobindo argues that even if we cannot apprehend that relation we have no warrant for accepting one and rejecting the other. No aspect of reality can be called unreal to make it harmonious with laws of our own thought. Reality does not follow reason, but reason must follow reality.¹

It will be seen that Aurobindo's argument of higher logic seeks to go beyond the present dimension of philosophy and logic into the realm of supra-human experience. This reopens the issue of two different levels of being and consciousness which Aurobindo rejected in his criticism of Śaṅkara's distinction of "relative reality" and "really real reality." The objection against Śaṅkara is that it is a mistake to explain the status of the world from the standpoint of Advaita. The explanation is to be given by reason to reason and not by the Absolute to us.² This objection may cogently be extended to Aurobindo in respect of his conception of reality. To the mind of lower reason the assertions of "Infinite Logic" must continue to appear like the answers of the Absolute to human problems.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan agrees with Śaṅkara that reality in its essential nature must be Nirguṇa, because the very process of logical thinking forces us to transcend finitude to reach the reality beyond subjectivity and predication. Intellect conveys contrary notions which are merely abstractions and the addition of some or all of such intellectual abstractions cannot comprehend the completeness (pūrṇatva) of reality. Only thought-as-such can serve as its nature, svarūpa. Therefore, identity of being and knowledge is the logical prius of intellectual thinking. The logic of Śaṅkara in regard to Nirguṇa Brahman is perfectly sound, but he goes wrong in over-stressing the transcendent, all-exclusive, niṣprapañca, at the cost of immanent, all-inclusive, saprapañca aspect of pure subjectivity, with the result that his position begins to verge on the philosophy of pure negation. His Vedāntic opponents find the secondless Brahman not materially different from the indescribable Śūnya of the Bauddhas.

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1. Rām Shankar Miśra in *The Integral Advaitism of Sri Aurobindo*, pp. 375-379, seeks to establish the possibility of logic of the Infinite and shows how its laws will transcend the purely formal laws of contradiction and excluded middle.
 2. P. T. Raju, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenge*, p. 88.

God or Absolute he (Sankara) cannot give up as a Vedantin, but when with the Buddhists he admits that the finite is illusory, his Absolute becomes something in which all is lost and nothing is found again . . . ; there is no denying that the positive method Sankara intends to pursue as a Vedantin and the negative method he does sometimes pursue as an interpreter of Buddhism ends in conflict and contradiction.¹

Radhakrishnan cannot but concede the justness of the criticism that the psychological effects of Sankara's static, qualitless, relationless Brahman are destruction of finite individuality, loss of interest in an illusory objective world and inactivity in pursuit of concrete ends and values.

The Absolute is transcendent of space, time, name and form i. e., pre-cosmic. That impersonal cannot act, nor can the infinite-limitless admit the limitation of a cosmic environment in which to operate. Therefore, it is pure, unmanifested calm. But, whereas Sankara understands transcendence to mean contentlessness of the Absolute and its inability to express itself, this transcendent Existence is capable of immanence. It is no contentless void, but being and activity, truth and force,² not a static but an active universal consciousness. Its staticness does not mean being locked in its own transcendence, but remaining transcendent (static) while realizing itself (dynamic) in cosmic processes. In the same way the Divine is formless yet capable of manifesting all forms. The mystery of creation is that the Absolute remains immutable, unaffected. Of such creation-non-creation no analogy can be given from the world of experience. The Absolute is different from the world, but it eternally includes the world, so they are not absolutely different. The logical indescribability of this compels recourse to the method of "neti, neti," to describe the Absolute by seeming contradictions.

It is difficult if not impossible to define supreme reality . . . we can be sure of what God is not i. e., not an emergent deity, not an exceedingly able mechanical engineer, not a super-natural proprietor of the universe, not one to whom we are bound in covenant or one who takes sides.³

The significance of the negative method is to bring out the truth that ultimate reality is not finite. But Radhakrishnan does not stop at this; he goes on to stress the

1. *The Philosophy of Rabindranath Tagore*, pp. 116-117.

2. *cf.*, Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, pp. 332, 796.

3. *The Religion We Need*, p. 22; *cf.*, William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 339.

positive aspect of the Absolute's freedom to manifest any one of its infinite powers and to reject the others, as well as its freedom not to manifest itself. The infinite, unbounded bliss (anand) overflows into creation.

The personalistic conception of Isvara is inevitable because of the relational character of thought which proceeds by relating subject to object. Given an environment viz., an imperfect world with its capacity to progress, there must arise the related idea of personality (human or divine) living and acting in it. God is a logical prius of the cosmic process. Creative advance takes us to the realization of primordial conception or plan or God's nature.¹ The Absolute is thought of as the creator and creation is the inevitable counterpart of the Divine Self. The "I am" needs confrontation with the "not I." It is *Māyā* or mystery why "not I" appears on assertion of "I." Interest of common humanity shifts from Absolute, which is the beginning and limiting concept, and centres on the intermediate process of creation. God the *Māyāvin* is more interesting to us.² As Tagore said, our interest is not in the cosmic Absolute or the background of the canvas, but on the activity of the *Māyāvin* or the painting.

The relation of God to world is an organic one, but the position of modified monism is unacceptable. The position of God, the Soul as the efficient cause and His body as the material cause is untenable: we cannot take half a fowl for cooking and leave the rest to lay eggs.³ God cannot but be affected by imperfections of the world. The "concrete universal" does not get over this difficulty by its arbitrary combination of identity and multiplicity, temporal process and eternal immutability in one Absolute. There is no need either to identify or to dispense with either one of these conceptions.

Immanent, omniscient, omnipotent God is a projection of the Absolute, an actualisation of one of the infinite possibilities of the Absolute. He is no mere appearance due to *Māyā* (*Sankara*) but real as one creative power of the Absolute. As to why this power or possibility? This can be answered only with reference to Absolute's freedom, as the work of an artist or *lila*, without effort as sport or human breath.

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 303.

2. *ibid.*, p. 340.

3. *Anandgiri on B. S.*, I, 2, 8 in *Indian Philosophy*, II, 715.

As partaking in the working of nature God is not eternal, for He lasts as long as the world-process lasts. He is contingent from the standpoint of the Absolute, but creator and maintainer from the cosmic standpoint. The Self-Existent becomes for the world compassionate, conserving, helpful saviour. He redeems the corrupt, reconciles the hostile, evolves rhythm out of chaos; His work continues until He has fashioned immortal substance out of evanescent nothingness.¹ As creator of time, God is timeless, but as personal being limited by His environment of selves and matter, He works for its spiritualisation in time. Cosmic striving and progress is guided by God. God's eternal values are being realized in human history on the plane of space-time creation, which is a necessary part of God's being and fulness. At the beginning of the evolutionary process He is transcendent because there is dualism of God and matter, at the end He is immanent because His plan is fully manifested in the world. The coincidence of God and world means the end of cosmic process, dissolution of both into the Absolute. The alienation of "not I" from "I" is overcome in a process of return of "I" to "me" i. e., return of both to original purity.²

In Vedanta, the Absolute and God are not to be understood as exclusive terms. God is not unrelated to the Absolute, but as one actualised possibility is that very Absolute from a particular point of view. It is not correct to say that concrete reality is higher than the Absolute, which becomes merely a factor, quality, adjective of concrete reality, therefore, superfluous,³ because the primordial and the projected coexist by nature of universal being and not as mere juxtaposition of opposites; the formless Divine is capable of manifesting all forms, absolute being and creative aspects are simultaneous, therefore, the latter is not richer than the former.⁴

There is scope for dualism as well as monism in spiritual experience. The difference of supreme person and supreme spirit is one of standpoint—God as He appears to us and God as He is. The Absolute is the abstract aspect, since all terms are inadequate but God is the self-aware, self-blissful Being. Absolute is self-existent

1. "The Spirit in Man," C. I. P., p. 501.
2. An Idealist View of Life, p. 340.
3. Schilpp, op. cit., p. 333.
4. *ibid.*, p. 796.

joy, God is love dependant on the object, expending itself without expecting a return for its self-expenditure.¹ The nature of God as loving redeemer meets some religious needs; the Absolute meets the other spiritual need of rest, fulfilment, eternity and completeness. Religion needs God related to the world to be also personal. Logic asks us to rise to the impersonal but emotional demands can be satisfied at the expense of logic only.² However, as in science so in religion we must not adopt the view of the plain man but must consult the specialist (mystic) who is only satisfied with infinite reality. Philosophy may fail to reconcile them but spiritual consciousness has always felt they are one.

From the standpoint of knowledge also there is a real continuity of experience between states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep consciousness pointing to a non-dual consciousness underlying the distinction of empirical knowledge. The "I" and "not I" become one in experience of self-consciousness or self of intuition. Thus, epistemologically speaking, God is the truth of dualistic intellect, the Absolute is the higher truth of intuition. The latter is not unreason but the deepest rationality, though non-conceptual, embracing immediacy and mediacy. Intuition as the response of whole man involves reason, though not translatable into the language of intellect. The proof of its validity is that we cannot think it away. Similarly, the Absolute is not different from but the completion of God. Theism if it wishes to be true must not only insist on dualism of God and man or transcendence, but on oneness, unity of spirit or divine immanence. They are not contradictory but the intellectual and intuitive ways of apprehending the same reality.

The necessity of the personalistic conception of reality cannot be denied, for spirit cannot be conceived except in terms of personality.³ When the mind demands a description the highest category of self-consciousness is applied. Cognition appears as attribute of knowledge, emotion as the attribute of love and will as the attribute of divine will.⁴ Thus ancient thinkers accept a variety of pictures of God not as pure

1. "The Spirit in Man," G. I. P., p. 499.

2. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 38-39.

3. The Religion We Need, p. 17.

4. Hindu View of Life, p. 27.

presentations of real-in-itself but as the presentations of it as influenced by intellect and will i. e., psychologically and pragmatically mediated. Personality, though the highest category of thought, is still an inadequate symbol of reality and the highest idea of God is a suggestion of the ineffable. The personal factor does not nullify the object, for the reality of the supreme spirit is not contradicted by man's inability to describe. To ignore the symbolic nature of "personality" is to shut out the truth. Those who regard reality as personal still have to admit it as vast and mysterious. Monotheists are loth to accept their own God as symbol, while calling God of others symbol of the true God. God is the symbol in which religion recognises the Absolute.¹ Symbols of Godhead are evoked for the sense of vastness of ultimate reality. At this point a misconception must be avoided. Though all imagination is necessarily infected with greater or lesser degree of error, this does not mean that form or personality is itself unreal. Even Advaita does not know any higher reality than personal God. It advises meditation on the super-personal and worship of the personal. The forms of God are really assumed for the welfare of the seekers and are not only imaginary. They are symbols of truth cherished by believers, were they unreal they could not act in this way. The question cannot be treated as one of scientific truth, but of relation between the deepest self of man and reality.²

Radhakrishnan is undeterred by difficulties of classical Vedānta in reconciling the indeterminate Absolute with the determinate God. There is no fundamental contradiction between the philosophical idea of God as all-embracing Spirit and the devotional idea of personal God. He takes his stand on the conviction that the best qualities of the two great thinkers of India, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are the defects of the other.³ An unbiased reading of the Upaniṣads shows that the final teaching is not clearly on the side of one or the other. Since the two teachings follow each other in an inseparable manner there is scriptural justification for regarding both as complementary. Śaṅkara's philosophy is also not lacking in similar suggestions. Philosophical

1. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 108; cf., C. E. M. Joad, *Counter-attack from the East*, p. 132.

2. *Freedom and Culture*, p. 131.

3. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 720.

accuracy discovers the slightest diminution from the Absolute in self-consciousness: "I am I,"¹ from this Sankara precipitates pure being, basal thought of all into the world. To think pure Brahman is to make principle of difference equally basal. God develops into organized existence. Thus, Sankara did give place to a logical theism not slighting intellect; though not working out the relation of absolutism of intuition with empirical theism of logic, he maintains a wise agnosticism on this point.² From Sankara Radhakrishnan derives the idea of the Absolute and the relative ways of expressing the same reality. But Sankara's distinction of para and apara, higher and lower fails to do justice to the empirical aspect by relegating it to the realm of unreality, and it also fails to give the complete conception of the Absolute by excluding God and the world from It. Radhakrishnan is determined to avoid both undesirable conclusions of Sankara's distinction. He makes Ramamuja's empirical theism of logic an actual projection of the Absolute, with real powers of creation and dispensation of justice for a particular cosmos. God is as real as the Absolute, both are infinite, divine and above limitation of finitude. That there may be other possibilities actualizing in other creators and creations does not take away from the reality of the creator of this world. Limitation—beginning and end—of creator and creation is not unreality. And God's continuous involvement in the origin and evolution of world-process and human history makes them fully meaningful i. e., relativity is real, Radhakrishnan maintains with Ramamuja and the theists. But he asserts against them that unless the distinction of Absolute and God, transcendent and cosmic Divine be admitted the immutable perfection of reality cannot be preserved. Sankara is right in insisting that the Absolute is totally independent of the world. But since he also insists that entity cannot come out of non-entity,³ he too must concede that the Absolute does contain within It both God and world, the actualisation of one possibility as well as infinite other possibilities and actualities while transcending them. Radhakrishnan's position may be understood thus: as long as the imperfect world has a nature antithetical to that of the perfection of Absolute it is not included in it, but

1. vide Br. Upa., I, 4, 10.

2. Indian Philosophy, I, 657-658.

3. B. S., II, 2, 26.

when the antithesis is overcome by transfiguration of world's impure nature i. e., when the design and ideals in God's mind are fully expressed in the world by means of evolution, then both are totally incorporated in the Absolute. "The Absolute eternally includes the world in its transformed or essential nature,"¹ hence its perfection remains unaffected.

Radhakrishnan's attempt at synthesising the Saguna and Nirguna conceptions of reality into one logical system rests on the application of a balanced negative-positive method to the understanding of reality. He parts with Sankara where the latter holds the positive method (iti, iti) to contradict the secondless nature. His thesis is unexceptional: "negative and positive moments are indispensable to the Absolute, not that the Absolute contains both, but our system of philosophy must contain them."²

It will be seen that the success of such a dual approach hinges on the crucial question of "how" or the manner in which the Absolute projects one or more of its powers as *Īvara*. Radhakrishnan explains it as the Absolute's free and effortless spilling over of the excess of bliss element in It into the names and forms of creation. This is not so much an explanation as a suggestion and Sankara has also advanced it in the analogy of sport and breathing. In order to complete his system Radhakrishnan is required to work out this suggestion into a consistent theory. It cannot be allowed that his "suggestion" is a sufficient substitute for Sankara's *Māyāvāda* which is a detailed epistemological analysis of the erroneous perception of the non-related Absolute as the creator God. However unsatisfactory the metaphysical denotations and connotations of this doctrine may be to realistic minded philosophy it is, at least, a more complete and consistent theory than the "positive" explanation of Radhakrishnan. Since the latter accepts almost all the meanings of *Māyā* in classical Advaita and also the mystification of intellect on this point it may be concluded that his theory of the "positive" Absolute though differing in form and description from Sankara's "negative" Absolute does not make a real departure from the position of the latter.

1. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 346.

2. *ibid.*, p. 350.

The fate of the relative and contingent conception of Īśvara still hangs in the balance of the anirvacaniya or "real-unreal" Maya. The difference between Radhakrishnan and Sankara is only seeming.

What Sankara presents as pure metaphysics for jnani by eschewing "a theistic veiling of truth in a mist of sentiment" Sri Radhakrishnan presents as a theory for the masses by embracing a functional method of presentation more palatable for the present day enquirer. The difference is not doctrinal, but only a manner of presentation.¹

Maya—The Nature of the World

Humanistic Conception of the World

Neo-Vedanta finds the Upaniṣads and Vedas to be full of a positive attitude to life and activity which implies belief in the reality of the world. The negative attitude developed in Vedānta because of a wrong emphasis or a false meaning being given to Maya and it gave rise to undesirable consequences. No Neo-Vedāntin stops at the negative thesis of Vedānta, "All this is nothing," but all go on to the positive thesis, "All this is nothing but God." Humanism prides itself on its attitude of world and life affirmation, but a truly integral humanism requires an exact discrimination of what is to be negated to affirm what. A philosophical affirmation of reality can only occur after all falsity has been negated. If Neo-Vedānta (e. g., Vivekanand) denies that compromise between world and God is possible and at the same time insists on living fully in the world to work out the truth of Vedānta, the contradiction is only apparent. A Truly humanist doctrine can see no efficacy in a mere juxtaposition of spiritual and mundane goods, hence a non-compromising attitude is necessary. To get an integral outlook a real synthesis is necessary. The world is to be rejected to the extent it is merely what it appears i. e., unreal, but it is to be accepted where it is something more than itself or has been transfigured by spirit i. e., real and good.²

The paradox of humanistic metaphysics is how to reconcile the diversity i. e.,

1. Ruth Reyna, *The Concept of Mayā*, p. 69.

2. cf., Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism*, pp. 101, 103: The more nature or society reflects reality the more sacred and worthy of love and respect it is and the more it is separated from reality the more profane and despicable it is.

reality and independence of many parts and forms in the universe with oneness and coherence of the whole i. e., paradox of difference and identity. Neo-Vedantins maintain that the world's nature is Maya—real and unreal i. e., indeterminate to the mind. Even humanism admits that the clear light of reason, though removing the veil from many phenomena, does not bring man face to face with the basic mystery of the world and existence.¹ The reason is clear: on the one hand is the complex world-reality, with infinite degrees and contradictions and on the other hand is the rigidity of conceptual understanding, where truth is not identical with reality but a representation of it. Therefore, a margin of indeterminateness must be allowed in man's knowledge of it, as even science has admitted,² and Vedānta insists on it in its conception of world. Acceptance of a basic irreducible mystery does not prevent the humanist, and even less does it prevent the Neo-Vedāntins, from retaining conviction of world-reality, sense of reverence, awe, wonder, strangeness and challenge in their empirical dealings with the problem of world and existence.³

The question of the relation of reality to phenomena involves a proper evaluation of time and history in relation to timelessness and the infinite. Anti-religious humanism tries to solve this by an over-simplification—it rejects the latter as unreal and makes the former real-in-themselves. But if humanism is to be realistic it cannot be thus facile, it must consider facts and realities in their totality; and human reality is relative to both time and timelessness, finite and infinite. Only Tagore holds the reality or eternal supreme person to begin only where it enters time. In fact, time, space and causation (world of nature and experience) is the medium for obscuration, but also for revelation of the absolute, eternal and infinite, according to Vivekanand and Gandhi. No absolute opposition need be insisted upon between the Absolute on the one hand and time and history on the other. There is no illogicality in admitting time and world-development within the timeless Absolute, according to Radhakrishnan, or again, eternity of time-movement—the self-existence of truth-consciousness or creator holding eternal potentiality of rest and movement and standing

1. Julian Huxley, *The Humanist Frame*, p. 42.

2. Moulton et al. (eds.), *The Autobiography of Science*, p. 550.

3. Huxley, *loc. cit.*

between time (world) and timelessness (Absolute), according to Aurobindo.

Such a complete realism alone allows for evolution of world and progress of man. Neo-Vedantins have given unprecedented importance to developmental and evolutionary factors. The doctrine of cosmic and organic evolution is not only consistent with but a scientific elaboration of Vedantic cosmology. Man is part of nature and is made up of the same material, operated by the same energy as the cosmos. And in spite of his unique distinctiveness he is linked by metaphysical and physical chains with all beings of the universe. However, materialistic or scientific evolution does not explain either the whole world or man. The dynamic spiritual view of man sees him developing through many stages of time and change, in each of which he remains an imperfect expression of his real self or spirit, both in his collective and individual aspects. Vivekanand's interest does not lie in working out a philosophy of man in society by increase of spiritual-creative forces in history, though he would not have denied this evolution, since the progress of society does depend upon soul-revelation in the individual. His interest lies rather in evolution of the individual ending in liberation of spirit's bondage to matter. All other Neo-Vedantins while accepting this goal, direct their attention to improvement of mankind in the form of better expression of spiritual principles (truth, love, non-violence, freedom). Life in time is a purification and refinement of man's nature, but there is no progress in a straight line, development is by forward and backward movements, with a gradual approximation to the goal of perfection.

In regard to the possibility of attainment of the goal there is difference of view. Vivekananda, Tagore and Gandhi deny perfection and allow only for eternal and infinite perfectibility of man, because attainment of the Infinite is identical with negation of the finite, since the two cannot coexist. And humanism does not allow the negation of time, history and world. Radhakrishnan does not hesitate to admit world and human perfection, though he too admits it to be beyond time and world. Movement from human imperfection to spiritual perfection is, metaphysically speaking, a reconciliation of eternal-temporal, absolute-historical, intuition-intellect and,

concretely, a spiritualised world and humanity. Attainment of the eternal and real need not be understood as negation of the phenomenon but as fulfilment of it, the latter passes into the former by evolution and at the end of the process i. e., the problem of time is resolved by attainment of an eternal, changeless state of being.¹ Aurobindo boldly asserts perfection of spatio-temporal world by descent of Supermind and transformation of nature and life. No other Vedantin describes so confidently the inevitable spiritual future of the human race and universe, what man and world is yet to be.

The differences of these views may be reconciled by distinguishing between spiritualisation-perfection and progress-development. According to Radhakrishnan progress refers to future world aeons and perfection to ultimate depth of one's being.² Progress deals with a solution in the stream of time at some undated moment in the future history of mankind. It thinks of ultimate perfection within the time-order, within limits of historical progress. Perfection is victory over time, passage from history to super-historical. The difficulty of ending of the present world of time and change by spiritualisation is overcome by the idea of the infinite possibilities of infinite world-developments in the Absolute. Aurobindo says that if by complete realization of spirit is meant a realization with nothing more to realize than Gandhi and others are right in saying that it is impossible and unnecessary. A divine (supra-mental) progression means that the present ignorance of man can be transcended, and, turning from darkness to light, from ignorance to knowledge, spiritual evolution will continue to modify embodiment of spirit in earth nature to suit further development.³

Humanism inculcates indestructible optimism in regard to unlimited possibility of development in human life, in spite of all obstacles. A sufficient reason must be discovered for self-improvement, which should give necessary emotional-volitional impetus. The discovery of the law of development in man's life carries with it an imperative to act and the law is that perfection (of happiness and freedom) is the

1. F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddle of the Sphinx and Studies in Humanism*, pp. 256, 258.
 2. "Progress and Spiritual Values," *Philosophy*, Vol. XII, No. 47, (1937), p. 264.
 3. *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, Second series, p. 92.

outcome of struggle against nature within as well as outside, and it stimulates creative life in man and society. Whether the perfection of world is possible or not, it is not a permanent home of man in its present condition. In neither view does Vedanta allow man to play a passive and ineffective role towards imperfect conditions of world or resignation to suffering in life. It insists on heroic attitude which abjures pessimism of inertia in the face of good and evil; man's responsibility is to work for the goal towards which evolution moves i. e., the ideal reality Brahman is the origin and final end of actual life and world. By not striving to conform to this truth man betrays his own real essential self. Only by his labour and experience can the world and human life be made a fitter and better expression of reality, consciousness and bliss.

Vivekanand

Vivekanand declares that *Māyā* is the best answer to the problem of one becoming the many.¹ Advaitavāda and Māyavāda are absolutely identical, there is absolutely no other explanation of Advaita except *Māyā*. God cannot become the world i. e., there is no *paripñāsa*; pantheism is avoided by the theory that the universe as we know and think it does not exist i. e., the unchangeable does not change or real nature is not lost for there is no becoming, and the universe of parts and differences is an appearance i. e., *vivarta*. The Absolute is the ocean in which all things are waves, different only in forms i. e., matter and thought, force and intelligence are but manifestations of the cosmic energy of the cosmic intelligence or Supreme Lord. He is both the external and internal nature and *Māyā* is the medium through which the Absolute becomes the creator and creation. It should be understood as the combination of three ideas, *śāśā-bhāva-nimitta*, which are further reduced or abstracted to two ideas of name-form.²

It is asked, what causes *Māyā*? This is an illogical question. The question arises only in the conditional sphere but is related to the unconditioned, therefore it is contradictory. The answer can only be that ignorance makes for illusion.³ It is

1. Complete Works, II, 191.

2. *Ibid.*, III, 419, 430.

3. *Ibid.*, V, 202.

a bold generalisation of Vedānta that no amount of knowledge of external world could solve the problem since the mind is limited and cannot go beyond space-time-causation.¹ Time depends on mind, space on objects, forms, qualities, and causation is inseparable from both. Clearly, the existence of the world means its existence in relation to mind only (mine, yours, everyones). Therefore, the world is existent because it satisfies to some degree our idea of existence. Reality runs to everything, as it were, caught in space, time, causation; a relative existence fulfilling all its requirements. It is perceived by all, but only the ignorant think it to be concrete, eternal and everlasting existence. In truth, it is non-existent because were we to see the world with a sixth or seventh sense we would see something more. Therefore, existence must be transcendent of space-time-causation i. e., it must be independent, absolute, unchangeable, immovable, infinite existence, which the world is not. The paradox of the world is that it is perceived as phenomenally real when transcendently it is not real.

Māyā is also the statement of the fact that the basis of life is contradiction of good and evil, happiness and misery and all dualistic qualities. To take things as they are is to understand the coexistence of opposites of which one term is impossible without the other, since each is a manifestation of the same reality. Hence it is that some of the fundamentals of reasoning are most curious inspite of our boast of science and knowledge. Vedānta is true philosophy which declares contradiction, dvandva, to be the law of world and life.

Creation shows a dual movement, onward and upward. Material evolution has its own laws and shows the onward movement of life and nature. Natural evolution is the working out of one material, ākāśa, by operation of one energy, Prāṇa, into infinite forms. But spiritual evolution has its own laws and is moving upward towards manifestation of oneness or universal spirit. From the highest to the lowest form the soul is working itself out through nature.² Or it may be said that the universe is struggling to complete the circle to return to its source (freedom). First, through the struggle balance or sāmyāvasthā is attained i. e., tamas is counteracted by rajas

1. *Ibid.*, II, 90.

2. *Ibid.*, VI, 33.

and then rajas is conquered by sattva, and, then, beyond this the Atman is discovered. The Indian mythologies of cycles, progress in form of waves, rise and fall, evolution-involution indicate the "state of man" to be a reflection or limitation in terms of space-time-causation of real man. And human progress means bringing this nature under control of soul, not vice-versa. Nature or life is a compound, therefore it cannot be eternal, at the same time all its combinations, recombinations, manifestations¹ are necessary for man to get experience. Spirit's progress is related to lapse of time, punarjanna, and is exhibited in individual's growth towards salvation. The question is is it necessary to pass through all lower stages to reach the highest? The answer is in the affirmative. On the physical side the embryo goes from amoeba to man in the womb. Vedanta goes further and says that just as man has to live the life of past humanity as in the case of the educated man, so also complete evolution requires him to live all future life of humanity as in the condition of the freed man.²

From the standpoint of evolution of mankind it is necessary to understand that all work against imperfection is more subjective than objective i. e., more educational than actual.³ "Perfect society" means not conditions and things being bettered, but man being bettered by making changes in things.⁴ Identity of universal and individual self, macrocosm and microcosm means social evolution has no lasting value unless roots in the inner nature of the human soul. The religious teachers (Acaryas) understood that change must be by evolution of spiritual ideals in man slowly. Therefore, they did not ~~criticize~~ but exhorted the race to do better. And this is the principle of progress in all spheres.

The evolutionary idea is that it is possible to eliminate evil from the world over millions of years, a time will come when all miseries will cease, only joys remain, earth will be heaven. People are inspired to work under this idea to make world perfect i. e., no disease, death, unhappiness, wickedness.⁵ This is not a true

1. e. g., earth, suns, stars, right-wrong, good-evil, laughter-tears, joys-sorrows.

2. Complete Works, VII, 95.

3. *Ibid.*, III, 214.

4. *Ibid.*, VI, 123.

5. *Ibid.*, I, 82.

idea but a dangerous phase of the enjoyment of the senses. On practical grounds it cannot be shown how the world can become a heaven, since misery is not ousted but driven from one point to another in the world.¹ By struggle to alleviate suffering no everlasting good can be done to the world, as history shows. The reason being that if the power to satisfy human desires is increased in arithmetic progression, power of desires is increased in geometric progression, hence misery-happiness remain inseparable. The fallacy in the general idea of evolution is that it takes both good and evil to be eternally fixed in nature and amount, but history shows increase of both, or if it be insisted that the nature of the universe is that the sum total of pleasure-pain is constant, then, also, they are merely pushed from one side to another, but one cannot totally overcome the other. On theoretical grounds also it is impossible to show how perfection is possible. Perfection is infinite (the ever-accomplished nature of self) but to try to manifest (finitise) perfection i. e., the theory of world-perfection at a particular point in time, means that man become unlimited limited; it is absurd to think that unmixed perfection of reality will ever come (manifest) as a part of mixed world and history.²

Humanism insists that realistic view of the world alone allows for improvement of the world, but this must not overlook facts. "A sober optimism in regard to human progress must not be based on facile, plausible untruth, but on some adamant foundation of truth, in holding which alone control of things and their uses for betterment i. e., optimism lies."³ The agnostic takes life minus the ideal component to be all that exists, while the Vedāntin holds it to mean above all the search after the ideal. It is true that the Absolute or Infinite is trying to express itself in the finite. But the question is, what is the scope of human effort to do good, better the world, in Vedānta—when it discovers the world as a mixture of optimism-pessimism it ends the natural human weakness of putting the blame on nature and rests responsibility for finding or not finding good squarely on man's shoulders.⁴ Man has a notion of the

1. *Ibid.*, II, 171, 172.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 172-173.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 180.

4. *Ibid.*, II, 180.

idea but a dangerous phase of the enjoyment of the senses. On practical grounds it cannot be shown how the world can become a heaven, since misery is not ousted but driven from one point to another in the world.¹ By struggle to alleviate suffering no everlasting good can be done to the world, as history shows. The reason being that if the power to satisfy human desires is increased in arithmetic progression, power of desires is increased in geometric progression, hence misery-happiness remain inseparable. The fallacy in the general idea of evolution is that it takes both good and evil to be eternally fixed in nature and amount, but history shows increase of both, or if it be insisted that the nature of the universe is that the sum total of pleasure-pain is constant, then, also, they are merely pushed from one side to another, but one cannot totally overcome the other. On theoretical grounds also it is impossible to show how perfection is possible. Perfection is infinite (the ever-accomplished nature of self) but to try to manifest (finitise) perfection i. e., the theory of world-perfection at a particular point in time, means that men become unlimited limiteds; it is absurd to think that unmixt perfection of reality will ever come (manifest) as a part of mixed world and history.²

Humanism insists that realistic view of the world alone allows for improvement of the world, but this must not overlook facts. "A sober optimism in regard to human progress must not be based on facile, plausible untruth, but on some adamantine foundation of truth, in holding which alone control of things and their uses for betterment i. e., optimism lies."³ The agnostic takes life minus the ideal component to be all that exists, while the Vedāntin holds it to mean above all the search after the ideal. It is true that the Absolute or Infinite is trying to express itself in the finite. But the question is, what is the scope of human effort to do good, better the world, in Vedānta—when it discovers the world as a mixture of optimism-pessimism it ends the natural human weakness of putting the blame on nature and rests responsibility for finding or not finding good squarely on man's shoulders.⁴ Man has a notion of the

1. *ibid.*, II, 171, 172.

2. *ibid.*, II, 172-173.

3. *ibid.*, II, 180.

4. *ibid.*, II, 180.

ideal world, though it cannot be known whether it will ever come, and it is also doubtful whether social perfection will ever be reached. But whether it comes or not, each must work for the idea as if it will come tomorrow, as if it only depends on his work alone. Each Man's responsibility is to believe that everyone in the world has done his work and the only work remaining to be done to make the world perfect has to be done by himself. Validation of human effort lies along these lines: in the first place, experience teaches men that sooner or later their efforts to make themselves happy can succeed only by working to lessen misery—evil (imperfection) in the world. Secondly, the only way to "end this life" of contradiction is to do his own part in the world i. e., to increase forces of good in the world. Thirdly, since Maya is the only medium in and through which man has to work, it is wrong to say, "I will only work when the world has become all good,"¹ and then I will enjoy bliss, for this is like the man who sits besides the Ganges and says, "I shall ford the river when all the water has run into the ocean."² Understanding of the nature of things gives the correct spirit to work; there cannot be fanaticism in actions of good work when there is awareness that every step in improvement carries its attendant evil. Since man's evil has no less value than his good and his good no more value than his evil, the Vedantin works with utmost patience for good.

The Vedanta declares: one must raise oneself by one's own exertion. To depend on one's self really points to the eternal self. But even to depend on the non-eternal self may gradually lead to the right goal as individual self is really eternal self under delusion.³ *Swakaryam udjharat prajña*—"the wise achieves his own object" i. e., no one can give spirituality but each must make himself master of his own soul.⁴ These ----- of spiritual life hold good in every sphere and demand utmost exertion by the individual.

Accepting the world as a permanent mixture of opposites (Maya), two attitudes are open to man. Practical or worldly wisdom says: since man cannot escape evil he

1. *Ibid.*, II, 104.

2. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 139.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

4. Complete Works, VI, 387.

must make the best of a bad world, without bothering his head about metaphysics or religion.¹ Giving up hope of unmixd happiness he should take the world as it is, bear pangs and pains in the hope of happiness, now and then. Such is the attitude of pravṛtti or revolving towards world, "I and mine," in which there is increasing dependence on the world and submission to its power because man tries to work it to get pleasure and, in consequence, suffers the inseparable opposites viz., reactions of pleasure and pain. This takes him only a little distance, because attempt to ignore the unpleasant fact carries the danger of despair and giving up of the struggle. If practical wisdom admits religion it teaches: do this as well as that i. e., it teaches spirituality as compromise of world and God, but this is not sincere advice, nor is it even possible, since the two are as night and day and cannot exist together.²

Vedanta takes an opposite stand to worldly wisdom. It advises: give up hope of pleasure, which is another form of pain and search to understand essential nature.³ It is untrue that the world is merely misery and nonsense that it is all good, but thought is to be guided towards that unity of which both are guises. This is to cut the gordian knot i. e., inextricable connection of opposites. The ideal of non-compromise with Maya is very difficult, but it must not be brought down to the actual. Only those who never want to reconcile nature and truth make progress.

The psychological effect of Vedantic position is salutary. Conviction of Maya makes man ready to march back to his original nature i. e., to reverse the process by which he got into finitude.⁴ This is nivṛtti or revolving away from the world, "I and mine." And by not working the world for his own pleasure he becomes independent of it i. e., suffers no reactions of opposites. Assertion of such freedom by man in society, ethics and religion changes the very meaning of Maya. To take the world as it is, leaves nothing but evil, therefore, "to end existence and world" means to understand truth about the world by giving up the error about it. World is not destroyed but known as it is i. e., deified. The Īśa says when the world is given up God remains.

1. *Ibid.*, I, 123.
 2. *Ibid.*, III, 451.
 3. *Ibid.*, VI, 342.
 4. *Ibid.*, II, 173.

To give up desire is not to commit suicide or to have no things, but to know the truth about them, that they belong to God. And this ends sense of possession.

The Vedantic philosopher (teacher of mankind) takes a stand midway between two states. He must know that the world is true (in its real ground) or else why teach? But unless he has realized the world as a dream (in its false character) he is no better than the ordinary man, what could he teach?¹ Life in the world in the Vedantic spirit (Practical Vedanta) is like that of a mud-fish, a life of Vidya-Maya i. e., seeing only God, and not of Avidya-Maya i. e., attachment to false character.² The false character is the inexplicable mixture of independence-dependence, freedom-slavery, illusion-reality in the world; the goodness of the world is accepted where it is the medium for shining through of the independent, pure, immortal soul or God. The question of the unreality of world is a mere matter of philosophical discussion. For, first man must reason by the method of neti, neti i. e., give up attachment to worldly things, to realize Saccidanand as neither living beings nor universe. Then comes affirmation of the denied or the realization follows that God Himself has become the world. In the stage of negation the world becomes a dream, "frame-work of illusion," in the positive stage it becomes a "mansion of mirth."³ But the Vedantin's rise to super-consciousness and return to human condition should not be understood to mean that God exists when eyes are closed to the world and ceases to exist when the eyes are opened. It means that the phenomenal world belongs to that very reality to which the Absolute belongs and vice-versa. The Absolute is real and the relative is real because of it. Thus, for example, the Atman is that absolute truth which is manifested in the relative truth and error. This is the same as bliss manifested through relative good and evil, and the same as existence manifesting through life and death.⁴ It is a good attitude to take that if God is real His creation cannot be unreal. In fact, it is only unreal so long as God is not realized, but after knowing God it is no longer

1. *Ibid.*, p. 402.

2. *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, trans. *Akhilanand*, p. 684.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

4. *Complete Works*, VI, 342.

impermanent and unsubstantial.¹ An extreme Vedantin might denounce the world as void but to an integral Vedantin it too is one face of God and as such to be loved and served. He lives in it like a lotus-leaf, heart given to God, hand to work.

It will be noted that Vivekanand does not deviate from traditional Advaita metaphysics of world in terms of Mayavada. He holds to Saṅkara's meaning of Maya as apparent reality of world at present, depending on some particular condition of the mind, but its ultimate falsity or disappearance in some higher consciousness. Vivekanand's object was to remove the misconception that Mayavada denies the existence of the phenomenal world. The popular meanings of Maya as untruth, ignorance, transitory things and attachment to material things are errors. The idea of the universe as a phantom, such as the son of the barren woman is adopted by Saṅkara's followers, and other meanings of Māyā as the infinitesimal duration of nama-rupa with reference to reality or the period between any two pralayas (involution) is peculiar to some classes of Advaitins, but not having Saṅkara's sanction.² The world is not an illusion, for Saṅkara says that in illusion is the real. Hence it is an indefinable mixture of reality and appearance and its value or disvalue depends entirely on the way in which man deals with its contradictions. Oxygen on Hydrogen may make cool water or destructive flame of blowpipe.³ Man has to fight through Maya to that which is beyond and not bound by Maya; only by utilizing the world of natural law he attains the world of freedom.⁴

Vedāntic form of Māyā is neither realism nor idealism. It is not a theory but simply a statement of facts, what the world is. Maya is what makes for difference so that one appears as many. The realist sees only phenomena; the idealist sees only the noumena; the genuine idealism based on power of perception shows that the vanishing and changing universe is the phenomena of some noumena.⁵ There are three steps in

1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, pp. 837, 250; cf., Romain Rolland, The Life of Vivekananda, p. 168: The world is, but not beautiful nor ugly, but a sensation without exciting any emotion. Every thing is good and beautiful, for they are losing their relative proportions to me.

2. Complete Works, V, 134.

3. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, p. 941.

4. Selections from Swami Vivekanand, p. 140.

5. Complete Works, II, 330-331.

knowledge. In the first stage each thing is individual and separate and Madhva postulated the will of God and non-freedom of the individual soul. At the second stage there is relation and correlation between all individuals and Ramanuja declared created forms as body of God. At the highest stage there is only one thing that is seen as many and Advaita asserts only the divinity in man, and nature and all other things as adhyasa. Mayavada rehabilitates realism and idealism in their true forms. It is not idealism such as that of Buddhistic Vijñānavada or Śūnyavada. For the world does exist. The external world is no imagining of our minds but certainly an entity outside our mental conceptions.¹ At the same time, it is not realism for the world is not what we take it for; the knowledge forms are partly our creation and partly something outside. Vedānta insists that this I and Y, I and world, are one i. e., they are whole (not parts) of that Absolute and divisions are not in the-thing-itself.² This teaching is the true reconciliation of realism and idealism.

Tagore

Tagore takes his stand on Māya as the creative power of God. But it is not the nature of an external force compelling Brahman to express. There is no compulsion, but only manifestation in anand. Brahman is pure affirmation or fullness of being and from the bliss of Brahman free from fear arises the rhythm and harmony of life running through the universe, consisting of man and nature. Creation by and out of the Supreme Person is comparable to artistic creation. The Absolute is an artist par excellence, the singer and the song. The universe in the form of song is never separated from the Eternal Singer. The entire cosmic form exists in Him in the form of a complete song, but its manifestation is not all at once. The expression is subject to the law of evolution, but every step bespeaks the central note.

The world as a product of art is Māya, an appearance (form) of the noumenon which does not contradict the latter, nor is it itself lacking in truth. "Māya is like the paper of the bank-note, useless unless it is stamped, but still having an existence of its own. Similarly, smoke is an appearance of the fire, but not to be

1. *Ibid.*, V, 236.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 418.

denied."¹ We may go one step further and say that man has no interest in truth-as-such, but only its appearance is real for him. And when truth is deprived of its appearance, it loses the best part of its reality. Appearance is a personal relationship, it is for the person.² The appearance does not offer any commentary of itself through its material. You may call it Maya and pretend to disbelieve it, the great artist, the Mayavin is not hurt. For art is Maya, it has no other explanation but that it seems to be (appears) what it is.

Maya refers to the changing nature of world objects. It is evident that the world is movement, *sahsara*—as expression (form) it must be definite but as expression of the infinite it must also be indefinite, and this it can only be in its movement. Forms are transitory and negative but their "elusiveness" is not synonymous with unreality. Inconstant nature is not outside the pale of reality because changing forms contain eternal chain of relationship. When the transitory and the eternal are known in harmony, with the help of that harmony man can cross the transitory to reach the eternal. This dual nature of world is the counterpart of the dual nature of reality. If the eternal Absolute is understood as timelessness it is a mere word i. e., having no significance for man who is in time. The reality of the eternal is where it contains time in itself. Reality is both eternal and transitory.³

Interrrelation of God and world is the primary truth, it follows that separation is false. *Māyā* is that which revolts against the truth of relatedness.⁴ Operation of *Māyā* in relation to self is that in freedom of will there is some amount of dualism of appearance viz., self-will or idea of independent self, and truth viz., harmonious soul or freedom of love. Everything has this dualism of *Māyā* and *Satyam*. Self is *Māyā* when merely finite and individual, considered absolutely separate; it is *Satyam* when its essence is recognised in universal and infinite self or *Paramātmā*. Ignorance clouds intellect to show difference where it is not. *Avidya* is that which

1. p. 80.

2. cf., *Creative Unity*, p. 10: Appearance is more real than reality itself e. g., the picture (dream) and not the canvas (reality) has the meaning of ultimate reality in art.

3. p. 57.

4. p. 85.

makes man see the world as unconnected. But Avidya is negative obscuration of man's comprehension and if under it he misapprehends the world in this way that error of his is not real.

Maya positively denotes that truth is relatedness and there is no contradiction in holding that the many are real and so is the organic unity of the whole. Only through experience of God's unity can the diversity of the many be understood. The latter by themselves are inconsistent, false, but are harmonised in the Infinite.¹ There is a reconciliation of opposites because reality and creation form a harmony of contrary forces. Homogeneity does not minimise the importance of heterogeneity. "God delights in uniqueness, both uniqueness and variety are indispensable."² All movement in human life is through separation and reunion of man-nature, man-man, man-God. God eternally differentiates within Himself, for the sake of realizing Himself through integration of love relation with another. Therefore, difference as essential principle of development has to be accepted, but it is also transcended in unity.

No logical explanation is possible, but the paradox of the One Infinite finding itself in the finite many lies at the root of existence. That one and many, unity and difference both are, is a fact of experience, but philosophy must admit failure in accounting for it—"This I shall accept—how the one could become the two I cannot understand."³ The problem is no more if the standard of reason is given up and testimony of life is accepted instead. Since life is not dogmatic as theological reasoning is, ideas of non-dualism and dualism do not exclude each other.⁴

Humanism rejects the religious, mythological conception of human perfection in some other world. Man does not enter heaven or supra-mundane realms, but whatever he attains must be attained in the world alone.

Where is heaven you ask my child,
The sages tell us it is beyond the limits of birth
And death, unswayed by the realm of day and night.
It is not of the earth,
For heaven is born in you, in the arms of the mother's dust.⁵

1. The Religion of Man, p. 22.

2. Atma-parichaya, p. 39.

3. *ibid.*, p. 98.

4. S. Radhakrishnan, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Intro. by Tagore, p. x.

5. Lover's Gift and Crossing, pp. 46-47.

The goal of perfection is not anywhere except in the human heart purified, in work dedicated to God in the world and made into His world, here in the everlasting present, not distant, not anywhere else. But rejection of perfection in another world is not equivalent to the conception of establishment of God's kingdom in space and time. Perfection belongs to the Infinite only, the finite may only attain more and more to it. In terms of the religious relation, the absolute identity of Infinite and finite cannot be accepted, for the two must keep separate for the sake of the love-drama. This implies that however man approximates to the ideal he cannot attain to it. The world is in the process of becoming perfect but can never be perfect, because attainment of the Infinite by man would bring to an end the whole finite order; there would no longer be any universe. Therefore, the purpose of man is to acquire never and never life, of the world to become better and better i. e., infinite perfectibility. The process and not the end is the aim of human existence.

Metaphysical denial of world perfection does not exclude the truth contained in the theory of evolution, physical, social and even individual. The scientific theory of evolution is the truth about development of the natural world and of natural man. However, evolutionary process of the world moves towards revelation of truth i. e., inner value or meaning in the world.¹ There are certain principles of evolution in the material world, but they do not apply purely at the human level e. g., it is an illusion to consider quantity to be greater than truth. Who can despise a speck of life because it was born recently, after aeons of time, and as compared to mass of matter is small. Within this life is the meaning of creation called will—first in a cell, then in animal and in man.² In man truth makes its positive appearance, struggles to manifest itself in history through obstruction of limits. In passing from the lower material to the higher human evolution there is a shift from the body i. e., struggle to preserve physical integrity, to the mind i. e., unity and its fulfilment in cooperation. Man's multicellular body is impermanent but his multi-personal unity is immortal. As in the body true nature of cells centres round

1. Religion of Man, p. 29.

2. Man, p. 38.

their universal aspect i. e., body, so individual's nature centres round universal man. This occurs at two levels--the individual evolves towards the wholeness of his own self. At its peak evolution takes an inward turn towards the supreme unity of all that is and it culminates in the vision of the soul of others in his own soul and of his own soul in the soul of others.¹ Mankind as a whole also evolves at the physical level in the principle of preservation, so that man's history is a search for better and better satisfaction of natural needs; and, at the human level, it moves towards enrichment of society, so that history is a journey to the unknown in quest of the immortal self through many states of civilization, through empires, through wealth, through building of great systems of thought, through actions, possessions and knowledge.²

Racial mythologies of a golden age in the past express man's aspiration that what is established from the beginning of time i. e., nature of Universal Humanity (Divinity), shall be continuously tested through the limitless flow. There is implicit expectation of a golden age in the future i. e., major aspect of the Supreme Man is yet unrevealed and is to come. And the refusal to give up the quest for it inspite of obstacles is called greatness in man.³ The idea of the millennium is treasured in the human soul; confined within its limits it feels its reverance for some ever-present source of inspiration in which all its experience of the true, the good and the beautiful finds its reality. Progress is the ideal perfection man reaches by extension of limits of knowledge, power, love, enjoyment to approach the Supreme Person through the rational mind and creative imagination.⁴

Limitations and imperfections of human life negate its perfection. But they are also the conditions and guarantees of progress, because their very existence provides the incentive and encouragement to man to overcome them. Limit is not mere limit, it only reflects an infinitesimal part of reality e. g., knowledge is precious to us ~~because~~ we shall never have time to complete it.⁵ The view of the whole field of life is goodness, which perhaps never ~~completely~~ can be, but man is ever ready to

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 26: Man of such vision are mahatmas.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

3. *Man*, pp. 9-10.

4. *The Religion of Man*, p. 21.

5. *Gardener*, 68.

sacrifice his present actual for the future unrealized. The price of progress is sacrifice and the pain of sacrifice. "The pain was great when the strings were being tuned, my master."¹ But the very quality of humanness in man consists in his willingness to take pains for improvement of self. Utmost effort and self-reliance on human energies is called for: human strength and courage mediate between realized actual and unrealized ideal. Man must not pray to be sheltered from dangers but to be fearless in facing them. To such human effort the realization of no ideal is impossible. "Asks the possible to the impossible . . . where is your dwelling place? 'In the dreams of the impotent,' comes the answer."² There is unlimited possibility of progress inspite of all obstacles. It is untrue to call this great world of man, this eternal effort to win victory for his power, untrue. Untruth or falsity lies within the world and does not belong to world as such, but falsity is transient and can be negated. God Himself stands guard over the destiny of man in the world and guides it through falsity to its goal. And man must respond to the call of the Charioter of the car of humanity.

Tagore takes a strong stand against the conclusion of unreality and meaninglessness of world in Mayivada. Vedantic illusion is a product of narrow intellectualism developed in the abstract atmosphere of inactive solitude.

Coming to the theatre of life (man) foolishly sit with their backs to the stage . . . and when the light is put out at the end . . . ask . . . in bewilderment, what is the meaning of it all? If (they) paid attention to the inner stage, (they) could witness the eternal love-drama of the soul and be assured . . . that the gorgeous preparations are not a magnificent delirium of things.³

Logically speaking, the distance between two points is never bridged because it is infinitely divisible, but we do cross this infinite divisibility at every step and meet the eternal every second. From this some philosophers come to the conclusion that there is no finitude. The real is the infinite and unreality (Maya) causes appearance of finite. But this is merely to state the fact that with truth there is also its opposite appearance, and not to give an explanation or to get over the incomprehensibility of their co-existence at one time. Nor is the term dvandva or series of opposites in creation an explanation. But logical indescribability does not mean unreality. Similarly the

1. Fruit Gather, nr. p. 49.

2. Stray Birds, p. 129.

3. G. F. Andrews, Thoughts from Tagore, p. 29.

Impersonal standard of space and time employed by science, if it is made the standard of creation it divests the world of reality. Such negative reasoning, scientific or theological, is true, but reasoning is not man himself.¹

Tagore rejects the thesis that the world is real and the only real. Its reality is inextricably connected with a reality beyond itself. Religion is the attitude which in accepting the world transcends its reality, which in accepting the world beyond regards the world here as real.² This is his meeting point with Advaita. Māyāvada may be quite consistent with the non-rejection of the world. There is an eternal element of truth in its negative implication i. e., to maintain the world as a self-dependant entity or absolutely separate is a fallacy.³ A separate self and separate nature from God is Māyā, for separateness or second principle does not exist by itself to limit God's infinity from outside. He repudiates the metaphysics of difference or dualism in Vedānta as categorically as does Advaita. But in elaboration of his thesis of non-separateness he parts company both with Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedānta. Interrelatedness of world and God means that "without the world God would be a phantom, without God world would be a chaos."⁴ "The one without the second is emptiness, the other one makes it true."⁵ This thesis is directly opposed to the Advaita doctrine of vivarta sṛṣṭi, wherein world or illusory projection depends on God (ground) for its existence and truth, but God is wholly independent (transcendent) of the world. Theistic Vedānta accepts the thesis of real creation or pariṇāma but insists on transcendence or perfection of God to a degree not envisaged in Tagore's conception of interdependence.

Tagore also agrees with Māyāvada about the imperfection of human knowledge:

Māyāvada—why should anyone get angry at the word. Does truth always reveal itself unalloyed? As fire burns by destruction of wood, so truth is gained by destruction of Avidyā. We may say fuel of Māyā has the purpose of lighting flame of truth but cannot identify Māyā with reality, since fuel is not flame. Fragmentariness has two aspects—it reveals and conceals infinite. The latter part is described as Māyā, mithyā.⁶

1. S. N. Vishvan, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Intro. by Tagore, p. x.
2. K. M. Purkayastha, "Tagore's View of Creative Spiritualism," *Northern Patrika*, December 15, 1962.
3. ———, p. 19.
4. *Shrey Birds*, p. 254.
5. *Fire-flies*, 22.
6. "Mata," *Shantiniketan*.

The Avidya or erroneous knowledge of the world as separated and divided has to be negated to attain the truth of unity or relatedness. From individual "I am" the transition must be to universal "I am." Maya is, means that finitude is experienced by man, and Maya is not, means the finite character vanishes when the infinite is realized.¹ The real-unreal character of Maya in Tagore's thought does not have the same metaphysical implications as the neither real nor unreal Maya of Advaita. For the cancellation of epistemological error (Avidya) does not mean ontological negation of its object or unreality of world. Like the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins Tagore rejects the conclusion of absolute negation of vyāvahārika sattā at the level of paramārtha.

Adopting the standpoint of human experience, Tagore affirms the reality of world and life. The good and evil, joy and sorrow which life's journey encounters are not to be lightly viewed as pictures. But realism can be maintained only by reference to a supremely active and personal reality. "I must emphasise this fact that this world is a real world only in its relation to a central personality, otherwise it falls into abstractions, logical symbols and vanishes."² If it were not a manifestation of a Supreme Person it is a stupendous deception, under whose stupendous weight of estrangement man's personality would have been crushed out of its shape and would have vanished into meaningless abstractions. Man and nature stand together in respect of their reality. Man's personality being independent and free, so must the world of nature be. Nor should this raise the problem of many realities relative to innumerable personality-centres, for, just as in man the principle of oneness is the basis of all his experiences of reality, so is one infinite central Personality the unity to which all personalities and world are related. This Supreme Person is neither passive nor negatively receptive, but a joy revealing itself in form. To discuss the world as Maya would imply that God is passive and inactive, but if God is active then the phenomenal world (the result of action) must be real. Tagore's refutation of illusionism does not consist in pointing out the fallacies in the different definitions or qualities of Maya,³

1. "The Religion of an Artist," G. I. P., p. 37.

2. Personality, p. 98.

3. As for example, the septānupepatti of Hamaṇṇa, the mithyanamāna-khaṇḍana of Madhya etc.

not in an appeal to the active and personal nature of reality. If such a nature could be logically established as the ultimate reality, Mayavada would be refuted and world-reality would be affirmed transcendently. But Tagore has nowhere denied that reality has an immutable and impersonal aspect. Science, philosophy and experience do apprehend that aspect, he admits. "The reality of the eternal is where it contains time in itself."¹ This is an implicit admission that the eternal has also an aspect of timelessness, however little of interest it may have for the "human" point of view of Tagore. When, therefore, he maintains that world's reality is related to the Supreme Personality, as creator and maintainer of that world, Advaita has no objection to raise. It will rebut, however, that to prove that the world has a vyavaharika satta is not to disprove Mayavāda.

Gandhi

Gandhi is an Advaitin on experiential grounds. God is the only Truth. "Often in my progress I have had faint glimpse of absolute Truth, God, and daily the conviction grows upon me that He alone is real and all else is unreal Let those who wish share my experimentation and also my conviction."² Hinduism calls world His lila or Māyā. The stress is on the ultimateness of the one reality from which existence of world-objects is derived and in separation from which there is non-existence or unreality. "A drop in the ocean partakes of the greatness of the parent although unconscious of it. But dries up as it enters existence independent of the ocean. We do not exaggerate when we say that life is a mere bubble."³ Māyā is the real power of God to manifest Himself in nature. "God by His mysterious power, Māyā, assumes the garb and control of Prakṛti."⁴ Māyā or appearance merely indicates that God is in everything, and the appearance must not be lost sight of.⁵ It is a mystery which deludes one of reality, not an illusion, but a veil or obstacle i. e., the manifestation ordinarily hides the real but can also reveal it, but in neither case does it disappear. "My

1. *ibid.*, v, p. 57.

2. All Men are Brothers, comp. Krishna Kriplani, p. 88.

3. *ibid.*, p. 103.

4. Mahadev Desai, The Gītā According to Gandhi, p. 196.

5. Vincent Sheean, Lead Kindly Light, pp. 201, 205.

divine delusive mystery made up of three gunas is hard to pierce. But those who make God their sole refuge pierce the veil."¹ The world has a character of impermanence and change. "Joy may be, as it really is a dream in a fleeting and transitory world, everything is like a dissolving phantasmagoria,"² therefore it may be called unreal but something persists and to that extent it is real. There is no objection in calling it real and unreal. *Māyā* points to the difficulty of knowing by mind the truth about world reality.

Things in this world are not what they seem and do not seem as they really are. Or if they are seen as they are, appear so only to a few who have perfected themselves after ages of penance. But none has yet been able to describe the reality and no one can.³

From the oneness of God follows oneness of universe, inspite of the fact of plurality of individuals. "I believe in absolute oneness of God, therefore also of humanity; what though we have many bodies? We have but one soul. The rays of the sun are many through refraction, but they have the same source."⁴ All are one though they seem to be many. When the *jñāni* sees diversity of being founded in unity and the whole expanse issuing there-from i. e., everything rests in Brahman, then he attains to Brahman. Reality at transcendental or noumenal level is one, but in its empirical and phenomenal expression it is many. "When we descend to the empirical level we descend to the world of duality."⁵ In order to do justice to unity and to diversity combination of monism (*Advaita*) with pluralism (*Dvaita*) is essential. There is no objection in *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda*, but it is based on a peculiar personal experience and subject to honest correction. Starting from the twin doctrines of *satya-ahimsā* philosophical thought arrives at manyness of reality i. e., if metaphysical-moral doctrine is meaningful then the reality of world society, containing as it does the conflict among the many, is a necessary conclusion.

The conflict of good and evil in all spheres of human life and resulting necessity of the moral effort is the plurality that engages Gandhi's attention. "At the

1. B. G., VII, 14.

2. Hindu Dharma, p. 52.

3. *ibid.*, p. 196.

4. Young India, September 25, 1924.

5. Chandra Shekar Shukla, Conversations with Gandhi, p. 37.

empirical level we get two forces, God and Satan, as Christianity calls it. Other terms are used in Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and Islam."¹ Realism requires the most comprehensive view of evil as inclusive of all suffering, tyranny, injustice, pain, terror and fear. We cannot dismiss evil i. e., suffering of fellow creatures as unreal and thereby provide a moral alibi for ourselves. Even dreams are true while they last and suffering is grim reality to sufferer. Whether world be real or unreal, duties must be faced, understood, performed while we are in this world. Reality of man consists in accepting this dualism as real, and in following the path of good. Man is not; God i. e., Truth and Good alone is. But if man will be, he must eternally sing His praises and do His will. The Māyā doctrine is the source of moral education. "The wonderful implication of the great saying, Brahma satyam jagamithyā, grows on me It teaches . . . patience . . . purges . . . harshness and adds . . . to . . . toleration."²

Man and world are moving towards a spiritual goal, but there is no world-perfection or even individual-perfection as long as man is in the body. It is impossible for man to realize perfect truth so long as he is imprisoned in mortal frame (earthly vesture of decay), he can only visualise in his imagination, but cannot through the instrumentality of body see eternal truth face to face. Perfection of love towards which he strives will always remain unattainable as long as man is alive. And perfect non-violence while inhabiting the body is only a theory like Euclid's point or straight line.³ Endeavour, effort for perfection or perfectibility alone is for man; he must always try to be perfect, but must ever remain imperfect. Not psychological pessimism but Advaita conception of the world as truth-falseness, light-darkness, life-death, and all relative dualities as parts of universal being which cannot be broken up into fragments, is the ground for accepting the permanent nature of imperfection or sorrow-suffering.⁴

Striving for ideals ensures progress in human life but difficulties are inherent in idealism. There is the unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the actual. It may

1. I. d.

2. To a Gandhian Capitalist, p. 51.

3. Harijan, July 21, 1940.

4. Nirmal Kumar Bose, Studies in Gandhism, p. 352.

be asked "what is the worth of an ideal which is impossible of fulfilment in its completeness by man?"¹ The answer is that it is the virtue of the spiritual ideal that it has to be proved by faith, which could not have place if perfection could be attained by the spirit. The goal ever recedes from man, the greater the progress the greater is the recognition of his own unworthiness. But this very fact proves the ideal to be closer to man than his hands and feet, because he is certain of its reality and truth more even than of his physical being. This faith in ideals constitutes true life, it is man's all in all. Secondly, there would be no scope for infinite expansion of spirit if mortal could reach the state of perfection i. e., if attainment of ideal were possible human life would end. Man is imperfect, but not content to remain so; God has created divine discontent in him, therefore he goes on saying, not this, not this, and continually presses forward. The ant is perfect because it has no urge to advance in its development, but man has got to advance.² Thirdly, were perfection attained there would be no scope for uniqueness or diversity in human life. Man would simply have to follow a cut and dry model and such a perfect code for all would allow no scope for diversity of faith, belief, conduct, because there would be one standard for all to follow. Unattainability means boundlessness of the ideal which is a virtue and not a fault.³

Progress in human society is due not to the operation of natural law understood as biological, physical education under cultural stimuli; human destiny is governed by a higher law, which, at the least, must be accepted as intelligent law. This conviction rests on "faith in living God, the arbiter of man's fate, without whom no blade of grass moves."⁴ Which means that it is not Prakṛti or material force which originates, governs thought-processes of Puruṣa, but spirit has the power to shape environment and course of history. Operation of the law of historical materialism for attainment of physical happiness and material values by individual and society is not totally excluded but "must be understood to operate in subordination to the higher, divine law."⁵ After the

1. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 239.

2. Chandra Shankar Shukla, *Gandhi's View of Life*, p. 11.

3. *Hindu Dharma*, p. 239.

4. *Correspondence with Government, 1942-1944*, (2d. ed.; Ahmedabad: Nav Jivan Press, 1945), p. 88.

5. *Sarvedkya*, p. 7.

attainment of physical value the nisus of evolution points to the attainment of moral-spiritual value.

The succession of events in history shows that inspite of temporary set-backs the human individual and race is marching forward. But there is no evidence for smooth gradual development only in one direction. "People do not move in arithmetical progression, not even in geometrical progression. They may perish in a day or rise in a day."¹ Negative and positive findings of historical research show pattern of events illuminated by truth or soul-force. History is a record of interruptions of the course of nature. Since soul-force is natural it is not noted in history. Once a common natural law of physical struggle prevailed over the whole of the living world, but human nature found it necessary to discover another law for its survival as evidenced by their activities in search for livalibood. Man's remote ancestors were cannibals, being fed up they began to live on chase. Being ashamed of life of wandering they took to agriculture, depended on earth for food. All these are signs of progressive ahimsa and diminishing himsa. All human actions and institutions are passing from greater violence to less violence and then to non-violence. Prophets and avatars have also taught lessons of ahimsa, since himsa does not need to be taught. The greatest and most unimpeachable evidence of success of truth or love is found in the fact that the world still lives inspite of wars.² Therefore it is correct to say that not the principle of physical fitness but principle of moral toughness is operating in man's progress.³ Man and society are in ceaseless unfoldment in terms of spirit because the sum of total energies of mankind are devoted, unconsciously it may be, to the working out of the spiritual law of cohesion between man and man, man and group, group and group, negatively called non-violence and positively love, leading to sense of peace, cooperation, justice, harmony and brotherhood. This conclusion is supported by a study of history, religion, commonsense and experience.⁴

1. Young India, January 19, 1921.

2. Hind Swaraj, p. 45.

3. vide Harijan, November 24, 1946: A friend used to say that the ahimsa sloka of Pateñjali, अहिंसा कर्तव्यं तस्यै श्रेयः, was a mistake and should be amended and the saying अहिंसा कर्तव्यं तस्यै श्रेयः ought to be read as अहिंसा कर्तव्यं तस्यै श्रेयः; but this amendment appeared to me to be absurd.

4. Sarvodaya, p. 7.

If mankind has progressed in this way, it follows that it must progress still further. Nothing in the world is static, but is kinetic; without progression there is inevitable regression.¹ The history of universe and man is yet incomplete, but to make progress it is necessary to make new history rather than to passively repeat history. Man has to add to the inheritance left by his ancestors. And having made discoveries and inventions in the phenomenal world he must not declare his bankruptcy in the spiritual domain. The difficulty in humanising, moralising and spiritualising mankind does not mean impossibility. "In this age of wonder no one will say a thing or idea is worthless because it is new. To say it is impossible because difficult is not in consonance with the spirit of this age . . . the impossible is ever becoming possible."²

Spiritual ideals are rooted in the present and point to the future and man need not be afraid of reducing them to practice to their uttermost. Contradictions and difficulties should not lead to giving up of the effort or degradation of ideals. Satisfaction lies in effort, full effort is full victory. Only human ignorance, weakness of faith and strength seek the support of the doctrine of world-perfection in some near or distant time, in order to regulate their means and strength to attain the ideal. The wise and the strong know that this doctrine is false, a "bait" with which God tempts his creatures to action along His path. Success or failure of human hopes and efforts depends wholly on God's will and He neither reveals His plans to man, nor gives control to man over the end, and only limited control over means. Therefore man's duty is not to seek to know if ever the millennium (perfection) would come or not but to strive to purify his nature and to fulfil God's appointed task without regard of consequences.³

This gives ample scope to man to help progress by discovering new knowledge and power of Atman through new applications. The dialectic of truth and non-violence is not inevitable in the nature of things or dependent on mere progress of time, but has to be made explicit by human action. The whole process of evolution is highly scientific i. e., through mistakes and rectifications. No good comes fully fashioned out of

1. Harijan, August 11, 1936.

2. *Ibid.*, August 25, 1940.

3. *Ibid.*, op. cit., pp. 345, 351.

God's hands but has to be earned by repeated failures and experiments.¹

Gandhi's world-view is profoundly influenced by Mayāvada, understood in the non-academic manner of the lay philosopher. Belief in the spirit apart from matter is central to his thought. "God alone is real."² But as the Upaniṣads do not negate existence of material world and Śaṅkara declares that the cognized world is different from the non-existent, its existence is granted. Unity of spirit does not exclude the existence of finite multiplicity, but neither contains multiplicity nor is affected by it. Śaṅkara says there is adhyāsa of subject and object and vivarta sṛṣṭi occurs. Gandhi holds that immutable spirit assumes the garb of mutability and materiality (Prakṛti). Īśvara's Māyā-śakti in some mysterious (anirvacanīya) manner veils the real (āvaraṇa) and projects appearances (vikṣepa) on it. Modern physics and ancient Upaniṣads agree that material world is an illusion of which the formulable essence is energy.³ Therefore, the world has an existence of the nature of real and unreal. Its reality is the reality of its spiritual ground (Brahma) and its unreality is the component of materiality (Māyā or Prakṛti) in it i. e., phenomenal world reality is derivative and dependent reality and any claim of independent or separate existence in its own right makes it unreal.⁴

The world exists for the sake of reality. Every name and form must be accepted as real because it is a manifestation, how-be-it imperfect, of the real and only through it can the real be revealed. The majority see only appearance and not the reality of the world. Yet spiritual idealism must accommodate the conception of world reality. This realism is supported primarily by the ethical argument viz., the necessity of a good life in terms of truth and non-violence, and not in terms of logical argument. The finite self and world must return to their real ground. God is in the world but world is not in God. Therefore the process is a process of negation of the unreal part of their being. Atomic energy does not surprise because dissolution of matter is absolutely certain at some point: disappearance of appearances is taught both by

1. *Speeches and Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1921), p. 245.

2. *All Men are Brothers*, p. 88.

3. *_____*. *op. cit.*, p. 351.

4. *All Men are Brothers*, p. 103.

philosophy and modern science.¹ In the spirit of Sankara Gandhi declares that in God there is no duality. Negation is ultimate and absolute, the world returns to Brahman not as world but as pure spirit.

Radhakrishnan

Radhakrishnan sums up the different meanings of Maya.² In the first place it indicates the dependent and derived being of the world; without the ground of absolute Being it cannot exist. The only way to reconcile all accounts is to hold Brahman as implying all states but independent of all. The idealist view regards the Absolute as the ideal home of infinite possibilities and creation as one actualisation out of those possibilities. The relation of the world to the Absolute is inconceivable and even to raise such a question is irrelevant because starting from the Absolute it cannot be inferred since it is not presupposed in that Absolute in any special way. Vivartavada points to transcendence of Absolute and its non-modification by world's being. This idea of one-sided dependence is opposed to the idea of organic relation (modern) because Advaita is emphatic that world-changes do not affect perfection. Evolution and novelty exist only on the cosmic side to reveal but not to add anything to the Absolute. In the second place Maya connotes mutability of the world. When it is declared that what is non-existent in the beginning and the end is also such in the middle³ it means that it is non-eternal and passing away. Therefore, the temporal, limited, non-permanent world is not ultimate reality and will come to an end. In the third place Maya expresses the Supreme Being's creative aspect, power of manifestation and delight in that manifestation. Maya as the sense of energy is potentially eternal in being. Creation is an expression of freedom i. e., self-limitation of God within the world-process. The Divine interacts with Prakṛti or Maya, and Maya associated with world-spirit makes all things sat and asat. Thought, too, demands opposition of being and non-being in experiential world, since whatever falls short of absolute reality has a mixture of both and without their conflict no world would exist. In the fourth place Maya as the

1. op. cit., p. 201.

2. vide Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, p. 800.

3. *Ākāṣhikā*, II, 6.

principle of non-knowing in the individual is Ajnana. It is the expression of self-conscious reason. Intellectual activities are derivations, selections, cut off from the whole truth, therefore a deformation of true knowledge (Avidya) having a natural result in selfishness. This is the tendency in man to identify himself with apparent self and to be exiled from maximum clarity and certainty of spiritual consciousness. Ajnana is also different from the real and the unreal and because of it man fails to know the universal principle in the world.

The Maya doctrine is thought to deny creation or spatio-temporal world in a process of change and development. But Radhakrishnan refutes this idea. In regard to time, movement and history, the logical mind is not forced to make a choice between the Absolute with an apparent multiplicity (vivartavada) and a living God working in the plural world (pariprasavada). The Supreme is both this and that. Eternity is not denial of time and history but transfiguration of time.¹ Both eternal and temporal may be real. Absolutism admits that there is no Absolute without finite process, as well as that the actual world is not a realized unity. Change is not unreal; world creation coincides with creation of time and development and history belongs to the world. Therefore, within the Absolute there is real growth, creative evolution. The temporal process is one of manifestation of reality, but actual and significant only in absolute timelessness. The conception of the Absolute is necessary as a guarantee that the historical process will be real, ordered and not chaotic. Within sphere of reality progress is possible and probable, though not applicable to reality as a whole, which means that the Absolute is not in time nor subject to development i. e., transcendent. But the same infinite God appears finite during world-process, struggles to transform imperfect into perfect and He Himself effects amelioration.² He is immanent in the world-process, organic with it and bound up with life in time, as its guide and ground i. e., progress is real to God, the future has a meaning to Him, because it refers to contrast between the ideal (plan, design, idea) and its actualisation.³ God, as

1. The Bhagavadgītā, p. 88; cf., The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 259.

2. P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India, p. 344.

3. "The Spirit in Man," G. I. P., p. 499.

personal, functions through three stages of plan, process, perfection, seen in creation, redemption and judgment. In His aspect of Vishnu He is sacrifice and shares the world's travail, pouring forth His essential nature of love to actualise His intentions to save the world.

The sequence of change in the temporal process is neither capricious nor unmeaning. Indian philosophy believes in progress because cycles are bound together by organic ties. Inner thread of continuity is never cut, the revolutions, backward eddies, epochs of decadence but strengthen the forward currents. Even Advaita does not hold that the world-process is a perpetual recurrence, or that each cycle is an exact repetition, which would exclude newness, meaning in history, there is historical fulfilment and destiny of the cosmic process.¹

In one sense human progress is part of the evolution of the world-process. Spirit rises from sleep of matter, through plant and animal life to human.² On the plane of life there is a steady upward march from variety of creatures, reptiles, monkeys, apes to Neanderthal man, primitive man, then to civilized man. At human level spirit battles with ignorance and imperfections, uses them as urge for improvement i. e., they are the very conditions of manifestations e. g., limited consciousness is to be used for opening to higher infinite self-existence, for limited and unlimited are not perpetual oppositions. Pain and suffering are corollaries of the struggle between them and advance. The historical process is no external chain of events but a succession of opportunities leading up to the crown of evolution i. e., development out of materialised into spiritualised being. Progress is the discipline of body, mind and the world of man in a spiritual way. Metaphysically, passage from the human to the spiritual level means a solution of the problem of eternal-temporal, absolute-historical, intuition-intellect, by a reconciliation in which the latter of each pair is completed in the former.³ Concretely, perfection of human existence is not ascent to a heaven above but ascent to spirit within—the new birth at the end of long and painful evolution is not a post-mortem salvation but a spiritualised humanity or kingdom of

1. *Upanishad Religion and Western Thought*, p. 88.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Schilpp, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

spirits.¹ The probability of it is seen in emergence of integral individuals, rare beings in advance of their time, fore-runners of the future race, setting the path for man. Each individual has this possibility of progress in him, the Bodhisattva indicates the divine sonship of everyman. It is difficult to imagine man without weakness, defect, limitation, impurity, poverty, but the ideal transformation of humanity is the dream of heaven or reign of God. Why may not human beings become divine as ape became human?²

If two equally permissible and reasonable interpretations of cosmic process are possible, there is no reason not to choose the one more favourable to unfoldment of the potentialities of man. The spiritual interpretation is valid and not a mere subjective sentiment.³ And spiritual evolution harmonises the humanistic conception of natural evolution of organic life, human race and institutions with the religious conception of evolution of the moral individual in accordance with his own actions.

God's active participation and guidance of the evolutionary process, His love which ensures the success of His plan, does not mean absolute predetermination of the world, which would paralyse moral effort and negate human freedom. He is to be looked upon as friend, lover, comrade, waiting for man's response to His call in order to bring about the end of the process. And man can exercise his freedom to either help in God's creative work or turn against it. Sin is refusal to respond to God's demand and virtue is participation in His purpose. Determinism of either divine dialectic or scientific dialectic is an inadequate explanation of historical events. There is play of immanent divine impulse moving to a telos automatically, but the pace of progress is determined by human efforts. There is no inevitable progress in history because man has a real choice of alternatives in personal life and making of history. The determinateness, orderliness and progressive character of the process is due to Him and the indeterminateness and ~~unpredictability~~ ~~unpredictability~~ is in reference to human cooperation as essential condition of world's process. A false analogy between natural and human existence, laws of sub-human specie and laws governing man and society leads to the erroneous assumption that the inexorable logic of world-process will move forward blindly, perhaps haltingly,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 805.

2. *An Idealist View of Life*, pp. 209, 210.

3. Kalki, p. 57.

inspite of man.¹ No autonomous law of progress realizes itself irrespective of human ideals and control. Man is no detached spectator but active agent to mould world into ideals.² He may not acquiesce in the world's imperfection from the idea that God, history or nature dictates that pattern, but is required to exercise his free-will. And civilization is the human creation of spirit, requiring vast effort of mind, will and activity.

The universe as such is always developing, never finished, because it is the realm of finiteness, which may approximate to the Infinite or Absolute but may never see it unless it becomes It. This means that since empirical life and activity is due to lack of perfect adjustment, a state of being where all desires are fulfilled and perfect harmony established is one where activity is logically inconceivable. Therefore, when the world-process reaches fulfilment (becomes infinite), life is not a going concern. Time and historical process cease.³ Not only is there a definite fulfilment of world's travail in unity of world and God, but even a fulfilment of God, by unity with the Absolute; since God is the Absolute from human view. Completion of human spirit means world has become God and both vanish in an all-embracing Absolute.⁴

Since the conception of salvation or perfection is linked with ending of time, history and world it is held that the whole is never perfected, only individuals are released, therefore time and the historical process never terminate. But endless perfectibility, perpetual effort without end of completion or perfection is a doctrine ignoring solidarity of man and nature, value and reality. Man must not only perpetually travel but must arrive, unending saṁsāra is meaningless.⁵ In terms of idealistic metaphysics it means that the present order passes but other orders will be in an endless series. The Absolute has infinite possibilities and is not to be equated to this particular process only.⁶ And there must be assurance of eventual triumph of this

1. *Selected Speeches and Writings*, Second series, p. 144.

2. *My Search for Truth*, p. 25.

3. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 307.

4. *ibid.*, pp. 340, 346.

5. *Schlipf*, op. cit., p. 45.

6. *ibid.*, p. 799; cf., *ibid.*, p. 777: Charles Hartshorne's objection that God's purpose being inexhaustible and infinite this world possibility cannot be completed and cease, does not hold because though divine purpose (Absolute) may be inexhaustible, yet it does not follow that one specific possibility (God and world) may not end.

possibility, realisation of ideal, to make life and effort meaningful. This particular world-plot must end, heaven and earth will be no more, time and history will be transcended when all are redeemed. And science also points to the winding up of the world one day. Intellect cannot think of it except in terms of time, yet the end is not in terms of time-series, but belonging to another life i. e., life eternal. World-redemption is not to be treated completely sub-specie historiae. Kant showed that the antinomy of time is not soluble within limits of the phenomenal world, therefore the end of time is not within time; end of cosmic history is to pass beyond its limits and not end in time but end of time.¹

True humanism demands that if man is to play the game of life he cannot do so with the conviction that the play is a show and the prizes are mere blanks. Such a theory is self-condemned as he is obliged to occupy himself with objects of value.² Radhakrishnan declares that there is no suggestion in the Upaniṣads that the world is a baseless fabric of fancy, since it is God's revelation of Himself.³ Vedānta does not call upon man to hate the world as a creation of a hostile demiurge, but to regard it as an expression of the Divine. Not even Śaṅkara teaches that it is a delusion or a phantom. In none of its meanings does Māyavāda stand for negative value or nothingness of the world. Some dialecticians of the past did use it as a value judgment, but generally the negative attitude is only so much as is contained in every religion which believes that reality lies beyond and behind the mundane world. All schools of Vedānta agree that reality is the non-difference of Brahman with individual self and the world. An unreal world could not be identified with the ground and be treated even as vyavahāra. ~~Phenomenal~~ or conditional character means that intellect holds world to be real, but what it grasps is not wholly or categorically real, because its reality is the reality of Brahman, but not of Brahman in its transcendent nature. Reflection shows the impossibility of the world known under empirical conditions being the real-in-itself. The real may exceed the empirical even as the world known to sight exceeds that known to touch. This involves no scepticism regarding world of knowledge and commonsense,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

2. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 46.

3. *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 62.

conclusions about which remain valid on their own premise. Its elements of plurality, change, subject-object relation are contained in the underlying reality of universal self, but they are beyond the individual self. The conclusion is that even though the world is not the highest reality it is real to the individual self, for he is not yet perfect.¹

The empirical reality of the many is valid until the higher plane is attained, then and only then is it negated in the insight into unity or oneness. Reality and existence are not metaphysical contraries. Therefore, the spiritual and metaphysical difficulties are not due to seeing of world multiplicity as such, but due to explaining the actuality of the manifold as distinct from reality. Sankara says that the whole multiplicity under name and form, in so far as having Supreme Being for essence is true, where it is regarded as self-dependent it is untrue.² Intellect holds only as a postulate: only by remembering that the world is a feeble representation of the one can man work up to the harmony which is intuited. Absolutism only says that the one pervades the world. From this fundamental unity to unreality of everything is a leap in logic not justified.³ The hasty logic that declares that because the one is real, the many are illusions is corrected in the view that the one spiritual being reveals itself in the many of the cosmic process. The conclusion is that nothing in experience is without meaning though every element has only a degree of reality, whose test is more or less approximation to the character of the real, in which there is no degree. Relative reality points to the feature of finite experience as falling short of the Absolute. The doctrine of hierarchy of grades of reality down from the Absolute is inconsistent with the theory of unreality.⁴

The problem is to explain that if reality is a spiritual unity, perfect and passionless, why should it have created a plural world. The history of philosophy is illustration of the inability of the mind to solve the relation of God to the world, greatest minds admit mystery,⁵ and coexistence of Brahman and world (tadataya), unity

1. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 70, 73.

2. S. B. on Chān. Upa., VI, 3, 2.

3. The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 49.

4. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 73.

5. Hindu View of Life, pp. 67, 68.

and plurality is explained by symbols. However, incapacity of philosophy to define is not repudiation of the world as a screen imagined by finite man. It is one thing to say that how the unchangeable reality expresses itself in the changing universe without forfeiting its nature is a mystery, and another to dismiss the whole changing universe as a mere mirage.¹ Temporality has a positive use but it has to be admitted that there comes a point at which no further deductions from it are possible. In a strictly philosophical sense the relation of reality and the world has to be reverently admitted as a mystery of logic rousing wonder and making the world more interesting than if it were wholly open to investigation and explanation of logic.

Our knowledge of the world is also not wholly true (Ajñāna). In the metaphysical sense subject and object are not distinct but two sides of a unity transcending them. But empirical knowledge is a separatist view of one aspect of the whole by another aspect, therefore partial, fragmentary and distorted knowledge. But this character of knowledge does not make it unreal. The conclusion from this is that in whatever sense the self is real in that sense is the experiential world real. And existence of things, perceptions of evil and pain and all qualities are not mental affections, but objective conditions. Even Śaṅkara grants that the world seen, felt, tasted and touched is as real as the being of man who sees etc.; the mind with its categories and the world it constructs hang together.²

It will be seen that there is no substantial difference between Radhakrishnan's view of the world and Śaṅkara's Māyāvāda. The former accepts all definitions of Māyā prevalent in Advaita: Māyā as vivarta śṛṣṭi, as Īśvara-śakti, as sat-asat, as anirvacanīya, as Ajñāna. The difference is only in interpretation and stress. One obvious point of difference is that Radhakrishnan does not base his doctrine on an epistemological analysis of perceptual illusion, because it has connotations which he expressly rejects. He seems to avoid the meaning of mithyātva, defined by Advaita as neither being nor non-being, which posits a kind of negative relation, and, instead, adopts the category of being and non-being: world is real or being because it exists

1. Indian Philosophy, II, 463.

2. *ibid.*, II, 497-498.

and non-real or non-being because its being is not absolute. This category Śaṅkara rejects as contradictory. However, examination shows that the difference between Radhakrishnan and the classical position is only apparent. For, by non-real he means that intellectual approach to reality which regards it as the creator different from the individual, and as the transcendent majesty to attain which there is desire to escape from the world-discord and struggle.¹ This is not a really real conception and disappears in the intuition of absolute unity. On the other hand, Śaṅkara does not mean to convey the meaning of total unreality, he expressly warns against the temptation of regarding the not completely real as utterly illusory, which does not exist; objective consciousness does give awareness of the real in some sense since Brahman is the Real of the real.² In other words, the world has existence and God is real from the phenomenal standpoint. Apart from the similarity of conclusions both the descriptions of real-unreal and of neither real nor unreal have the same end of giving opportunity to the spiritual aspirant to arrive at the intuition of reality.

Radhakrishnan does not indulge in the dialectical method of adhyāropāvāda in trying to establish the relation between Māyā and Brahman, because that method has greater implications of negation than he would like to admit. However, he cannot avoid the use of negative terms in a progressive attempt at self-realization, as is the case in any interpretation of Vedānta.³ Still he insists that neither Māyavāda nor "neti, neti" repudiate world-reality, but both are necessary and even valid in an absolute sense to indicate the gap between the temporal appearance and the eternal reality. For, from the direction of Brahman the world can only be negatively understood because the Infinite does not imply or presuppose the finite.⁴ But understanding it in a negative sense does not make it a negative entity: classical Advaita calls it bhāvapadārtha and Radhakrishnan calls it an actualisation of one of the infinite possibilities of the Absolute. The stress must be on the positive approach, as, metaphysically, Brahman as fullness of being makes possible whatever of positivity there is in the world. The being

1. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 29.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 87.

3. Ruth Rayna, *The Concept of Māyā*, p. 66.

4. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 340.

part of Maya is preserved in it and the non-being part will not raise any problem there. From the standpoint of the world and finite self, Brahman is positively realized in spiritual experience, because the former's existence is dependent on the latter. Everything, everywhere, is based on reality.

The doctrine of the world as sustained and directed by the Supreme is the continuation of the effort to distinguish between higher and lower, to impress the difference of the Absolute and the conditioned truth to enable transfer of attention to the ground of all value. The inexplicability-doctrine shows world to be a delimitation distinct from the unmeasured and the immeasurable. An interval exists between what separate things are and what they ought to be, for if the Absolute is understood as perfection there must be a qualitative difference between it and the standpoint of imperfection.² Thus there is immense potentiality in the world. Nothing in it is utterly perfect or utterly imperfect, and things of unvalue, disvalue and less value ever struggle to recover their full value. Radhakrishnan asserts that Vedānta wants man to shake off bondage to unreal values, not to treat the world as an illusion and show indifference to its welfare.³ Even if this conclusion be regarded as a modification of Śaṅkara's asceticism and world and life negation it is not an unwarranted and logically unjustifiable development of Māyāvāda. Radhakrishnan concentrates on the practical bearing of that doctrine on thought and conduct, instead of merely concentrating on its metaphysical or transcendental bearing.

Radhakrishnan asserts that on the question of the metaphysical status of the world Śaṅkara takes his stand on the golden mean between the exaggerated nihilism (nothingness of world) of negative and fanatical mysticism and the equally exaggerated realism of extreme materialism. "Śaṅkara has nothing in common with people who will not accept the visible world any more than those who will accept nothing else."⁴ He concludes that the idealism of Advaita and Māyāvāda is in full consonance with all the legitimate claims of realism.

1. *ibid.*, p. 397.

2. *ibid.*

3. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, p. 47.

4. *ibid.*, p. 100.

Aurobindo

Aurobindo rejects the meaning of Maya as cunning illusion and goes back to its original meaning of a comprehensive containing consciousness, capable of limitation, therefore, formative. Maya is knowledge, skill and intelligence, not the essential truth of infinite existence, but truth of creation of self-consciousness out of its own being.¹ It is the self-expression of reality in the relative sphere, its infinite power of self-manifestation under aspect of finitude; more specifically, it is the selective faculty to produce finite appearance out of infinite reality, to measure out in limitation of name and shape. This real or higher Maya is the power that creates the world and also allows infinite consciousness to emerge in the individual. A necessary stage of yogic development is attainment of this supramental Māyā that each and all coexist in inseparable unity of one, or the power of liberating spirit from its finite enclosure into clearer vision of essential totality and continuity with infinitude. Out of this cosmic or higher Māyā emerges, inevitably, the Māyā of ignorance (illusion of Māyā or Ajāñā). The veil of over-mind falls to separate mind from its source of Supermind and Vidya-Māyā and its effect in life and nature is to obscure infinite consciousness.² Thus each finite is persuaded that it is a separate being and not God, the really limited and not the illimitable, the bound and not the free.³ Through this avidyā-Māyā also knowledge or Vidya-Māyā actualises its power for the work in hand.⁴ It is a purposive self-limitation and self-oblivion of reality by engaging in exclusive movements or concentrating in particular directions for fulfilment of specific purposes. Lower Māyā acts in the universe as mind of imperfect consciousness, partly knowing, partly not knowing, capable of error and misrepresentation, a half position between jñāna and ajāñā, truth and error but, however stumblingly, it does proceed upon knowledge and towards knowledge i. e., even Ajāñā is not the principle of illusion, it is an inferior mode of operation of knowledge, partial, distorted and fragmentary knowledge, but still real. Spiritual development requires that the concealing mental play

1. *The Life Divine*, I, 121-122.

2. *ibid.*, II, 342.

3. *Yoga and Its Objects*, p. 57.

4. *The Life Divine*, II, 174.

(Avidya-Maya or Ajhana) must be first embraced and then overcome in the higher Maya of Vidya.

Aurobindo's criticism of classical Vedanta is that it overlooks the distance of higher and lower Maya and mental play is called Maya.¹ Or there is confusion between true Supermind (Divine Gnosis) and over-mind force or Vidya-action and the latter is taken for supreme creative power and is called an indescribable paradox. The theists took the over-mind lustre descending to be the true illumination and stopped there, the Mayavādins concluded that this too was Maya and lila and tried to go beyond these to some inactive silence of the Supreme.²

Creative energy is inherent in the absolute principle i. e., reality is Brahman veiled in real Yoga-Maya. The religious notion of omniscience and omnipotence of God means that the creator and creative power (śakti) are non-different like fire and power of burning. But Maya expresses unlimited freedom of Brahman from the circumstances through which He expresses Himself. The psychological representation of the transcendent Absolute or its manifestation to man is in terms of both pure being and becoming, stability and movement. By accepting both we seek to know the measureless movement in time and space with regard to timeless and spaceless pure existence.³ We must understand space to be the self-extension of spaceless Brahman for holding together of forms and objects and time to be the self-extension of timeless Brahman for deployment of movement of self-power carrying forms and objects. The how of the movement does not arise because force has eternal potentiality of both rest and movement; the why of the movement remains because self-existence is consciousness. The Vedic form of it is Sat-cit, truth-consciousness. The creator is this Supermind. The principle of both will and knowledge i. e., knowledge in the idea is not divergent from will in the idea. Bliss of Sachchidananda: reveals in infinite multiplicity i. e., world is born of ānand, lives by it, wheels from ānand to ānand. The world's existence is līlā or ecstatic dance of Śiva, its sole object is joy of dancing. All possibilities are inherent in this infinite bliss of existence in mutable becoming, but actualisation of some occurs

1. Ibid., I, 199.

2. The Middle of This World, pp. 3-4.

3. The Life Divine, I, 94.

in creation when Supermind plunges through Vidya-Maya into Avidya-Maya.¹

Creation occurs by a threefold process, which may be called sessions or poises of the Supermind or unitarian consciousness.² There is essential and self-concentrated existence in timeless eternity which contains spatio-temporal manifestation in another manner. Next is diffusion, apparent disintegration in integrality of three orders of time or whole consciousness of succession, relation of all things belonging to destined or actual creation, preceding manifestation. Finally, actual self-extension in creation, but not real disintegration, which is the processive time-movement of the working out of Sat-cit.³ Through these three steps Sat-cit exercises first the power of infinite self-variation i. e., it is many things at one time. Secondly, the power of cosmic and individualizing self-limitation i. e., each product of creation knows its own self-nature and self-truth.⁴ Thirdly, the power of self-absorption or silent withdrawal into itself which is supra-consciousness in its absolute, luminous i. e., open, explicit and manifest form and inconscience or matter in its dark, i. e., unmanifest, dormant and implicit form. From Saccidānand or reality to matter there is real continuity—other principles of reality as Supermind, over-mind, illumined-mind, higher-mind, mind and life intervene because of Māyā-śakti of Brahman from which the world arises by involution of the real.

The unity of reality cannot be identified with a particular attribute for it is indefinable by mind's largest conception and experience. It is only partial logic or Avidyā which declares that because the one is real, the many are not.⁵ In truth, spirit as Existence (Sat) is one, as Intelligence (Sat-cit) it is multiple without ceasing to be one.⁶ This is no mere juxtaposition of opposites but something perfectly natural and possible in the logic of the Infinite. Here, Māyā means the miracle of the universe that oneness finds itself infinitely in what seems to be falling away from its oneness, for "Māyā of Brahman is the logic and magic of infinitely variable oneness."⁷ As stated

1. *Ibid.*, I, 119.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 79.

3. cf., S. K. Maitra, *Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*, p. 20.

4. e. g., setting up of mind, life and matter as independent processes.

5. *The Life Divine*, I, 41.

6. *The Ideal of the Karmayogin*, pp. 91-92.

7. *The Life Divine*, II, 56.

before, the three poises of Supermind are: the inalienable unity of things, modification of unity to support manifestation of many in one and one in many, further modification to support evolution of diversified individual, which by action of ignorance (Avidyā-Māya) becomes in man, at lower level, illusion of separate ego or divided and individualised soul excluding all others. But it must be noted that even at the level of Avidyā there is no dualism, for Avidyā does not exist in the indivisible unity of Saccidānand nor in Supermind, nor even in the divine soul, but only on the plane of mind and, therefore, it cannot affect the unity of Saccidānand.

In the Vedas ignorance is called Adevi-Māyā, partial, distorted view. In the Upaniṣads a distinction is made between Vidyā or knowledge of the one and Avidyā or knowledge of the many divorced from the one, but there is no opposition between them. It is Advaita which separates them and calls Avidyā unreal, with the result that one and many are also made irreconcilable.¹ Real or integral Advaita is not affected by mental ideas of unity and multiplicity both of which are necessary to each other. But the one is never plural, nor a sum of the many. Pluralism is an error, for the many are dependent on the one and interdependent, but plurality is real because one soul dwells as the individual in many souls.² "Sarvam idam" does not contradict unity or establish bheda. One intelligence looks at itself from hundred viewpoints. One particular self-expression may disappear in its source but phenomena are not abolished. One is for ever and many is for ever because one is for ever. As long as the sea, so long the waves. Advaita means overcoming pluralism. The error is not so much in seeing variety and harmony as in the failure to see unity, which is supreme over the other two. Unity is not contrasted to variety but permeating it. God is not one among the many, but is totally unrelated and unaffected. By whatever path we follow, the final result of knowledge becomes one. Science confirms in the domain of matter conclusions arrived at by different methods of Vedānta. While the latter describes things in the cosmos to be one seed arranged by universal energy in multitudinous form,³ science discovers universal energy amidst complex multiplicity. This unity could be no other than divine reality to be

1. *Ibid.*, I, 201, 202.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 50.

3. *Sve. Upa.*, VI, 12.

known from within and not from without by piecing together elements.¹

Materialistic evolution eliminates any intelligent cause of the development of indeterminate matter, makes life and mind develop out of matter only, instead of seeing all three as manifestations of one truth, makes all resultants of previous causes and thus eliminates mystery; makes the principle of struggle the means of evolution instead of the principle of mutual help; makes matter alone determinant of evolution rather than matter, life and mind all working together; makes evolution a slow and gradual process in a straight line, whereas history shows alternations of progress and recoil i. e., a cyclic process.² The cosmic evolution is not to be determined by mechanical principles, but by the spiritual conception wherein reality of Sacchidanand having involved itself in creative movement down to inconscience in matter, emerges out of it to evolve upward by stages, back to its source. Evolution of consciousness is an integral movement of three aspects of widening of the field of each emergent principle i. e., differentiation, organisation, variety of expressions and adaptations; of heightening i. e., ascent from grade to grade, the lower into higher; of integration i. e., taking much of the lower into the higher and transforming it.³ The lower evolute is not doomed to destruction or always condemned to remain at that level, nor is the higher evolute dissociated from all lower principles. Spiritual evolution is more fundamental than the material; though integral evolution justifies and gives meaning to scientific theory of evolution in time, which is seen opaquely through study of matter and force, the evolution of consciousness is not identical with theory of form-evolution, physical life-evolution; the latter may be accepted as support, but is not indispensable to the former. The outer visible mechanism and process of scientific evolution does not affect the self-evident fact of spiritual evolution. But it does point to bodies becoming more complex, organised, therefore, capable of housing more evolved consciousness and to a gradual and necessary succession of evolutes.

Cosmic evolution contains within it the evolution of the human race and that

1. Hariharas Chandhuri and Frederic Spiegelberg, *The Integral Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo*, pp. 121, 122.

2. *Evolution*, p. 59.

3. *The Life Divine*, II, 512.

contains within it the evolution of the individual. History is the expression of man's destiny and that destiny is neither indefinite nor chaotic. The spiritual principle involved in world and man is moving through both to a definite goal. Destiny without destination is absolutely meaningless. Progressus ad infinitum is a contradiction in terms, at the same time attainment of a definite goal as the last word in the process of evolution, progressus ad finitum, is to ignore infinite character and inexhaustible richness of the Absolute. To steer clear of both difficulties Aurobindo advocates the idea of a definite goal controlling evolution throughout. But this will not end evolution: the end is ascent of man into spirit here and descent of spirit into normal humanity and transformation of earthly nature. Or, more concretely, perfection is attained when the material, moral, intellectual and spiritual transformation in man and universe coincides.¹ This will be no post-mortem salvation or ascent of man into heaven, but a real birth for which humanity waits, as the crowning moment of its long, obscure and painful course.² Superman is a being in whom Supermind has descended, gnostic being with supra-consciousness, a race of such beings in a new universe. Not that the whole race would rise in a block to supramental level, but that when a certain stress of evolutionary impetus is reached in the human mind, it will be capable of pressing forward to a new plane of consciousness and its embodiment in the being. Attainment of divine life in terrestrial life and physical body is possible and inevitable. But though the supramental being and life will be very noble, yet it is not God. Therefore, the process of evolution will not stop, only it will undergo radical change, from evolution through ignorance, zig-zag, slow with errors and set-backs into evolution through knowledge, march of truth to truth, glory to glory, new era of infinitely variable self-expression in truth, love and beauty. Knowledge itself has many grades, therefore evolution would continue upward to attain emergence of Saccidānand. Complete fruition of present cycle of evolution would perhaps be followed by other cycles of evolution and modes of self-fulfilment of the Divine.

The created world is not finished or static. A non-evolutionary world is

1. *Life and Glimpses*, p. 39.

2. *The Human Cycle*, p. 329.

limited to its own harmony like a life-heaven. But earth is evolutionary world because it is not glorious or harmonious, even in its lowest material aspect. It is sorrowful, disharmonious, imperfect, yet in that there is the urge to higher and many-sided perfection. It contains the last finite which yet attains to Supreme Infinite.¹ Such a transformation is inevitable because embodiment is not of life but of consciousness, which having come to the stage of mind can develop to Supermind. There is no reason for life to evolve out of matter and mind from living forms unless it is accepted that life is already involved in matter, mind in life, therefore there is no objection to the further step in the series that the mental consciousness may itself be a veiled form of higher state, hence unconquerable impulse of man to "wisdom" is simply means by which nature tries to evolve beyond mind.² There are intimations of higher levels of consciousness-existence in human experience in the form of intuition, which is projection of higher grade of consciousness of self-manifesting spirit into mind of ignorance, in the form of mind's exceeding of ego limitations to see in their impersonality and universality, in the form of genius which is penetration from above into mental limits, in the form of mystic experience. Examination of human consciousness to ascertain signs of higher destiny shows spiritual aspiration to possess the divine being in animal and egoistic consciousness, to convert physical mentality into supramental illumination, to build peace-bliss in place of physical pain, emotional suffering, to establish infinite freedom in the world of mechanical necessities, to discover immortal life in mortal changing body, and apart from all these the spiritual urge to self-exceeding. Man does conceive a supreme state as an absolute of all his aspirations—knowledge without shadow of error, bliss without experience of suffering, power without denial of incapacity, purity, plenitude without sense of defect and limitation i. e., a dream of heaven or human perfection.³ The ideal is expressed in the religious symbol of avatāra i. e., conquest of all by spirit.

The most important part of man's nature is his mentality and here evolution takes place by conflict of ideas applied to life or reality. Man's present actuality

¹ Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 187.

² The Life Divine, I, 3, 4, 7.

³ Ibid., I, 66, 67; cf., ibid., II, 672.

is the form-value-power to which nature and life have attained but his potentiality expressed in ideals points to new forms etc. The ideal is yet unreal because discovery of spiritual truth and its application to life is difficult but man's idealism is the most human thing about him. But this is significant only when mental idealism is converted into spiritual realism. Ideals are aspects in the world-consciousness as basis of working of world-power. Creative Divinity's order is the real, the idea, the phenomena.¹ It is difficult for the customary human mind to conceive a human existence radically changed, idealised, spiritualised. Man's position in regard to higher evolution is like that of the original ape of Darwinian theory in regard to the present development of man.² But the very sense of impossibility is the beginning of all possibility. The temporal world is a paradox i. e., impossibility, therefore the Eternal created it out of His being. Impossibility is only a sum of greater unrealized possibilities.

To live rightly means to know rightly laws of nature and one's own nature, but nature is not fixed, static, no eternal right rule but a progression having eternal being in it. Therefore, evolutionary philosophy gives fundamental existential human responsibility in regard to human progress. The problem of man's effort turns on the question of determination and indetermination. Though the determining factor of historical process is not the principle of causality (material), yet to get rid of that is not to pass into complete indeterminism. From lower determination one passes to higher or complete self-determination, even more determinate than the lower, because the supreme spirit has its own logic.³ In cosmic evolution advent of Supramental truth is inevitable, even the question of when and how is decided, predestined from somewhere above.⁴ The argument is that if there is divine omniscience-omnipotence then all is foreseeable and man needs to do nothing. However, for the terrestrial world this predestined result is hidden, man only sees a whirl of possibilities, forces, attempting to achieve something and destiny of it all concealed from his eyes. Moreover, not all

1. Ideals and progress, p. 2.

2. The Life Divine, I, 66.

3. *ibid.*, I, 399.

4. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 67.

possibilities are realized, some fail, are half manifested or precipitate their results in more complete creation.¹ The predestined is being fought out in world and man's life amid a state of rather grim clash of conflicting forces i. e., imperfect world conditions. In this working out of possibilities in time, the play of spiritual, moral, mental, physical forces, no absolute rigidity is discernible, nor is there any blind, inconscient chance.² Personal will is one among the many forces at play in the world. From the standpoint of the principle of integral evolution that each plane inspite of connection below and above is a world in itself, having its own movement, force, being, types, forms, it means that a call from within the lower as well as from above is needed to realize all possibilities.³ Since evolution occurs by cooperation from the "upward tending force from below" and "upward drawing force from above," man's responsibility is to follow the upward urge of aspiration to higher consciousness. For only through growth of individual can cosmic spirit organize the collective being and make it expressive. His duty is to use the material instruments at hand to exceed himself, to gather fragmentary being into complete being, to master his own environment and apply it to world-perfection, union and harmony.

Aurobindo's stand on the question of world-reality may now be examined. There are three alternative world-views.⁴ The cosmic terrestrial view of the world holds life in material world of nature as the only reality. The opposite or supra-cosmic view holds supreme reality to be the sole reality and the world as having no meaning. An intermediate, supra-terrestrial or other-worldly view allows the material world to be real, but other worlds to have more permanent duration. In the second view of Śaṅkara Māyā is the original consciousness and power creative of illusion and unrealities, with the mind as its medium in human and animal consciousness, so that the world is unreal and some indeterminable Absolute is real. Śaṅkara was right in holding the mystery of the world to be supra-rational, but because he failed to take a further step he posited the unreal reality (vyāvahārika sattā) of the world⁵ i. e., a particular type of order

1. The Middle of This World, p. 11.
2. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, Second series, p. 264.
3. The Middle of This World, pp. 9-10.
4. vide The Life Divine, II, 456.
5. Ibid., II, 206.

or level of reality, real from standpoint of Maya-Avidya, but false from the standpoint of transcendental reality. It will be seen that this is not a categorical denial of the world, but affirmation of it as a mystery or anirvacaniya. This qualified illusionism of Sankara does provide rational solution of the opposition afflicting the mind, two orders of the transcendental and pragmatic, absolute and phenomenal, eternal and temporal (relative). But it is difficult to see why if reality is conceded to self and the world, it should not be true reality in its own right.¹ Similarly, it is true that Vedanta cannot avoid negation, which is one factor in affirmation of spirit and transformation of life. Recoil of life and mind from life is valid since there is perception of illusion of human effort, social gospels, ethical efforts at perfection; philosophically and logically speaking, from one sole reality it is possible to deduce unreality of other grades of reality and states of consciousness, but there is no reason to make negation universal and absolute or to consider the recoil of life and mind as valid conclusively.² Mayavada creates more difficulties than it solves. It drastically simplifies the problem of existence by nullifying it and thus causing separation from nature and world in any meaning of Maya that it gives viz., no reality (asat), equilibrium of things (Prakṛti or matter), something-nothing (sat-asat), our idea (bhāva) or contradicted by knowledge (jñāna-virodhi). In fact, Maya must be taken as immutable and permanent in the Real.

Mayavada takes the stand that the world is founded on one part of truth (Avidya), therefore all is half-truth, half-error in it. Avidya-Maya is consciousness of creation as limited and perverted because it is separated from the integral light of Sacchidanand. One modification of Prakṛti and Avidyā illumined by spirit is this ignorance which has a locus in the human mind. Advaita rightly holds that the world as normally experienced or as appearing to man or as thought to be existent in its own right is unreal. But it is wrong in ignoring that what is erroneous is our ignorant perception of the world rather than the multiform content of the world itself. Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, insists with Advaita that intellect holds world to be real but what it grasps is

1. *Ibid.*, II, 194, 195.

2. *Ibid.*, II, 147.

not wholly, categorically real. Even Aurobindo cannot reject the argument that the world's reality is the reality of Brahman, but not of Brahman-as-such i. e., Sacchidanand or absolute transcendence.

According to Aurobindo, Maya is one realization, an important one, which Sankara over-stressed; the word should be left for subordinate use and the attention fixed on the idea of lila—it includes and exceeds Maya and has not its association of the vanity of things.¹ There is no real reason not to grant the real reality of the world because the supra-rational consciousness maintains and surpasses it. The cosmic must depend on supra-cosmic, time must have significance for the timeless eternity in Brahman. The world may be temporary (temporal), but not to be condemned for that reason.² Its changing character proves it to be a different order of reality, but not transcendently unreal. Since the dynamics of the Absolute is present as inherent force it need not create illusion, creations of the real must be real. Omnipresent reality is annulled by non-being or by being (universe) at either end. Out of the silence of that non-being proceeds the activity of world creation (being and becoming) and both are eternal.³ Detached reason and mystic intuition agree that eternity is fundamental to reality, but reality of change also cannot be denied. They cannot be made discontinuous, nor can one of them be an illusion. In fact, akṣara and kṣara are poles of supreme spirit (Paruṣottama). Māyāvāda accepts only one aspect of Vedāntic truth when it insists that the Absolute cannot be bound to manifest the universe, it misses the other aspect which is that it also cannot be bound not to manifest, therefore in the realization of truth there is no inevitable consequence of a rejection of the truth of change or universe. Vivartavāda denies causation but it presupposes paripāma, for "to establish monism Vedānta must simultaneously assert and deny the manifold in the identity of being and logically affirmation goes before denial, is before is not."⁴ This is admitted by Sarvajñāta in Saṅkṣepa Śārīraka when he explains away paripāma as nearest to Vivarta and as leading people to vivarta.⁵

1. *Lila and Its Objects*, pp. 55-56.

2. *The Life Divine*, II, 196.

3. *Ibid.*, I, 40.

4. N. N. Srinar, *Comparative Studies in Vedānta*, p. 105.

5. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 45.

As against the perpetual opposition between beyond and here, reality and world, found in Buddhism and a certain type of monism there is another indubitable experience that the Divine is here and in everything as well as above. From the standpoint of Vidya free from Avidya the idea of world as self-existent disappears but the world is perceived as eternally, essentially dependant on Brahman, a rhythmic manifestation of it, and "as manifestation of the real it is itself real."¹ The world does not reveal the Divine immediately and wholly, only because there is progressive self-expression through a hierarchy of reals viz., matter, life, mind, value, whose imperfection is destined to disappear in the course of evolution. The reality of the world may be designated as "derivative reality." If this were the meaning of mithya, real-unreal or indescribable in Mayavada it would be unobjectionable, but this is a very unusual meaning of it.² It may be noted, however, that Radhakrishnan has given the primary meaning of Maya as dependent and derived being of the world; Maya denotes the fragility of the world for without the absolute ground it cannot exist.³ This has also been emphasized in classical Advaita and is the major meaning of Mayavada.⁴ But Aurobindo continues to insist that real monism must not bisect real existence into truth and falsehood, self and not-self, real self and unreal self as Advaita has done.⁵ It must be realistic Vedanta. When the Vedantic formula, "One without a second," is read in the light of the other formula, "All this is Brahman," there is no reality not reflecting descent of the Absolute into the finite. Thus the central tenet of idealism—inmost essence of reality is consciousness—is not incongruous with or destructive of realism of world and life. Whereas the Advaita monism denies phenomena which is the substantial form of truth and the materialist denies intelligent consciousness, integral Vedanta recognises both, it holds world to be real but identical with Brahman, who transcends it.⁶ It is a synthetic view of the world in which existence is a becoming with divine being for origin and object, a progressive manifestation, a spiritual evolution, with the supra-cosmic for

1. Letters of Sri Aurobindo, First series, p. 61.

2. Haridas Chaudhari, The Philosophy of Integralism, p. 122.

3. vide supra, p. 748.

4. vide infra, p. 782.

5. The Life Divine, II, 38.

6. The Ideal of the Karmayogin, p. 44.

its support, the other-worldly for its condition and connecting link and the cosmic-terrestrial for its field.¹

In spite of Aurobindo's criticisms of Mayāvāda it cannot but be granted that such a doctrine is essential to meet the deeper implications of spiritual life. Aurobindo also starts from the premise that reality is identical with the inmost self, the rediscovery of this forgotten identity must involve an element of negation and transcendence of the veils or errors which hide it from us. He grants that there is negation, but refuses to make it absolute. He is, however, bound to grant that the negated element cannot be carried into that reality and is, to that extent, rightly called unreal. This is also, in effect, the meaning of Aurobindo:

I have not said that everything except supramental truth is falsehood, only that there is no complete truth below it. In over-mind the whole and harmonious truth enters into separation of parts, many truths fronting each other to fulfil themselves in worlds of their own or to combine in world's make-up of separated truth and truth forces. Lower down fragmentation is pronounced and positive error, falsehood, ignorance and inconscience (matter) occurs.²

This admission that there is no complete truth below supermind justifies Mayāvāda-position of the real-unreal or phenomenal truth of the world, and its insistence on negation as an ultimate fact.

The transcendental nature of reality created a dilemma for Śaṅkara. If the world is real, then it is either dependent or independent of Brahman. In the first alternative it would become an integral part of Brahman and would affect its unity, and in the second it would create the problem of dualism.³ In Mayāvāda he found a solution for this spiritual and metaphysical predicament by making the world an existent fact of experience (vyavahāra) but not of reality (paramārtha). Aurobindo's solution for this dilemma is the logic of the Infinite whereby both Advaita and world-reality is established. Śaṅkara's difficulty is to explain that if Māyā and its products are adhyāsa or alien projections how does Māyā come to operate in the Absolute or how does the mind fall into ignorance? In effect, Mayāvāda amounts to the admission that reason cannot grasp the mystery of how the secondless reality becomes the manifold of the world.

1. *The Life Divine*, II, 456.

2. *The Middle of This World*, p. 58.

3. *Ram Shankar Misra, The Integral Advaitism of Aurobindo*, p. 1.

Aurobindo's difficulty consists in sustaining the contradiction of both being and non-being in a transcendental reality. In effect, the higher logic amounts either to conceiving reality as actually changed into the world, partly or wholly (pariṇāma) or merely asserting that both aspects of absolute and relative, transcendental and phenomenal, infinite and finite, perfection and imperfection are equally real and eternal.

The differences in the conclusions of the two arise from the fact of their different approaches to reality. Śaṅkara's interest is centred in the Absolute and his method is an epistemological and dialectical analysis of error and its correction by the method of adhyāropapavāda. Aurobindo is more interested in working out a theory of creation and evolution, but does not support it sufficiently in terms of an analysis of the knowledge process. By standing on the ground of formal logic Śaṅkara is led to the conclusion that the idea of pariṇāma in the Absolute is self-contradictory. By standing on the ground of infinite logic Aurobindo is led to the conclusion that pariṇāma and Absolute are not incompatible. Radhakrishnan does not resort to infinite logic but suggests a via media in his idealistic view which offers fullest scope for change and progress within the Absolute, but keeps the reality as a whole outside the concept of time and development. A further examination of Māyāvāda is necessary to judge the exact status of pariṇāma in it and its relation with vivartavāda. This would help in the ~~clarification~~ clarification of the wider question whether Advaitic idealism is exclusive of realism or not.

Role of Māyāvāda

At the outset, it is necessary to clear the question of the importance of Māyāvāda in Advaita-darśana. One view¹ is that Māyāvāda is non-essential to Vedānta, it merely goes out of its way to explain world-contradictions. There need be no confusion of the problems of reality and Māyā because Advaita rests on the fact of experience of unity. First the unquestionable truth of sole reality of pure consciousness is proved by analysis of states of self, then the world-variety is derived from it. The opposite view² is that the approach of Māyāvāda to ultimate reality is fundamentally

1. A. Erismanaswami Iyer, Vedānta or the Science of Reality, p. 169.

2. Rayna, op. cit., p. 5.

correct metaphysics, for, without Maya the identity of Atman and Brahman, the unreality of phenomena apart from Atman and the unity of existence could not be posited. The separation sought to be created between the ontology and the cosmology of Advaita in the first view is not true to its spirit. The stand of Advaita is that only Maya explains the appearance of diversity while guarding against the inconsistency of attributing change to the changeless and transcendental reality. Even the critic admits that condemnation of the attempt at intellectual derivation of the world from unity in Mayavada is to be understood not merely as admission of inability but as revelation of the nature of the problem of the one and the many, the relative and the absolute, the empirical and the transcendental, therefore, to this extent, it is conceded that Mayavada is integral to Vedanta.¹

It is expressly declared that the unity of Brahman can be proved only by proving the unreality of the world.² This pluralistic world has to be assumed as a matter of necessity since it cannot be discarded abruptly, but it turns the adhaka in the direction of the one. The Advaita analysis of reality shows that if reality is unrealized there is sustained manifestation of manifold appearances which fact logically leads to the conclusion that non-realization is due to Maya. It is objected that the conception of metaphysical unreality of manifold appearances is illogical but "Vedantism establishes absolute monism by empirically explaining phenomenal order as based on noumenon and by transcendently dislodging all connection between them."³ There are three steps of the dislodging process. The man on the street regards Maya to be real, vastavi, the metaphysician trusting his intellect calls it neither real nor unreal, anirvacaniya, and the learned in scriptures considers it as unreal, tuccha.⁴ The names and forms superimposed on Brahman as picture on the canvas, when realized to be such adhyāsa, as the man seeing his reflection in water knows it to be unreal, then the real nature of Brahman is known. While the world continues to appear, its cognition as real must be given up to set intellect free to contemplate Brahman. And the superficial cognition of

1. *ibid.*, loc. cit.

2. *vide Advaitasiddhi*, sec. I.

3. M. N. Sircar, *The Systems of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, p. 34.

4. *Pañcadakī*, VI, 130.

Brahman in objects has to be made constant by contemplation. When satya etc. nature is seen the cognition of nama-rupa vanishes.¹ In terms of the epistemological analysis of perceptual error the snake is first present and believed as real; next, that error is corrected by knowledge of rope as locus; finally, the contemplation of the corrected locus ends in affirmation of it as real. The appearance remains as a presentation though endowed with the new feature of unreality. In terms of spiritual progress it means that the disillusionment brought about by transience, anityata, of phenomenal plurality indicates something beyond it, and both are then synthesised in an experience negating all sense of difference. Thus Mayāvada and Brahmavada are not mutually incompatible. For, theoretically, Mayāvada establishes unity as the necessary prerequisite of appearance and, practically, only a radical rejection of Maya can lead to the realization of this unity. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī sums up the position well: to establish Advaita the manifold must be simultaneously asserted and denied in Brahman, were it altogether denied in Brahman there would arise the possibility of its being thought an independent existence.² Thus, Mayāvada may be regarded not merely as an intellectual feat,³ but as an important instrument of spiritual training and development; it gives man the initial hint to understand both his own nature and that of the mysterious universe, and also leads him to the goal of his spiritual quest.

Meaning of Māyā

The concept of Māyā appears in the Śruti in the sense of supernatural power, mysterious will, wonderful skill and also in the sense of magical delusion. Even there it is possible to understand it either as the principle of creation i. e., as cause corresponding to the meaning of power, śakti, or as phenomenal creation i. e., as effect corresponding to the meaning of illusion and appearance.⁴ Thus, the Upaniṣads have a dual approach to reality; from the transcendental standpoint the acosmic view of Maya is propounded—vivarta is the illusory show of the universe on the one reality, niṣprapañca Brahman; from the empirical standpoint the cosmic view of Māyā is propounded—parinama

1. *Ibid.*, XIII, 93, 100.

2. *Advaitasiddhi*, (Kumbakonam ed.), pp. 62-63.

3. *cf.*, V. P. Upadhyaya, *New Lights on Vedānta*, p. 94.

4. *Prabhu Dutt Sastri, The Doctrine of Māyā*, p. 31.

explains it as actual transformation or emanation of reality, *saprapanica Brahman*. One point of debate between the Vedantic schools is whether *Māyā* is taught by the three *Prasthanas* or not. Śaṅkara and his followers concede that the cosmic view is discussed by the *Sūtrakara*, but insist that the main teaching of *acosmism* is hinted at.¹ If the *Gīta* and the *Brahma-Sūtra* give more prominence to the cosmic view, then the logical inconsistency of *Brahman* dwelling in his modifications as material cause while yet separate from them is overcome only by reference to *Śruti pramāṇa*. But *Advaita* advances *Māyāvāda* as a solution of this inconsistency. In *Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍūkya-Kārika* is seen the evolution of the distinctive form of *acosmism* out of *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* through *Advaita* and *ajātavāda*. He begins his argument (*Āgama prakāraṇa*) by taking the position that *Māyā* is not a real existence but an appearance of *Advaita*, therefore realization only means the destruction of an illusion. He goes on to argue (*Vaitathya prakāraṇa*) that world and dreams are alike in being perceived by some self (*dṛṣyamānatva*), one externally and the other internally, therefore both are equally unreal. Further (*Advaita prakāraṇa*), *Ātman* though appearing to give birth to multiplicity is unaffected just as infinite *ākāśa* by finite *ghatakāśa* i. e., *Māyā* depends on *Ātman* for giving rise to *saṁghāta* which delude even the *Ātman*. He concludes (*Alāta-sānti*) that *sat-cit* is unborn, *ajāta*, but only appears to admit creation without being affected as motion does not affect the firebrand; motion and causality are indescribable and with the ending of faith in them the world is nowhere. From the standpoint of pure absolutism *saṁsāra* is *vitathya* and its cause, *Māyā*, is *mithyā*.

Śaṅkara incorporated earlier meanings of *Māyā* and made it a many-sided doctrine. It is both the power of reality and its effects, inconceivably presenting reality broken up as subject and object, which reality is not. Firstly, it means the creative power of the omnipotent and omniscient Lord.² The world is displayed by *Māyā* acting in the form of intelligence, will and activity of *Brahman*³ i. e., *jñāna-śakti* combining with *kriyā-śakti* appears as *satya saṁkalpa* to become many. Secondly, *Māyā* means the ideal universe in God's mind before creation called *Prakṛti* or

1. *Prasthanas*, I, 14.

2. S. R. on B. G., Intro.

3. Suresvara, *Dakṣiṇa Mūrti Stotra*, II, 33-34.

aksara:¹ God knows the unevolved nama-rupa.² Thirdly, Maya means that the created universe is a mystery (anirvacaniya) because it is not explained by catuṣkoṭi nyaya. Fourthly, Maya is Avidya or wrong knowledge which causes adhyasa or superimposition of nama-rupa on reality depending on and veiling it. The bhūtas, antahkarana and indriyas are the many sheaths of Avidya connected with the divisive, limitative and exclusive consciousness of upādhis. Avidyā working at level of upādhis is involved in God's knowledge but does not affect it. One reality itself unrealized through Avidyā gives rise to phenomena, pseudo realities which are real for practical purposes.³ According to abhāsavāda, the many images of the moon on water appear real until the moon is perceived, but, at the same time, there are no images unless the moon illumines.⁴ There is no contradiction in holding that that which transcends time, space and causation may be source, substratum of its opposite. Avidyā is the modifying medium as well as the effectuating principle or diversifying force responsible for eliciting diverse appearances from reality. Together with its modifications it serves as the many receptacles and media of appearances of reality. According to pratibimbavāda the moon reflected in the receptacle, water, is as real as the original moon in the sky, the bimba, because identical with it, but in empirical experience it appears different from it because it is wrongly located. This error arises due to the attitude of the cognising mind, Māyā or Avidyā, which is the standing receptacle of the primordial reflection of the one bimba. According to avacchedakavāda the unlimited, all-pervasive continuum of bhāsa appears limited by different adjuncts i. e., Avidyā and its modifications of mind etc. limit cit-anand into enclosed finite portions.

Śaṅkara held that adhyāsa is appearance in a different substratum of the form of an object cognised in the past. Vācaspati and Prakāśānand interpret this as an anirvacaniya appearance in a real substratum similar to the form of an object, existing elsewhere. Even on the empirical plane the relation of cause and effect is not found between two explicables e. g., rope and shell, or two inexplicables e. g., illusory

1. G., VII, 25: Triguṇātīkā. Also XIII, 29: Mula Prakṛti.

2. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 5.

3. Sureśvara, Bhāṣya-Vārttika, (Poona ed.), p. 1003.

4. *ibid.*, p. 915.

snake and illusory silver, or an inexplicable and an explicable e. g., illusory serpent and real rope, but between an explicable and an inexplicable e. g., shell and false silver.¹ Thus the world is an inexplicable effect of an explicable reality. Advaita is careful to distinguish its position from other theories of erroneous perception.

Asatkhyati stands at one end as the appearance of the non-real, *tuccha*, in false perception. The Advaita objection is that what is generated by the unreal cannot be other than unreal, if the unreal could generate anything at all, only the *atuccha* appears in illusion as unreal.² The *asat* is not *tuccha* since it is expressed by a word and the thing denoted must be different from the word, hence real. What is denoted by it is not void but indeterminate *Māya*. At the other end stand *atmakhyati*, *satkhyati* and *anyathākhyati*, as the appearance of something real in the false perception.

Anirvacanīyākhyati emerges from a critical review of these theories also.³ As between the appearance of the non-real and the appearance of something real stands this theory of the appearance of something relatively real and non-real in illusory perception.

Māya as *Avidyā* has been shown as the explanation of world-appearance. It is unreal when imagined that one Brahman is made up of many accidental attributes, that the world exists independently, that it evolves from Brahman in a material sense (*paripāma*), that *jīva* is separate from a world existing outside of it.

The Advaita theory of the world or subject-object experience as a cosmic illusion on the substratum of pure consciousness due to *Avidyā* is rejected by the *Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins*. *Rāmānuja* holds all experience to give only true knowledge of facts. *Avidyā* exists only in the *jīva*, counteracting the knowledge of essential nature and kinship of *jīva* with Brahman, the inner controller, and consequently causing false identification of self with the body. *Madhva* explains illusory perception as wrong location due to defective vision. God's omniscience is not *Avidyā* or false appearance, but *Avidyā* does veil the natural knowledge and bliss of *jīvas*; each has a specific

1. *Bhāṣati*, 513, 8-514, 4.

2. *Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 163.

3. *Māyā* — *Māra* finds *viperītakhyati* of the *Bhāṭtas* and *anyathākhyati* of *Nyāya* to be acceptable for practical purposes, but it is reduced to a form indistinguishable from *anirvacanīyākhyati*. *Vācaspati* carries forward this trend to effect a merger in the *Bhāṣati*.

avidya and there is no generic Avidya veiling the knowledge of all souls. Vallabha holds that illusion is due to Avidya which dims the vision of truth and gives a distorted view of the thing, but this does not distort the thing itself i. e., illusory perception is only the epistemological function of Avidya, which creates difference-consciousness where none exists, but there is no creative function of Avidya as in Advaita.¹ For Rimbarka also Avidya is but the egoistic consciousness in the individual, an effect of the creative power of Maya.

Ramanuja calls Maya the creative principle (Prakṛti) underlying nature's operations, it is inert and controlled by Isvara to realize His will. It is eternal as well as positive. The pure form of acit is suddha sattva, eternal and productive of bliss and knowledge, constituting the manifestation of Brahman or nitya-vibhūti. Mixed sattva, Prakṛti, Avidya or Maya is the means of lila-vibhūti or empirical manifestation and it is mutable. It is the material cause which is undifferentiated in Kāraṇa Brahma, and in creation constituting the body of Brahman i. e., the world is real as Kārya Brahma.

Rimbarka agrees with Ramanuja's conception of Maya as the inconceivable power of God. Brahman is the material and efficient cause transforming Himself into the world without accessory conditions, by His own will-power i. e., there occurs a modification of cit-śakti and acit-śakti in creation but His essential nature remains unmodified, avyākṛta, transcendent of jīva, jagat and even Himself.

Madhva holds that Māyā or Prakṛti is God's will, iccha, svarūpa-śakti of God, subordinate (paratantra) to Him alone.² God puts forth only a small part of His will and knowledge characterized by bliss, for creation. As His outer form, bahiṣṭa rūpa, it is the material cause Prakṛti, which is modified into real forms, vikāras, while God and jīva remain unmodified (avikṛta).

Vallabha also holds that Māyā is Īśvara-śakti to create the world-order, either in evolution, avirbhāva, or in involution, tirobhāva. Since power is non-different from God the power-holder, Pure Brahman Himself unmodified, avikṛta, is the cause as

¹ Śuddhādvaita-Mārtanda makes a difference between Māyā as metaphysical and Avidya as epistemological principle but not Vallabha in his Subodhinī on the Bhagavat.

2. Aṅga-Vyākhyāna, II, 2, 1-20.

wall as the world-effects.

The theists stress that in nature Maya is creation-evolution and in supernature it is self-expression in delight. Maya is the material cause, and Isvara is the efficient cause. But all emphasise the identity of the two since material cause is not independent. It is a real power energised by Isvara and subordinate to His will. Madhva is the only theist who denies identity of Maya and Brahman; it is distinguished from God by visesa or particularity. "Generally maya means mysterious power of creation and rarely, even in Saṅkara, absolute unreality."¹ Maya and Brahman are related as heat and fire. Therefore God's power is only unreal when thought of as separate from God. But Advaita accepts this meaning of Maya only in connection with the world i. e., Maya is positive but not eternal. For which reason all the theists attack the doctrine and claim to have demolished and discarded Maya. Their contention is that the world is metaphysically real though its knowledge may be erroneous. Saṅkara is objectifying avidyā, transforming it from an epistemological principle to a metaphysical one i. e., confusing truth and falsity, which are criteria of knowledge, with reality and unreality, which are attributes of being.² If Maya is positive it must pass investigation and Advaita cannot avoid this necessity by calling it inexplicable because it is using the concept to explain the world.³ The theists accuse Advaita of creating dualism by postulating Maya.⁴ It seems that if the theistic conception of śakti in Brahman can be said to be referring to something not an other to Brahman then neither is Advaita Maya an other. Whether theism makes Maya identical with or different from Isvara its retention does create the metaphysical difficulty of dualism. To overcome this difficulty Vaiṣṇava Vedānta also is forced to call Maya the "inexplicable" power of Isvara which is, logically speaking, not a better description than to call it "inexplicable mystery of reason," as in Advaita Vedānta.

1. P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 403.

2. Advaita rebuts the charge of philosophical confusion by insisting on the reality of al experience, wherein knowledge and being do coincide.

3. cf., S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, II, 220-221.

4. e. g., Vallabha's argument is: if Maya is produced then Brahman as its cause must be determinate and qualified; if it is unproduced then it is an eternal reality besides Brahman, in which case neither occasional appearance and disappearance of the world nor the destruction of unproduced Maya can be explained, therefore it is an irrational doctrine.

Dialectic on Mithyatva

One of the main targets of theistic attack is the concept of anirvacaniyata understood as mithya. Madhusudana Saraswati gives five meanings of mithya (panca-mithyatva) accepted in Advaita darsana. Following Padmapada's definition in the *Pañcapadika* he defines falsity as inexplicable and inconceivable as neither receptacle of existence nor non-existence, .¹ The criticism that indefinability is itself a definition, a thing may not be properly defined as real or unreal, but is, therefore, not unreal, *svastava*,² seems to miss the point of the definition. But even apart from this, the theists all take their stand on the law of the excluded middle and declare that a tertium quid between sat and asat is impossible. The anirvacaniya-anupapatti of Ramanuja is to the effect that all experience is either of the real or the unreal. There is no experience of anything which is neither real nor unreal. If such a thing were an object of experience then anything would be an object of experience. Madhva philosophers³ argue that all meanings of anirvacaniyata are logically inconsistent; it cannot be absolute negation of non-existence characterised by existence nor dual character of absolute negation of existence and of non-existence nor absolute negation of non-existence as characterised by negation of existence. The reply of the Śāṅkaras⁴ is that all three meanings are wrong as they are based on absolute mutual negation, paraspara viraha rūpa, between sattva and asattva. Sattva is to be understood as free from contradiction at all time, trikālabādhita, and asattva as what never forms the object of cognition in any substrate. Thus defined, there is no unbroken uniformity, nitya-sāhacarya, between sattvābhāva and asattva or between asattvābhāva and sattva. Therefore, sat and asat are not contradictory and do not exhaust the universal order, as ~~-----~~ by the theists. Notions of true and false are both negated in a non-existent like a sky-flower, which proves that they are not contrary. Moreover, even contradictory notions can coexist in vyavahāra if they do not possess the same degree of being.

When mithyā is defined as counterpositive of absolute negation with reference

1. *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 48.

2. Dasgupta, op. cit., III, 436: Nimbārka's criticism.

3. Vyāsarāja, *Nyāy-sūtra*, p. 22.

4. *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 51.

to the substratum where it is cognised, or to the substratum which is cognised as being qualified by the knowledge of the false appearance, the Madhva philosophers subject *atyantabhava* to adverse criticism in this context. But Advaitins continue to insist¹ that absolute negation is *paramarthika* and *vyavahara* as negation is non-different from Brahman. Nor will they admit the correctness of the Madhva objection that if *vyavahara* is liable to sublation then the world would become real, since it is the *pratiyogi* of *atyantabhava*. The situation would arise only if the reality of negation is of a lesser order, which is not the case here. This also rebuts the argument of Kimberka that what demolishes and is demolished must be of the same order, and if Brahman-jñāna destroys world-outlook that outlook must be a real and true one.

The definition of *mithyātva* as possessing the character of being sublated or discarded by knowledge, *pratyakṣa-śūnya*, is criticised² as possessing inconclusiveness or *avyāpti* since "unreal" jar is destroyed by the stick, and also wider extension or *ativyāpti* since the *ajñāna* which causes illusion of silver and is later removed also falls under the definition of *mithya*. Madhusūdana meets the first difficulty by arguing that the jar is *pratiyogi* in its causal form (*kāraṇa*) and not in its own form (*svarūpa*), and the second difficulty by arguing that the causal *Avidyā* is not absolutely real as conceived by the critic, therefore it will also be annihilated in *paramāthika* *dyṣṭi*. Rāmānuja's *nivṛtyānupepatti* is that no cessation of *Avidyā* is possible as there is no knowledge to destroy it, certainly not knowledge of identity or undifferentiated Brahman. But this criticism rests on his own definition of *Avidyā* as knowledge of independence of *jīva* from Brahman, to be destroyed by constant meditation on God and performance of *bhakti*. Advaita replies that it is a misrepresentation to find objectivity in Brahman-jñāna; here is no contact (*saktyoga*) of object and *śaktakarana-vṛtti*, but self-revelation of pure consciousness which is identical with *Avidyā-nivṛtti*.

The fourth definition of *mithyātva* by Citukha in *Tattvapradīpikā*, as the *pratiyogī* of *atyantābhāva* located in its own substratum, is a paraphrase of the second

1. Advaita M. p. 96.

2. Nyāyārtha, p. 38.

and refuted in the same manner by Advaitins. The Madhva refutation of the fifth definition of mithya as distinct from reality and existence, is that existence cannot mean satta as a jati or genus nor something never the object of contradiction. The Advaitins reply that this criticism overlooks that jati is a creation of Avidya and is not referred to in this definition. And Existence at paramarthika level must be uncontradicted if Advaita is to be established and dualism to be avoided.

Advaitins also give a spirited refutation of the theistic criticisms of their inferential arguments to establish mithyātva, following the lead of Gauḍapada and Śaṅkara. No vyapti exists between dr̥ṣyatva and reality e. g., as in Brahman. Reality or satta is to be denied to phenomenon on ground of its perceptibility. Unreality is also to be denied to it because in that case also it cannot be characterized by the hetu or dr̥ṣyatva e. g., as in hare's horn. Therefore, perceptibility points to the double negation of existence and non-existence and the Vaiṣṇava theory of reality of world-appearance is wrong. If they object that a non-real object cannot be object of perception, dr̥ṣya, the Advaitins reply that "appearance is an object of perception, not in its aspect as existence, but as different from the non-existent."¹ Nor can the opponent argue that the existent cannot be sublated for the determinant of sublation (unreality) is not absolute non-existence of appearance but its character as different from absolute existence. Similarly, mithyātva of pragmatic appearance can be established on ground of its jaḍatva, non-sentience or apramāṭṭva, anātmatva, never being the subject of cognition. In spite of the criticism of realists that this argument applies to Ātmā and leaves out of its comprehension Avidyā, the middle term anātmatva remains uncontradicted in the sense of non-manifestation of the real nature of self. Paricchinatva, spatio-temporal limitation, is yet another ground, hetu, for establishment of mithyātva. Vaiṣṇava refutation of this syllogism concludes by proving the reality of space, time and change, which is unjustified since these are only conceptual and pragmatic terms. The inference of mithyātva based on the middle term anātmatva is criticized as leaving no room for either validity or invalidity of non-existence in

1. Nyāya-Makaranda, p. 116.

the context of Advaita. But the reply¹ is that empirical validity of neither affirmation nor negation is at variance with Advaita, which is the verdict of both Śruti and smṛhava.

It is evident that throughout the dialectic on mithyatva the theistic critics have confused the two standpoints. Advaita distinguishes Reality of the paramarthika satta from the reality of the vyavaharika satta, and nowhere does it violate the principle of reality that the substratum should be of a higher order of being than the superimposed and later contradicted object.

In Advaita, falsity or mithyatva means dependent existence. Dependent means what is not self-luminous existence, and is also not non-existent, but is of lesser essence. The Upaniṣadic teaching, satyasya satya,² applies the term satya to the empirical sphere in contrast to the satya of reality. Advaita seizes upon this contrast and makes it the foundation of its theory of the world. While granting that the differences and variety revealed in experience cannot be reduced to nullity, Śaṅkara insists that they cannot be as real as Brahman, because that would lead to dualism. Following the suggestion of the Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad he distinguishes phenomenal and absolute, vyavahāra and paramārtha, in a tentative way. Again and again he insists that the world is mithyā because it is anirvacanīya and that for all practical purposes of life and action it is real. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's clarification of this is that the real character of the world held to be unreal, asat, is that it is not sublated by any other cognition save the knowledge of Brahman.³ But if unreality is also unreal this does not prove that the world is also real, as the critics argue, but only that the world is "practically but not absolutely real."⁴ This doctrine does not create dualism. There may not be two realities, but there can be Reality and a reality. The real, sat, is so called commonly i. e., relatively, as water is more real than the mirage; here the non-deviating in its form is called sat and the deviating is called asat.⁵ Advaita is

1. Cf. *Tattvaśāstrīyā*, p. 41.

2. Bṛ. Upa., II, 7, 6.

3. Advaitasiddhi, sec. II.

4. *ibid.*, sec. IV; cf., *Bhāṣati*, 736, 5: Falsity does not deny semblance of truth pertaining to world but only stresses its conditional character, contrasts it with absolute unconditional truth of noumenon.

5. Sureśvara on Taittī. Upa., p. 577, 578.

right in insisting on the reality of the world being a relative one.

In Advaita Vedanta grades of reality are fundamental but Vaisnava Vedantins do not distinguish levels of being and consciousness. All experience is self-expression of Brahman,¹ therefore there is no more or less real experience. They treat the concept of reality existentially, as equated to space-time-objectivity. For Madhva the criterion of reality is being an object of experience, an object of any pramana. He also accepts causal efficacy, arthakriyakaritva as criterion of reality. Ramanuja accepts the same criterion of reality viz., pramanikatva. The world is apprehended by pramana which reveals only determinate objects, cognitions lead to fruitful activity, vyavahara-yogyata, therefore cognitions are of true objects. Realism necessitates avoidance of all uncertainty about integrity of ordinary knowledge and maintains unbroken continuity with the highest type. Only difference of degree and not of kind between empirical and transcendental knowledge need be accepted. Man can rise above the limitations of empirical knowledge to the knowledge of reality and then judge whether his knowledge is in conformity with it or not.² Therefore, the reality of the world is as real as the reality of Brahman. When, therefore, Madhva talks of three grades of reality as irreducible he only means that God, jiva and world are all ontologically real, though God is unique and independent while the other two are dependent realities. The world is anitya and not like nitya Brahma; it is pravahatah nitya while God is the greater nitya, nityonityama. Vallabha regards different degrees of reality to be only degrees of concealment and manifestation of divine qualities of sat, cit and anand. Soul, world and God are eternally Brahma, but involution and evolution of these qualities make them different. Vallabha holds world or Kārya Brahma to be of a lower order than God or Kāraka Brahma but still real. Thus, while the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins talk of grades and different aspects of being they continue to castigate the Advaita doctrine of pāramārthika sattā as an unwarranted assumption, remote and hypothetical, and the Advaita doctrine on the vyāvahārika sattā as a lower reality, sadāśad anirvacaniya, as arbitrary violation of laws of consistent thinking. For judgment upon the world's

1. vide supra, pp. 777-778.

2. Sriis Chandra Sen, The Mystic Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 66.

nature must be given by reason and not by some trans-rational Absolute. Reason grasps world as a fact and the undifferentiated Brahman is a mere idea founded on dialectic. Ramanuja argues that the Brahman experience cannot negate the world since, according to Advaita itself, the two are never experienced together. According to the nivartaka-
 sūpapatī a real world cannot be destroyed by identity-knowledge, nor can any knower of the knowledge of the real-unreal world be found. Madhva says that badha of the world is not consistent with psychology and rational reflection. The world as a whole is not subjected to viparīta pramāṇa. And Śruti testifies to Brahman but not to contradiction of sense-objects.

Advaitins argue that all the criteria of true knowledge in theism have some element of subjectivity as they are related to the attitude of the subject, puruṣa tantra, but Atman- or Brahma-jñāna is the self-revelation of the object, vastu tantra i. e., it is knowledge transcending the three-term relational schema of knowledge. Therefore, the theistic definitions of truth and reality may be accepted only in the pragmatic sense. It is "no over-statement of facts to assert that the absolute truth of theists is just the vyāvahārika sattā of advaita, which according to advaita is product of avidyā and for theists real and absolute."¹ The theists fail to give due consideration to the stand of Advaita that the transcendence of reality is necessarily an argument for its being a different order of reality. Śaṅkara's one criterion of reality is non-stultification by subsequent experience. Reality is eternal, immutable, indestructible, self-existent, self-explanatory. And the world, not having this nature, is different from the real. But this does not contradict Advaita since the world is a different order of being and consciousness.

Even in the case of empirical objects we do apply the term "real" to that in respect of which knowledge is constant and unchangeable and "unreal" to that in respect of which it is transitory and changeable. The empirically real is that which manifests itself in human experience in accordance with rules of orderly connection and the illusory is that which does not fit into that context of experience. In technical terminology the pratibhāsa is that in which causal and specific avidyā is short-lived,

1. K. Narain, A Critique of Madhva Refutation of the Śaṅkara School of Vedānta, p. 23.

the vyavahara is that in which Avidya is primal, continuing uninterruptedly, immo-
 rially. Further, the former is coterminous with its appearance while the latter exists
 even if appearance is not presented to someone. Finally, the former is private and
 sakṣi-bhāgya while the latter is for all cognisers and cognised through pramanas. What
 we call unreal and real, however, are both equally inconstant, from another and
 transcendental level of experience. Since Brahma-jnana cancels both they are sama-
 sattaka, of equal being.

If a breach in continuity of perception is, in some cases, sufficient to justify
 us in characterising an object of perception as unreal, I fail to see why we should
 not be allowed to extend, broaden and universalise our definition of reality and say
 that there can be no reality apart from substantial unity, and unalterable continu-
 ity of existence.¹

If greater permanence is test of greater reality within experience, the deduction is
 perfectly justifiable that absolute permanence must be indicative of absolute reality.
 Very extreme Advaitins adopt the position of satta-aikyavada. There is only one reality
 without degree and even through Avidya only reality is perceived through its manifesta-
 tions. Less extreme Advaitins, the drṣṭi-śrṣṭivādins adopt the position of satta-
 dvaividhyavada, in which entities arise and are coterminous with their cognitions. Less
 radical Advaitins adopted satta-traividhyavada, in which reality of objects pertain to
 time and place, not to the Absolute, but the former is not to be decried for that
 reason. The first view reduces the world to total unreality, tuccha and alika, and
 contradicts the central doctrine of levels of being and knowledge. The second view
 fails to allow for any criterion of reality within experience. No doubt both vyavahara
 and pratibhāsa are superimposed on reality and, as appearances, are not different. But
 it would be intellectual folly to confuse them; that would be but another example of
 adhyāsa. Their difference is that of appearance of reality and appearance of appear-
 ance; the former having pragmatic significance in life and world and the latter not.²

According to Date:

The Advaita theory of levels of reality allows adoption of several criteria to
 distinguish one truth from another. Tests of correspondence, coherence, workabili-
 ty, authoritativeness, continuity, development and non-contradiction point at
 validity of experience in some form, though all are not equally valuable for the

1. Priyannath Sen, *The Philosophy of the Vedānta*, p. 110.

2. M. N. Sircar, *The Systems of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, p. 74.

same reason. Some truths have value for social life, some others for philosophical and still others for spiritual life. There is continuity of experience from absolute unreality to absolute reality, allowing for a difference in quantity as well as quality of experience.¹

It is philosophically correct to hold that different levels of experience—alika, prati-bhāsa, vyavahāra, paramārtha—are existent. But being cannot be attributed to the Absolute, the spatio-temporal world, illusory appearance and the totally unreal and unperceived in the same sense. "Inexplicability" is a good term because the reason for the difference of levels cannot be given; neither can any level be completely explained, nor can it be logically connected with the others. They should also be understood as ascending levels of values. The emerging nama-rupa point to some final end, as yet unrealized.² This end, avasāna, towards which all changing manifestations are perpetually moving is Brahman, the jñāna-phala or jñeya.³ The lower levels are finite, therefore separated from highest good, but the Absolute or Brahman is identical with eternal good, absolute value. Infinite perfection, mokṣa, Brahma-jñāna or Paramātma is also parama nihāreyas.⁴

Causation

All Vedāntins with the exception of the Madhva philosophers conceive Brahman as the abhinna-nimittopadana kāraṇa. The Madhvas only attribute nimitta kāraṇatva to Brahman. Advaitins insist that the Brahmanhood of the world should be understood not in a material and commonsense way but in the metaphysical sense, which alone preserves transcendence, immutability and unrelatedness of Brahman. The two approaches were distinguished in classical Vedānta as paripāṃavāda, "a process of becoming in which the cause gradually changes and reappears in the form of effect," and as vivartavāda, "a process of reflection in which effect does not possess the same amount of being with the cause," according to the Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha. All Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins take their stand on the dynamic theory, the transformation of spiritual material or Īśvara into real effects. Śaṅkara argues that transcendence of Brahman is preserved by conceiving

1. V. H. ... Vedānta Explained, II, 449.

2. B. S., IV, 3, 14.

3. B. S., XVIII, 30; XIII, 17.

4. Ram Pratap Singh, The Vedānta of Śaṅkara, pp. 14, 19.

Him as the substantive, *viśeṣya*, unaffected by modifications of the attributive, *viśeṣana*, element. Nimbarka agrees that essential nature of Brahman remains unmodified, *avyākṛta*, for He transcends the effects as well as Himself. He emphasises differences of effects while Rāmānuja stresses unity. Vallabha distinguishes two types of transformation; change from a previous state which is no longer within bounds of the effect to attain i. e., movement from cause to effect, and change from a prior state which is within bounds of effects to attain i. e., a two way movement. *Avikṛta parinama* makes change an expression of reality, cause and effect are identical.¹ Yet reality is transcendent as the false conception of the world or *sāṃsāra* has its locus in the individual mind alone.

It was Rāmānuja who first made an absolute opposition between *parinamavāda* which he identified with the idea of world-reality and *vivartavāda* which he identified with the idea of world-unreality,² and this distinction was accepted unquestioningly by all the theists in the long debate on *Mayavāda*. The opposition is easiest for the *Madhva* dualists to sustain; they argue that the idea of material causality is essentially connected with *pariṣānavāda* and efficient causality has no intelligible meaning in the *abhimanimittopādāna kāraṇavāda* of *Advaita darśana*.

Advaitins themselves gave some support to this dichotomy. They seem to accept the criticism viz., the difficulty of explaining the impure effect (world-plurality) from the pure cause (One), for they began to give prominence, in different degrees, to *Māyā* as the material cause.³ Brahman and *Māyā* are conjoined like two strands in a rope i. e., both are equally primary, it is material causality of Brahman qualified by inert *Māyā* (*Padārthatattva-Nirpaya*). Or the sole material cause is Brahman but *Māyā* is intermediary cause, *dvāra kāraṇa* (*Śaṅkṣepa Śarīraka*), or only helping It (*Vacaspati Mīra*). Or the material cause is only the *Māyā-śakti*, but power points to a power-holder, therefore Brahman is also material cause. Or *Māyā* alone is material cause but Brahman as substrate of *Māyā* is also material cause i. e., in a secondary sense . (*Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*). While the *Śaṅkaras* implicitly conceded that Brahman dissociated

1. *Advaita-Mārtanda*, p. 6.

2. *Ide*, op. cit., II, 492.

3. *cf.*, *Daṅgupta*, op. cit., II, 221.

from indescribable Maya is inconceivable as karana, they also insisted that the above theories should not be taken literally or as assumptions of final truth. Creative effort is operation of will and only on the natural or immanent plane; it is referred to in order to indicate Advaita. But intellect cannot fully apprehend the relation between reality and the world. If this be criticised as intellectual failure, we may, as a preliminary statement, accept on behalf of the Advaitin the reply "that the panorama of the universe is the writing of an unseen hand which we can only half understand . . . we will not be required to apologise for being finite."¹

At this point modern scholarship² accuses Advaita of the inconsistency of confusing paripamavada and vivartavada, since Sankara has adopted the vivarta view by taking his stand on the analogy of the magician and his magic he must give up the paripama view and the similies illustrating it. The confusion is further increased when Sankara illogically supports satkaryavada along lines of paripamavada as against asatkaryavada of Nyaya, along vivarta lines. In his satkaryavada Sankara allows for existence of effects before creation in the form of knowledge of nama-rupa in God's mind. Advaita logic of identity and transcendence of oneness in vivartavada denies rather than accepts causation³ and asatkaryavada which insists on prior non-existence of effects is more in harmony with his treatment of effects as non-existent and false. The assumption of the essential opposition of dynamis or paripama and stasis or vivarta is the basis of the criticism that Advaita has fallen into analogical and ideological confusion. But this assumption is unwarranted. A deeper reading of Sankara's philosophy will reveal that he himself did not accept this dichotomy, and gives both kinds of illustrations merely to point towards the relative nature of world reality. The analogy of the snake and the rope turns the attention from appearance to the substratum, while the analogy of ornament from gold brings out the idea that the cause is present in the effect.⁴ The important thing is not the manner in which effect appears; what is common to both theories is the insistence on non-difference of the effect, world, from the cause,

1. P. T. T., Thought and Reality, p. 154.

2. vide Dasgupta, op. cit., I, 38-39.

3. M. N. Sircar, Comparative Studies in Vedantism, p. 89.

4. Dasg., op. cit., II, 493-494.

Brahman. Seen in this light Sankara's indifferent use of both parinama and vivarta analogies indicates the comprehensiveness of his Mayavada rather than his self-contradiction.

Later Advaita (e. g., Sanksepa Sariraka) also accepted the possibility of harmonisation in terms of three standpoints, drsti-traya. The aropa drsti, cosmic view, sees parinama as real transformation of ultimate reality; the vyamisra drsti, cosmic-acosmic view, sees vivarta as the conditionally real transformation of the unconditioned; the apavadaka drsti declares the world-appearance as mere hallucination. The critic might argue¹ that this development is due to the fact that parinama-interpretation cannot be avoided in the Brahma-Sutras, but the argument that parinama is the nearest position to the real theory of vivarta is specious. Apart from the desire to synthesise the teachings of the sutras, there is a logical basis for this harmonisation. Sarvajñāta Muni points out that thought must pass over three steps of the philosophical ladder to rise to the height of Advaita. The creation theory is represented by arambhavada, the transformation theory by parināmavāda and the transfiguration theory by vivartavāda. Logically, affirmation of the world does go before negation and Sarvajñāta is right in saying that parinama is presupposed in vivarta² and not incompatible with it. Acceptance of this conclusion will correct a general misunderstanding of Mayāvāda on a vital point. And many of the difficulties of abhinnavimittopādāna kāraṇavāda, unanswerable from standpoint of parinama, can be resolved from the standpoint of vivarta.

The contention of Anurobindo cannot be accepted that Advaita rejects parināmavāda and accepts only vivartavāda. The more correct conclusion of Radhakrishnan is that Advaita allows parinama-drsti according to the phenomenal method and vivarta-drsti according to the transcendental method i. e., change and evolution occurs in vyavahāra but not in paramārtha, or that there is parinama within reality but not for reality. This does not amount to the position of some later Advaitins that the world is parinām of Māyā and vivarta of God,³ or distinction of sama and viśama sattā, because all such

1. Dasgupta, op. cit., I, 45.

2. Sanksepa Sariraka, II, 61: निवर्तनादृश्यं हि पूर्वमूगिः नैदान्तवादे परिणामत्ववदः। व्यापारे परिणामः। परिणाममन्वादे स्वयं समाधानि निवर्तनादः।

3. vide supra, pp. 737-738.

views contradict Advaita. Sankara allows only for one satta viz., Brahman, and Maya is the power of God to create.¹ Madhusudana explains that upadanatva of Atman or Brahman is parinama in regard to hierarchy of causes ending in Avyakta or Hiranyagarbha but vivarta in regard to relation of world or vyakta with Brahman.²

Clearly, Advaita is willing to allow the belief in parinama to be logically correct. Scientific knowledge must be founded on causation. In the empirical chain there is necessity which is to be understood in terms of determination of effect by material and efficient cause. Cause and effect can be differentiated as different forms of some reality which never changes, and production has effect in the sense of causing a different form, a chain of events and facts.³ In the phenomenal field Advaita readily accepts transformation of the cause. But "changes while real as appearances, are unreal if regarded as changes of the changeless."⁴

At the same time, the Advaitins cannot regard change as self-sufficient but only as a means, upaya or dvāra bhūtāni, or as indicative marks, paricāyaka līngāni, or as expression, saisthānamātra, of unity.⁵ Parinama and its result viz., kārya-prapañca is subordinate or dependent on vivarta.⁶ If effect is real then it cannot be complete change of cause, which would make knowledge impossible, nor partial change, for the question would arise: is part different or identical. Thus parinama prepares the way for vivarta-sṛṣṭi. The theistic criticism is that epistemological analysis of error when applied on a cosmic scale breaks down. Self as substratum and cosmos as superimposition are seen as different. Analysis reveals that at a given moment a unit of data may be erroneously perceived as one illusory object, but not a plurality of objects i. e., rope simultaneously appearing as chain, snake, garland etc. Advaitins meet this criticism at the epistemological level and prove that anirvacanīyakhyāti is the sound foundation for vivartavāda. But a more comprehensive answer may be given by pointing out that the theistic idea of cause is inadequate, dealing with the problem in

1. *op. cit.*, II, 498.

2. *Advaitasiddhi*, p. 757.

3. M. N. Sircar, *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, p. 92.

4. Malini Kant Brahma, *Causality and Brahman*, p. 106.

5. *Chān. Upan.*, VII, 17, 1.

6. S. R. on B. S., II, 1, 14.

the limited form of material and efficient cause only. A sufficient cause must not only explain the determinate aspect but also the form and goal of the process. Such a cause cannot itself be subject to change i. e., it must be perfectly free and spontaneous, therefore the effect is a free production involving no transformation of the thing. Nor is it logically inconsistent that the substratum of the determinate causality should transcend it. "Śaṅkara is perfectly at ease when he declares that Brahman is above all determinations and still is the ground of necessity and causal determinism."¹

Rāmānuja's criticism is that non-difference cannot be established between a true ground and false effect, for either Brahman becomes false or world becomes true, and only real causation can prove identity. But this criticism misses the point. For effect is only different from cause empirically, and metaphysically it has no independent existence. Therefore, practical reason or realization of identity overcomes the objection raised above by pure reason. Vivartavāda implies that reality of the effect is merged in the reality of cause or substratum, therefore both horns of Rāmānuja's dilemma are avoided.

Though it has been shown that Māyāvāda has ample scope for incorporating the meaning and value of pariṇāmavāda it cannot be denied that it has a pronounced bias towards vivartavāda. The reason for this is that creation is a one way movement from cause to effect only. "Brahman is not made of world"² but world is made of Brahman. Therefore, to know the immutable Brahman the transient forms or nāma-rūpa veiling it have to be penetrated. The chances of realizing reality are greater if world is regarded as a superimposed appearance, vivarta, rather than as a real transformation of Brahman, pariṇāma.³ Śaṅkara will allow that the truth of nāma-rūpa is no other than Brahman, sarvam khalu idaṁ Brahma, but not that pariṇāma can prove any element emerging out of Māyā or Avidyā to be retained in Brahman, nor will this truth contained in pariṇāmavāda be accepted by him either on ground of theory (tarka) or of practice, but only on ground of Brahmanubhava in which effects are eliminated in their appearance (form) and remain only in their essence. Thus, unlike the theists, he refuses to equate pariṇāma with reality of world and vivarta with unreality of world.

1. Brahma, op. cit., p. 19.

2. Suresvara on Taittī. Upe. Bhāṣya, p. 310.

3. Date, op. cit., II, 496.

He regards it as unreal if it is treated as something apart from Brahman and used only for enjoyment of transient appearances; but it is real if it is nothing else but Brahman and used for attainment of Brahman. It is both parināma and vivarta of Brahman, containing avidya and vidya, real and unreal, thus indescribable.¹

Mayāvāda removes the theistic dichotomy of parināma and vivarta and synthesises saprapañca and nisrapañca Śrutis, world is God but God is more than the world.

Meaning of Idealism and Realism

Interpretation of Mayāvāda as vivartavāda exclusive of parināmavāda gives rise to the criticism that Advaita Vedānta is a position of exclusive idealism which gives no scope for realism. To examine this charge we must first understand the meanings given to "idealism" and "realism." By idealism is meant that nothing can be imagined to exist without presupposing consciousness; by realism is meant that being of empirical objects is distinct from knowledge of these in the subject's consciousness. It is easy to misconstrue the meaning of both positions. Scientists and logicians confuse realism with reality of object and the mentalist philosophers confuse idealism with ideas. Because ultimate reality is pure consciousness the empirical phenomena are treated as mental states and object's nature is identified with the mind's nature. The Upaniṣads verge on these erroneous notions² and the system-makers cannot always avoid them.

The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins oppose their realism to Advaita monism and idealism, but the issue cannot be judged merely in the light of the definition of reality adopted by them. Another consideration must apply viz., that the inner consistency of Vedānta darśana must not merely be a narrow one, but comprehensive enough to include both positions. The theistic objection is that realism and pragmatism or vyavahāra constituted by physico-social and ethical reality is treated as a mere concession to non-philosophical needs and developed in Advaita darśana under unwarranted metaphysical limitations. They join issue with Advaita Vedānta because the transcendentalism of its idealism brings it too close to Buddhistic idealism, which expressly negates realism. Modern scholarship concurs with the Vaiṣṇava realists that Advaita realism is superficial, and an inconsistent reversal of its central thesis. The criticism runs thus:

1. *ibid.*, II, 499.

2. *cf.*, Pratyagatmanand, *The Fundamentals of Vedānta Philosophy*, p. 264.

In his *Mandukya-Karika-Bhāṣya* Śaṅkara built a strong case for non-existence of objects of waking experience on analogy with dream experience His view seems to have undergone a change in *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, where he argues that world objects are outside of individual thought, present objectively and independently, though in ultimate nature inexplicable; and this argument is directed against the Buddhist doctrine of essencelessness, *niḥsvabhava* (*Sūnyavāda*) and *sahopalambha niyama* (*Vijñānavāda*).¹

Admittedly, Śaṅkara's criticism of Buddhist idealism shows some amount of realism and he was never afraid of indulging in realistic interpretation of the Upaniṣads, but this is because he could easily assert that this was an estimate of things from the common-sense view.² It may be rebutted that the use of realistic arguments and analogies against Buddhist opponents does not prove any illogical shift in Śaṅkara's thought. He has expressly declared that "it is not a rule that a parallel instance should be absolutely similar to what it is intended to exemplify."³ The criticism fails to do justice to him by overlooking this rule and by concluding that his philosophy cannot be realistic since he and his followers expounded the doctrine of world-illusion.

Objects and forms of world are transformations of *anirvacanīya* stuff of *māyā*, which is not being but dependant on being, and they can only be expressed when they are reflected in mental shapes and presented as ideas. Analogies of dream objects and illusion make this Vedāntic idealism popularly intelligible.⁴

It would, however, be more correct to understand that, at this juncture, Śaṅkara's purpose is not to prove mental existence of the world, which position he clearly repudiates, but to show that both dreams and waking experience are non-permanent; they are real while they are experienced, but are ultimately contradicted. Which is to say that they are relatively real. Nor can it be accepted that Śaṅkara's teaching of two levels of being and knowledge is a sign of intellectual dishonesty. It is on sound experiential and logical grounds that he distinguishes his conception of relative value of the phenomenal from the illusionist theory of the Buddhists.

For a correct assessment of Advaita Vedānta vis-à-vis illusionism it is desirable to take note of its debate with the theists on the question of the locus and object, substratum and content of *Māyā-Avidyā*. Rāmānuja raises the objection that *Māyā* cannot abide in any locus, *śarāyāmpapatti*; not in the *jīva* since *jīva* itself is a product of

1. Dasgupta, op. cit., II, 28, 30, 35.

2. *ibid.*, II, 2.

3. S. R. on B. S., I, 2, 21.

4. Dasgupta, op. cit., II, 36.

Maya and therefore there is anyonyasraya doṣa; not in Brahman since Brahman as self-luminous knowledge is contradictory to nescience, therefore either Maya becomes indestructible or Brahman cannot be of the nature of pure knowledge and cannot be so apprehended because the knowledge of falsity contradicts, not the ignorance of real nature of Brahman, but only ignorance which consists in view of reality of world-appearance; and knowledge and ignorance are contradictory only if they refer to the same object, which is not the case here.

Śaṅkara had taken the position of Īśvarāśrta Avidyāvāda in the Brahma-Sūtra. The post-Śaṅkarites made a serious attempt to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the relation of Māyā to Brahman, Īśvara and jīva. Sureśvarācārya and Sarvajñātma Muni take their stand on cidāśrta or Atmāśrta Avidyāvāda; like clouds appearing and disappearing in the limitless sky the finite, changing universe appears and disappears on infinite Ātmā, having apparently existed for a time.¹ Were "not-self," Īśvara or jīva, the locus rather than Ātman, jñāna could not destroy ajñāna of jīva with self and not-self as locus, respectively.² Padmapāda's position of Brahmāśrta Avidyā in which bhāvājñāna obstructs pure Brahman and acts as a painted board of ignorance, citta-bhitti, to produce individual souls, incorporates Sureśvara's theory, though it does not give a clear answer to the question of abode of Māyā. The āsraya-āśrayī-bhāva with pure consciousness does not destroy the latter's nature, since bhāvājñāna is not negation, but anirvasaniya. Its object is pure consciousness because it conceals and conjurs up adhyāsa in relation to self, and does not conceal but only gives birth to various appearances in relation to not-self.³

Madhva Miśra takes his stand on aneka jīvāśrta Avidyāvāda but rebuts the charge of fallacy of reciprocal dependence levelled by Rāmānuja. Causation does not hold for Avidyā which is not a vastu or thing and each—jīva and Avidyā—owes semblance of existence to the other in an anādi cycle.⁴ If Brahman were locus then liberation of one would lead to liberation of all, therefore jīva which contains space, time and causality

1. Kaiśvaryaśiddhi, II, 68.

2. Śaṅkara Śāstrīya, I, 51.

3. Vivarāṇa-Prasāda-Saṅgraha, p. 23.

4. Brahmaśiddhi, 10, 9-10, 13.

must be the locus.¹ Though Avidya is one, yet its negation in one jīvātma does not create the problem because avidyatva as genus, jati, is not destroyed though its individual expression may be sublated. Or the many powers of the one Avidyā to conceal reality differ from jīva to jīva. Vācaspati Miśra removes even the possibility of sarva-mukti by declaring straight away that there are many Avidyās corresponding to many jīvas. This is the position of aneka jīvāśrta Brahmaviṣeyaka aneka Avidyāvāda.

The debate on the locus of Māyā-Avidyā has a bearing on the problem of the nature of the world. Sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭivāda is a corollary of the cid or Brahmāśrta Avidyāvāda. It gives greater validity to the world, which is created by God, possessed of unknown existence, ajñāta sattāyukta, and absolutely extra-apprehensional in nature. Avicārita saṁsiddhi² means that the manifold is an established fact, real and veritable so long as the ultimate reality is not realized, and it continues uninterrupted by the supreme liberation of any one of its cognisers. Continuity, stability, independence and objectivity are marks of creation but this does not contradict mithyātva. Mithyātva of Māyā is only legitimate with reference to pāramārthika sattā, wherein it is sublated by jñāna i. e., it is a relative proposition, and, therefore, it is not illogical to maintain vyāvahārika sṛṣṭi.³ This world-view is in no way different from Sāṅkhya realism—vyāvahāre tu sāṅkhya nayah.

The corollary of the jīvāśrta Avidyāvāda is the dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda, which, by different stages,⁴ pares away the element of realism until the position is not very different from illusionism. In the first statement by Vācaspati, aneka jīvāśrta aneka Avidyāvāda raises the problem of plurality of worlds. One way to explain the notion of "common world" permeating the perception of many worlds is to postulate a common-to-all-soul's-universe arising and submerging in Avidyā or Māyā in the context of Īśvara. The very radical philosophers⁵ declare that the "commonness" notion is false. On Avidyā, eka jīva eka Avidyā, is a legitimate idea as other avidyās are but creations of one

1. *Ibid.*, 12, 2-12, 7.

2. Sureśvara, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Bhāṣya-Vārttika*, p. 1616.

3. *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, 31, 1-3.

4. vide S. S. Hasrarikar, *Vācaspati Miśra on Advaita Vedānta*, pp. 240-248: Four phases of dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda.

5. *Siddhanta-Muktāvalī*, 51, 6-7.

jiva's Avidya, on the analogy of dream. This second statement of the doctrine makes one or many creations the creations of one or many dr̥stis. In both statements all phenomena have existence so long as they are seen. The difficulty is in knowing who is the cogniser or speculator of this world, Ātma or jiva. In the third statement the implications of it are applied within the empirical sphere, and vyavahāra and pratibhāsa are given equal status, both being creations of Avidyā.¹ Thus the world has no non-apprehensional status, ajñāta sattā.² This conclusion, however, does not upset empirical life, which does not require positive proof of truth of empirical object independent of apprehension, but only absence of its negation, which is always there as the original nescience.³ Even in this phase the vyāvahārika sattā has an external existence during the period of its apprehension. The logical last stage of this siddhānta takes the form that world objects are not only not independent of apprehension but as good as non-existent in their non-apprehensional aspect, jñānātirikta sṛṣṭi i. e., objects are nothing but cognitions.⁴ In the last two statements of this doctrine consciousness itself is the world.

It will be seen that the Advaitins are not unanimous regarding their theory of the world. Advaita darśana has ample scope for the realistic view of sṛṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭivāda as well as the idealistic view of dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda. To characterise it as pure and simple illusionism, in disregard of this fact, is to fail to do justice to its comprehensiveness. Advaita realism distinguishes itself from Buddhism on three counts: the empirical objects though superimposed on Brahman are capable of action-existence of their own;⁵ endowed with extra-apprehensional validity;⁶ adhyāsa means not asat but anirvacanīyatā.⁷ Advaita idealism can only distinguish its position from Buddhism by emphasising the positive nature of the ground of superimposition viz., Brahman. Admittedly, in its last phases it comes so near to subjectivism and nihilism as to give some justification to the charge of illusionism.

1. Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, 72, 2-5.
2. Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī-Tīkā, 51, 4-5.
3. Vedānta-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī, 50, 5-8.
4. ~~si~~śāstra-sāra-Saṅgraha, 72, 6-8.
5. Vivarāṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, 74, 22-75.
6. Pañcapādikā-Vivarāṇa, 83, 25-84.
7. Vivarāṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, 42, 9-13.

All modern Neo-Vedāntins have insisted that a true Advaita philosophy must teach that the world is neither illusory nor material. The former is the negative implication of realistic position in the epistemological field and the latter is the negative implication of the idealistic position in metaphysics. It has been shown that apart from the most extreme Śāṅkarites, Advaitins do not subscribe to illusionism. Śāṅkara would whole-heartedly agree that material objects do not need to be explained as projections of the mind, either Divine or individual, to harmonise epistemology with idealistic metaphysics.¹ For ultimate spirituality of both subjective and objective parts of the world has no connection whatsoever with mentalistic epistemology. He is, therefore, free to say with the theistic realists that the existence of object is independent of its consciousness. As the dancer cannot dance on his own shoulders so mind cannot know unless there is something distinct from it. In fact, without assuming the mind-independence of objects the distinction of truth and falsity, which is debated in all schools of Vedānta including Advaita Vedānta, cannot arise. All agree that the object must be existent. If Advaitins add that it must also be non-existent, it does not take away from the realism of the first proposition. Deussen has pointed out that the pantheistic trend in the Upaniṣads, sarvam khalu idam Brahma,² concedes the reality of the manifold without abandoning fundamental idealism, Advitīya Brahma; idealism accommodates itself to the realistic view and presents itself in pantheism.³

The distinction of parā vidyā and aparā vidyā⁴ is a most comprehensive form of reconciliation with realistic-pluralistic view-point. Parā vidyā indicates the appearance of the world from human standpoint; Ātmā sees world as outside and separate to it. The very introduction of the Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya is evidence of Śāṅkara's readiness to make a reasonable adjustment with realism, for he begins by exhibiting the dualism of Ātmā and anātmā. Furthermore, though the theists attack Māyāvāda because it is thought to be irreconcilable with bhakti which implies a separation of real object of worship from a real worshipper, it has been shown that the dualistic devotional sentiment can be

1. P. T. Raju, Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges, p. 94.

2. Ghān. Upa., III, 14, 1.

3. Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 159-162, 335, 361.

4. Prasna Upa., V, 2.

accommodated within Advaita. Later dialecticians make ingenuous use of the anirvacaniyata-concept to prove the possibilities and limits of realism within Advaita.¹

We would make the opposite mistake of that made by Śaṅkara's critics, however, if we were to regard him as a realist when he accepts the reality of the external world. For "Vedānta rests content in the view that however realistic the cognitive relations to objects may be they are . . . appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness."² The central doctrine of Advaita is that creativity of spirit is not its transformation into something not itself, but self-polarisation in which self is intact as one pole while objectivity is the other pole. Absolute spirit has world for its object.³ And within the world the inseparable correlativity of senses and objects, mind and matter, proves them parts of a more ultimate reality, modes of an All-Self. Idealism begins with freedom of spirit in creativity, as all the Neo-Vedāntins have stressed. Śaṅkara also agrees with this. Freedom is expressed when the Advaita reality remains unimpaired, immutable, even when that spirit overflows into creation. The true meaning of idealism appears in the contention that in liberation and samādhi Ātman is realized as all-pervading and world is seen from standpoint of Brahman i. e., non-differently. In Ātma-jñāna the universe is seen as one with his self, absorbed as the universe is in the universal self which man has become.⁴

Thus, Advaita idealism goes further than realism in its acceptance of the world as real, when it argues that this reality must be understood in the background of pure consciousness. Any form of metaphysical realism which denies ultimateness of consciousness or freedom as illogical constructs is equivalent to materialism and is a very partial realism. Advaita idealism is a complete idealism because without denying the existence of matter-nature it can yet maintain the spirituality of the natural world. "Indian idealism holds spirit as natural, different from character of matter. Spiritualism of Vedānta has been as such naturalism to Indian mind as non-spiritualism is right naturalism to western mind."⁵ In fact, it would not be incorrect to conclude

1. vide Eppuravani Shastri, *Compromises in the History of Advaita Vedānta*, pp. 31, 30.
2. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, II, 213.
3. Raja, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges*, p. 31.
4. Suresvara on *Bakṣiṣa-Mūrti-Stotra*, 14, 15.
5. P. T. Raja, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges*, p. 5.

that Advaita teaches neither an idealistic nor a realistic view of the world but comprehends a more inclusive and deeper set of values in which both positions are harmonised.

Māyavāda and World Reality

Certain apologists of Advaita have attempted to demonstrate that Māyavāda allows scope for ontological reality of world. From Śaṅkara's argument against the Buddhist Śūnyavāda that what has no substratum or ground is unreal, the conclusion is sought to be drawn that the world which has a substratum is real.¹ But this conclusion, besides applying equally to vyavahāra and pratibhāsa, overlooks the fact that Śaṅkara's aim is not so much to prove the reality of the phenomenal as to turn the mind towards the one only reality. Similarly, though Śaṅkara may argue that "it is not seen in the world that there can be creation of anything from the non-existent, but only from the existent,"² his aim, here also, is not to prove the reality of the effect or world, but to emphasise the reality of the cause or Brahman.³ The argument that waking and dreaming do not form the real essence or swarūpa of self, does not mean that these are real as such and only unreal when confused with the self. For Śaṅkara, what is not of the nature of the one reality is not ontologically real. Nor can it be argued that the world is a manifestation without which the real nature of Brahman could not be comprehended.⁴ For, Śaṅkara has also said that the manifestation is a distorted one. Nor does Śaṅkara's interpretation of satyasya satya prove world to be real in the same sense as Brahman is real. And anirvacariyatā may be different from unreality within vyavahāra but not different from it from the standpoint of paramārtha.⁵ This realistic interpretation is being refuted here in some detail because any attempt to interpret Māyavāda which overlooks the doctrine of levels of being and knowledge, is a deviation from the true position of Advaita. The difference of levels is a pivotal doctrine based on experience, and in that scale the world's reality is different in kind from the reality of Brahman.

1. vide Kekileśvar Shastri, An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy, p. 11.

2. S. B. on Taitti. Upa., II, 6.

3. cf., Tattvopadeśa, 49: Knowledge of the world reality serves no useful purpose, only knowledge of Brahman leads to mokṣa.

4. Shastri, op. cit., p. 62.

5. R. S. Naulakh, Śaṅkara's Brahmavāda, p. 215.

On the other hand, there is an opposite criticism that the Advaitin has no sufficient logic behind his doctrine of indescribability and falsity. At best, particular definitions of Nyaya or Vaiṣṇava realism are refuted, but it is not proved that concepts involved in these categories are fraught with inner contradictions inherent in the very nature of those concepts. To show that particular definitions are wrong is not to show the things defined as wrong¹ e. g., Vedānta Deśika argued that the unintelligibility of *dr̥k-dr̥ṣya-sambandha* does not prove falsity, for, even if two things have no possible relation, as hare and horn, the relata may be real. But the critic's attempt to show the unfoundedness of *mithyātvā* or *anirvacanīyatā* on ground of non-refutation of all realistic definitions of reality does not take into account the whole position of Advaita; it misunderstands the nature of the task the Advaita philosopher has set for himself. It has been seen² that Advaita is nowhere questioning the existence of the world as an objective fact. Even the critic concedes this.³ Śaṅkara himself explicitly declares that non-admission of first principles leads to infinite regress.⁴ The philosopher who fails to admit something so perfectly known from evidence and establishes his own position by words fails to convince himself or others;⁵ we cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny what is directly evident to all. Thus, Śaṅkara's is no rigorous and exclusive transcendentalism, he does comprehend the universe of realists in the real, giving it pragmatic status. The effects are real because they do appear; the yogic consciousness comprehends past, present and future i. e., the continuity of effectual transformation; and God's fore-knowledge supports continuity of reality and sternity of effects.

The Neo-Vedāntins have also emphasised that meaning of *Māyā* which shows the connectedness of whole world with Brahman, and not that nothing of value apart from Brahman exists to be known.⁶ Śaṅkara would have no objection to this emphasis that world is real only when viewed as non-different from Brahman⁷ and unreal when regarded

1. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, II, 147.

2. *vide supra*, pp. 792-799.

3. *vide Dasgupta, op. cit.*, II, 220.

4. S. B. on B. G., XII, 2; cf., S. B. on B. S., II, 2, 30.

5. S. B. on B. S., II, 2, 25.

6. *vide* W. S. Urquhart, *The Vedānta and Modern Thought*, p. 140.

7. This is not the same as the argument rejected earlier, *vide supra*, pp. 774-775.

as different from Brahman. Advaita requires us to give up the common notions of reality and unreality here, but, for that reason, nothing of the world as we know it is taken away from us. The argument is that since dream and waking nullify each other unreality of dream cannot be raised as objection to practical efficacy of waking experience. Fulfilment and its object must have the same kind of existence, that is all.¹ Besides which, fulfilment of practical efficacy of dream state is not sublated by waking e. g., dream serpent perpetuates its effects, fear etc., on waking, therefore fear is not unreal. Similarly, there is rise of real effects from unreal objects e. g., a man coming from glare of the sun finds false darkness which he dispels by lamp.² Realists cannot insist on reality of things as necessary for practical efficacy because in the production of real effects bathing and drinking etc., only existence, sattva, not reality, satyatva, is needed. Reality of water is not the causal character, kāraṇatāvachhedaka, of practical efficacy.³ This meets the objection that Advaita speaks of empirical world as vyavahāra but, inconsistently, does not admit the pragmatic criterion. Vyavahāra does meet all the tests of validity such as purpose, causality, coherence and workability. And as shown before,⁴ Śaṅkara would readily grant all other criteria demanded by realism, such as correspondence, non-contradiction, authoritativeness, continuity and development. The conclusion is that the category of mithyātva as applied to the phenomenal does not cancel any form, property, activity and value which a humanistic realist might cherish, just as the category of Nirguṇa reality does not cancel determination in human life or personality.

This point being cleared up, the real purpose of Māyāvāda and Advaita reality may be noted: the former's implication is the inadequacy of the real world and the latter's implication is that a transcendental goal is offered as the legitimate end of human aspiration. All the Neo-Vedāntins, even the supporters of ontological realism like Aurebindo, have correctly understood Māyā to raise the question of the subjective attitude to be adopted towards the world i. e., the question of value or meaning. Since

1. *Śaṅkara-Śaṅkara-Saṅgraha*, p. 73.

2. *ibid.*

3. *ibid.*, p. 74.

4. *vide supra*, pp. 785-786.

the world is known through the doubtful medium of the senses and mind, it is known only in relation to them and not to absolute reality, hence it is between being and non-being i. e., relative. Moreover, if any doubts were retained on this subject they would be cleared by the most realistic of all modern disciplines. Commonsense belief about reality of external world is not demonstrated by science; it is neither self-evident law of thought, nor an inference from experience, nor an analytic judgment. Hume's criticism was that the scientific criteria of reality, uniformity and causation cannot be proved as necessary laws of thought. Science no longer attempts to characterise the world as "real," but is content to posit an objective world, conventionally and pragmatically existent and probably non-existent apart from the present physical system or position of the observer.¹ World-experience is linked with consciousness of the subjects, its consistency or law depends on the subject's way of perceiving it. And its reality is constituted by its objectivity or the universality of the acceptance of its laws. To insist that world's reality is absolute is to assume that the knowing consciousness cannot change its present level.² But it is a gratuitous assumption that the position of the observer or the human level of being and mind is bound to remain so for ever. All Neo-Vedantins grant that a different level of consciousness and being is possible, in which the being, meaning and value of the world would change radically. And if this be granted it must also be accepted that the Advaita contention of the relative reality of world is correct. All Vaiṣṇava schools attack Māyāvāda and pretend to discard it. But they are not being consistent when, on the one hand, they reject the doctrine of relative reality of world in favour of its ontological reality, while, on the other hand, they talk of the attainment of Brahman by destruction of Māyā. By implication, they too admit that the being and value of the world is less than the being and value of reality; for, there is a diminishing of God's knowledge and bliss in world-manifestation.

Ontological realism means the separate and ultimate reality of the world. All theistic schools begin by criticizing the tendency of the human mind to misinterpret experience. The very first error is to see the manifold as self-existent and

1. Royce, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

2. N. H. Sircar, *The System of Vedāntic Thought and Culture*, p. 32.

independent. Were this the case, the finite effect would stand outside the infinite cause, would limit and negate it as an other. And such a method would destroy the unitary nature of reality, therefore, an other of Brahman must be an error in principle. Dualistic thought, on which realism is based, must be made, through self-criticism, to admit its own contradictions of relativity, and to overcome this error by recognition of unity in past, present and future. At level of jñāna it means identity and Māyā as appearance implies that the objective-subjective world is not to be regarded as separate from Ātman. The Advaita philosopher also understands that the realistic expectation of attaining unity by adding up the infinite qualities of the objective world is bound to remain unfulfilled and he is logically justified in using the method of negation. And the logical counterpart of this method is the category of neither real nor non-real, which, in effect, is "a positive statement precluding the necessity of looking for the ontological meaning of the world,"¹ while allowing for the proper use of it for the attainment of the final end of unity.

The logical consequences of this conclusion must be accepted honestly. The manifold of names and forms disappears when Brahman is seen and will not exist over and above Brahman.² If to this it is objected that Advaita is inconsistent in teaching non-difference of world from Brahman and at the same time asserting that at one stage the world ceases to be³ i. e., it is failing to rise to the realistic aspect of Māyā, the reply may be given as follows. It may be that a non-philosopher is frightened by the disappearance of names and forms, but the philosopher understands that these are different expressions of one principle,⁴ and in the direct intuition of that self he does transcend plurality and dualistic relationships. This "ceasing to be" must be understood not as physical, but as metaphysical destruction. In transcendental experience, knowledge of Brahman causes the world's disappearance by way of producing the conviction of its lesser reality. Now, if it be objected that this interpretation is contrary to any number of Advaita statements on this point, the reply is that such statements do not

1. *ibid.*, op. cit., p. 87.

2. *Ibid.*, op. cit., II, 495.

3. *vide* Upphart, loc. cit.

4. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

forbid such a new interpretation. For, to the criticism that if the world is not real it should not be perceived, and if it is an unreal product of ignorance its perception should be made to disappear by the effort of the wise, Advaita has replied that continuance of perception is not inconsistent with the knowledge that apart from Brahman the world has no reality. Neither is belief in reality of world a condition of its perception, therefore, cessation of that belief cannot cause its dissolution e. g., belief in the unreality of magical objects coexists with its perception. World as a rival (other) of Brahma-jñāna has to be dissolved (prapañca-vilaya), but not as heat disintegrates solid particles of clarified butter and dissolves them, because it exists actually in subject and object condition.¹ But if it means dissolution of false identification with Brahman due to erroneous imposition of the former upon It, it is possible and must be done.² Whether the world will be regarded as real or not depends, therefore, entirely on the point of view. The Advaitin who has realized transcendental unity will continue to insist that the world as other than Brahman i. e., in plural and separate nature, is unreal and ceases to be, but the world as originating from Brahman is real because it is non-different from Brahman. Such a position alone safeguards ontological idealism while incorporating in it all that is best in realism.

Sādhana—Philosophy of Conduct

Types of Sādhana in Classical Vedānta

Having contended that vyāvahārika sattā is a perfectly logical category it becomes the responsibility of Advaitins to examine the philosophical value of conduct, because vyāvahārika ṛṣṭi exists and operates only by means of conduct.

Indian idealism has not to point to reality of matter, but the necessity of taking an interest in matter and activism in ethics and religion. It is not naturalism or epistemological realism that Indian idealism needs to incorporate but a new kind of ethical activity with stress on intellectual, ethical, aesthetic value.³

Vedāntic philosophy of conduct is elaborated in debating the nature of sādhana to be adopted. Schematisation of different mārgas to mokṣa was the corollary of different

1. S. B. on B. S., III, 2, 21.

2. *Ibid.*

3. P. T. Raju, *Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges*, p. 14.

interpretations of Vedānta by the Acaryas. According to one position, only one course should be pursued exclusive of others, in other words, either karma or bhakti or jñāna. Another position made one the primary course and treated the other two as preliminary disciplines ending at the inception of the primary sādhanā. Still another position made one primary and the other two auxiliaries, to be continued throughout the period of sādhanā. There were also attempts to have a balanced discipline, samuccaya, of two or all three sādhanās.¹

It is generally held that Śaṅkara opposed jñāna-sādhanā to karma- and bhakti-sādhanā. Substance is given to this belief by his opposition to karmavāda of Mīmāṃsā and karma-jñāna samuccayavāda of Bhedābheda-vāda.² Moreover, he declares Brahma-jñāna and dharma-jñāna to be antithetical.³ The Purva-Mīmāṃsists while accepting scripture as authoritative, interpret it in terms of Karma-Kāṇḍa. Its teaching must be understood as injunction either to discharge specific types of duties or to refrain from other types of actions. Though the philosophical parts of the Vedas viz., Upaniṣads, teach the pure nature of Brahman, even there the command is to meditate upon Brahman as having a nature identical with our inner self of Ātmā. Śaṅkara combats this interpretation: neither meditation nor worship nor action is necessary since scripture reveals jñāna as Brahman. He argues that if jīva is only Brahman no such cause as karma is required to restore its nature. Conversely, if jīva is not Brahman then karma cannot reveal it as Brahman. If it be argued by the opponent that karma is required to destroy the adharma arising from the contact of Ātman with the psycho-physical organism, then he must explain what is the cause of this contact. If it be contended that dharma-adharma is the nature of the soul then karma cannot remove that nature. If the jīva be unrelated to dharma-adharma then karma is not needed to remove these. Not only must kāmya or optional and pratiṣiddha or prohibited karmas be given up but even nitya or obligatory and naimittika or occasional karmas, because even the latter produce good fruits and mokṣa means total exhaustion of both good and bad fruits. Karma-Kāṇḍa is for those who desire abhyudaya.

1. cf., S. K. Maitra, Ethics of the Hindus, p. 277.

2. Bhedābheda of Aśmarthya, the progenitor of Viśiṣṭādvaita and another more dualistic position of Anḍalomi, the progenitor of Mādhva dualism.

3. S. B. on B. S., I, 1, 4.

and Jñāna-Kāṇḍa for those who desire mokṣa.¹ The condition of the latter is viveka and its result is Brahman; the condition of the former is aviveka² and its results are producible, obtainable, modifiable and purifiable by means of action. These characteristics of karma-phala do not apply to Brahman at all.³ Therefore, Brahman is realized only by jñāna, which destroys the Mūla Avidyā, the cause of bāṇdhana. The Karma-Kāṇḍa teaching is meant for inferior types of sādhakas and Jñāna-Kāṇḍa for superior sādhakas who have transcended karma. In his commentary Śaṅkara relegates followers of vidhi, performers of yaǰña and karma to a lower order. He contends that kevalād eva tattvajñānān mokṣa-prāptih na karma samucchitāt.⁴ Vedic rites are meant for the ignorant and the mokṣa-sādaka must renounce them; the aim of the Gītā is supersession of the world and all activities within it. The teaching of phala-tyāga is applicable only to the karma-yogī but for the jñānī the teaching is of naiṣkarmya.⁵

As for samuccayavāda, it negatively means that man is neither to act only for selfish ends nor to be satisfied only with jñāna; and positively it means that man is to act for the attainment of ultimate reality alone. Such a coordination implies that reality is a unity-in-difference, that diversity cannot be removed from the nature of the one reality, and karma refers to diversity while jñāna refers to unity. Advaita declares that it is a logical contradiction to hold that both unity and diversity are equally real.⁶ And when oneness is realized through true knowledge and the sense of otherness and difference is removed it is not possible to perform duties because they imply experience of duality and difference.

All Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins are unanimous about the primacy of bhakti-sādhanā while differing on the question of whether it should be jñāna-miśra or jñāna-śūnya or on the degree of mixture. They attack Advaitins for not allowing any scope for bhakti. Its doctrine of identity of jīva and Brahman contradicts the conception of God as object of devotion separate from the devotee, and relegates bhakti to the realm of unreality. Nor

1. Sarva-vaśa, Sambandha Vārttika, p. 60.
2. ibid., p. 69.
3. Vivarapa-Prameya-Saṅgraha, p. 112.
4. S. B. on B. G., II, 11.
5. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 352.
6. Sambandha Vārttika, pp. 113-116.

will it do to treat "worship and meditation as mere means of *āntahkarana-suddhi* or helpers of cognition."¹

Ramamuja declares that realization is identical with *bhakti*.² For *bhakti* as meditation and devotion is to be defined as *dhravasartī*, and this is no other than being in a state of *jñāna*. *Darśana* or *jñāna* is a specific form, while *nididhyāsana* or *dhyāna* or *dhravasartī* is a general form i. e., *dhyāna* characterised by vividness is *darśana*, therefore, knowledge in the form of *upāsana* (*bhakti*) is the means to *mokṣa* while mere knowledge generated by *śravaṇa* etc. of *Vedānta* cannot be the means.³ The role of *karma* is to promote devotion, and, therefore, it must be performed even by the *jñānī* as long as he lives. The view of the *Brahma-Sūtra*⁴ that *puruṣārtha* comes by *vidyā* is, according to *Rāmamuja*, directed against the view of *Jaimini* that man derives greater benefit from *karma*. Furthermore, *vidyā* is not different from *bhakti* and such *jñāna* does require different types of *karma* to foster it.

Viśiṣṭādvaita, thus, takes its stand on *jñāna-karma samuccayavāda*. Enquiry into *Karma-Kaṇḍa* is also necessary for enquiry into *Jñāna-Kaṇḍa*. Knowledge of both is essential to the study of *Vedānta* and both form an integral whole.⁵ Scriptural injunctions demand the entire text including the subordinate branches, *aṅgas*, to be studied. Scripture cannot be restricted to *Brahma*, since one may desire to know all the four ends of life. *Karma* is not only for one who desires worldly ends, *abhyudaya*, but is an indispensable purificatory in *Brahma-jijñāsā* leading to desire for highest knowledge, *vividhiṣā*, as well as to *Brahma-jñāna*. It is not *yajña* etc. which conflict with *sama-dana* etc., the subsidiaries to *jñāna* in *jñāna-mārga*, but *niṣiddha karma*. In fact, *vidheyā karma* are subsidiary to *Brahma-jñāna*. Secondly, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* aids *Uttara* by providing its arguments and principles to it, *nyāyopajīvanam*.⁶ *Advaitins* are wrong in

1. S. B. on *Chān. Ūpa.*, Intro., p. 114.

2. S. B. on B. S., I, 2, 23.

3. *Vedānta Deśika*, *Satadūṣaṇī*, vāda 4.

4. III, 4, 1₂

5. *Satadūṣaṇī*, vāda 6: *Karma-Kaṇḍa* is antecedent factor as it studies the order in which a person proceeds to study *Vedānta*; it makes sure that he understands the arguments required for knowing the nature of *Brahman* and its contemplation; it facilitates enquiry by removing *prima facie* superficial knowledge that rites lead to infinite results; it alone makes two (*virāga* and *mumukṣā*) out of the four *Advaita* preliminaries (*sādhana catuṣṭaya*) become consequential (*arthalābhatva*).

6. *ibid.*

holding that in content, aspirant and end the two Mīmāṃsās are contradictory. In fact, only the one who understands the impermanent nature of karma through Karma-Kāṇḍa can enter the study of Vedānta referring to the highest goal. There is also an inherent unity of subject matter of both, one is the preliminary and the other is the development of it. The Advaita argument against their unity on ground of contradiction of the categories of unity and difference cannot be accepted because here the identity and difference refer to different things. Karma-Mīmāṃsā examines the means and accessories and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā does not teach identity of these, but of God and world. Neither are the results of karma and jñāna different, since the end of karma is determined by the motive of a person and by change of motive the karma meant for attaining dharma can be directed towards attainment of mokṣa.¹ Naimittika karma may not be renounced and even kāmya karma is conducive to mokṣa if the agent surrenders it to God. The Gītā is teaching conversion of all karma into niṣkāma karma and not naiṣkarma, as Advaitins try to interpret it.

Further, Advaita is wrong in holding that vakyārtha-jñāna leads to mokṣa because whether jñāna be sātva-karṇa-vṛtti or attribute of self it is dependent on a karṇa and is originated. Advaita cannot argue that if mokṣa is a fruit or a means that is enjoined, niyoga-sādhyaṭve, it would cease to be eternal, because mokṣa as destruction of sorrow is eternal, since destruction or dhvaṅsa is itself eternal. Or, if mokṣa is revelation of self's nature, svarūpa-āvirbhāva, still it is eternal, because the form revealed, after the removal of impurities veiling its nature by means of vidheya karma, is the very nature of the eternal self. Thus it is proved that karma and jñāna are not contradictory and the true sādhanā is constituted by karma-jñāna samuccaya.

Nimbārka, Madhva and Vallabha also make jñāna subservient to bhakti. All contend that the Gītā teaches bhakti-yoga as supreme. According to Nimbārka, by complete surrender to God the individual acquires bhakti in the sense of knowledge of supreme reality, the nature of soul, the obstructions to realization of God and the nature of mokṣa as continuous realization of Brahman, arising from destruction of Avidyā. It is not meditation, as Rāmānuja holds, but love and devotion. Karma is the indirect means

1. *ibid.*

Brahma-jnana and involves devotion.¹ The vividigu may give up nitya karma by entering sannyāsaśrama and only meditate on Brahman, but he may not give up vidheya karma which is indispensable for cleansing the heart.

Madhva also agrees that direct means of mokṣa is Iśvara-prasāda arising out of bhakti and prapatti. But jñāna is the means of achieving prasāda. Jayatīrtha declares that liberation is only possible through grace, which is conferred on those who have right knowledge of God through śravaṇa etc. But the latter are only made possible due to worship and devotion. It is knowledge of God which produces absolute dependence on God and love for Him.² It is an exaggeration to say that "in Mādhva literature also bhakti does not acquire supreme status and is still inferior to jñāna."³ But it is evident that Mādhva philosophers do take their stand on a degree of mutual dependence of bhakti and jñāna. Furthermore, spiritual discipline cannot leave out ritual, which must be performed as an end in itself and done in the niṣkāma bhāva and with devotion to the Supreme Lord. All forms of karma may thus become means of spiritual elevation, for they help in attaining insight into truth.

Vallabha calls bhakti excessive attachment to God, different from karma or state of jñāna (Brahmānūja). Puṣṭi-mārga is highest bhakti different from maryāda-mārga. Jñāna bears two fruits: according to maryāda it leads to mokṣa or the Akṣara Brahma; according to puṣṭi it leads to Bhagavadvaraṇa or Bhagavadbhāvarūpa bhakti. In the first case grace may and does arise from jñāna and karma; but in the other grace in the form of highest bhakti is independent of both.⁴ Brahma is the puruṣārtha and He is both jñāna and kriyā-śakti; therefore both lead to mokṣa.⁵ Samuccayavāda is taught in the Śruti,⁶ but both are subordinate to bhakti. Karma precedes knowledge of the Supreme and continues even when knowledge is attained. The liberated perform all karmas. Yoga creates a mental state of meditation and, as such, karma is prerequisite of bhakti. For Paraśottama-jñāna which is different from transcendental consciousness of Brahman all

1. Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, I, 1, 4 and 7.

2. cf., S. Radha-krishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 747.

3. K. Narain, A Critique of Madhva Refutation of Sāṅkara School of Vedānta, p. 331.

4. Anu Bhāṣya, II, 1, 3 and 29.

5. ibid., III, 4, 1.

6. ibid., III, 4, 5.

three are needed. Karma avoids the obstacles of jñāna-mārga, impurities of heart, but cannot secure jñāna-phala.¹ Sama-dama etc. are constituents of jñāna but not of bhakti. The jñani may aim at absorption in Brahman, but the bhakta aims at bhajananand i. e., remaining in an embodied condition, where spirit creates a new body and fruits of highest bhakti may be eternally enjoyed.²

All the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins have corrected the one-sided emphasis of Advaita on jñāna-yoga. They allow much less efficacy to jñāna in the sādhanā, by exalting the efficacy of bhakti. Caitanya makes uttamā bhakti swarūpa-siddhā and totally independent of jñāna and karma. No other Vaiṣṇava teacher goes as far as this though they all make karma and jñāna auxiliary to bhakti and favour jñāna-karma samuccaya.

The controversy between Vaiṣṇavas and Advaitins is the controversy between rationalism and pietism on the one hand and between activism and quietism on the other.³ It should be noted that from the point of view of actual discipline of religious life there is very little difference, but it becomes a major difference at the doctrinal level. Advaita takes a transcendental view of reality as qualitiless, partless and immutable, and the world's differences and relations as unreal. It is led to the conclusion that pure jñāna-mārga differentiating the self from the non-self is the only sādhanā logically consistent with this position. The Vaiṣṇavas take an immanent view of reality as having differences, parts and relations and the world as real expression of it. They are led to the conclusion that the dualistic and relational sādhanās of karma and bhakti are consistent with their metaphysics and that the jñāna-sādhanā must allow scope for these.

Integral Yoga in Neo-Vedānta

Neo-Vedānta accepts the end of human life as idealistic perfectionism. The stress at the human level is on trans-organic values and the emergence of self. The self being made the locus of value, it is the philosophy of self-realization. Idealism refers to the nature of the self which is being realized—it is neither the physical nor

1. *Ibid.*, III, 3, 25.

2. *Ibid.*, III, 3, 4-25.

3. Maitra, *loc. cit.*

the vital nor the mental nor the purely rational self, but the integral self. This harmonises well with the demands of "humanistic conscience which is a reaction of man's personality to its proper functioning or dysfunctioning—actions, feelings and thoughts—proper for the unfoldment of the total personality."¹ All the Neo-Vedāntins discard Mayāvāda in that aspect which dissociates self from not-self or nature and society. The exclusive jñāna-mārga discriminates self from not-self while uniting soul with the Absolute; it discriminates the self from natural elements which, consequently, remain material, partial and unredeemed. This one-sided rationalism is a contradiction of the ideal of the integral self. The discipline of gnostic existence must not be a one-sided or partial discipline. The Neo-Vedāntins insist that the new form of jñāna-yoga must spiritualise the whole self of man—his consciousness, will and emotion. And individual's spiritualisation must also be connected with the spiritualisation of natural and social environment. According to Eckhart, knowledge is better than love, but the two together are better than one of them, for knowledge really contains love.² The Neo-Vedāntins would whole-heartedly subscribe to this conception of knowledge as intuitive awareness. Nor does this knowledge remain passive; it is made the foundation of a new sādhanā of action. Discarding the minute prescriptions, superstitions, observances and rituals of orthodox religion they arrive at a programme of human conduct based on well-being, brotherhood, virtue, equality and peace as a logical deduction from the premise of Advaita reality.

Vivekanand gave the call for action, directing his appeal to man's faculty of action and not merely to his faculty of thought. He demonstrated that the deep spirituality of Advaita darśana is not destroyed by action, and the modern age needs a combination of darśana and action. To the critic who asserted that karma is within the field of Māyā he replied that in that sense even mokṣa is Māyā; Ātman being nitya mukta, there is no need to strive for liberation even by jñāna-yoga. But if the goal is admitted to be Ātma-jñāna, then the approach may be made equally through bhakti, karma and rāja yoga—any or all of them—and there is no logical contradiction between them and

1. Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself*, p. 158.

2. Floyd H. Ross, *The Meaning of Life in Hinduism and Buddhism*, p. 145.

jñāna-yoga. Aurobindo objects to Vivekanand's schematisation of different yogas into unique and separate paths but Vivekanand does not regard them as exclusive; they are three sections of one road all leading to one destination.

All other Neo-Vedantins have emphasised that religious experience is of oneness with all based on relatedness to world through action, grasped with thought and love. Theism makes God the acme of man's own personality and power, which man seeks to realize in his own life. Though Tagore opposes the mysticism of Advaita Vedānta which identifies Atman and Brahman with consequent loss of individual personality and complete passivity, he talks of fundamental identity of person to Person. Man's likeness to God, God's need of man and man's need of God lead to the perfect sādhanā of devotional love of God, dedicated service of man and creation of beauty. This is the highest rationalism which unites man's cognitive, affective and volitional nature, and his whole life to sat-cit-ānand reality in the relation of identity-in-difference.

Gandhi's ahimsā-yoga is a most comprehensive, many-sided path to liberation and uplift of the universe. Development of soul-personality by removal of ignorance, passion, hatred, jealousy and ill-will is the aim. The law of spiritualisation is overcoming of hate by love i. e., truth is the end and action of love and non-violence is the only means. Many aspects of truth, consciousness, blessedness and power are sought to be realized by the yogas but ahimsā-yoga is grounded in devotion to God, bhakti, discrimination of truth from untruth, jñāna, and ethical pursuit of righteous action through selfless service, karma. It is an integral method of God-realization, more suitable than the old, exclusive, abstract paths, to the socio-spiritual context of a mechanical-industrial society. According to Gandhi, such an approach is the logical corollary of the conception of unity of God and His oneness with all selves derived from Him, in the bond of universal love.

Aurobindo criticised the traditional yogas for turning only one main principle of human mind towards the Divine to the exclusion of others. Integral yoga means an act of total self-consecration to the Divine. Integral karma-yoga does not aim at liberation from phenomenal activity, but at the spiritualisation of human energy and will by bringing these in relation with the true psyche (not desire-soul) in both its

static and dynamic aspects. Such a disciplined will also leads to highest devotion to God, for love and communion with the Divine in thought, will and emotion constitute the essence of bhakti. Since this also demands constant remembrance of liberating knowledge and its externalisation in action, a self-dynamising meditation of this type will result in uninterrupted vision of jñāna. Integral jñāna-yoga is not merely discriminative thought concentrating on the idea of self, but the conquest of cosmic existence through realization of supreme self in all and in the universe, which expresses the play of supreme consciousness. It sees reality as self-existent, also as conscious time-spirit, self-expanding in space and must, consequently, end in acceptance of love as well as works. The intellectual mind and the static self conceives the Divine as impersonal, but the soul, heart and dynamic being of man conceives it as divine personality. Integral bhakti-yoga is no exclusive concentration on God, indifference to all activities of thought or will other than worship of the Beloved, but love extended to all beings and taken up in the adoration of universal divine and delight in the transcendental power. This love is a creative power; it can be silent and unchangeable, leading to perfect knowledge of the Divine or it can rejoice in eternal forms and expressions, leading to service of the Divine in all. Aurobindo's integral-yoga is based on the metaphysical conception of reality as a multi-poised unity; the conception of Sat-cit as both a static self-existent being and dynamic spirit of joyous creativity.

Enough has been said to prove the Neo-Vedāntic rejection of the dichotomy of either jñāna and bhakti or of jñāna and karma. Their integral approach arises from the Advaita nature of reality, conceived in such a way as to allow room for both unity and difference. This accommodates the dualism necessary in the disciplines of karma and bhakti. But it will be noted that Neo-Vedāntic exponents of Kevala Advaita like Vivekanand and Radhakrishnan also find no difficulty in reconciling these with their preference for jñāna-yoga. The latter has been criticised for being too spiritual because of his emphasis on contemplation and the mystic goal of pure identity. But he too has combined this jñāna-yoga naturally with the paths of action and devotion. Man does not attain his true nature by rational intellect alone because it causes a division in his nature. This division is overcome by yoking of all his energies; intellectual

concentration through meditation, emotional detachment through worship of God and ethical dedication through development of love and sympathy. Unmixed jñāna-marga is not superior to others. It must not be a mere knowledge of the ideal but a vision of spirit coming out in a life of action. Mere knowledge is vain without love. Devotion as detachment from world and direct union with personal God is sustained by jñāna, but not identical with it. It must be an active love, for the Divine enters the world to redeem it. Karma-yoga is an independent and coordinate discipline meant for all aspirants and not only for the inferior ones. The aim of life is attainment of mokṣa as well as work in the world, therefore jñāna and karma must combine. A complete discipline means apprehension of supreme spirit followed by control of concrete life by it.¹ The new discipline will not consist of renunciation of action, naiṣkarma, but altruistic service.² All things and beings will attain Brahma-bhāva in the course of time. Our duty is to help all to reach this state and this alone is religion or work, Karma-Kāṇḍa, all else is evil doing. Other works, Vaidikī or Tāntrika, may produce results but resort to them is waste of time. Through such works as sacrifice etc. one may get enjoyment, but sattva śuddhi which is the goal of work is realizable only through good to others.³ To obtain good we must throw away ceremonial and worship the living God—God in His universe as the human form—and to worship is to serve it. This indeed is work, not ceremonial. And such worship of the universal aspect of Godhead was never preached before in our country.⁴

Integral or spiritual discipline is required by the very nature of reality and its relation to the world. God as actualisation of one real possibility out of the infinite possibilities of the Absolute is interpenetrating with His creation. The one is in the many, therefore contemplation of God, the highest universal, is meaningless without embodying itself in work for man, the finite-particular.

The modern yoga is more in harmony with the coordinated discipline of the theists rather than with the one-sided rationalism and quietism of pure jñāna-marga. It is felt

1. Eastern Religion and Western Thought, p. 31.

2. The Bhagavadgītā, p. 355.

3. *ibid.*, p. 275.

4. *ibid.*, p. 279.

that faith in the transcendental reality of Vedānta can be reconciled with the doctrine of works and of piety. Nor is there anything in the original revelation to support the extreme doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. The Upaniṣads do not support the view that works and knowledge are exclusive of each other, or that knowledge alone leads to salvation, the life of spirit combines both.¹ The distinction of Karma-Kaṇḍa and Jñāna-Kaṇḍa and two kinds of knowledge is sought to be overcome by Bādarāyana and later Vedāntins make efforts to represent them as complementary. Karma is regarded as having a chastening and disciplinary effect for attainment of jñāna. The difference between karma and karma was always noted, though this might have been obscured due to the operation of priestly interests. Modern thinkers are justified in rejecting the futile ceremonial observances, legalistic and mechanical rites, and even the old rules of moral action, dharma, in favour of karma as personal righteousness combined with loving service of all. The theistic Vedāntins have come nearer to the spirit of the Gītā than the Advaitins in accepting that it teaches conversion of all karma, and not only of prescribed karma, into niskāma karma rather than renunciation of karma. The Gītākāra is decidedly for practice of karma-yoga with impersonal outlook and inner renunciation of work. Only selfish works are to be abandoned not activity. We cannot be saved by works alone, as Mīmāṃsā declares, but works are not opposed to saving wisdom.² The interpretation of the Vaiṣṇava-Ācāryas, however, over-emphasises bhakti. The Bhagavadgītā is rightly called the Yoga-sāstra because of its synthesis of all ways of life, alternately emphasising jñāna, bhakti and karma in all forms of combination as leading to the final goal.

Scope of Karma in Śāṅkara Darśana

Though Śāṅkara does not allow coordination of jñāna and karma in any sense whatsoever, he does allow accommodation with karma in terms of sādhana catuṣṭaya i. e., karma is of great importance until the very portals of Advaitic truth. Non-sectarian reading of Śāṅkara would show that he does not have the purpose of renouncing all karma, moral virtue, or of advocating inertia. Karma-Kaṇḍa has been admitted as purifier of

1. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 101.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, pp. 174-175.

mind and this alone is foundation of Jnana-Kanda. Moreover, he is right in differentiating the attitudes towards karma or motives of action. Men of the inferior type worship gods and perform prescribed karma for fulfilment of desires. Men of the mediocre type treat gods as manifestations of one power and coordinate their karma to the goal of jñāna. At the highest level of Brahma no ritualistic duties are required, but contemplation, altruistic thought and action and moral virtues of amanitva etc. are still necessary.¹ Duties of the āśrama cannot be relinquished in sannyāsa nor the sādharana dharma. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the one who performs duties is still in bondage and the liberated cannot act.² Karma may continue until one reaches death and even after wisdom.³ Śaṅkara himself set the highest example of such karma after the attainment of jñāna.

Some of Śaṅkara's followers carry the spirit of compromise further. They debate the manner in which karma is useful to jñāna. Karma has instrumental value only until the rise of knowledge in two ways. It may generate desire for knowledge, vividiṣā (Sureśvara and Vācaspati). Ṣaṭ saṃpatti etc. are adjacent means due to connection with jñāna, but karmas—yajña, tapas, dāna, swādhyāya—are remote means due to connection with desire to know Brahman. The other view is that karma generates knowledge itself by removing impurity and creating eligibility (Maṇḍana Miśra and Prakāśānand). In this theory no distinction is made between vividiṣā and its phala, therefore karma is indirect means to jñāna itself. It is indirect because it is not proximate, sannipatya, but remote, grādopakāraka, cause. In the first theory karma vanishes with the rise of desire for gnosis, in the second theory active duties cease but passive duties remain till the rise of jñāna.⁴ As to the kind of actions and duties which are purifiers—there is also difference of opinion. Some would allow duties of the āśramas, yajña etc.⁵ Śaṅkara and Sureśvara hold sannyāsāśrama to be superior but Maṇḍana comes nearer to common humanity and insists that gṛhasthāśrama is quicker as in it only there is scope for implementing jñāna by dedicated service. Others would even allow duties of the

1. Kabilēśvar Shastri, An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy, p. 225.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgītā, p. 350.

3. S. B. on B. S., III, 3, 32; cf., S. B. on B. G., II, 11; also III, 8 and 20.

4. Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha, p. 86.

5. ibid., p. 87.

varna besides those of āśramas (Amalanand). According to this view the mumukṣu should give up kāmya and pratiṣiddha karma but not nitya and naimittika karma¹ i. e., he is only required to free himself from errors of commission and omission but not from action. Still another view (Sarvajñātma Muni) goes even further and allows the value of both kāmya and nitya karmas, though the latter are more efficacious.² It will be seen that the followers of Śaṅkara allow full value to moral duties and professional actions as preparatory to jñāna-sādhanā, though they are opposed to the doctrine that it is a means to mokṣa. As remarked earlier, their difference from the theists is theoretical and not practical.

Other developments within the Advaita philosophy bring it very close to the position of samuccayavāda. All agree that jñāna is indispensable but others would have it that Karma- and Jñāna-Kaṇḍa should both be regarded as concerned with the sādhyā. Brahmādatta attempted adjustment between Brahmānubhava and karma-yoga in his abhyāsa or dhyāna-niyogavāda. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads is to be found in the vidhi requiring long and continuous meditation on the identity of jīva and Brahman till the end of life. One must also perform all obligatory duties, since omission in performance of these produces demerit which would hinder liberation.³ Thus by jñāna-karma samuccaya one attains absorption in Brahman. Maṇḍana Miśra in his prasahkhyānavāda declares that even Upaniṣadic injunctions in the characteristic mahāvākyas do not bring about mokṣa, but require the mumukṣu to engage in śravaṇa etc. The verbal and conceptual knowledge derived from the mahāvākyas should pass the purifying fire of meditation, upāsanā, to have its "detractive and recessive elements of relations and mediacy"⁴ replaced by pure, direct realisation of reality, Brahma-sākṣātkāra. He accepts that Śabda produces only indirect and relational knowledge. The utility of karma lies in production of mysterious effect, a special kind of adṛṣṭa, helpful to the manifestation of mokṣa to avert evils detrimental to emergence of mokṣa. That is, karma in the shape of agnihotra or yajña or upāsanā plays an important role in the final stage of the causal process

1. Iṣṭakarmyasiddhi, I, 10.

2. Siddhāntaleśa Saṅgraha, p. 87.

3. S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, II, 99.

4. S. Kappaswami Shastri, Compromises in the History of Advaita Vedānta, p. 24.

necessary to bring about Brahma-jñāna. Mandana concludes the Brahmasiddhi by showing how Vedānta-vākyas can be connected with efficacious action, pravṛtti, by turning it in the direction of upāsānā and, consequently, transforming mediate knowledge of the mahāvākyas into immediate experience of reality in the same mysterious way as effects of Vedic sacrifices are produced. Clearly, activities prescribed by Karma-Kāṇḍa are bi-functional—conducive to their respective fruits and to Brahma-realization. Secondly, all karmas are intended to purify the mind and make it fit for Brahma-realization.¹ Śaṅkara rejects forced methods where vidhis and niṣedhas keep a person engaged in a particular act so that he suppresses his desires or destroys his self to realize its true nature as nisrapaṅca.² The reason for his rejection is that the spirit of this method is: "Aye is otherwise nay, to do is to forbear; to enjoy is to cloy."³ Sureśvara follows Śaṅkara in holding that mokṣa and jñāna are identical and this does not require performance of Vedic duties, in the least. Prasaṅkhyāna cannot aim at establishment of absolute reality, vastu-siddhyārtham,⁴ because nothing can establish self-subsistent reality or pure consciousness; nor can it aim at removal of mediacy or indirectness of the vastu, Brahman, because It is absolutely immediate and removes the mediacy of all things by appearing in them; nor can it aim at negation of non-existence because Brahman cannot be made existent by denial of non-existence through prasaṅkhyāna-vidhi; nor can it remove Avidyā about Brahman because Brahman is spontaneously revealed by successful application of its means, jñāna; nor can it emancipate essentially ever-free Brahma or dissipate Ajñāna through Jñāna because all the Vedāntas have this purpose and would be rendered useless. Vedāntas cannot have two functions—something to be affected, sādhya,

1. Maṇḍana Miśra in his Brahmasiddhi mentions five other theories besides the above two, supporting vidhi in different ways:
 - a) vidhis are divertive in purpose and turn the mind away from natural activities to meditative activities enjoined for Brahma-jñāna;
 - b) all vidhis relating to karma are intended to kill desires through the process of enjoyment and cloying, thus to prepare the way for meditative activity leading to Brahma-jñāna;
 - c) karma is necessary to discharge matraya whose liquidation is the qualification for Brahma-jñāna;
 - d) Brahma-realization should be regarded as a purificatory subsidiary to the agent, sub-serving the requirements of various activities of Karma-Kāṇḍa;
 - e) karma and jñāna are fundamentally opposed and have no relation.
2. S. B. on B. S., III, 2, 21.
3. Sudarśana Bhāṭṭa, Śruti-Prakāśikā, I, 1, 4.
4. Saṅkha Vārttika, pp. 220-231.

as well as assertion of identity of jīva and Brahma, siddha. If Vedānta was in need of prasaṅkhyāna it would lose its authoritativeness, prāmāṇya. Nor can three causes—Upaniṣads, tarka, prasaṅkhyāna—be said to lead to one end, Brahma-siddhi. One only can be primary and the other two superfluous, for if all three were causes the theory of samuccayavāda would be destroyed. Moreover, if verbal testimony, śabda, conveys only indirect, mediate knowledge by its nature, prasaṅkhyāna cannot make it direct and immediate.¹ It does lead to the destruction of the popular belief in the existence of mere diversity independent of unity. But its own metaphysical base is unity-in-diversity, and it cannot be accepted that unity and diversity together can be real.²

Scope of Bhakti in Śāṅkara Darśana

While insisting on exclusive jñāna-mārga Śāṅkara does not altogether reject devotion to a personal God in attaining Brahmānubhava. The latter can be regarded as the first stage and the former as the final stage of the same development. Bhakti may be said to be integral to jñāna-mārga: "Not-with-standing the removal of difference between thou and I . . . I belong to thee, O Lord, thou may not be said to belong to me."³ It is not incorrect to hold that Śāṅkara's criticism of bhakti-mārga is not directed so much against the practical discipline as against the theological doctrines of the Vaiṣṇava Bhaktas, such as the doctrine of vyūhas, avatāras etc. as different and not-different. God as qualified and, consequently, finite.⁴ Some of his followers deliberately departed from the position of pure jñāna and assigned bhakti its due place in Brahma-jñāna. Even in the Upaniṣads worship of the Nirguṇa is described as one means to Ātma-darśana.⁵ The Indivisible may be worshipped without contradiction of its Nirguṇa nature—this is possible by worshipping it not as object, though objectivity cannot be negated absolutely. Vedānta holds sāṅkhya-mārga to be the direct and shorter path. It is the royal road consisting of the hearing of Vedāntic texts from the guru, reflection or vicāra etc. Yoga is the indirect and longer path

1. *Ibid.*

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-116.

3. S. R. on B. S., II, 1, 13.

4. V. H. Date, *Vedānta Explained*, II, 533-534.

5. Muṇḍaka enjoins it, Kāṭha opposes it.

consisting of contemplation, upāsana of Brahman devoid of qualities. The former is for the intellectually strong, the latter for the intellectually weaker sādḥaka. Brahman is to be contemplated as what is other than the Being, God, who is contemplated by this world. Bhāratīrtha allows for application of positive and negative attributes to the Absolute, as against Sagunopāsana which regards these as real attributes.¹ Such contemplation may be a delusion but it has a fruitful end, as, for example, mistaking the light of a gem for the gem we get the precious stone. One may start with mediate knowledge of Nirguna, but repetition of the cognition of secondary implication is essential to take the upāsaka to Brahma-loka, where he is emancipated at the end of the world-aeon. Bhāratīrtha declares that Nirgunopāsana is not inconsistent with jñāna-yoga as capacity of contemplation is admitted only through the channel of knowledge. The Gītā also defines yogānand—the yogī can fix his mind on God and carry on activities of the world e. g., the crow sees with one eye i. e., directs his vision alternately through both cavities or one knowing two languages can get the meaning through both or one immersed in water feels both the coolness of water and heat of the sun. Yoga or Nirgunopāsana has a position inferior than jñāna-mārga and they are differentiated due to adhikāra-bheda, but the result of both is Ātma-jñāna.²

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī completes the union of jñāna and bhakti—at the very summit of nirākāravāda he gives expression to the impulse of bhakti in a stuti to Kṛṣṇa.³ He declares the Bhāgavat to be the third Prasthāna and bhakti the most superior path leading most speedily to the goal. The bhakti ideal of the Gītā and the Bhāgavat is reconcilable with the Advaita ideal or Brahmānubhava. In the Bhāgavadbhakti-Rasāyana he holds that bhakti is the highest rasa connected with the raso vai saḥ of the Śruti,⁴ different from the other nine, having the Lord as its primary stimulus and the accessories of worship, sandal paste etc., as secondary stimuli. Love of God is the means and the end is Brahmānand or Ātma-jñāna. The synthetic spirit reaches its culmination

1. ~~...~~ pa.

2. This is Bhāratīrtha's general view, but in Pañcadaśī, IV, 38-39 (Dvaita), he declares that citta-vṛtti-nirodha (yoga) is the attempt to straighten the curly tail of the dog. In Vivarāna-Prameya-Saṅgraha it is said that jñāna through śravaṇa etc. is the only means.

3. End of Advaitasiddhi.

4. cf., Guḍhārtha Dipikā, III, 22-24.

in the catholicism of Madhusūdana, but it must be admitted that the importance he gives to bhakti in his sadhana and his reconciliation of it with Advaita is not free from logical difficulties in the context of his metaphysics. Upāsana and bhakti, subject and object of meditation and worship, do presuppose the distinction of act, instrumentality and result as much as karma-mārga, according to Suresvara, and can, therefore, be said to belong to the realm of plurality or Māyā.

Integral Yoga and Advaita

Following the interpretation of the Neo-Vedāntins it can be concluded that there is no contradiction between Advaita reality and karma-mārga. Rationalism and activism can be made compatible and the samuccayavāda of Rāmānuja is substantially true in spirit. Furthermore, samuccaya must allow for the truth of pietism. The position of Vallabha and others making bhakti an independent or superior sādhanā which by itself is indicative of the nature of reality is too extreme. The point is that the theists tend to fall into the same kind of fallacy as the Advaitins: just as the latter feel that mokṣa as jñāna requires insistence on jñāna-mārga so the former seem to think that their definition of mokṣa as supreme love of the Lord requires insistence on superiority of bhakti-mārga. But the latter position contradicts the express teaching of Vedānta that mokṣa is jñāna. This difficulty is overcome by Rāmānuja by defining bhakti as dhruvasmṛti or a state of jñāna, and others like Madhva do not fail to make jñāna the condition of bhakti and prapatti. Be that as it may, one is constrained to reject the Advaita contention of the antithesis of bhakti and jñāna, for theistic devotion and mystic oneness can be brought into natural harmony as demonstrated in the integral jñāna-yoga of Neo-Vedānta.

The problem that Vedānta has to deal with is the erroneous belief of man that he is not free and the consequent effort to become free. Advaita holds that to know the truth of one's nature is to attain freedom, therefore purification and direction of the cognitive faculty is primary and volition and emotion are subordinate elements in discipline. It forgets that jñāna is not so much the impersonal, unrelated consciousness of the mere witness, sākṣī, as the total consciousness of spiritual existence. The latter requires the direction of volition and emotion if perfect clarity of knowledge

is to be attained. Burning desire for liberation is generated by karma which is the purifier of the mind, by bhakti which elevates the mind and by jñāna which leads the mind to the one reality. The psychology of sādhanā is that mumukṣutva transforms the dualistic mind into the mind desiring only unity. This desire for unity expresses itself in jñāna-mārga as the realization of emancipation from Avidyā, in bhakti, prapatti- and karma-mārgas as feeling of freedom from sin and passion. After the egoism resulting from Avidyā, rāga-dveṣa and karma is removed man discovers the truth of God within himself. Thus jñāna-karma-bhakti samuccaya is the causal factor in mumukṣutva which is the condition of attainment of parama puruṣārtha.

There appears to be a contradiction between the propositions, jīva is Brahman and jīva becomes Brahman. But the contradiction is only seeming. Because in becoming Brahman the jīva is merely recognising the nature which has unchangingly remained its own. The negative procedure of realizing metaphysical identity consists in the epistemological removal of superimpositions on that true nature. Its positive aspects require the disciplining of the intellectual, emotional and moral nature. Thus, all three yogas have causal efficacy though they do not change the nature of Ātman-Brahman.¹ The Advaitin's objection is that karma-yoga and bhakti-yoga are based on the postulate of reality as pure difference, or, at best, identity-in-difference. Here the contention is, firstly, that the dualistic approach at the psychological level, as explained above, is not a contradiction of the nitya-siddha nature of the Advaita reality at the metaphysical level.² The Advaitin, like the Vaiṣṇavite, has also to begin from the apparently pluralistic condition of the psycho-physical individual or jīva, and he must allow the efficacy of karma and bhakti as coordinated parts of sādhanā, which is throughout a psychological process. The condition of Brahman-Ātman is non-dualistic but the process of its realization by a particular sādhanā is dualistic—consisting of development of his moral-devotional spirit upto the level of perfection. Advaitins also have the purpose of achieving Brahma-jñāna, obtaining identity with all or removing Avidyā and winning the grace of the guru, and all this does require sustained and devoted action.³

1. *ibid.*, op. cit., II, 523-524.

2. *vide supra*, p. 808.

3. *Date*, op. cit., II, 521.

Secondly, it may be pointed out that the process of jñāna-yoga is no less dualistic than that of the other yogas. Sravana, manana, nididhyāsana presuppose the difference of the sādḥaka, the guru and the Vedāntic teaching. The Advaitin tries to overcome this difficulty by contending that on the attainment of jñāna the Mayā or unreal nature of these is established. But this amounts to the admission that jñāna-yoga is also opposed to the advitiya swarūpa of Brahman. On the ground of the Advaitin either all three yogas must be rejected as means to the attainment of Brahma-jñāna, or, as has been argued above, all three must be accepted as coordinated disciplines.

We may stop again to analyse Śaṅkara's reasons for rejecting samuccayavāda. One cannot quarrel with him in so far as he wishes to bring out the truth that man cannot pursue two opposite ends viz., satisfaction of his impulsive nature by means of karma and realization of mokṣa by means of jñāna. The first goal lies in the context of object-oriented attitude in man, wherein man's attention is fixed on the outer, pleasure-giving mundane ends. The second goal lies in the context of the subject-oriented attitude, wherein man's attention is fixed only on his inmost and true self. Man must never remain satisfied with the lesser end but must aim at the ultimate end. As light and shade cannot coexist so these eternally contradictory ends cannot coexist. Unless there is distaste and detachment, virakti and virāga, from karma and abhyudaya there cannot be the choice of jñāna and mokṣa. In so far as Śaṅkara's antithesis of karma and jñāna establishes the above truth his position may be accepted. All schools of Vedānta have accepted the nivṛtti-mārga to be opposed to the pravṛtti originating in Avidyā, attachment to abhā-mān and karma-phala, which can never bring dukha-nivṛtti or mokṣa.¹ But the contention is that this opposition of the results of karma and jñāna cannot be used in support of jñāna-mārga as the only true sādhanā. The Advaitin is confusing the Jñāna which is the end, with the jñāna which is the means. The first is the same as transcendental unity but the second is not and, therefore, the exclusive path of jñāna cannot claim any special logical connection with the former. Nivṛtti or the choice of the jñāna-phala i. e., mokṣa, is perfectly compatible with activity to control the senses and mind, non-attachment to worldly and heavenly pleasures, devotional meditation, moral

1. *ibid.*, II, 523.

virtue and disinterested service to humanity, unbroken mental activity of consciousness, abhyāsa-prasāṅkhyāna embodied in the proposition, "I am Brahman."¹ And the jñānī is said to be above duties only in an eulogistic sense² i. e., in principle; there is no opposition between mokṣa and karma. Though there remains nothing to be done because all mundane ends disappear from his sight yet he works for the good of the world. Nor is the work performed as sādhanā but as lakṣaṇa.³

Another truth is brought out in Śaṅkara's opposition of jñāna and dharma. Ethical action is a developmental process or progress leading man to higher and higher virtue, but it cannot be completed in the spatio-temporal field. This points to an end transcending that field wherein all its values and aspirations find fulfilment.⁴ Śaṅkara is right in insisting that by performance of varṇāśrama-dharma alone we cannot attain the transcendental end. "Without faith in the transcendent mere works languish. The end is not achieved by mechanical goodness."⁵ Deeds, even virtuous deeds, niṣkāma karma must terminate in spiritual experience, otherwise moral life remains incomplete, thus it is that Śaṅkara makes karma-yoga no more than the indirect cause needed for citta-suddhi.⁶ But in arriving at this conclusion, Śaṅkara has again confused the end with the means. It is not denied that reality is of the nature of desirelessness, akāma and destruction of karma-phala, but it does not follow that the emergence of such a condition in a particular individual is independent of these factors. Niṣkāma karma-yoga is the ever intensifying effort of the sādhanā to turn his desire and his action from mundane to the transcendental end. The process goes on side by side with gradually increasing knowledge and detachment of the self from the not-self—the superimposed adjuncts and objects. Jñāna-yoga and karma-yoga are mutually interdependent and there is no warrant for the Advaita contention that karma-yoga is the remote and mediate and jñāna-yoga the immediate

1. *Ibid.*

2. B. S. I, 1, 4.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavadgītā*, p. 74.

4. B. S., III, 3, 1.

5. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 101.

6. *cf.*, *Date*, *op. cit.*, II, 525, 527, 529: Akāma being a condition of Ātma-kāma, Ātma-rati, Ātma-krāṇā, Śaṅkara contends that Ātma-jñāna which destroys all other kāma, karma and phala, must be the source of niṣkāma karma-yoga. The doctrine that niṣkāmatva is the means to Ātma-jñāna is both an illogical and impossible reversal of the process.

and proximate means to mokṣa.

We have also to examine the whole question of sādhanā in the context of Māyāvāda. There is no intervening condition between jñāna and mokṣa, therefore no premature detachment from works or devotion is to be encouraged. The Advaitin justifies the continuance of these sādhanās in vyāvahārika sattā. According to Narahari, the ethico-religious significance of Māyā is that the antitheses bred by it are different means for worship of Brahman, and we can add to this, service of Brahman. Even Sureśvara declares¹ that the world is not necessarily evil, but it depends on the individual to utilise it properly or improperly to prove its value or disvalue. The conditional value, provisional truth of the sādhanās in vyavahāra does not overcome altogether the theistic objection that Advaita Vedānta relegates dualistic disciplines of karma and upāsana to the realm of falsehood, since they have neither place nor significance at the level of pāramārthika sattā. It has already been argued that on Advaita's own ground jñāna-sādhanā is not in a different case from the other two. Māṇḍūkya Kārikā² has declared as truth that there is neither bondage nor striving for liberation nor attainment of liberation. Therefore, all such striving, be it jñāna-sādhanā or any other, falls in the realm of Māyā. Advaita has merely argued that falsehood can lead to truth e. g., mistaking the light of the gem for the gem one may obtain the gem. But it is possible to avoid the conclusion of unreality of the spiritual striving of humanity. Earlier it was argued that absolute idealism of Advaita Vedānta does not logically debar a realistic view of world.³ The duality of matter and mind, object and subject is not contradicted but derives its being and truth from its adhithana or ground of pure undifferentiated consciousness. In whatever sense the world is regarded as true by the realist and the materialist in that sense is the reality of its creator upheld. And in that very sense the reality of karma- and bhakti-sādhanā coincides with the reality of jñāna-sādhanā. If even now, a hint of "unreality" remains about them, the Advaita metaphysics as interpreted by Radhakrishnan overcomes this difficulty. The personal God is a real but non-eternal actualisation of one of the infinite possibilities of the impersonal reality.

1. Bhādarāyaka-Bhāgya-Vārttika, p. 433.

2. II, 32.

3. vide supra, pp. 796-799.

He is the creator of a real creation with which He maintains a relation of ever-increasing interpenetration. An integral spiritual discipline is the means by which the individual and then the whole cosmos realizes its unity with the cosmic God, and ultimately attains identity with the indivisible and immutable Transcendent Spirit.

Jīva—The Metaphysical Status of the Individual

The Classical Positions

This raises the question of the ultimate status of the individual who is undergoing discipline. Broadly speaking, two doctrines of individuality are found in Vedānta, which can be differentiated from one another by imagining Ātman as a centre. The centre may be regarded as truly the nature of point and the theists think of it as an *anu*, having as its sphere the changeable and the empirical. Or the centre may be regarded as a phase of the infinite curve of a continuum and the Advaitins think of it as really a limitless and partless whole or *vibhu*, admitting limitations only as empirical appearances. The different positions are clearly brought out in the metaphysical explanation of the relation of *jīva* to Brahman, in terms of the categories of difference, difference-non-difference and non-difference. Madhva holds *jīva* to be ultimately real, but completely different and dependent on Brahman. In the *Viṣṇutattva-Vinirṇaya* he does not tolerate even a hint of identity of the two in the three *Prasthānas*. Not only in the experience of *dharma* but even in highest experience is difference not transcended. *Bheda* is *dharmī-svarūpa*, different aspects do not destroy individuality. This is *saviśeṣa abheda*, identity tolerating real difference. Other theists all accept the difference of *jīva* and Brahman, but try to harmonise this with the teaching of real unity. *Ramānuja* stresses inseparable relation of part and whole, attribute and substance. *Nimbārka* also gives the analogy of qualified, *dharmī*, and its quality, *dharma*. But even as *svābhāvika* and as *svarūpa* of Brahman *jīva* is not identical with it. *Vallabha* holds the *jīva* to be *svāśā* (own part) of Brahman; real identity, *abheda*, exists but parts are different parts of the same whole. Only Śaṅkara takes his stand on pure identity and rejects every interpretation of difference. The argument is that if souls are different from each other, they are also different from God; contrariwise, if they are non-

different from God they are non-different from world also. The difference of subject and object, self and self, self and supreme person, Īśvara, is due to fleeting adjuncts created by Maya. There can neither be real difference nor identity-in-difference between Īśvara and jīva, Brahman and jīva, because all relations of general-particular, quality-qualified, cause-effect, part-whole, qualified-pure are unintelligible. Jīva and Īśvara may be treated as both reflections of Brahman in mind and totality of subtle states of mind in Māyā (Prakāṣārtha Vivaraṇa, Śaṅkṣepa Śāriraka), or Īśvara may be treated as bimba and jīva as reflection or pratibimba, while Brahman inheres in both (Pañcapādika-Vivaraṇa), or jīva may be treated as intelligence, cid, defined or limited by nescience and Īśvara as unlimited intelligence, or jīva is Brahman associated with ignorance of its own infinitude. But difference of avacedaka or pratibimba regarding jīva is strained controversy, since the main teaching is of non-difference of jīva and Brahman in essence, after eliminating differences due to relative adjuncts, as in bhāgyāga lakṣṇā. The soul, then, realizes unreality of all distinctions of itself and all with Brahman.

Advaita does not accept the aham-padārtha as Ātmā, since the "I" does not persist in all states. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins reply that analysis shows it to persist in waking, dreaming and sleep and also in mokṣa, though in the latter state it is freed from nescience. If this is not granted neither would anyone have illusion of self in the body, dehātmaika bhāva, nor would anyone want to study Mokṣa-Śāstra, which is destructive of the person himself. Madhva philosophers point out that destruction of the "I" in a condition of real identity, aikya, contradicts Advaita Brahma. Māyāvāda-Khaṇḍana argues that even propagation of Advaita philosophy becomes impossible. For the four conditions—the adhikāri (enquirer), viśaya (object), prayojana (purpose) and sambandha (relation of purpose to object)—are explained as kalpita distinctions due to beginningless Avidyā. To Madhusūdana's contention that all the distinctions held good in vyavahāra, Jayatīrtha replies that not a superimposed agency, kartṛtva (body and intellect etc.), but a real agency is necessary for upholding utility of scripture. And Vyāsātīrtha adds that even if superimposition be granted Advaita must admit it to be nirupādhika adhyāsa i. e., only of attributes of the superimposed entity. The reply of the Advaitasiddhi is

that agency is *sopadhika adhyāsa* i. e., of quality similar to that of attributes of *upādhis*. The superimposed entity and its attributes bear their counterparts in a similar entity which belongs to a superior plane of reality, but this cannot endanger Advaita. In *Upādhi-Khaṇḍana* the *Dvaitin* also attacks the doctrine of separate individuality as due to *upādhis*. If *Advaitins* argue that identity can tolerate difference due to *upādhis* (*Bimba-pratibimbavāda*), *Mādhvas* point out that the reflecting medium must be real, and there is fallacy of *petitio principii*, *cakraka-doṣa*, between *upādhi* and *Ajñāna*. If a real *upādhi* is said to produce real difference while yet securing oneness, then *upādhi* is either useless or reveals some difference lying somewhere else in space and time (*Avacchedakavāda*). They insist that the individual may be of a limited nature but is not false, nor is the difference between individuals arising from their natures a false difference. As against the Advaita contention that identity of individuals is intrinsic while their differences are due to superimposed *āntahkaraṇa* etc. the truth is that the *āntahkaraṇa* etc. are distinct because the selves with which they are associated are different from one another. Only a real difference will allow for the *sādhaka's* desire for *jñāna*.

The *Mādhva* philosophers try to establish *swarūpa-bheda* as against *swarūpaikya*. The difference between God and self is perceived by God as well as *jīva* (he may not perceive God but does perceive his difference from Him). To this the *Advaitin* replies that refutation of difference belongs only to *paramārtha* and its experience in *vyavahāra* is not being denied. Thus the *Mādhva* argument of the undoubted reality of difference which is known through perception is fully met. The *Mādhva* argument is that *anusaṅdhāna* (one's own experience of pleasure and pain) must be private and unique i. e., subjective. In *swarūpaikya* the *anusaṅdhāna* of Brahman and *Ātman* would be identical, but their *anusaṅdhāna* being different the difference is not *supādhika* but *swābhāvika* i. e., the inferential ground of difference is that sorrows and sufferings of *jīva* are absent in Brahman and both being permanent entities their mutual difference is eternal and real.¹ But monists use the psychological premise of the above argument to turn the table against theists. For the theistic conception of the possibility of the liberated

1. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, IV, 178.

self, mukta jiva, enjoying Brahmanand¹ in liberation points to identity of jiva and Brahman, since one's anand cannot be experienced by another for obvious reasons.²

In the dialectic on difference, the argument of the theists, e. g., Vyāsātīrtha, that any object is bhava in itself and abhāva in respect of others, does not meet the Advaita objection. The latter had never tried to deny the simultaneity of bhāva-abhāva with regard to different counter-positives, pratiyogis. And the Mādhva identity of pratiyogi and dharṃi in the same locus in vyavahāra creates the absurd position that presence of jar is perceived in the cloth. This difficulty of swarūpa-bheda only proves the illusory character of difference. Advaitins also examine at length the Nyāya definition of difference as mutual negation or ananyobhava between substrate and counter-entity; the Bhāṭṭa definition as dissimilarity of two entities or vaidharmya and as separate, vidārapataka, substance because of its being the object of perception. They conclude³ that in terms of origin of the psychological experience of difference as well as in terms of its metaphysical consistency it is an inexplicable term. It has been remarked even by a critic of Advaita⁴ that the theistic defence of difference appears to be weak as compared to its refutation by the Advaitins. And the Advaita position of the essential identity of self and reality is more valid.

Neo-Vedānta and Individuality

All Neo-Vedāntins discard the conception of self as passive existence-consciousness, and conceive it as infinite power, consciousness, bliss, truth and perfection. This nature of the self is latent, but actualised in evolution until oneness with reality is attained. Vivekanand does not depart from the strictly orthodox position of Advaita. His contribution consists in interpreting the concept of empirical individual in a more dynamic way as against the static interpretation of the Advaitic jñāna-mārga. But though he allows that the individual may seek the goal through the coordinated disciplines of the four great yogas the goal itself remains as the ever-

1. cf., -- B. on B. S., IV, 4, 5.

2. Appaya Bhaṅgī, Anand-Lahari, (Bharati mandiram Sanskrit series), p. 146.

3. Citsukha, Tattva-Pradīpikā; Kāśmīraka Sadānand, Advaita Brahmasiddhi; Nṛsiṅghāśrama Muni, Bheda-Dhikāra; Śrī Harā, Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya.

4. vide Dasgupta, loc. cit.

accomplished, eternal identification of self with reality. Only the Absolute is real and idols, temples, gods, deities, images, mind, body and cosmos disappear. The unreal individuality of jivahood disappears leaving behind the swarūpaikya of Ātman and Brahman.

Gandhi and Tagore adopt the theistic conception of self. Tagore conceives God as harmony of selves, organically related and dependent on Him; but they are also independent since each is a unique centre, distinct entity. The many real and free selves eternally exist in the infinite and derive their joy in harmony of love-union, cooperation and play with God. Highest realization is of the presence, communion and enjoyment of supreme person. It is a vision in which duality between God and man is preserved. Even spiritualised individuality remains finite and limited as absolute perfection, infinitude and unlimitedness belongs only to God. Moksa is the eternal process of approaching God by removal of ego but never the ending of individuality. The sense of egohood is the ignorance of real nature of world and man's place in it i. e., illusion of ultimateness of individuality. When this is overcome the individual consciousness is found to be a unique expression of satyam.¹ Tagore rejects the merger of individual self in the pure identity of Brahman and takes his stand on the relation of identity-in-difference. The self is identical with God in existence, but different in expression.

Gandhi conceives God as manifesting Himself in plurality of selves and matter. The many selves are real expressions of God's Law and completely dependent on Him. He, too, postulates the relation of identity-in-difference. The soul is identical with God as particle of His existence, but different because a part cannot be the whole, nor the particle God. Gandhi thinks the goal of the individual self is God-realization, in which he remains separate from God, but surrenders completely to God, dedicating all his powers to Him. Both Gandhi and Tagore are equally intent on breaking the chain of egotism, but while Tagore insists on experience of universal love only through retention of individual personality, Gandhi's stress is on merger of the individual in the ocean of humanity. He uses the language of Advaita in describing the highest state as oneness with God by loss of separate selfhood. But inspite of this difference, the philosophical

position of both is similar. Only, Tagore finds it necessary to insist on retention of purified individuality to make possible the bliss of love-relation between God and self, while Gandhi's emphasis on service of man to God necessitates acceptance of a separate individuality, devoid of all egoity as ultimate. But the fact is that the category of identity-in-difference tries to safeguard the reality of the individual self at the cost of sacrifice of the unity and infinity of the Absolute.

Aurobindo's integral Vedānta has the avowed aim of showing Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita as containing different aspects of the integral truth in respect of the metaphysical nature of the individual, as also in respect of the nature of the Absolute. He argues that Dvaita is right in insisting on the non-temporal reality and the ultimate significance of the spiritual individual in jñāna; only the exclusive particularity of the phenomenal self due to the organization of Prakṛti for his many experiences comes to an end. But Dvaita is wrong in thinking of the jīvātmā in terms of exclusiveness of being; svarūpa-bheda means the ontological separation of each self from all others and from divine being.¹ While insisting on the unique individuality of the self as concrete and eternal, Dvaita is failing to grasp the transcendental aspect of selfhood, which is beyond the stream of space-time-causality and plurality² and also compromising unity, infinity and all-comprehending character of divine being and negating the experience of essential oneness with Godhead. The philosophy of identity-in-difference or of difference-in-identity correctly conceives the jīvātmās as eternally depending on the Supreme Lord as His self-differentiations and not as ontologically different from Him. Rāmānuja, Nimbarka and Vallabha bring out the reality as well as unity of self and God by means of different analogies. Aurobindo points out the common mistake of all in treating the self as a part, whether in terms of a power, function, form or quality of the Absolute, instead of understanding it as the indivisible Absolute itself in a unique integration. Advaita is correct in stressing the essential unity of self and reality, but it wrongly interprets the unity as unqualified and undifferentiated. It confuses individuality with exclusive particularity and comes to the conclusion that in respect

1. Haridas Chaudhuri, *The Philosophy of Integralism*, pp. 118-119.

2. *ibid.*, p. 258.

of individuality the individual self is eternally negated entity (bādha) i. e., unreal, while in respect of selfhood, Ātman, it is the eternally accomplished, nitya siddha, Absolute.¹ This logical conclusion finds support in the transcendental types of spiritual experience wherein the finite, empirical self is negated in the identity of pure consciousness. But Aurobindo rejects the conception of identity which ends in dissolution of spiritual individuality as well as empirical finitude. According to him, this criticism must be admitted by Śaṅkara himself, because while commenting on the last sūtra he allows the possibility of the liberated individual choosing either to remain absorbed in the static calm of unitary experience or of cooperating with the dynamic and creative aspect of spirit in the task of world evolution. This exercise of free-will is the proof of the reality of individual self in liberation.

The jīvātma may be regarded as a particle of Sacchidānand in the sense of a particular poise of being of the indivisible Absolute, which remains unexhausted by infinite such manifestations. This spiritual individual is a centre of Universal Consciousness, medium of the Transcendent Divine. He may be less fundamental but no less real than the Universal or the Transcendental. The three are the constituents of one principle and represent uniqueness, creativity and freedom respectively. The real and transcendental self in man is unassociated with world or with exclusive individuality. The creator or Supermind is a unity which is differentiated into infinite such undivided centres in its second poise. The jīvātma is aware of its identity with the Supermind but the individual soul or psychic being, caitya-puruṣa or ātmā, which is the outer soul inhabiting mind, life, body in transmigration, is not aware of its unity. It is this Ātmā which is the centre of all activities and principle of separate individuality. Man is united with Sacchidānand by the cancellation of psychic personality, but remains as the individual reality.

But the integral Advaita of Aurobindo, in saving the individual self from "annihilation" in the undifferentiated Brahman, compromises the absoluteness of the Absolute. The conception of the multipoised unity is not different, logically, from the category of identity-in-difference, which he has himself criticised. Though he

1. *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

declares that there is no contradiction in the infinite expressing from above as the transcendental existence, Para Brahma, in between as cosmic self, Īvara, and below as individual consciousness, jīvātma, the contradiction is avoided not in finite logic but only in Infinite logic. Further, if the goal of self is attainment of the being, knowledge, power, bliss and truth of the Absolute what is meant by saying that jīvātma is less fundamental than the cosmic self, and the cosmic self less fundamental than the super-transcendent Saccidānand? To assert the ontological reality of the individual self, freed from elements of exclusive particularity is bound to bring in a hint of separateness and dualism which will prejudice Advaita reality. Nor can this be avoided by calling jīvātma "less fundamental" poise of Supermind. Aurobindo's attempt to prove the self-contradiction of Advaita goal of annihilation of individual self in liberation with its idea of the exercise of free-choice on the part of the liberated between quiescent spirit and dynamic will of spirit is not conclusive. For the Advaita conception of jīvana mukta does rest on the notion of negation of individual self, which is equivalent to the identity of Ātman and Brahman. And Advaita Vedānta does not accept that jīvana mukti and Advaita are contradictory conceptions which cannot coexist.

According to Radhakrishnan, man's personality is a unique product of evolution, it is dynamic and developing in a teleological way. The transformation of man into divine being is a high state of perfection but it is not the final goal. The supreme end must be total identity with ultimate reality—monism of the ānand-swarūpa Brahman. From birth to birth the personality rises higher and higher accompanied by its jñāna, karma and saubhava. Throughout the process of perfecting itself the Divine Personality remains an ether to the individual self and an object of worship for it. When narrow individuality is broken by meditation and moral life the self attains unity with universal spirit. This illumined soul retains his individual life after God-realization, but his body, life and consciousness are controlled by divine unity. This spiritualised individuality continues until the end of the cosmic process, otherwise the world would remain unperfected till eternity. The jñāni's thought and activity is directed towards purification of all sinful, ignorant souls until the world and all the souls are perfected and united with God and God lapses back into the Absolute.

Thus, Radhakrishnan has done full justice to the claims of human personality in postulating continuation of self, even after ending of egoity. The spiritual self lasts as long as the cosmos lasts. But unity of reality cannot be preserved by insisting on eternity and ultimacy of cosmic universality of God as well as of infinite number of individual selves, as Aurobindo insists. Radhakrishnan agrees with Aurobindo that both are real; they are manifestations of one of the infinite possibilities of the Absolute. But reality does not mean eternity, for both are destined to return to their source after their evolution is completed. It was the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins who had first criticised the Advaita argument of unreality of the individual on ground of its non-permanence. Radhakrishnan is fully justified in turning their criticism against them as well as Aurobindo. The reality of the individual self is perfectly consistent with its disappearance in the experience of Advaita, and there is no necessity of insisting on the survival of individuality to prove reality. The theists deny that the self does disappear in the experience, but Aurobindo admits it as true of a certain type of experience.

Vedānta experience is on the whole a non-dualistic experience. All schools have admitted the Sūtra ideal of avibhāga, but they understand it either as complete dependence of the self on the Lord from whom he is different, swarūpa-bheda, or as some form of unity, viśiṣṭaikya, or swarūpaikya. It is self-forgetfulness in the love of God i. e., effacement of the self through worship of God and service of man (Dvaita) or cancellation of the egoity of jīva (Viśiṣṭadvaita) or self-negation of jñāna and the cancellation of jīva as ahaṅkāra (Advaita).¹ Śaṅkara is thought to favour absorption of temporal individuality in the eternal since he repeatedly declares that eternity means non-temporality. The theists have made a concerted attack on the doctrine of temporal individuality as adhyāsa. Radhakrishnan has shown that the doctrine is valid as an explanation of the fact of egoity in man, yet the validity of the Advaita experience is, philosophically, not marred by that doctrine. For self-loss is not loss of real personality, but of superimposed personality; and this leads to enrichment by participation in divine life or less in the only personality viz., Universal Self. Radhakrishnan

1. cf., K. C. Bhattacharyya, "The Concept of Philosophy," C. I. P., pp. 121-123.

accepts the truth in the theistic position and expands Advaita doctrine on this vital point. The true or universal individuality is not an illusory projection of ignorance, but a real expression of divine essence, presence, power.¹ The freed self sees God in all and all in God and effaces itself in service of humanity. Sarvātma-bhāva is the idea of taking all names-forms and functions as higher and higher expressions of divine purpose. The result of union with God is not abolition of objects and people as unreal but cessation and abolition of the false idea of separateness, anyatva-bodha. The attempt to impose the concept of difference, identity-in-difference or difference-in-identity, in any form on the Advaita reality is inspired by the fear of loss of personal identity, which is but another manifestation of that very egoism which needs to be overcome. Experience and reason both point toward the necessity of a pure undifferentiated consciousness and experience as the acme of reality. Radhakrishnan holds to the essential truth of the final end as identity of Ātman and Brahman. Of all Neo-Vedāntins, his reconciliation of the conception of reality of individual self with the doctrine of Advitīya Brahman is the most satisfactory.

Mukti—The End of Life

Jivana Mukti and Videha Mukti

The original teaching that Ātma-jñāna is mukti, does not carry the meaning that the soul becomes something other than what it is; it is the soul's realization of its eternal but veiled nature. With the teaching of vimuktasca vimucyate there developed two separate conceptions of mukti viz., liberation while in corporeal existence and final deliverance after the end of the body. Classical Vedāntins accepted these as antithetical conceptions. The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins conceive videha mukti as the transformation of the bound soul into another condition in some other place and time—a condition of eternal and inseparable union of love² of the perfected Ātman with the Supreme Lord³ in contrast with the Advaita idea of jivana mukti as a condition of

1. The Bhagavad-gītā, p. 33.

2. Sālekya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya.

3. e. g., Vallabha's Mukta Ātman is a loving inhabitant of Goloka and Rāmānuja's of Baikunṭha.

getting rid of the idea of duality of Ātman and Brahman and laya of the mukta in the substance of the Akṣara or Para Brahma, here and now. The Advaitins could, however, accommodate the empirical way of conceiving the Ātman as becoming liberated. The devotee who has not yet destroyed Māyā worships the transient gods, Brahmā etc. as manifestations of Īśvara and, after death, proceeds by the path of the gods to Brahma-loka and, from thence, rises to the abode of Viṣṇu and, finally, communes with Īśvara. After having grasped real unity with Īśvara that soul enters Īśvara. But the transcendental meaning of liberation is that the jñānī, with or without the cessation of the body, continues as an individual being, bound karmically to assist in the task of saving the world.¹ The difference between the theists and monists as regards the meaning of liberation depends on the differences of their metaphysical-logical determinations of Ātman-Brahman. But the Advaitins with the synthetic outlook (e. g., Vidyāranya in Jīvanamukti-Vivēka) insist that there is no difference between jīvana and videha muktis, since in both the identity of Ātman and Brahman is the same. Strictly speaking, mokṣa at a particular time and place, after death is a creation of imagination in Avidyā; liberation is eternal, nitya mukti, and not a process in time.

There is, however, siddhānta-bheda among Advaitins, in their logical explanation of the nature of jīvana mukti. The total annihilation of karma in Brahma-jñāna is explained by Śaṅkara² as excluding prārabdha karma, by the force of which body and activity is continued in the mukta. Following Śaṅkara, Sureśvara explains that there is no contradiction between the teaching that jñāna dissolves duality and the teaching of the retention of body by the liberated due to prārabdha. For the liberated is conceptually unrelated to the time-process or phenomenal world. Maṇḍana Miśra's explanation is that the ideal of sthitaprajña and sadyo mukti may be understood as the condition of jīvana mukti by admitting the existence of Avidyā in an extremely attenuated form, Avidyāleśa, but with its power shattered by Jñāna, and it is this residual Avidyā which causes the appearance of bhoga, empirical experience, in jīvana mukti.

In the Yoga-Vasīṣṭha, however, mokṣa is described as pāṣāṇavat i. e., cessation of individual existence, calm and eternally unclouded, but this is not the general position of the followers of Śaṅkara.

2. S. R. on B. S., IV, 1, 15 and 19.

More specifically, there is destruction of āvarana-sakti of Ajñāna but the residual continuance of vikṣepa-sakti due to prarabdha;¹ or Ajñāna-saṁskara survives Avidyā-nāśa like the scent of garlic remaining after the vessel is cleansed; or there is persistence of the Mūla Ajñāna in a lifeless state just as the burnt piece of cloth retains its shape.²

The conception of jīvana mukta is essential for the Advaita Vedānta, which cannot otherwise account for continuation of the teaching of Vedānta. But its attempts to explain in terms of Avidyāleśa are somewhat strained. Even Maṇḍana Miśra feels that annihilation of all karma conflicts with the Gītā ideal of sthitaprajñā, and concludes that the latter is a highly advanced sādḥaka rather than a siddha. Sarvajñātma Muni admits that no middle condition between appearance and disappearance of Avidyā exists and, consequently, gives up the attempt to explain this phenomenon. He contents himself with the declaration that body, mind and world cease for the liberated, he is not "ordinarily" existent but is only pure sattva and ānand. In the Laghu-Chandrikā, Brahmānand rejects outright the doctrine of jīvana mukti in favour of videha mukti.

The debate on jīvana mukti versus videha mukti can be brought to an end without recourse to the doctrine of Avidyāleśa, by elaborating the implications of Mayāvāda. There is a meeting point between Advaitins and their opponents: for both of them liberation means the cancellation of the attitude which accepts phenomenal world as the final truth. Being motivated by the desire to preserve the reality of the world, the theists thought that this was only consistent with videha mukti. They interpreted the doctrine of the four states of the soul to mean that all have the same relative nature, though at different levels i. e., the subject of "I" is present in all the states and, therefore, to attain to its true condition of perfected purity there must be cessation of the first three, which are real but ignorant and imperfect states of existence, symbolised by Māyā, saṁsāra and jarā-maraṇa. But the theists overlooked the truth that turiya is a condition different in kind from the others and is only called a state of the soul figuratively. Advaita has correctly understood the first three as empirical states resting on the

1. Siddhāntaleśa Saṁgraha, p. 106.

2. *ibid.*, p. 107.

ground of the last or transcendental. Therefore, to rise to the latter does not necessarily entail cessation of the former. How the compresence of the real and the unreal is possible is explained in terms of anirvacaniya adhyāsa. This is the logical ground for the doctrine of jivana mukti, in which body and world-process is noticed but no longer mistaken for reality.¹ The ideal of freedom is not a plea to efface the object from the stream of experience or from the outside, but the objective world is to be commuted into the symbol of a vision in which the axiological nullity of everything contemplated in the objective attitude takes the place of infactuation.² The Advaitin must affirm that as in the condition of bondage jñāna is the substratum of Māyā, so in the condition of freedom knowledge and ignorance are not exclusive of each other in the existential sense. In other words, the phenomenal level does not disturb the transcendental. It is declared that the knower of the essence, enjoying all pleasures of the senses and also realizing the bliss of Brahman may derive both temporal and spiritual pleasures, even like one having knowledge of two languages.³ He is liberated who performs every act without the idea of his doing it, taking it to be only a part of multifarious, spontaneous action of nature.

Neo-Vedānta and Mukti

The criticism is made⁴ that Indian philosophy is self-enclosed in certain dogmas of which the doctrine of liberation generally and its conception as identity with superconsciousness specially, makes it difficult to explain change or return from change to changelessness. From the moral side, the dogma of karma-rebirth and the experiential states (saṁsāra) as states of bondage hampers relational and moral explanations in philosophy. But it cannot be admitted that such difficulties are inherent in the doctrines of bondage and liberation. The doctrine of jivana mukti does not entail existential cessation of phenomena, as has been shown, therefore there is no logical impossibility of explaining change and changelessness and passage from one to the other. All Neo-Vedāntins have unanimously accepted that the highest end of philosophy is "moksa" i. e.,

1. Kalini Kant Brahma, *Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā*, p. 195.
2. S. S. Roy, *The Heritage of Saṅkara*, p. x.
3. Manilal N. Dvivedi, *The Imitation of Saṅkara*, p. 143.
4. Dasgupta, Surendranath, "Philosophy of Dependent Emergence," C. I. P., pp. 253-254.

the non-acceptance of the phenomenal or given as ultimate. Like the classical Vedāntins, both theists and monists, they too seek transformation of man's outlook from its present object-oriented condition into the truly spirit-oriented condition. And, far from rejecting mokṣa as an unproved dogma they have adopted and expanded its meaning much beyond that given to it by classical Vedānta.

Both the Vaiṣṇava and Advaita Vedāntins conceive the mokṣa doctrine in an individualistic manner. It is the individual jīva which attains perfection, but the world and its myriad other selves continue in the condition of imperfection. All modern thinkers, implicitly and explicitly, consider this doctrine too narrow. Without denying the ideal of individual salvation they treat it as a preparation for universal salvation. The development in Vedāntic thought is somewhat similar to the development of the Hīnayāna ideal of Arhatship into the Mahāyāna ideal of the Bodhisattva working for the liberation of all sentient beings. The Neo-Vedāntins stress the inextricable connection between jīva and jagat; the individual develops only in a spiritual environment free from ignorance, evil and impurity, and, conversely, when one soul is spiritualised the world is elevated to a higher level. Thus the individual and the world must rise together towards the final goal. Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan propound the theory of cosmic evolution and cosmic salvation, while Gandhi and Tagore stress the salvation of the community of selves in God in togetherness and simultaneity i. e., social salvation.

Vivekanand's doctrine of liberation is the nearest to the orthodox position of Advaita, but, he tempers the individualistic exposition of the highest end. The ideal is jīvana mukti, eternal identification of Ātman-Brahman in jñāna. In the highest samādhi the Absolute alone is real and the world and body disappear as illusions. Soul's liberation means that it is separated from saṁsāra and no longer bound in the cycle of birth and death. In all this, Vivekanand makes no significant departure from the classical position. But the criticism cannot be accepted that he is excessively individualistic, paying regard to social or cosmic spiritualisation¹ or that the universe does not benefit from the salvation of the individual.² Vivekanand admits

1. See Ram Shankar Srivastava, Contemporary Indian Philosophy, p. 76.

2. *ibid.*, p. 45.

that no rational foundation was given to the doctrine of sarva-mukti in the past, Advaita dialecticians held it to be not free from logical contradictions. Still, unlike the earlier followers of Śaṅkara he does not consider it an āpatti to be avoided, but a grand and glorious doctrine. This conviction is due to his own socio-moral-humanistic attitude and finds support in the teachings of Ramakrishna. The latter differentiated two kinds of liberated souls. The jīva-koṭi bhaktas are those who, through devotion, come to realise God and attain to samādhi, not returning to the relative plane.¹ This conception comes near to the Vaiṣṇava conception of videha mukti and salvation as an empirical process of the Ātmā's transformation. The Īśvara-koṭi bhaktas are the divine messengers who follow the process of negation and affirmation i. e., they return from the Absolute (samādhi) to the relative plane.² These correspond to the Advaitic jīvana muktas. Vivekanand seems to suggest that such jīvana muktas continue in empirical existence for the sake of helping all souls to advance, or, more correctly, he says that the universalised souls put off self-realization so long as imperfect and suffering humanity is in need of their help. In the light of the above, the charge of individualism against Vivekanand must be rejected. Though he seems to concede that the identity doctrine allows only for liberation of souls, singly and at different times, his philosophical position allows scope for the ideal of sarva-mukti, in the sense of the welfare of all. He nowhere clearly states the doctrine of redemption of the world as a whole. It was left to the later thinkers to provide the metaphysical and logical argument for this doctrine, which Vivekanand failed to provide.

There is a certain indefiniteness and vagueness in Gandhi's notion of salvation. He declares it to be the end of human life but is silent about its nature; and sometimes goes so far as to call it an unrealizable ideal. Man remains bound in flesh, limiting life conditions, evil social situation. But for that reason, Gandhi is not willing to reject mokṣa altogether, as a dogma. For the soul may be a finite entity but still it is divine. Therefore man must go on striving for perfection though he may never be able to eliminate evil and ignorance. Such a difficulty arises in the attainment of any

1. The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Nikhilanand, p. 634.

2. *ibid.*

ideal: even lesser goals of health, wealth and prosperity are not attainable in any absolute sense, and this is even more true of the highest end of life. When Gandhi's thought is directed towards the end, he can find no logic for or evidence of man's perfection. Therefore, he gives his full attention to the method of realization; his interest lies in the satyagrahi way of life built on the foundations of satya, ahimsā, brahmacharya, aparigraha and asteya. The individual approximates to or realizes his goal to the extent to which he practices and perfects his means.

It seems that Gandhi's idea of the unattainability of the ideal is connected with his rejection of the idea of individual salvation. Mokṣa is not attained singly and consecutively by souls but totally and simultaneously. The conception of sarva-mukti removes the appearance of inconsistency in his view of liberation. He is opposed to the ideal of jīva-mukti only when it is divorced from sarva-mukti, as in classical Vedānta. The individual's salvation being a part of and dependent on world's salvation, there is no logical contradiction between the two doctrines. Here, as elsewhere, he insists on concentration on the means and leaves the end to take care of itself. He will say that if the end is personal salvation it will arise only if each individual concentrates on the achievement of sarva-mukti. Even if sarva-mukti be treated as a means to jīva-mukti, as in the above interpretation, it does not contradict the conclusion of the primacy of sarva-mukti. For he holds that the natures of the means and end must coincide throughout the process of development and the end is non-different from the perfected means.

Gandhi takes no sides in the debate on jīvana mukti versus videha mukti. He seems to reject the former in as much as he does not envisage attainment of jñāna in the sense of loss of individuality in the Absolute, while in the body. On the other hand, we do not find in him the conception of an extra-mundane world where soul attains unity with God, such as is connected with the latter doctrine. While, negatively, the doctrine of jīvana mukti seems to influence his rejection of the idea of cessation of existence, aloofness from spatio-temporal world and passivity of the spiritualised soul, positively, the doctrine of videha mukti influences his conviction of the impossibility of soul's attainment of perfection while it is still encased in body and related to material

conditions, as well as his conviction of the ultimate duality of spiritualised soul and Divine Being. Strictly speaking, he shifts the angle of discussion on liberation because both doctrines are associated with the idea of *jīva-mukti*, which he has rejected.

Gandhi's general ground for supporting the doctrine of *sarva-mukti* is the Vedānta metaphysic of the Advaita Brahma, which implies the unity of humanity and, consequently, the simultaneous spiritualisation of the world. He does not attempt to work out in detail the metaphysical or logical foundations of that doctrine. Furthermore, he tends to take a static view of that goal. While tracing the historical process of man's spiritual development in terms of non-violence, he develops no metaphysical theory of world-evolution. Nature does not evolve with man but seems to remain always in an imperfect condition. But any theory of *sarva-mukti* is incompletely worked out which does not conceive of the ascent and perfection of both *jīva* and *jagat*. Secondly, as in the case of *jīva-mukti* so in the case of *sarva-mukti* he does not envisage the end of the spatio-temporal world in the eternity of the Absolute. Clearly, the ideal of *sarva-mukti* is being conceived in a socio-moral sense and not in a spiritual or metaphysical sense.

Like Gandhi, Tagore conceives liberation in a manner which combines the form of *jīvana mukti* with the spirit of *videha mukti*. He explicitly rejects the latter ideal: liberation is not perfected existence in a super-mundane sphere, freedom from the necessity of *punarjanna* or total disconnection from the world. On the contrary, salvation is to be sought in bondage, here on earth, since God has taken upon Himself the bonds of creation. Tagore's conception of *jīvana mukti* is like that of the Advaitins in as much as it means the perfected spiritual life of man united with God on earth, but unlike it in as much as it refuses to accept that unity to be a state of non-differentiated and immutable being. He believes that such a condition cannot but be a condition of utter passivity. The retention of body and action, which are products of *ajñāna*, in *jīvana mukti* is inconsistent with the nature of *mokṣa* and also with the Advaita doctrine that *ajñāna* is contradicted by *jñāna*. At this point Tagore adopts the teaching of *videha mukti*; the substance of liberation is that the spiritualised self retains its uniqueness and autonomy and enjoys the perfection of love-relation or

communion with God. Such an identity of self with God does not logically entail disconnection from body, life, mind and nature, which are to be regarded not as products of ajñāna but as real expressions of the very existence of God. The jīvana mukta lives in the world and uses his body and perfected powers in the divine spirit of love and creativity. The Vedāntic religion of devotion combined with the Buddhistic teaching that liberation is for all men points to the conclusion of sarva-mukti. Freedom of humanity is a higher end than jīvana-mukti. The liberated soul reincarnates to help suffering humanity. Like Gandhi, Tagore insists that no individual can win salvation until the whole of humanity is liberated from its imperfections.

The sudden shift from jīva-mukti in the form of jīvana-mukti to sarva-mukti necessitates a closer examination of the former conception. The state of the jīvana mukta as described by Tagore is the state of the sādḥaka rather than that of a siddha, for he holds mokṣa to be an eternal process without an end. Man never reaches the condition of perfection nor is he transformed into the Divine. The soul cannot transcend its finite and limited nature. The jīvana mukta of Tagore is not the jñānī or gnostic being of the Advaita but a highly spiritual soul which has attained to companionship, partnership and presence of God. Similarly, he does not develop the idea of sarva-mukti to the extent of postulating spiritualisation of the world. He has a more generalised theory of evolution than that of Gandhi, but it is an extension of the scientific account of evolution of inorganic and organic principles as well as a sociological account of the progress of humanity. There is no scope in it for the idea of perfection of humanity or of nature. He gives no hint of the philosophical theory of cosmic liberation in the being of the Absolute. Like Gandhi, he too has failed to provide the doctrine of sarva-mukti a metaphysical and logical base.

Aurobindo conceives liberation as a condition in which Ātman's potential divinity is actualised and no distinction of power, perfection, consciousness and bliss remains between it and Divinity. He categorically rejects the classical idea of liberation. Both Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas misconceive mokṣa as escape from self and world into some higher plane; permanent detachment from body, life, mind, by attainment of the bliss of Brahman; the ending of the cycle of rebirth. This is literally or physically

the case in vidha mukti and figuratively or metaphysically in Advaita jīvana-mukti. But Aurobindo sees no reason to postulate only the liberation of the spirit exclusive of all the other elements, which remain condemned. They too are manifestations of Saccidānand in the process of its involution and evolution in the world.

He classifies grades of immortality corresponding to his metaphysical doctrine of the three grades of reality viz., transcendence of Brahman, universality of the cosmic divine or Īvara and individuality of jīvātma.¹ Psychic immortality is the passage from birth to birth of the psychic being (antarātmā or caitya-puruṣa). This death-defying element is the means of man's evolution i. e., all the instrumental elements of his being—body, life, mind—instead of falling away are brought under the domination of soul-personality and when this process is completed then arises spiritual immortality i. e., reunion of the psychic being with individual self or jīvātma, which is always transcendent of the evolutionary process and totally unaffected by it, though presiding over it. Advaita Vedānta considers mokṣa to be only the undifferentiated and transcendent Brahman in which the superimposed individuality of man's psycho-physical personality disappears and only that which is real as Brahman survives. But if the idea of mokṣa as inherent in the nature of the individual soul is to be truly interpreted i. e., in a democratic manner, it must mean the perpetuation of each jīvātma as unique individual differentiation of Brahman,² not in a disembodied way but encased in a divinised body, life, mind, soul and grades of consciousness. This is the real meaning of jīvana mukti for which there is no scope in Advaita, and even in Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, which claims to preserve the reality of individual self in liberation.

The jīvana mukta of Aurobindo is a gnostic jīvātma who has become identified with the Sat-cit or Supermind. Brahmāmbhava does not mean disappearance of world but its transfiguration by reality; having attained to the freedom of the Absolute that liberated soul may freely choose to remain in the transcendent, peaceful and static aspect of the Supreme Divine or to participate dynamically in its aspect of joyous creation of world and life. If this were not the case, the attainment of the highest

1. Haridas Chaudhuri, *The Philosophy of Integralism*, p. 184.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

end of immortality by each self for itself would be nothing more than expanded egoism. Individual salvation must benefit humanity; individual yoga must become a prelude to cosmic yoga. The gnostic being undergoes rebirth and lives a divine life on earth endowed with infinite powers of consciousness, creativeness and blessedness, for the purpose of helping in the perfecting of the cosmos. The process continues until the whole of nature from its lowest element viz., inconscience, to its highest element viz., spirit, is totally transformed into Brahman. Accurately speaking, Saccidānand descends in the form of Supermind into the individual, the group, and then spreads to divinise all of humanity and world, which then continues to evolve further at a new and as yet unrealized level of spiritualised being, eternally. Aurobindo's conception is a truly metaphysical conception of salvation having no family resemblance to the modern doctrines of cosmic evolution and the higher destiny of man. Nevertheless, these scientific and sociological theories provide useful suggestions¹ for explanation of the mechanics of world evolution, the end of which is a spiritualisation not envisaged in any one of them.

It will be seen that Aurobindo's conception of salvation has carried the issue much beyond the very limited scope of the debate between the supporters of jīvana mukti and videha mukti. His aim is not even to reconcile the two doctrines but to tackle the problem at a different level altogether. The difference lies in his insistence that salvation cannot be partial but integral. Videha mukti as a "post-mortem" and trans-mundane conception fails to meet the test of integrality. Advaita jīvana mukti is also an illogical attempt to make Ātman bodiless, unrelated and inactive condition of spirit. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that divinised man cannot rise in an undivine cosmos. Integral salvation declares that the individual is raised to the highest spiritual status only with the whole world, containing within it every grade of reality. There can be no objection to this conclusion of Aurobindo but it is lacking in a sufficient metaphysical base. As noted before, Aurobindo's insistence on the ultimacy of the individual soul and the world is resting on his conception of the Absolute as a multiposited unity, but such ultimacy contradicts the monistic nature of reality and makes its transcendental character logically doubtful.

1. vide Haridas Bhattacharyya, "The Principles of Activism," C. I. P., pp. 73-75.

Radhakrishnan's integral Vedānta is the attempt to synthesise the theistic and absolutistic conceptions of mokṣa. This is done by tracing the process of salvation through two stages. In the first stage the form is that of jīvana mukti but the content is that of videha mukti i. e., it is liberation in life and in this world; however, the liberated soul is not identical with the Deity but only lives in perfect communion with it. Man's body, life, mind and self-consciousness are unified to realize harmony with spirit; the empirical ego, jīvātma, is merged with the transcendental Ātman and the latter is united with Īśvara. This means that the human self which exists in different degrees of wholeness during the condition of ignorance now becomes a teleological unity of desires, emotions and intellectual ideals and attains to the universal spirit of the creator. There is substantial agreement between Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo on the nature of jīvana mukti; both depart from the Advaita view that it is a condition of absolute identity in which individuality disappears. They also depart from the theistic conception in as much as the liberated, though retaining his identity, does not get divorced from world, life and action.

The second stage of liberation succeeds, or rather proceeds apace with, the first. The jīvana mukta leads an active life in the world, but the principles of experience and behaviour governing him are diametrically opposed to the principles governing unliberated mankind still dominated by consciousness of empirical ego. His divine mission is to be saviour of the world, redeemer of souls in bondage. And he undergoes rebirth for the sake of cosmic divinisation and suffers crucifixion for the love of humanity. As the universe evolves more and more of such liberated souls are manifested. The end of this process comes with the union of transformed and perfected universe of souls and matter with the Divine creator and withdrawal of both into the Absolute. Strictly speaking, individual salvation was only provisional and partial in jīvana mukti and only becomes final at this stage. It is not possible for a single individual to become liberated while the world remains in bondage. The real end is cosmic salvation in which the plurality of God, world and infinity of souls come to an end in the ultimate identity of Brahman. In his conception of sarva-mukti Radhakrishnan goes back to the general Vedāntic position of ending of karma and rebirth, cessation of world and the

specific Advaitic conception of eternal oneness with Saccidanand.

The goal of jiva-mukti has been dubbed as magnified egoism by all the Neo-Vedantins. Though neither the Vaiṣṇava nor the Advaita Vedāntins are justified in attempting to preserve the reality of Ātman in isolation from an unredeemed world, yet the latter, at least, think of salvation in terms of the one universal Ātman. It is the former who are more open to the objection raised by Neo-Vedānta, in so far as they insist on the distinct and separate reality of each self in liberation. It seems that the conception of personal survival need not be an indispensable outcome or objective of individual progress, nor need it be made an essential condition of the salvation of humanity and cosmos. The conception of jīvana mukti in classical Advaita and its developed form in Neo-Vedānta is a sufficient reason for the latter end. Therefore, there is more reason for Aurobindo and others to criticise the idea of jīva-mukti and to give up the insistence on ultimacy of separate individuality in mokṣa. The reality of the one Ātman rather than the reality of the infinite selves and the Supreme, however their relation be conceived, is the conclusion consistent with the Neo-Vedāntic approach. Furthermore, the contention of the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins that a "real world" remains ultimately unredeemed as a whole cannot be accepted as logical. Except that both Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan take a metaphysical view of cosmic salvation as against a merely sociological and scientific view of the other Neo-Vedāntins, and both envisage it as a real end giving meaningfulness to the evolutionary process as against the idea of the eternal perfectibility but nonperfection of the world and humanity of the other Neo-Vedāntins, there is no other point of resemblance between them. The former rejects the conception of ending of punarjanma and saṁsāra in respect of jīvana mukti as well as sarva-mukti, whereas the latter defers the ending only in respect of jīvana mukti but not of sarva-mukti.

To prove the metaphysical reality of world and self it is unnecessary to insist with Aurobindo on their continuance as separate entities. His notion of eternal progress of a divinised individual and cosmos at another level implies that their "spiritualisation and divinisation" by descent of Saccidānand in them is not equivalent to their perfection or liberation. The hesitation in accepting the Vedāntic conception

of "ending of individual and world" is unnecessary as it does not amount to the destruction of the real essence of either. Radhakrishnan's thesis of the final liberation of individual and world, sarva-mukti, preserves the reality of both. The truth of Advitīya Brahman is logically preserved only by taking the stand of identity. The individual, God and world remain separate only as long as there is an element in them foreign to the nature of the Absolute. Attainment of salvation is total elimination of non-being, non-knowledge and pain characterising the world, after which there is non-difference between it and the reality of being-consciousness-bliss.

Advaita and Sarva-Mukti

Classical Vedāntins reject the conception of sarva-mukti as inconsistent with their postulation of anādi-ananta saṁsāra. Even Advaita Vedāntins with their doctrine of absolute unity as the ground of multiplicity do not admit collective liberation and the connected idea of "liberation of God." It is the individual in bondage and ignorance who needs to be liberated and not God. The more extreme among the Advaitins take the stand of eka jīvavāda. The one only self is the perceiver of the phenomenal world and all others are its dream productions. Or the one real jīva is the omniscient being, Hiraṇyagarbha, and all others are reflections of this one. In either case the conclusion seems to be liberation of all on the liberation of one, and both God and jīva subside into the Absolute on the rise of jñāna. The less radical thinkers among the Advaitins take the stand of bahū jīvavāda. The plurality of jīvas is accounted for by the plurality of upādhis (limiting adjuncts) of minds; each has its own intelligence. In pratibimbavāda, both Īśvara and jīvas being reflections, mokṣa is absorption of jīva into Brahma and not in Īśvara. But if jīva is reflection of Īśvara then mokṣa is absorption in Īśvara and Īśvara ceases only when all souls are liberated. This means that if Īśvara or the primary appearance of consciousness in Avidyā or cidābhāsa is the adhiṣṭhāna then all appearances are ābhāsas of this primary appearance and only the secondary appearances are destroyed by adhiṣṭhāna-sākṣātkāra i. e., jīvas are identified with Īśvara, but until the Mūla Avidyā is sublated no Brahma-jñāna arises and this alone would give rise to sarva-mukti. If consciousness erroneously non-differentiated from

its appearance in Avidyā or ābhāsa-vivikta cit is the adhiṣṭhāna then sarva-mukti follows immediately from the realization of the adhiṣṭhāna because Avidyā and its products are destroyed.¹ Suresvara, Padmapāda and Vacaspati Misra draw only the conclusion of jīva-mukti from bahu jīvavāda. Māyā-Avidyā is one but its potencies are many, hence there are many minds and bodies and the sublation of Avidyā for one does not sublimate it for others i. e., phenomenal world may cease for one self while it continues for others. The adjuncts of the mukta Ātmā are mixed in the functions of Māyā and at the beginning of the new aeon the upādhis containing new reflections of intelligence or cit migrate new egos into the phenomenal world but the released soul is not reborn.

In spite of the explicit rejection of the idea of sarva-mukti by the followers of Śaṅkara Radhakrishnan insists² that there are certain passages in Śaṅkara which might be said to be hinting at sarva-mukti as the end of spiritual evolution. The ideal of jīvana mukti³ means attainment of universality of spirit, retention of individuality as centre of action until the end of the cosmic process, working for the whole world's redemption in its multiple values. If the thesis of some later Advaitins be accepted that Īśvara is Brahma limited by Māyā and jīva is Brahma limited by Avidyā then it follows that jīva (reflection) who overcomes his share of Avidyā attains the state of Īśvara (original), and continues to take part in the process of creation for the enlightenment of all other unenlightened jīvas. He awaits final absorption in the Absolute till the moment of sarva-mukti. This interpretation of Radhakrishnan is strenuously opposed⁴ on the ground that Advaita Vedānta does not allow scope for recurrent rebirth of the jīvana mukta; that videha mukti cannot be said to be irreconcilable with Śaṅkara's statement that certain mukta Ātmās, Apāntarātmā and Vaśiṣṭha remained in mundane existence at the bidding of the Lord to help suffering humanity, for they were commissioned for a specific purpose and never lost the knowledge of their liberated condition; further, that Śaṅkara's followers⁵ expressly declare jīvana mukti to end

1. - The views are discussed by Appaya Bīkṣita, Śivādvaīta Nirṇaya, pp. 77-79 and Brahmānand's commentary, Nyāya-Ratnavali on Siddhānta-Bindu, p. 259.

2. An Idealist View of Life, p. 306.

3. The Brahma-Sūtra, III, 3, 32.

4. vide B. Venkataramaiah (trans.), Pañcapādikā, Intro., p. xi.

5. e. g., Vidyāranya in Jīvanamukti-Viveka.

rebirth. The critic only concedes that *jīvana mukti* may mean getting rid of the idea of duality, but *Brahma-bhāva* ensues only at death; the *jīvana mukta* may work only as long as life lasts¹ and he alone is competent to instruct in *Brahma-jñāna*. This he does not for any reasons of self-interest or even as a duty but out of the plenitude of universal love.

It must be granted that Advaitins have a *siddhānta-bheda* on this point. While Maṇḍana Mīśra allows only service through the physical frame in which *Brahma-jñāna* is realized but not beyond that, it is possible to understand Śaṅkara and Sureśvara as allowing for another course of action; the *jīvana mukta* may attain to *mokṣa* at the death of his present body or he may reembody in many other bodies through the potency of his *prārabdha karma*. In this compromise is discovered the means by which the liberated is enabled to engage in service of society. The objector may, however, insist that even if *jīvana mukti* can be interpreted in this manner, it still does not mean that Śaṅkara taught *sarva-mukti*. He and his followers have argued that dissolution of the world does not occur on the attainment of liberation by one soul. But in spite of the difficulty of demonstrating *sarva-mukti* as a classical Advaita *siddhānta* there is no metaphysical or logical bar to the incorporation of this doctrine. Radhakrishnan rightly agrees with Aurobinde that *ānand* is impossible so long as a single soul remains unredeemed. The critic questions this conclusion on the ground that it implies that the liberated soul is a *bhakta* or enjoyer of bliss, which contradicts the fundamental Advaita thesis of identity in the liberated condition. But Radhakrishnan's argument for *sarva-mukti* does not contain this contradictory implication. *Brahmānand* is absolute bliss-in-itself and not that enjoyment which is the object of experience of some soul. There cannot be any partial revelation of it. It is either wholly revealed or not revealed. As long as there is relativity of experience i. e., certain *jīvas* have not realized their *sat-cit-ānand svarūpa*, *Ātman* cannot be said to be revealed. *Sarva-mukti* is the only logically consistent conclusion from the nature of reality as *Advitīya Brahma*.

1. vide Ś. B. on *Chān. Upa.*, VI, 14, 2: Corporeality does not cease at the moment of the rise of *jñāna* (*sadyo mukti*).

Conclusion

The world-view of Vedānta, comprising the nature of reality, world, individual, conduct and goal of life, needs a final statement. The possibility of synthesising certain antithetical doctrines of classical Vedānta was suggested in Neo-Vedānta. And a system of Vedānta is obtained which has theoretical consistency as well as capacity to lead to such practical consequences as are satisfying for a truly humanistic approach to reality and experience.

Reality.—Advaita Vedānta took the stand that reality cannot be both Saguna and Nirguna simultaneously. Saguna Brahma is an intermediate step of thought between infinite variety of beings in perception and infinite unity of Being in realization, and does not contradict Nirguna. The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins took their stand on the Saguna—God as characterised by perfect gunas and supremely active creator. Since the ontology of Vedānta is founded on its epistemology, the opposition of these doctrines cannot be overcome so long as Advaita continues to insist that mutable, relational thought is secondary and pure consciousness is primary, revealing an indeterminate, partless reality, and the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins insist with equal force that the one and ultimate consciousness is synthetic, dynamic and determinate, revealing reality as self-conscious principle or as substance subsisting through difference.

The theists indulge in destructive criticism, denying the spiritual experience of identity of knowledge and being on which the Nirguna conception is based. Absolutists adopt a constructive approach—accepting both types of religious experience they make a genuine logical attempt at reconciliation. Analysis of deep sleep reveals personality to be latent and to become manifested in waking by self's limitation by activation of gross and subtle bodies—this is the explanation of how Nirguna appears as Saguna. Since words only give indirect knowledge even the swarūpa lakṣaṇa, like the tatastha lakṣaṇa, fulfils the purpose of indicating reality only indirectly and limitedly. The doctrine of Saguna is, therefore, no unnecessary importation into Advaita, but the means by which, having propounded Ātman-Brahman, Śaṅkara explains that the world is verily Brahman. Since Nirguna and Saguna are not distinct Gods but contrasting view-points of

one reality, Advaita must be absolved of the charge of advocating an imaginary and false God. Nor does the teaching of unknowable reality deny anything taught about the personal nature, but only seeks to know the most complete nature.

The attitude of Advaita on this point is the very spirit of compromise and accommodation characteristic of Vedānta. Attempts of classical Vedānta in the direction of synthesis are neither irrelevant nor objectionable, that is, if we start from the premise that several different types of syntheses are possible and that all such attempts must be adjudged in terms of the points of views or siddhāntas a system can make consistent with its own central thesis. The Neo-Vedāntins deal with the problem of synthesis in new ways. Their point of departure is the Absolute—a unity, infinite, unlimited and unconditional, in which they reconcile all categories of transcendence-immanence, difference-non-difference, change-changelessness, determinate-indeterminate, which appeared irreconcilable to earlier thinkers. Adoption of a non-sectarian stand enables them to take important truths of different systems, to utilise ideas of western philosophy and science, to arrive at an enriched system of Advaita. "The modern thinkers are perceptibly theistic but dominantly absolutistic."

Vivekanand takes his stand on the many-sidedness of reality: the personal is grasped by bhakti, the impersonal by jñāna. But, like classical Advaita, he too fixes the status of the Saguna only at the highest point of vyavahāra, which derives its meaning and value from paramārtha. Thus, though he gives greater emphasis to personality in God, he fails to satisfy the critic who asks not for provisional but for ultimate reality of personality. Moreover, his synthesis is a practical synthesis through sādhanā, but not a theoretical synthesis through logic.

By giving an unorthodox interpretation of Dvaita and Advaita Gandhi passes easily back and forth between Saguna and Nirguna, for he sees no contradiction between them. Behind his personalistic conception is the belief that God alone is, we are not i. e., para Brahma and Māyā. However, as he makes no distinction of para and apara Brahma, he fails to synthesise absolutism and theism logically, though in his life and personality they are practically harmonised. His intellect cognises the Nirguna, his emotion worships the Saguna.

Tagore's personalism is of the most concrete and anthropomorphic kind, and his conception is open to all the objections against the doctrine of Bhedābheda and Viśiṣṭādvaita. And God's dependence upon the love-relation with the finite self makes Him finite. Unlike the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins who had based their theism on logical and epistemological arguments, Tagore's main argument is pragmatic—the personalistic conception is of greater utility to life than the impersonalistic. While the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins denied the impersonal aspect and the very experience sustaining it, he, very rightly, accepts the fact of the "great psychological experience of transcendental consciousness." To be consistent he must examine the relation of the two experiences, —reality as object and reality as unity—which he fails to do. Thus his synthesis of "intellectual truth" of philosophy and science with the "human and moral truth" of religion is philosophically ineffectual. Till the end he insists that the contradiction of Saguna and Nirguna is only at the intellectual level, but in the intuition of religious love unity and duality are no longer contradictory. But this is logic of emotion and not logic of reason.

Aurobindo postulates reality as a multiposed unity of which Śaṅkara's unity-beyond-diversity and Vaiṣṇavite unity-in-diversity are two real poles. The logical priority of the indeterminate aspect does not make the creative principle metaphysically inferior or unreal. Aurobindo adopts Spinoza's method of the solution of the problem of dualism viz., reduction of the two ultimate conceptions to two aspects (attributes) of the immanent aspect of the Absolute substance, Sat-cit or Īśvara. But reference to higher logic means that he can sustain his position only by a philosophic tour de force: in logic, where law of contradiction holds, his multiposed unity is no better than the category of unity-in-difference and suffers from the same difficulties. He objects to Māyāvāda-logic as the explanation of the manner in which transcendence appears as immanence, but he himself can solve the problem only by negating logic itself and going into the realm of super-human experience. If Śaṅkara is criticised for explaining the empirical from the transcendental level, so may Aurobindo be criticised for solving the problem of finite logic from the standpoint of higher logic.

Radhakrishnan holds the svarūpa of reality to be Nirguna, because relational

thought presupposes a non-relational ground which can be nothing else than Thought-as-such. The logic of Nirguṇa Brahma is very sound: Brahman is pre-cosmic, but this impersonal, immutable, unmanifested calm is capable of immanence, no contentless void but being and activity, truth and force. Radhakrishnan is determined to synthesise Śaṅkara's all-embracing spirit with Rāmānuja's devotional idea of it as personal Lord. Śaṅkara fails to do justice to the empirical aspect by making it unreal and to the Absolute by excluding God and world from it. In order to avoid this mistake Radhakrishnan makes Rāmānuja's logical theism a real projection of the Absolute. The beginning and end of Creator is not ground for concluding His unreality. A balanced negative-positive approach arrives at this synthesis of the Nirguṇa and Saguna. His argument is not that the Absolute has qualities and parts in Its nature, but that our philosophy must approach It in two ways. To explain how the Absolute projects one of its powers as Īśvara he borrows the analogy of līlā from Śaṅkara i. e., free and effortless spilling over of excess of the ānand element. Śaṅkara's epistemological analysis of this process in Māyāvāda may have implications which are unsatisfactory to realism, but it is, at least, a more complete explanation than the "positive" suggestion of Radhakrishnan. The fate of the relative conception of Īśvara still hangs in the balance of anirvacanīya Māyā. Radhakrishnan's difference from Śaṅkara is not doctrinal but merely a manner of presentation. And no true conception of Advaita reality can be built by merely avoiding the doctrine of Māyā.

Māyāvāda.—All Neo-Vedāntins do go beyond the negative meaning of Māyā, "All this is nothing" to its positive thesis, "All this is nothing but God." True humanism must not be unthinking acceptance of the world but exact discrimination between that which is to be negated as false and that which is to be affirmed as real. Even science admits a margin of indeterminateness in man's knowledge of the world. This does not deter the humanist, nor need it deter the Vedāntin from the conviction of world reality in empirical dealings with problems of world and life.

Vivekanand holds Māyā to be the best explanation of the one becoming the many. He wants to remove the misconception that Māyāvāda denies existence of the phenomenal

world. Realism only sees phenomena, idealism only noumena and Māyāvāda is the genuine idealism postulating that the universe is phenomena of some noumenon. At first only separation of things is regarded as real (dualism), then relation and correlation between all things (qualified monism) and lastly only the one thing is seen as many adhyāsas (monism).

Tagore declares that Māyāvāda is right where it rejects the truth of the world as a self-dependent entity: were this the case God's infinity would be limited from outside. Metaphysics of difference is absolutely false. With the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins he agrees that cancellation of the erroneous knowledge of the world as separate and divided does not cancel the world in reality or vyavahāra in paramārtha. But in his conception of non-separation of God and world understood as interdependence he parts company with the transcendentalism of both the Advaita and Vaiṣṇava variety.

Tagore's realism can be maintained only with reference to a personal reality: finite personality and world are related to a unity, therefore, real. If reality were not such then world would be a logical abstraction, a stupendous deception. There are two lacunae in his position: he does not explain logically the supremely active and personal nature of reality as ultimate, nor does he refute logically the immutable and impersonal aspect of reality which is apprehended by science and philosophy. Advaita has never denied that the reality of the world is dependent on its creator and maintainer. But demonstration of the vyāvahārika sattā does not disprove Māyāvāda.

Gandhi's world-view is profoundly influenced by Māyāvāda: the conclusion is that world is real in respect of its spiritual ground (Brahman) and unreal in respect of the component of materiality (Māyā and Prakṛti). World exists for the sake of reality. Every name and form is real because it manifests the real and through it alone can the real be achieved. His spiritual idealism does accommodate idea of world reality, but it is supported not so much by logical argumentation as by the moral or pragmatic argument viz., necessity of good life in terms of truth and non-violence. And return to God means the total negation of materiality and duality. World returns to God not as world but as pure spirit, as Śaṅkara also holds.

Radhakrishnan insists that Māyāvāda in none of its meanings stands for negative

value or nothingness of the world. Vyavaharika character implies that multiplicity in so far as its essence is supreme being is true, only when it is regarded as self-dependent is it untrue. From the Advaita unity to unreality of everything is a leap in logic not justified. The philosophic problem of explaining how perfect unity could create imperfect multiplicity is admitted as a mystery of logic. But this philosophical inability to define the relation of God and world is not a repudiation of the world as an illusion of man's mind.

While accepting all the meanings of Māyā prevalent in Advaita, Radhakrishnan avoids the epistemological analysis of perceptual illusion because it has denotations which he expressly rejects. But the difference between Śaṅkara's neither real nor unreal and his real and unreal Māyā is only apparent. He holds that the intellectual conception of individual and world is not really real and disappears in the intuition of the Absolute, while Śaṅkara warns us against the misconception of total unreality of that which is not completely real. The conclusions are similar. Radhakrishnan avoids method of adhyāropāpavāda because of its negative implications, but Māyāvāda and "neti, neti" are necessary to indicate gap between temporal appearance and eternal reality. From the side of Brahman the world is only negatively understood as it is not specially implied in the Infinite, but that does not make it a negative entity. Advaita calls it bhāva padārtha and Radhakrishnan's positive approach makes it a real actualisation of one of the Infinite's possibilities: its positivity is due to Brahman but its non-being creates no problem in Brahman. The realization of the qualitative difference of the Absolute from the relative world is meant to rouse man to shake off the bondage of unreal values and imperfections and not to treat the world as illusion and so to become indifferent to it. This is a justifiable implication of Māyāvāda. Radhakrishnan concentrates on practical bearings of this doctrine on thought and conduct, instead of concentrating on its metaphysical or transcendental bearings. He concludes that Śaṅkara takes a middle stand between nihilism and exaggerated realism on the question of the status of the world. Hence idealism of Advaita and Māyāvāda is fully consonant with legitimate claims of realism.

Aureliando rejects the cosmic terrestrial view of world viz., life in material

world of nature as the only reality as well as the opposite supra-cosmic view viz., supreme reality is sole reality and world is meaningless. The latter is Śaṅkara's view of only unreal reality (vyāvahārika satta) of the world. But this qualified illusionism is difficult to accept—why should not reality of self and world be real reality? Māyā must be taken as immutable: in its higher form (Vidyā) it is the selective faculty to produce finite forms out of infinite reality and in its lower form (Avidyā) it is the veil separating the effects in life and nature from their source of Supermind. Aurobindo does not deny that one modification of spirit is ignorance having its locus in the mind, but insists that what is erroneous is our ignorant perception of the world and not the multiform content of the world. But Radhakrishnan agrees with Śaṅkara that though intellect holds world to be real it grasps what is not categorically real. Even Aurobindo cannot deny that though the world's reality is the reality of Brahman it is not Brahman-as-such. When he says that the world is only a different order of reality but not transcendently unreal he is not far from accepting the doctrine of relative reality.

Aurobindo says that as manifestation of the real the world is itself real; it may be called derivative reality but this, according to him, is not the usual meaning of mithyā in Māyāvāda. But it has been seen that Radhakrishnan describes Māyā as dependent and derived being of the world and this is also one of the major meanings in Māyāvāda. Aurobindo objects to division of real existence into true and false, self and not-self, because real Vedānta must be realistic. But in spite of this criticism Māyāvāda is essential to meet deeper implications of spiritual life. He too admits that negation is essential and is, therefore, bound to grant that the negated element is not carried into the real and to that extent it is rightly called unreal. In admitting that there is no complete truth below Supermind he is not far from the Māyāvāda position of real-unreal or phenomenal truth of the world. The transcendentalist's dilemma is either making the world an integral part of Brahman or creating the problem of dualism, and Śaṅkara's solution is to make the world an existent fact of experience though not of reality, but he does find it difficult to explain how Māyā comes to operate in the Absolute or how mind falls into Avidyā. Aurobindo apparently gets over this difficulty by postulating

higher and lower *Māyā* connected and differentiated at over-mind level. A closer examination reveals that Aurobindo's resort to higher logic amounts either to the Absolute's transformation into the world or to a mere assertion that absolute perfection and imperfect reality are equally real and eternal.

Role of *Mayāvāda*.—One view is that Advaita is primarily a metaphysic resting on the fact of experience of unity; *Mayāvāda* is non-essential to it and merely goes out of its way to explain world contradictions. But this separation of ontology (*Brahmavāda*) and cosmology (*Mayāvāda*) cannot be accepted. For theoretically, *Mayāvāda* establishes unity as the necessary prerequisite of appearance and practically, only a radical rejection of *Māyā* can lead to the realization of this unity. Vaiṣṇava Vedānta argued that *Avidyā* is defective knowledge in the *jīva* but not false appearance nor a distortion of the thing itself i. e., illusory perception is only epistemological function of *Avidyā* creating difference-consciousness where it does not exist but there is no metaphysical, creative function of *Avidyā* as in Advaita Vedānta.¹ And Advaita postulation of *Māyā* creates dualism. It may be rebutted, however, that if theistic conception of *śakti* in Brahman does not create dualism then neither does Advaita *Māyā*. Theists may make *Māyā-śakti* either identical or different from God but dualism does arise. To overcome it, they call *Māyā* inexplicable power of *Īśvara*, but this is no better than calling it "inexplicable mystery of reason," as the Advaitins do.

Mithyātva.—Throughout the dialectic on the conception of *anirvacanīyatā* understood as *mithyā* the theistic critics have confused the standpoint of *pāramārthika sattā* with the *vyāvahārika sattā*, which Advaita insists on distinguishing. There cannot be two Realities but there is no objection in having Reality and a reality. Advaita is right in insisting on relative being of the world. Aurobindo's objection that "*mithyā*" does not mean derived and dependent being of the world has not been admitted.

Since the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins treat reality only spatially and temporally, for them the difference of empirical and transcendental knowledge is merely one of degree. However, all of them are forced to make some qualitative difference between God and

1. This objection has been answered later.

world; the divine qualities are obscured in the world. In spite of this admission they go on castigating the pāramartha satta of Advaita in which the vyāvahārika satta is sublated. Advaitins accept all their criteria of knowledge; but there is an experience which is pure consciousness, transcending the relational schema and the transcendence of reality is necessarily an argument for its being of a different order of reality. Non-stultification must be the absolute criterion of reality and the world does not have this nature.

If a breach in continuity of perception is, in some cases, sufficient to justify us in characterizing an object of perception as unreal, I fail to see why we should not be allowed to extend . . . universalise our definition of reality and say that there can be no reality apart from substantial unity and unalterable continuity of existence.¹

One may not subscribe to satta-aikyavāda which makes world tuccha; dvaividhyavāda does not distinguish vyavahāra from pratibhāsa; but traividhyavāda allows for adoption of different criteria of truth at different levels of experience; and being cannot be attributed to all levels in the same sense. "Inexplicability" is a good term because reason cannot be given, neither can any level be completely explained, nor can it be logically connected with others. At the same time difference of knowledge and being at these levels cannot be denied, since it is a fact of experience.

Causation.—It was Rāmānuja who first made an absolute antithesis between pariṇāmavāda which he equated with world reality and vivartavāda which he equated with world unreality. Śaṅkara's use of both pariṇāma and vivarta illustrations proves that for him there is no such contradiction. Since his aim is to teach non-difference of effect from the cause the vivarta analogies turn attention from appearance to substratum and the pariṇāma illustrations bring out the idea that the cause is present in the effect. Later Advaitins connected this teaching with the doctrine of levels or the ladder theory. The logic of Advaita reality dictates three steps of thought—creation, transformation, transfiguration. Advaitins are right in arguing that pariṇāma is not contradictory of vivarta but is a presupposition of it.

Modern scholarship, proceeding on the Rāmānujite assumption of the opposition of

1. Priyānath Sen, *The Philosophy of the Vedānta*, p. 110.

dynamics and statics, charges Advaita either with rationalisation or with inconsistency. Apart from the fact that Aurobindo has rejected the assumption behind this criticism on ground of infinite logic, it cannot be sustained even in terms of finite logic. By standing on the ground of formal logic Śaṅkara denies parināma in the Absolute as self-contradictory. By standing on the ground of infinite logic Aurobindo concludes that parināma and Absolute are not contradictory. Radhakrishnan offers a satisfactory via media without resorting to infinite logic—there is change and progress within the Absolute but reality as a whole is outside the concept of time and development. The test of true humanism is concreteness: reality is a totality of finite and infinite, time and timelessness, and Neo-Vedānta allows for evolution of world and progress of man. Thus, doctrines of cosmic and organic evolution are scientific and materialistic elaborations of Vedāntic cosmology, but they are not final: cosmic and human evolution is a gradual manifestation of spirit, and only human striving can bring world and life nearer to their source and final end of Brahman. This progress and development is in time but the end of perfection is in timeless Absolute. Śaṅkara is right in accepting pariṇāma sṛṣṭi according to the phenomenal method and vivarta sṛṣṭi according to the transcendental method. The method and content of science remains unaffected—in the empirical chain of events there is necessity to be understood in terms of determination of effect by cause; and the cause and effect can be differentiated as different forms of the one reality whose nature is absolutely unaffected. Advaita has met the Vaiṣṇava objections against the process of vivarta by engaging in an epistemological debate to demonstrate anirvacanīyakhyaṭi as a sound foundation for vivartavāda. But a more comprehensive answer is that the Vaiṣṇava idea of cause is too limited. A sufficient cause must also indicate the teleological end or final cause and this goal or cause must not be subject to change. Therefore, creation is a free spontaneous production involving no transformation in the thing.

Thus, Śaṅkara does not equate vivarta with unreality and pariṇāma with reality of the world. If the world is treated as nothing else but Brahman and so used for attaining Brahman then Śaṅkara will call it real; if the same world is treated as something separate from Brahman and used for attaining ends other than Brahman then Śaṅkara

will call it unreal. Thus Māyāvāda removes all opposition of parināma and vivarta. This removes a misconception about it at a very vital point.

Realism and Idealism.—The charge that Vedānta is a position of idealism exclusive of realism rests on the mistaken opposition of vivartavada and parināmavada. Idealism understood as the ultimacy of consciousness need not be confused with equation of all objects with ideas. And realism understood as mind-independence of objects need not be confused with the idea of ultimacy of material object (and, to this Advaita would add, the mental process or subject). To make a correct assessment of Advaita vis-à-vis realism its debate with theism on the locus and object of Māyā must be followed. Cid or Brahmārta Avidyāvada has its corollary in sṛṣṭi-dṛṣṭivāda. This vāda establishes the manifold as real and veritable fact as long as ultimate reality is not realized, continuing uninterrupted even by the mokṣa of any one of its cognisers. Marks of the world's reality are continuity, stability, independence and objectivity (vyavahāre tu Sāṅkhya nayah), but this does not contradict mithyātva with reference to pāramārthika sattā. The corollary of jīvārta Avidyāvada is dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda which, in its different statements, pares away elements of realism and comes close to illusionism—objects are nothing but their cognitions.

Neo-Vedāntins insist that a truly Advaitic philosophy must teach that the world is neither illusory nor material. The former is the negative implication of the realistic position in the epistemological field and the latter is the negative implication of the idealistic position in the metaphysical field. The above mentioned debate amply sustains this conclusion. Like the theists Śaṅkara is free to say that existence of objects is independent of their consciousness. This alone sustains the difference of truth and falsity which is a much debated issue in all Vedāntic schools. This also does not jeopardise the ultimate unity of spirit whose self-polarisation is the world of selves and objects. All modern Vedāntins agree with Śaṅkara that idealism is this freedom of spirit in creativity.

Realism which denies the ultimacy of consciousness or freedom is equivalent to materialism and a very partial realism. Advaita idealism is complete idealism because

it does not deny existence of matter-nature and yet maintains spirituality of natural world. It is teaching neither an idealistic nor a realistic view of world but a more comprehensive position to harmonise both.

World reality.—Attempts to prove that Māyāvāda allows the ontological reality of the world overlook the doctrine of levels of being and knowledge which is the pivotal point of Advaita darśana. The critic rejects mithyātva or anivacaniyatā because it is not based on a refutation of all definitions of reality, but this criticism does not comprehend the whole task of the Advaita philosopher. The latter is nowhere questioning the existence of the realist's world as an objective fact; it is evident to everyone directly and cannot be denied. Therefore the Advaitin is not bound to refute every definition of reality. Neo-Vedāntins emphasise that meaning of Māyā which shows connectedness of world with Brahman and not the other meaning that nothing of value apart from Brahman exists to be known, and Śaṅkara agrees with them. This might be opposed to common notions of reality and unreality but for that reason nothing of value is lost in the world. Realists may not insist on reality of things as necessary for practical efficacy, because for the production of real effects only existence, sattva, and not reality, satyatva, is needed. Category of mithyā does not cancel any form, property, activity or value cherished by humanists and realists; all criteria of validity such as coherence, correspondence, authority, continuity, development, non-contradiction also remain valid.

The real purpose of Māyāvāda is to bring out inadequacy of the real world, known through the doubtful medium of the mind. Even science does not demonstrate the common-sense belief about reality of the external world. It does not attempt to prove a "real" world but only posits an objective world, conventionally and pragmatically existent and probably non-existent apart from the present physical system or position of observer. To insist on world's reality as absolute is to assume that knowing consciousness cannot change its present level,—a gratuitous assumption. When theists talk of attainment of Brahman by destruction of Māyā they, too, admit that the being and value as well as knowledge of world is less than that of God. Modern Vedāntins agree that a level of

consciousness can be achieved in which the being of the world is radically changed.

Ontological realism means separate and ultimate reality of the world. All theists, even Madhva, have admitted that the seeing of manyness as self-existent and independent is an error. Mayāvada declares that dualistic thought on which realism is based must be made to see the contradictions of its relativity and to admit unity in past, present and future. The method of negation of dualism has its logical counterpart in the category of neither real nor non-real,¹ which, in effect, is a positive statement precluding the necessity of looking for ontological meaning of the world while allowing for a proper use of it for attainment of the final end of unity.

The world ceases to be in the intuition of Brahman—this must be accepted. This is not, however, physical destruction, but metaphysical i. e., a conviction of lesser reality is established. This is a legitimate extension of the Advaita doctrine. Belief in reality of the world is not a condition of its perception. Cessation of that erroneous belief, therefore, does not cause dissolution in the manner of heat disintegrating solid particles of butter. For the Brahma-jñānī the world's plural and separate nature ceases, but the world as issuing from Brahman continues to be real. This alone guards ontological idealism while incorporating in it all that is best in realism.

Sādhana.—Having urged the vyāvahārika satya of the world it is incumbent upon the Advaitins to examine conduct, by which the vyāvahārika sṛṣṭi is sustained. Vedāntic philosophy of conduct has to be gleaned from the debate on sādhanā. The controversy is doctrinal in nature: the Advaita metaphysic of the one partless, relationless reality is thought to be consistent only with the unitary approach of jñāna-yoga. The Vaiṣṇavites take an immanent view of things—difference, parts, relations of world are real expressions of reality—dualistic karma and bhakti are thought to be consistent with this metaphysic.

All Neo-Vedāntins discard that aspect of Mayāvada which dissociates self from not-self (nature and society). Exclusive jñāna-yoga makes this kind of dichotomy while uniting soul with the Absolute and it also leaves the not-self material, partial and i. This is not different from the modern category of real and unreal.

unliberated. Discipline of the integral self must not be one-sided or partial. The new jñāna-yoga must spiritualise the whole self (consciousness, will and emotion) as well as natural and social environment. Tagore, Gandhi and Aurobindo have conceived Advaita reality in such a way as to allow for unity and difference, hence dualism of karma and bhakti sādhanas can be incorporated in jñāna-sādhanā. But even modern followers of Kevala Advaita like Vivekanand and Radhakrishnan find no difficulty in reconciling bhakti and karma with jñāna-yoga in a natural way. Radhakrishnan argues that jñāna-yoga is not mere knowledge, but a vision of spirit coming out in a life of love and action. The ideal is not naiṣkarma but altruistic service. Admittedly, this kind of worship of the universal aspect of Godhead was never preached in India. Integral sādhanā is based on Radhakrishnan's metaphysic of God as a real actualisation of one possibility out of the infinite; and God is interpenetrating His creation, one in the many.

It will be seen that modern yoga is more in harmony with the coordinated discipline of the theists rather than with one-sided intellectualism and quietism of jñāna-mārga. Faith in oneness can be reconciled with doctrine of works and piety. The theists come nearer to the Gītā than Advaitins in understanding that it teaches conversion of all karma into niṣkāma karma rather than renunciation of karma. But they fail to understand the balanced view of Gita as Yoga-Sāstra (synthesis of all ways of life) by over-emphasising bhakti and limiting karma to Vaidikī and devotional activities. Modern Vedāntins are justified in rejecting the orthodox legalistic and mechanical rites and even rules of moral law, dharma, in favour of karma as personal righteousness combined with a social ethic of service—a programme of human conduct based on well-being, virtue, equality and peace. The humanist may not object to this procedure whereby the scope of spiritual discipline is enlarged to include in it a total discipline of all mundane activities.

This necessitates a further examination of the classical position. Śaṅkara does not allow coordination of karma and jñāna in any sense but does allow practical ~~-----~~ation with karma in the form of sādhanā catuṣṭaya. The attempts at doctrinal accommodation of the theory of conduct are not absent in Advaita e. g., dhyānaniyogavāda

of Brahmādatta is a type of jñāna-karma samuccayavāda, so is prasankhyānavāda of Mandana Miśra. However, such doctrines were rejected by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara on the ground that they are based on the erroneous metaphysic of unity-in-difference. Similarly, Śaṅkara admits bhakti as the first stage towards the goal of Brahmāmbhava and makes it integral to jñāna-mārga in the statement, "Notwithstanding the removal of difference between thou and I . . . I belong to thee, O Lord, thou may not be said to belong to me."¹ Śaṅkara's criticism is not directed against bhakti-yoga but against the doctrines of the theists which make God qualified and therefore finite. His followers allow that Nirguṇopāśanā and jñāna-mārga are differentiated due to adhikāra-bheda, but the result of both is Ātma-jñāna. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī completes the union of jñāna and bhakti, but it must be admitted that the logical difficulty of dualism in bhakti, as in karma-yoga, is not resolved by him.

The Neo-Vedāntic contention that there is no contradiction of Advaita and karma-yoga is correct. Samuccayavāda is substantially true in spirit and it must allow for truth of bhakti. The cause of bondage is ignorance of self; but Advaita wrongly understands this to mean that the ultimate step must be reliance on purified cognitive faculty alone, whereas the fact is that Jñāna is the total consciousness of spiritual existence and it is produced by karma which purifies mind, by bhakti which elevates mind, as well as by jñāna which leads mind to oneness. Desire for unity is reflected in all three yogas and all are equal causal factors in mokṣa.

The ever-accomplished nature of unity in the metaphysical sense does not preclude necessity for the individual of realizing it in all parts of his being by disciplining of all of them. Dualistic effort at psychological level does not contradict monism. Moreover, the method of jñāna-yoga is admittedly as dualistic as that of bhakti and karma since it involves separation of teacher, taught and teaching.

It is true that man cannot follow two contradictory ends. Satisfaction of his impulsive nature which is embedded in his object-oriented attitude cannot coexist with realization of mokṣa which is embedded in subject-oriented attitude. In so far as Śaṅkara's opposition to samuccayavāda or antithesis of karma and jñāna brings out the

1. S. B. on B. S., II, 1, 13.

above truth the theists must agree with him, since they too oppose *nivṛtti* to *pravṛtti*. But this opposition is no presumption in favour of pure *jñāna-marga*. The Advaitin confuses the *Jñāna* which is the end with the *jñāna* which is the means. *Nivṛtti* or choice of *jñāna-phala* or *mokṣa* is equally compatible with activity to control mind and senses, devotion, moral virtues, disinterested service, mental activities of *abhyāsa* applied to the proposition, "I am Brahman."

Through the opposition of *jñāna* and *dharma* Śaṅkara also tries to bring out the truth that ethical action is a developmental process but its end must be on the transcendental plane. To indicate incompleteness of moral life in itself he makes *karma-yoga* only indirect cause, needed for *citta-śuddhi*. Here again he confuses means and ends. *Niṣkāmatva* and destruction of *karma-phala* is the end but the emergence of such a state in an individual is not independent of the factors of *jñāna* and *karma*. The *sādhaka's* effort to turn his actions to transcendental ends (*niṣkāma karma*) rests upon his detachment from not-self (*jñāna*); both being interdependent, Śaṅkara has no warrant for making one an indirect and the other the direct cause of *mokṣa*.

Śaṅkara insists on continuance of *sādhana* in *vyavahāra*. The ethico-religious significance of *Māyāvāda* is that the antitheses bred by it are different means for worship and service of Brahman. This does not altogether overcome the theistic objection that Advaita relegates dualistic *sādhanā* of *karma* and *upāsana* to the realm of unreality, though it has been shown that *jñāna-sādhanā* is not in a different case from the other two. The conclusion of unreality of spiritual striving of the masses is sought to be avoided by Advaita. But this is not enough for later Advaitins to argue that by the fruitful mistake of applying positive attributes to the Absolute in *upāsana* we can arrive at the goal. As shown in the discussion of the problem of the status of the world, the transcendentalism of Advaita gives due place to reality of matter, object and relation. In the sense that the world is real in that very sense all three *sādhanās* are real. If a hint of "unreality" still remains then Radhakrishnan's interpretation overcomes it. Integral *sādhanā* is the means by which the individual and the cosmos realize unity with cosmic God, non-eternal but real, and, finally, with transcendental immutable Spirit.

Status of the individual.—This raises the question of the ultimate status of the individual undergoing discipline. Śaṅkara has rejected the aham-padartha "I" as Ātmā since it does not persist in all states. He takes his stand on pure identity. Neither difference nor identity-in-difference nor difference-in-identity between jīva and Īvara, jīva and Brahman can be accepted, as all relations are unintelligible. Theists insist that the "I" persists in waking, dreaming, sleeping and also in mokṣa, though there it is freed from nescience—were this not the case there would be no one to study Mokṣa-Śāstra, nor would there be any utility of scripture. They also insist on separateness of Ātman and Brahman—Madhva makes bheda dharāī-swarūpa, and others try to harmonise difference with the teaching of real unity.

All modern Vedāntins view the self as infinite power, consciousness, bliss, truth and perfection and not as passive existence-consciousness. Without departing from orthodox Advaita position Vivekanand takes a more dynamic view of the empirical individual as against the static interpretation of the jñāna-mārga. However, at liberation the unreal individuality does disappear leaving behind swarūpaikya of Ātman-Brahman. Although both Tagore and Gandhi adopt the theistic stand Tagore gives more importance to finite personality as the necessary counterpart of Divine Personality in the harmony of love-relation or mokṣa; Gandhi stresses dependence on God of real self freed from its egoity, in the life of service. But one feels that the category of identity-in-difference safeguards the reality of the individual self at the cost of unity and infinity of the Absolute.

Aurebindo accepts from Dvaita the idea of the non-temporal reality and ultimate significance of spiritual individual in jñāna: only exclusive particularity of phenomenal self is destroyed. From the conception of identity-in-difference he accepts the idea that jīvātmā is eternally dependent on the Supreme Lord as His self-differentiation i. e., not ontologically different. From Advaita he takes the idea of essential unity but not its interpretation as unqualified and undifferentiated: Advaita confuses individuality with exclusive particularity of ego, therefore, seeks to end both in identity. But Aurebindo's attempt to save individual self from annihilation in undifferentiated Brahman compromises the absoluteness of the Absolute. The contradiction

of the infinite expressing as transcendental existence, as cosmic self and as individual consciousness is overcome in infinite logic alone; to finite logic this appears as yet another type of identity-in-difference, which he has himself criticised. To assert ontological reality of individual self freed from elements of exclusive particularity brings in a hint of separateness and dualism, which is not avoided merely by calling *jīvātma* "less fundamental poise" of the Supermind. And, in another sense, the latter description only proves the identity of *jīvātma* with Supermind.

According to Radhakrishnan, through evolution man's finite personality is transformed into Divine Being by breaking of narrow individuality—but this is only a high state of perfection and not the final goal. The Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins had argued against Advaita that non-permanence of the individual does not disprove its reality. Radhakrishnan makes telling use of this same argument against the Vaiṣṇava thinkers and Aurobindo: reality of the individual self and God is quite consistent with their eventual disappearance in the Absolute and survival of individuality is not necessary to prove its reality.

Vedāntic experience is a non-dualistic experience. But attempts to impose categories of difference, identity-in-difference, difference-in-identity or multipoised unity upon the Advaita reality are inspired by fear of loss of personal identity. The theists had attacked the Advaita explanation of temporal individuality as *adhyāsa*. Radhakrishnan shows that the doctrine is valid as an explanation of the fact of egoity in man, yet the validity of Advaita experience is not marred by that doctrine since self-loss is not of real personality but only of superimposed personality. He incorporates the truth of the theistic position that there is enrichment by participation of self in Divine Being, the only personality. The true or universalised individuality is not an illusory projection of ignorance but a real expression of divine essence, presence, power. But experience and reason both point towards necessity of pure, undifferentiated consciousness and experience as acme of reality. He holds to essential Advaita position of identity—of all Neo-Vedāntins, his reconciliation of conception of cosmic reality of individual self with the doctrine of Advitīya Brahman is the most satisfactory.

Liberation.—Classical Vedānta holds the doctrine of jivana mukti, realization of ever-accomplished nature of unity of self here and now, as antithetical to videha mukti or liberation as transformation of bound soul into another condition in some other world. The explanation of the former in terms of prārabdha karma or Avidyāleśa is artificial, since Advaita does not admit any middle position between appearance and disappearance of Avidyā.

It is possible to end this debate without recourse to the doctrine of Avidyāleśa, by elaborating the implications of Māyāvāda. The meeting point of Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas is that both want to cancel the object-oriented attitude i. e., world as independently real. Requirement of the cessation of saṁsāra and egoism in mokṣa forces theists to the conclusion that it must be a post-mortem condition (videha), for they interpret the fourth state to be only different in degree but not in kind from the first three. But Advaitins correctly hold that the fourth or turiya as the ground of the first three states is different in kind. Since it is a transcendental condition they are not forced to the conclusion that destruction of the empirical condition or existential cessation is inevitable i. e., jivana mukti contains co-presence of real and unreal as explained by anirvacanīya adhyāsa. Liberation does not erase the object from the stream of consciousness but only changes the valuational meaning of it. As in bandhana jñāna remains the substratum of Māyā, so in mokṣa Māyā's appearance does not disturb transcendental reality.

The criticism that there is logical difficulty of explaining passage from change to changlessness or vice versa is not insurmountable. Far from rejecting mokṣa as dogma, the modern Vedāntins have expanded its meaning. They reject only its individualistic interpretation given by classical Vedānta and insist that in view of the inseparable connection of jīva and jagat universal salvation alone is logical.

While admitting that the logical basis of sarva-mukti remains unestablished in orthodox Advaita, Vivekanand takes a positive view of this doctrine and not the negative view of it in which it is treated as an āpatti to be avoided. However, he nowhere states the doctrine of redemption of world as a whole but understands it to mean welfare of all—a socio-moral-humanistic conception.

Gandhi holds mokṣa to be the end of life but also holds the idea of unattainability of the end of perfection. Universal salvation overcomes this seeming inconsistency. From the metaphysics of Advaita Brahman he passes to unity of humanity, and, thence to the conception of simultaneous spiritualisation of humanity, but fails to work out the logical ground of the doctrine of sarva-mukti. Furthermore, he has no metaphysical doctrine of world evolution i. e., nature is not becoming perfected but there is only historical development of non-violence. He does not envisage either the liberation or perfection of society or world in the absolute reality. His conception is also socio-moral.

A close examination reveals that the jīvana mukta of Tagore is not the jñānī of Advaita but a highly spiritual soul who has attained the presence of God. Nor does he develop the idea of sarva-mukti to the extent of postulating the spiritual perfection of world. Though he has a more generalised theory of world evolution than Gandhi, it is only an extension of the scientific theory of inorganic and organic principles as well as sociological theory of the progress of humanity. There is no metaphysical doctrine of sarva-mukti.

Aurobindo rejects the conceptions of both Advaita and Vaiṣṇava Vedāntas on the ground that they lead to escape from self and world into some higher plane and detachment from body, life, mind and world. Jīvana mukti means divinisation of all these elements, and such an integral yoga is a prelude to cosmic yoga. The completed process of the latter means descent of Supermind into individual, group and spreading of it to divinise humanity and world and its further evolution at a new level of spiritualised being eternally. His doctrine of integral salvation has no similarity with modern doctrines of cosmic evolution or higher destiny of man, as it also has no relation with the limited ideas of jīvana and videha muktis. There is no objection to his conclusion, but it is lacking in a sufficient metaphysical base. His insistence on ultimacy of individual soul and world seems to contradict the monistic nature of reality.

Radhakrishnan's attempt to reconcile the theistic and absolutistic conceptions of mokṣa takes the form of postulating two stages of development. He agrees with Aurobindo that the first stage of jīvana mukti or attainment of universalised

consciousness is not a condition of absolute identity or severance of connection with life, world or action. The liberated self works for liberation of other souls and world. At the end there is union of transformed and perfected universe of souls and matter with divine creator and withdrawal of both into the Absolute. The earlier provisional and partial stage is now completed in cosmic salvation. In his conception of sarva-mukti Radhakrishnan goes back to the general Vedāntic position of ending of karma and rebirth, cessation of world and the specific Advaitic conception of eternal oneness of Saccidānand reality.

The charge against the classical conception of individual salvation is that it is a condition of magnified egoism. It may be pointed out that Advaita, at least, thinks of salvation in terms of attainment of the one universal Ātman of all, whereas the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins insist on distinct and separate liberation of each self. Personal survival is not the indispensable outcome or objective of individual progress, nor need it be the essential condition of salvation of humanity and cosmos. The conception of jīvana mukti in classical Advaita and its development in Neo-Vedānta is a sufficient explanation of cosmic salvation. There is more reason for Aurobindo and the theistic Neo-Vedāntins to give up insistence on ultimacy of separate individuality in mokṣa since it is connected with the idea of jīva-mukti, which all have rejected.¹ Reality of one Ātman rather than the separate reality of infinite selves is more consistent with the Neo-Vedāntic stand. Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan are right in taking a metaphysical view of cosmic salvation as against the merely scientific and sociological view of the other Neo-Vedāntins, which rests on the notion of eternal perfectibility but non-perfection of cosmos. The contradiction is only apparent here. For there is no antithesis between spiritualisation or perfection which is a timeless conception and progress-development which is perfectibility within the time-order and limits of history. The latter is completed in the former. Thus, Radhakrishnan and Aurobindo supplement the Vaiṣṇava conception at a vital point (a "real world" forever unredeemed is not logical), yet they differ on the question of ending of karma, punarjama and saṁsāra in connection with the

1. Aurobindo's explanation of individual yoga as a prelude to cosmic yoga does not altogether overcome the implication of jīva-mukti.

final goal of sarva-mukti.

To prove the metaphysical reality of world and self it is not necessary to insist on their ontological continuance as separate entities. Aurobindo's notion of the eternal progress of divinised individual or cosmos at the level of knowledge means that perfection or salvation is not yet complete. The idea of ending of individual and world does not amount to the destruction of the real essence of either. Radhakrishnan's thesis of final liberation of both preserves their reality. And, truth of Advitiya Brahman is logically preserved only by accepting the stand of identity. When the alien qualities are removed from the universe it is non-different from reality.

Classical Vedāntins reject the conception of sarva-mukti as inconsistent with their postulation of anādi-ananta saṁsāra. Even Advaitins with their doctrine of absolute unity as the ground of multiplicity do not admit collective liberation. In different theories of the relation of jīva, Īśvara and Brahman the one conclusion sought to be avoided by Advaitins is sarva-mukti. Admittedly, there is siddhānta-bheda among Śāṅkaras on this point, but, inspite of the objections against interpretation of the classical doctrine of jīvana mukti in the manner of Radhakrishnan and the difficulty of demonstrating its connection with sarva-mukti in classical Advaita darśana, there is no metaphysical or logical bar to the incorporation of this doctrine. All the Neo-Vedāntins rightly argue that ānand is impossible as long as one soul is unredeemed. The conclusion is that Brahmaṇand being non-dual reality is either revealed wholly or not revealed, but it cannot be partly revealed i. e., as long as some jīvas have not realized their Saccidanand-svarūpa so long Ātman cannot be fully revealed. Thus sarva-mukti is the ultimate goal of spiritual striving in Advaita darśana.

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